(European) Allies

WORKING WITH OUR (EUROPEAN) ALLIES PAUL GEWIRTZ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY between the current China policies of the U.S. and Europe, Europeans are extremely distrustful U.S. foreign policy experts broadly agree that of the United States after four years of the Trump the U.S. would have much greater leverage in administration. addressing China by “working with our allies” rather than acting unilaterally as the Trump Administration For a new U.S. administration, developing a more has so often done. For a new administration to act collaborative policy regarding China with Europe on this important idea, however, it must identify must fit within a broader and intensive diplomatic priority policy areas and concrete issues where restoration of trust with our European allies and the effective collaboration is plausible and must also EU. Building back Europe’s trust will take time and develop a diplomatic strategy to achieve that result. skilled diplomacy, and even new understandings This essay identifies five promising priority areas of what “American leadership” means. But the for trans-Atlantic collaboration regarding China: (1) gains for the U.S. will be great if policymakers economic issues, (2) technology issues, (3) human can develop strong trans-Atlantic collaboration on rights, (4) re-invigorating the international system, global challenges — and in no area is this more and (5) climate change.1 important than policies toward a powerful China. But working with our (European) allies to develop common and coordinated policies toward China THE PROBLEM will not be an easy effort. Although the trend within Virtually all foreign policy experts outside of the Europe is clearly toward a significantly tougher Trump administration agree that it has been a major approach to China, our perceived interests and mistake for the United States to act unilaterally on current policies diverge in important respects, most foreign policy matters over the last four years and Europe’s basic approach to China is more and that we should be working with our allies — multifaceted and nuanced than the current including on China policy. And rightly so. The U.S. U.S. approach. On the economic front, Europe will be much stronger and have greater leverage has greater economic dependence on China in addressing China if it develops and executes than the U.S., even as it is increasingly pushing policies in coordination with allies and friends. back against China’s unfair economic policies; moreover, Europe and the U.S. Europe are tough But what common policies are possible to develop economic competitors themselves. Europe also and carry forward? This requires both understanding does not share the superpower focus of the United where the interests of countries converge and States on geopolitics and intense national security diverge even when they are “allies” and also what concerns in the Asia-Pacific. Although increasingly diplomatic strategies by the U.S. are needed to vocal in criticizing China’s human rights abuses, overcome the serious ruptures that have occurred Europe’s willingness to take concrete actions to with our allies during the Trump administration. This impose costs on China for those abuses remains paper addresses these questions in the context of unclear. In addition, Europe has embraced close our European allies. cooperation with China in areas such as climate change alongside their tougher stance in other The election of Joe Biden as U.S. President creates areas, while the U.S. has currently abandoned most major new opportunities. Both EU and European cooperation with China. Added to these differences national leaders warmly welcomed the election outcome and the prospect of a broadly revitalized 1 WORKING WITH OUR (EUROPEAN) ALLIES trans-Atlantic partnership, with some explicitly Many observers have correctly underscored including cooperative efforts regarding China. Josep the “systemic rival” concept as an importantly Borrell, High Representative of the EU, stated on new and much tougher way in which the EU November 9, “We are ready . for close cooperation describes China. The EU has indeed increasingly [with the incoming Biden administration] on China underscored challenges to democracies arising and the challenges it poses in terms of unfair trade from authoritarian systems — including China’s practices, security and other issues where we both “influence” and “disinformation” activities, as have concerns.”2 well as the even more direct intrusions by Russia. But too many observers have ignored the other But a central problem in developing a collaborative concepts that the EU embraces in the very same approach with the Europeans is that U.S. and sentence: “cooperation partner,” “negotiating European interests related to China hardly partner,” and “economic competitor.” EU Council converge across the board. Indeed, there are President Ursula von der Leyen has confirmed that significant differences among different European this multifaceted strategy remains the EU approach, countries, which China has been exploiting — for and she concluded her prepared remarks after the example, by separately engaging countries in June Summit with the statement, “It is not possible Central and Eastern Europe (usually labelled the to shape the world of tomorrow without a strong EU- “17+1”). Nor have European policymakers followed China partnership.”5 At their press conference at the U.S. in starkly shifting their approach away the close of the September Summit, EU Commission from engagement with China. Debates about China President Charles Michel, EU Council President von policy are now vigorous in Europe, and the trend is der Leyen, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel clearly toward a significantly tougher approach to continued the tougher trend in Europe’s approach, China. Nevertheless, substantial diverging interests but they also continued to characterize China with a exist between Europe and the U.S. and will almost verbal mixture of “cooperation” and “competition,” certainly remain, and working with Europe on a joint “partner” and “rival.”6 President Michel’s phrase China policy will have to deal directly with that reality. “balanced relationship” succinctly summarized the EU’s current approach to China designed to Summits between the EU and China in June and “promote our values and defend our interests.”7 September revealed both the potential and the 3 challenges of trans-Atlantic collaboration on China. Thus, working with Europe on a joint China policy Europe’s position toward China continues to toughen will have to confront directly these realities: — especially because of China’s unfair economic practices, human rights abuses, COVID-19 actions, • Economic issues are clearly the top interest and “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy — but very substantially for Europe. Europe is far more dependent on differs from the policies of the United States under trade and investment with China than the the Trump administration. The most important United States. China is the EU’s second largest comprehensive statement of EU policy toward China trading partner, and the EU is China’s biggest is the March 2019 EU Commission document titled trading partner. EU leaders have repeatedly “EU-China: A strategic outlook.”4 It clearly signaled expressed impatience with the progress of a sharper EU approach to China; but it describes the the EU’s multi-year negotiations with China EU-China relationship in a multifaceted way: on a comprehensive investment agreement to achieve more reciprocity and fairness, and “China is, simultaneously, in different policy a new U.S. president will find Europe much areas, a cooperation partner with whom the unhappier with China if no economic deal is EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating reached by the announced goal of December partner with whom the EU needs to find a 31. But Europe sees maintaining good economic balance of interests, an economic competitor relations with both the United States and China in the pursuit of technological leadership, and as core to its interests, certainly not wanting a systemic rival promoting alternative models to choose between them. (Technology-related of governance. This requires a flexible and issues such as 5G and Huawei raise distinct pragmatic whole-of-EU approach enabling a issues.) Furthermore, the U.S. and the EU are principled defense of interests and values.” themselves tough economic competitors, with 2 WORKING WITH OUR (EUROPEAN) ALLIES major complaints, lawsuits, penalties, and • After four years of the Trump administration, tariffs coming from both sides, very much European allies and Europeans more generally including the high-tech space. are extremely distrustful of the United States. President Trump has frequently expressed • Europe does not share the superpower focus annoyance or even hostility towards Europe, on geopolitics and intense national security and Washington is perceived as unreliable and concerns related to the Asia-Pacific. Europe sees unpredictable. A new U.S. administration should its interests in Asia overwhelmingly in economic prioritize efforts to restore the lost trust among terms. Europe’s most important countries have Europeans. But that will not be easy to do and long maintained a special relationship with the will take time, skilled diplomacy, and a type of United States and a sense of shared values, but American leadership that includes listening, they do not want to be embroiled in a U.S.-China negotiating, and even compromising with our great power rivalry. Some European

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