Chapter IV

Impact of the Europeans in Bijapur Sultanate 1510-1686

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to come into contact with the

Bijapur Sultanate during the first decade of sixteenth century, later on the English and the Dutch entered into this relationship in the first half of the seventeenth century and the French was permitted to establish their factory at pondichery in 1674.

This chapter discusses the impact of the European trade on the economy of the Bijapur Sultanate. The relations between the Sultan and the different European powers, the reason for permission granted to establish factories, and the problems faced by the Europeans as a result of the policies of the Sultans is studied here. An attempt has been made to understand the place of trade and commerce in the official policies of the sultanate.

1. Relations with the Portuguese (1510-1686)

The Portuguese were the first European nation to establish overseas commercial intercourse with India during the medieval period of Indian History. The entry of the Portuguese had affected the patterns of trade in Asia as a whole. The centre of Portuguese power was Goa, which they captured from Adil Shahi Sultanate in 1510. Various key events related to the relations of Adil Shahi Sultanate with the

Portuguese are discussed here.

A new phase in Luso-Indian relation began from 1508 with the dispatch of

Francisco de Almeida with the title of Viceroy and authorization by the king of

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Portugal to consolidate Portuguese commerce with the east on imperial lines. 300

Almeida was instructed to conclude alliances with the Indian rulers and to interrupt

Muslim spice trade by establishing control of the Red Sea. By a system of licenses,

i.e. cartaz301, an attempt was made to control all Asian trading ships. The system

resulted in considerable rivalry, especially after the Portuguese managed to capture

Socotra off the Red Sea.302

1.1 Bigining of Bijapur – Portuguese Relations

The first result of the new political and mercantile equations in Asian waters

was an attempt by the rulers303 of Egypt, Gujarat, Ahmednagar, Bijapur [Adil Shahi

Sultanate] and Calicut to take concerted action against the Portuguese. A joint naval action was taken, and a naval battle was fought off the coast of Chaul in 1508. Bijapur joined the allies in fear of the loss of its trade, revenue and monopoly over the seas.

The Portuguese retaliated and gave a crushing defeat to the allies on 2nd February

1508, off Diu.304 This assured the Portuguese the sea power in the Indian Ocean.

In December 1508, on his way to Diu, Almeida took “revenge at Dabhol (an

Adil Shahi port) for the assistance which had been given there to the Egyptian fleet.

The Bijapuri were driven out and the Portuguese occupied the harbor on 30th

December 1508. Next day the victors set the buildings of the town on fire and

returned to their ships. The Bijapuri did not retaliate.”305

300 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 213 301 It was a passport or license issued by the Portuguese as a permit for shipping by Indian rulers or their subjects. 302 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 213. 303 Rulers, i.e. King or Sultans of the respective Kingdom or Sultanate. 304 M. Longworth Dames: “The Portuguese and Turks in the Indian Ocean in the Sixteenth Century”, Journal of The Royal Asiatic Society (JRAS), January 1921, p. 5. 305 Barbosa, op. cit., vol. I, p.166.

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1.2 Bijapuri port of Goa captured by Portuguese

In 1509, Afonso de Albuquerque was appointed as Viceroy of Portugal’s

settlement in India. Albuquerque was a much more aggressive and dynamic Viceroy,

who was intent on establishing Portuguese power both on land and at sea. This policy

necessitated a metropolis and Albuquerque chose Goa, which by its island position

half-way down the coast of India, best fulfilled the strategic requirements of the

capital of a maritime empire.306 Albuquerque, having collected a fleet, started for the

proposed conquest of Goa. He found that the army of Bijapur was absent on an

expedition and he captured Goa with little effort, on 3rd March 1510.307 Soon Yusuf

Adil Khan returned with a large army. Before attacking Goa he made overtures to

Albuquerque for a peaceful settlement. He also sent Mustafa Khan and endeavoured to arrive at a settlement with the surrender with Cintcora with its islands and revenue to the Portuguese instead of Goa. But when Albuquerque declined the offer, Mustafa

Khan suggested that Goa itself would be surrendered, if Albuquerque handed over

Timoja to the Bijapuris. This proposition was also rejected by Albuquerque. Ferishta describes the events, “In the year A.H. 915 (A.D. 1510), the Christians surprised the town of Goa, and put to death the governor, with many Mussulmans. On receiving intelligence of this event Yoosoof Adil Shah marched with three thousand chosen men, composed of Deccanies and foreigners, with such expedition, that he surprised the Europeans, retook the fort, & put many to death though some made their escape to sea in their ships.”308 Albuquerque was forced to retired to Cochin, after the defeat.

However, the Portuguese attacked the port again in the following year. The death of

Yusuf ‘Adil Shah in October, 1510, facilitated Albuquerque’s work. When nearly all

306 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 214. 307 M.A., Nayeem, The Heritage of the Adil Shahis of Bijapur, Hyderabad Publishers, Hyderabad, 2008, p. 61. 308 Firishta, John Briggs translation, op. cit., Vol III, p. 17.

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men of garrison at Goa had gone to Bijapur to attend the coronation ceremony of

Isma‘il, the new Adil Shahi ruler, the Portuguese reappeared before Goa, stormed the

harbour and occupied it on 25th November 1510.309

Subsequently, Isma’il Adil Khan received a personal letter from

Albuquerque. ‘Albuquerque wrote to Adil Khan professing peace and friendship. For

Albuquerque that peace and friendship with Bijapur meant the foundation of the

Portuguese power on the Indian soil and for that he was prepared to do anything in his

power’.310

Under the circumstances, the regent Kamal Khan considered it wise and

expedient to accept Albuquerque’s offer of peace and friendship at the cost of Goa. It

was finally agreed that the Europeans should retain Goa, on condition their not

molesting the towns and districts on the sea coast. According to Ferishta, “since that

time the Portuguese have kept possession of Goa, & observing the treaty; have not

made any farther encroachments on the Adil Shahy territory.”311 In return for giving

up Goa, the Adil Shahis received an assurance from the Portuguese that the horse

trade would continue as before.312 Hence to continue trade in horse to fulfil the need

of Adil Shahi cavalry they accepted the peace proposal at the cost of Goa.

The treaty seems to have been a method of gaining time in order to try and

recapture Goa. Thus, when Albuquerque left Goa for Malacca, Kamal Khan

dispatched a force under Faulad Khan to drive out Malhar Rao, who was carrying on

the administration of the mainland district on behalf of the Portuguese. 313 Faulad

Khan defeated the forces of Malhar Rao and then invaded the island of Goa and

309 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 215. 310 M.A., Nayeem, The Heritage of the Adil Shahis of Bijapur, op. cit., p. 61. 311 Firishta, John Briggs translation, op. cit., Vol III, p. 19. 312 D.C. Verma, History of Bijapur, op. cit., pp.56. 313 F. C., Danvers, ‘The Portuguese in India’, London, 1894, Vol. I, p. 242.

165 established himself in the Banestarim. The Portuguese captain Rodringo Rebello who marched out against the Bijapur’s forces was defeated. Faulad Khan gained possession of the mainland territories of Goa.314

In the meanwhile news reached about the departure of a great fleet from

Suez to help Bijapur against the Portuguese. Albuquerque, who had returned to India, now once again launched an attack on Goa. In September 1512, he attacked

Banestarim. Instead of driving out Rasul Khan be blockaded the passage and cut off his retreat and finally made entry into Goa. Rasul Khan was forced to sue for peace.

The terms which Albuquerque demanded were that fort to be surrendered with all its artillery, ammunition and horses and that the deserters in Rasul Khan’s camp to be given to him. Rasul Khan consented only on condition that the lives of the deserters should be spared. Banestarim was evacuated and it was re-occupied by the

Portuguese.315

The recapture of Banestarim was followed by further attempts to expand the

Portuguese power. In May 1513, the port of Dabhol was blockaded. The commander of the fleet off the port, Garcia de Sousa, was ordered not to permit any ships to go into or out of the port. For Bijapur this created a serious problem. Bijapur now had no other alternative but to sue for peace. Kamal Khan sent an envoy to Goa to propose peace. Albuquerque professed friendship and peaceful relation to Bijapuri envoy, but demanded certain rare articles and deputed his own envoy to Bijapur to fetch them.

On the request of Bijapur envoy, Albuquerque ordered his men to open the naval blockade of Dabhol, pending negotiations to the treaty. It was a gesture to establish friendly relations. Ambassadors were then exchanged between Bijapur and Goa.

314 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 217. 315 Ibid, p.217.

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Diogo Fernandez was the Portuguese ambassador, and he accompanied the Bijapuri envoy to Bijapur. The former was accompanied with over two dozen persons.316

Early in 1516 Bijapur and Goa clashed due to some petty quarrel between one Monroy and Ankush Khan, the Bijapuri General of Ponda. The Bijapuri besieged

Goa. But with the arrival of reinforcements, the Bijapuris raised the siege and a formal treaty of peace was concluded. However, relations between the two continued to be strained. Thus, contrary to the treaty with Bijapur, the Portuguese assisted

Krishna Devaraya of Vijaynagar in the latter’s conflict with Bijapur. Further taking advantage of the defeat of the Bijapuri forces, Ruy De Mello, who was commanding at Goa, occupied a part of the mainland opposite Goa.317

In 1535 when Ismail Adil Shah was busy in a war with Golconda, Nuno da

Cunha occupied the Bijapuri territory of the mainland opposite Goa, for the protection of which a fort was also erected at Rachol by the Portuguese, but not without opposition of Bijapuris. Sulaiman Agha tried in vain to prevent its construction. Asad

Khan was very much pressed by Adil Shah to declare war against the Portuguese and demand demolishing the fort of Rachol. Asad Khan sent the captain, Sulaiman Agha, with a large army. In February 1536. Dom Joaso Pereira opposed the Bijapuris with a large army. In a battle the Portuguese emerged victories and the Bijapuris retreated.318

316 Ibid, p. 218. 317 M.A., Nayeem, The Heritage of the Adil Shahis of Bijapur, op. cit., p. 62. 318 Ibid, p. 62.

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1.3 Peace Treaty of 1546

Adil Shah, finding that the Portuguese governor was not to be conciliated by

costly presents, agreed for peace. On 26th February 1546 a treaty was concluded319

reaffirming friendly relations .The treaty was totally in favour of the Portuguese. It

did not provide any condition for the release of ‘Abdullah, Ibrahim Adil Shah’s

brother, who was imprisoned at Goa. On the contrary, the Portuguese got more

territory. They got as gift the territories of Salsette and Bardes and held the question

of ‘Abdullah in suspense, till the envoy of Adil Shah returned from Portugal with

necessary orders. The question of ‘Abdullah was left on the decision of the king of

Portugal in order to gain time to occupy the territories.320

1.4 Anti-Bijapur Alliances of Portuguese with Ahmednagar and Vijaynagar (1547) The Portuguese also took steps to safeguard their possessions. In 1547, the

Portuguese concluded separate treaties with Ahmednagar and Vijayanagar, thus

preventing a possible alliance between the three powers. The strategy maintained

balance of power and forced ‘Adil Shah to be at peace and friendly with the

Portuguese. Any hostility with the Portuguese meant the opening of hostilities on two

other fronts, with Ahmednagar and Vijaynagar; and Bijapur could not fight at three

fronts simultaneously with three powerful adversaries. In the treaty, a provision was

made to check Bijapur’s military power.321

During the governorship of Garcia De Sa (September 1554 to June 1555) he adopted a conciliatory policy towards Bijapur. Adil Shah sent his envoy, Mutabar

Khan to Goa. Garcia concluded a ‘Contract’ with Adil Shah on 22nd August 1548.

319 F. C., Danvers, ‘The Portuguese in India’, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 475. 320 M.A., Nayeem, The Heritage of the Adil Shahis of Bijapur, op. cit., p. 62. 321 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, 1489-1686, op. cit., p. 222.

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Adil Shah agreed to release the Portuguese captives in Bijapur, renewed the declaration that the territories of Salsette and Bardes were to be property of the king of Portugal forever and he promised to help the Portuguese in the event of any naval attack on them by the Turkish fleet.322

1.5 Abdullah Proclaimed Sultan of Bijapur by the Portuguese

The question of Abdullah was still unsettled and there were persons interested in his succession to the throne of Bijapur. Some of the nobles made terms with the Portuguese Viceroy for the installation of ‘Abdullah as a Sultan of Bijapur.

In return for Portuguese help they offered to make over to the crown of Portugal all the lands of the Konkan, yielding revenue of about a million rupees a year. The viceroy attracted by the large accession of wealth assented to the proposal. 323

Abdullah was proclaimed Sultan of Bijapur and was accompanied by three thousand Portuguese soldiers and two hundred horses, besides a body of Bijapur supporters, to establish him on the throne. After a slight resistance Ponda was taken.

Here Abdullah set up his government. The Portuguese detained the wife and children of Abdullah at Goa as hostage, to extract more benefits. The new governor Franciso

Baretto went to Ponda to assist the installation of Abdullah as Sultan of Bijapur. He also appointed the officers for the collection of the revenues around Ponda, leaving

Dom Fernando de Monroyo in that fort, and sent de Noronha to receive the revenues of the Konkan. Salim Agha, who was collecting revenue on behalf of Adil Shah, opposed Noronha with a force. In a sharp fight the Bijapuris were completely routed.

322 F. C., Danvers, ‘The Portuguese in India’, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 485. 323 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 223.

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Further up the river the Portuguese encountered another force commanded by Agha himself. Here again the Portuguese emerged victorious.324

Adil Shah with the assistance of Vijaynagar dethroned Abdullah and made him prisoner. He next sent a force to recover the lost territories. The Viceroy ordered

Noronha to withdraw and similar orders were sent to de Monroyo, who was at

Ponda.325

At this time, some of the rulers of south India came together to try and check the Portuguese power. A secret league between Adil Shah, Murtada Nizam Shah I,

Zamorin of Calicut and the ruler of Achin was formed. They raised powerful armies and were so much confident of their success that they even agreed to the division of the Portuguese territories after its conquest. Adil Shah’s share was Goa, Onor and

Barcelor. Adil Shah even assigned offices at Goa for his chief men.

When in November-December 1570 Adil Shah marched to besiege Goa other members of the league too made simultaneous attacks. The Bijapuris commenced attack on Goa by a bombardment of the port of Goa and works of

Banestarim, which suffered severely. The Portuguese, while defending Goa, sent de

Vasconcellos to Dabhol, to destroy the port. The Viceroy used every possible means of securing intelligence from the Bijapuri camp. He bribed some of the renegade

Portuguese in the Bijapuri camp. He succeeded in obtaining information regarding secret designs and intentions. When Bijapur’s strategy leaked out, Adil Shah found it impossible to continue war .He again made proposals for peace; but the siege was continued. With the reinforcement in the Portuguese army, Bijapuris retreated.326

324 F. C., Danvers, ‘The Portuguese in India’, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 504. 325 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 224. 326 Ibid, pp. 224-225.

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The proposed terms of the treaty of peace having failed, the siege of Goa

continued but could make little advance. Adil Shah in order to divide and weaken the

Portuguese camp again persuaded the Rani of Gersoppa to attack Onor. She did oblige

Adil Shah by collecting a large army and besieging the fort. With the reinforcement

coming from Goa, the besiegers were put to flight. In retaliation, the Viceroy

endeavoured to create a diversion in his favour by secretly stirring up other

neighbouring rulers to invade Bijapur and by that means he thought of compelling

Adil Shah to raise the siege. Nothing appears to have come out of this project. Both

the Viceroy and Adil Shah were equally anxious for peace, but neither desired that the

other should be aware of it. To all outward appearances, the siege and defences were

carried on as before without any spirit or vigour. The siege prolonged for ten months

and finally the Bijapuris retreated without effecting any treaty or settlement.327

1.6 Implications of the Treaties of 1571, 1575 and 1576

On 6th September, 1571 when Dom Antonio de Norhana arrived at Goa as

new Viceroy, the Bijapuris were pressing the siege of Goa. On his arrival, Adil Shah

raised the siege and returned to Bijapur, leaving behind the commissioners to make a

peaceful settlement. A treaty was concluded on 13th December, 1571, by this treaty

Adil Shah agreed to the Portuguese possession of the territories of Salsette and

Bardes. The treaty provided terms and conditions of several items of mutual interest for the better regulation of the commercial and economic relations. The Portuguese owing to their maritime supremacy reserved the right to control the shipping of

Bijapur. The Viceroy granted to Adil Shah the privilege of taking twenty five foreign horses annually, which were imported at Goa. The Viceroy granted six passes in

addition to previous passes for the navigation of Bijapur’s ships sailing to Arabia and

327 F. C., Danvers, ‘The Portuguese in India’, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 552.

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Persian Gulf. The Bijapuri ships importing horses from Ormuz were to pay duty to the

Portuguese.328

The treaty was one sided one. The Portuguese commanding the Indian seas,

directed terms to Adil Shah, the latter, being weak at the seas, was compelled to

accept.

In accordance with the provisions of the treaty of 13th December, 1571, an

Adil Shahi ambassador visited Lisbon and met the king of Portugal. On his return from Lisbon, the ambassador Zahir Beg entered into a treaty with the Portuguese on

22nd October 1576. Under instruction from the king of Portugal the terms of treaty

were approved by both the parties. The terms of the treaty were more favourable to

Bijapur as it made some concessions to Bijapur and facilitated normal trade

relations.329

‘This treaty promised Ali Adil Shi I freedom to purchase horses at Ormuz

and to land them at Goa, for being transported to Bijapur, paying the usual customs

due of 40 pagodas per horse. It also conceded Ali’s demand that lead, copper, sulphur

and saltpetre for Adil Shahi use should be permitted to pass through the port of

Goa’. 330 The important feature of this treaty was that Bijapuris were expected to

provide military assistance to the Portuguese, whenever the latter needed it. This

treaty was more in the nature of a military alliance; though it had the provisions of

mutual commercial benefits. The previous treaty introduced the right of the

Portuguese to investigate any action of Adil Shah against his enemies but friends of

328 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 226. 329 Ibid, p. 226. 330 H.K., Sherwani, and P.M.Joshi (ed.), History of Medieval Deccan, op. cit., Vol.I, p. 334.

172 the Portuguese, while this treaty required the Adil Shah to defend the Portuguese possessions and provide military assistance, both by men and material.331

In 1581, King Philip II of Spain also became king of Portugal, under the title of Philip I. The Portuguese possessions in India came under the suzerainty of the King of Spain.332 On 29th January 1582, a treaty was concluded by which all the previous treaties were renewed and affirmed. 333 However, the Portuguese continued to be slightly suspicious of the Adil Shah, especially in view of the expansion of Adil Shahi territory in the Kanara coast.334

1.7 Triple Alliance of Adil Shah, Portuguese and Nizam Shah

In 1595 Maties de Albuquerque sent an embassy to Bijapur with the intention of forming a triple alliance between Adil Shah, Malik Ambar of

Ahmednagar and himself in order to counter the Mughals.335 Approving this proposal of Albuquerque, King Philip II of Spain wrote to the new Viceroy, Dom Francisco de

Gama, on 25th February, 1596 to continue to adopt the policy of Albuquerque and to help in achieving the goal by way of persuading the rulers of the Deccan, one after another, to form an alliance.336

King Philip II of Spain wished to maintain cordial relations with Bijapur as is evident from his letter to the Viceroy, dated 21st November 1598 from Lisbon. The king wrote –“I approve of your interest in keeping the king of Bijapur on good terms- although he ordered no visit to be paid to you until now, as is customary. Treat him always; remembering how necessary is the alliance with the neighbouring kings to

331 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 226. 332 F. C., Danvers, ‘The Portuguese in India’, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 25. 333 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 227. 334 Ibid, p. 228. 335 Ibid. 336 Ibid.

173 defend us all against the Mughal (Emperor). Obviously the king of Spain wished to preserve the independence of the two barrier states – Bijapur and Ahmednagar in order to prevent the direct onslaught of the Mughal imperialism on the Portuguese possessions on the west coast of India. This evident from another letter of the King

Philip II of Spain to the Viceroy, Ayres de Saldanha, dated 25th January, 1601. King

Philip wrote: “-since that king (Akbar) is very powerful and suspicious and desirous of approaching to that island of Goa, I recommend you to keep your eyes open on his designs and intentions to prevent them with the necessary remedies”.337

During the siege of Bijapur by the Mughal commander Asaf Khan in 1631, the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa, Conde de Linhares, helped Adil Shah secretly with bombardiers, power and munitions. Linhares was tempted by greedy offers of the

Mughals and he soon changed his allegiance and thus wrote to the king of Portugal on

16 November 1636 that –“I was obliged to help him (Mughal General) to gain the kingdom of Adil Shah and that they would give me as my share almost all the low land (Konkan) of these surroundings.”338 The Portuguese adopted dual and flexible policy to suit their own purpose and the exigencies of the time. They failed to keep up their treaties with Bijapur. They even deviated from their own proposals. The

Viceroy, on the basis of the resolution passed by the Portuguese Council of State on

3rd April 1632, offered all help and favour to Adil Shah against the Mughals. This offer was made by virtue of command of the King of Portugal. It was decided that “in case the Mughals pressed Adil Shah too much, when his Excellency (Viceroy) would arrange to come to his help in order that the Mughals should not prevail in destroying

337 Ibid, p. 228-29. 338 Panduranga Pissurlekar, ‘The attitude of the Portuguese towards Shivaji during the campaign of Shaista Khan and Jai Sinngh’, I.H. R. C., IX, December 1926.

174 him and taking from him his kingdom.”339 And the Viceroy expressed his pressing anxiety in a report to the king of Spain that “should Adil Shah lose his kingdom to the

Mughals, the Portuguese territories would be placed in a position of greater danger of the direct onslaught of the mighty Mughals.”340

Early in 1636 the Portuguese attacked an outgoing ship from the Bijapuri port of Dabhol on her way to Persia and Mecca and “shamefully murdered the

Moors.” The Viceroy had tried to excuse this attack and the massacre of the people by sending an envoy and some presents to Adil Shah. In retaliation, the Bijapuris attacked a Portuguese ship coming from Muscat to Rajapur. The goods amounting to about 6000 ducats were confiscated and the Portuguese were imprisoned. This action of the Portuguese was due to the violation of the terms of the treaty by the

Bijapuris.341

Early in the year1654 Muhammad Adil Shah sent Malik Yakut as ambassador to Goa to settle the old dispute about the territories of Bardez and

Salsette. Malik Yakut carried a farman of Adil Shah in the name of the Portuguese

Viceroy asking the latter to allow the Jesuits Father of the College of St. Paul, to reside at his Court at Bijapur. The Viceroy De Castro did not object to this proposal.

When Yakut returned to Bijapur, a Jesuit Father Antonio Betelho accompanied him.

The Father brought a present for Adil Shah on behalf of Viceroy and informed Adil

Shah of the favourable disposition of de Castro towards Bijapur. The Jesuit Father carried a letter of de Castro for Adil Shah, Yaqut induced Adil Shah to favour the

339 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 230. 340 F. C., Danvers, ‘The Portuguese in India’, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 250, 252. 341 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 230.

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Portuguese and he obtained from him two farman, which were favourable to the

Portuguese.342

Dom de Castro, on receiving the farman of Adil Shah, called the Council of

State and informed the councillors of its contents. They decided to send a gift as a

sign of their gratitude for the issuance of the two Farman’s. Fr. Martins was sent to

Bijapur in April 1654 but not as on official envoy with some secret message. Fr.

Martins was given two documents by de Castro. One was the credential letter

declaring him as the envoy of the governor to treat with the Adil Shah about the

business and settlement of the Jesuit Mission Bijapur Court. The other document

contained the secret instruction suggested by the Portuguese Council of State. The

letter of the Viceroy to Adil Shah contained the Council of States’ decision, which

expressed indebtedness to Adil Shah and professed cordiality and friendship.343

Embassies were exchanged between Goa and Bijapur and from December

1654, trade was resumed between Bijapur and Goa. To strengthen the bond of friendship, Muhammad Adil Shah and de Castro entered into a new treaty. On 7th

March 1655, the treaty was signed by the Bijapuri envoys, the governor, and other

eminent persons. The Council of State decided upon ratifying the former treaties of

peace with Bijapur viz., the treaty of 3rd April 1633, that of 1576 and that of 29th

January1582. Malik Yaqut and Fr. Martins accepted the decision of the Council.344

After the treaty the envoys returned to Bijapur and Muhammad Adil Shah ratified the

342 H. Heras, ‘Some unknown dealings between Bijapur and Goa’ I. H.R.C., VIII, November, 1925, 131 ff. 343 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 231. 344 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 231-32.

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treaty in May 1655. When this news reached Goa, de Castro sent another gift to Adil

Shah.345

After the death of Muhammad Adil Shah in November, 1656, the Bijapuris

were busy dealing with the Mughals and therefore had no opportunity to renew

hostilities with the Portuguese. Hence from 1656 to 1686, nothing special happened to

disturb the peaceful relations between the Portuguese and Bijapur.

Commercial rather than political factors determined the Bijapur-Portuguese

relations. The Portuguese sovereignty of the seas compelled Bijapur always to adopt

conciliatory policy even at the cost of territorial losses. Import of Persian, Arabian

and Iraqi horses and foreign emigrants were the main causes which made Bijapur to

yield and adopt a weak policy towards the Portuguese. These factors dictated Bijapur

to put an end to the hostilities abruptly in peaceful settlements. The cartaz system also

governed the Bijapur-Portuguese relations over the seas.

1.8 Portuguese Sovereignty of the Sea-‘The Cartaz System’

The Portuguese policy in the Indian Ocean aimed at a monopoly of Eastern trade with Europe by exercising a command over the sea-routes. King Emmanuel of

Portugal offered his merchants the privilege of trading with India in their own ships, provided they paid a fourth of the profits to the King’s treasury and undertook not to deal in spices which were a Crown monopoly. 346 The Portuguese achieved their objective with the help of their powerful navy. Their victory over the combined fleet of Bijapur, Ahmednagar, Gujarat, Egypt, and others established their supremacy over the seas. They claimed the sovereignty of the sea and compelled all powers to seek their permission to sail on the seas, and cartazes had to be purchased by every trading

345 Ibid. p.232. 346 F. C., Danvers, ‘The Portuguese in India’, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 254.

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vessel. Even vessels of the Indian sovereigns were not exempted from this

acknowledgement of Portuguese naval supremacy.

The system of licensing the ships of all trade was started by Almeida, and

was perfected by Albuquerque and his successors. Bijapur was no exception. It too

had to obtain Portuguese cartazes, and many conditions were imposed even after

purchase of the cartaz. Bijapur was not allowed to import or export specified articles

mentioned in cartaz. They were prohibited from visiting the port of Muscat and the

ports of other enemies of the Portuguese. They were not allowed to carry any

Christian slaves. In order to make sure that the terms of the cartaz were being properly

implemented, the Portuguese also claimed the right to stop and search any ships on

the high seas, and to impose a penalty if the terms were not being properly

followed. 347 Initially, the Portuguese claimed a monopoly of pepper and ginger.

Gradually they added cinnamon, clove, spices and several other articles which yielded large profits. The Muslims [and Gujarati traders] were forbidden business in all these articles and were not allowed to undertake sea voyages for trade to the neighbouring countries.348

As mentioned earlier, early in 1513 Albuquerque sent Garcia for the naval blockade of Dabhol. This strategy forced Bijapur to come to a peaceful settlement with the Portuguese. Pending the negotiations of the treaty, the Bijapur ambassador requested Albuquerque to suspend blockade of Dabhol. Albuquerque agreed to this request, but made it clear that only those ships which were carrying merchandise or provisions would be allowed, and no goods that were prohibited by the Portuguese

347 S. N., Sen, ‘A Preliminary Report on the Historical Records at Goa, Calcutta, 1925, p. 46 ff. 348 Mahalingam, ‘Economic Life in Vijaynagara Empire, Madras, 1951, p. 199.

178 would be permitted. Adil Shah had to apply and seek permission of the viceroy or governor at Goa for the free navigation of Bijapuri ships.349

The blockade of Dabhol and its opening by the Portuguese meant the end of

Bijapur’s access to the seas and to their oceanic trade. The Portuguese compelled

Bijapur to obtain cartazes for their ship under stringent conditions. They claimed sovereignty of the sea, and maintained it through a mixture of force and diplomacy, initially through mutual negotiations, by agreements and finally through specific clauses of treaties or ‘Contracts’. Treaties signed between the Portuguese and Bijapur, had stringent clauses regulating the Oceanic trade. They imposed a duty of one per cent on the merchandise carried by the Bijapuri ships. This was on the pretext of defraying the expresses of the fleets that were guarding the Bijapuri coast for the safety of Bijapuri ships.350

Some of the clauses of the treaties made the control of the Portuguese very clear. For example, the one feature of the treaty of 1576 was that it was applicable to

Bijapuri ships originating from Bijapuri ports, and destined for non Portuguese, as well as Portuguese ports. Even though the Portuguese had no jurisdiction over the

Bijapuri ports, they claimed sovereignty and guarded them for their own commercial interest but at the expense of Bijapur and also by exacting duty on the merchandise.

This was due to their maritime supremacy. The number of cartazes to be issued annually was regulated by the treaties, but on special demand by Adil Shah, additional cartazes were issued. The study of the system throws considerable light on how

349 F. C., Danvers, ‘The Portuguese in India’, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 253-255. 350 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 234.

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systematically the Portuguese destroyed Bijapur’s oceanic trade and rights over the

seas.351

The text of the various cartaz issued to Bijapur were also identical.352 The studies of the numerous original cartazes reveal the following features:

“That all Bijapuri ships both, private and official had to obtain a

cartaz before sailing both on outward and inward voyages.

“The ships had to anchor or touch only the ports specifically

mentioned in cartaz. Sailing to the ports not mentioned in the cartaz

meant breach rules and treaty.

“The cartaz specified the Nacoda (Captain, nakhuda) of the ship,

other persons, capacity of cargo or merchandise carried, and also the

prohibited items which the ship could not carry. It also mentioned

the specific nature of the arms carried by the persons on board,

required for self- defence. The cartaz did not mention duration of the

sailing, and but in some case it did mention.

“The Portuguese, as overlords of the seas, reserved the right to

search or inspect the ship, on suspicion of prohibited merchandise

being carried in it or on any grounds of violations of the of the

conditions laid down in the cartaz .

“Though no fee was charged for cartazes issued for official purposes

to Bijapur, for private ships of the Bijapuris the Portuguese levied a

fee of 20 Zarafins per hundred weights of the cargo for the issue of a

cartaz; and if they failed to obtain the cartaz before venturing out in

351 Ibid. 352 S. N., Sen, Studies in Indian History, Calcutta, 1930, p.62 ff.

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the sea, their ships and its cargo were liable for confiscation by the

Portuguese, even though they were on a peaceful trade mission.”353

By the cartaz system the Portuguese entirely controlled Bijapur’s oceanic trade and did not allow them to sail from Bijapuri ports to other ports, outside

Portuguese territories. By permanent resident factors at Bijapuri ports they had complete check on the shipping. Further the number of horses which Bijapur imported was by the Portuguese. Horses were the life-blood of the Bijapuri army. And the existence of Bijapur kingdom meant regular supply of horses and foreign immigrants.

These factors compelled Bijapur to maintain peaceful, if not friendly relation with the

Portuguese. Enmity with Portuguese meant the destruction of Bijapur kingdom.

2. Relations with the British (1585-1688)

The success of the Portuguese in establishing a lucrative commerce with the

east induced other nations of Western Europe to follow suit.354 England and Holland,

in particular, began to look eastwards for trade and profit. Among the first of the

official English travellers, sent by Queen Elizabeth to get accurate information about

Asian produce and trade was Ralph Fitch. He was followed by many others.355

In 1585, Ralph Fitch visited Bijapur city and several places in the Adil Shahi

sultanate. This was after they had escaped from the Portuguese, who had taken him

and his companions’ prisoner in Ormuz and brought them to Goa. At Bijapur, he did

some business in diamonds. 356 However, his account has no information on

353 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., pp. 234-35. 354 Ibid, p. 238. 355 Arthur Innes, A Short History of British India, London, 1919, p. 40. 356 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 237.

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Portuguese-Bijapur relations, and he soon left the Bijapur territory to go into north

India.

2.1 Bijapur and the East India Company (1612-37)

The outcome of Ralph Fitch’s tour of India was the founding in 1599 of an

association in London for eastern trade.357 Once the company was established, other

Englishmen began to be sent to explore possibilities of trade in the various ports on the west coast of India in particular. In February 1612, Sir Henry Middleton visited the Bijapuri port of Dabhol. He was assured of friendly relations and help in trade by the Governor of Dabhol.358

This was followed in 1619 by a visit by Captain Bonner, following a

suggestion made by Sir Thomas Roe. While nothing concrete came of the visit, a

report was submitted to the Company authorities, advising that a ship with cargo be

sent to Dabhol in the following year. 359 With this beginning British ships started

calling at Bijapuri ports, and import of British goods and export of Bijapuri

merchandise started.

In March 1623, Captain Michael Green reported to President Rastell at Surat

that they had received a letter from Ibrahim Adil Shah, asking for a treaty of friendhip

and help in driving out the Portuguese from Bijapuri territories, both those within the

kingdom at the time, and those lost earlier to the Portuguese. Assistance of the

English was to be by sea, while Adil Shah himself would operate from land. 360

Captain Green sent back conciliatory messages, but did not commit himself to

357 Arthur Innes, A Short History of British India, op. cit., p.40. 358 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., pp. 237-38. 359 Ibid, p. 239. 360 William Foster, English Factories in India (1622-23), (henceforth cited as E.F.I.) Vol. II, p. 214.

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anything specific, 361 in keeping with Sir Thomas Roe’s stated policy of non-

interference. Roe disliked the military-commercial policies of the Portuguese and the

Dutch which he believed was responsible for consuming all their profits. This policy of Roe was adopted by the company for about seventy years362 from 1615 onwards,

but with an exception, when the British allied with Bijapur against the Portuguese in

October, 1637.

By 1635, the English trade at Dabhol had increased considerably, leading to a request being made to Adil Shah to grant permission to establish a factory at that port. On 3rd December 1635 President Methwold and the council at Surat instructed

William Pitt to proceed to Dabhol in the ‘Francis’ and deliver letters to the Bijapuri

governor of Dabhol. The governor was given other letters and presents for passing on

to Agha Raja at Bijapur, with a request for a speedy action for obtaining from

Muhammad Adil Shah a farman to establish a factory at Dabhol. The Adil Shahi

farman was so essential for the British that William Pitt wrote from Dabhol to the

President and Council at Surat and 17th April, 1636, “The king’s farman is expected

daily”.363 The farman was issued by Adil Shah in August 1636. It was not very much

to the liking of William Pitt; and he expressed his dissatisfaction over it.364

The next attempt of the British to establish a base in or near Bijapuri territory

came in 1637. On 27thJanuary, 1637 a British fleet under the command of Captain

Weddell fleet anchored at the Bijapuri port of Bhatkal. At this time, the Shah Bandar

and ‘king’s merchant’ [Virbhadra Nayak, king of Ikkeri, being tributary of Bijapur his

state was included in the kingdom of Bijapur] came on board and assured the

361 Ibid, p. 215. 362 P. E. Roberts, History of British India under the Company and the Crown, Oxford, 1952, p. 36. 363 H. G.Rawlinson, British Beginnings in Western India (1579-1657), Oxford, 1920. 364 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. V (1634-36), p. 282.

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Englishmen of a welcome, offering to provide pepper and made an agreement for the

barter deal of lead for pepper.365 They sent a letter and a present to Adil Shah who

replied promising all reasonable concessions. The Englishmen also sought permission

to establish a factory or a settled residence. 366

During February 1637, the Bijapuri governor of Rajapur opened up a

correspondence with the English, asking them to come to his port for trade. He

promised them freedom of trade, and also undertook to provide 3000 candys

[khandi] 367 of pepper yearly, in addition to buying large quantities of English

commodities. Though the Englishmen traded at Dabhol and Rajapur they also

travelled down to various places in the interior of Bijapur kingdom for the purchase of

commodities and for selling English goods-coral, broadcloth, lead etc,368 as some of

the ports like Rajapur had neither goods nor merchants, and everything had to be

obtained from markets in the interior of the kingdom.369

2.2 English Factory at Karwar

In 1639 the English sent a mission to Muhammad Adil Shah with rich presents consisting of several articles valued at 2500 pagodas. In return the English demanded a farman for trading in his dominions.370 Permission was granted to the

English to trade at Karwar and Rajapur. The English built a house at Karwar to serve

as a factory, but were unable to carry on any business there, and merely stationed a

365 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 240. 366 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. V (1634-36), p. 282. 367 Candy is khandi in Maharashtra, i.e. about 500 lbs. (John Fryer, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 129). 368 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. V (1634-36), p. 12. 369 Sir Charles Fawcett, ‘English Factories in India (1670-77)’ I, New Series, London, 1936. P. XIX. 370 H. G.Rawlinson, British Biginings in Western India, op.cit. p.111.

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few English factors. 371 They next contemplated building factories at Rajapur and

Raybag.372

Sir William Courteen, a Cornish gentleman was the first Englishman to establish a factory at Karwar in Bijapur territory in the year 1639.Muhammad Adil

Shah granted to him a piece of land, where Courteen carried on the trade under the banner of Courteen’s Association.”373 Later on this Association founded factories at

Rajapur and Bathicola . The Association was afterwards styled as “The Assada

Merchants.”374

Earlier in 1636, Courteen had obtained from Charles I a license to engage in

Indian Trade, Mountney and captain Weddel were dispatched to Surat, on behalf of

the new company of Merchants Trading to the East.375 “The king (Charles I) received

a share in the venture” of the Courteen’s. When in 1639 Sir William Courteen died,

his license for trade in Bijapur kingdom was renewed in the name of his son and his

associates.376

In1639-40 Leonard Woodman of the Courteen’s Association was permitted

by the Rajapur governor to trade at Rajapur. He presented to Adil Shah costly articles

of various description, valued at 2535 pagodas and a petition desiring freedom of

trade throughout Bijapur kingdom paying usual custom, as other Bijapuri merchants

do. He further requested the issuance of a farman for the recovery of 12000 pagodas,

imprested in 1639 by Mounteny to the chiefs of Karwar for the supply of pepper

371 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. VIII (1646-50), p. 196. 372 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. VI (1637-41), p. 223, 237. 373 Johan Feryer, ‘A New Account of East India and Persia(1672-1681), ed. by W. Crooks, II , Hakluyt Society, London, 1909-15, p. 3. 374 H. H. Dodwell, ‘The Cambridge History of India’, V, Cambridge, 1929, p. 91. 375 W. H Carey, ‘The Good Old Days of Honourable John Company, Calcutta, 1964, p. 23. 376 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 248.

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which was till then not delivered.377 It seems that Adil shah granted the petition. The

Association lingered on till 1657, when Cromwell renewed the charter, and the East

India Company absorbed Courteen’s bankrupt Association and resumed its

monopoly.378

Under instructions from the Council at Surat, another attempt was made to

find a base at a Bijapuri port. Captain Blackman sailed for Kharepatan (Carapatan),

another Bijapur port. As always, he was received well by the governor of the port, and

given promises of assistance, including for getting back cloth that had been

confiscated by the governor of Rajapur. The governor of Kharepatan granted a “cowle

or warrant for free trade at that port;” and gave a list for the payment of customs upon

easy terms.379

The company’s agent Beni Das was deputed to the court at Bijapur for

pleading the cause of English for the release of the cloth, which had been confiscated

at Rajapur. On his arrival at Bijapur, Beni Das met the queen-mother of Adil Shah,

and leading noblemen, for influencing the sultan to favour the Englishmen.380

In March 1659, Revington 381 came to Rajapur and obtained grant of privileges from Rustum –i Zaman382, i.e. Randulla Khan, he was the viceroy of south-

western corner of Bijapur Sultanate. On 24th July, 1659, Agha Murshid, governor of

Karwar, granted to Randolph Taylor and Philip Gifford, the following privileges, on behalf of Ali Adil shah for the port of Karwar:383 “guarantee given to the English for

free trade; the customs dues were fixed at 1½ % on imported goods; treasure were

377 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. VI, (1637-41), p. 231. 378 Sir John A. R. Marriot, The British in India, Oxford, 1932. p. 61. 379 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 241. 380 Ibid., p. 252. 381 Chief of East India Company’s Rajapur factory. 382 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. X (1655-60), p. 235 f. 383 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. XII (1665-67), p. 208 f.

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exempted from duty; the English were permitted to build a new house, with the

permission of Rustum-i Zaman; and other usual privileges’’. Later these privileges

were confirmed by the Court of Bijapur.384

Though Lari was in use along the Bijapuri coast, due to the absence of silver

coinage in Bijapur, great inconvenience was caused to the traders. To get rid of this

trouble, Revington proposed to Rustum-i Zaman to procure permission for the English

to establish mint at Rajapur, and strike silver coins, similar to that of the Mughal.

Rustum-i Zaman agreed and recommended for a license to the Court of Bijapur for

permitting such an undertaking to the English. This proposal only materialized

thirteen years later, and a mint was established at Bombay. The coins minted at

Bombay were also intended partly for circulation in the Bijapur kingdom.385

Revington then proceeded to Ikkeri, to meet Rustum-i Zaman and negotiate

with him regarding payment of customs on the portion of the pepper which had been

sent to Karwar for shipment. After smoothing the way by the presentation of articles

valued at a hundred pagodas, Revington obtained a grant. The privileges which

Rustum-i Zaman granted were: “The English could buy pepper at Hubbli; without

paying any customs there. They were to pay the customs only at Rajapur, from where

it was exported. Nor they were to pay at Karwar but only at Rajapur.”386

At this time, it appears that Rajapur was envisaged as the centre of a large

English trade in saltpetre, pepper, calicoes and cotton yarn. In addition, it was seen as

an alternative to Surat as the headquarters of the English Company, and with the

addition of mint privileges, it would have provided a very strong base for the English

Company’s activities. A crucial aspect of the fulfilling of this vision was the

384 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, 1489-1686, op. cit., p. 243. 385 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. X (1655-60), p. 235 f , 243 f., 246. 386 Ibid. p. 246.

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maintenance of good relations with Rustum-i Zaman,387 and through him, Bijapur. An

opportunity to get on good terms with Bijapur came in 1660, and Revington was

quick to seize the opportunity of offering to sell his mortars and shells to Siddi Johar

(Salabat Khan) for the reduction of the fortress of Panhala held by Shivaji.388

In 1661 Shivaji took revenge on the English for their help to Bijapur, by

imprisoning their President, Revington and a few other Englishmen.389 In retaliation to this action the English ordered the seizure of Bijapuri ships along the western coast, one of these ships being the one on which the Queen of Bijapur was travelling, on her way back from Mecca.390 At the same time, a letter was written to Ali Adil Shah,

asking him to help in procuring the release of the prisoners. In response to President’s

letter, Adil Shah replied that it would be of no avail to write Shivaji for releasing the

Englishmen. Adil Shah said that an army of his was proceeding against Shivaji, and if

successful, he hoped to accomplish his and their (Englishmen’s) desires. The English

at this time apparently totally failed to realise that Shivaji was not a ‘subject’ of the

Adil shah, nor was Rajapur still a Bijapuri port. The English played mischief and they

robbed and plundered a squadron of Bijapuri vessels.391 This led to the closure of the

Rajapur factory for a few years.392

The English demanded a farman from Adil Shah for the security of the

Englishmen and their goods in the Bijapur kingdom.393 Adil Shah issued a farman in

July, 1663 in favour of the English. Assuring the English of security of trade, he

instructed them to return and re-establish trade at Karwar. He likewise wrote to

387 Ibid. p. 352. 388 Ibid. p. 370 f. 389 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. XI (1661-64), p. 4 f. 390 Ibid. p. 87 f, 107. 391 Ibid. p. 190, 232, 237. 392 Ibid. p. 238. 393 Ibid. p. 232.

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Rustum-i Zaman to give orders to his men at Karwar to use civility and to be good in

their relations with the English and not to trouble them. Through the above farman

and latter the English obtained several privileges.394

By August, 1663, the English factors started returning to Karwar. 395 The

Directors of the East India Company in London observed that “Trade should be

maintained at Karwar and a ‘faire correspondence’ kept with the ‘king of Deccan,

(Bijapur) by all possible means.”396 However despite the good gesture of Bijapuris

towards the English, the latter refused to issue a pass for the ship of the dowager

Queen of Bijapur for Basra and Baghdad. The English demanded specific farman

from Adil Shah himself for the issue of a pass.397

In 1665, when Rajapur once again came into Adil Shahi hands, the governor

of Rajapur invited the English to re-establish their factory and trade which was closed down due to the capture of Rajapur by Shivaji. The English were reluctant to return to

Rajapur;398 but the Bijapuris were keen enough on their return to refuse permission to

the Dutch to establish a factory at Rajapur on the grounds that “the place was at the

English’s refusal.”399

On 20th September, 1668, an agreement was made between the English and

the governor of Karwar, Siddi ‘Abdul Hasan and his mujumdar. The terms400 of the

agreement were:

“That the English should be well treated, and should be permitted to

go up country or elsewhere at their pleasure;

394 Ibid. p. 240, 244 f. 395 Ibid. p. 244. 396 Ibid. p. 325. 397 Ibid. p. 343. 398 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. XII (1665-67), p. 85 ff. 399 Ibid. p. 85. 400 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. XIII (1668-69), p. 107 f, 110.

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“That they might import and export all manner of goods paying 1½ per cent for customs, except for treasures, which were to be free of duty;

“That any goods not sold might be shipped off again without paying any duty at all;

“That no hindrance should be placed in their way in selling their goods.

“That if any merchant failed to pay for goods bought from the

English, the governor should either force him to do so or allow him to be detained in the factory until payment was made.

“That where as the dwelling house that was formerly built at the charge of Rustum-i Zaman (‘late owner of the town’) and given to the English had partly fallen down, the factors should be allowed to rebuild the same and to reimburse themselves out of the customs due from them, upto a limit of 250 pagodas.

“That no one should forcibly enter the factory; but that, if any difference of importance should arise, it should be settled by the governor and the English chief.

“That disputes arising among the English should be decided by their chef; and that disputes between Englishmen and muhammadens should be settled by the Governor and the chief together; the culprit being punished by one or the other, according to his nationality.

“That if any servant of the English should abscond, the governor should do his best to secure his return.

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“That, if an English ship be wrecked within the king’s (Adil Shah’s)

dominions, all possible assistance should be given.

“That the governor shall at all times and on all occasions protect and

secure from any abuse or the said companies servant residing within

his jurisdictions and also what goods and merchandize they have in

their warehouse, and in case any violence or robbery shall happen to

any of them or ought of theirs the governor shall cause reparation to

be made, as in justice the cause doth merit; but if the delinquent doth

not appear, the proto is to be answerable.

“That in the event of a controversy between the brokers or other

servant of the English and any of the country people, the English

chief should punish the former, if found culpable, or the governor

the latter.

“The governor shall endeavour to procure a farman from the king of

Bijapur confirming the Agreement”.

The English insisted so much on getting the farman from Adil Shah that they prohibited Bijapuri ships (both official and private) from navigating the sea till the farman, confirming the agreement, was issued.401

In spite of the agreement, differences and disputes did arise. In 1670, the

Desai of Karwar demanded half-percent separate duty on goods. This claim he put

forward after the factory was resettled by Randolph Taylor under the agreement. The

agreement provided a comprehensive duty of one and half per cent; and the desai

sought to get half-per cent either out of this, which the governor refused, or from the

401 Ibid. p. 116.

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factory. The English refused to agree to the demand and the desai caused some trouble by preventing them from building the factory house. However, the desai finally gave a licence for the building of the new houseAt the opening ceremony in

1674, the same desai was present.402

2.3 The British on the Bijapuri Coromandal Coast

Until 1673 Bijapur’s relations with the English were restricted only to the

factories and trade in the west coast. On 10th March, 1673, Nadir Muhammad,

Bijapuri governor of Ginji, invited them to settle a factory on the Coromandel Coast,

at or near Porto Novo and at Valudavur near Pondicherry. The governor offered the

English all possible facilities and suggested construction of forts for their own defence

with promises of grant of privileges. He extended an invitation for the deputation of

an English Agent to him and sent a present.403 The English welcoming the invitation

sent a formal reply and a present through Elihu Yale to the Khan. They initiated

negotiations for the acquisition of a port in Bijapuri territory. The Khan advised the

English to send their men to take the possession of the port and set up the English flag

there, in order to free him from the problems caused by the Dutch and the French. The

proposed project to acquire the port was confirmed by the director of company at

England, who instructed the Agent at Fort St. George that “We approve of the

settlement you have made in the Ginji country and would have you nourish it by all

means possible.”404

During 1675, the English Agent Child established good relation at Raybagh.

He got a remission at half the custom duty, usually charged at Raybagh, from Bahlol

402 Sir Charles Fawcett, ‘English Factories in India, II, op. cit., p. 296 ff. 403 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 247. 404 Ibid. p. 247.

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Khan, commander-in-chief of Bijapur.405 At the Bijapuri port of Dharwar Adil Shah had granted the English, through a farman, exemption of two years customs and permission to build a warehouse.406

2.4 British Policy towards Bijapur

Throughout the seventeenth century, the English settlements in India were

only place s of commerce. As a general rule, the Company avoided the acquiring of

property, which could be taxed, but over a period of time, opinion began to shift in

favour of acquiring some territory of their own, which could be defended. Security of

life and trade could then be ensured. Thus trade became armed trade, and this was

followed first by employing soldiers to defend the settlements, as at Fort St. George,

and then to establish ‘spheres of influence.’407

The year 1661 ushers in a new era in the relations of Bijapur with the British.

By the Royal Charter, the East India Company’s servants in India were “authorized to

make peace and war with any prince or people, not being Christian; and to administer

justice for themselves for their dependents. These privileges transformed a body of

warehouse men into a political corporation, which might almost be called a government.”408

From the very beginning the British adopted a policy of friendship and amity

with Bijapur, non interference in the affairs of Bijapur and a policy of non-alignment

(with one or two exceptions). Roe adopted an “unaggressive wholly mercantile”

policy. He disliked the military-commercial policies.

405 Sir Charles Fawcett, ‘English Factories in India (1670-77) I, op. cit., p. 259. 406 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 248. 407 M. Edwards, Asia in the Age of Europe (1498-1955), Asia Publications, p. 47. 408 P.Anderson, ‘The English in Western India’, London, 2nd ed. 1856, p. 97.

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It was their non-aligned policy which resulted in the failure of the

English to accept the invitation in 1659 of Rustum-i Zaman to assist Shivaji in taking the fort of Danda-Rajapuri and become partner in the share of rich treasure in that

Bijapuri port.409 In 1674, when Rustum-i Zaman came back to Bijapuri service, he

requested the English to spare him guns and ‘bullions’ in his conflict with Shivaji.

The English factor at Karwar, Bandish refused to comply, pointing out that “they

were merchants, who had come to Karwar to trade and not to fight.”410 Sometimes the

Englishmen assisted Bijapur secretly.411 Bijapur-British relations paved the way for

building up British power in south India.

The British were directed by the Directors of the Company in England to

adopt peaceful and reconciliatory measures with Bijapur. But often, there was

considerable distrust of the Bijapuri nobles; for instance, on 10th January 1666, the

President and Council at Surat advised the factor Robert at Karwar to “not to trust to

the favour of the king of Bijapur of Rustum-I Zaman, ‘for they are all the slaves of

bribes, and money will incline them any way.”412

3. Relations with the Dutch (1637-86)

The Dutch came to trade with India towards the close of the sixteenth

century. For the Dutch Lisbon was the market from where they purchased Indian

merchandise. In 1580, the Spanish and Portuguese dominions were united under the

Spanish crown.413 King Philip II closed the harbours of Spain and Portugal to the

409 D. R. Bannaji, Bombay and the Siddis, Bombay, 1932, p. 6. 410 Sir Charles Fawcett, ‘English Factories in India (1670-77) I, op. cit., p. 327. 411 M. A. Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 250. 412 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. XII (1665-67), p. 200. 413 B. D. Basu, ‘Rise of the Christian Power in India, Calcutta, R. Chatterjee, 1931, p. 22.

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Dutch in 1585 and they were thus deprived of Indian goods. The Dutch then decided

to engage directly in the Indian trade. “In the beginning of the seventeenth century

they entered in the profitable commerce of India and acquired a foothold on the

Coromandel coast and obtained many concessions from the Sultans of Golconda.

They were also keen on getting a place on the Western or Malabar coast and soon after their arrival in India, they began negotiations with the Zamorin of Calicut, with the Adilshah of Bijapur and with the Mughal Emperor who controlled the rising port of Surat”.414

The Dutch being fully aware of the chronic enmity between the Portuguese

and Bijapur, sought an alliance with Ibrahim Adil Shah II against the Portuguese.415

In 1637 the Dutch adopted the policy of annually blockading Goa. They wanted to

build a port and fortified factory at Vengurla to serve as a strategic location for

blockading Portuguese fleets and as a port of observation during the months when

they were not there.416

With this blockade and motives, the Dutch Governor-General and the

Council of the Dutch sent Jan Van Twist as ambassador to Bijapur. In January, 1637,

Van Twist, Chief Factor for the Dutch at Surat, landed at Dabhol, on his mission to

Adil Shah. The purpose of the mission was partly to procure trading rights at Dabhol,

but mainly to seek the assistance of Bijapur against the Portuguese at Goa.417 This is

evident from the letter of Commander Jacob Cooper, addressed to Adil Shah which

throws considerable light on the Dutch diplomacy. With the letter which is dated 31

December, 1636 Van Twist arrived at Bijapur. The letter was read out to Adil Shah by

an interpreter. Ibrahim Adil Shah was quick to understand the potential of support

414 P.M.Joshi, ‘Johan Van Twist’s Mission to Bijapur, 1637’, op. cit., p.111. 415 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 251. 416 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. V (1634-36), p. 31, 49, 82 f. 417 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. VI (1637-41, p. 23.

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from the Dutch against the Portuguese, and immediately granted the Dutch concessions for trade within the kingdom. The minister Mustafa Khan was ordered to draw up a farman to that effect. 418 It was issued in 1046/1637. “The farman was

granted to trade in the Adil Shahi dominions and establish a factory at Vengurla. Adil

Shah also agreed for joint attack on Goa. For the service and help of Dutch ships at

sea, Adil shah granted the Dutch freedom from tolls; and promised to pay half the

tribute of the “afandigos” and of the revenues of Goa and booty, after its conquest.”419

On the advice of van Twist, Mustafa khan gave orders for the fortification of

Vengurla, and for its reinforcement to help the Dutch. For the Dutch, Vengurla was of

prime importance and they considered that “without it, it would be impossible to

continue the siege before Goa.”420 Mustafa Khan advised Van Twist to appoint a

Dutch Agent at the court of Bijapur. This was in order to prevent the Portuguese

factions who were out to obstruct the Dutch-Bijapur alliance. Van Twist sent a

permanent ambassador to Bijapur.421

The Dutch continued the war with the Portuguese with increased vigour and

almost with unvarying success. The blockade of Goa was resumed and fierce naval

fighting took place between the Dutch and the Portuguese at sea, near Karli River

south of Malvan.422 During the naval blockade of Goa by the Dutch in 1638-39, the

Portuguese viceroy felt hopeless to compete with the Dutch single-handed; he dispatched an embassy to Adil Shah with a view of inducing him to help them to turn

418 P.M.Joshi, Johan Van Twist’s Mission to Bijapur, op. cit., p.113. 419 Monumenta Historia India, English translation of Dagh Register in Journal of Bihar Research Society, September, 1928, p. 200 f. 420 Ibid. p. 203. 421 Ibid. p 197. 422 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. VI, (1637-41, p. 229 fn. 1.

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out the Dutch. The Portuguese were unaware of the Bijapur-Dutch alliance. The

Portuguese ambassador entirely failed to accomplish his object.423

3.1 The Dutch on Bijapur’s Coromandel Coast

The expansion of Bijapuri power southwards brought many of the Dutch

settlements on the Coromandel Coast under Bijapur’s rule. By 1649, much of the

Ginji coast had been conquered. The port of Tegnapatam, where the Dutch had a

small factory, was among the areas conquered. The Dutch promptly applied for, adn

received, a kaul (an agreement) from teh Bijapur commander-in-chief at Ginji and

Madurai for the continuation of their concessions in the new political setup. By 1649,

the whole of the district of Ginji, including the sea board Tegenapatam was conquered

by Bijapur. The Dutch promptly obtained from the Bijapuri commander in-charge of

Ginji and Madurai a “kaul” (an agreement), for trade and other facilities in the Bijapur

Kingdom. In 1650 the new governor of Bijapur gave further assurances that the

trading rights of the Dutch in Ginji and further south would be respected.424 In August

1651, farmans from the Adil Shah, formally guaranteeing the Dutch trading rights at

the Bijapuri ports on the west coast and the Coromandel coast, and fixing the tolls for

Tegenapatam at about half the previous rate were granted.425

When the Nayak of Thanjavur formally accepted Bijapur’s suzerainty, this

coast too became part of the Adil Shahi dominions, and the port of Kariakal, where

the Dutch had a factory, was included in that kingdom. The Bijapuri governor of the

423 F. C., Danvers, ‘The Portuguese in India’, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 267. 424 Tapan Raychaudhary, ‘Jan Company in Coromandel, 1605-1690: op.cit, p.55. 425 J E Heeres, Corpus Diplomaticum, Neerlando-Indicum (1650-1675), Neetherland, 1931, p. 8, 25.

197 region granted ‘kauls’, to the Dutch in 1652, with the same conditions as granted in

Adil Shah’s farman of 1651.426

Grants of farmans or kauls did not, however, guarantee that there were no problems between the Dutch and the Bijapur nobles. The commander-in-chief of the

Bijapur army, the Khan-i-Khanan, had been instrumental in getting the farmans from the Adil Shah for the Dutch. Deapite this, in 1652, the Dutch refused passes for his ship to proceed to Achin and Queda. Instead of these places, the Dutch offered him passes for Tenasserim and Pegu. This did not satisfy the Khan and he decided to send one ship to Achin without a pass. In 1655, one of the Khan’s ships, while returning from Achin without a pass was attacked by a Dutch ship cruising in the Bay. Such incidents were a source of continuous tension despite Khan’s generally friendly and helpful attitude towards the Dutch company. 427 The nobles of Bijapur wanted to develop trade relations with the eastern countries and this clashed with commercial interests of the Dutch. During the Bijapur-Golconda conflict in 1652 over the partition of the Karnatak, the Dutch adopted a neutral policy.428 In August, 1654, the Dutch obtained another farman of Adil Shah, granting them privileges at Tegenapatam and neighbouring ports.429

By 1659, the Portuguese were successful in their endeavour to instigate the queen of Bijapur against the Dutch. The Portuguese sent an envoy to Bijapur with very costly presents valued at 100,000 pagodas, and a further promise of offering

10,000 pagodas annually if amicable relations between Bijapur and the Portuguese were restored, and if the Dutch were expelled from the Bijapur territory.430 In reponse

426 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 255. 427 Tapan Ray Chaudhary, ‘Jan Company and the Coromandel’, op. cit. p 55. 428 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 256. 429 Ibid. p. 256. 430 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. X (1655-60, p. 247f.

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to this, the Dutch offered a ‘peshkash’ to the Adil shah, and got the Portuguese

proposal of sending Bijapur’s army against the Dutch cancelled. They even managed

to turn the queen against the Portuguese, and induced her to send an army against the

Portuguese to claim Bijapur’s rights over the territories of Bardesh and Salsette. She

demanded 20,000 pagodas as yearly payment for claim over these territories.431

In 1660 the young Adil Shah granted the Dutch exemption from tolls on the cows purchased at Vengurla.432 In the following year the Dutch displayed their desire

to be on friendly terms with Bijapur by providing a ship to the queen mother of

Bijapur for her pilgrimage to Mecca. Later when she visited Persia, the Dutch carried

her letters to Bijapur.433 They loaned money to her in Persia, while Adil Shah was

directed to pay the amount to the Dutch company at Golconda [Loan and hundies or

bill of exchange].434 In January 1663 Dutch requests for permission to establish a factory at Karwar was granted by the Bijapur governor of that place.435

Ekoji, commander of Bijapur, conquered and occupied Thanjavur in

1675.The Dutch approached him for confirmation of their trading rights on the

Coromandel Coast. After negotiations between Ekoji and Peter Verwer, they agreed and signed a treaty in 1676.436 As per the treaty Bijapur agreed to surrender all claims

over Nagapatam, ten old villages, Poyyur and Veli gardens, which Ekoji was to hand

over to the Dutch. In return for these territorial gains, the Dutch company agreed to

give Ekoji one tusker elephant and a specific amount of cash: “1200 pon per annum fourteen old villages of the Company at 10 panams of 31/2 mattu per pon; 300 pon for

431 Ibid. p. 248. 432 Monumenta Historia India, English translation of Dagh Register in Journal of Bihar Research Society, September, 1929, II (2), p. 243. 433 Ibid. p. 240 f. 434 Ibid., March 1931, IV (1), p. 76. 435 E.F.I., op. cit., Vol. XI (1661-64), p. 238. 436 K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, ‘Two Nagapatnam Grants from the Batavia Museum’, Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, XIV, December, 1937, p. 39 ff.

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Negapatam; making in all 4200 pon and one tusker elephant to be handed over by the

end of the year.”437

Ekoji further permitted the Dutch to establish a mint at Nagapatam, where

some of the coins current in South India – panam, varahan and pagoda – could be

minted. Profits earned by the mint were to be shared between the Dutch and Ekoji.

However, one of the representatives of Ekoji was to stay in the mint for the

verifications of accounts and profits.

3.2 Dutch Policy towards Bijapur

Though Bijapur-Dutch relations began from 1637, as early as 1615 the

Dutch made an attempt to establish commercial ties with Bijapur. In September 1615

the factor Leonard Wolff was sent to Bijapur to obtain the right to trade in diamonds

in Bijapur kingdom. But Wolff’s mission failed. Pieter Gilliaz, who was sent to

replace Wolff, also did not achieve anything.438

The Dutch company shifted from a commercial to territorial and political

basis as the company had to compete with other European companies established in

India, particularly the Portuguese. The first move was naturally to establish factories,

forts etc. They took interest in the affairs of Indian states; and thus entered in the

native politics439. Since from its foundation on 20 March 1602, the state-General of

Holland endowed the Dutch company with a strong military power,440 we find them

seeking commercial end through military and diplomatic channels. In the military

area, their policy with Bijapur was to negotiate an alliance against the Portuguese (and

later the French), in order to safeguard their commercial interest and to achieve

437 Ibid. 438 Tapan Ray Chaudhary, Jan Company and the Coromandel, op. cit. p 171. 439 Amry, Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies, op.cit. p. 52. 440 K. Glamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade (1620-1740), Copenhagan, 1958, p. 257.

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monopoly. They approached Adil Shah in 1637 to form an alliance against the

Portuguese. The Dutch were aware of the enmity between Bijapur and the Portuguese.

They fully utilized any opportunity to gain favour of Adil Shah on the one hand and to increase the animosity between the Portuguese and Bijapur on the other. By making

tempting offers of naval attacks on Goa, the Dutch got sanctions for trade and

establishment of Dutch factories in the Bijapur kingdom. On the basis of military

assistance they sought exemptions and concessions from the customs and tolls. The

military relations with Bijapur were only restricted to the Portuguese and the French;

in a relation of 3rd October 1664, when the Bijapur governor Rustum-i Zaman asked

the Dutch resident Leendersz, were the Dutch friends of Shivaji, the Dutch replied,

“not only with him but also with all other rajas there about.”441

Except for a few minor incidents, the Bijapur-Dutch relations throughout the period from 1637 to 1686 were friendly. There was never any war or hostility between the two, as was the case in Bijapur- Portuguese relations.

4. Relations with the French (1670-1678)

4.1 French Factory at Raybag

Most of our information about French relations with Bijapur comes from the

account of Abbé Carré. On his arrival in Bicholim in December 1672, Abbé Carré

reported that the “Moor Governor” called on the Bishop with whom Abbé Carré was

staying, and showed him ‘great civility.’ The Governor was reported to have said that

“he held the French in great esteem, and that the king of Bijapur, under whom I held

the government of Bicholim, had given orders to all our governors to render

441 Monumenta Historia India, English translation of Dagh Register in Journal of Bihar Research Society, September, 1930, III (3), p. 283.

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assistance, passports, and all manner of help, to every Frenchmen in his kingdom. He

added that the king had given a warehouse to French Company, to establish a factory

and trade in Rhebach [Raybag], six days’ journey from Bicholim’; and that, having

learnt that our Viceroy at St.Thome was being besieged by the King of Golconda, he

had sent instruction to the Governor of Porto Nove [Porto Novo], one of his ports on

the Coromandel coast not far from St. Thome, to help the French with everything they

needed, including men, provisions and munitions.”442

4.2 Bijapur grants Pondicherry to the French

Early attempts by the Bijapur nobles to get the French to settle in their

territory had begun a early as 1670, when Sher Khan Lodi, the Bijapuri Governor of

the Province of Valikondapuram of Ginji, sent to Francois Martin (one of the French

Directors in India) a proposal to settle a factory in his territory. The adviser of de la

Haye, Francois Caron prevented Martin from replying to Sher Khan.443 However, in

1672, when a French agent visited him, he granted to the French the site of

Pondichery for a settlement.444

At this time, the French were besieged in San Thomé by the combined Dutch

and Golconda forces. 445 In November 1672, Francois Baron and Francois Martin sent

Bellangarde Lespinay to Sher Khan, to try and the provisions needed by the defenders

at San Thomé. The envoy was well received and obtained not just food and

ammunition, but also the site for a factory at Pondicherry. The Dtuch did attempt to

442 Abbe Carre, The Travels of The Abbe Carre, op.cit. Vol I, p.223. 443 Martin, Francois, (translated and annotated by Lotika Varadrajan), India in the 17th Century, Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 1983, I, p. 90 f., 387. 444 Sherwani and Joshi (ed.), History of Medieval Deccan, Vol.I, op.cit. p. 387. 445 St. Thome was a Portuguese settlement on Coromandel Coast near Madras. It was captured by Golkonda in 1662. Ten years later in 1672, the French captured it. But it was recaptured by the Golkonda in 1673 with the assistance of the Dutch – Cambridge History of India, V, 103 f.

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prevent this grant, for as Lespinay was leaving, in January 1673, a Dutch envoy

arrived, to try and prevent the grant. Much to the surprise of the Dutch, though, Sher

Khan declared that “as the Dutch and the French were neighbours in Europe, so they

should be in India.”446 Sher Khan granted Pondicherry to the French for a factory. By

the order of the French Directors in India, Lespinay established himself at

Pondicherry on 4th February 1673.447 In April, 1674, some sixty French men went to the site and took charge of the plot of the land, which later on became Pondicherry.448

The French-Dutch rivalry on the Coromandel Coast and the fear of Dutch

attacks and provocations compelled the French to establish relations with Bijapur,

with a view to provide themselves with a place of refuge in case of problems.

Besides the French-Dutch rivalry, competition with the English was also one

of the causes which led to the establishment of French factory at Pondicherry, and

necessitated contact with Bijapur. 449 As mentioned earlier, in 1673, Nadir

Muhammad, the Bijapuri governor of Ginji, had offered the English the option of

establishing a fortifying a factory in his territory, either near Porto Novo or near

Pondicherry.450 For the French, therefore, friendly relations with Bijapur were even

more necessary, given that Bijapur seemed to be willing to grant concessions to all the

Europeans.

From 21st September, 1674, Martin was left at Pondicherry and he became founder of Pondicherry as he developed it, transformed and made it the capital of the

446 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 260. 447 M. A., Nayeem, External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom, op. cit., p. 260. 448 G. B. Mallesan, History of the French in India (1674-1761), Edinburgh, 1909, p. 20 ff. 449 C. S. Srinivasachari, A History of Ginjee and Its Rulers, Annamalainagar, 1943, p. 210. 450 V. G. Hatalkar, ‘Relations between the French and the Marathas’, Bombay, 1958, p. 13.

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French settlements in India.451 Besides Lespinay and Martin, to whom the credit goes

for establishing Pondicherry, credit also goes to Sher Khan who went even to the

extent of advancing loan to the French to establish their factory at Pondicherry.452 On

26 February, 1675, Sher Khan sent one of his cavalry captains at Pondicherry to

Baron. On the request of Sher Khan, Baron sent some French soldiers to join Sher

Khan’s contingent at Cuddalore and to proceed to Porto Novo. This gesture was for

show of friendship between Bijapur and the French.453

While money had been advanced by Sher Khan in 1673, till as late as 1675,

the acoounts were not settled. In April 1675, Martin was sent from Pondicherry to

meet Sher Khan and settle the accounts. He was told by Baron that “the settlement

arrived at should be favourable to Sher Khan”; “because of the services rendered” to

the French by him.454 Martin wrote that in April 1675 Baron was very anxious to secure an interview with Sher Khan and the latter too appeared as eager for the meeting. After envoys had been exchanged between them it was decided that Baron was to go to Cuddalore to meet Sher Khan.455 At the end of the discussions, Sher

Khan entered into a ‘pact’ with Baron, who was to advance five lakh pagodas and

send one hundred Frenchmen. With this French aid, the Khan wished to fulfil his

ambition of becoming master of the whole of south India. After consolidating his

authority in the newly acquired territory, his plan was to conquer the kingdom of

Golconda –“an enterprise for which Baron promised to obtain 5000 cavalry and

20000 French soldiers.”456

451 Martin, Francois, (translated and annotated by Lotika Varadrajan), India in the 17th Century, op.cit, II, p.3. 452 Ibid, p. 11. 453 Ibid, p. 15. 454 Ibid, p. 17. 455 Ibid, p. 15. 456 Ibid, p. 15.

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Baron also tried to negotiate other pacts. In 1675, he approached the Maratha

prime minister. Baron tried unsuccessfully to forge an alliance between Shivaji,

Bijapur and the French.457 Even though his efforts as a whole did not materialize, still

he was able to achieve part fulfilment of the project. The French successfully helped

Sher Khan in crushing Nadir Muhammad, Bijapuri governor of Gingi, with whom

Sher Khan apparently had mny differences. On the mid-night of 23th -24th September,

1676, martin received a letter from Sher Khan in which he requested him to siege

Valudavur “On behalf of the king of Bijapur, for his rebellious subject” Nadir

Muhammad. Sher Khan also assured Martin that he would send to him reinforcement

of troops. On the morning of 24thSeptember Muhammad Raza was sent by Sher Khan

to guard Pondicherry and was placed at the disposal of Martin.458 It was the first stage

of the grand project, which was achieved by Bijapur-French alliance.459

While on the one hand French soldiers were sent to help Sher Khan, Martin realized that a handful of Europeans would not enable him to defend Pondicherry successfully in case of attack. In 1676, he therefore applied to Sher Khan for permission to recruit and train some Indian soldiers, in response to which Sher Khan sent three hundred of his own men. Martin not only trained them, but also gave each a piece of land and encouraged them to export. Thus, Pondicherry grew to prosperity.460

Before long, however, relations between Martin and Sher Khan became

rather strained. Sher Khan had never returned the money that had been advanced to

him under the terms of the pact, and with the entry of Shivaji into the Karnatak, as

well as the promise of neutrality made to Shivaji, Martin became anxious to get back

457 Martin, Francois, (translated and annotated by Lotika Varadrajan), India in the 17th Century, op.cit, II, p.22. 458 Ibid. p. 52, 55. 459 Ibid, p. 16 f. 460 G. B. Mallesan, ‘History of the French in India (1674-1761), op. cit. p. 25.

205 as much money as possible. Sher Khan appealed to Martin for help. But Martin avoided the issue.This neutrality and attitude of the French changed the whole course of Bijapur-French relations and politics of south India.

Sher Khan was defeated by Shivaji’s forces in July 1677 at Tiruvadi. Despite the fact that Sher Khan had to take refuge in the forests near the town of Ariyalur,

Martin continued to demand the repayment of the money that Sher Khan owed.

Finally, Sher Khan was forced to hand over some emeralds as part payment of the debt.461

With the signing of the Treaty on 17th July, 1677 between Sher Khan and

Shivaji, the French and Bijapur relations came to an end; as Pondicherry was now ceded by Bijapur to Shivaji.

Throughout the brief span of eight years of Bijapur-French relations, Sher

Khan proved to be friend, helper, financier and an ally of the French. Sher Khan helped and allied with the French at the cost of the enmity of the English, Dutch,

Golkonda, and even of Nadir Muhammad. At one time, in 1676, the Dutch threatened

Sher Khan, refusing to issue passports to his ships, unless he expelled the French from

Pondicherry. Sher Khan replied that “he owed us (French) protection no less than the

Dutch themselves”.

Relations of Adil Shahi Sultanate with the Europeans worked as a stimulating factor for the trade and commerce. The involvement of nobles in external trade for a moment were beneficial to them but also increases the total trade of the state.

461 Ibid. p. 166 f.

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