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Strengthening and Reform of the Iaea Strengthening and Reform of the Iaea PRAISE FOR TREVOR FINDLAy’s UNLEASHING THE NUCLEAR WATCHDOG: STRENGTHENING AND REFORM OF THE IAEA UNLEASHING THE NUCLEAR WATCHDOG: STRENGTHENING AND REFORM OF THE IAEA “It is an exceptionally good piece of work that covers the key issues comprehensively and captures the key nuances that shape the Agency and its work. I am vastly impressed by the author’s command of the institution and the subject matter.” Mark Gwozdecky, Canadian ambassador to Jordan and former IAEA spokesperson UNLEASHING “Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog is insightful, comprehensive and accessible. It will be useful to people who are in a position to make changes, and useful to analysts who want to understand both how the IAEA works and how it doesn’t work.” THE NUCLEAR Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University WATCHDOG “This is a very strong piece of work, with a very good descriptive review of the Agency’s activities, a vigorous discussion and numerous interesting recommendations.” STRENGTHENING AND James Keeley, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary REFORM OF THE IAEA TREVOR FINDLAY TREVOR FINDLAY UNLEASHING THE NUCLEAR WATCHDOG: STRENGTHENING AND REFORM OF THE IAEA Trevor Findlay CIGI’s Strengthening and Reform of the International Atomic Energy Agency project is conducted in partnership with the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance (CCTC) at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa. The project is directed by Trevor Findlay, Senior Fellow at CIGI and Director of the CCTC. Copyright © 2012 by The Centre for International Governance Innovation CIGI would like to thank the Government of Ontario for its support. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Centre for International Governance Innovation or its Operating Board of Directors or International Board of Governors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution — Non- commercial — No Derivatives License. To view this license, visit (www. creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). For re-use or distribution, please include this copyright notice. 57 Erb Street West Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada tel +1 519 885 2444 fax + 1 519 885 5450 www.cigionline.org Cover and page design by Steve Cross. TABLE OF CONTENTS v List of Tables and Figures 49 IAEA Nuclear Security Standards and Recommendations vi About the Author 51 The Process of Preparing Nuclear Security Documents vii Preface 51 Three-year Plan of Activities to Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism 1 Executive Summary 52 Nuclear Security Funding, Resources and Staffing 5 Introduction 52 IAEA Advisory Services and Missions 9 Part One: Origins and Mandate 52 Nuclear Security Evaluation Missions 10 The Statute 53 Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans 10 Enter the NPT and IAEA: Boon and Complication 53 Nuclear Security Support Centres 13 Part Two: Governance and Leadership 53 Nuclear Security Education and Training 13 The General Conference 53 IAEA Activities in Countering Nuclear Smuggling 14 The Board of Governors 53 Nuclear Trade and Technology Analysis Unit 16 “Politicization” of IAEA Governance 54 IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database 17 The Director General 54 Assistance to States in Combating Nuclear Smuggling 19 Conclusions 55 Improving Use of IT for Nuclear Security Program 21 Part Three: Nuclear Safety 55 Other Activities 22 The IAEA’s Roles in Nuclear Safety 55 Conclusions 23 Emergency Preparedness and Response 57 Part Five: Nuclear Safeguards and Verification 23 The IAEA’s Role in Implementing the Nuclear Accident Conventions 58 Comprehensive or Full-scope Safeguards 24 IAEA Emergency Preparedness and Response Framework 59 The Safeguards Crisis: Iraq Case Reveals Shortcomings 27 Response to the Fukushima Disaster 60 Strengthened Safeguards 27 Initial IAEA Response and Offer of Assistance 62 The Additional Protocol 28 Emergency Assistance Coordination 63 Small Quantities Protocol 29 Coordination of International Organizations 64 Integrated Safeguards 30 Conclusions 64 State and Regional Systems of Accounting and Control 30 The Agency as Information Hub 65 Role of SAGSI 31 Coordination with Other International Organizations 65 The Impact of the Case of Iran 32 Emergency Information Exchange 66 Current Safeguards Issues and Challenges 33 Safety of Nuclear Facilities and Materials 67 Safeguards Department’s Strategic Plan 33 The IAEA’s Role in Implementing International Treaties 68 New Safeguards Concepts and Approaches 35 IAEA Safety Standards 69 Safeguards Data Management and Collection 38 INSAG 69 Changing the Safeguards “Culture” 38 IAEA/NEA International Reporting System for Operational Experience 70 Safeguards Detection Goals and Bulk Handling Facilities 39 IAEA Assistance to Member States in Ensuring Nuclear Safety 71 Inspections — Special and Otherwise 42 Re-thinking the Nuclear Safety Regime? 73 Detecting Weaponization and Military Dimensions 43 Conclusions 74 Transparency and Openness 45 Part Four: Nuclear Security 75 Use of Intelligence Information 46 IAEA Role in Treaty Implementation 76 An Additional Protocol Plus? 46 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 76 Other IAEA Non-proliferation Activities 47 Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources 76 Assurances of Supply and the Multilateralization of the Fuel Cycle 48 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 77 Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 49 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 78 Non-compliance with Safeguards 79 Secretariat Involvement in Non-compliance Cases 80 Future Safeguards Challenges Trevor Findlay • iii UNLEASHING THE NUCLEAR WATCHDOG: STRENGTHENING AND REFORM OF THE IAEA TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) 81 Involvement in Nuclear Disarmament 133 Works Cited 82 Conclusions 141 Acronyms and Abbreviations 83 Part Six: Promotion of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 143 About CIGI 85 Promotion of Nuclear Energy 143 CIGI Masthead 86 Technical Cooperation 144 CIGI Nuclear Energy Resources 89 The Proliferation Issue 90 Conclusions 91 Part Seven: Management and Administration 91 The Current State of Transition 92 Management and Administrative Reviews 93 Commission of Eminent Persons 93 The MANNET Report 94 Strategic Planning 95 Human Resources 99 Part Eight: Technology and Infrastructure 100 Verification Technologies and Infrastructure 100 Sample Analysis (Environmental and Nuclear Material) 101 Infrastructure 102 Satellite Imagery 102 Remote Monitoring 103 Safeguards Research and Development, Including Novel Technologies 104 Information Technology 104 The IAEA Website 107 Part Nine: Finance and Budget 108 Expanding Roles 110 The Impact of Zero Real Growth 111 Who Pays for the IAEA? 112 Late Payments and Non-payments 112 The Regular Budget 114 Voluntary Extra-Budgetary Contributions 115 Safeguards versus Technical Cooperation 116 The Case for Increased IAEA Funding 116 Future Financial Needs of the Agency 118 Alternative Funding Models and Sources 118 An IAEA Endowment 118 A Contingency Fund 118 Implementing the User Pays Principle: A Surcharge, Tax or Fee for Service 120 A Resource Mobilization Strategy 120 Other Budgetary Reforms 123 Conclusions and Recommendations 124 Does the Agency Need Strengthening and Reform? 125 Future Challenges 126 Strengthening and Reform Proposals: The Final Cut 128 Annexes iv • CiGi SpeCial reporT | www.CiGionline.orG LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 15 Figure 1: IAEA Membership by Group per Year (1957–2011) 15 Figure 2: Percentage of IAEA Board of Governors Seats by Region 25 Figure 3: Elements of the IAEA Emergency Preparedness and Response Framework for Nuclear and Radiological Incidents and Emergencies 27 Figure 4: International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale 36 Table 1: IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles 37 Figure 5: IAEA Safety Standards Series 61 Table 2: Safeguards-strengthening Measures 62 Figure 6: Development of the Safeguards System Since 1991 69 Figure 7: State Evaluation Is a Continuous Process 103 Figure 8: Number of Remote Monitoring Systems in Use, 1999–2010 108 Figure 9: Growth of IAEA Safeguards Commitments, 1957–2011 109 Figure 10: Facilities Under IAEA Safeguards, 2000 and 2010 109 Table 3: Approximate Quantities of Material Subject to Agency Safeguards (in SQs), 2000 and 2010 110 Figure 11: Top 10 Contributors to IAEA Budget and Selected Others to IAEA Budget (2011) 111 Figure 12: Difference between Scaled and Unscaled Contributions to 2011 Regular Budget 113 Figure 13: Regular Budget Expenditures, 2000–2011 113 Figure 14: Percentage of Budget (Regular plus Extrabudgetary) by Program, 2000–2011 114 Figure 15: Extra-budgetary Expenditures in Support of the Regular Budget by Category, 2000–2011 115 Figure 16: Technical Cooperation Funding as a Percentage of Safeguard Funding, 1999–2010 119 Figure 17: Top 10 Contributors to IAEA Budget and Selected Others with Domestic Nuclear Shares of Electricity Generation (2011) 128 UN Member States and Observers Not Members of the Agency 128 The Members of the Agency 129 IAEA Organizational Chart 130 IAEA Chronology Trevor Findlay • v UNLEASHING THE NUCLEAR WATCHDOG: STRENGTHENING AND REFORM OF THE IAEA of seven books, including Nuclear Dynamite: The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Fiasco (Sydney: Brassey’s Australia, 1990); Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC (Oxford:
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