Proliferation Alert! the IAEA and Non-Compliance Reporting
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Project on Managing the Atom Proliferation Alert! The IAEA and Non-Compliance Reporting Trevor Findlay October 2015 Project on Managing the Atom Report No. 2015-04 Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 617-495-4219 [email protected] http://www. belfercenter.org/mta The author of this report invites liberal use of the information provided in it for educational purposes, requiring only that the reproduced material clearly cite the source, using: Findlay, Trevor. “Proliferation Alert! The IAEA and Non-Compliance Reporting.” Project on Managing the Atom, Report #2015-04, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2015. Design & Layout by Andrew Facini and Josh Anderson Cover photo: Satellite photograph of Yongbyong nuclear facility from September 11, 2005, prior to North Korea’s demolition of the reactor cooling tower on June 27, 2008 in compliance with the Six Party Talks Agreement of February 13, 2007 (Digital Globe) This report was funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Copyright 2015, President and Fellows of Harvard College Printed in the United States of America Project on Managing the Atom proliferation Alert! The IAEA and Non-Compliance Reporting Trevor Findlay October 2015 About the Author Dr. Trevor Findlay was a Senior Research Fellow with the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) at the Belfer Center from 2011 to 2014 and remains an MTA Associate. He is a former Australian diplomat, with a Ph.D. in international affairs from the Australian National University (ANU). He has held research positions at the ANU and the Stockholm International Peace Research Centre and was Executive Director of the London-based non-governmental organization the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) for seven years. In 2005 he was appointed professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada, where he held the William and Jeanie Barton Chair for eight years and where he remains an Associate Research Professor. In January 2013 he was appointed to the United Nations Secretary-General’s Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters. He is currently a Principal Fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne. Dr. Findlay is the author of several books and monographs, including: Nuclear Dynamite: the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Fiasco (Brassey’s Australia, Sydney, 1990); Nuclear Energy and Global Governance: Ensuring Safety, Security and Non-proliferation (Routledge, London, 2011) and Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, ON, 2012). His monograph, IAEA Safeguards Through a Cultural Lens: Power, Planning, and Habit, will be published by Belfer later in 2015. In addition he is writing a book on the IAEA and global nuclear crises. Preface This study is a product of the Project on Managing the Atom (MTA), the first in a series of reports on the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York from 2013–2015. Research for the project involved documentary study, analysis of IAEA reports, interviews with current and former IAEA personnel, and consultations with government officials and academics. In conducting the research I have had assistance from three enthusiastic young MTA interns: Nate Sands, who conducted a masterful textual analysis of IAEA non- compliance reports and compiled the chart on the corpus of non-compliance reports; Kate Miller, who compiled the acronym list, helped with the bibliography and proof- reading, and produced the chart showing non-compliance reporting trends; and Aurora Lachenauer, who also helped finalize the bibliography and proof-read the final draft for publication. The Iraq case study relies on document gathering and analysis by Derek De Jong, a student research assistant at the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance at Carleton University in 2005. My colleagues at MTA, Joshua Anderson, Matthew Bunn, Martin Malin, and Nickolas Roth, were unfailingly helpful and supportive. Two of my MTA Research Fellow colleagues, Ahsan Butt and Rachel Whitlark, and Executive Editor for the Belfer Center Studies in International Security book series, Karen Motley, were constant sources of encouragement as we all struggled to complete our various major time-bound projects. I am also indebted to Ken Brill, Matthew Bunn, John Carlson, Jean-Maurice Crete, Vilmos Cserveny, Olli Heinonen, Cathy Pasterczyk, Steve Pullinger, Tariq Rauf, Jenni Rissanen, Gary Samore, and Dirk Schriefer, who contributed invaluably in the form of interviews, answers to specific questions or in reading the manuscript. I am especially indebted to Laura Rockwood for steering me through the shoals of IAEA legal terminology and practice. I am also grateful to Laura in her new position as Executive Director of the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP), as well as to her predecessor Elena Sokova, for hosting a seminar on the draft report on July 9, 2015, and to Mara Pfneisl for organizing it. I am appreciative of all those from the Agency, diplomatic missions, academia, and civil society who attended and provided suggestions and advice. Thanks also to Carl Robichaud at the Carnegie Corporation of New York for his encouragement and support. Notwithstanding all the generous assistance I received from many quarters, the views and analysis in the report are my responsibility alone. Finally, I am grateful to the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and its Director Graham Allison for a wonderful four years as Research Fellow (later Senior Research Fellow) with MTA and the International Security Program, led by Steve Miller. I was intellectually nourished, inspired, challenged, and stimulated in ways that will have a lasting effect on my work and life. Trevor Findlay Cambridge, October 2015 List of Acronyms AEA Atomic Energy Authority [Egypt] AEOI Atomic Energy Organization of Iran AP Additional Protocol AVLIS atomic vapor laser isotope separation BOG Board of Governors CANDU Canada Deuterium Uranium (reactor) CNS Convention on Nuclear Safety CSA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBTO Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization DDG Deputy Director General DG Director General DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea DU depleted uranium E3 European 3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) E3+3 European 3 plus China, Russia, and the United States E3/EU+3 European 3/EU plus China, Russia, and the United States EU European Union EU3 European Union 3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) EXPO Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination FFCD Full, final and complete declaration (Iraq) HEU highly-enriched uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICC Iraq Coordination Committee INVO Iraq Nuclear Verification Office JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran) KAERI Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute KANUPP Karachi Nuclear Power Plant KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Corporation LOF location (of nuclear materials) outside facilities MNSR Miniature Neutron Source Reactor NAM Non-Aligned Movement NGO Non-Governmental Organization NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty OMV ongoing monitoring and verification OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons P5 permanent five (members of the United Nations Security Council) PIV physical inventory verification PMD Possible Military Dimensions RSAC Regional system of accounting and control ROK Republic of Korea R&D Research and Development SAGSI Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation SIR Safeguards Implementation Report SQP Small Quantities Protocol SLC State-level concept SRD shipper/receiver difference SSAC State system of accounting and control SSC significant safety concerns STA Safeguards Transfer Agreement STR Safeguards Technical Report UAE United Arab Emirates UN United Nations UNDSS UN Department of Safety and Security UNGA UN General Assembly UNMOVIC UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission UNSC UN Security Council UNSCR UN Security Council Resolution Table of Contents Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................i Key Recommendations ..................................................................................................................i Implications for the Iran Deal .......................................................................................................iii Introduction ...............................................................................................................................1 The IAEA and Non-Compliance Reporting ................................................................................2 Aims of the Study ............................................................................................................................4 A Note About Terminology ...........................................................................................................5 Part 1: The Non-Compliance Reporting Process: In Theory and Practice .................7 Role of the “Inspectors” .........................................................................................................................9