NPR 16.1: Jean Du Preez Interviews Ambassador Yukiya Amano on The
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INTERVIEW MAKING THE AGENDA STICK Lessons Learned From the 2007 NPT PrepCom Jean du Preez interviews Ambassador Yukiya Amano After the conclusion of the 2008 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Nonproliferation Review interviewed Ambassador Yukiya Amano of Japan, who presided over the 2007 session of the PrepCom in Vienna. He provided valuable insights into his preparations for the PrepCom and shared his thoughts on some of the most pressing issues that confronted his chairmanship and the PrepCom as a whole. The interview also provides useful perspectives on the future of the strengthened review process. KEYWORDS: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; nuclear nonproliferation; nuclear disarmament The legacy of the 2007 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is one of deep disputes among delegations on how to reflect the significance of past agreements and the implementation of the treaty. Despite vigorous efforts by PrepCom Chairman Yukiya Amano to consult widely with delegations prior to the start of the meeting, these differences prolonged the adoption of the agenda until the second week. This in turn limited substantive discussion of some of the treaty’s most significant challenges. Ambassador Amano is the permanent representative of Japan to international organizations in Vienna and has served as Japan’s governor on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors since September 2005. He has held increasingly senior positions in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, notably as director- general of the Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Science Department. Ambassador Amano has extensive experience in disarmament, nonproliferation, and nuclear energy policy and has been involved in negotiating major international nonproliferation measures, including the indefinite extension of the NPT, the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention verification protocol. He represented Japan as a governmental expert in the UN Expert Group on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education, and was a diplomat-in-residence at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in 2001. The 2007 PrepCom, held in Vienna from April 30 to May 11, 2007, was the first of three sessions to be held prior to the 2010 Review Conference. Under the terms of the ‘‘improved’’ strengthened review process (agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference), Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 2009 ISSN 1073-6700 print/ISSN 1746-1766 online/09/010015-10 – 2009 Monterey Institute of International Studies, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies DOI: 10.1080/10736700802645577 16 JEAN DU PREEZ INTERVIEWS YUKIYA AMANO the first two sessions (in 2007 and 2008) considered ‘‘principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the [NPT], as well as its universality.’’ The third session, which will be held in New York City from May 4Á15, 2009, will make recommendations to the 2010 Review Conference, taking into account the deliberations and results of the two previous PrepComs. One hundred and six states parties, as well as IAEA representatives, participated in the PrepCom. Representatives from the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the European Commission, the League of Arab States, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference attended as observers. Unlike previous years, when all but the plenary meetings were closed to nongovernmental participants, representatives of sixty-six civil society organizations were allowed to attend all the meetings of the committee. Although Amano discouraged parties from proposing amendments to the agenda* noting that the draft agenda represented a fine balance of various positions based on prior consultations and that a single amendment would invite other parties to propose changes, thereby delaying work on substantive issues*the agenda was nevertheless contested. Specifically contested was the absence, in the paragraph that frames the work of the PrepCom, of any reference to the 2000 Review Conference agreement. While an appropriate reference was eventually agreed upon, France and the United States insisted that references to the 1975, 1985, and 2005 Review Conferences also be included, thereby diluting the significance of the 2000 outcome. The major point of contention, however, surrounded agenda item VI, which called for states parties to ‘‘reaffirm the need for full compliance of the treaty.’’ Iran insisted that the text be changed to clarify that ‘‘full compliance’’ entailed compliance with all provisions of the treaty, a position that was intended to prevent a formalized and official censure of its enrichment activities. A proposal from South Africa, offered on the final day of the first week, presented a compromise that led to an agreed agenda, which included a footnote defining ‘‘full compliance.’’ The agenda was used for the 2008 PrepCom session and will again be used in 2009. Although the delayed adoption of an agenda limited the discussions during the last three days of the PrepCom, Amano managed to extract a comprehensive Chairman’s Summary that covered all the issues raised at the PrepCom in a balanced manner. However, some delegations, most notably Iran, supported by some non- aligned states, criticized the summary because it did not include every issue discussed during the committee’s session. Given the emphasis placed on Iran during the PrepCom debate, Iran also objected to be singled out in the summary. Instead of forming part of the final report, the summary was submitted in the Chairman’s Working Paper. Jean du Preez, director of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, sat down with Amano after the conclusion of the 2008 PrepCom. Their conversation follows. MAKING THE AGENDA STICK 17 Preparations and Expectations Jean du Preez: What were your initial expectations about the outcome of the PrepCom? Were these expectations met? Yukiya Amano: Following our experiences at the 2005 Review Conference, I hoped to resolve a number of procedural issues, including the adoption of the agenda, from the very outset of the 2007 PrepCom. My aim was to allow for a sufficient amount of time to conduct discussions on substantive matters and also for the preparation of the summary at the end of the meeting. As the chair, I felt it was my responsibility to achieve these goals. Fortunately, most of the objectives were attained, although the adoption of the agenda took longer than expected. JdP: During the period between your nomination as the PrepCom chairman- designate and the start of the 2007 PrepCom, how did you consult, and with whom? What do you think of using a mechanism such as an informally constituted ‘‘Friends of the Chair’’? Did you ever feel the need for such a mechanism, as was employed in the past by some review conference presidents and PrepCom chairs? YA: I initiated a series of consultations with states parties as soon as the Western Group endorsed me as the chair-designate. In Vienna, New York, and Geneva, I had the opportunity to hold meetings with three groups, namely the Western Group, the Group of Eastern European States, and the Group of Non-Aligned States (also known as the Non- Aligned Movement, or NAM), in addition to other states parties on numerous occasions. Bilateral consultations were also held with participating countries at a number of NPT seminars and conferences, which I attended. Meetings with the NAM troika were very helpful, as were the exchanges of views with group coordinators. As for the ‘‘Friends of the Chair’’ mechanism you mention, I am fortunate to have very good relationships with representatives of the states parties, and I consider them, and in particular the group coordinators, as good friends of mine. As such, I did not feel there was a great need for a mechanism of this type to be put in place at the time. JdP: Disagreements over the PrepCom agenda delayed the start of deliberations until the second week. What was your strategy in consulting delegations to resolve the differences over the agenda? YA: I conducted intensive consultations, primarily with coordinators from each regional group, and also with other key players. If and when discussions among the parties showed signs of becoming overly protracted, I worked to identify options that would potentially be helpful in reaching an agreement. I would then call a meeting and ask the floor whether or not the options on the table were acceptable. If one of these options was not fully supported by all parties concerned, it was removed from the table, and I would then re-consult in order to identify and propose further options until agreement was reached. My aim in opting for this approach was to demonstrate that I wanted, and was prepared 18 JEAN DU PREEZ INTERVIEWS YUKIYA AMANO for, thorough consultations. On the other hand I also wanted to make clear that discussions would not be left to continue indefinitely if there was a way of bringing an item on the agenda to a close sooner. JdP: What other procedural issues had to be resolved prior to the start of the PrepCom? For example, were there any differences among delegations about the indicative timetable, and how was the question about North Korea’s status at the PrepCom handled? YA: There was some disagreement relating to the identification of ‘‘specific issues’’ and regarding the allocation of time for these. Nevertheless, I would say that at the time, the aforementioned agenda-related issues were probably the trickiest. Regarding the status of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), I listened carefully to the views of a number of countries and to those of civil society.