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Cold War Continues 1960'S Or Cuban Missile Crisis C.Notes Cold War Continues 1960’s or Cuban Missile Crisis C.notes Cold War Continues 1960’s or Cuban Missile Crisis C.notes Fidel Castro and Cuba Fidel Castro and Cuba • After assuming power in 1959, Fidel Castro transformed • After assuming power in 1959, Fidel Castro transformed Cuba into the first communist state in the Western Cuba into the first communist state in the Western Hemisphere Hemisphere • Bay of Pigs April 1961 • Bay of Pigs April 1961 – ex·pa·tri·ate - give up residence in one’s homeland – ex·pa·tri·ate - give up residence in one’s homeland and denounce allegiance to them and denounce allegiance to them – Take notes during clip – Take notes during clip http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8qXZp8bxpNY : http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8qXZp8bxpNY : summarize Bay of Pigs I.N. top ½ page 68 summarize Bay of Pigs I.N. top ½ page 68 Cubam Missile Crisis Cubam Missile Crisis * October 1962, U.S. U-2 spy plane secretly photographed nuclear * October 1962, U.S. U-2 spy plane secretly photographed nuclear missile sites being built by the Soviet Union on the island of Cuba. missile sites being built by the Soviet Union on the island of Cuba. 13 days in Oct. on the brink of nuclear war 13 days in Oct. on the brink of nuclear war “On the 8th day of the crisis, October 24, 1962, The U.S. has set up a “On the 8th day of the crisis, October 24, 1962, The U.S. has set up a naval blockade around Cuba. President Kennedy is doing what he can to naval blockade around Cuba. President Kennedy is doing what he can to avoid armed conflict and still stand up to the Soviet ships that appear to avoid armed conflict and still stand up to the Soviet ships that appear to attempt to run the blockade. This was the first of many days during the attempt to run the blockade. This was the first of many days during the 13-day crisis that looked like the U.S. and the Soviet Union were going 13-day crisis that looked like the U.S. and the Soviet Union were going to engage in all-out nuclear conflict.” to engage in all-out nuclear conflict.” The rest of the story.. why would USSR agree to remove the The rest of the story.. why would USSR agree to remove the missiles? Because US had missiles in Turkey and removed missiles? Because US had missiles in Turkey and removed agreed to remove them agreed to remove them Secrets of the Dead: The man who saved the world. Secrets of the Dead: The man who saved the world. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4VPY2SgyG5w “New http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4VPY2SgyG5w “New Conclusion? Conclusion? What was the Secret deal that the US and USSR made What was the Secret deal that the US and USSR made to resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis? to resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis? Read 3 documents answer guided Read 3 documents answer guided questions………reading like a historian questions………reading like a historian “It horrifies me to think what would have happened in the event of an “It horrifies me to think what would have happened in the event of an invasion of Cuba!... It would have been an absolute disaster for the invasion of Cuba!... It would have been an absolute disaster for the world.... No one should believe that a U.S. force could have been world.... No one should believe that a U.S. force could have been attacked by tactical nuclear warheads without responding with attacked by tactical nuclear warheads without responding with nuclear warheads. And where would it have ended? In utter nuclear warheads. And where would it have ended? In utter disaster.” disaster.” —Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara —Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara “If we go into Cuba we have to realize that we are taking “If we go into Cuba we have to realize that we are taking a chance that these missiles, which are ready to fire, a chance that these missiles, which are ready to fire, won’t be fired.... The fact is that that is one hell of a won’t be fired.... The fact is that that is one hell of a gamble.” gamble.” —President John F. Kennedy, October 22, 1962 —President John F. Kennedy, October 22, 1962 .
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