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James Giglio on One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy

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James Giglio on One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy Aleksandr Fursenko, Timothy Naftali. One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997. xi + 420 $27.50, cloth, ISBN 978-0-393-04070-8. Reviewed by James N. Giglio Published on H-Diplo (March, 1998) The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 has the frst to incorporate sources from the Russian been a veritable cottage industry for scholars.[1] archives, including the Presidium materials on Moreover, considerable primary materials contin‐ Cuba, the KGB's records of its Washington, D.C. ue to become available, most recently State and and Havana bureaus, and the military intelligence Defense department documents published in The files. Whether this represents full disclosure re‐ Foreign Relations of the United States, which ap‐ mains unclear. The study also incorporates per‐ peared about one year prior to the publication of sonal interviews of former Soviet officials. This the study under consideration, and The Kennedy collaborative effort involves Timothy Naftali, a Tapes edited by Ernest R. May and Philip D. Ze‐ teacher of history at Yale University where he is a likow, which came out too late for One Hell of a fellow at International Security Studies, and Alek‐ Gamble. With the publication of the May-Zelikow sandr Fursenko, chairman of the History Depart‐ study, one now has access to all of the taped delib‐ ment of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Billed erations of the Executive Committee of the Na‐ as an international study, it also includes materi‐ tional Security Council (ExComm), increasing our als from the archives of France and the Czech Re‐ understanding of how Kennedy and his associates public. What is notably missing are sources from grappled with Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Cuban repositories, which most likely will remain With the release of the Kennedy tapes, the John closed. Fitzgerald Kennedy Library has opened about The book title comes from a response Presi‐ ninty-nine percent of its material on the missile dent Kennedy made to the congressional leader‐ crisis. All that remains closed apparently are the ship in the heat of the crisis following a recom‐ materials in Robert Kennedy's personal papers as mendation to invade Cuba. With Soviet nuclear well as some intelligence-related documents. medium- and intermediate-range missiles pointed Of the recent works, none is more significant at the United States, it would indeed have been than One Hell of a Gamble because it represents "one hell of a gamble" to knock them out--one that H-Net Reviews Kennedy privately did not wish to take. But this sional elections of 1962 to inform Kennedy per‐ work does not limit itself to the crisis; it begins sonally of the missiles. Of course, his plan could with the emergence of Fidel Castro as the leader succeed only if the missiles remained undetected of the Cuban revolutionary government, and it prior to being made operational and if Kennedy concludes with Khrushchev's ouster from power. were willing to "swallow" them as the Soviets had It covers Soviet-U.S. relations through the late done in Turkey. From the beginning the Russian Eisenhower-Kennedy presidencies, paying partic‐ military leaders were skeptical that the missiles ular attention to the Bay of Pigs and the Kennedys' could be concealed from American U-2 reconnais‐ obsession with Cuba afterward. Since the greatest sance fights, and even Khrushchev soon had his revelations come from Soviet sources, it tilts in doubts. Kennedy's tough September statement that direction. Those who are accustomed to asso‐ against possible Soviet military presence in Cuba ciating certain events and names with the missile suggested that the American president would fnd crisis will be surprised by the omissions: There is the missiles difficult to ingest. no mention of Dean Acheson, Adlai Stevenson's The United States detection of the missiles confrontation with the Soviets at the UN, Andrew and the ExComm secret deliberations of how to Cordier, AM/LASH, or the dramatic events relating respond is a familiar story that One Hell of a Gam‐ to the blockade. Obviously, this is not a definitive ble retells. It emphasizes the fuidity of the posi‐ study of the crisis. tions taken, with Defense Secretary Robert McNa‐ One Hell of a Gamble does show the extent to mara favoring a limited air strike by the morning which Khrushchev directed Soviet foreign policy of October 26 after initially opposing it, and it re‐ from the inception of the Cuban revolution. He veals that JFK, despite supporting an air strike un‐ alone decided to support the Castro regime by til October 20, became the greatest proponent of a supplying it with arms and then negotiating a se‐ trade involving the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. cret treaty pledging to defend Cuba. Because of Less well-known is the extent to which both sides Castro's fears of a U.S. invasion--there were four engaged in back-channel negotiations largely in‐ separate invasion scares in 1960-1961-- volving Robert Kennedy, the president's brother, Khrushchev advised an ambivalent Castro to ac‐ and Georgi Bolshakov, the Soviet military intelli‐ cept Soviet ground-to-ground missiles as a deter‐ gence officer. In such encounters Soviet sources rent. Soviet sources suggest that Khrushchev may confirm the misperceptions that both had of one have been even more concerned by the discrep‐ another. While the Soviets correctly surmised that ancy between Soviet and U.S. ICBM capabilities. Kennedy faced pressure from the military for an Placing Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba would en‐ air strike, they exaggerated the possibility of a U.S. able him to close the gap. Those same missiles invasion of Cuba. U.S. policymakers, meanwhile, might force the United States to reconsider its had it wrong that Soviet hard-liners were pressur‐ Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Moreover, Kennedy's ing Khrushchev. The study also discloses the decision to resume nuclear testing also became a weakness of Soviet intelligence during the crisis. consideration as was Castro's suspected drift While ignoring more credible sources, the Rus‐ away from Moscow as the result of internal con‐ sians instead accepted questionable information siderations. Khrushchev made the missile deploy‐ from a New York Herald Tribune correspondent ment decision, and the Presidium unanimously that the U.S. planned an invasion, convincing approved it. Khrushchev that he could not keep ballistic mis‐ Khrushchev's strategy included a proposed siles in Cuba without going to war. visit to the United States following the congres‐ 2 H-Net Reviews One Hell of a Gamble suggests that the removal of all offensive weapons, including Khrushchev's October 26 letter, proposing a U.S. the Il-28 bombers. promise not to attack Cuba for a Soviet one to re‐ Khrushchev's capitulation invited Castro's move the missiles, was circulated among Presidi‐ wrath. The Soviet records reveal the extent to um members before being sent to Kennedy. His which antagonisms developed between the two letter the following day represented a reconsider‐ allies. Angry at not being consulted, Castro op‐ ation influenced not by hard-liners but by feelers posed UN inspection of the removal of the mis‐ emanating from meetings between Bolshakov and siles and the withdrawal of the bombers. His com‐ close Kennedy friend Charles Bartlett, a Washing‐ patriots--particularly "Che" Guevara--mocked So‐ ton-based correspondent; and journalist Frank viet power; one attempted to toast Joseph Stalin at Holeman, who had ties with Robert Kennedy. That a dinner attended by Anastas Mikoyan, second letter of October 27, proposing a missile Khrushchev's personal envoy to Havana. At the trade, was apparently dictated by Khrushchev at a same time Khrushchev became livid at Castro for meeting of the Presidium. Of course, it became a threatening to shoot down American U-2s and for crucial part of the settlement in which Robert earlier suggesting that the Soviets unleash their Kennedy secretly promised Bolshakov that the nuclear arsenal against the United States. He missiles in Turkey would be removed in four or called Castro unreasonable and undisciplined and five months. Khrushchev apparently did not be‐ momentarily questioned his commitment to him. tray Kennedy's confidence either to Castro or to And after the Cubans began to covet the tactical his own bureaucracy even after coming under nuclear weapons, which were unknown to the heavy criticism for failing to extract any conces‐ U.S., the Soviets decided to remove them too. sion other than the U.S. promise not to attack Soviet fles revealed how concerned Cuba. Khrushchev was about Kennedy's assassination. Perhaps the most controversial issue of the Since the Soviet leadership had only Kennedy's missile crisis remains the deployment of tactical word about not invading Cuba, rather than a writ‐ nuclear missiles in Cuba. Did the Soviet military ten agreement, his demise threatened to overturn commander, Issa Pliyev, have authorization to use the arrangement and the emerging detente be‐ them in the event of an invasion? Apparently, tween the two countries. Viewing Kennedy's as‐ even though Pliyev had not received fnal instruc‐ sassination as a right-wing conspiracy, the Soviets tions from Khrushchev, enough ambiguity existed became immediately suspicious of President John‐ where they could have been used against invad‐ son who was repeatedly denigrated by Kennedy ing forces. It was not until the 27th that he re‐ loyalists. In the end, as Soviet sources suggest, ceived an order that "you are forbidden to apply Cuba contributed to Khrushchev's collapse. He fell nuclear warheads ... without authorization from victim to a bloodless coup in October 1964 follow‐ Moscow" (p. 276) Also on the 27th, a Soviet com‐ ing an attack in the Presidium for his Cuban ad‐ mander disobeyed instructions by fring a SA-2 venturism, which his detractors argued brought rocket, thereby destroying a U-2 plane piloted by the world to the brink and led to Soviet humilia‐ Captain Rudolf Anderson, an indication that mat‐ tion.
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