The End Was Near New Information About the Cuban Missile Crisis Shows Just How Close We Came to Nuclear Armageddon by Michael Dobbs
t was one minute before high noon on Oct. 27,1962, the air-defense tracking network. But there was little they could day that later became known as "Black Saturday" More do with this information: The ability to "read the mail" than 100,000 American troops were preparing to invade of Russian air defenses was a closely guarded Cold War Cuba to topple Fidel Castro's communist regime and secret. Pentagon records show that Defense Secretary Robert destroy dozens of Soviet intermediate- and medium-range McNamara was not informed about tbe missing U-2 until ballistic missiles thought to be aimed at targets in the 1:41 p.m., 101 minutes after Maultsby first penetrated Soviet IUnited States. American reconnai.ssance aircraft were drawing airspace. He briefed President Jobn E Kennedy by phone enemy fire. The U.S. Strategic Air Command's missiles and four minutes later. manned bombers bad been ordered to DEECON-2, one step "There's always some sonofabitch who doesn't get the word," short of nuclear war. In the Caribbean, U.S. Navy destroyers was Kennedy's frustrated response. were playing a cat-and-mouse game with Russian submarines At 2:03 p.m. came news that another U-2, piloted by Major armed with nuclear-tipped torpedoes. Rudolf Anderson Jr., was missing while on an intelligence- And then, at 11:59 a.m., a U-2 spy plane piloted by Captain gathering mission over eastern Cuba. Evidence soon emerged Charles W. Maultsby unwittingly penetrated Soviet airspace it had been shot down by a Russian surface-to-air missile in a desolate region of the Chukot Peninsula opposite Alaska. near the town of Banes. Anderson was presumed dead. Flying at an altitude of 70,000 feet, the 11-year Air Force Historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. called the Cuban Missile veteran was oblivious to the drama below. He bad been Crisis "the most dangerous moment in human history." Schol- on a routine mission to the North Pole, gathering radio- ars and politicians agree that for several days the world was active air samples from a Soviet nuclear test. Dazzled by tbe the closest it has ever come to nuclear Armageddon. aurora boreahs, he'd wandered off course, ending up over But the nature of the risks confronting Kennedy and the Soviet Union on the most perilous day of the Cold War. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev have been widely mis- THE END WAS NEAR NEW INFORMATION ABOUT THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS SHOWS JUST HOW CLOSE WE CAME TO NUCLEAR ARMAGEDDON BY MICHAEL DOBBS
He was completely unaware the Soviets had scrambled understood. Eor decades, the incident was taught in war MiG figbters to intercept him, and not until he heard bala- colleges and graduate schools as a case study in the art laika music over bis radio did he finally figure out where of "crisis management." A young American president went he was. "eyeball to eyeball" with a Russian chairman and forced A former member of tbe Air Force's Tbunderbirds fligbt- him to back down through a skillful blend of diplomacy demonstration team, Maultsby bad enough fuel in his and force. Accorditig to Scblesinger, Kennedy "dazzled the tank for nine hours and 40 minutes of flight. That was world" through "a combination of toughness and restraint, sufficient for a 4,000-mile round trip between Fairbanks' of will, nerve and wisdom, so brilliantly controlled, so Eielson Air Force Base and tbe Nortb Pole, but not enough matchlessly calibrated." for a 1,000-mile detour over Siberia. At 1:28 p.m. Washing- Tbanks to newly opened archives and interviews with ton time, Maultsby shut down his single Pratt & Whitney key participants in the United States, Russia and Cuha, it is J57 engine and entrusted his fate to his U-2's extraordinary now possible to separate the mytb from the reality. The real gliding capabilities. The Air Force's Alaskan Air Command risks of war in October 1962 arose not from the "eyeball-to- sent up two F-102 figbters to guide bim back across tbe eyeball" confrontation between Kennedy and Khrushchev, Bering Strait and prevent any penetration of American but from "sonofabitcb" moments exemphfied by Maultsby airspace by the Russian MiGs. Because of the heightened and his wandering U-2. alert, the F-102s were armed with nuclear-tipped air-to-air The pampered son of the Boston millionaire and the o missiles, sufficient firepower to destroy an entire fleet of scion of Russian peasants had more in cominon than they incoming Soviet bombers. imagined. Having experienced World War II, both were On the ground, SAC commanders were frantically trying horrified hy the prospect of a nuclear apocalypse. But neither to retrieve their wayward reconnaissance plane. They knew leader was fully in command of his own mihtary machine. Maultsby's location, as they had tapped into the Soviet As the crisis lurched to a climax on Black Saturday, events
\ MILITARY HISTORY Photographed from a low-flying U.S. Navy patrol aircraft in November 1962, the Soviet freighter Anosov carries tarpaulin-shrouded ballistic missiles on her fore and aft decks. threatened to spin out of control. Unable to effectively A full-scale invasion of the island would follow within communicate with each other, the two leaders struggled seven days. Marine units and the Army's 1st Annored Divi- to rein in the chaotic forces of history they themselves sion would hit the beaches east and west of Havana, along a had unleashed. 40-mile front, in an operation modeled after the ]uno 1Q44 D-Day landings in France. he countdown to Armageddon began on October 16, It is impossible to tell what would have happened had when Kennedy learned that Khrushchev had broken Kennedy accepted the advice of Air Force General Curtis This promise not to deploy "offensive weapons" in LeMay and the other joint chiefs. But several things are Cuba—a U-2, piloted by Major Richard Heyser, had flown certain. The risks of a nuclear conflagration were extraor- over the island two days earlier and taken photographs dinarily high. And the full scope of the danger was not of intermediate-range Soviet missiles near the town of understood in Washington, Moscow or Havana. None of San Cristóbal. Kennedy branded the mercurial Russian the main protagonists—Kennedy, Khrushchev or Castro— leader "an immoral gangster," but the Americati presi- had tnore than a very limited knowledge of events unfolding on a global battlefield that stretched from the Florida Straits to the Bering Sea. In sotne ways. World War III had already begun—aircraft were taking fire, missiles were being readied for launch and warships were forcing potentially hostile subtnarines to surface. As Black Sattirday dawned, Castro wrote Moscow of his conviction that an American attack on the island was "almost inevitable" and would take place in the next 24 to 72 hours. Unbeknownst to Kennedy, the Cuban leader had visited the Soviet embassy in Havana at 3 a.m. and petined an anguished telegram to Kbrushchev. If the "itnperialists" invaded Cuba, Castro declared, the Soviet Union should undertake a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the United States. In the meantime, he ordered his anti-aircraft defenses to begin firing on low-flying American reconnaissance planes. Castro declared that he and his comrades were "ready to die in the defense of our country" rather than submit to a Yanqui occupation. The Soviet cotnmander in Cuba, General Issa Pliyev, was also preparing for war. On his orders, a convoy of trucks carrying nuclear warheads moved out of the central storage depot at Bejucal, south of Havana, around mid- night. By early afternoon, the convoy had reached the Sagua la Grande missile site in central Cuba, tnaking it possible for the Soviets to lob eight 1-megaton missiles Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and American President John F. Kennedy at the United States. Pliyev also ordered the arming of share a light moment after a meeting at the U.S. Embassy in Vienna, shorter-range tactical nuclear missiles to counter a U.S. in- Austria, in June 1961. Just over a year later, the men, both veterans of vasion of Cuba. By àawn a battery of cruise missiles tipped World War II, would bring the world to the brink of all-out nuclear war. witb 14-kiloton warheads had targeted the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay from an advance position just dent bore some responsibility for bringing about the crisis. 15 miles away. His bellicose, but ultimately ineffective, attempts to get Kennedy was blissfully unaware of the nature of the rid of Castro had provoked Khrushchev into taking dras- threat facing U.S. forces poised to invade Cuba. Oti October tic action to "save socialism" in Cuba. Kennedy imposed 23, the CIA estimated that the Soviets had between 8,000 a military quarantine on the island and demanded the and 10,000 military "advisers" in Cuba, up from an earlier Soviets withdraw their missiles. estimate of 4,000 to 5,000. We now know that the actual By October 27—tbe 12th day of the crisis—the two super- Soviet troop strength on Black Saturday was 42,822, a figure powers were on the brink of war. The CIA reported that that included heavily armed combat units. Furthermore, morning that five of the six Soviet R-12 missile sites were CSI these troops were equipped with tactical nuclear weapons ae. "fully operational." All that remained was for the warheads intended to hurl an invading force back into the sea. Mc- LU to be mated to the missiles. Time was obviously running out. CO Namara was stunned to learn, three decades later, that the The U.S.Joint Chiefs of Staff presented the president with Soviets had 98 tactical nukes in Cuba that Atnerican intelli- a formal recommendation to bomb tbe Soviet missile sites. gence knew nothing about.
MLITA»V HISTORY U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, flying at high speed and often at low altitude, took thousands of images over Cuba, including, left, missile equipment at the port of Mariel; right, Soviet 11-28 jet bombers at San Julian Airfield; and, below, a medium-range ballistic missile base.
ERECTOR ON LAUNCH PAD
MISSILE READY BLDGS
OXIDIZER VEHIC!' •MHHHl PROB HYDROGEN PEROXIDE TANKS
READY BLDGS BLACK SATURDAY. HOUR BY HOUR No one can know for sure whether the Soviets would SATURDAY OCT. 271962 • 12:44 p.m. Soviet have actually used these weapons in the event of an • 12:38 a.m. Soviet SAM MiG fighters attempt American invasion of Cuha. In a cahle to Pliyev, Khru- missile sites on Cuba activated, to intercept Maultsby. shchev had asserted his sole decision-making authority according to transmissions • 1:28 p.m. Maultsby over the firing of nuclear weapons, both strategic and tacti- intercepted by USS Oxford. runs out of fuel. cal. But communications between Moscow and Havana • 3 a.m. Fidel Castro visits • 1:41 p.m. SAC informs Soviet embassy in Havana, Defense Secretary Robert were sporadic at best, and the missiles lacked electronic wires Moscow urging McNamara that U-2 is locks or codes to prevent their unauthorized use. The Khrushchev to use missing off Alaska. weapons were typically under the control of a captain or a nuclear missiles against • 1:45 p.m. McNamara U.S. if Cuba is invaded. major. It is quite conceivable that a mid-level Soviet officer informs Kennedy of missing U-2. • 4 a.m. U-2 piloted by might have fired a nuclear weapon in self-defense had tlic • 2:03 p.m. McNamara Captain Charles W. Maultsby informed that U-2 is Americans landed. takes off from Eielson AFB missing over Cuba. en route to North Pole to "You have to understand the psychology of the military monitor Soviet nuclear tests. • 2:25 p.m. Maultsby person," said Colonel-General Viktor Yesin, a former chief lands at Kotzebue. Alaska. • 5 a.m. Soviet nuclear of staff of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, when con- • 3:02 p.m. Cuban cruise missiles arrive at fronted with precisely this scenario. "If you are being launch position. 15 miles radio announces that from Guantanamo naval base. U.S. aircraft overflying attacked, why shouldn't you reciprocate?" As a young lieu- Cuba will be fired upon. • 6:45 a.m. U.S. Navy tenant in October 1962, Yesin was responsible for preparing tracks Soviet freighter • 4:28 p.m. Cuban anti- the missiles at Sagua la Grande for the final countdown. Grozny en route to Cuba. aircraft guns fire on Navy reconnaissance planes There is at least one documented case of a Soviet offi- • 9:09 a.m. U-2 piloted by near San Cristobal. cer contemplating the unauthorized use of tactical nuclear Major Rudolf Anderson takes off for mission over eastern Cuba. • 5:59 p.m. Navy drops practice weapons on Black Saturday Valentin Savitsky, captain of depth charges on nuclear-armed the Soviet submarine B-59, considered firing his 10-kiloton • 10:12 a.m. Anderson enters Soviet submarine B-59. Cuban air space. nuclear torpedo at the destroyer USS Beale as the latter • 8:05 p.m. Robert Kennedy • 10:18 a.m. Radio Moscow meets with Soviet ambassador attempted to force B-59 to the surface by dropping practice announces Khrushchev offer Dobrynin. offers to withdraw to withdraw missiles from depth charges. Savitsky could not communicate with U.S. missiles from Turkey Moscow and had no idea if war had broken out while he Cuba in return for withdrawal "within four to five months" of U.S. missiles in Turkey. of Soviet puliout from Cuba. was submerged. "We're going to blast them now!" he yelled. • 11:19 a.m. Anderson is • 9:52 p.m. ß-59 surfaces "We will die, but we will sink them all!" Fortunately for pos- shot down, shortly after without a fight. terity, his fellow officers calmed him down. The humiliated overflying Soviet missile positions near Guantanamo. SUNDAY OCTOBER 28 Savitsky surfaced his vessel at 9:52 p.m. • 11:30 a.m. Nuclear • 2 a.m. Khrushchev meets with Communist Party warheads arrive at Soviet he unauthorized firing of nuclear weapons was only missile base at Sagua la presidium; decides to withdraw Grande in central Cuba after Soviet missiles from Cuba. one ol several dangers the world faced at the peak overnight journey from Bejucal. • 9 a.m. Radio Moscow of the Guban Missile Crisis. The very act of ordering announces withdrawal of T • U:59 a.m. Maultsby's Ü-2 armies, missiles and nuclear-armed bombers to hair-trigger Soviet missiles from Cuba. enters Soviet air space as a states of readiness created its own risks, which increased result of navigational error. (All times Eastern; exponentially as the crisis progressed. Mishaps, accidents and near misses occurred on all sides. A U.S. F-106 carrying a nuclear warhead crash-landed in III CIISIIIIl •II« SltBs. Terre Haute, Ind. A guard at an Air Force base in Duluili, situ 11 Him ifiia SIIIS Minn., mistook a fence-climbing bear for a Soviet saboteur, ma sill triggering an alarm to scramble an interceptor squadron in Wisconsin. A truck in the Soviet cruise missile convoy moving toward Guantanamo fell into a ravine in the middle of the night, convincing others in the convoy they were under attack. American air-defense radars picked up evi- ! s« I !<• siTis Ii4i D cioaat roati IHT dence of a missile launch in the Gulf of Mexico that was later
/ ss» cmisi siTis (5) ^ * III« «muiDs 12) traced to a computer glitch. Mistakes and miscalculations go hand in hand with war. tea ptiiot ciiri iKSis (21 |«iii siiis 1 Some have far-reaching consequences, leading to the point- o o «IC.II «llflliti Ui less squandering of blood and treasure, but they are unlikely CM to cause the end of civilization. Kennedy understood that
00 Based on reconnaissance photographs, communications intercepts a nuclear war is different from a conventional war. There is and other sources, U.S. intelligence analysts produced the above map no room for error. A "limited nuclear war" is a contradiction of Soviet installations in Cuba, including the contested missile sites. in terms.
MILrTARY HISTORY As the missile crisis deepened, U.S. forces at Guantanamo Bay on Cuba's southeast coast went on high alert. As Maultsby glided across the skies of eastern Russia, Bypassing his executive committee, or FxComm, the presi- a debate raged in the White House over how to respond dent sent his brother. Attorney General Robert F Kennedy, to a new message from Khrushchev, delivered over Radio to meet Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Do- Moscow. The Soviet leader had offered Kennedy a deal: brynin at 8:05 p.m. on Black Saturday. "There's very little The Soviet Union would withdraw its nuclear missiles from time left," the younger Kentiedy warned Dobt"ynin. "Events Cuba if the United States agreed to remove its analogous are moving too quickly." If the Soviet government disman- missiles from Turkey Advisers urged the president to reject tled its missile bases in Cuba, the United States would end Khrushchev's offer, arguing that acceptance would destroy the Cuba quarantine and promise not to invade the island. NATO, compromise the American negotiating position "What about Turkey?" Dobrynin asked. and confuse public opinion. Kennedy remained open to Tbe attorney general told the ambassador that the presi- the proffered deal. dent was willing to withdraw the Ainerican Jupiter missiles "How else are we gonna get those missiles out of there?" from Turkey "within four to five tnonths" but added that the he asked. U.S. government would not make any public commitment to do so—that part of the deal would have to remain secret. Al- ennedy's decisions on Black Saturday were shaped though Bobby Kennedy did not set a deadline for a response by a lifetime of political and military experience, from Khntshchev, he warned that "we're going to have to make K beginning with his service as a World War 11 U.S. certain decisions within the next 12, or possibly 24, hours.... Navy torpedo boat commander in the Pacific. One lesson If the Cubans shoot at our planes, we're goitig to shoot back." he learned from World War II was that "the military al- Like John Kennedy, Khrushchev had come to understand ways screws up." Another was that "the people deciding the liinits of crisis management. At 9 a.m. on October 28— the whys and wherefores" had better be able to explain why the 13th day of the crisis—the Soviet premier broadcast they were sending young men into battle in clear and sim- another message over Radio Moscow, announcing the dis- ple terms. Otherwise, Kennedy noted in a private letter, mantling of the Cuban missile sites. He also expressed his "the whole thing will turn to ashes, and we will face great concern about the overflight of the Chukot Peninsula by trouble in the years to come." He was also influenced by his- Maultsby's U-2. "What is this—a provocation?" he asked torian Barbara Tuchman's 1962 book The Guns of August, Kennedy. "One of your planes violates our frontier during which described how the great powers had blundered into this anxious time we are both experiencing, when every- World War I without understanding why. Kennedy did not thing has been put into combat readiness. Is it not a fact that want the survivors of a nuclear war to ask each other, an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a "How did it all happen?" nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step?"
MILITARY HISTORY r-T':"sc*Tr:*- -"' ••'-•
iting national-security considerations, the U.S. Air Khrushchev's concession triggered the removal of most Soviet military Force has yet to release a single document on hardware from Cuba. Top, Kasimov'is outbound with il-28 bomber CMaultsby's adventures. In the book One Minute fuselages. Above, USS Vesole escorts the missile-bearing Polzunov. to Midnight, this author was able to piece together his story from a family memoir, interviews with his fellow the cockpit like "a rag doll." (Charles Maultsby died of U-2 pilots and scraps of information discovered in other cancer in 1998.) government archives. After switching off his engine, The "sonofabitch wbo never got the word" was fortunate Maultsby glided for 45 minutes across the Bering Sea and to survive that day the White House called Black Saturday. was eventually picked up by the American F-102s. Maultsby So was the rest of humanity. (^ performed a dead-stick landing on an ice airstrip near Kot- zebue, on the westernmost tip of Alaska. Numbed from Eor further reading, Michael Dobbs recommends his own his 10 hour 25 minute ordeal, he had to be lifted out of One Minute to Midnight (Knopf 2008). Copyright of Military History is the property of Weider History Group and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.