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The Development of Military Nuclear Strategy And
The Development of Military Nuclear Strategy and Anglo-American Relations, 1939 – 1958 Submitted by: Geoffrey Charles Mallett Skinner to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History, July 2018 This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. (Signature) ……………………………………………………………………………… 1 Abstract There was no special governmental partnership between Britain and America during the Second World War in atomic affairs. A recalibration is required that updates and amends the existing historiography in this respect. The wartime atomic relations of those countries were cooperative at the level of science and resources, but rarely that of the state. As soon as it became apparent that fission weaponry would be the main basis of future military power, America decided to gain exclusive control over the weapon. Britain could not replicate American resources and no assistance was offered to it by its conventional ally. America then created its own, closed, nuclear system and well before the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, the event which is typically seen by historians as the explanation of the fracturing of wartime atomic relations. Immediately after 1945 there was insufficient systemic force to create change in the consistent American policy of atomic monopoly. As fusion bombs introduced a new magnitude of risk, and as the nuclear world expanded and deepened, the systemic pressures grew. -
Copyright by Paul Harold Rubinson 2008
Copyright by Paul Harold Rubinson 2008 The Dissertation Committee for Paul Harold Rubinson certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Containing Science: The U.S. National Security State and Scientists’ Challenge to Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War Committee: —————————————————— Mark A. Lawrence, Supervisor —————————————————— Francis J. Gavin —————————————————— Bruce J. Hunt —————————————————— David M. Oshinsky —————————————————— Michael B. Stoff Containing Science: The U.S. National Security State and Scientists’ Challenge to Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War by Paul Harold Rubinson, B.A.; M.A. Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin August 2008 Acknowledgements Thanks first and foremost to Mark Lawrence for his guidance, support, and enthusiasm throughout this project. It would be impossible to overstate how essential his insight and mentoring have been to this dissertation and my career in general. Just as important has been his camaraderie, which made the researching and writing of this dissertation infinitely more rewarding. Thanks as well to Bruce Hunt for his support. Especially helpful was his incisive feedback, which both encouraged me to think through my ideas more thoroughly, and reined me in when my writing overshot my argument. I offer my sincerest gratitude to the Smith Richardson Foundation and Yale University International Security Studies for the Predoctoral Fellowship that allowed me to do the bulk of the writing of this dissertation. Thanks also to the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale University, and John Gaddis and the incomparable Ann Carter-Drier at ISS. -
Annual Report 2013.Pdf
ATOMIC HERITAGE FOUNDATION Preserving & Interpreting Manhattan Project History & Legacy preserving history ANNUAL REPORT 2013 WHY WE SHOULD PRESERVE THE MANHATTAN PROJECT “The factories and bombs that Manhattan Project scientists, engineers, and workers built were physical objects that depended for their operation on physics, chemistry, metallurgy, and other nat- ural sciences, but their social reality - their meaning, if you will - was human, social, political....We preserve what we value of the physical past because it specifically embodies our social past....When we lose parts of our physical past, we lose parts of our common social past as well.” “The new knowledge of nuclear energy has undoubtedly limited national sovereignty and scaled down the destructiveness of war. If that’s not a good enough reason to work for and contribute to the Manhattan Project’s historic preservation, what would be? It’s certainly good enough for me.” ~Richard Rhodes, “Why We Should Preserve the Manhattan Project,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2006 Photographs clockwise from top: J. Robert Oppenheimer, General Leslie R. Groves pinning an award on Enrico Fermi, Leona Woods Marshall, the Alpha Racetrack at the Y-12 Plant, and the Bethe House on Bathtub Row. Front cover: A Bruggeman Ranch property. Back cover: Bronze statues by Susanne Vertel of J. Robert Oppenheimer and General Leslie Groves at Los Alamos. Table of Contents BOARD MEMBERS & ADVISORY COMMITTEE........3 Cindy Kelly, Dorothy and Clay Per- Letter from the President..........................................4 -
Character List
Character List - Bomb Use this chart to help you keep track of the hundreds of names of physicists, freedom fighters, government officials, and others involved in the making of the atomic bomb. Scientists Political/Military Leaders Spies Robert Oppenheimer - Winston Churchill -- Prime Klaus Fuchs - physicist in designed atomic bomb. He was Minister of England Manhattan Project who gave accused of spying. secrets to Russia Franklin D. Roosevelt -- Albert Einstein - convinced President of the United States Harry Gold - spy and Courier U.S. government that they for Russia KGB. Narrator of the needed to research fission. Harry Truman -- President of story the United States Enrico Fermi - created first Ruth Werner - Russian spy chain reaction Joseph Stalin -- dictator of the Tell Hall -- physicist in Soviet Union Igor Korchatov -- Russian Manhattan Project who gave physicist in charge of designing Adolf Hitler -- dictator of secrets to Russia bomb Germany Haakon Chevalier - friend who Werner Reisenberg -- Leslie Groves -- Military approached Oppenheimer about German physicist in charge of leader of the Manhattan Project spying for Russia. He was designing bomb watched by the FBI, but he was not charged. Otto Hahn -- German physicist who discovered fission Other scientists involved in the Manhattan Project: Aage Niels Bohr George Kistiakowsky Joseph W. Kennedy Richard Feynman Arthur C. Wahl Frank Oppenheimer Joseph Rotblat Robert Bacher Arthur H. Compton Hans Bethe Karl T. Compton Robert Serber Charles Critchfield Harold Agnew Kenneth Bainbridge Robert Wilson Charles Thomas Harold Urey Leo James Rainwater Rudolf Pelerls Crawford Greenewalt Harold DeWolf Smyth Leo Szilard Samuel K. Allison Cyril S. Smith Herbert L. Anderson Luis Alvarez Samuel Goudsmit Edward Norris Isidor I. -
William T. Golden October 1950 – April 1951
Impacts of the Early Cold War on the Formulation of U.S. Science Policy Selected Memoranda of William T. Golden October 1950 – April 1951 Edited with an Appreciation by William A. Blanpied Foreward by Neal Lane Copyright © 1995, 2000 American Association for the Advancement of Science 1200 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20005 The findings, conclusions, and opinions stated or implied in this publication are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Directors, Council, or membership of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. William T. Golden Contents Contents Foreword....................................................................................................................................................... 4 Preface ......................................................................................................................................................... 6 Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................................ 7 A Brief Biography ........................................................................................................................................ 8 William T. Golden’s Chronicle of an Era: An Appreciation ....................................................................... 9 Decision Memorandum F.J. Lawton, Decision Memorandum for the President, October 19, 1950................................................ 34 Conversations: 1950 Herman -
Pugwash Literature Review Paul Rubinson April 2019
Pugwash Literature Review Paul Rubinson April 2019 During the 1990s, historians began to study the reasons for the Cold War’s abrupt end. While scholarship at first emphasized the role of traditional, powerful political actors such as Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, more and more historians began to study the influence of non-state actors, including social activists and nongovernment organizations (NGOs), on Cold War foreign relations and their contributions to the conflict’s end. When the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, along with co-founder Joseph Rotblat, were awarded the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize, scholars began to pay closer attention to the historical role of these particular scientific activists. Founded in 1957, the Pugwash conferences brought together notable scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain to discuss nuclear disarmament in an informal but serious setting. The hope was that these elite scientists would be able to sway their respective governments into pursuing arms control measures. As one of its original participants explained, the ideal Pugwash conference consisted of politically influential scientists “free from governmental ties” as well as “opinion-makers…who are concerned with policy making on a governmental or semi-governmental level. Any major thoughts that were developed at such a meeting could then filter through the observers to the general public and to the governments involved.”1 Over time Pugwash expanded to include a wider array of scientists and social scientists and broadened its scope to include chemical and biological weapons, third world development, and other issues. On an international level, Pugwash was led by a General Secretary and Continuing Committee based in London. -
Character List
Character List - Bomb Use this chart to help you keep track of the hundreds of names of physicists, freedom fighters, government officials, and others involved in the making of the atomic bomb. Scientists Political/Military Leaders Spies Robert Oppenheimer - Winston Churchill -- Prime Klaus Fuchs - physicist in designed atomic bomb. He was Minister of England Manhattan Project who gave accused of spying. secrets to Russia Franklin D. Roosevelt -- Albert Einstein - convinced President of the United States Harry Gold - spy and Courier U.S. government that they for Russia KGB. Narrator of the needed to research fission. Harry Truman -- President of story the United States Enrico Fermi - created first Ruth Werner - Russian spy chain reaction Joseph Stalin -- dictator of the Tell Hall -- physicist in Soviet Union Igor Korchatov -- Russian Manhattan Project who gave physicist in charge of designing Adolf Hitler -- dictator of secrets to Russia bomb Germany Haakon Chevalier - friend who Werner Reisenberg -- Leslie Groves -- Military approached Oppenheimer about German physicist in charge of leader of the Manhattan Project spying for Russia. He was designing bomb watched by the FBI, but he was not charged. Otto Hahn -- German physicist who discovered fission Other scientists involved in the Manhattan Project: Aage Niels Bohr George Kistiakowsky Joseph W. Kennedy Richard Feynman Arthur C. Wahl Frank Oppenheimer Joseph Rotblat Robert Bacher Arthur H. Compton Hans Bethe Karl T. Compton Robert Serber Charles Critchfield Harold Agnew Kenneth Bainbridge Robert Wilson Charles Thomas Harold Urey Leo James Rainwater Rudolf Pelerls Crawford Greenewalt Harold DeWolf Smyth Leo Szilard Samuel K. Allison Cyril S. Smith Herbert L. Anderson Luis Alvarez Samuel Goudsmit Edward Norris Isidor I. -
Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing
Battlefi eld of the Cold War The Nevada Test Site Volume I Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing 1951 - 1963 United States Department of Energy Of related interest: Origins of the Nevada Test Site by Terrence R. Fehner and F. G. Gosling The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb * by F. G. Gosling The United States Department of Energy: A Summary History, 1977 – 1994 * by Terrence R. Fehner and Jack M. Holl * Copies available from the U.S. Department of Energy 1000 Independence Ave. S.W., Washington, DC 20585 Attention: Offi ce of History and Heritage Resources Telephone: 301-903-5431 DOE/MA-0003 Terrence R. Fehner & F. G. Gosling Offi ce of History and Heritage Resources Executive Secretariat Offi ce of Management Department of Energy September 2006 Battlefi eld of the Cold War The Nevada Test Site Volume I Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing 1951-1963 Volume II Underground Nuclear Weapons Testing 1957-1992 (projected) These volumes are a joint project of the Offi ce of History and Heritage Resources and the National Nuclear Security Administration. Acknowledgements Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, Volume I of Battlefi eld of the Cold War: The Nevada Test Site, was written in conjunction with the opening of the Atomic Testing Museum in Las Vegas, Nevada. The museum with its state-of-the-art facility is the culmination of a unique cooperative effort among cross-governmental, community, and private sector partners. The initial impetus was provided by the Nevada Test Site Historical Foundation, a group primarily consisting of former U.S. Department of Energy and Nevada Test Site federal and contractor employees. -
Trial Run May 7, 1945
trial run may 7, 1945 A crew prepares fission products from the Hanford slug Completed stack of 100 tons of TNT rests on the sturdy for insertion in the high explosive for the 100-ton test. tower, ready for the May 7 firing. Carpenters who built Material simulated, at a low level, the radioactive the tower were appalled, on returning to the site after products expected from the nuclear explosion. the test, to find the structure completely obliterated. Crates of high explosive, brought from Fort Wingate, The 100-ton explosion would have been an unforget- ore stacked on the 20-foot high wooden tower. The table sight, witnesses say, had it not been outdone so men have about 15 more rows to go before the stack soon afterward by the nuclear explosion. Brilliant will be complete. orange fireball was observed 60 miles away. 41 The rehearsal proved to be tremendously valu- devices. Each experiment required different time able and the high percentage of successful measure- schedules, some having to start ahead of Zero, others ments in the final test may be attributed in large requiring a warning pulse only 1000th of a second measure to the experience gained from the shot. ahead of the detonation. The circuits were the re- Blast and earth shock data were valuable not only sponsibility of Joseph McKibben and the electronic for calibrating instruments but for providing stand- timing device was developed by Ernest Titterton of ards for the safe design of shock proof instrument Australia. In addition to these chores there were the shelters. -
George Bogdan Kistiakowsky
GEORGE BOGDAN KISTIAKOWSKY MEMORIAL MINUTE ADOPTED BY THE FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES HARVARD UNIVERSITY NOVEMBER 13, 1984 GEORGE BOGDAN KISTIAKOWSKY BORN November 18, 1900 DIED December 7, 1982 eorge B. Kistiakowsky began an adventurous, vibrant, and highly successful career in Kiev, Russia, November 18, 1900, the son of a professor of international law. At his death on December 7, G1982, he was Abbott and James Lawrence Professor of Chemistry Emeri tus at Harvard. Kistiakowsky was an eminent scientist, a very loyal officer of this Uni versity, and a tireless battler for the proper application of science to pub lic policy questions. In particular, he continued his vigorous crusade for the control of nuclear weapons right up to his last days. His friends knew him as a truly exceptional man, courageous, dashing, witty, intelligent, and strong. Kistiakowsky was fearless and forceful in expressing his views, in public as well as in private. He held strong opin ions about people as well as issues so that he inevitably made enemies, but he never let this interfere with his advocacy of courses of action he believed in. In fact, he seemed to thrive on controversy. Each of us has his favorite Kistiakowsky story, all marked by his unique brand of irrev erent humor, which never left him. After a series of hair-raising adventures as a member of the White Army in the Russian Revolution and a harrowing escape from the Cri mea, Kistiakowsky’s scientific career started in Berlin. There he began his lifetime study of chemical kinetics—the detailed steps by which chemicals react—under Professor Max Bodenstein, from whom he acquired his approach to chemical research: the primacy of experiment and the importance of a personal command of a broad range of laboratory and intellectual techniques. -
George Pake Became Purcell’S Second Student
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES GEOR G E EDWARD PAKE 1 9 2 4 — 2 0 0 4 A Biographical Memoir by CHARLES P. SLICHTER Any opinions expressed in this memoir are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Academy of Sciences. Biographical Memoir COPYRIGHT 2009 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES WASHINGTON, D.C. GEORGE EDWARD PAKE April 1, 1924–March 4, 2004 BY CHARLES P . SLICHTER EORGE PAKE WAS A brilliant scientist, a devoted teacher, Ga wise and strong academic leader, and an exceptional director of industrial research who brought to life a remark- able, highly creative industrial research laboratory. His ac- complishments affect the lives of millions of people all over the world in numerous ways. I met George in 1947 when we were graduate students doing our doctoral research with Edward Purcell. We main- tained c lose scientific contact through the early 1960s and professional contact into the early 1970s, but our contacts became more sporadic as his enormous responsibilities at Xerox grew in scope and intensity. Nevertheless, any occasion on which I saw George was a delight. We picked up where we left off with no sense of intervening time. I feel especially fortunate since I saw close up his ability as a scientist, as a teacher, as someone who could bridge disciplines, and as someone others sought to be their leader. George grew up in Kent, Ohio, where his father taught English at Kent State University. George loved baseball, re- maining a fan all his life. He also learned to play the French horn, deriving great pleasure from it for many years. -
Nuclear Freeze (16 of 16) Box: 15
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections. Collection: Blackwell, Morton: Files Folder Title: Nuclear Freeze (16 of 16) Box: 15 To see more digitized collections visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected] Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/ I 139 From Foreign Affairs, Summer 1982, Volume 60, No. s. 1 I 11,The. Deb~te Qv~ No Fj,~s:t 'l:,Jse t- T/u autltor.1· re/1/y: Responses to our essay, in these and other comments, have demonstrated wide interest in the issue. Instead of attempting a detailed response to these I thoug!Hful letters, we would like to address a number of the ba<;ic questions raised hoth in the letters and elsewhere. First, it should be emphasized, because some critics have misunderstood I our argument, that while we ourselves believe in a policy of no-first-use, our specific recommendation was for official and private studies of ways and means of moving,.lo such a policy. Obviously the most important question for study is how to ensure a conventional force posture that will persuasively deter I a Soviet conventional attack. J\ number of officials assert that such a posture is unattaina!Jlc, but many qualified authorities disagree, including a number of senior retired military leaders, now free to speak their minds. Recently Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, a well-informed member of the Senate Armed I Services Committee, made a strong public argument for modernizing conven tional forces so as to create what he calls "a viable conventional defense.'' Senator Nunn believes that strengthened conventional forces should precede I and not follow any adopt ion of a no-first-use policy; we think progress toward both can be made together, in a mutually reinforcing way.