DOCSLIB.ORG

Reforming Haiti's Security Sector

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Reforming Haiti's Security Sector REFORMING HAITI’S SECURITY SECTOR Latin America/Caribbean Report N°28 – 18 September 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. SECURITY IN HAITI TODAY....................................................................................... 2 III. POLICE REFORM........................................................................................................... 7 A. VETTING AND TRAINING ..............................................................................................................9 B. BORDER INITIATIVES .................................................................................................................11 C. REESTABLISHING THE ARMY?....................................................................................................13 D. COMMUNITY VIOLENCE REDUCTION .........................................................................................14 IV. JUSTICE REFORM ....................................................................................................... 16 A. INDEPENDENCE AND STRENGTHENING OF THE JUDICIARY..........................................................16 B. PRISON REFORM ........................................................................................................................17 1. Conditions of imprisonment ......................................................................................................17 2. Reducing overcrowding.............................................................................................................19 V. THE WAY FORWARD.................................................................................................. 20 A. REMOVING OBSTACLES TO SUCCESSFUL SSR............................................................................20 B. ADDRESSING JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM CHALLENGES ...............................................................22 C. SWIFTLY ALLEVIATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC HARDSHIP TO PREVENT VIOLENT PROTEST .............23 VI. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................ 24 APPENDICES A. MAP OF HAITI..................................................................................................................................26 B. GLOSSARY.......................................................................................................................................27 C. REPORTED KIDNAPPINGS, 2006-2008..............................................................................................30 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................32 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN ......................................33 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................34 Latin America/Caribbean Report N°28 18 September 2008 REFORMING HAITI’S SECURITY SECTOR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Operations led by the UN peacekeeping mission best way to preempt dangerous, politically motivated (MINUSTAH) largely disbanded armed gangs in the pressures to reconstitute the notorious army. slums of Haiti’s cities in early 2007, but security and stability are far from consolidated. The failure to pro- Strengthening the justice sector, including the dys- vide an immediate, visible peace dividend once the functional penitentiary system, is another key part gangs’ hold was broken was a lost opportunity the of SSR. Haiti still lacks the basic capacity to detain, still fragile country could ill afford. Now new threats prosecute and sentence offenders, especially those are appearing. Serious crime persists, especially kid- responsible for serious crimes. To strengthen the rule napping and drug trafficking, and in the absence of of law, it is crucial that the new government speed a sufficiently large and fully operational police force implementation of the justice legislation parliament and functioning justice and penitentiary systems, it passed in late 2007, conclude vetting of the members threatens to undermine political progress. This was of the Superior Judicial Council and establish special evidenced by the fall of Prime Minister Jacques- chambers to bring cases of serious crime to trial. Hai- Edouard Alexis’s government following April 2008 tian authorities, with donor help, must also swiftly protests and riots against high living costs. Security improve correction facilities, which remain in awful sector reform (SSR) is essential to stabilisation but shape, vulnerable to prison breaks and filled with sus- has been plagued by serious institutional weaknesses. pects who have never seen a judge. The new prime minister, Michèle Pierre-Louis, who Likewise, border control and economic development was confirmed by parliament only in August and in- along the border with the Dominican Republic (D.R.) augurated in September, and President René Préval is vital to security and the economy. The new gov- need to act immediately and decisively, with MINUS- ernment should define a strategy and reach out to re- TAH and donor help, to conclude police and justice cently re-elected Dominican President Leonel Fernández reform. These challenges are all the more urgent, as with the aim of concluding agreements on border they come at a time when Haiti is struggling with development and security. These should cover migra- severe hurricane devastation, and quick disbursement tion, economic and environmental issues, as well as of international emergency and recovery assistance is transborder organised crime and law enforcement. of crucial importance for the new government. Without such a strategy and improved cooperation be- tween the neighbours, Haiti’s Border Development The process to create a modestly sized 14,000-strong Commission and MINUSTAH’s expanded role along Haitian National Police (HNP) by 2011 – a pivotal ele- the frontier will be empty shells. Finally, the govern- ment of SSR – must be speeded up. The vetting of the ment and donors need to put in place comprehensive approximately 9,000 active duty HNP officers has violence reduction programs that recognise the link- been much too slow and insufficiently transparent ages between severe poverty, social deprivation and to address concerns that individuals responsible for crime, particularly in the rural communities, where 70 human rights violations and corruption remain in per cent of Haitians live, and the high density urban the force. Administrative difficulties have limited neighbourhoods. recruitment and training. The intake of qualified per- sonnel, with special emphasis on more female cadets, has to be increased or the 2011 goal will be impossible to reach. A graduate-level police academy is needed in which commanders can acquire specific skills, including riot and border control, intelligence gather- ing and analysis, forensics and expertise in fighting drug trafficking. Building a professional HNP is the Reforming Haiti’s Security Sector Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Report N°28, 18 September 2008 Page ii RECOMMENDATIONS (e) cooperating with the bar association to estab- lish a national network of lawyers to assure legal To the Government of Haiti: representation in all criminal cases and justice centres that provide free legal aid to the poor. 1. Strengthen reform of the Haitian National Police (HNP) by: 3. Improve the inhumane conditions in prisons by: (a) expediting the vetting of all active duty officers; (a) reviving the Detention Commission (CCDPP) to review cases of prisoners detained for (b) bringing enrolment at the police academy to minor crimes, especially those not charged full capacity (1,300), recruiting in particular for an extended period of time, broadening more female cadets with good academic its mandate to the entire country and requir- records and making learning materials and ing that any recommendations for release are equipment available to all cadets; reviewed by a justice ministry working group (c) establishing an academy for advanced training to ensure that dangerous criminals are not of mid- and senior-level commanding officers; released; (d) expanding exchange programs for training (b) establishing, with international humanitarian abroad of HNP officers in counter-drugs, agencies such as the International Committee anti-kidnapping, riot control, forensics and of the Red Cross (ICRC), regular visits to all intelligence gathering and analysis; detention centres to monitor the health and conditions of prisoners; and assisting the (e) implementing a more efficient human re- Prisons Administration Directorate (DAP) to sources, equipment maintenance and man- set up and maintain a health records system agement system to deploy personnel based on for inmates; and skills and training, monitor performance and ensure more adequate control and use of (c) moving more rapidly to implement, with donor equipment; and support, the national prison reform plan’s commitments for new construction and guard (f) establishing the more muscular elements of training, including refurbishing the Delmas the force (border police, coast guard and riot 75 former psychiatric hospital to house inmates, control), publicising their capabilities and finalising plans for the new national prison
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Multilateral Peace Operations and the Challenges of Organized Crime
    SIPRI Background Paper February 2018 MULTILATERAL PEACE PROJECT SUMMARY w The New Geopolitics of Peace OPERATIONS AND THE Operations III: Non‑traditional Security Challenges initiative CHALLENGES OF was launched with support from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, co‑sponsored ORGANIZED CRIME by Ethiopia, and in continued partnership with the Friedrich‑ jaÏr van der lijn Ebert‑Stiftung (FES). This phase of the initiative seeks to enhance understanding I. Introduction about peace operations and non‑traditional security Multilateral peace operations are increasingly confronting a set of challenges such as terrorism interrelated and mutually reinforcing security challenges that are relatively and violent extremism, new to them, that do not respect borders, and that have causes and effects irregular migration, piracy, which cut right across the international security, peacebuilding and organized crime and environmental degradation. It development agendas.1 Organized crime provides one of the most prominent aims to identify the various examples of these ‘non-traditional’ security challenges.2 perceptions, positions and There are many different definitions of organized crime depending on the interests of the relevant context, sector and organization. The United Nations Convention against stakeholders, as well as to Transnational Organized Crime defines an ‘organized criminal group’ as stimulate open dialogue, ‘a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time cooperation and mutual and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes understanding by engaging key or offences . in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other stakeholders and mapping the material benefit’.3 However, this definition is not unchallenged.
    [Show full text]
  • MOE Steve Ijames
    27-CR-20-12953 Filed in District Court State of Minnesota 1/14/2021 1:33 PM Steve Ijames EDUCATION • Bachelor of Science degree in Criminal Justice Administration, Drury University, Springfield, Missouri • Master of Science Degree in Public Administration, City University, Bellevue, Washington • Graduate, Missouri State Highway Patrol Law Enforcement Academy • Graduate, Missouri State Highway Patrol undercover narcotics investigator training program. • Graduate, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) undercover narcotics investigator training program. • Graduate, Mid States Organized Crime Information Center (MOCIC) narcotic investigators Criminal Intelligence Techniques training program. • Graduate, Springfield, Missouri Police Department Academy • Graduate, 186th FBI National Academy LAW ENFORCEMENT/PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Poplar Bluff, Missouri Police Department • April 1979 through February 1981-Patrol Officer • February 1981 through August 1982-Narcotics Detective Springfield, Missouri Police Department • August 1982-1000 hour Springfield Police academy training • January 1983-uniformed patrol officer • September 1985-undercover narcotics investigator and Federal Drug Task Force member-Commissioned Deputy Untied States Marshal • October 1987-uniformed patrol • July 1988-Detective-criminal investigations and undercover narcotics investigations • September 1989-Sergeant-criminal investigations • April 1990-Crisis Action Team leader/sergeant (SWAT) • December 1992-Lieutenant, Special Operations Commander-overseeing all SWAT and narcotics
    [Show full text]
  • Evolution of Police Monitoring in Peace Operations
    12 Evolution of police monitoring in peace operations J. Matthew Vaccaro ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ C are often conducted in failed states or in those emerging from civil conflict. In these environments, the local criminal justice system has often been largely destroyed or has become otherwise ineffective as a result of widespread corruption among its constituent parts and/or their involve- ment in the war. This problem is exemplified by the state of indigenous police forces at the beginning of recent peace operations. In Somalia, for instance, the police were inoperative: they left their posts when a central government failed to emerge after President Siad Barre was deposed in 1991. In Haiti, the police were integrated into the armed forces and used by the ruling junta to repress the popula- tion. When the multinational peacekeeping force arrived in September 1994 and broke the regime’s stranglehold, police officers stopped doing their jobs and assumed a defensive posture, fearing that ordinary citizens would seek retribution. In Bosnia- Herzegovina, where police forces had been segregated along ethnic lines and had participated in the sectarian conflict, the police attempted to continue the fighting through intimidation and thuggery throughout the tenure of the United Nations Protection Force () (1992–95). In the ethnically polarised Kosovo conflict, the police were a primary player in the ‘ethnic cleansing’ and were forced to leave the province as part of the settlement granting access to North Atlantic Treaty Organization () troops and the establishment of a United Nations () administration. Furthermore, in each of these situations the other components of the criminal justice system—the courts, prisons and, in a less tangible way, the laws of state—were also absent, ineffective or unjust.
    [Show full text]
  • Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
    Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response Rhoda Margesson Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy Maureen Taft-Morales Specialist in Latin American Affairs February 2, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R41023 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response Summary The largest earthquake ever recorded in Haiti devastated parts of the country, including the capital, on January 12, 2010. The quake, centered about 15 miles southwest of Port-au-Prince, had a magnitude of 7.0. A series of strong aftershocks have followed. The damage is severe and catastrophic. It is estimated that 3 million people, approximately one third of the overall population, have been affected by the earthquake. The Government of Haiti is reporting an estimated 112,000 deaths and 194,000 injured. In the immediate wake of the earthquake, President Preval described conditions in his country as “unimaginable,” and appealed for international assistance. As immediate needs are met and the humanitarian relief operation continues, the government is struggling to restore the institutions needed for it to function, ensure political stability, and address long-term reconstruction and development planning. Prior to the earthquake, the international community was providing extensive development and humanitarian assistance to Haiti. With that assistance, the Haitian government had made significant progress in recent years in many areas of its development strategy. The destruction of Haiti’s nascent infrastructure and other extensive damage caused by the earthquake will set back Haiti’s development significantly. Haiti’s long-term development plans will need to be revised. The sheer scale of the relief effort in Haiti has brought together tremendous capacity and willingness to help.
    [Show full text]
  • Examining the Urban Dimension of the Security Sector
    Examining the Urban Dimension of the Security Sector Research Report Project Title: Providing Security in Urban Environments: The Role of Security Sector Governance and Reform Project supported by the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) February 2018 Authors (in alphabetical order): Andrea Florence de Mello Aguiar, Lea Ellmanns, Ulrike Franke, Praveen Gunaseelan, Gustav Meibauer, Carmen Müller, Albrecht Schnabel, Usha Trepp, Raphaël Zaffran, Raphael Zumsteg 1 Table of Contents Table of Contents Authors Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations 1 Introduction: The New Urban Security Disorder 1.1 Puzzle and research problem 1.2 Purpose and research objectives 1.3 Research questions 1.4 Research hypotheses 1.5 Methodology 1.6 Outline of the project report 2 Studying the Security Sector in Urban Environments 2.1 Defining the urban context 2.2 Urbanisation trends 2.3 Urban security challenges 2.4 Security provision in urban contexts 2.5 The ‘generic’ urban security sector 2.6 Defining SSG and SSR: from national to urban contexts 3 The Urban SSG/R Context: Urban Threats and Urban Security Institutions 3.1 The urban SSG/R context: a microcosm of national SSG/R contexts 3.2 The urban environment: priority research themes and identified gaps 3.3 Excursus: The emergence of a European crime prevention policy 3.4 Threats prevalent and/or unique to the urban context – and institutions involved in threat mitigation 3.5 The urban security sector: key security, management and oversight institutions
    [Show full text]
  • Congressional Record—Senate S2006
    S2006 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE March 6, 1997 to all of those who are suffering and all market principles. In Latin America, This is one area in which American those who are fighting back, trying to the Reagan doctrine certainly has expertise can make a big difference. In- put their lives back in order. worked. deed, with some extra United States I see on the floor my colleague from As free elections and economic liber- help, Haiti could succeed in convicting Ohio and my colleague from Kentucky alization has taken place in country some of the worst defenders, like the and my colleague from West Virginia. after country, the countries of South murderers of Mireille Bertin and Guy All are States, as well as Indiana, that and Central America have become bet- Malary. Mireille Bertin was an anti- have been hit very hard. ter neighbors for the United States. I Aristide lawyer. Guy Malary was The most heartening thing to see believe these same principles apply to Aristide’s justice minister. To pros- during a tragedy such as this is how our national strategy in regard to ecute and convict the killers in those people react. We have many organiza- Haiti. kinds of cases would send an unmistak- tions that are involved, but probably Mr. President, we need to apply these able message to Haitian society: Your the biggest organization involved is principles to Haiti so that over the chance of getting justice does not de- not an organization at all, it is just long term, Haiti can move out of the pend on what side you are on.
    [Show full text]
  • Report on Haiti, 'Failed Justice Or Rule of Law?'
    ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OEA/Ser/L/V/II.123 doc.6 rev 1 26 October 2005 Original: English HAITI: FAILED JUSTICE OR THE RULE OF LAW? CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR HAITI AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY GENERAL SECRETARIAT ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES WASHINGTON D.C. 2006 2006 http://www.cidh.org OAS Cataloging-in-Publication Data Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Haiti: Failed Justice or the Rule of Law? Challenges Ahead for Haiti and the International Community 2005 / Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. p. ; cm. (OAS Official Records Series. OEA Ser.L/V/II.123) ISBN 0-8270-4927-7 1. Justice, Administration of--Haiti. 2. Human rights--Haiti. 3. Civil rights--Haiti. I. Title. II Series. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.123 (E) HAITI: FAILED JUSTICE OR THE RULE OF LAW? CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR HAITI AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................. v I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................5 II. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................6 A. Events in Haiti, 2003-2005 ..................................................6 B. Sources of Information in Preparing the Report ..................... 11 C. Processing and Approval of the Report................................. 14 III. ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN HAITI ............ 17 A. Context for Analysis .......................................................... 17
    [Show full text]
  • Keeping the Peace in Haiti?
    KEEPING THE PEACE IN HAITI? An Assessment of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti Using Compliance with its Prescribed Mandate as a Barometer for Success March 2005 Harvard Law Student Advocates for Human Rights, Cambridge, Massachusetts & Centro de Justiça Global, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil March 2005 Keeping the Peace in Haiti? TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ____________________________________________________________ 1 INTRODUCTION __________________________________________________________________ 2 I. RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________________________________________ 2 II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HAITI _____________________________________________________ 4 III. RESOLUTION 1542: THE MINUSTAH MANDATE __________________________________ 12 III.A. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration_____________________________ 12 III.B. Institutional Strengthening: Police Reform and the Constitutional and Political Process _______________________________________________________________ 13 III.B.1. Police Reform________________________________________________________ 13 III.B.2. The Constitutional and Political Process __________________________________ 14 III.C. Human Rights and Civilian Protection _____________________________________ 15 III.C.1. Human Rights________________________________________________________ 15 III.C.2. Civilian Protection____________________________________________________ 19 IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS ______________________________________________________ 21 IV.A. Methodology ___________________________________________________________
    [Show full text]
  • Inventory of USAID Security Sector Governance and Institution Building Programs Last Updated: January 2019
    Inventory of USAID Security Sector Governance and Institution Building Programs Last Updated: January 2019 U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID), throughitscommitment to security sector reform (SSR), works to support good governance and rule of law, conflict prevention, mitigation and response, and reintegrationand reconciliation programs aimed at building civilian capacity tomanage, oversee, and provide security and justice. Security Sector Reform (SSR) is the set of strategies, policies, procedures, and processes, programs and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. SSR is an umbrella term that might include integratedactivitiesin support of: defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice; police and law enforcement; corrections; intelligence and national security; border management; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and/or reduction of armed violence. The security sector includes both military and civilian-led organizations, and personnel operating at the international, regional, national and/or sub-national level. Relevant actors in the broader security sector apparatusmay include state security providers, governmentalsecurity management and oversight bodies, civil society organizations(CSOs), and non- state security providers. Security Sector Governance is the transparent, accountable, and legitimate management and oversight of security policy and practice. Fundamental to all SSR engagement is the recognition that good 1 governance- the effective, equitable, responsive, transparent, and accountable management of public affairs and resources – and the rule of law are essential to an effective security sector.
    [Show full text]
  • Haiti Mission Review
    Peacekeeping_3_v17.qxd 2/2/06 5:03 PM Page 41 3.2 Haiti Haiti had a difficult year in 2005, and the UN The political stalemate erupted in armed Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) a conflict in the city of Gonaïves in February challenging one. A fluctuating security situation 2004. Insurgents took control of much of the saw signs of improvement in the latter half of the northern part of the country, and threatened to year, while elections were repeatedly delayed. march on the Haitian capital. Under pressure MINUSTAH’s more robust approach opened from the United States and France, President greater access to some of Port-au-Prince’s poor- Aristide signed a letter of resignation on 29 est and most dangerous neighborhoods, but the February, and left the country on a US-char- level of political and criminal violence, including tered plane for the Central African Republic almost daily kidnappings, remained deeply dis- under circumstances that remain a source of turbing. Little progress was made in reforming tension. In response to a request from the the corrupt Haitian National Police and even less interim president, the UN Security Council in reforming the judiciary. At the start of the year, authorized a US-led Multinational Interim Haiti was described by many as a “failing state”; Force (MIF) in March and declared its readi- twelve months later it is a somewhat safer place, ness to establish a follow-on UN stabilization but one whose future is far from secure. force three months later. A Haitian Council of Eminent Persons appointed Gerard Latortue Background MINUSTAH is the latest in a series of six UN peace operations in Haiti, dating back to the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in 1995, which succeeded the US-led multinational force that saw President Jean-Bertrand Aris- tide’s return to power in 1994.
    [Show full text]
  • National Police Reform Plan
    United Nations S/2006/726 Security Council Distr.: General 12 September 2006 Original: English Letter dated 31 August 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council Further to Security Council resolution 1608 (2005), I have the honour to convey a letter dated 18 August 2006 from Jean Rénald Clérismé, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Haiti (see annex), confirming the adoption of a plan for the reform of the Haitian National Police and enclosing a copy of the plan. I should be grateful if you would bring this letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council. (Signed) Kofi A. Annan 06-51735 (E) 061006 061006 *0651735* S/2006/726 Annex Letter dated 18 August 2006 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Haiti to the Secretary-General [Original: French] I have the honour to share with the members of the Security Council, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1608 (2005), the reform plan of the Haitian National Police, elaborated in coordination with MINUSTAH, and adopted by the Government of Haiti on 8 August 2006. This plan, which now constitutes a component of security sector policy represents the joint efforts of the Government of Haiti and MINUSTAH to make progress in the area of reform. The Government of Haiti undertakes to implement this reform plan for the Haitian National Police in close cooperation with MINUSTAH and the international community, but notes that its success depends on the latter’s ongoing support. I should be grateful if the contents of this letter and its enclosure could be brought to the attention of the Security Council.
    [Show full text]
  • Haiti's Human Rights Record
    The Human Rights Record of the Haitian National Police Human Rights Watch/Americas, National Coalition for Haitian Rights, Washington Office on Latin America I. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d’Haïti, HNP) constitutes the first civilian, professional police force in Haiti’s 193-year history. In past decades, Haiti's military controlled a subservient police, and both institutions engaged in widespread, systematic human rights abuses. Following former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's dismantling of the military in 1995, Haiti's transition to a civilian-controlled police has been marred by serious human rights violations. In the year and a half since its deployment, members of this U.S.-trained force have committed serious abuses, including torture and summary executions. Political authorities condemned many of the abuses and senior police authorities sanctioned or fired some of the responsible personnel, but the HNP only recently began to refer cases of police abuses to the courts. While a number of HNP agents now face criminal prosecution, Haiti's dysfunctional judicial system has made meager progress on prosecuting police abuse cases. Not one policeman or woman has been convicted of any killing. Since the HNP commenced operations in July 1995, agents and officers have killed at least forty- six Haitians. A minority of these deaths occurred when police agents used deadly force in legitimate self-defense. Most of the dead suffered extrajudicial executions or the excessive, unjustified use of lethal force by the police. The worst incident of police abuse occurred on March 6, 1996, in the Port-au-Prince shantytown of Cité Soleil, when the HNP summarily killed at least six men.
    [Show full text]