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Haiti Mission Review Peacekeeping_3_v17.qxd 2/2/06 5:03 PM Page 41 3.2 Haiti Haiti had a difficult year in 2005, and the UN The political stalemate erupted in armed Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) a conflict in the city of Gonaïves in February challenging one. A fluctuating security situation 2004. Insurgents took control of much of the saw signs of improvement in the latter half of the northern part of the country, and threatened to year, while elections were repeatedly delayed. march on the Haitian capital. Under pressure MINUSTAH’s more robust approach opened from the United States and France, President greater access to some of Port-au-Prince’s poor- Aristide signed a letter of resignation on 29 est and most dangerous neighborhoods, but the February, and left the country on a US-char- level of political and criminal violence, including tered plane for the Central African Republic almost daily kidnappings, remained deeply dis- under circumstances that remain a source of turbing. Little progress was made in reforming tension. In response to a request from the the corrupt Haitian National Police and even less interim president, the UN Security Council in reforming the judiciary. At the start of the year, authorized a US-led Multinational Interim Haiti was described by many as a “failing state”; Force (MIF) in March and declared its readi- twelve months later it is a somewhat safer place, ness to establish a follow-on UN stabilization but one whose future is far from secure. force three months later. A Haitian Council of Eminent Persons appointed Gerard Latortue Background MINUSTAH is the latest in a series of six UN peace operations in Haiti, dating back to the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in 1995, which succeeded the US-led multinational force that saw President Jean-Bertrand Aris- tide’s return to power in 1994. Between then and 2000, the Haitian army was formally abolished and a measure of democracy was restored, but owing to the continuing political crisis and concomitant lack of stability in the country, self-sustaining institutions and eco- nomic development never took hold. Presi- dent Aristide claimed victory in delayed elec- tions in the year 2000, with a turnout of barely 10 percent of the voters. The other parties con- tested the results and, when dialogue with the government broke down in late 2003, a newly united opposition movement began calling for the president’s resignation. 41 Peacekeeping_3_v17.qxd 2/2/06 5:03 PM Page 42 42 • MISSION REVIEWS the Philippines, and Senegal were supplying UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) formed police units at the end of 2005, and individual police officers came from over thirty countries. Over one thousand inter- • Resolution passage 30 April 2004 (UNSC Res. 1542) • Start date 1 June 2004 national and national civilians also staff • SRSG Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile) MINUSTAH. • Acting force commander General Aldunate Eduardo Herman The pace of deployment of MINUSTAH (Chile) was slow. By mid-August 2004, less than half • Police commissioner Richard Graham Muir (Canada) • Budget $506.15 million of the authorized troops and a quarter of the (1 July 2005–30 June 2006) police were on the ground. By November 2004 • Strength as of Troops: 7,273 the mission was able to deploy throughout the 31 October 2005 Civilian police: 1,594 country, but it took until February 2005 for it International civilian staff: 438 Local civilian staff: 469 to get close to full strength. The slow deploy- UN volunteers: 160 ment was exploited by the former Haitian mil- itary, who occupied abandoned police stations in August and September and contributed to serious waves of violence and criminality that did not subside until the end of 2004. prime minister of a transitional government. He A Security Council mission to Haiti in April formed a thirteen-member government shortly 2005 identified a need for additional police and thereafter, composed mainly of individuals military resources. The Secretary-General rec- from the private sector and nongovernmental ommended and the Council approved an expan- organization (NGOs)—a supposedly “techno- sion of the military component to 7,500 and the cratic” body that excluded most political par- police to 1,897. A new battalion joined the mis- ties, including Fanmi Lavalas, the party of sion in October and a “force commander’s re- Aristide. The transitional government signed a serve”—designed to serve as a quick reaction pact with most political parties (but not Lava- force—was expected before the end of the year, las), civil society groups, and the Council of along with a new formed police unit and 200 Eminent Persons, setting out a series of steps to individual police officers. be taken during the transitional period, which MINUSTAH’s mandate is based on a was to culminate with the installation of a combined reading of Resolutions 1542 (2004) newly elected president in February 2006. and 1608 (2005). While detailed, it straddles the line between assigning a purely assistance role to MINUSTAH and authorizing a more Mission Mandate and Deployment proactive, interventionist approach. The am- MINUSTAH formally took over from the bivalence is largely a result of difference of 3,700-strong MIF on 1 June 2004. Rehatting opinion in the Security Council. The effect is the Chilean and Canadian contingents facili- to give the UN Secretariat and mission con- tated the handover and, while the latter with- siderable discretion to interpret the mandate drew at the end of July, the Chileans remained in a manner that strikes an appropriate bal- part of the new mission. Brazil took over ance between deference to local authorities command of the operation, supplying 1,200 and taking independent action to ensure its troops as well as the force commander. Sub- objectives are achieved. That balance evolved stantial contingents from Argentina, Uruguay, throughout 2005, tipping toward the end of Sri Lanka, Jordan, and Nepal followed, as the year in the direction of a more proactive well as smaller contingents from Peru, Spain, approach in view of Haiti’s dire security situ- Morocco, the Philippines, Ecuador, and Guat- ation, weak state institutions, and the unwill- emala. Meanwhile, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, ingness of the transitional government to act Peacekeeping_3_v17.qxd 2/2/06 5:03 PM Page 43 HAITI • 43 as a true partner to MINUSTAH in pushing the peace process forward. OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti The operative words in Resolution 1542 are largely facilitative, but the key security • Authorization date 16 January 2002 (OAS Permanent provision is under Chapter VII of the UN Council Decision CP/Res. 806); 6–8 Charter. It mandates MINUSTAH to “sup- June 2004 (OAS General Assembly, port” the transitional government in provid- A/Res. 2058, amended) ing a secure environment, and to “assist” with • Start date June 2004 • Head of mission Ambassador Denneth Modeste the disarmament of armed groups and the (Grenada) maintenance of public safety and public order. • Budget as of $15 million MINUSTAH is also authorized to act force- 30 September 2005 fully to protect UN personnel, as well as civil- • Strength as of Civilian police: 6 30 September 2005 Civilian staff: 24 ians under imminent threat of physical vio- lence, “within the mission’s capabilities and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Transitional Government decentralization and good governance at all and of police authorities.” With the abolition of levels of government. the army, the only security institution in Haiti The overarching goal of MINUSTAH’s for MINUSTAH to support and assist in these justice function is to promote human rights functions is the Haitian National Police, a and renovate justice institutions. Small teams notoriously ineffective body. Resolution 1608 of human rights officers deployed in ten reaffirmed MINUSTAH’s authority to “vet regions monitored the dismal human rights sit- and certify” the HNP, implying a more proac- uation, undertook investigations, and sought to tive role in reforming the institution. build local capacity, both in official institu- Given Haiti’s turbulent history, the need to tions and among NGOs. Resolution 1542 gave ensure credible elections was a priority for the MINUSTAH a rather weak mandate to “de- mission, and occupied the Special Representa- velop a strategy” for reform of the judiciary, tive of the Secretary General (SRSG) and civil- which was upgraded by Resolution 1608 to ian staff for much of the year. The Organiza- take a more active role in rebuilding the dys- tion of American States (OAS) Special Mission functional court and correctional systems. for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti is man- Finally, MINUSTAH has humanitarian dated by the OAS General Assembly to assist and development functions, on both an emer- in the preparation of elections, in cooperation gency and a more long-term basis. An “interim with MINUSTAH. A memorandum between cooperation framework” was developed with the two organizations assigns principal respon- the transitional government and a range of sibility for voter registration to the OAS, while bilateral and multilateral donors, focusing on MINUSTAH is tasked with supervising all four priority areas: strengthening political aspects of the electoral process and with pro- governance, strengthening economic gover- viding security. nance, promoting economic recovery, and im- In addition, MINUSTAH was tasked by proving access to basic services. Resolution 1542 with helping the transitional government to initiate a broad-based “na- tional dialogue” among civil society as well Key Developments and Challenges as the political parties. And in collaboration with UN Development Programme (UNDP) Security and bilateral donors, MINUSTAH assisted Broadly speaking, there were two types of the transitional government in extending state security threats in Haiti in 2005—politically authority throughout Haiti and sought to foster motivated violence and criminality.
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