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Congressional Record—Senate S2006 S2006 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE March 6, 1997 to all of those who are suffering and all market principles. In Latin America, This is one area in which American those who are fighting back, trying to the Reagan doctrine certainly has expertise can make a big difference. In- put their lives back in order. worked. deed, with some extra United States I see on the floor my colleague from As free elections and economic liber- help, Haiti could succeed in convicting Ohio and my colleague from Kentucky alization has taken place in country some of the worst defenders, like the and my colleague from West Virginia. after country, the countries of South murderers of Mireille Bertin and Guy All are States, as well as Indiana, that and Central America have become bet- Malary. Mireille Bertin was an anti- have been hit very hard. ter neighbors for the United States. I Aristide lawyer. Guy Malary was The most heartening thing to see believe these same principles apply to Aristide’s justice minister. To pros- during a tragedy such as this is how our national strategy in regard to ecute and convict the killers in those people react. We have many organiza- Haiti. kinds of cases would send an unmistak- tions that are involved, but probably Mr. President, we need to apply these able message to Haitian society: Your the biggest organization involved is principles to Haiti so that over the chance of getting justice does not de- not an organization at all, it is just long term, Haiti can move out of the pend on what side you are on. Ohioans and Kentuckians and Hoosiers category of ‘‘problem country’’ and Mr. President, these reforms will not and people from West Virginia who are into a fuller economic and political happen without leadership from the out there, helping their neighbors and participation in regional progress. The President of Haiti. President Preval helping their friends, and sometimes challenge for us, the challenge for Con- needs to push judicial reform and make just helping people they do not know gress, the challenge for the administra- clear that the period of impunity from at all. tion is to provide assistance that actu- the left and from the right is now over. It is the American spirit and is some- ally works, a do-good approach, not a These reforms will not take place ei- thing that is a wonderful thing to be- feel-good approach. This means work- ther, Mr. President, without expertise hold. ing with the Haitian people to deter- and without assistance from the United f mine the real roadblocks to democracy States. The SIU needs the kind of and to free enterprise and determine know-how that U.S. law enforcement PROBLEMS—AND PROGRESS—IN what form of United States assistance officials can provide; indeed, they can HAITI will help overcome these obstacles. provide it better than anyone else in Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, I would Two years after the United States in- the world. like to take a few minutes today to vasion, Haiti still is struggling by any After my recent visit, I wrote to Dep- talk about an issue that I have been reasonable measure. But a closer exam- uty Secretary of State Strobe Talbott looking at for some time. I rise today ination reveals several seeds of and told him that additional U.S. ex- to discuss U.S. policy in regard to one progress struggling to take root. pertise is needed in this area. I am of our most troubled neighbors in this First, Let’s start, Mr. President, with pleased to report that I have received a hemisphere. Over the last several the justice system. For democracy to letter back from Secretary Talbott. He years, in my capacity as a member of survive, it is not enough that Haitians wrote me that two additional Creole- the Intelligence Committee, I traveled have the power to effect change at the speaking U.S. citizens, U.S. police offi- to Haiti on three separate occasions to ballot box. They also must have a cers, have been added to the SIU since investigate the problems of that coun- working judicial system. Frankly, my last visit, and further, that the FBI try and to assess the efforts of the Haiti has never had a functioning judi- has agreed to provide a medical exam- United States to help the Haitians cope ciary, certainly not the way we under- iner to perform autopsies. Further- with these problems and to help them stand it. There are sitting judges today more, he told me that the FBI will as they try to secure the solid legal who can’t read or write. Others are just visit Haiti with a view toward possibly and economic infrastructure that has, incompetent. helping to develop an investigation frankly, eluded them now for centuries. Understandably, the Haitian people plan for the SIU. I did this because I believe Congress are demanding change. Specifically, Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- and the administration must under- they want to know if President Preval sent that Secretary Talbott’s letter be take a candid, realistic look at U.S. is committed to building an inde- printed in the RECORD at the conclu- policy, what is working, what is not pendent and a competent judiciary. sion of my remarks. working, and where we go from here. Since President Aristide’s return, there The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without The American taxpayers have already has been a series of commando-style objection, it is so ordered. invested a great deal in Haiti, contrib- killings of political opponents. The (See exhibit 1.) uting at least $2 billion to the coun- numbers have dropped off since the in- Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, it is my try’s recovery, risking the lives of auguration of President Preval, but, view that this would be a big step for- American service personnel in the 1994 disturbingly, too many people in Haiti ward for the progress of restoring civil invasion, and leaving hundreds of them still think they can commit political society in Haiti. It would help bring there today to help keep an uneasy murders with impunity. high-profile killers to justice and send peace. Mr. President, there are two things a powerful message to the people of While Haiti is not of great strategic you always need if you want to solve Haiti that they can count on law and importance to the United States, we do high-profile crimes. First, you have to order becoming a reality in the future have a serious interest in what happens have the expertise, good solid police of their country. in this, the poorest country in our work, good professional police inves- Let me discuss a broader topic—topic hemisphere. These interests stem from tigation. And Second, you also have to No. 2—the ordinary day-to-day oper- geography and are amply proven by have the political will from the top so ation of the Haitian police as it deals history. I do not think most of us need that everyone in the country, everyone with run-of-the-mill, nonpolitical to be reminded, for example, about the in the judicial system, everyone in law crimes, the crimes that most people Haitian boat people. It is clear the only enforcement understands the priority. face the threat of each day. thing preventing yet another explosion The good news is that the Haitian na- The United States has already helped of refugees into the southern part of tional police have established a special to train 5,000 young recruits as a civil- this country is a wise, multinational investigations unit, SIU, to investigate ian police force to replace the discred- investment in the stability of Haiti. human rights crimes. The bad news is ited Haitian military. This task was Fortunately, recent history has given that while I was there in November, and remains daunting. Try to imagine, us some good guidelines, some good ad- my most recent visit, the SIU con- Mr. President, the Washington, DC po- vice, if you will, on how to help secure sisted of one experienced United States lice force fired one day, everyone fired such stability. One of the great prin- police officer and roughly 36 inexperi- en masse and replaced by kids fresh out ciples of the Reagan administration enced Haitians. This has changed some- of the police academy who are then was that America’s national interest what since my visit, since two more asked to patrol the city’s most dan- was best served by having neighbors U.S. police officers have been added to gerous neighborhoods. Or think of any that practiced democratic and free- the force. other big city in this country. VerDate Mar 15 2010 21:57 Oct 24, 2013 Jkt 081600 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 0624 Sfmt 0634 E:\1997SENATE\S06MR7.REC S06MR7 mmaher on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with SOCIALSECURITY March 6, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S2007 As one would expect, there have been Mr. President, another thing that ab- without having to pay the 4-percent so- some pretty serious problems with this solutely must happen in Haiti is the called verification fee. Shipments of police force. They are alleged to have fundamental reform of Haiti’s corrupt food, pharmaceuticals and scholastic killed innocent people. In fact, even and inefficient ports. And this brings materials will be exempt from that Pierre Denize, director general of the me to my fourth topic. verification fee for all PVO’s, as well as Haitian national police has acknowl- My wife Fran and I visited an or- United States Government agencies edged these problems.
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