REFORMING HAITI’S SECURITY SECTOR Latin America/Caribbean Report N°28 – 18 September 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. SECURITY IN HAITI TODAY....................................................................................... 2 III. POLICE REFORM........................................................................................................... 7 A. VETTING AND TRAINING ..............................................................................................................9 B. BORDER INITIATIVES .................................................................................................................11 C. REESTABLISHING THE ARMY?....................................................................................................13 D. COMMUNITY VIOLENCE REDUCTION .........................................................................................14 IV. JUSTICE REFORM ....................................................................................................... 16 A. INDEPENDENCE AND STRENGTHENING OF THE JUDICIARY..........................................................16 B. PRISON REFORM ........................................................................................................................17 1. Conditions of imprisonment ......................................................................................................17 2. Reducing overcrowding.............................................................................................................19 V. THE WAY FORWARD.................................................................................................. 20 A. REMOVING OBSTACLES TO SUCCESSFUL SSR............................................................................20 B. ADDRESSING JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM CHALLENGES ...............................................................22 C. SWIFTLY ALLEVIATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC HARDSHIP TO PREVENT VIOLENT PROTEST .............23 VI. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................ 24 APPENDICES A. MAP OF HAITI..................................................................................................................................26 B. GLOSSARY.......................................................................................................................................27 C. REPORTED KIDNAPPINGS, 2006-2008..............................................................................................30 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................32 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN ......................................33 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................34 Latin America/Caribbean Report N°28 18 September 2008 REFORMING HAITI’S SECURITY SECTOR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Operations led by the UN peacekeeping mission best way to preempt dangerous, politically motivated (MINUSTAH) largely disbanded armed gangs in the pressures to reconstitute the notorious army. slums of Haiti’s cities in early 2007, but security and stability are far from consolidated. The failure to pro- Strengthening the justice sector, including the dys- vide an immediate, visible peace dividend once the functional penitentiary system, is another key part gangs’ hold was broken was a lost opportunity the of SSR. Haiti still lacks the basic capacity to detain, still fragile country could ill afford. Now new threats prosecute and sentence offenders, especially those are appearing. Serious crime persists, especially kid- responsible for serious crimes. To strengthen the rule napping and drug trafficking, and in the absence of of law, it is crucial that the new government speed a sufficiently large and fully operational police force implementation of the justice legislation parliament and functioning justice and penitentiary systems, it passed in late 2007, conclude vetting of the members threatens to undermine political progress. This was of the Superior Judicial Council and establish special evidenced by the fall of Prime Minister Jacques- chambers to bring cases of serious crime to trial. Hai- Edouard Alexis’s government following April 2008 tian authorities, with donor help, must also swiftly protests and riots against high living costs. Security improve correction facilities, which remain in awful sector reform (SSR) is essential to stabilisation but shape, vulnerable to prison breaks and filled with sus- has been plagued by serious institutional weaknesses. pects who have never seen a judge. The new prime minister, Michèle Pierre-Louis, who Likewise, border control and economic development was confirmed by parliament only in August and in- along the border with the Dominican Republic (D.R.) augurated in September, and President René Préval is vital to security and the economy. The new gov- need to act immediately and decisively, with MINUS- ernment should define a strategy and reach out to re- TAH and donor help, to conclude police and justice cently re-elected Dominican President Leonel Fernández reform. These challenges are all the more urgent, as with the aim of concluding agreements on border they come at a time when Haiti is struggling with development and security. These should cover migra- severe hurricane devastation, and quick disbursement tion, economic and environmental issues, as well as of international emergency and recovery assistance is transborder organised crime and law enforcement. of crucial importance for the new government. Without such a strategy and improved cooperation be- tween the neighbours, Haiti’s Border Development The process to create a modestly sized 14,000-strong Commission and MINUSTAH’s expanded role along Haitian National Police (HNP) by 2011 – a pivotal ele- the frontier will be empty shells. Finally, the govern- ment of SSR – must be speeded up. The vetting of the ment and donors need to put in place comprehensive approximately 9,000 active duty HNP officers has violence reduction programs that recognise the link- been much too slow and insufficiently transparent ages between severe poverty, social deprivation and to address concerns that individuals responsible for crime, particularly in the rural communities, where 70 human rights violations and corruption remain in per cent of Haitians live, and the high density urban the force. Administrative difficulties have limited neighbourhoods. recruitment and training. The intake of qualified per- sonnel, with special emphasis on more female cadets, has to be increased or the 2011 goal will be impossible to reach. A graduate-level police academy is needed in which commanders can acquire specific skills, including riot and border control, intelligence gather- ing and analysis, forensics and expertise in fighting drug trafficking. Building a professional HNP is the Reforming Haiti’s Security Sector Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Report N°28, 18 September 2008 Page ii RECOMMENDATIONS (e) cooperating with the bar association to estab- lish a national network of lawyers to assure legal To the Government of Haiti: representation in all criminal cases and justice centres that provide free legal aid to the poor. 1. Strengthen reform of the Haitian National Police (HNP) by: 3. Improve the inhumane conditions in prisons by: (a) expediting the vetting of all active duty officers; (a) reviving the Detention Commission (CCDPP) to review cases of prisoners detained for (b) bringing enrolment at the police academy to minor crimes, especially those not charged full capacity (1,300), recruiting in particular for an extended period of time, broadening more female cadets with good academic its mandate to the entire country and requir- records and making learning materials and ing that any recommendations for release are equipment available to all cadets; reviewed by a justice ministry working group (c) establishing an academy for advanced training to ensure that dangerous criminals are not of mid- and senior-level commanding officers; released; (d) expanding exchange programs for training (b) establishing, with international humanitarian abroad of HNP officers in counter-drugs, agencies such as the International Committee anti-kidnapping, riot control, forensics and of the Red Cross (ICRC), regular visits to all intelligence gathering and analysis; detention centres to monitor the health and conditions of prisoners; and assisting the (e) implementing a more efficient human re- Prisons Administration Directorate (DAP) to sources, equipment maintenance and man- set up and maintain a health records system agement system to deploy personnel based on for inmates; and skills and training, monitor performance and ensure more adequate control and use of (c) moving more rapidly to implement, with donor equipment; and support, the national prison reform plan’s commitments for new construction and guard (f) establishing the more muscular elements of training, including refurbishing the Delmas the force (border police, coast guard and riot 75 former psychiatric hospital to house inmates, control), publicising their capabilities and finalising plans for the new national prison