Irak : Bagdad Et Erbil Toujours En Désaccord Sur Le Budget

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Irak : Bagdad Et Erbil Toujours En Désaccord Sur Le Budget INSTITUT KURDDE PARIS E Bulletin de liaison et d’information N°336 mars 2013 La publication de ce Bulletin bénéficie de subventions du Ministère français des Affaires étrangères (DGCID) et du Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations (FASILD) ————— Ce bulletin paraît en français et anglais Prix au numéro : France: 6 € — Etranger : 7,5 € Abonnement annuel (12 numéros) France : 60 € — Etranger : 75 € Périodique mensuel Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Numéro de la Commission Paritaire : 659 13 A.S. ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tél. : 01- 48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01- 48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: [email protected] Bulletin de liaison et d’information de l’Institut kurde de Paris N° 336 mars 2013 • TURQUIE : ÖCALAN APPELLE À DÉCRÉTER UN CESSEZ-LE-FEU ET À RETIRER SES COMBATTANTS DE TURQUIE • SYRIE : VERS UNE ÉVOLUTION DE LA GUERRE DANS LES RÉGIONS KURDES ? • IRAK : BAGDAD ET ERBIL TOUJOURS EN DÉSACCORD SUR LE BUDGET • KURDISTAN D’IRAK : HALABJA, 25 ANS APRÈS • LONDRES : RECONNAISSANCE DU GÉNOCIDE KURDE PAR LE PARLEMENT BRITANNIQUE • CULTURE : PARUTION D’UNE « HISTOIRE DE LA SYRIE CONTEMPORAINE », DE MIRELLA GALLETTI TURQUIE : ÖCALAN APPELLE À DÉCRÉTER UN CESSEZ-LE-FEU ET À RETIRER SES COMBATTANTS DE TURQUIE uit fonctionnaires et Pendant ce temps-là, dans la gestes turcs en parallèle aux agents de sécurité turcs société civile et politique kurde, avancées kurdes. De même Lütfi retenus à Qandil depuis on assiste à la fois à une sorte Baksi, président du parti H deux ans ont été libérés d’effervescence incertaine et KADEP, juge que les Kurdes et le le 13 mars par le PKK, d’inquiétude prudente sur les Kurdistan doivent être mention- comme premier « geste » du pro- différentes étapes de ce proces- nés explicitement dans la cessus de paix initié entre sus. Réunions et plate-formes se Constitution, sans quoi il n’y Abdullah Öcalan, le chef empri- multiplient, entre responsables aurait pas de réelle résolution de sonné du PKK et le gouverne- du BDP, le principal parti poli- la question kurde, la citoyenneté ment turc. tique pro-kurde, ceux du DTK « turque » restant un déni de la qui rassemble des ONG kurdes. réalité des Kurdes. Bawer Dersim, un commandant militaire du PKK a déclaré, le Le président du parti kurde İmam Taşçıer (DDKD), critique jour de cette libération, que « la HAK-PAR a exprimé sa convic- la seule représentation du BDP balle était maintenant dans le tion que la question kurde ne dans les rencontres avec Öcalan, camp de la Turquie », même si pouvait être résolue que dans un en soulignant qu’eux aussi « ont cette dernière s’est montré sobre cadre fédéral (à l’instar du des suggestions ». D’autres, dans l'expression de sa recon- Kurdistan d'Irak, donc) et a aussi comme Nusrettin Maçin, prési- naissance, se contentant de insisté sur la nécessité de rédiger dent du bureau de Diyarbakır saluer le retour des prisonniers, une nouvelle constitution. Selon pour le parti ÖDP, s'interroge retour qualifié d’ « acte humani- lui, le processus qui s’amorce sur le fait de savoir si les ren- taire » par le ministre de n’est pas exactement une phase contres d’Imralı portent sur le l’Intérieur, Muammer Guler, de négociations, mais plutôt une seul désarmement du PKK ou alors que ces enlèvement étaient, étape de « dialogue et de norma- sur la question kurde dans son eux, des « violations inhumaines lisation » et, s’il soutient le retrait ensemble, en critiquant égale- des libertés » qui ne devaient et le désarmement par étapes du ment le fait que les projecteurs plus jamais se reproduire. PKK, il réclame, lui aussi, des soient braqués sur le PKK, lais- • 2 • Bulletin de liaison et d’information n° 336 • mars 2013 sant de côté le reste des cercles répressives », Öcalan annonce tard, l'absence de drapeau turc militants kurdes, même s’il est ainsi une ère nouvelle qui voit lors des célébrations du Newroz, douteux qu’Erdogan laisse se s’ouvrir « l’époque de la poli- tâchant ainsi d’apparaître à la former un « Conseil national tique démocratique. Un proces- fois comme « l’homme qui va kurde » en Turquie, comme celui sus essentiellement politique, sauver la Turquie de la guerre », des Kurdes de Syrie. social et économique débute. La mais sans trop se compromettre, mentalité qui met l’accent sur la vis-à-vis d’une opinion publique Après avoir reçu le projet rédigé liberté, l’égalité et les droits turque très hostile au PKK, dans par Öcalan, remis en mains démocratiques progresse. » le rôle de « l’homme qui a tendu propres par une délégation du la main aux terroristes ». BDP, l’Union des communautés Les seuls points concrets et pré- du Kurdistan (KCK, soit l’orga- cis sont la confirmation d'un L’appel au cessez-le-feu a, bien nisation politique du PKK) appel pressant à faire taire les sûr, été salué par toutes les par- Murat Karayilan a répondu par armes pour laisser place à un ties non concernées directement, lettre à son leader, exprimant son processus politique et à ce que que ce soit l’Union européenne, soutien et son adhésion à son les « éléments armés » du PKK les États-Unis, le Secrétaire géné- plan de paix, tout en lui soumet- se retirent de Turquie et le pro- ral de l'ONU et le Gouvernement tant les « opinions et proposi- bable abandon de toute forme régional du Kurdistan d’Irak. tions » émanant des militants «d’autonomie « des régions (sans en préciser la teneur) : kurdes, car s’adressant ensuite Du côté turc, dans la presse, « Dans toutes nos réunions, nous au « cher peuple de Turquie », Taraf (un journal de gauche) avons convenu, nous avons déci- Öcalan insiste sur l‘unité histo- s’enthousiasmait pour ce « prin- dé très clairement, que la pers- rique des Kurdes et des Turcs temps de Turquie ». Milliyet pective stratégique mise en avant qui doit servir à ce qu'ils fon- titrait « L'Adieu aux armes » et par notre leader est correcte et dent ensemble une « modernité Hürriyet annonçait de même la que nous y adhérerons. démocratique » : « L’heure n’est fin d’une ère militaire. Cependant il y a plusieurs préoc- pas à la désunion, à la guerre et cupations et problèmes qui aux combats ; l’heure est à Mais à l’intérieur des mêmes jour- nécessitent d’être surmontés .» l’union, l’alliance, les retrou- naux, des éditorialistes, comme vailles et le pardon ».Sur le cadre l’historien Murat Bardakci Le 18 mars, une autre rencontre et la structure politique qui servi- (Haberturk), faisaient part de entre des représentants du BDP raient à cette nouvelle société, leurs doutes et incertitudes sur la et Öcalan a pu avoir lieu à Imralı Öcalan indique que « pour créer possibilité d’une paix fondée sur et le chef du PKK a ainsi fait ce modèle, il est inévitable de la seule déclaration d’Öcalan, monter la pression en annonçant s’inspirer à nouveau des cultures « après tant d’années, d’affronte- qu‘un appel historique serait lu antiques des terres de la ments, de deuils » (Fuat Keyman le 21 mars, jour du Newroz, où il Mésopotamie et de l’Anatolie », de Milliyet). D’aucuns ont suppo- serait fait mention d’une démo- ce qui ne nous en apprend guère sé une contrepartie secrète, en rai- cratisation pour l’ensemble de la plus. son de l’absence criante de condi- Turquie, d’une solution apportée tions posées de la part d'Öcalan. à la question du désarmement et Plus loin, Kurdes, Turkmènes, Sa libération serait-elle en jeu ? Le au soutien qu’il attendait de la Assyriens et Arabes sont appe- Premier ministre turc l’a nié avec part des partis politiques et du lés, eux aussi, à s’unir au sein vigueur, affirmant qu’il ne s’agis- Parlement turc, ce dernier d’une « Conférence de la paix et sait pas d’un « marchandage ». devant surtout, selon lui, de la solidarité nationale » afin prendre en charge la question du qu'ils « discutent de leurs véri- Du côté kurde, il était aussi pré- retrait de la guerilla. tés, s’informent et prennent des visible qu’une fois l'exaltation décisions » mais cela semble plu- passée, à la relecture, les doutes Ainsi le 21 mars, à Diyarbakir, tôt concerner la Syrie et l’Irak. ou l’incertitude prennent le devant des centaines de milliers relais. Ertugrul Ozkok fait ainsi de Kurdes, la députée BDP Pervin Le jour-même, Recep Tayyip remarquer, dans Hürriyet, qu’en Buldan a lu le message d'Öcalan Edrdogan, alors aux Pays-Bas, dehors de Diyarbakir, les villes en kurde et son collègue Sırrı déclarait simplement que les kurdes n‘ont pas particulière- Sureyya Önder en turc. opérations militaires turques ment exprimé de liesse ou de pourraient cesser si les Kurdes soulagement, mais ne sait s’il S’élevant contre « les mentalités du PKK cessaient le combat. Il a s’agit là d’une bonne ou d’une colonialistes, négationnistes et même critiqué, trois jours plus mauvaise chose. Bekir Coşkun, n° 336 • mars 2013 Bulletin de liaison et d’information • 3• de Cumhurriyet, a demandé car- Gultan Kişanak, co-présidente un possible successeur d’Öcalan rément quelles concessions la « du BDP, a aussi très vite exigé mais que Murat Karayılan a peu république turque » avait faite à des garanties de la part des à peu évincé, a ainsi déclaré sur « celui qui est en prison. » Turcs, afin que ceux qui soutien- Nûçe TV (une chaine pro PKK) draient les initiatives pour le qu’il fallait des garanties légales Seul Taraf continuait d’être porté processus ne soient pas, une fois à un tel retrait, cette demande de par l'enthousiasme, sous la de plus, inquiétés judiciairement, « protection » étant relayée par le plume de l’éditorialiste Ildiray alors que presque tous les repré- reste des commandants mili- Ogur, qui parlait, lui aussi, d’une sentants politiques kurde ont taires.
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