Iran's Growing Network of Influence Among
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The Potential for an Assad Statelet in Syria
THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ASSAD STATELET IN SYRIA Nicholas A. Heras THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ASSAD STATELET IN SYRIA Nicholas A. Heras policy focus 132 | december 2013 the washington institute for near east policy www.washingtoninstitute.org The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessar- ily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. MAPS Fig. 1 based on map designed by W.D. Langeraar of Michael Moran & Associates that incorporates data from National Geographic, Esri, DeLorme, NAVTEQ, UNEP- WCMC, USGS, NASA, ESA, METI, NRCAN, GEBCO, NOAA, and iPC. Figs. 2, 3, and 4: detail from The Tourist Atlas of Syria, Syria Ministry of Tourism, Directorate of Tourist Relations, Damascus. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publica- tion may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2013 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Cover: Digitally rendered montage incorporating an interior photo of the tomb of Hafez al-Assad and a partial view of the wheel tapestry found in the Sheikh Daher Shrine—a 500-year-old Alawite place of worship situated in an ancient grove of wild oak; both are situated in al-Qurdaha, Syria. Photographs by Andrew Tabler/TWI; design and montage by 1000colors. -
Al-Qamishli the Syrian Kurdish Rebellion
Cities in Revolution Al-Qamishli The Syrian Kurdish Rebellion Researcher: Sabr Darwish Project leader: Mohammad Dibo Translator: Lilah Khoja Supported by Cities in Revolution حكاية ما انحكت SyriaUntold Table of Contents Table of Contents 2 Introduction 3 Chapter One: The Uprising 5 I. The First Steps of the Uprising .............................................................5 II. Committees and the Parties .................................................................8 III. Challenging the City’s Elders ................................................................9 IV. The Weekly Demonstrations ...............................................................11 V. The Popular Movement’s Setbacks .....................................................14 Chapter Two: Recovery of Civil Society Organizations 19 I. Birati: Fraternity Foundation for Human Rights ...................................19 II. Shar for Development .........................................................................20 III. Other organizations .............................................................................22 Chapter Three: Autonomy in Al-Qamishli 25 I. Introduction ........................................................................................25 II. Democratic Self-Rule Project ..............................................................27 III. Fledgling Democratic Institutions ........................................................28 IV. Self-Rule and the Lack of Democracy ................................................30 V. Silencing -
Iraq's Muqtada Al-Sadr
IRAQ’S MUQTADA AL-SADR: SPOILER OR STABILISER? Middle East Report N°55 – 11 July 2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. MUQTADA’S LINEAGE .............................................................................................. 1 A. MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL-SADR: THE REVOLUTIONARY THINKER AND “FIRST MARTYR” ......2 B. MUHAMMAD SADIQ AL-SADR: THE PLEBEIAN ACTIVIST AND “SECOND MARTYR”............3 C. MUQTADA AL-SADR: THE UNLIKELY HEIR .........................................................................6 II. MUQTADA’S STEEP AND SWIFT LEARNING CURVE....................................... 7 A. FROM CONFRONTATION TO DOMINANT PRESENCE................................................................7 B. TRIAL AND ERROR: THE FAILURE AND LESSONS OF RADICALISATION ................................10 C. MUQTADA’S POLITICAL ENTRY ..........................................................................................12 III. THE SADRIST MOVEMENT: AN ATYPICAL PHENOMENON ....................... 17 A. MUQTADA’S POLITICAL RESOURCES...................................................................................17 B. AN UNSTRUCTURED MOVEMENT ........................................................................................20 IV. THREE POTENTIAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT ................................................. 21 V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 24 APPENDICES A. MAP OF IRAQ ......................................................................................................................25 -
Humanitarian Bulletin
Humanitarian Bulletin Syria Issue 34 | 10-23 September 2013 In this issue Issue 34 | 10-23 September 2013 Medical services need protection P.1 Calls for access to trapped civilians P.2 International community cannot forget crisis P.3 HIGHLIGHTS Crisis undermines progress towards MDGs P.3 Medical facilities, personnel Overview of the UN-coordinated response P.5 and wounded and sick must Humanitarian response only 45% funded P.9 be afforded special protection Photo: UNICEF/BHalabi Calls for access to civilians trapped in contested areas Momentum builds towards a Call for respect and protection of medical political solution to the conflict facilities and personnel Crisis undermines Syria’s The health situation continues to deteriorate across Syria progress towards MDGs Across Syria, the health situation continues to deteriorate with shortages of medicines, UN response plans remain the deliberate targeting of medical workers and health facilities by all parties, restrictions underfunded on the delivery of medical supplies to affected areas, and difficulties in accessing health care due to insecurity. FIGURES Of particular concern is the destruction of hospitals, assaults on medical professionals, Population 21.4 m and clinics, the impact of the conflict on pharmaceutical factories, as well as the challenge # of people in 6.8 m to import medicines to meet chronic medical needs, given economic sanctions. Medicines need needed include those for treatment of cancer, vaccines and medicines for chronic # of IDPs 4.25 m conditions. Additional ambulances are also needed. Some 60 per cent of public hospitals, 34 per cent of public health centres and 92 per cent of public ambulances have been # of Syrian 2.1 m refugees in affected. -
Emergency Appeal Final Report Syria: Floods
Emergency Appeal Final Report Syria: Floods Emergency Appeal Operation n° MDRSY004 Date of issue: 08 April 2020 GLIDE n° FL-2019-000031-SYR Date of disaster: 31 March - 30 April 2019 Operation start date:12 April 2019 Operation end date:15 October 2019 Host National Society presence: Syrian Arab Red Operation budget: CHF 3,500,000 Crescent (SARC) Headquarters; Al-Hassakeh Branch (75 staff and 120 volunteers covering Al- DREF amount allocated: CHF 500,000 (12 April 2019) Hassakeh Governorate) Number of people affected: 235,000 Number of people assisted: Planned 45,000; actual 153,417 Red Cross Red Crescent Movement partners involved in the operation: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC); International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), British Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross, Danish Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross, German Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross and Swiss Red Cross. Other partner organizations involved in the operation: National government authorities, Al-Hassakeh Governorate and local authorities, and World Food Programme (WFP). The IFRC, on behalf of SARC, would like to thank the following for their generous contributions to this Appeal: Canadian Red Cross (from Canadian Government), Red Cross Society of China Hong Kong Branch, Finnish Red Cross, Japanese Red Cross, Netherlands Red Cross (from Netherlands Government) and Swedish Red Cross. In addition, SARC would like to thank the following for their bilateral contributions: British Red Cross, Danish Red Cross, German Red Cross and Swiss Red Cross. Summary This Emergency Appeal was launched on 15 April 2019, seeking CHF 3.5 million to enable IFRC to support Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) to provide assistance to 45,000 people affected by floods in Al-Hassakeh Governorate in northeast Syria, over a six-month period, mid-April to mid-October 2019. -
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MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 3198 What Is Iran Up To in Deir al-Zour? by Oula A. Alrifai Oct 10, 2019 Also available in Arabic / Farsi ABOUT THE AUTHORS Oula A. Alrifai Oula A. Alrifai is a senior fellow in The Washington Institute's Geduld Program on Arab Politics. Brief Analysis Tehran and its proxies have been exerting hard and soft power in northeast Syria, combining military consolidation with economic, social, and religious outreach in order to cement their long-term influence. n September 30, Syria and Iraq reopened their main border crossing between al-Bukamal and al-Qaim, O which had been formally closed for five years. The circumstances surrounding the event were telling—the ceremony was delayed by a couple weeks because of unclaimed foreign airstrikes on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targets in east Syria following the Iranian attack against Saudi oil facilities earlier that month. What exactly have the IRGC and its local proxies been doing in Deir al-Zour province? And what does this activity tell us about Iran’s wider plans there? OPENING THE DOOR FOR IRAQI PROXIES T he border ceremony was led by Khadhim al-Ikabi, an Iraqi government representative, raising questions about whether the decision will help circumvent U.S. sanctions placed on Iran. Although Syrian state media celebrated the event as an opportunity to increase trade with Iraq, Tehran’s reaction indicated that the crossing will mainly serve Iranian military interests. According to officials and media in Iran, reopening the border is of “high strategic importance” in strengthening the Islamic Republic’s “trilateral coalition” with Baghdad and Damascus. -
MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA Continued: Iran: Winning Hearts and Minds in Deir Ezzor “…A History of Iranian Shi’I Proselytism in Deir Ezzor Which Dates to 1988…”
MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA Iran: Winning Hearts and Minds in Deir Ezzor OE Watch Commentary: Deir Ezzor is a tribal Sunni province of Syria located on the Euphrates River, along the border with Iraq. Its physical and socio-cultural environments resemble those of Iraq’s Anbar Province, and it was an ISIS stronghold for several years. Late last year, the provincial capital and surrounding areas were retaken by loyalist forces, with Iranian-backed militias leading the charge. Although it is not a natural social environment for deep-rooted Iranian influence to take hold, some of the Iran-backed militias may be there to stay. The foundations for Iran’s ability to assert control over this traditionally Sunni area are partially explained in the accompanying passage, published last November in the Syrian opposition news website alsouria.net. According to the article, soft-power measures from as early as 1988 have paved the way for Iran’s new foothold in Deir Ezzor. That year, the article claims, Iranian envoys began enticing poor villagers from the Baqqara (Baggara) tribe to adopt religious practices associated with Shi’i Iran. Through mechanisms such as the Imam al-Murtaza Foundation, Iran extended its influence by providing these neglected areas with material assistance and a new ideological edifice, based on Iranian Revolutionary ideals and centered around newly built Shi’i houses of worship (Husseiniyat). Iran’s close relations with the Assad government also allowed its envoys and allies to provide government functions in some areas, according to the article. The loyalist retaking of Deir Ezzor in late 2017 received crucial support from Nawaf al-Bashir, a prominent member of the Baqqara in Syria. -
Iran's Networks of Influence in the Middle East
an strategic dossier IRAN’S NETWORKS OF INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST published by The International Institute for Strategic Studies ARUNDEL HOUSE | 6 TEMPLE PLACE | LONDON | WC2R 2PG | UK 1 an strategic dossier IRAN’S NETWORKS OF INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST The International Institute for Strategic Studies ARUNDEL HOUSE | 6 TEMPLE PLACE | LONDON | WC2R 2PG | UK DIRECTOR-GENERAL AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE Dr John Chipman This publication has been prepared by the Director-General and Chief Executive of the Institute and his staff. It incorporates commissioned contributions from recognised subject experts, which were reviewed by a range of experts in the field. The IISS would like to thank the various individuals who contributed their expertise to the compilation of this dossier. The responsibility for the contents is ours alone. The views expressed herein do not, and indeed cannot, represent a consensus of views among the worldwide membership of the Institute as a whole. First published November 2019 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. © 2019 The International Institute for Strategic Studies cover images: Top: Background: A Lebanese Hizbullah fighter near Arsal, Lebanon, 26 July 2017 (Anwar Amro/AFP/ Getty Images); main images, top–bottom: Popular Mobilisation Units fighters launch missiles targeting the village of Salmani, south of Mosul, in Iraq’s Nineva province, 30 October 2016 (Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP/Getty Images); Major- General Qasem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) attends a meeting between Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (not pictured) and the IRGC in Tehran, 18 September 2016 (by Pool/Press Office of Iranian Supreme Leader/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images); Pro-government forces at a funeral ceremony at the Sayyida Zainab mosque in Damascus, Syria, 26 April 2017 (Louai Beshara/AFP/Getty Images) Printed and bound in the UK by Hobbs the Printers Ltd. -
Two-Week Conflict Summary | 11 – 24 November 2019
TWO-WEEK CONFLICT SUMMARY | 11 – 24 NOVEMBER 2019 WHOLE OF SYRIA SUMMARY • NORTHWEST | The first advances of the Government of Syria (GoS) since August were reported in the southeastern parts of the Hayyat Tahrir ash Sham (HTS)-dominated northwest. Inside the enclave, widespread demonstrations took place against HTS and its civilian body, the Salvation Government. In Jarablus, the first suicide attack in over two years occurred on 19 November. • SOUTH & CENTRAL | There were prolonged clashes between GoS personnel and armed groups. Also, the first civilian protests against Hezbollah’s presence in southern Syria took place. Two waves of Israeli airstrikes targeted a Palestinian Islamic Jihad commander and Iranian- linked sites in and around Damascus. • NORTHEAST | Territorial changes occurred in the northeast as the Turkish-led Operation Peace Spring continued. Russia and Turkey deployed additional patrols in Raqqa and Hassakeh governorates. In the Euphrates and Khabour River Valleys, attacks against SDF personnel continued. Also, improvised explosive devices (IED) targeted three areas of Qamishli city. Figure 1: Dominant actors’ area of control and influence in Syria as of 21 November 2019. Please see the footnote on page 2 for further details. Page 1 of 7 TWO-WEEK CONFLICT SUMMARY 11 – 24 NOVEMBER 2019 NORTHWEST SYRIA1 GoS forces advanced in the Hayyat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-dominated northwest during the reporting period. By 17 November, GoS had captured Tal Al Khaznah and Luwaybdah villages in the southeast of the enclave, before taking the National Liberation Front-controlled (NLF) Musheifra Shamaliyah, Um Al Khalil, and Ard al Zurzur villages by the end of the reporting period (Figure 2). -
The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria
Flight of Icarus? The PYD’s Precarious Rise in Syria Middle East Report N°151 | 8 May 2014 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. An Opportunity Grasped .................................................................................................. 4 A. The PKK Returns to Syria .......................................................................................... 4 B. An Unspoken Alliance? .............................................................................................. 7 C. Brothers and Rivals .................................................................................................... 10 III. From Fighters to Rulers ................................................................................................... 12 A. The Rojava Project ..................................................................................................... 12 B. In Need of Protection ................................................................................................. 16 IV. Messy Geopolitics ............................................................................................................. 18 A. Turkey and -
Syria: Internally Displaced Persons, Returnees and Internal Mobility — 3
European Asylum Support Office Syria Internally displaced persons, returnees and internal mobility Country of Origin Information Report April 2020 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office Syria Internally displaced persons, returnees and internal mobility Country of Origin Information Report April 2020 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN: 978-92-9485-158-1 doi: 10.2847/460038 © European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2020 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Cover photo: © DFID - UK Department for International Development, Syrian women and girls in an informal tented settlement in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, 3 February 2017, (CC BY 2.0) https://www.flickr.com/photos/dfid/31874898573 EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY — 3 Acknowledgements EASO would like to acknowledge Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Country of Origin Information, Section for Information Analysis, as the drafter of this report. The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report: Denmark, Danish Immigration Service (DIS) ACCORD, the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO. 4 — EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................ -
Full Document in PDF Format
Spotlight on Global Jihad November 2 – 8, 2017, 2017 Main events of the week The conquest of the regions controlled by the Islamic State has reached the last lap. Abu Kamal, ISIS's last stronghold, is currently under combined pressure from the Syrian army, the Shi'ite militias and Hezbollah operatives, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) advancing on the city from both sides of the Euphrates. The attack on Abu Kamal is being waged with intensive Russian air support. The first forces of the Shi'ite militias and Hezbollah are apparently a few dozen kilometers from Abu Kamal. All the forces, and the countries behind them, want to be part of the final victory at Abu Kamal, which will mean the end of the Islamic State's existence in Syria. For that reason Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, made a point of visiting Deir al-Zor and had his picture taken with Shi'ite militia fighters affiliated with Iran, despite being in mourning for the death of his father. The strategically significant events in Syria were overshadowed this week by potentially explosive local events in the northern Golan Heights. On November 3, 2017, the rebel forces headed by the Headquarters for the Liberation of al-Sham (originally the al-Qaeda- affiliated al-Nusra Front), initiated an offensive aimed to open a supply route to besieged rebel operatives in the Beit Jinn enclave. After several hours of clashes the Syrian army and its affiliated militias halted the attack and restored the status quo ante. According to a report, the clashes were renewed on November 6, 2017.