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Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-02804-3 - Money and Banks in the American Political System Kathryn C. Lavelle Index More information Index ABA.SeeAmerican Bankers and regulation of derivatives, 127 Association American Enterprise Institute, 23 adjustable-rate mortgages, 54, 180 American International Group (AIG), 193, 255 Administrative Procedure Act, 124, 150 and bailout, 196–197, 199 advocacy coalition, 10 failure of, 195–196 agencies of the federal government, 3, 25, 109. American political culture, 1–2, 31, 249 See also executive branch agencies; by aversion to concentration of economic individual agency power and political authority, 6, 13, and financial crisis of 2008, 188, 217 28–29, 40, 151–152 and policy process, 19–20, 110 defined, 4–5 agency capture, 8, 31, 159, 249.Seealso and institutional arrangement, 187 revolving door; lobbying; lobbyists and opposition to banks, 54–55 defined, 14–15, 130–133 American revolution, 40, 48 and relief for individuals, 206 American Securitization Forum, 22 agency debt, 140–141, 243, 255 Americans for Financial Reform, 260 AIG.SeeAmerican International Group America’s Community Bankers, 133 Aldrich, Nelson, 44, 45 appropriations bills, 90 Aldrich Plan, 45 appropriations committees, 92 Aldrich-Vreeland Act, 44, 45 ARMs.Seeadjustable-rate mortgages Allison’s models of the bureaucratic process, asset-backed commercial paper, 78 4–5, 6, 15.Seealsobureaucratic auto industry, 201 politics paradigm bailouts, 188, 202 and action channels, 83–85 success in lobbying Congress, 216 and actions across time frames, 109 and bargaining among agencies, 15, 34 Bachus, Spencer, 263 and financial crisis of 2008, 188, 253 bailouts, 96, 188.SeealsoBear Stearns; Alt-A mortgages, 72–73 American International Group (AIG); American Bankers Association, 22, 25 CIT bailout; GMAC; Citigroup; Bank and Congress, 157 of America; Troubled Asset Relief and creation of the Federal Reserve, 44 Program; auto industry and merger with thrift trade association, after-effects of, 254, 265 133 international, 225, 226, 227–228 political action committee, 24 political accountability for, 196–197, 199 293 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-02804-3 - Money and Banks in the American Political System Kathryn C. Lavelle Index More information 294 Index bailouts (cont.) Boeing, 21 and problems with individual borrowers, Born, Brooksley, 126–130 206 Brady, Kevin, 160 size of, 204–205, 209, 254, 255 Brady, Nicholas, 117–118 Bair, Sheila, 120, 215, 217, 256 branch banking, 26, 37, 69–70, 245 and reforms, 262 Bretton Woods Institutions, 220, 224, 241.See Baker, James, 116–117 also International Monetary Fund; Bank for International Settlements, 233–234, World Bank 240 Brown Brothers and Company, 38 Banking Act of 1933, 52, 99 Bryan, William Jennings, 43 Banking Act of 1935, 48 budget process.SeeCongress, budgeting banking industry, 26.Seealsoderegulation of system in; appropriations bills banking industry; shadow banking budget resolution, 90 industry bureaucratic politics paradigm, 29–30, 50.See changes after 2008, 68, 82–254 also Allison’s models of the changes in 1970s, 50 bureaucratic process in France, 27 and competing mandates of Fed, 136, 160 in Germany, 27–28 and components of the US government, 83, in Japan, 27–28 109 niches in, 56, 57, 67, 74, 104–105 and competition among agencies, 251 blurring among niches, 69 Treasury-State relationship, 244 and regulatory process, 110, 132–133 Dodd-Frank passage, 251–254 structure of, 9, 26–27, 254, 259 and financial crisis of 2008, 188, 190–191, banking operations, 1, 8–9 194, 213 as an intermediary, 58 and international standards, 234, 236–238 and creation of money, 138 and rulemaking, 125 Bank of America, 24, 131, 183, 193, 199 Bush, George H. W., 64, 117–118 and bailout, 200 Bush, (George H. W.) administration, 102, banks, 68, 69, 73 117–118 balance sheet of, 58–59, 82 Bush, George W., 66, 118–119, 178, 241 and closure, 120 and financial crisis, 197, 210 bank supervision, 142–145 Bush (George W.) administration, 112, charges for examination, 145–146, 157 118–119 and conflict of interest, 154 and financial crisis, 189, 194, 199, 209, 217 and regulatory consolidation, 148 business associations, 21–22 Barclays, 193, 199 in Germany and Japan, 27 Basel Committee, 2, 78, 220, 232–240 business cycle, 163, 172–173, 187.Seealso Basel I Agreement, 220, 233–235, 237 political business cycle Basel II Agreement, 220, 235–240 defined, 166 Basel III Agreement, 25, 220, 238–240 and financial politics, 267 Bear Stearns, 192, 199, 238 of future, 252 Bennett, Robert, 199 overview, 165–166 Bentsen, Lloyd, 117–118 and presidential action, 177 Bernanke, Ben, 95, 118–119, 150, 172, 213 business lobbies.Seelobbying; lobbyists and actions in financial crisis, 190–191, 196–197, 204, 217 CAMELS rating system, 143–144 as Fed Chair, 160, 202 campaign contributions, 5, 8–9, 20, 24–25 and reforms, 262, 266 and banking committees, 94 and swaps, 215 and end of Glass-Steagall, 102 BIS.SeeBank for International Settlements and policy process, 99, 249, 251, 267–268 Black Tuesday, 47 capital adequacy standards, 234, 235–236 Bland-Allison Act, 42 Carter, Jimmy, 53, 116 Blankfein, Lloyd, 190–191 CDOs.Seecollateralized debt obligations Blunt, Roy, 198 CDSs.Seecredit default swaps © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-02804-3 - Money and Banks in the American Political System Kathryn C. Lavelle Index More information Index 295 CEA.SeeCouncil of Economic Advisers and Glass-Steagall, 99–100, 259 CEBS.SeeCommittee of European Banking and Volcker Rule, 212 Supervisors commercial paper, 78, 81 central bank.SeealsoFederal Reserve System; and structured finance, 77–78 European Central Bank Commercial Paper Funding Facility, 81, 82 American lack of, 14, 55 commercial paper markets, 101 Federal Reserve as, 48, 136, 137–138, 141, and Federal Reserve support of, 140, 199. 151 See also Commercial Paper Funding shift away from fiscal policy, 168, 186 Facility and finance ministry, 113 freeze in financial crisis, 192, 193–194 and role in crisis, 170–171 Committee of European Banking Supervisors, and role in monetarist thought, 167 232 certificates of deposit, 50 Commodity Exchange Act, 123, 125 CFPB.SeeConsumer Financial Protection Commodity Futures Modernization Act, Bureau 129–130 CFTC.SeeCommodity Futures Trading Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 17, Commission 123 checking accounts, 44, 53, 73 and changing role after Dodd-Frank, 253, history of, 41, 52 254, 259 checks and balances, 25 and congressional oversight, 98 Cheney, Dick, 197 and regulation of derivatives, 125–130, China, 242, 243–244.SeealsoStrategic 214–215 Economic Dialogue and regulation of swaps, 214 CIT bailout, 202–203 and relations among executive branch Citibank, 23, 24, 78, 225 agencies, 110, 122–123 Citigroup, 131, 190–191, 199, 237, 242 and role in policy process, 84 and bailout, 200 Community Reinvestment Act, 51, 54, 71, merger with Travelers, 103–104 104 and SEC lawsuit, 18–19 criticism of, 71, 125 Civil War, 34, 40, 43, 141 passage of, 51–52 aftermath of, 44 Comptroller of the Currency.SeeOffice of the and panic of 1861, 44 Comptroller of the Currency in retrospect, 187 conduits, 76, 81 Clearing House, 22, 45 Congress, 12.Seealsolegislation Clinton administration, 102, 117–118, 126, as branch of government that makes laws, 185–186 87, 150, 151 Clinton, Bill, 95, 102, 103, 117, 118, 173 budgeting system in, 87, 89–93, 116 and Commodity Futures Modernization and business cycle, 165 Act, 123 and Dodd-Frank, 215–216 and rulemaking process, 125 and end of Glass-Steagall, 103–104 Clinton, Hillary, 244 and geographic representation, 106 CMOs.Seecollateralized mortgage obligations and GSEs, 255 Cold War, 34, 224, 242 and international commitments, 242 collateralized debt obligations, 78, 180, 182, and role in policy process, 17, 19, 20, 28, 195–196 83, 105 collateralized mortgage obligations, 76, 77 and elections, 250 created, 70 and Federal Reserve, 135, 158–159, 168, commercial banks, 56 173–174, 186 changing charters, 146, 148 and regulators, 85–87, 133 competition with shadow banking system, and US Constitution, 13–14 74, 101 Congressional Budget and Impoundment and credit cards, 60 Control Act, 92 European, 229 Congressional Budget Office, 90, 200 and Federal Reserve System, 135, 152 congressional calendar, 188, 206 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-02804-3 - Money and Banks in the American Political System Kathryn C. Lavelle Index More information 296 Index congressional committees, 8, 89.Seealsoby Department of Housing and Urban individual committees Development, 65, 93 budget and taxation, 89–90, 92–93 affordable housing goals in, 72 jurisdiction, 89, 105–106, 253 deposit insurance, 24, 74, 139, 148–149, 215. overview, 86–87 See also Federal Deposit Insurance and regulation of derivatives, 127–128 Corporation and relations with presidential benefits of, 260 administrations, 108, 112 drawbacks of, 101, 119 and relations with the Federal Reserve, 96, depository banking, 61 98, 106–107 Depository Institutions Deregulation and congressional districts, 27 Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA), 51, Consumer Bankers Association, 22, 216 53–54, 69, 166 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 18, passed, 53 253, 254 depression, 166.SeealsoGreat Depression and auto dealerships, 216 deregulation of banking industry, 57, 181, created, 150 184.SeealsoDepository Institutions future of,
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