DOCSLIB.ORG

Outline of Banking History from the First Bank of the United States Through the Panic of 1907 by B

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Outline of Banking History from the First Bank of the United States Through the Panic of 1907 by B Outline of Banking History From the First Bank of the United States Through the Panic of 1907 By B. H. BECKHART Columbia University United States was particularly The entire capital was subscribed THEfortunate in having as its first within two hours on the day the sub- Secretary of the Treasury a veritable scription books were thrown open, and genius, whose program of fiscal reform the Bank was ready to begin business quickly placed the new republic on a on December 12, 1791, with Thomas sound financial basis. As an essential Willing as president.6 From the very part of his program, Hamilton urged outset, the Bank proved to be a great the establishment of a National Bank success, in providing the country with in a report to Congress, dated Decem- a sound and elastic currency, in supply- ber 1~,1~’90. Since the economic signif- ing the needed banking facilities, and icance of banks was then but crudely in preventing any excess issue of state understood, Hamilton, in this now fa- bank notes by having such state notes mous document, first indicated the as were in its possession redeemed. In numerous advantages resulting from the performance of its fiscal functions, banking in general and from a National it transferred government funds and Bank in particular, taking occasion to provided a safe depositary for them; it dispel some of the current erroneous also helped to collect the revenues and ideas on the subject.’ After showing provided the bullion needed by the that no one of the three banking insti- mint in coinage. Further, by 1795 it tutions2 then in existence could be suit- had loaned the government $6,200,000. ably employed as a National Bank, In order to procure funds to repay the he laid down in great detail the plan loan, the government by 1802 had sold for the new institution.3 The act all of its stock at a profit of $671,860, chartering the bank modelled upon this and while a shareholder had received plan was signed by the President on $1,101,720 in dividends of 8§ per cent. February 25, 1791.44 On April 20, 1808, the stockhold- ers memorialized for a re- 1 Hamilton’s report may be found printed in Congress full in the American State Papers—Finance I., newal of the charter which expired in pp. 67-76. 1811. A month later, Albert Gallatin, 2 The Bank of North America founded in then Secretary of the Treasury, in a 1781, the Bank of Massachusetts in 1784, and to enumerated the the Bank of New York in 1784. report Congress fiscal services of the and advised 3 Hamilton’s plan closely followed the charter Bank of the Bank of England as it existed at that time. that the charter be renewed with a few 4 The act provided for a capital of $10,000,000, changes. Nevertheless, the bill to con- of which one-fifth was to be subscribed by the tinue the charter was defeated, the government. The administration was placed in the hands of twenty-five directors elected an- oftener than once a week by the Treasury nually by the shareholders. Branches were to Department. be established where the directors saw fit. The 5 July 4th, 1791, at Philadelphia. circulation was not to exceed the capital. State- 6 Formerly, president of the Bank of North ments of condition might be called for but not America. 1 Downloaded from ann.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on June 18, 2015 2 opponents charging that the Bank was to 1817. Further, without the assist- a &dquo; money trust&dquo; controlled by foreign- ance of the Bank, the government had ers,7 a tool in the hands of the Federal- difficulty in selling its bonds (even ists, and that the act chartering the when offered below par), and was bank was unconstitutional-so the forced to borrow sums from the state First United States Bank went out of banks and to issue some 37 million existence on March 3, 1811.8 dollars of &dquo;Treasury notes&dquo; which &dquo;ultimately degenerated into a kind of FINANCIAL CHAOS, 1811-1816 currency.&dquo;&dquo; Writing in 1831, Gallatin stated that had the Bank been rechar- It was a most unfortunate time for tered, the have been the country, on the verge of a war with suspension might and the state banks would England, to be deprived of the services prevented have been restrained within of the Bank. State banks on proper sprang up bounds. every hand to take its place. Their number increased from 88 in 1811 to THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED 24s in 1816 and their circulation grew STATES from ~~.’~ million dollars in 1811 to 100 As early as October 14, 1814, Secre- millions six years later.9 Such a rapid Dallas,12 in a report submitted to inflation of the currency resulted nat- tary called attention to the need urally in the depreciation of bank notes Congress, for a National Bank, the in terms of gold, amounting at the emphasizing fact that such a bank could restore the maximum to 23 per cent in Baltimore, currency to a gold parity and 16 per cent in Philadelphia and depreciated New York.lo and that in its fiscal relations with the would be of incalculable The revenues of the government, Treasury assistance. After seven unsuccessful consisting largely of tari~ were duties, within two the charter for the most part collected in this attempts years, of the Second Bank, closely resembling depreciated currency, while it was that of the was Con- necessary for the nation to make First, passed by large and became law on disbursements of funds in New gress April 10, Eng- 1816.13 an with land where specie payments had been Through agreement maintained. reason of con- 11 By this Willis, H. P., American Banking.1918, p. 209. dition, it has been estimated that the 12 Alexander J. Dallas from Pennsylvania, government lost $5,000,000 from 1814 appointed Secretary of the Treasury, October 6, 1812. 7 Though three-fourths of the stock was held 13 The act provided for a capital of $35,000,000, abroad, the foreign shareholders exerted little of which the government subscribed one-fifth. control, as they were not allowed to vote through There were to be twenty-five directors, twenty of proxies. whom were to be elected annually by the share- 8 By 1834 the process of liquidating the assets holders and five appointed by the government. had been completed, the shareholders receiving Branches were to be established wherever the in all $434 for each $400 share. The assets of Bank thought necessary, managed by from seven the parent bank in Philadelphia were purchased to thirteen directors appointed by the parent by Stephen A. Girard, which was reopened on bank. The circulation was not to exceed the May 12, 1812, as "Girard’s Bank." capital. Deposits of public funds were to be 9 This increase was due to two factors: (1) made in the Bank unless the Secretary of the the suspension of specie payments everywhere Treasury should otherwise direct. The Bank during August of 1814 excepting in New Eng- was required to pay the government a bonus of land; and (2) to the withdrawal of the restraining $1,500,000 and to transfer public funds without influence of the Bank. charge. Weekly statements of condition might 10 The specie was either driven abroad or into be called for and Congress was given the right to the New England States. inspect the books of the Bank. Downloaded from ann.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on June 18, 2015 3 the state banks in the larger towns, the bursing government funds, in furnish- resumption of specie payments was ing domestic exchange, in paying the brought about (nominally at least) by pensioners of the government, and in February 20, 1817, thus realizing the acting until 1833 as the sole depositary first purpose of the Bank. Due partly of public moneys, the Bank was of great to governmental pressure and partly to service to the whole people. a lack of banking training, the direc- In his first message to Congress, on tors, at first, extended loans and rapidly December 8, 1829, President Jackson increased the circulation, a policy expressed doubts as to the constitu- which resulted in a heavy loss to the tionality of the Bank and the sound- Bank and in the retirement of William ness of its notes. The President’s Jones as president in January of 1819. hostility subsequently cooled, but Langdon Cheves, chosen as his succes- when the Whig party at Baltimore in sor, immediately inaugurated a policy 1831 took the side of the Bank, there of retrenchment and deflation. Under ensued a long and bitter struggle which his management and later under that ended in the defeat of the attempt to of Nicholas Biddle, the Bank became recharter it. The reasons as given by &dquo;the most powerful and best managed Professor Catterall for this opposition financial institution the country had were the &dquo; widespread belief that the ever seen.&dquo; ~4 Its notes, circulating from Bank was unconstitutional, the hostil- Montreal to Mexico City, were safe ity of the states, the opposition of the and elastic, In transferring and dis- state banks, the rise of democracy, 14 Willis, H. P., American Banking. 1918, p. 210. Downloaded from ann.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on June 18, 2015 4 and the envy and hatred which the and the government, whereby they poor always feel for the rich.&dquo;15 were required to give security for the Upon the failure to recharter the funds deposited &dquo; whenever the deposits Second Bank, the era of central banks, should exceed one-half the bank modelled after those existing in Europe, capital paid in,&dquo; 17 or whenever the passed.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Martin Van Buren: the Greatest American President
    SUBSCRIBE NOW AND RECEIVE CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN* FREE! “The Independent Review does not accept “The Independent Review is pronouncements of government officials nor the excellent.” conventional wisdom at face value.” —GARY BECKER, Noble Laureate —JOHN R. MACARTHUR, Publisher, Harper’s in Economic Sciences Subscribe to The Independent Review and receive a free book of your choice* such as the 25th Anniversary Edition of Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government, by Founding Editor Robert Higgs. This quarterly journal, guided by co-editors Christopher J. Coyne, and Michael C. Munger, and Robert M. Whaples offers leading-edge insights on today’s most critical issues in economics, healthcare, education, law, history, political science, philosophy, and sociology. Thought-provoking and educational, The Independent Review is blazing the way toward informed debate! Student? Educator? Journalist? Business or civic leader? Engaged citizen? This journal is for YOU! *Order today for more FREE book options Perfect for students or anyone on the go! The Independent Review is available on mobile devices or tablets: iOS devices, Amazon Kindle Fire, or Android through Magzter. INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE, 100 SWAN WAY, OAKLAND, CA 94621 • 800-927-8733 • [email protected] PROMO CODE IRA1703 Martin Van Buren The Greatest American President —————— ✦ —————— JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL resident Martin Van Buren does not usually receive high marks from histori- ans. Born of humble Dutch ancestry in December 1782 in the small, upstate PNew York village of Kinderhook, Van Buren gained admittance to the bar in 1803 without benefit of higher education. Building on a successful country legal practice, he became one of the Empire State’s most influential and prominent politi- cians while the state was surging ahead as the country’s wealthiest and most populous.
    [Show full text]
  • History of Banking in the U.S. (9/30/2010) Econ 310-004
    History of Banking in the U.S. (9/30/2010) Econ 310‐004 Definitions • independent treasury – separation of bank and state • laissez faire – transactions between private parties are free from state intervention, including restrictive regulations, taxes, tariffs and enforced monopolies • mercantilism – alliance between government and certain privileged merchants • interstate branch banking – the ability of a bank to have branches in more than one state • intrastate branch banking – the ability of a bank to have multiple branches in the same state • unit banking – no interstate or intrastate branching • fractional currency – currency in denominations less than a dollar (e.g., 5¢, 10¢, 25¢, etc.) • bond collateral requirement – dollar for dollar banknote to state bond ratio • wildcat banking – fraudulent banks setup in wilderness that made it very hard to redeem notes • inelastic currency – inability of the system to convert deposits into banknotes Principles • Banking has always been one of the most regulated industries. • Branching allows diversification. o Assets: Without branching banks only loan locally, so when the local economy goes bad, many loans default at once. o Liabilities: Without branching banks only get deposits locally, so when the local economy goes bad, many customers withdraw at once. • The stability of the bank system effects the reserve rate, not the other way around. • Bond collateral requirement led to more bank panics due to inelastic currency. Alexander Hamilton early state banks • Secretary of the Treasury (Washington) • 1776‐1837 • formed United States Mint • regulation at state level • got Morris to form Bank of North America • no general incorporation for banks • started Bank of New York • 9/31 states outlawed banking • architect of 1st bank of the United States • some states setup monopoly banks • killed by Aaron Burr (VP) in a duel • some still chartered banks • 6 states tried deposit/note insurance Andrew Jackson • President of U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolution of Fed Independence
    FEDERALRESERVE The Evolution of Fed Independence BY STEPHEN SLIVINSKI oday there is a consensus Wars, Depression, and How monetary policy that a central bank can best Dependence T contribute to good economic When the United States entered and central bank performance by pursuing price stabil- World War I in April 1917, the Federal ity — and that it should remain inde- Reserve almost instantly became the autonomy came pendent from political forces. In the primary vehicle for financing the war case of price stability, this understand- effort. The main function of the Fed of age ing evolved over decades of experi- during those war years was to lend ence. The notion of independence of money to banks to purchase “Liberty the central bank was more difficult to Loans” bonds from the U.S. Treasury. fulfill. They loaned the money at a discount- The original conception of the ed rate — not coincidentally lower Federal Reserve System when it was than the interest rate on the war bonds created in 1913 was meant to continue — to entice bond purchasers. After the spirit of the “independent treasury the war, the Federal Reserve Bank of system” that existed in the pre-Fed New York remained the official era. That system assumed that the U.S. fiscal agent of the U.S. Treasury Treasury would store its gold and Department. assets in its own vaults lest it unduly In the post-war years, the Fed influence the markets for credit and busied itself with maintaining the money. Ideally, Treasury meddling in newly reconstructed gold standard. what passed for monetary policy at the Its missteps in the wake of the stock time was to be avoided.
    [Show full text]
  • Antebellum Banking Regulation: a Comparative Approach
    ANTEBELLUM BANKING REGULATION: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Alka Gandhi, M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2003 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Richard H. Steckel, Advisor Professor Paul Evans ________________________ Advisor Professor J. Huston McCulloch Economics Graduate Program ABSTRACT Extensive historical and contemporary studies establish important links between financial systems and economic development. Despite the importance of this research area and the extent of prior efforts, numerous interesting questions remain about the consequences of alternative regulatory regimes for the health of the financial sector. As a dynamic period of economic and financial evolution, which was accompanied by diverse banking regulations across states, the antebellum era provides a valuable laboratory for study. This dissertation utilizes a rich data set of balance sheets from antebellum banks in four U.S. states, Massachusetts, Ohio, Louisiana and Tennessee, to examine the relative impacts of preventative banking regulation on bank performance. Conceptual models of financial regulation are used to identify the motivations behind each state’s regulation and how it changed over time. Next, a duration model is employed to model the odds of bank failure and to determine the impact that regulation had on the ability of a bank to remain in operation. Finally, the estimates from the duration model are used to perform a counterfactual that assesses the impact on the odds of bank failure when imposing one state’s regulation on another state, ceteris paribus. The results indicate that states did enact regulation that was superior to alternate contemporaneous banking regulation, with respect to the ability to maintain the banking system.
    [Show full text]
  • Once Bitten, Twice Shy: Rethinking the Federal Reserve’S Independence and Monetary Policy in the U.S
    ONCE BITTEN, TWICE SHY: RETHINKING THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S INDEPENDENCE AND MONETARY POLICY IN THE U.S. by Niveditha Prabakaran B.S. Mathematics-Economics, B.A. Politics and Philosophy School of Arts and Sciences 2011 Submitted to the Undergraduate Faculty of School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2011 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This thesis was presented by Niveditha Prabakaran It was defended on April 20, 2011 and approved by Steven Husted, Professor, Economics, University of Pittsburgh Thomas Rawski, Professor, Economics, University of Pittsburgh James Burnham, Professor, School of Business, Duquesne University Thesis Director: Werner Troesken, Professor, Economics, University of Pittsburgh ii ONCE BITTEN, TWICE SHY: RETHINKING THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S INDEPENDENCE AND MONETARY POLICY IN THE U.S. Niveditha Prabakaran, B.Phil University of Pittsburgh, 2011 Copyright © by Niveditha Prabakaran 2011 iii Once Bitten, Twice shy: Rethinking the Federal Reserve’s Independence and Monetary Policy in the U.S. Niveditha Prabakaran, B.Phil University of Pittsburgh, 2011 It is widely believed that the Federal Reserve played a central role in bringing about the biggest catastrophe in American history—the Great Depression. The literature is extensive in seeking to provide an explanation for the Federal Reserve’s policy errors. This paper offers a new interpretation on why such an event occurred by studying a heretofore-unexamined landmark court case. In 1928, a private citizen filed suit against the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for increasing discount rates; he sough a court injunction that would force the Federal Reserve to decrease rates.
    [Show full text]
  • OMW Sprague (The Man Who" Wrote the Book" on Financial Crises) And
    NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES O.M.W. SPRAGUE (THE MAN WHO “WROTE THE BOOK” ON FINANCIAL CRISES) AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE Hugh Rockoff Working Paper 19758 http://www.nber.org/papers/w19758 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 December 2013 This paper was prepared for a conference on alternatives to the Federal Reserve held at George Mason University on November 1, 2013. I thank the organizers of the conference George Selgin and Larry H. White; my discussant, David Wheelock; and other participants in the discussion for many helpful comments. Elmus Wicker and Eugene White read an earlier draft and made many helpful suggestions. The opinions expressed here and the remaining errors are mine. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2013 by Hugh Rockoff. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. O.M.W. Sprague (the Man who “Wrote the Book” on Financial Crises) and the Founding of the Federal Reserve Hugh Rockoff NBER Working Paper No. 19758 December 2013 JEL No. B26,N1 ABSTRACT O.M.W. Sprague was America’s leading expert on financial crises when America was debating establishing the Federal Reserve.
    [Show full text]
  • The National Monetary Commission: American Banking’S Debt to Europe
    1 The National Monetary Commission: American Banking’s Debt to Europe Zack Saravay Honors Thesis Submitted to the Department of History, Georgetown University Advisor: Professor Katherine Benton-Cohen Honors Program Chairs: Professors Amy Leonard and Katherine Benton-Cohen 8 May 2017 2 Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................................ 3 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 4 HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW .................................................................................................................. 6 Creation of the Federal Reserve ........................................................................................................... 7 Progressive Era Economics ................................................................................................................ 13 BACKGROUND – THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM (1863-1908) ......................................................... 15 CHAPTER I. ORIGINS OF THE NMC (1908) ...................................................................................... 25 THE BATTLE FOR CURRENCY REFORM ................................................................................................... 25 THE ALDRICH-VREELAND ACT ............................................................................................................... 28 COMPOSITION AND SCOPE OF
    [Show full text]
  • The United States Independent Reasury System
    "'I: ,~~ THE STORAG! UNITED STATES INDEPENDENT REASURY SYSTEM FEDERAL HALL, N.Y. December 30, 1968 The United States Independent Treasury System Federal Hall, N.H.S. - New York by Dr. John D.R. Platt DIVISION OF HISTORY Office Of Archeology And Historic Preservation December 30, 1968 National Park Service U.S. Department of the Interior THE UNITED STATES INDEPENDENT TREASURY SYSTEM: ITS SIGNIFICANCE AND APPLICATION TO FEDERAL HALL•• WITH A NOTE ON THE CUSTOMS HClJSE PERIOD by ·Historian John D. R. Platt December 30, 1968 Background and Evaluation Study · Preface This study, prepared under RSP FEHA•H-2, brings together in narrative form, from an extenaive range of secondary and printed source materials, data needed for the development of museum exhibits on the New York Sub-Treasury and Customs in the building at the corner of Wall and Broad Streets in New York City. It has been made as complete as time had permitted. A complex subject, the Independent Treasury System gauged America's economic development during its years of operation. The Customs is a subject on quite another level, lacking an extensive liter­ ature, although tariff policy has been the subject of much eco­ nomics and historical writing. The data offered here touches on the essential topics to be considered among those concerning the 1842-1862 period of occupancy. i CONTENTS Page Preface i 1. How the Independent Treasury System Came into Being and What It Was 1 2. How Effectually the Independent Treasury System Operated 18 3. The New York Sub-Treasury and Its Functions 35 4. The Sub-Treasury's Wall Street Locale 46 5.
    [Show full text]
  • The Politics of Monetary Policy!
    The Politics of Monetary Policy Alberto Alesina Andrea Stella Harvard University and IGIER Harvard University September: 2009 Preliminary and Incomplete Abstract In this paper we critically review the literature on the political econ- omy of monetary policy emphasizing the questions opened by the recent …nancial crisis. We begin with a discussion of the issue of rules versus discretion. We then examine the independence of Central banks both in normal times and in crisis and in relation to the political cycles. Finally we address international institutional issues concerning the feasibility, op- timality and political sustainabilty of currency unions in which more than one country share the same currency. A brief review of the Euro experi- ence concludes the paper. 1 Introduction Had we written this chapter before the summer of 2007 we would have concluded that there was much agreement amongst economists about the optimal institu- tional arrangements for monetary policy. Sure, for the specialists there were many open questions, but for most outsiders (including non monetary econo- mists) many issues seemed to be settled. An hypothetical paper written (at least by us, but we believe by many others) before the summer of 2007 would have concluded that: 1)Monetary policy is better left to independent Central Banks at harms length from the politicians and the treasury. 2)Most central banks should (and must do) follow some sort of in‡ation targeting; that is they look at in‡ation as an indicator of when to loosen up or tighten up. Certain Central banks do it more explicitly than others (say the UK Central Bank versus the Fed), some other Central Banks still look at quantity of money and or credit indicators (like the so called "second pillar" of the ECB, the …rst being in‡ation) but in‡ation targeting had basically "won".
    [Show full text]
  • The Appropriations and Budget Process for Multilateral
    Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-02804-3 - Money and Banks in the American Political System Kathryn C. Lavelle Index More information Index ABA.SeeAmerican Bankers and regulation of derivatives, 127 Association American Enterprise Institute, 23 adjustable-rate mortgages, 54, 180 American International Group (AIG), 193, 255 Administrative Procedure Act, 124, 150 and bailout, 196–197, 199 advocacy coalition, 10 failure of, 195–196 agencies of the federal government, 3, 25, 109. American political culture, 1–2, 31, 249 See also executive branch agencies; by aversion to concentration of economic individual agency power and political authority, 6, 13, and financial crisis of 2008, 188, 217 28–29, 40, 151–152 and policy process, 19–20, 110 defined, 4–5 agency capture, 8, 31, 159, 249.Seealso and institutional arrangement, 187 revolving door; lobbying; lobbyists and opposition to banks, 54–55 defined, 14–15, 130–133 American revolution, 40, 48 and relief for individuals, 206 American Securitization Forum, 22 agency debt, 140–141, 243, 255 Americans for Financial Reform, 260 AIG.SeeAmerican International Group America’s Community Bankers, 133 Aldrich, Nelson, 44, 45 appropriations bills, 90 Aldrich Plan, 45 appropriations committees, 92 Aldrich-Vreeland Act, 44, 45 ARMs.Seeadjustable-rate mortgages Allison’s models of the bureaucratic process, asset-backed commercial paper, 78 4–5, 6, 15.Seealsobureaucratic auto industry, 201 politics paradigm bailouts, 188, 202 and action channels, 83–85 success in lobbying Congress, 216 and actions across time
    [Show full text]
  • Quantitative Easing in the 1930S October 2018 Christopher Hanes Department of Economics State University of New York at Binghamt
    Quantitative Easing in the 1930s October 2018 Christopher Hanes Department of Economics State University of New York at Binghamton P.O. Box 6000 Binghamton, NY 13902 (607) 777-2572 [email protected] Abstract: During the 1934-39 recovery from the U.S. Great Depression, overnight interest rates were usually at a lower bound while American monetary authorities followed policies related to today's debates on quantitative easing (QE): they tried to stabilize Treasury yields with open market operations; they created rapid growth in high-powered money; and they allowed transitory factors to affect high-powered money. I find relationships between these policies and bond yields that reveal a portfolio effect of short- duration asset supply on term premiums, and help explain why trend high-powered money growth was associated with recovery of real activity over 1934-39. JEL codes: E43, E52, G12, N12, N22 Acknowledgements. For comments and suggestions, thanks to William English, John Fernald, James D. Hamilton, Barry Jones, Edward Nelson, Gary Richardson, Eric Swanson, Susan Wolcott and Wei Xiao; to participants in the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco conference “The Past and Future of Monetary Policy,” March 2013; the Yale Economic History workshop; NBER DAE Summer 2014; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland workshop; Rutgers University Economic History Workshop. During the post-2009 recovery from the Great Recession, the Federal Reserve tried "quantitative easing" (QE) to influence bond yields while short-term rates appeared to be near a lower bound. In QE a central bank acquires long-term bonds, usually Treasury bonds, in exchange for newly-created reserve balances.
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of Financial Reform on Federal Reserve Autonomy
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Shull, Bernard Working Paper The impact of financial reform on federal reserve autonomy Working Paper, No. 735 Provided in Cooperation with: Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Suggested Citation: Shull, Bernard (2012) : The impact of financial reform on federal reserve autonomy, Working Paper, No. 735, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Annandale-on- Hudson, NY This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79448 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten
    [Show full text]