The End of Empire: ’s Wall and Military Infrastructure in Britannia During the Second and Early Third Centuries.

Hadrian’s wall did not exist in isolation. Throughout the second and early third centuries the wall was part of a greater entity both across the Empire and in Britannia. Assessing the wall in Britannia independently of the supporting infrastructure is a key mistake made by many academics. The wall must be assessed as it was: part of a greater system. Nonetheless there is still a major problem that confronts any study of military infrastructure in Britannia: the sparsity of Roman literary material. Texts are a miniscule part of the corpus of material evidence and therefore, a variety of other sources must be utilised. By triangulating corroborating data from the numismatic, archaeological and epigraphic evidence the frontier can be reconstructed. Ultimately it will demonstrate how the military infrastructure in Britannia served not as a defensive barrier, but as a platform that allowed the army to operate effectively on both sides of the frontier. These operations ultimately served as a way for Emperors to gain military legitimacy, either by direct or indirect action, as expressed in various examples of imperial propaganda.

Most early reconstructions present the wall as a defensive . Arguably, the most prominent was Eric Birley’s model.1 Many of his reconstructions are, however, based on questionable evidence. For example, he often depicts the wall and other featuring crenels. 2 The evidence for this coming from niche sources such as the depiction of the wall on the Rudge cup, which features heavily in Birley’s Research.3 This cup depicts the wall with crenels clearly visible.4 However, this may well be an artistic trope used to clearly identify that the object being depicted is a wall rather than as an accurate representation of what the wall looked like. Assumptions based on circumstantial evidence has plagued study of the wall, as Breeze puts early academics: “only solved the problems they had defined”.5 One major factor that affected earlier reconstructions was Mommsen’s theory that the wall was built in response to Legio VIIII Hispana being destroyed north of the wall.6 This theory was unfounded, being based on questionable sources such as a letter by Fronto that vaguely references a massacre by the Britons that occurred decades before under Hadrian which was then taken alongside a single line in the Historia Augusta and that the last known inscription referring to the legion in Britannia dates to 108 AD.7 This theory was later derailed by the discovery of a tegula stamped ‘LEG VIIII’ in Nijmegen that suggested the legion was moved to the Netherlands.8 Ironically, after this new evidence

1 Birley, E (1961). 270 2 Birley, E (1961). Fig. 32 3 Birley, E (1961). 196, 203, 208, 211, 266 4 Moore, C (1978). 321; See also Rudge Cup Replica 5 Breeze, D (2018). 6 Mommsen, T (1856); For English translation see Campbell, D (2010). 7 Fronto, On the Parthian War 2; Historia Augusta, Hadrian 5.2; Figure 1 8 Wright, R (1978). was discovered Birley himself acknowledged that Legio VIIII was not destroyed in Britannia, but nonetheless stuck by his original interpretation that the wall was a primarily defensive structure based on the insubstantial evidence that the Romans were struggling in Britannia.9

However, evidence from the Tablets suggests that the region immediately south of the wall was relatively stable. One tablet makes clear that the woman writing expects her friend’s attendance to a birthday party.10 This itself could only be the case if the region was stable as otherwise the risks incurred by travel would be too severe for such a benign reason. This stability contradicts the idea that Northern England was a region under regular attack put forward in defensive reconstructions. Instead the evidence would point to far more violence happening north of the wall. Research by Hodgson based on excavations of farmsteads has shown that following the walls construction, farming communities that inhabited the area north of the wall for a millennium suddenly disappear. 11 Most likely being wiped out by the Romans.12 This adds credibility to the wall being an offensive tool, thus explaining the numerous offensives launched from the wall. 13 Even Emperors who did not have any direct involvement such as Commodus or Antoninus Pius nonetheless benefited from military action in the provinces, appropriating the achievements of their legates in either campaigning north of the wall or putting down rebellions.14 This clearly changes the narrative of the frontier from one of defence to offense.

It is not just in the historical context that the defensive model falls apart. The design of the wall simply does not make sense from a purely defensive viewpoint. The for example, were small fortlets placed across the entire length of the wall at mile intervals and would have been almost useless as defensive structures. There is no evidence of protruding or wall slits leaving any observers heavily exposed. Furthermore, Breeze estimates that they would only have been large enough to support a single contubernium of 8 soldiers based on the size of the living quarters, making it a fair assessment.15 Therefore, if any significant force attacked the wall then this garrison would be quickly overwhelmed. Even if reinforcements arrived quickly another issue with the wall would emerge: its narrow breadth. Even at its widest the wall was no more than 10 feet with some areas being as narrow as 6 feet.16 This meant that even at its widest point Roman soldiers bearing Pilum would struggle to stand more than one deep. Even speculated additional defences such as crenels, this narrowness would have heavily hindered reinforcement of the wall if under assault. 17 This also assumes a wall-walk even existed with some academics such as Bidwell suggesting it may not have.18 Either way, it is telling that in 180 AD,

9 Birley, E (1971). 10 Tab. Vindol. 291 11 Hodgson, N (2017). 12 Ibid 13 RIB 2034; Cassius Dio, LXXVII 11-13; HA, 18.2, Antonius Pius 5.4 14 HA, Antonius Pius 5.3-4, Commodus 6.1-3; Dio, LXXIII 8.1 15 Breeze, D (2007). 40 16 Breeze, D (2007). 39; Birley, E (1961). 81-89; For visual reconstructions see Crow, J (1991). 54 17 Ibid 18 Bidwell, P (2008) the only time a major force attacked the wall in this period, the wall was breached. 19 In contrast Hadrian’s Arabicus forwent a wall entirely. Instead this frontier used a series of forts alongside the natural barrier of the Arabian desert, allowing them to last until the fifth century in a far more active frontier.20 This contrast highlights the poor defensive capability of the wall and the numerous shortcomings that emerge when it is assessed as a purely defensive structure.

Consequentially, theories surrounding military infrastructure in Britannia have moved away from a purely defensive reconstruction. Mann argues that the wall was an ‘accidental frontier’, built where the ’s impetus ran out.21 This however, is extremely simplistic and ignores key principles highlighted in research by Breeze and Poulter such as the particular use of the topography and the close proximity to the pre-existing Stanegate.22 It is also known from an inscription that the wall’s construction was ordered directly by Hadrian meaning, when taken with the specific nature of its design, it was not there by chance.23

A more interesting argument based on this premise of a non-defensive design is the customs barrier model. Archaeological findings have found Roman commodities in Scotland and various inscriptions that suggests trading ventures north of the wall.24 Though, while it is true that trade did occur between Britannia and Caledonia, this argument does not properly explain the function of the wall. This model is based heavily on evidence from areas such as the Danube and North Africa.25 This is a flawed comparison as these areas were far more active than the fringe province of Britannia. Caledonia was sparsely populated meaning the flow of goods would be minimal when compared to other border regions. Additionally, this model does not take the military infrastructure throughout the rest of the province into account. If the wall is to be assessed with accuracy, then it must be examined how it existed: part of a greater network.

The 3 legionary garrisons were all located adjacently to upland areas in York, Chester and on the Welsh border.26 Based on findings at multiple sites there were also numerous auxiliary cohorts and alae units located across Britannia, mainly focused between the legionary bases at York, Chester and the Wall itself.27 These bases were all located on or near fertile flatland areas, allowing the production of grain or barley helping solve the logistical challenge of supplying the bases. 28 By having many smaller bases rather than a few large camps supply chains became far more efficient as the need for supplies was spread, meaning more could be source locally rather than being inefficiently transported from across

19 Dio, LXXIII 8.1 20 Fisher, G (2004); Parker, S. (1988); Bowersock, G (1976) 21 Mann, J (1990a); Mann, J (1990b) 22 Breeze, D., Dobson, B (2000). 26; Breeze, D (2007). 36; Poulter, J (2010). 23 RIB 1637 24 Macinnes, L (1989); Roberston, A (1983); RIB 2059; RIB 2182 25 Breeze, D., Dobson, B (2000). 149; Breeze, D (2011). 76, 84, 200-203; Cherry, D (1998). 59-66 26 Breeze, D (2007). 22; Riley, B (2015). 113 27 Breeze, D., Dobson, B (2000). 55; Bidwell, P (2009). 28 Smith, D., Kenward, H (2011); see also Tab. Vindol. 185 the province. In addition, these bases were placed either next to navigable rivers or connected to a sophisticated network of roads.29 This made it far easier to move large numbers of troops and supplies quickly. The large number of different routes prevented both congestion and allowed most units to move directly without unnecessary detours.

This same strategic principle is also shown in the design of the camps themselves. Figure 2 shows a drawing reconstructing the layout of one of these military camps.30 The first thing that stands out about this camp is how it lacks the concentric principle of later fortifications such as medieval castles. Being composed as a complex of buildings rather than as a fortification built around a central structure meant there was no defensible place to retreat to if breached. Moreover, like the milecastles, there were also no protruding watch towers or wall slits, leaving any sentries exposed. This overall design demonstrates how these camps were not meant for siege warfare. However, by trading defensive advantages it allowed these camps to have more internal routes, buildings for accommodation and entry points. Additional accommodation allowed for a larger number of troops to be garrisoned while multiple entrances allowed for more rapid mobilisation of troops and movement of supplies. With the bulk of the garrison concentrated in northern England between the two northern legionary garrisons and the wall, Roman units could react relatively quickly to events both north and south of the wall.31 If the wall itself were attacked then it most likely would have acted as a delay as suggested by the likes of Hodgson and Bidwell; buying time while reinforcements were mustered.32

It is unlikely that delay was the walls primary purpose but one piece of supporting evidence that it would have acted in this way was the . This was a flat-bottomed ditch approximately 20ft across and 10ft deep with mounds 20ft wide and 7ft high either side.33 Being located not north, but south of the wall meant it would have slowed the advance of any army that broke through the wall allowing more time for Roman troops to mobilise and form a counterforce. This shows how the infrastructure was optimized towards rapid response and mobilisation. Allowing the army to respond to both invasions from the north and rebellion in the south in addition to quickly forming and launching campaigns north of the wall. This theory is similar to an early model put forward by Bruce with the acceptations that, due to writing in the 19th century, he had a far smaller corpus of evidence and that he still insisted that the wall also served a defensive purpose.34 Still, If the ancient accounts are correct and the Romans were struggling to control Britannia at the beginning of Hadrian’s reign then having this ability to quickly react would have been an extremely efficient way to pacify the province, creating a justification for the walls peculiar design.

29 Breeze, D., Dobson, B (2000). 55; Poulter, J (2010). 30 See Figure 2 31 Breeze, D (2007). 22; Riley, B (2015). 113 32 Hodgson, N (2009). 44-45; Bidwell, P (2005). 74 33 Heywood, B (1966); Smith, G (1978); Lobell, J (2017). 29 34 Bruce, J (2014). Yet, the wall in Britannia was but one small part of Hadrian’s wider, empire spanning, wall. this vast series of frontiers and fortification was one of Hadrian’s key avenues in establishing military legitimacy, an essential part of the role of emperor.35 The role of martial success in establishing gravitas was a roman tradition dating back to the Republic.36 Therefore, being an Imperator without any laurels to justify that claim could quickly make an Emperor’s position untenable and consequentially non- military emperors prior to Hadrian had gone to a variety of extreme lengths in order to establish themselves such as Claudius’s 16 day campaign in Britannia.37 Britannia was like Parthia in that it would have been a natural place to campaign due to being located at the edge of the Empire. However, unlike Parthia there was little threat of a major repercussions if a campaign failed due to the sparse population of Caledonia. This is what makes Britannia unique as part of Hadrian’s empire wide wall, as it offered a place whereby military force could be exerted without the risk of large-scale counter invasion as with frontiers in the Levant or on the Danube and Rhine.38 This function fits with Mattern’s view of Roman ‘strategy’ whereby Roman military decisions were taken based upon Roman notions of honour rather than ideas of grand strategy as suggested by the likes of Luttwak.39 Though as Whittaker points out the two may not necessarily be mutually exclusive.40 Either way, this honour was an essential part of imperial legitimacy and the wall became an essential avenue to gain this honour.

The regularity of Emperors either campaigning or appropriating the military achievements of their legates in Britannia highlights how the province served as an avenue for attaining martial glory. Fig 3 shows a Sestertius of Antoninus Pius with the legend declaring that he was proclaimed Imperator in Britannia for the second time and his image wearing the laurels befitting such a conqueror.41 In reality Antonius Pius never visited Britannia with the campaign being the effort of its Governor Quintus Lollius Urbicus. 42 This situation however was not unique and similar examples are found in the numismatic propaganda of various emperors. A similar coin was also minted by Commodus bearing the title of Britannicus in addition to Imperator, serving the same purpose.43 This again, being despite the military achievements in Britain being due to subordinates, in this case Pertinax.44

These coins are also almost indistinguishable from coins minted by emperors with far more legitimate military achievements. For example, there is an early second century sestertius minted by that presents him in a similar manner. The only real differences is that the coins bear the title of ‘Dacicus’ instead of ‘Britannicus’ and a submitted, conquered Dacia takes the place of the triumphant and resorted

35 Dio, LXIX 9.1-3; HA, Hadrian 12.6 36 Dio, XXXVI 31.3; Appian, The Civil Wars I 55 37 Dio, LX 21.3-22.2 38 HA, Marcus Aurelius 8.6-9.6, 17.2, 21.10-22.3; Dio, LXXII 3 39 Mattern, S (1999); Luttwak, E (1976). 40 Whittaker, C (2004). 41 See Figure 3 42 HA Antoninus Pius 5.4 43 RIC III Commodus 437c 44 Dio, LXXIII 9.2; HA, Commodus 13.5, Pertinax 3.5-9 Britannia.45 These coins being sestertii meant that they would be used regularly in monetary transaction while being minted and used in Italy strongly indicates that they were specifically minted for use by Roman citizens. This means that through coinage common Romans were subconsciously being conditioned to liken the ‘achievements’ of Commodus and Antonius Pius in Britannia with the military exploits of Emperors such as Trajan. This of course was a false parallel, but nevertheless acts as a demonstration of the purpose Britannia served: to help establish imperial military legitimacy.

The exploitation of Britannia in imperial propaganda is not limited to the numismatic evidence. Caracalla’s victory arch in Volubilis listed, among many others, the title of Britannicus maximus.46 The use of this title possesses the same meaning as in the coins of Antoninus Pius and Commodus. Moreover, a surviving part of the cape from the accompanying bronze statue of Caracalla depicts barbarian figures in proto-tartan, clearly portraying Picts.47 As the cape would have been fairly prominent this means that, when taken alongside the use of the title Britannicus maximus, Caracalla was making a purposeful choice to emphasise his military record in Britannia as one of glory. In truth his first action as emperor was to make a white peace that abandoned all his father’s gains.48 Yet, this monument highlights how, at least for Caracalla, the war with Caledonia was more important than conquering the province. Additionally, the fact that he was doing this in a fringe province thousands of miles from both Rome and Britannia demonstrates the paramount importance that Britannia and the military infrastructure present there played in imperial propaganda. The inscriptions on this monument being written in Latin suggest that this imagery was tailored for a Roman audience meaning that military achievement in Britannia was being used not just in Rome, but across the Empire. This is also found on the Wall itself with a fragment from the Wallsend/Jarrow monument at Terminus also being written in Latin.49 For well educated, historically minded Romans the style of language in monuments such as these harkened to the Res Gestae of Augustus; presenting Emperors through the lens of their great deeds, whether true or exaggerated.

Ultimately this ability to generate legitimacy was Britannia’s greatest resource. Britannia was a poor fringe province rich in neither resources nor finance and yet the Roman’s dedicated 1/6th of their entire army to keep it under control. In the end Britannia’s value was personal to the Emperor, offering a unique source of opportunity that allowed them to portray themselves with marital legitimacy across the Empire and this purpose is reflected in the design of the province’s military infrastructure. The topography and locations of the forts spread the need for supplies and allowed the camps to source some food locally meaning more troops could be stationed in the province. Meanwhile the design of the actual fortifications and the connective network of rivers and roads allowed rapid movement of troops and

45 RIC II Trajan 564 46 CIL 08, 09993 47 Piggott, S (1968). 48 Dio, LXXVIII 11.1 49 RIB 1051 supplies. This alongside most units being located in northern England allowed the Army the flexibility to operate both sides of the wall: Suppressing rebellion in the south as well as launching various incursions north of the wall. These actions being celebrated across the empire from coins in Rome to monuments in the Sahara.

Word count (inc. Footnotes): 3,135

Fig. 1 – RIB 665, Building inscription of Trajan. [Stone]. c.108 AD. At: York: Yorkshire Museum. 1998.21

Fig. 2 – Illustrated overview of the Roman Fort at Housesteads based on excavational evidence. Taken from Breeze, D, Dobson, B (2000). 167. See also Birley, E (1961). Fig 24

Fig. 3 - RIC III Antoninus Pius 745. Sestertius of Antonius Pius. [Bronze]. C 143-144 AD. Obverse: Bust of Antonius Pius, Laureate. Legend: ANTONINVS AVG PIVS P P TR P COS III. Reverse: Depiction of the Goddess Britannia, seated on a rock holding a shield and a standard with left elbow resting on shield; on the shield a cuirass. Legend: IMPERATOR II BRITANNIA S C

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