Hadrian's Wall and Military Infrastructure in Britannia During the Second and Early Third Centuries
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The End of Empire: Hadrian’s Wall and Military Infrastructure in Britannia During the Second and Early Third Centuries. Hadrian’s wall did not exist in isolation. Throughout the second and early third centuries the wall was part of a greater entity both across the Empire and in Britannia. Assessing the wall in Britannia independently of the supporting infrastructure is a key mistake made by many academics. The wall must be assessed as it was: part of a greater system. Nonetheless there is still a major problem that confronts any study of military infrastructure in Britannia: the sparsity of Roman literary material. Texts are a miniscule part of the corpus of material evidence and therefore, a variety of other sources must be utilised. By triangulating corroborating data from the numismatic, archaeological and epigraphic evidence the frontier can be reconstructed. Ultimately it will demonstrate how the military infrastructure in Britannia served not as a defensive barrier, but as a platform that allowed the army to operate effectively on both sides of the frontier. These operations ultimately served as a way for Emperors to gain military legitimacy, either by direct or indirect action, as expressed in various examples of imperial propaganda. Most early reconstructions present the wall as a defensive fortification. Arguably, the most prominent was Eric Birley’s model.1 Many of his reconstructions are, however, based on questionable evidence. For example, he often depicts the wall and other fortifications featuring crenels. 2 The evidence for this coming from niche sources such as the depiction of the wall on the Rudge cup, which features heavily in Birley’s Research.3 This cup depicts the wall with crenels clearly visible.4 However, this may well be an artistic trope used to clearly identify that the object being depicted is a wall rather than as an accurate representation of what the wall looked like. Assumptions based on circumstantial evidence has plagued study of the wall, as Breeze puts early academics: “only solved the problems they had defined”.5 One major factor that affected earlier reconstructions was Mommsen’s theory that the wall was built in response to Legio VIIII Hispana being destroyed north of the wall.6 This theory was unfounded, being based on questionable sources such as a letter by Fronto that vaguely references a massacre by the Britons that occurred decades before under Hadrian which was then taken alongside a single line in the Historia Augusta and that the last known inscription referring to the legion in Britannia dates to 108 AD.7 This theory was later derailed by the discovery of a tegula stamped ‘LEG VIIII’ in Nijmegen that suggested the legion was moved to the Netherlands.8 Ironically, after this new evidence 1 Birley, E (1961). 270 2 Birley, E (1961). Fig. 32 3 Birley, E (1961). 196, 203, 208, 211, 266 4 Moore, C (1978). 321; See also Rudge Cup Replica 5 Breeze, D (2018). 6 Mommsen, T (1856); For English translation see Campbell, D (2010). 7 Fronto, On the Parthian War 2; Historia Augusta, Hadrian 5.2; Figure 1 8 Wright, R (1978). was discovered Birley himself acknowledged that Legio VIIII was not destroyed in Britannia, but nonetheless stuck by his original interpretation that the wall was a primarily defensive structure based on the insubstantial evidence that the Romans were struggling in Britannia.9 However, evidence from the Vindolanda Tablets suggests that the region immediately south of the wall was relatively stable. One tablet makes clear that the woman writing expects her friend’s attendance to a birthday party.10 This itself could only be the case if the region was stable as otherwise the risks incurred by travel would be too severe for such a benign reason. This stability contradicts the idea that Northern England was a region under regular attack put forward in defensive reconstructions. Instead the evidence would point to far more violence happening north of the wall. Research by Hodgson based on excavations of farmsteads has shown that following the walls construction, farming communities that inhabited the area north of the wall for a millennium suddenly disappear. 11 Most likely being wiped out by the Romans.12 This adds credibility to the wall being an offensive tool, thus explaining the numerous offensives launched from the wall. 13 Even Emperors who did not have any direct involvement such as Commodus or Antoninus Pius nonetheless benefited from military action in the provinces, appropriating the achievements of their legates in either campaigning north of the wall or putting down rebellions.14 This clearly changes the narrative of the frontier from one of defence to offense. It is not just in the historical context that the defensive model falls apart. The design of the wall simply does not make sense from a purely defensive viewpoint. The milecastles for example, were small fortlets placed across the entire length of the wall at mile intervals and would have been almost useless as defensive structures. There is no evidence of protruding watchtowers or wall slits leaving any observers heavily exposed. Furthermore, Breeze estimates that they would only have been large enough to support a single contubernium of 8 soldiers based on the size of the living quarters, making it a fair assessment.15 Therefore, if any significant force attacked the wall then this garrison would be quickly overwhelmed. Even if reinforcements arrived quickly another issue with the wall would emerge: its narrow breadth. Even at its widest the wall was no more than 10 feet with some areas being as narrow as 6 feet.16 This meant that even at its widest point Roman soldiers bearing Pilum would struggle to stand more than one deep. Even speculated additional defences such as crenels, this narrowness would have heavily hindered reinforcement of the wall if under assault. 17 This also assumes a wall-walk even existed with some academics such as Bidwell suggesting it may not have.18 Either way, it is telling that in 180 AD, 9 Birley, E (1971). 10 Tab. Vindol. 291 11 Hodgson, N (2017). 12 Ibid 13 RIB 2034; Cassius Dio, LXXVII 11-13; HA, Septimius Severus 18.2, Antonius Pius 5.4 14 HA, Antonius Pius 5.3-4, Commodus 6.1-3; Dio, LXXIII 8.1 15 Breeze, D (2007). 40 16 Breeze, D (2007). 39; Birley, E (1961). 81-89; For visual reconstructions see Crow, J (1991). 54 17 Ibid 18 Bidwell, P (2008) the only time a major force attacked the wall in this period, the wall was breached. 19 In contrast Hadrian’s Limes Arabicus forwent a wall entirely. Instead this frontier used a series of forts alongside the natural barrier of the Arabian desert, allowing them to last until the fifth century in a far more active frontier.20 This contrast highlights the poor defensive capability of the wall and the numerous shortcomings that emerge when it is assessed as a purely defensive structure. Consequentially, theories surrounding military infrastructure in Britannia have moved away from a purely defensive reconstruction. Mann argues that the wall was an ‘accidental frontier’, built where the Roman Army’s impetus ran out.21 This however, is extremely simplistic and ignores key principles highlighted in research by Breeze and Poulter such as the particular use of the topography and the close proximity to the pre-existing Stanegate.22 It is also known from an inscription that the wall’s construction was ordered directly by Hadrian meaning, when taken with the specific nature of its design, it was not there by chance.23 A more interesting argument based on this premise of a non-defensive design is the customs barrier model. Archaeological findings have found Roman commodities in Scotland and various inscriptions that suggests trading ventures north of the wall.24 Though, while it is true that trade did occur between Britannia and Caledonia, this argument does not properly explain the function of the wall. This model is based heavily on evidence from areas such as the Danube and North Africa.25 This is a flawed comparison as these areas were far more active than the fringe province of Britannia. Caledonia was sparsely populated meaning the flow of goods would be minimal when compared to other border regions. Additionally, this model does not take the military infrastructure throughout the rest of the province into account. If the wall is to be assessed with accuracy, then it must be examined how it existed: part of a greater network. The 3 legionary garrisons were all located adjacently to upland areas in York, Chester and on the Welsh border.26 Based on findings at multiple sites there were also numerous auxiliary cohorts and alae units located across Britannia, mainly focused between the legionary bases at York, Chester and the Wall itself.27 These bases were all located on or near fertile flatland areas, allowing the production of grain or barley helping solve the logistical challenge of supplying the bases. 28 By having many smaller bases rather than a few large camps supply chains became far more efficient as the need for supplies was spread, meaning more could be source locally rather than being inefficiently transported from across 19 Dio, LXXIII 8.1 20 Fisher, G (2004); Parker, S. (1988); Bowersock, G (1976) 21 Mann, J (1990a); Mann, J (1990b) 22 Breeze, D., Dobson, B (2000). 26; Breeze, D (2007). 36; Poulter, J (2010). 23 RIB 1637 24 Macinnes, L (1989); Roberston, A (1983); RIB 2059; RIB 2182 25 Breeze, D., Dobson, B (2000). 149; Breeze, D (2011). 76, 84, 200-203; Cherry, D (1998). 59-66 26 Breeze, D (2007). 22; Riley, B (2015).