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Roman Warfare and Fortification Roman Warfare and Fortification Oxford Handbooks Online Roman Warfare and Fortification Gwyn Davies The Oxford Handbook of Engineering and Technology in the Classical World Edited by John Peter Oleson Print Publication Date: Dec 2009 Subject: Classical Studies, Ancient Roman History, Material Culture Studies Online Publication Date: Sep 2012 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734856.013.0028 Abstract and Keywords This article concentrates on the role of technology in improving the operational capabilities of the Roman state. It reviews the organizational and weapon system developments that enabled Roman armies to engage their enemies with confidence in the field, alongside the evolution of fortification schemes that enabled economies of force, which were essential to imperial security. Roman weapons and equipment include the spear, sword, missiles, artillery, shields, helmets, and body armor. Although the Roman army was often on the attack and made use of complex siege technology, it was also highly skilled in the preparation of defensive fortifications. The Romans diligently applied themselves to the arts of war. Their successful mastery of battlefield techniques and their adoption, where appropriate, of equipment and technologies first introduced by their opponents allowed Roman armies to sustain the state over several hundreds of years of challenge and change. Keywords: Roman armies, Roman warfare, Roman fortification, spear, sword, missiles, artillery, shields, helmets, body armor Warfare and the Romans A message relayed to the Roman people by Romulus after his translation to the heavens, stands as an unambiguous endorsement of Roman military prowess. “Tell the Romans that it is the gods' will that my Rome shall be the capital of the world; therefore let them cultivate the arts of war and let them know and teach their children that no human force can resist Roman arms” (Livy 1.16.7). For Livy, the equation of Roman greatness with martial accomplishment was a truism that stood as a simple and unassailable explanation Page 1 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Washington; date: 06 December 2017 Roman Warfare and Fortification for the rise of the city to its pinnacle of imperial dominion. As the gods themselves had mandated, Roman success, the well-being of the state and its continuing expansion, were inextricably linked with the maintenance of military supremacy. This glorification of war and its elevation as the primary causal factor in the construction of Roman hegemony was not just the view of a leading propagandist of the new Augustan age. Instead, a belief in the efficacy of warfare as both a tool of state policy and a worthy undertaking in its own right permeated Roman society. For the elite, political reputations were consolidated (or established in the first place) by demonstrable military achievements, and service in the army formed an important component of the successful cursus honorum. Further down the social scale, the status of ordinary soldiers was reflected in their receipt of a respectable income enhanced by occasional donatives and (for the imperial period at least) the prospect of significant “retirement” benefits at discharge. Additionally, the steady (p. 692) transformation of the army into a professional standing force (substantially completed by the start of the first century A.D.) meant that the state enjoyed access to trained personnel sufficiently versatile to assist the process of civil governance over a broad spectrum. In such a climate, the virtues of training, discipline, and competence were increasingly viewed as essential prerequisites for the army, both on campaign and in the performance of its domestic duties. As a result, it is not surprising to note that for the late Roman historian Vegetius “we see no other explanation of the conquest of the world by the Roman people than their drill-at-arms, camp discipline, and military expertise” (Mil. 1.1). A considerable body of scholarship has been devoted to explaining the basis of Roman military power and to elucidating the technical aspects of its development and utilization, and it is not necessary to recapitulate these discussions here. Rather, this chapter will focus on the role of technology (and the complementary dimension of engineering competence) in improving the operational capabilities of the Roman state, allowing for the projection of power on a systematic and sustained basis. To this end, we will trace the organizational and weapon system developments that enabled Roman armies to engage their enemies with confidence in the field, alongside the evolution of fortification schemes that enabled economies of force essential to imperial security. The Army in the Field: Organization, Weapons, and Tactics It is not unrealistic to claim that the Roman army was the most proficient military force of the ancient world. The successes that it enjoyed over several centuries of campaigning against a diversity of enemies in often difficult terrain and harsh environmental conditions oblige us to acknowledge the resilience of both individual soldiers and the system that sustained them in the field. This is particularly true when we recall that the general trajectory of battlefield superiority was not seriously checked even by such Page 2 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Washington; date: 06 December 2017 Roman Warfare and Fortification calamitous reverses as Cannae, Carrhae, Kalkriese (Teutoberg Forest), and Edessa that involved the complete loss of entire armies and even the capture (in the last instance) of the emperor himself (Valerian). This resilience stemmed in part from the inherent flexibility of the Roman army and its capacity to adapt to new challenges, whether in terms of the adoption of revised formations and weapon systems or the wholesale reorientation of its strategic posture to confront changing threats along the frontiers. As tempting as it might seem to ascribe a monolithic character to the Roman army and its institutions—a habit fostered by (p. 693) unhelpful modern references to the existence of a “Roman military machine”—it is increasingly apparent that an essential factor in the long-lived success of the Roman state was the capacity of its armed forces to evolve in the face of new threats. Army Structure and Organization The centrality of the citizen army to the early Republic is made clear by the measures that formed part of the reforms generally attributed to Servius Tullius but whose introduction probably spanned a much wider period of time. A key component here was the division of society into different voting blocs based on gradations of wealth, and both Livy (1.43) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 4.19) make an explicit connection between the citizen's capacity to arm himself for battle and his place in the new social framework. Although considerable doubt has been cast on this particular equation of wealth, fighting potential, and political representation (Cornell 1995: 186–90), it is clear that the original impetus behind some of these constitutional measures lay in the more efficient mobilization of the state's military resources. The expansion of the Roman state allowed for the steady increase in the size of the military forces at its disposal, and by the time of the First Punic War it was not unusual to have armies up to 40,000 strong operating at the end of lengthy lines of communication. This capacity to campaign at long range was instrumental for the projection of Roman power. During the Second Punic War, large-scale enterprises were sustained simultaneously in Spain, Italy, and Greece, a remarkable multi-front effort that testifies to Roman logistical and organizational capabilities. These demonstrations of Rome's developing strategic reach were also reinforced on the tactical level by the posture adopted for pitched battles. The Roman legion as described by Polybius (6.19–24) was composed of 30 maniples of paired centuries with a mix of heavy and light infantry. Each of the two front line formations (in the standard three lines of battle) had ten maniples each made up of about 120 heavy infantry and 40 skirmishers, while the rearmost line of battle had ten smaller maniples of 60 heavy infantry and 40 skirmishers. These lines were drawn up on the battlefield in open order, that is, each maniple was separated from its neighbors by a gap equivalent in width to the frontage of another maniple. The gaps in the line of battle were covered by the troops of the next line to the rear. The difference in manipular strength is explicable by the different tactical roles that each of these Page 3 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: University of Washington; date: 06 December 2017 Roman Warfare and Fortification formations was intended to fulfill. The two front line formations were intended to engage the enemy forces directly, and if all went well the third line was not called into action. However, if matters proved less than successful for the troops of (p. 694) the first two lines, then the open order enabled these units to disengage and to fall back through the gaps and seek cover to reorganize behind the solid screen of the third line.
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