Ross Burns Justinian's Fortifications East of Antioch

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Ross Burns Justinian's Fortifications East of Antioch Ross Burns Justinian’s Fortifications East of Antioch Almost fifty years ago, Dillemann put the issues starkly – fortifications were a useless distraction: The Notitia Dignatatum, at the beginning of the 5th Century, only speaks of units, generally cavalry, with their bases. In [Procopius’] Buildings, the only issues are fortified positions with no mention of units. Defence policy has reached sclerosis. Previously, positions were surrounded by walls of light construction, like enclosures, which attracted Procopius’ disapproval. For good reasons Justinian’s predecessors judged it useless to raise solid ramparts; it was a nonsense to condemn cavalry to defend them. The latter only had to be given shelter from the blows of marauders and pillagers; they did not imagine they had to withstand a siege.1 Is it true, as Dillemann has argued, that Justinian put too much faith in fortresses and not enough in manpower and élan? As a corrective, we have Liebeschuetz’s observation that while fortresses did not in themselves amount to an impermeable physical barrier, they prevented permanent occupation of territory by an enemy. In the sixth century there was no way in which the Persians could be prevented from penetrating into the Empire. The only way to check an invasion was by means of a field army strong enough to defeat or at least to threaten the invading force. Fortified cities provided no kind of barrier and most of them could be captured easily. Nevertheless, they too had an important function. They provided shelter for the inhabitants, their corn and their animals. They also provided bases for Roman armies operating in the neighbourhood…[The Persians] could not remain in permanent occupation while the cities were not in their hands.2 It is well recognised that no line of fortresses can operate as an effective line of defence in its own right.3 Nevertheless, the distribution of forts could mark out the extent of territory a state sought to control for most purposes. There would be times when that line could not possibly be maintained – some penetration would be tolerated in order to lure an enemy onto territory more favourable to a defending force. Moreover, by modern standards some functions (such as control of population movement; taxation of goods) were imperfectly exercised on the fringes of a state’s territory. With these limitations in mind, this paper begins by looking at how the frontier defences were deployed in the Roman imperial period under Diocletian and then examines the changes, in doctrine as well as in practice, some 200 years later. 1 L. Dillemann, Haute Mésopotamie orientale and pays adjacents (Paris 1962), 224. 2 J.H.G.W. Liebeschuetz (ed), “The Defences of Syria in the Sixth Century”, in From Diocletian to the Arab Conquest: Change in the Late Roman Empire (Ashgate 1977), 487–499. 3 The arguments were most forcefully advanced in B. Isaac, The Limits of Empire – The Roman Army in the East (Oxford 1990). For a more recent study, see note 5 below. 122 Justinian’s Fortifications East of Antioch Taking the line of forts now reasonably assumed to have been built or improved under Diocletian in the provinces of Arabia and Syria, gives the pattern outlined in Fig. 1. Figure 2: Diocletian’s Fortifications in the East This map includes only the eastern-most fortifications along the line, and only legionary bases, not other fortified points, to the west. It is interesting that many of the ‘Diocletianic’ dates blithely attached to the fortifications by Père Poidebard’s aerial researches in the 1920s and 1930s,4 regarded with some scepticism in later decades, are now in some cases confirmed by new surveys and a limited range of excavations.5 4 A. Poidebard, La trace de Rome dans le désert de Syrie – le limes de Trajan à la conquête arabe – recherches ariennes (1925–1932) - tome 1 (Paris 1934); R. Mouterde & A. Poidebard, Le limes de Chalcis – organisation de la steppe en Haute Syrie romaine – tome 2 – Atlas (Paris 1945). 5 For the most thorough and recent exploration of the issues in the context of southern Jordan, S.T. Parker & J.W. Betlyon, The Roman Frontier in Central Jordan: Final Report on the Limes Arabicus .
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