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Dissertation UMI Information Service University Microfilms Iniernational A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Micfiigan 48106

8629425

Roberts, Joseph Bradin

. EARLY ISLAMIC : IDEOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY

The Ohio State University Ph.D. 1986

University Microfilms I nternstionsi300 N. zeebRoad, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106

Copyright 1986 by Roberts, Joseph Bradin All Rights Reserved

EARLY ISLAMIC HISTORIOGRAPHY: IDEOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY

DISSERTATIOI

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of the Ohio State University

By

Joseph Bradin Roberts, B.A., M.A.

The Ohio State University

Dissertation Commnittee: Approved by

M.R. Waldman

C.H. Fleischer " ^ Adviser S.F. Dale Department of History Copyright by Joseph Bradin Roberts 1986 To My Parents

1 1 ACKNOWLECGMOmS

I would like to thank the American Research Center in for awarding me a dissertation research fellowship with funding provided by the International Communications Association» The officials of Dar al-

Kutub al-Misriyya and Ma'had al-Makhtûtât of the Arab League in Cairo kindly allowed me access to their manuscripts and permitted me to micro­ film several of them.

I am indebted above all to my teacher and friend. Professor Marilyn

Waldman, who introduced me to the subject of Islamic history and over many years taught me to think as a scholar and to appreciate texts written by medieval . Her insights and painstaking suggestions lie behind much of this dissertation, and her kindness and patience made a difficult task easier. My other committee members. Professors Cornell

Fleischer and Stephen Dale, helped in more ways than I can mention. I am grateful to Prefessor Fleischer for his encouragement, for his incisive comments that helped me to clarify my thoughts on many points and to improve the quality of this study, and for his generous help in translating some difficult passages. I am equally indebted to

Professor Dale for his encouragement and sound advice and for the many hours he spent talking with me about this dissertation. Many other teachers, colleagues, and friends contributed to this dissertation. If I do not mention them by name, I am no less grateful. iii My wife, Diane, endured with grace and good-humor even when I showed neither and kindly took time away from her own dissertation to read parts of mine and to make many valuable suggestions. For her understanding and encouragement I will always be grateful. Finally, I should express my appreciation of P. Porlock's infectious optimism. VITA

August 25, 1950 ...... Born, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

1973 ...... B.A. The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1975 ...... M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field; Medieval Islamic History

Studies in Ottoman History, Greco-Roman History, and Literary Criticism. TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... iii

VITA ...... V

TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM ...... viii

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Selection of material ...... 12 Selection of form ...... 16 Notes 22

II. Religious and Political Background ...... 30

Partisan Loyalty: A.H. 10-33 (632-750) .... 31 The First (36-41/656-61) 35 The (60-73/679-92) ...... 36 The Third Fitna and the Demise of Partisanship (127-133/744-750) .... 38 Assimilation and Conversion D'xcing Marwâni T i m e s ...... 40 Piety-Minded Concerns During Marwâni Times . . 42 The Shi*at *— From Partisan Loyalty to Sectarianism...... 44 Political Background 809-945 (194-334) ...... 51 Notes ...... 60

III. KHALIFA B. KHAYYÂT (d. 240/854) ...... 65

The Account of the Battle ...... 68 N o t e s ...... 78

IV. IBN QUTAYBA (213-276/828-889) ...... 81

The Account of the Battle ...... 84 N o t e s ...... 92

VI V. PSEUDO-IBN QUTAYBA (d. after 196/811) 94

The Account of the Battle ...... 95 The Bay* a ...... 107 Portrayal of Characters ...... 116 Notes ...... 127

VI. B. YAHYÂ AL-BAIÂDHURI (d. 279/892) 132

The Account of the Battle ...... 136 Al-Baladhuri and the Format ...... 148 Al-Balâdhuri's Loyalties ...... 152 Notes ...... 166

VII. AD-DÎNAWARÎ (d. 282/893) ...... 173

The Account of the Battle ...... 175 Ad-Dinawari's Loyalties ...... 181 Notes ...... 187

VIII. AL-YA'QÜBI (d. ca.284/897) ...... 190

The Account of the Battle ...... 192 Al-Ya'qubi's Loyalties ...... 196 Notes ...... 204

IX. AL-GHALÂBI (d. 298/910) 207

The Account of the Battle ...... 208 Al-Ghalabi's Loyalties ...... 212 Notes ...... 218

X. AT-TABARI (224-311/838-923) 221

The Account of the Battle ...... 226 At-Tabari's Loyalties ...... 266 Notes ...... 282

XI. CONCLUSION...... 288

Ideology ...... 289 Methodology...... 292

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 296

Vll Transliteration System

The system of transliteration is essentially that used by tiie International Journal of Studies. Some Arabic words taken into English have been spelled in their English form; e.g., "caliph," not khalifa.

1 > 4 b J, t LL t Ji z th E j ^ gh C h ^ f t kh d J k j dh J 1 j r j.m z j 0 " s 0 h sh 5 « s ^ y 2 -a (at in construct)

Vowels

Long 'or u; â Dipthongs 5 au ^ Û <-5' aa

Doubled "/iyy (final i) uww (final u)

Vlll CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Relative to other fields of history, the study of Arabic/Islamic histories and historiography is under-developed. It received considerable attention at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century when the field of as a whole came into being; but after important initial efforts, interest in questions of historiography declined and has only recently begun to revive. As a consequence, the conclusions of the pioneers in the field have continued to inform the way scholars deal with and understand medieval

Muslim histories, in spite of the appearance in the interim of many new texts and the development of new literary critical techniques of reading and understanding texts.

Many of these early studies focused on the history of and the early community during and immediately after Muhammad's lifetime.

The major sources on which these scholars relied were the slra/maghazi works of such authors as (d. 151/768) (in the recension of

Ibn Hisham (d. 218/833), al-Waqidi (d. 208/823), and Ibn ‘d (d. 1 231/845) and supplementary material in the collections of hadith.

Subsequent studies of the periods of the conquests and the Râshidûn and Umayyad were made possible largely through the publication of the lengthy and detailed history of at-Tabari (d. 310/923).^

All of these sources have four noteworthy characteristics: 1) They are composed in what we shall term the hadith format. That is, they are made up of sequences of hadith, each of which consists of the actual report or narrative— the matn— and a chain of individuals who had transmitted the report and attested to its accuracy— the isnad. In theory, the first link or figure in the isnad (the first name one sees when reading the isnad) was the person from whom the author of the work

(al-Waqidi or at-Tabari, for example) had received the hadith and the last link was the person who had witnessed what the matn described and had narrated what (s)he had witnessed to the penultimate person in the chain. 2) The authors of the surviving histories were not themselves, therefore, eye-witness authorities. Rather, they related material that purportedly came from an eye-witness. 3) The authors of the work are largely invisible. With the exception of introductory remarks at the beginning of the work or of significant sections, the entire work is in the words of others, which the author faithfully repeats. 4) The works often contain multiple and sometimes conflicting versions of events and almost never an overt indication from the author as to how the different versions should be weighed or understood.

In light of the primary goal of the earliest modern scholars— to write the history of early Muslim society— and in light of the characteristics of the works on which they most depended, it should not be surprising that these early scholars developed a view of early Muslim historiography that granted little creative scope to the medieval Muslim .

Scholars stressed that Muslim viewed history as the unfolding of a divine plan. The Qur'an, after all, emphasized that God worked through history, that history was, in fact, a testimony to God's existence, and that His ultimate plan would be achieved in history or more properly, at the end of history. The Muslim historian could not explain or interpret history; he could only recount it. In his works, he therefore strove accurately to include the descriptions of others and to document his sources, but by the conventions of his craft, he made no attempt to link this material in thematic or interpretive frameworks.

Such an understanding of the standards of medieval Muslim historiography not only 'explained' the configurations of the histories, but also necessitated using them as mines of information or as the 'raw material' from which the modern scholar could critically select material and with it construct a coherent history of early

Muslim society. The goal of reconstructing history affected the criteria of selection of material from a given work. Some of the sources or authorities in a work were deemed unreliable and material transmitted by them was suspect. The eighth century historian Sayf b.

‘Umar, for example, was (and is) deemed unreliable because he often cited material that glorified his own tribe or that seemed more legendary than historical.^ Scholarship on the authenticity of the hadith in the canonical collections has also had important implications for assessments of the accuracy of hadith in the early Arabic histories. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Hungarian scholar Ignaz Goldziher published a study of hadith in which he argued convincingly that many of the so-called "sound" hadith— those that purported to describe what the Prophet had said or done— were in fact 4 later fabrications. According to Goldziher, as the prescriptive value of the Prophet's sunna gained recognition in the latter part of the second/eighth century, it became common practice to validate all manner of views and customs through the fabrication of an appropriate hadith.

The value of the collections of hadith in his estimation, then, lay in their status as unintentional sources for the late second/eighth and third/ninth centuries of Islamdom. Goldziher's thesis was taken up by

Joseph Schacht, who wrote in the middle of this century.^ Schacht focused specifically on early Islamic jurisprudence and argued that many of the hadith in the collections of al-Bukhâri, Muslim and others were fabricated after the jurisconsult ash-Shafi‘i (d. 205/820) fixed the Prophet's sunna firmly in the legal process.

Some of the articles of James Robson and the studies of Nabia

Abbott and Mohammad Azami have argued against the skepticism of

Goldziher and Schacht.^ Abbott and Azami in particular maintain that hadith were committed to writing at a much earlier date than either

Schacht or Goldziher had been willing to recognize and that the legal value of hadith may have been accepted by Muslims even as early as

Muhammad's lifetime. The issue of the authenticity of hadith has had a greater impact on modern historians of medieval Islamdom than it has had on students of Islamic law. As one scholar has put it, "scholarship in the field of Islamic history has suffered from what might be called a collective schizophrenia;" some have accepted the accuracy of medieval Muslim histories, with some reservations, whereas others have judged them 7 largely spurious.

Among those those who have accepted the accuracy of at last significant parts of the histories, two approaches are evident— the historicist and the historiographical. The historicist has largely eschewed questions of historiography and has used the histories as mines of information, as sources for the political, social, and economic history of medieval Islamdom. Studies of this kind have clearly been of benefit to the field, yet they are only rarely based on a stated understanding of the standards of medieval Muslim historiography or of the goals of the Muslim historians. This limitation is especially apparent and serious in those studies that rely primarily on hadithi-histories, which so often present seemingly confused and contradictory narratives. There is only a minimal scholarly consensus on strategies for dealing with these kinds of histories— certain transmitters, for example are held to be unreliable— and few modern scholars make their particular strategy explicit. A case in point is M.A. Shaban's brief discussion of the

Battle of the Camel— a discussion he bases on at-Tabari*s lengthy account,^ Shaban, understandably, had to select from the wealth of detail that at-Tabari provides, but he never explains his criteria for selection of material. Shaban observes, for example, that *Ali was the only logical candidate for the and that he eventually "let himself be persuaded" to accept the rule. There are, to be sure, some hadith in at-Tabari's account that describe the 'election' in this manner; several others, however, mention significant opposition to

‘Ali, and some suggest that Talha and az-Zubayr were also candidates.

Yet Shaban says nothing about these other versions. The only comment he makes that might be construed as an indication of his understanding of at-Tabari's account as a whole is in a note where he claims that

"the traditions related by at-Tabari, mostly on the authority of Sayf

_ 9 and al-Mada'ini among others, agree on most of the details." On the contrary, Sayf and al-Mada'ini's versions, as at-Tabari presents them, differ significantly. In short, Shaban's discussion of the battle is based on a radical oversimplification of the complexities of his major source, and is itself constructed on the basis of unstated assumptions about the value of its material.

Studies that fit into the second approach, the historiographical, have dealt with questions of historiography, but from an essentially descriptive rather than analytical point of view. They have described the development of Muslim historiography in terms of the content, organization, and reliability of particular histories.

Although studies of this type have been able to suggest possible trends or developments in the way histories were written, their value remains uncertain since the kinds of generalizations they make are not grounded in detailed studies of individual works, but are based rather upon more superficial readings of a limited number of these— generally those works most valued and used for their factual content.Similarly, the criteria for evaluating reliability are usually limited to considerations of the author's sources, his care in identifying them, and to discussions of biases he may have had that could invalidate his reliability.

The dominant scholarly approaches outlined above have treated the histories as essentially explicit and intentional accounts of things that happened. A different approach has been taken by a few scholars who have focused on the philosophy of history of a small number of

Muslim historians. The contributions of these studies to the history of ideas or to intellectual history is significant; but their value for our knowledge and understanding of Islamic historiography is attenuated by a concern with philosophical issues, by a relative disinterest in the importance of the works studied as sources for Islamic history, and by a tendency to deemphasize the historical goals and intentions of the historians chosen for study. Moreover, the works that are studied have not generally been those that other scholars commonly rely on for their factual content nor those that were most appreciated or popular in the tradition itself. A striking case in point is the abundance of scholarship on the famous fourteenth century historian (d.

809/1406), almost all of which focuses on the impressive "Introduction"

(Muqaddima) to his universal history and generally ignores the actual

^ 12 history. In more recent years, a few scattered studies, usually of individual Muslim historians, have moved in new and profitable directions. These studies have in common their use of different histories as primary sources for their author's lifetime and for the

"historian's craft." Instead of asking only what the histories can tell us of the periods and events they cover, the studies in this last approach have asked questions about the goals of the historians and about how literary and generic conventions and the author's education, occupation, and religious and political values helped to shape the way 13 he wrote history. These questions have engendered an understanding of some of the histories that has helped to see them as far more than unstructured mines of potentially useful facts. In some cases they have also pointed to pitfalls that attend using the sources for their factual content without a clear understanding of the role that these facts may have played in the overall structure of the works and the goals of their authors.

Several scholars, for example, have remarked on a didactic component in Muslim histories. On an explicit level, history could be construed to convey obvious lessons. An account of an unsuccessful revolt, for example, could point to the importance of giving allegiance to the duly elected ruler. On a more interpretive and less explicit level, history could also be used to admonish and criticize; the past could be idealized in such a way as to point to the inadequacies of the present; or, an historian could portray a ruler in an uncomplimentary manner, without ever actually saying anything derogatory about him, by subtly diverging from or manipulating well known and established 14 conventions for describing a ruler. One scholar, Marshall Hodgson, has even suggested that the didactic goals of some historians may have led them to a kind of "extreme" deductivism that subordinated factual accuracy to thematic and didactic clarity.The historicity of the material presented may, for some historians, have mattered less than the effectiveness with which that material illustrated a point the historian was trying to make.^^

Most of these studies have focused on histories written after the beginning of the 5th/llth century; of works produced before that time, however, there are almost none. This dissertation is intended to begin to fill this gap. It is a comparative study of the eight earliest 17 surviving accounts of the , which was fought in

36/656 between the fourth caliph ‘All and Talha, az-Zubayr, and

‘Â'isha— the latter being, respectively, leading Companions and one of the Prophet's favorite wives. The battle was the first repercussion 19 of the murder of the third caliph, ‘Uthmln; at issue was who was to blame for his death and, particularly, who was to succeed him; what ensued was a five-year power-struggle, first between ‘Ali and ‘Â'isha,

Talha and az-Zubayr, and then between ‘Ali and Mu‘iwiya. It is described in the histories as a period of unprecedented tension, conflict, and bloodshed, which ended with the death of ‘Ali and the acceptance of Mu‘awiya's rule by most of the community. This period of conflict seriously divided the previously united Umma. Leading

Companions, who had struggled together during the Prophet's lifetime to 10 create an Islamic society and attempted after his death, in the Wars of the Ridda, to preserve this society, now vied with one another for power, blamed each other for ‘Uthmln's death, and threatened to destroy 20 what they had for over thirty years endeavored to protect.

Muslims in later years came to view this five-year period as the . a term that is usually translated as 'civil war,* but that should also be understood to denote a 'trial' or 'temptation.' It was a fitna for those involved in it, because the community's unity had been fractured by the murder of its leader. Yet attempts to redress the crime of his murder and to restore unity only made the fracture worse, in part because many of the leading Companions may have been implicated in the caliph's death. The events of this period were also a fitna, in the sense of a trial, for succeeding generations of Muslims. In their thoughts and in their debates with each other, the first fitna loomed large as a watershed in their history. It marked the end of an ideal or almost sacred time, a time when when the Prophet’s behavior— his sunna— and the Qur'an governed the behavior of the individual and the guidance of the first caliphs. Although not all Muslims agreed on how to recapture that time, they all looked back to it as a kind of paradigm for the ideal. In their debates and in their writings, the fitna became a 'test-case' inasmuch as religious and political values could be articulated through discussions of it.

Since the event could raise such fundamental questions about the course of the Umma's history— questions which subsequent generations did not ignore— one could reasonably expect accounts of the fitna or of 11 one its parts to have an interpretive component. Indeed every account was potentially an interpretation of it; since those writing about or debating religious and political variance in the community saw the fitna as the starting point of disunity, their accounts could take on the characteristics of a litmus-test. This dissertation aims primarily to demonstrate the presence of an interpretive dimension in accounts of the Battle of the Camel. In focusing on ninth and tenth century accounts of the battle, it also seeks a new way to understand the nature of religious and political values in early Islâmic(ate) society. These objectives involve four related hypotheses about medieval Muslim historiography and the values and loyalties of medieval

Muslims.

1)Contrary to the view held by many modern scholars, medieval

Muslim historians did interpret.

2)Their histories can appropriately and profitably be used for more than their explicit factual content.

With regard to accounts of the Battle of the Camel, these general hypotheses have certain specific implications. Given the sensitive and controversial nature of an event such as the Battle of the Camel, some historians may have deemed it prudent to hide or disguise their interpretation if it did not accord closely with official and popular views and especially if it criticized or questioned them. They therefore may have employed dissimulative devices or techniques which enabled them to achieve their interpretation without explicit statement of it. In the accounts of the the Battle of the Camel, two techniques 12 are particularly evident; a) The selection of material and b) the selection of the style or form within which that material was cast.

a)The Selection of Material: The surviving medieval Muslim accounts of the battle vary significantly; they range in length, for example, between one page and 120 pages. This variety was possible because for important events, such as the Battle of the Camel, there was, by the beginning of the third/ninth century, a large pool of material, in the form of several accounts, from which historians writing about the battle could draw. The size of the pool was such that historians had considerable flexibility in their construction of an account. Each could select the material he wanted, edit it, and organize it in a manner that accorded with his own interpretation. In doing this, an historian may also have been able to take advantage of what the average reader or audience listening to the text (since written texts were often transmitted by being read to a large audience) 21 might be expected to know about the battle. An historian could use this familiarity to his advantage. Some of the historians, for example, mention that there was opposition to the election of ‘. If a particular historian wanted to stress his belief in the legitimacy of ‘Ali's succession and perhaps also his condemnation of

Talha and az-Zubayr he could include in his account a version of the

'election' which described no opposition.

Since the earliest accounts of the battle are lost, the contents and characteristics of the pool from which later historians could draw is uncertain. The following chronologically arranged list of 13 transmitters should, however, give an indication of the number of historians who composed works on the battle, now lost, which later historians could use. The accompanying chart indicates the extent to which the historians of the third/ninth and fourth/tenth used the works of their predecessors.

- Jabir b. Yazid b. al-Harith al-Ju'fl (d. 128/747)^^

- Muhammad b. Ishaq (d/ 151/768)^^

- (d. 151/774)^^

- Sayf b. ‘Umar (d/ 180/796)^^

- Hisham b. Muhammad b. Sa'ib al-Kalbi (d. 204/819)^^

- Abu Hudhayfa (d. 206/821)^^

- Muhammad b. 'Umar al-Wâqidi (d. 208/823) 29 - Abu 'Ubayd Ma‘mar b. al-Mutharm (d. 210/825)

- Nasr b. Muzahim al-Minqari (d. 212/827)^^

'Abd b. Muhammad b. Abi Shayba (d. 225/839)

- Abu al-Hasan 'Ali b. Muhammad al-Mada'ini (d.226/840)^^ « - 33 - Abu Ishaq Isma'il b. ‘ïsâ (d. 232/847)

- Ibràhim b, Muhammad b. Sa'id b. Hilal (d, 283/896)^^

In accounts of the battle, the pool seems to have been especially rich in material that dealt with the bay'a and the major characters in the battle— 'A'isha, 'Ali, Talha, and az-Zubayr. Accordingly, analysis of the accounts and discussions of their author's values will be based in part on how they treat these two topics. A few words about the bay'a are in order. 14

«UIKKS OF KrnjMIS OF TOE BPOTU: OF TOE CME. AND LINES OF TOMEKIS5IEN

745 al-Ju‘fi 750 755 760 765 770 775 780 785 790 795 800 805 810 615 620 AbG HuAavfa 825 Abu ‘ubayd al-Mutlam5 630 635 640 845 850 655 [Khalifa b. Khayjât; 660 655 670 875 680 865 690 895 900 905 910 915 920 925 930 935 940 945 950 955

The lines of transmission are not limited to aooouits of the Battle of the camel. 15

The bay*a was a sacred and binding oath, sworn in God's name, by 35 means of which a Muslim volunteered allegiance to a caliph. It was sacred and binding because the one swearing the bay* a called explicitly on God to witness the oath he gave and invited God's wrath as punishment should he violate the oath. The bay*a was thus sworn to God at the same time that it was sworn to another man— one promised God that he would give allegiance to another in full cognizance of the punishment he would suffer if he broke the promise. Or, as the Qur'an more eloquently formulates this idea;

Those who swear fealty to thee (yubSyi*ûnak) swear fealty in truth to God, God's hand is over their hand. Then whosoever breaks his oath breaks it to his own hurt, and who fulfills his covenant made with God, God will give him a mighty wage." (48:10 [Arberry])

The ruler who received the bay* a had to accept the sincerity and honesty of the person giving the oath because of its intrinsically sacred nature. He therefore had every right to expect allegiance from all who had sworn it to him. The importance of God to the efficacy of the bay*a also explains why the oath had to be voluntary. One man might coerce another into giving a verbal cath of allegiance, but a promise to God could not be coerced. Without this promise, the bay*a was invalid.

From these remarks on the bay*a, it should be apparent that the way an historian described the bay* a significantly influenced his portrayal of *Â'isha, *Ali, Talha, and az-Zubayr. If *Ali's election was described as unopposed, or if, in particular, Talha and az-Zubayr 16 were described as having willingly pledged their allegiance to 'Ali, then by virtue of their subsequent actions their characters appear flawed. For some historians, at least, this fact posed an understandable problem. The generally idealized image that many came to have of the period before Umayyad rule— a period that came to be termed that of the Râshidün— and a widespread concern for the sunna, required preserving or resurrecting the integrity of all of the

Associates, who were primary transmitters of the sunna. I n contrast, other historians, for a variety of reasons, were far less concerned with protecting the reputations of Talha and az-Zubayr than they were with establishing the legitimacy of 'Ali's caliphate.

b)% e S e l e c t i o n o f Form: Modern students of Islamic history have understood the hadith format to be normative for medieval Muslim historiography. Indeed, received wisdom holds that the writing and study of history was a direct product of interest in hadith and that the former was at least initially undertaken in the service of the 37 latter. Yet the validity of this view must be questioned in light of third/ninth century histories which are not in the hadith format, notably those by Ibn Qutayba, al-Ya'qubi, and ad-Dinawari. Gibb, in his article on "Tarikh," has been one of the few to address specifically the question of the different styles or formats that histories from this century display. He suggests that during the third/ninth century, "the bureaucratic organization of government brought the class of officials and courtiers to the fore as authorities for political history, and relegated men of religion to the second 17 place. For this reason also, the third century marks the end of a 39 stage in Arabic historiography." That is, Gibb understands the two styles or forms as being more sequential than parallel; "continuous narrative" histories written by bureaucrats replaced hadithi histories written by "men of religion."

This explanation may oversimplify a more complex state of affairs. The distinction that Gibb makes between "men of religion" and the bureaucrats may be over general; the bureaucrats may not have been so "secular" as he suggests, and the piety of the "men of religion" may not have been the only or major reason for their use of the hadith format in the writing of history. Furthermore, relatively little is known about histories that were written during the first two Islamic centuries. It has been assumed, by Gibb and others, that these early histories were written by scholars of hadith and were in the hadith format; yet the available evidence does not necessarily point to this conclusion.Although many of the authors of sira/maghazi works seem to have used the hadith format, other early authors of works that dealt with events after the Prophet's death may not have consistently used that format. Some of the few surviving manuscript copies of works attributed to second/eighth century historians, for example, display a 41 more continuous narrative style.

In the second place, even if continuous narrative histories became relatively more common than hadithi histories after the third/ninth centuries, the latter by no means disappeared. Ibn ‘Aslkir (d.

572/1176), Ibn Mas (d. 734/1334), and adh-Dhahabi (d. 748/1348), 18 to name but three, used the hadith format. The available evidence from the first two centuries, admittedly inconclusive, and the prevalence of both hadithi histories and continuous narrative histories in the third/ninth century and later periods, suggests that it might be wiser to see the two forms or styles as co-existent and to understand an historian's use of one or the other as at least partly a matter of choice.

3)The third hypothesis of this study is that the complex of religious and political values that a comparative analysis of the accounts of the battle reveals cannot adequately be described by the

Sunni/Shi'1 categories conventionally used by modern scholars. The development of Sunni and Shî‘i ideologies was a very gradual process that in some respects was not complete until the latter part of the fourth/tenth century. But even after this time, and certainly before,

Sunni and Shi‘i were more points on a spectrum or a range of values.

Consequently, in the analyses of most of the accounts, the authors' values have been described, and discussed in some detail, but not characterized with labels.

4)The final hypothesis of this dissertation is related to the first three. Before the latter part of the fourth/tenth century, there were not yet identifiable historiographical traditions associated with specific loyalties. In other words, an historian's interpretation of the battle could reflect his identification with a particular loyalty; but this identification did not shape his history in such a pervasive 19 manner that it can be categorized on the basis of the author's loyalties.

This hypothesis and its implications stand in considerable opposition to widely accepted views of modern scholars of Islamicate history, both Middle Eastern and Western. These scholars have assumed that there were distinct Sunni and Shi'i histories and have maintained that the Sunni histories are to be preferred since they were more likely to be objective: Because Shi'is held an anti-historicist view of the Umma's early history, a period that in retrospective political terms saw Sunni success and Shi'i failure, Shl'i historians have been suspected of being unable to portray objectively events of which they strongly disapproved. In other words, their loyalties were believed to have injected subjective biases that pervaded their works. Whenever possible, therefore, the works of Sunni historians have been preferred because they are assumed not to be colored by their authors' loyalties or identification with frustrated political ambitions. Yet if during the first three-and-a-half centuries there were not historiographical traditions associated with particular loyalties, then the rationale behind a preference for histories by reputed Sunni historians over those by reputed Shi'is is without foundation.

Scxne of the assumptions in the last two hypotheses are looked at more fully in the first parts of the following chapter, which focuses on partisan groupings and loyalties in the first century and a quarter of the Umma's history. Subsequent chapters then proceed chronologically according to the death-dates of the historians. 20 beginning with Khalifa b. Khayyât (d. 854/240) and ending with at-Tabari (d. 311/923). Chronological organization highlights subtle changes in the character of religious and political values; it also aids discussion of the hypothesis that the hadith format should not be understood as an early style of historiography that was replaced by a more continuous narrative style. Each chapter begins with a biographical discussion of the historian in question and a brief description of his work and then proceeds in more detail with a summary of his account of the battle and an analysis of his loyalties. The biographical discussions are generally quite short since our knowledge about most medieval Muslim historians is lamentably incomplete— few historians tell us anything of their lives and the bibliographical and biographical sources from the tenth century and later usually only list the works of an historian and mention some of those with whom he studied and whom he taught. Consequently, the information that can be assembled often fails even to meet our own standards even for a brief curriculum vitae.

The summaries of the accounts are intentionally quite detailed, because none exists in translation and since the analysis relies so heavily on them. In light of the importance of sequence and selection in Muslim historiography, the repetition and alternate versions that are prevalent in some of the accounts have been replicated in the summaries. In the case of at-Tabari's account, which is especially long, a chart has been provided instead of a prose summary. Since an underlying goal of the dissertation is to understand medieval Muslim 21 histories in new ways, as the products of rational and critical minds, it is important to consider all that an historian chose to include in his account. The details in each of the accounts contribute in a variety of ways to the authors* interpretations. NOTES

CHAPTER I

The sira/maghâzi works were those that treated the biography of the Prophet Muhammad and described the numerous campaigns and battles which the nascent Islamic community (Umma) fought. The hadith (pi- ahâdith), often mistranslated as "tradition" are reports’about the sayings and actions of the Prophet and, less commonly, his associates. Those which medieval scholars of hadith deemed the most sound or reliable were collected into a number of works and, over time, six of these collections have been deemed (by the Jcunâ'i-Sunni community) more authoritative than the rest. These are the collections of al-Bukhâri (d. 257/870), Muslim (d. 261/874), Abu Dàwûd (d. 276/889), at-Tirmidhi (d. 279/892), an-Nasà'î (d. 303/915), and Ibn Màja (d. 283/896). The hadith are, after the Qur'an, the primary source for the law. 2 For examples of these studies see, J. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, trans. M.G. Weir (Calcutta, n.p., 1927; reprint ed. Beirut; 1963); T. Noldeke, Sketches From Eastern History (: n.p., 1892; reprint ed. Beirut: Khayyât-, 1963); W. Muir, The Life of Muhammad, ed. T.H. Weir (: Edinburgh University Press, 1923); and Annals of the Early Caliphate from Original Sources (London: 1883); and D.S. Margoliouth, Mohammed and the Rise of (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1905).

^None of Sayf's works survives, but they are quoted extensively by some historians who lived after him, especially a-t-Tabari, the famous author of a multi-volume history of the Umma down to the year 303/915. 4 I. Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 2 vols., ed. S.M. Stern, trans. C.R. Barber and S.M. Stern (vol.l, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966; reprint ed., Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1967; vol.2, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971); vol. 2 contains his discussion of hadith. 5 “ Schacht's major work on the hadith literature is his The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 4th eà. (Clarendon: University Press, 1967). He outlines the thesis of this works in his "A Revaluation of Islamic Traditions," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1949): 143-54, which appeared shortly before the publication of his Origins. G.H.A. Juynboll's recently published Muslim Tradition:

22 23

Studies in chronology, provenance and authorship of early hadith, Studies in Islamic Civilization (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1983) also questions the authenticity of many of the hadith.

^James Robson, Muslim Tradition; The Question of Authenticity, Memoirs and Proceedings of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society, vol. XCIII (1951-52); 84-102; "The Form of Muslim Tradition," Transactions of the Glasgow University Oriental Society 16 (1955-56); 38-56; "Traditions from Individuals," Journal of Semitic Studies 9 (1964):327-40; "The Isnad in Muslim Tradition," Transactions of the Glasgow University Oriental Society 15 (1953-54); 15-26; "Tradition in Islam," 22 and 23 (1950); 98-112; "The Material of Tradition," Muslim World 22 and 23 (1950): 167-80; "Standards Applied by Muslim Traditionists," Bulletin of the John Rylands Society 43 (1961); 459-79; "Tradition; Investigation and Classification," Muslim World 41 (1951); 98-112; "Tradition; The Second Foundation of Islam," Muslim World 41 (1951); 22-33. Nabia Abbott, Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri, vol. 1; Historical Texts (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1957), vol. 2; Qur'ânic Conmentary and Tradition (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1967). Mohammad Mustafa Azami, Studies in Early Hadith Literature (Indianapolis; American Trust Publications, 1978); and Studies in Hadith Methodology and Literature (Indianapolis; American Trust Publications, 1977).

^Fred M. Donner, "Introduction" to A.A. Duri's The Rise of Historical Writing Among the , ed. and trans. • Lawrence Conrad with an introduction by Fred M. Donner, Modern Classics in Near Eastern Studies (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1983)r p. ix. 's Slaves on Horses; The Evolution of the Islamic Polity (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1980) is a good example of an extreme of the skeptics' approach. 0 M.A. Shaban, Islamic History; A.D. 600-750 (A.H. 132) (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1971)), pp. 71-72.

^Ibid. p. 72, n. 1.

^^Any number of works fit in this category, among them the following; D.S. Margoliouth, Lectures on Arabic Historians (Calcutta; 1902; reprint ed.. New York; Burt Franklin, 1972); F. Rosenthal, A History of Muslim Historiography (Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1952); N.A. Faruqi, Early Muslim Historiography; A Study of Early Transmitters of Arab History from the Rise of Islam up to the End of the Umayyad Period (Delhi; Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 1979); H.A.R. Gibb, "Tarikh," Studies on the Civilization of Islam, ed. Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk (; Beacon Press, 1962; reprint ed. Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 108-34; B. Lewis and P.M. Holt (eds.). Historians of the Middle East, Historical Writings on 24 the People of Asia (London: , 1952); A,A. Duri, The Rise of Historical Writing; G. Richter, Die Geschichtsbild der arabischen Historiker des Mittelalters (Tubingen: 1959% trans. S.M. Saber Khan as "Medieval Arabic Historiography," XXXIII (1959): 240ff., XXXIV (1960): 139ff.

^^Many of the descriptive studies treat Ibn Ishaq (), al-Waqidi, al-Ya'qubi, ad-Dinawari, al-Balâdhurî, at-Tabari, and al-Mas*ûdi. Fewer, however, treat other less commonly used historians such as Khalifa b. Khayyât, pseudo-Ibn QutaybaIbn *Abd al-Hakam, Ibn 'Atham al-Kùfi, Abu Zur'a, al-Azraqî, or al-Minqari. 12 The best example of a study of this type is Muhsin 's Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History: A Study in the Philosophic Foundation of the Science of Culture (London; George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957; reprint ed., Chicago; Phoenix Books, 1971). Also see Marshall Hodgson's remarks on Ibn Khaldun in The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), vol. 2, pp. 478-84. Other examples of aspects of this approach are in two studies of the historian al-Mas*ùdi (d. 345/956); Ahmad M.H. Shboul, Al-Mas'ûdi and His World (London: Ithaca Press, 1979% and T. Khalidi, Islamic Historiography: The Histories of al-Mas'udi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975). 13 In addition to those studies mentioned above, the following reflect aspects of this approach: Peter Hardy, Historians ’ of Medieval India: Studies in Indo-Muslim Historical Writing LondonLuzaci 1960; , Donald Little, An Introduction to Historiography; A Analysis of Arabic Analistic and Biographical Sources for the Reign of al- an-Nâsir Muhammad b. Qalâ'ûn (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1970); and his "The Historical and Historiographical Significance of the Detention of Ibn Taymiyya," International Journal of Middle East Studies 4 (1973): 311-27; K. Allin Luther, "The Literary Analysis of Inshâ' Texts and Historical Works from the Saljuq and Mongol Periods," Opening Remarks to "Methodological Approaches to Islamic Historical Sources, a Workshop," Ninth annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, 19 November, Louisville, Kentucky; Marilyn R. Waldman, "'The Otherwise Unnoteworthy Year of 711': A Reply to Hayden White," Critical Inquiry, vol. 7„ no. 4 (Summer, 1981): 784-92; "Semiotics and Historical Narrative," Papers in Comparative Studies 1 (1981): 167-89; and Cornell H. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman : The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). 14 Marilyn R. Waldman, Toward a Theory of Historical Narrative: A Case Study in Perso-Islamicate Historiography (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980), pp. 10-11. This feature is amply documented in Roman histories; both Livy and Tacitus, for example, idealized the days of the Reman Republic and made heroes of its leaders as a kind of gentle 25 protest against some of the inequities that attended the Imperial Settlement. Moses Hadas, "Introduction" to the Complete Works of Tacitus, trans. A.J. Church and W.J. Brodribb, ed. with an introduction by Moses Hadas, The Modern Library College editions (New York; Random House Inc., 1942), p. xviii; and W.G. Sinnigen and A.E.R. Boak, A History of Rome to A.D. 565, 6th ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1977), p. 270.

^^Marshall G.S. Hodgson, "Two Pre-Modern Muslim Historians: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Presenting them to Moderns," in John U. Neff (ed. ), Towards World Community, Publications of the World Academy of Arts and Sciences, V (The Hague: Junk Publishers, 1965) pp. 53-68; p. 62. Cf. Thucydides' remark in his The Peloponnesian War, 3rd rev. ed. and trans. Rex Warner with an introduction and notes by M.I. Finley, The Penguin Classics (Middlesex; Penguin Books Ltd., 1975).

In this history I have made use of set speeches some of which were delivered just before and others during the war. I have found it difficult to remember the precise words used in the speeches which I listened to myself and my various informants have experienced the same difficulty; so my method has been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words that were actually used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation (p. 47).

His "Melian Dialogue" provides an excellent example of speakers "saying what the situation called for" and in so doing graphically illustrating some of Thucydides' perceptions of the causes of the war and the problems inherent in the Athenian democracy.

^^If there is a limitation to this approach, it is that it has not generally dealt with histories as potentially accurate accounts of past events. That is, by treating histories as 'primary sources' for the author's lifetime, the works are not always dealt with in terms that correspond to the stated intentions of many of the Muslim historians— to relate accurately what had happened. However, this limitation is not inherent in the approach nor does this approach need to 'compete' with ones that use histories for their factual content. Ideally, historiographical studies could be propedeutic to other studies and could tell us what kinds of questions we can appropriately ask of Muslim histories and what uses we can make of them. 17 Modern scholarship on the battle is minimal; in most studies brief references to it are sandwiched between much more detailed discussions of the murder of 'Uthmân and the subsequent . The minimal treatment is probably due in part to the fact that in retrospective terms the outcome of the Battle of the Camel changed little whereas the Battle of Siffin, between 'Ali and Mu'âwiya, which 26 also ensued from *'s death, paved the way for the establishment of the . One of the longest discussions of the battle is Nabia Abbott's 'Â'isha: The Beloved of Muhammad (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp.123-65. Shorter discussions can be found in L. Veccia Vaglieri, s.v. "al-Djamal," , second edition (hereafter referred to as E.I.^)t S. Husain M. Jafri's The Origins and Early Developments of Shi*a Islam, Arab Background Series (London and New York: Longman Group Ltd. and Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1979), pp. 87-90; and M.A. Shaban's Islamic History, pp. 71-72. In addition, E.L. Petersen's *Ali and Mu*àwiya in Early Arabic Tradition; Studies on the Genesis and Growth of Islamic Historical Writing until the end of the Ninth Century (Copenhagen: Minksgaard, 1964); Julius Wellhausen's The Religio-Political Factions in Early Islam, ed. by R.C. Ostle and trans. by R.C. Ostle and S.M. Walzer, North-Holland Medieval Translations, vol. 3 (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1975); and Martin Hinds' "The Siffin Arbitration Agreement," Journal of Semitic Studies XVII (1972): 93-129, although primarily studies of the Battle of Siffin, contain scattered discussions of the Battle of the Camel.

The Companions (sahaba, sing, sahib) were those who had had some contact with Muhammad. As'a group they were chiefly important in later years as authorities on the Prophet's sunna— the body of descriptive material about his behavior which from early on had a paradigmatic value and eventually came to have prescriptive value in the law. As Marshall Hodgson has suggested, the term 'Companion' is a somewhat misleading translation since it suggests a close relationship with Muhammad which many of these figures did not in fact have. Hodgson's alternative, 'Associates,' is probably a better translation since it does not imply this close relationship. (Venture, vol. 1, p. 215, n. 6 .) With Hodgson's reservations in mind, the terms 'Associates' and 'Companions' will often be used here, the latter because the major figures in the Battle of the Camel— *A'isha, 'Ali, Talha and az-Zubayr— were close companions of Muhammad.

^^In an interesting article, Martin Hinds suggests that 'Uthmân's death was the outcome of social and economic tensions brought on by the old 'aristocracy's' attempt to regain the political and economic power they had enjoyed before Muhammad's success. "The Murder of 'uthmân," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 3 (1972); 450-469. Cf. Mahmood Ibrahim "The Social and Economic _ Background of the ; The Role of Mu'âwiya b. Abi Sufyan" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of California at Los Angeles, 1981) makes a similar kind of argument in much more detail.

^^The Wars of the Ridda occurred after the Prophet's death, mainly during the reign of the first caliph (r. 11-13/632-34), when a number of tribes contested Madinan hegemony. In spite of the 27 implications of the appellation ridda or apostasy, only some of the tribes who were attacked had converted to Islam and accepted Muhammad's political authority. 21 Hodgson, Venture, vol. 1, p. 353; "Two Pre-Modern Muslim Historians," p. 63. 22 F. Sezgin, Geschichte des arabischen Schrifturns, 5 vols, to date (Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1967-), vol. 1, p. 307 (hereafter referred to as GAS); *,U.R. Kahhlla, Mu*jam al-Mu'allifIn, 15 vols. (: n.p., 1957-67), vol. 3, p. 105; Bukhiri, KitSb at-Ta'rIkh al-KabIr, 2 vols. (: n.p., 1964), vol. 1, p. 210; Ibn Hajar, Tahdhib at-TahdhIb, 12 vols. (Beirut; Dàr Sâdir, 1968), vol. 2, p. 648; adh-Dhahabi, Mizan al-I*tidal, 4 vols., éd., 'All Muljammad al-Bajawi (Cairo; '.îsâ al-Bâbï al-Halabî, 1963), vol. 1, p. 176. 23 Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur, 2 vols, and 3 supplements (Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1937-49), vol. 1, p. 134 (hereafter referred to as GAL); GAS, vol. 1, p. 288; an-Nadim, Kitâb al-Fihrist an-Nadim, ed. Ibn 'All Zayn al-'Âbidin al-Hâ'iri al-Mâzandarâni (; n.p., 1971), p. 205; Kahhala, Mu' jam, vol. 9, p. 44; Yâqût, Mu' jam al-Udaba', 20 vols. (Cairo; Dar Fikr al-Arabi, 1980), vol. 18, pp. 5-8; adh-Dhahabi, Mizan, vol. 2, pp. 21-24; Ibn Hajar, Tahdhib, vol. 9, pp. 28-46; N. Abbott, Arabic Literary Papyri, vol. 1, pp. 80-100. 24 GAL, SI, p. 101; GAS, vol. 1, p. 308; an-Nadim Fihrist, p. 105; Kahhala, Mu' jam, vol. 8, p. 157; Yâqût, Mu' jam, vol. 17, pp. 41-43. See also Ursula Sezgin, Abu Mibnaf; Ein beitrag zur Historiographie der umaiyadischen Zeit (Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1971).

^^GAL, SI, p. 213; GAS, vol. 1, p. 311; an-Nadim Fihrist, p. 106; Ibn Hajar, Tahdhib, vol. 4, p. 295; Kahhâla, Mu' jam, vol. 4, p. 288. A.R. 'Armûsh's Fitna wa Waq'at al-Jamal (Beirut; Dàr al-Nafâ'is, 1972) is a compendium of material from Sayf in at-Tabari on the killing of 'uthmân and the Battle of the Camel.

^^GAL, vol. 1, p. 139; GAS, vol. 1, p. 271; an-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 107; Yâqût, Mu'.jam, vol. 19, pp. 287-92; Kahhâla, Mu' jam, vol. 13, p. 149.

^^GAS, vol. 1, p. 294; an-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 106; Yâqût Mu'.jam, vol. 6, p. 73; Ibn Hajar, Kitâb Lisân al-Mizàn, 8 vols. (Beirut; n.p • i 1971), vol. 1, pp. 354-55; Kahhâla, Mu'jam, vol. 2, p. 231. 28 GAL, vol. 1, pp. 135 ff., SI, pp. 207 ff.; GAS, vol. 1, pp. 294-97; an-Nadim,Fihrist, p. 111; Yâqût, Mu'jam, vol. 18, p. 277; Kahhâla, Mu'jam, vol. 11, p. 95; Marsden Jones, "Introduction" (in Arabie) to al-Wâqidi's Kitâb al-Maghâzi, 3 vols., ed, Marsden Jones, 28

(London: Oxford University Press, 1966; reprint ed., Beirut: *Âlam al-Kutub, n.d.), vol. 1, pp. 6 ff.; Ibn Abi al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-Balâqha, 5 vols., ed. Shaykh Hasan Tamim, (Beirut: Dàr Maktaba al-Hayat, 1963) refers to al-Wâqidï's "Kitâb al-Jamal," vol. 5, p. 247. 29 GAL, vol. 1, p. 103; an-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 59; Ibn Çajar, Tahdhib, vol. 10, p. 246; Yâqût, Mu*jam, vol. 19, p. 154; Kahhala, Mu*-jam, vol. 12, p. 209.

^^GAL, SI, p. 214; GAS, vol. 1, pp. 307, 310, and 311; an-NadIm, Fihrist, p. 106; Yâqût, Mu*:jam, vol. 19, p. 225; Ibn Hajar, Lisân, vol. 6, p. 157; Katoâla, Mu*ijam, vol. 13, p. 92; ®Abd as-Salàm Muhammad Hàrün (éd.), "Introduction" to al-Minqari*s Kitâb Waq*at as-Siffin (Cairo: al-*Arabiyya al-, 1981), p. "ha*." 31 GAL, SI, p. 215; GAS, vol. 1, p. 108; an-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 285; Ibn Hajar, Tahdhib, vol. 6, p. 2; Kahhâla, Mu* jam, vol. 6, p. 107.

^^GAL, SI, pp. 214-15, GAS vol. 1, p. 314; an-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 112; Yâqût, Mu*jam, vol. 14, pp. 124 ff.; Ibn Hajar Lisân, vol. 4, p. 253; Kahhâla, Mu* jam, vol. 7, p. 311; Badri Muhammad Fahd, Shaykh al-Akhbâriyln: Abu al-Hasan *Ali b. Muhammad al-Madâ*inx (: al-Kada Press, 1975), pp. 20-52 especially.

^^GAS, vol. 1, p. 294; an-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 122; Yâqût, Mu* jam, vol. 14, p. 124; Kabhala, Mu* jam, vol. 2, p. 285. 34 GAL, SI, p. 215; GAS, vol. 1, p. 321; Ibn Hajar, Lisân, vol. 1, ;; Yâqût, Mu*ja m, vol. 1, pp. 294-96; Kahhâla, Mu*nam, vol. 1, p.p. 102;; Yâqût, Mu*jam, vol. 1, pp. 294-96; Kahhâla, Mu*nam, vol. 1, p.p. 90.

In this discussion of the bay*a I have drawn freely on Roy Mottahedeh’s Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society, Princeton Studies on the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 50-57 and passim.

^^The point of origin of the term "Râshidün" (rightly-guided, referring to the first four caliphs) is uncertain. As early as the first decades of the second/eighth century, some Muslims looked back to the days before the first fitna as an ideal time, but the term Râshidün may not have come into usage before the first quarter of the third/ninth century. Ahmad Hasan, The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence (Islamabad; Islamic Research Institute, 1970), p. 112, n. 38. Cf. Hodgson Venture, vol. 1, pp. 250ff.; and N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, Islamic Surveys, no. 2 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964), p. 36. 37 Al-Duri, The Rise of Historical Writing, pp. 12ff.; Gibb, "Tarikh," p. 111. 29

Cf. al-Duri, The Rise of Historical Writing, p. 65. Al-Duri suggests that al-ya®qûbî "... considered it unnecessary to give isnâds, since the attitude towards the important historical isnads had already been fixed before his time."

^^Gibb, "Tarikh," p. 119. 40 A.A. Duri, The Rise of Historical Writing pp. 41ff. and ch. 4. Duri argues that the hadith format was always employed by scholars of Madina and came to typify the histories of scholars from other areas. But cf. Nabia Abbott's discussion in Arabic Literary Papyri, vol. 1 pp. 8-10. She argues that early histories, composed in Madina and elsewhere, did not usually have isnads. makes a similar point about the infrequency of isnâds in early histories in his "The Kitâb at-Ta'rikh of Khalifa b. Khayyât," Arabica 16 (1969); 79-81, p. 79.

^^For example, Abu Mikhnaf "Waq'at Siffin" (cited in U. Sezgin, Abu Mifcinaf, pp. 123-45) and his "Maqtal al-Husayn b. 'Ali" (Ma'had al-Makhtûtât, ta'rikh no. 1245); Nasr b. Muzahim al-Minqari "Maqtal al-Husayn" (Dàr al-Kutub, ta'rikh Taymur no. 3461); Hisham b. Muhammad b. Sa'ib al-Kalbi, "Kitâb Mathâlib al-'Arab" (Ma'had al-Makhtütât, ta'rikh no. 404); and Muhammad b. Ishaq, "Ghazwd:MadinatTakrit" (Ma'had al-Makhtûtât, ta'rikh no. 1849). CHAPTER II

RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Abu Zur*a said: . . . Marwan b. al-Hakam and *Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr were given the bay*a. The people of Jordan and some of the people of Damascus gave the bay* a to Marwan; the rest of the people were Zubayrids. Then MarwSn and his shi* a fought Ibn az-Zubayr at Marj Râhit. Marwan and his shi* a defeated the shi* a of Ibn az-Zubayr, and the people supported Marwan, (Abu Zur*a, Ta'rikh Abu Zur*a, vol. 1, p. 191j,

That the division of the Islamic community into the Sunnis and the

Shi*Is was a gradual development is a fact disputed by few. Events in the Umma's early history moved faster than the development of theories to explain those events. It was not until the middle decades of the second/eighth century that some Muslims even began to distinguish themselves from other Muslims on the basis of sectarian identities, and developed sectarian ideologies were not in place much before the middle of the fourth/tenth century. Nevertheless, when one looks at the early history of the Umma, it is sometimes difficult to keep these truths in mind and to avoid viewing early events in the context of later developments. Modern historians who generally recognize, for example, that support for *Ali's caliphate was politically and not religiously constituted, may nevertheless allow themselves to see in that support

30 31

at least the embryo of a much later sectarian Shi‘1 vision of ‘Ali and

his rule.^ Even when specific aspects of sectarian Shi'ism are not

"traced back" to the earliest period, some scholars do not avoid a

tendency to view early support for ‘Ali and his descendants as simply

different from the support Muslims displayed for other individuals, 2 although the differences are not specifically addressed. To a certain

extent this problem may simply reflect the nature of the discipline of

history, which looks for first causes. The problem may also stem from

the sources for the study of the early history of the community. With

the exception of some fragments from the second/eighth century, the

earliest sources date from the third/ninth century, and the works that

deal with the development of sectarian identities, the so-called heresiographies, are even later. In varying degrees all of these

sources tend to project back into the first century of Islamic(ate) history developments of later periods. A general awareness of this

feature of the sources has not always prevented oversights of it in particular cases. There is, in other words, a need for a way to view

support for ‘Ali and his early descendants that does not prefigure a

later sectarianism.

Partisan Loyalty; A.H. 10-133 (632-750)

If one looks at the first century-and-a-quarter of the Umma's history, not from the perspective of the Umayyads who controlled the 32 caliphate during most of this period, but instead from the perspective of those who sought to control the caliphate, the period appears to be one of almost constant competition among partisan groups.^ The fundamental ingredient in political life during this period was partisanship (mushaya'a)— the loyalty of a party (shi*a) for its leader. It was through partisanship that the Banû Umayya were able to attain the rule and it was through partisanship that others tried to wrest it from them. Aspects of this partisanship can be related to the relationship between the Arab tribes and their shaykhs. The partisan leader, like the tribal shaykh, ruled as a kind of 'first among equals' and, like the shaykh, he stood for the interests of his group over and against those of another. Yet it would be a mistake to assume a direct relationship between the leadership of the tribal shaykh and partisan leadership. Whereas the members of a tribe laid claim to the same genealogy, the "members" of a shi*a could be from diyerse tribes; and even if a shi* a consisted primarily of individuals from the same or related tribes, this blood relationship was not the only or primary source of common identity.

It is more likely that the origins of this partisanship lie in developments that occurred in Makka in the three quarters of a century 4 before the birth of Muhammad in 570 C.E. At the end of the fifth century or the beginning of the sixth, one of the Arab tribes, the Quraysh, settled in the village of Makka. Makka was well situated along north-south and east-west trade routes, and the Quraysh nourished and controlled its growth as a center of trade. The Quraysh's focus on 33

commerce, and their sedentarization, created patterns of leadership and

social organization different from those that obtained amongst the

tribal bedouin. The wealth controlled by the heads of families or

clans was an important factor in their positions of leadership and helped to create socio-economic stratifications in Makkan society.

In contrast, among the bedouin and even among sedentarized Arabs in

other villages. Ta'if and Yathrib for example, the degree of

stratification was much more limited and the wealth of the shaykh was not usually much in excess of that of the tribesmen, nor was this 5 wealth the basis of his leadership.

Muhammad and the message he preached certainly challenged the hegemony of the mercantile elite and sought to abolish the stratification of Makkan society. Many of the Makkan suras unequivocally castigate the wealthier Quraysh for their false sense of self-sufficiency and for their self-sei'ving values. Yet at the same time, the rise of Islam worked in favor of the Quraysh once they converted to Islam and accepted the Prophet's leadership. Although the interests of the wealthier merchants were now subordinated to those of the nascent Islamic state, the political expansion of the new state, first within Arabia and subsequently outside of it, undoubtedly benefited commercial interests. Furthermore, the rise of Islam also added a new dimension to the role played by the Quraysh. During the

Prophet's lifetime, many of its members served as military commanders in the conquest of Arabia and in the forays outside of it. After the

Prophet's death, men of the Quraysh helped to command the campaigns of 34

conquest, and many helped . .to sustain the ideal and the reality of one Muslim community under one leader."^ Yet while working to preserve and nourish the Umma, leading families or clans of the Quraysh and their supporters, as partisan groups in a newly constituted Islamic community, competed with each other for control by vying for the caliphate. These families should not be seen just as tribes or clans, nor their leaders as shaykhs. Rather, the partisan leaders were the ashraf (sing, sharif), the nobility of early Arab Islamic society.^ The source of their nobility and of their influence was genealogical, economic, political, and military, and as Associates of the Prophet each also enjoyed a certain social prestige.

This partisanship helps to explain the history of the caliphate from its beginning. When the Prophet died, the partisan leaders agreed to recognize as caliph Abu Bakr and two years later they accepted

‘Umar, Abu Bakr's choice as his successor. When ‘Umar was fatally wounded he appointed a council (shûrâ) to designate from amongst themselves his successor. ‘Abd ar-Rahman b. ‘Auf, Sa‘d b. Abi WaqqSs,

Talha, az-Zubayr, ‘Uthmân, and ‘Ali, the six members of the shûrâ were among the most influential members of the community. But partisan

loyalties became especially important in the Umma's history in the period after the death of the third caliph, ‘Uthmân, and they are especially apparent in the series of conflicts that later Muslims designated the fitna wars. 35

The First Fitna (36-41/656-61)

When ‘uthmân was killed, the community was divided into three partisan groups. The party of ‘Ali consisted of many of the Madinans, who gave him the caliphal oath of allegiance, and eventually many of the Kufans; the party of Talha and az-Zubayr was primarily made up of

Basrans; and the party of Mu'âwiya consisted of the . Mu'âwiya eventually succeeded in being recognized as caliph because the power of competing partisan groups had been enervated; Talha and az-Zubayr had died at the Battle of the Camel and, for a time, no leader emerged to marshal the support of those who had followed them. ‘Ali had been killed by one of his disgruntled followers and Mu‘awiya was able to reach an agreement with ‘Ali's son, al-Hasan, to whom many of ‘Ali's party had transferred their allegiance.

The first fitna also gave rise to a partisan group. In the course of the Battle of Siffin, Mu'âwiya suggested that the question of

'Uthmân's guilt or innocence— the question that had been the original cause of the conflict— should be arbitrated on the basis of Qur'ânic verses. When 'Ali agreed, a number of his followers left his army.

They maintained that ‘Uthmân had been guilty before God's law, as it was expressed in the Qur'an, and that 'Ali was no longer worthy of their support if he v/as willing to arbitrate what God had clearly stipulated. These individuals took the name of al-hârùriyya. after the 36 name of the village to which they withdrew, but in later years those who identified with the groups action and the piety that motivated it came to be called the Kharijis ("those who withdraw," (khawarij)

Whereas the majority of the partisan groups supported the leadership of those who can be termed ashrif, the Kharijis were radically egalitarian. They accepted as their leader any individual whose behavior demonstrated proper Islamic faith, and they did not hesitate to replace him if his conduct fell below their standards. Many of the

Kharijis insisted that it was the duty of true Muslims to oppose corrupt rule and that those who accepted an unworthy ruler could not, in fact, call themselves Muslims. Although the majority of Muslims found the Kharijis' 'militant piety' excessive, in the years following

Siffin, Khâriji groups flourished in many parts of the Dar al-Islam.

They stood in constant opposition to the caliphate; they threatened the stability of regions where they were strong; and at times of more general partisan conflict, they played a far from negligible role.

The Second Fitna (60-73/679-692)

Mu'âwiya restored unity to the Umma, and with the help of his loyal Syrian troops and competent governors he was able to maintain unity and a large measure of stability for the twenty years of his reign (41-60/661-680). On his death, however, partisan loyalties once 37 again caused disruption. Before he died, Mu'âwiya designated his son

Yazid as his successor. Although many of the Syrians accepted Yazxd, several other contenders to the caliphate arose elsewhere. When al-Hasan died in 50/670, most of his party gave their allegiance to another of ‘Ali's sons, al-Husayn. Now a group of these followers in

Iraq invited al-Husayn to come to and there proclaim his caliphate. Al-Husayn agreed, but by the time he reached‘, the fervor of his Kufan following had died and al-Husayn, accompanied only by his small retinue of loyal followers, suffered a gruesome defeat by

Yazid's army at ' in 61/680.

In the Hijiz, ‘Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr, the son of az-Zubayr b. al-‘Awwam, proclaimed his caliphate shortly after Mu'awiya's death.

Yazid made substantial progress against Ibn az-Zubayr, but when the former died in 64/683, the majority of the community, including a large tribal bloc in (the ), recognized the caliphate of Ibn az-Zubayr. Meanwhile, a group of Kufans, repentant of having abandoned al-Husayn, supported Mukhtir b. Abi ‘Ubayd who proclaimed the caliphate of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya, another son of ‘Ali. (Other partisan followers of al-Husayn had transferred their loyalty to his son, ‘Ali b. Husayn, also known as Zayn al-‘Abidin.) As Ibn az-Zubayr was trying to assert his power over a Khâriji group that controlled much of the

Hijiz, and as his brother, Mus'ab, was fighting on his behalf against a

Khâriji group and MukhtSr in'Iraq, the Syrian party (primarily the

Kalb) that favored the rule of another of the Banû Umayya raised as tlieir candidate for the caliphate Marwan b. al-Hakam, a cousin of 38

Mu'âwiya. Marwàn succeeded in defeating at the Battle of Marj Râhit the

Syrian supporters of ‘Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr. Then in the.following

years, Syrian forces directed by ‘Abd al-Malik (r. 65-86/685-705),

Marwln's son and successor, were able to defeat Mus'ab b. az-Zubayr in

*Iraq (72/691), ‘Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr in the Hijâz (737/692), and a

large Khâriji group i n ‘Iraq and western .^

The Third Fitna and the Demise of Partisanship (127-133/744-750)

The period between the e^nd of the second fitna and the beginning

of the third (ca. 73-127/692-744) was not free from disruptions

stemming from partisan loyalties; Khâriji uprisings id different parts

of the empire were a frequent event; Ibn al-Ash‘ath, supported by many

Basrans and Kufans, rebelled against the strict rule of the Umayyad

governor of*Iraq (82/701); and Zayd b. ‘Ali, a grandson of al-Husayn,

led a futile revolt in Kûfa (123/740). Yet these events did not

seriously threaten the caliphate; since they were relatively localized

and occurred at different times, they were suppressed without much

difficulty by the competent generals of the Umayyads.

During the last decade of the first half of the eighth century

(ca. 123-33), however, several partisan movements arose almost

simultaneously. In the first place, the tribal tensions (between the

gays and the Kalb) that had threatened the continuation of rule by the 39

Banû Uitiayya after the death of Mu'âwiya resurfaced. Walid II

(r. 125-26/743-44) and his two predecessors, HishSm

(r. 105-125/724-434) and Yazid II (r.101-05/720-24), had favored the

Qays, and, in 126/744, the Kalb killed Walid II and replaced him with

Yazid III, whose six-month reign was followed by that of his brother

Ibrahim. At the same time that the Kalb gave their loyalty to Ibrahim,

however, the Qays raised as their candidate another MarwSnid, Marwân II

(r. 127-32/744-50). MarwSn was able to overcome Kalb opposition, but was confronted with several other partisan movements that threatened his rule. In Kûfa, the partisans of rule by a relative of ‘All

supported ‘Abd Allah b. Mu'iwiya in an unsuccessful r e v o l t . Marwân had little difficulty in dealing with Ibn Mu'àwiya, but was occupied for some time by two separate Khâriji movements, the Ibidiyya and the

Shaybaniyya, that had gained control of most of Arabia and Iraq and western Iran. By the time Marwàn II eliminated the Khâriji threat, he was too late to stop a bid for power led by the Banû ‘Abbas and carried out in the name of Abu Hashim, a son of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya (see above, page 37).^^ In 132/750, Marwân II was killed in Upper Egypt, to which he had fled, and the caliphate passed to the ‘Abbasids.

The third fitna, like the first two, was fought between different partisan groups each of which sought to control the entire Dâr al-Islâra. Yet the third fitna was different from the first two, and by virtue of these differences it possesses a significance for the history of the community that the first two do not. One of the most obvious differences was that the third fitna tied Islamic virtue to the 40 legitimacy of the caliph. All of the parties to this fitna insisted on reform along Islamic lines and based their opposition to the ruling branch of the Umayyads on this insistence. The ultimate victors, the

‘Abbasids, came to power on a platform that stressed the corruption of

Umayyad rule, the necessity of proper Islamic rule, and their ability 12 to provide it. This linkage of virtue to the caliphate resulted from two related developments: 1) changes in the configurations of

Islamicate society and 2) the varied concerns of pious Muslims who had become increasingly dissatisfied with MarwSni rule— those whom Hodgson has designated the "Piety-minded."^^ Both these developments resulted in the demise of partisanship.

Assimilation and Conversion During Marwâni Times

In the course of the Marwâni period (73-133/592-750), the nature of Islamicate society began to change. At the beginning of this period, tiiere were clear distinctions between the ruling Arabs and the non-Arab-ruled. The former were Muslim and most were soldiers; the majority of the latter were neither. Outside of Arabia, in the lands formerly held by the Sâsànians or the Byzantines, the Arabs lived in garrison towns (amsir,sing, misr), as befitted their military function, apart from the local population. The non-Muslims () helped to

"support" the Arabs through payment of a poll tax () and, if they 41 were landowners, a land tax (the ). By the end of this period many of these distinctions had ceased to apply: The majority who lived in the empire were now Muslim; the garrison towns were no longer occupied only by Arabs and had lost their military hue; and many of the

Arabs were no longer soldiers living as part of an occupying army, but had taken up residence and in some cases bought land. More generally, this period witnessed the beginning of a melding of different cultural traditions of the caliphal lands, all brought together by the presence of Islam;T I' 14

Under the Marwanid Caliphs and especially under the ‘Abbasids who succeeded them, the barriers gradually fell away that had kept the evolution of the cultural life of the several conquered nations separate from each other and from the internal development of the Muslim ruling class. The leading social strata of the empire, of whatever background— even the minority that was ggt yet becoming Muslim— lived in a single vast society.

In short, the conditions that had promoted partisanship were gradually disappearing. The Arabs were no longer a distinct group set apart physically, and by language and religion, from those that they ruled.

A growing proportion of tlie society, both Arab and non-Arab, had ceased to fit into the old partisan groupings. 42

Piety-minded Concerns During MarwSnî Tiroes

The changing character of Islamic(ate) society was an important element in the thoughts and concerns of pious Muslims who lived during the period of Marwâni rule. As a growing number of non-Arabs converted to Islam and as Islamic society ceased to be simply an Arab society, these Piety-minded Muslims became increasingly disturbed by the minimal role that Islam seemed to play, by the apparent lack of caliphal concern with the establishment of and adherence to religious norms, by the arbitrary power that the MarwSnids wielded, and by the inequities that these inflicted on those who were not part of their party. In the relative political calm that followed the second fitna, the

Piety-minded began to ask questions about what it meant to be a Muslim, what an Islamic society ought to be, and how such a society should be governed and maintained. The Piety-minded were not a uniform group, and they did not develop a single platform or set of solutions. Yet most agreed on certain essential points: What must bind their society together was Islam, and any other source of unity or identification, such as tribal or partisan affiliation was potentially divisive and contrary to the spirit of the equality of all Muslims that was at the heart of the Islamic message. In their opposition to Marwâni rule, they envisioned a government that would rule in accordance with Islâmic values and principles contained in the Qur'an. These principles were 43 exemplified by the Prophet and, more generally, by the community of

Muslims that had existed before the first fitna.

The Banû ‘Abbas, in their condemnation of Umayyad rule, voiced

Piety-minded concerns and expectations. Although they were themselves a partisan shi*a, the Banû ‘Abbas claimed legitimacy on the basis of

Islamic principles that transcended partisan lines, and on that basis 17 they called for the support of the community. Thus with the third fitna Islamic virtue was linked to caliphal legitimacy, and thereafter the more personalized loyalty of partisanship could no longer serve to mobilize support or to legitimize caliphal rule. In theory, as theory was developed, and in actuality, the caliph now stood above the interests of any one group in the Muslim Umma and, at least potentially, he could now rule according to the Islamic principles with 19 which the Umaj^yads had seemed so unconcerned. Yet in the views of many of the Piety-minded, the ‘Abblsids did not realize this potential; they did not rule according to the religious ideals the pious had envisioned. Confronted with this disappointment, the Piety-minded could either find a new foundation for opposition— given the demise of partisanship— or accept the ‘Abbasids and find another way to realize their goal. The majority accepted the latter choice and over the next two centuries they endeavored to provide in the law (Shari‘a) a comprehensive source on which the pious Muslim could pattern his or her 20 life. Among a smaller number of the Piety-minded, specifically those who had favored the rule of an ‘Alid, disappointment led in a very different direction. 44

The Shi'at ‘Ali— From Partisan Loyalty to Sectarianism

In the years before the third fitna, groups that had supported the

candidacy of an ‘Alid were simply some of the several partisan groups

in competition with others for political power. The original support

for ‘All, and subsequent support for one of his descendants (or

relatives), had not been intrinsically different from the support given

to Talha and az-Zubayr, to ‘Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr, to Mu'àwiya, or to

Marwân. After the third fitna, while the majority of the community came

to accept the ‘Abbasids, the shi‘a of ‘Ali refused to recognize the new

rulers' legitimacy and continued to hope for rule by a descendant of

‘All. But now the basis of their support of a descendant of ‘All

gradually ceased to reflect a partisan loyalty and came to reflect a

sectarian one that over the next two centuries developed into a

coherent sectarian ideology. In short, after the third fitna and the

disappearance of most other partisan groups, the shi‘a of 'Ali became

the Shi‘a=^^

At the heart of developed sectarian Shi'i ideology was the

doctrine of the Imâmate.^^ According to Shi‘i theorists and

theologians, God never sent to a people a prophet without also sending

successors to the prophet who were among his kin. These successors,

each of whcxn God specifically designated, were not prophets, but they possessed the knowledge ( ‘ ilm) of prophets and by means of that 45

knowledge and through God's grace (lutf) they were immune from error 23 — (ma*sum). Thus when God sent Muhammad, he also designated ‘All and

specific descendants of ‘Ali as to guide the Muslim community

after the Prophet's death. The names of each of the Imams and

instructions concerning their Imimates were contained in God's

testament(wasiyya) that the angel Gabriel reyealed to the Prophet and the Prophet in turn dictated to ‘Ali. The Diyine designation of these

Imams was duplicated on earth in history; Before his death, Muhammad specifically designated (nassa) ‘Ali to guide the Umma; ‘All before his death designated his son al-Hasan and passed to him God's testament, 24 the wasiyya; al-Hasan designated al-Husayn, and so forth.

In a very real sense then, the Imâmate was a sign of God's mercy.

If God sent Islam to provide Muslims with a path to salvation. He sent the Imams to illuminate that path. In the person of the , God gave to each generation of Muslims an authoritative leader who possessed a wisdom and knowledge far beyond what the ordinary Muslim could attain.

Only by paying allegiance to the Imam and by accepting his guidance could each believer attain salvation. Those who denied the Imam deprived themselves of salvation, in part because they did not accept the Imam's guidance and in part because they did not surrender to God's 25 will by accepting His Imam.

Since the Imam was necessary for the believer's salvation, the

Twelver Shi'i theorists insisted that God would never deprive Muslims of the Imam's guidance. However, these theorists maintained that God, out of concern for the well being of His Imam and out of anger at those 46 who stubbornly refused to accept him, temporarily removed the twelfth

Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi in 260/873-74. Al-Mahdi was not dead but was in (qhayba), beyond human perception. At a pre-ordained time, shortly before the end of time, he would return and avenge the wrongs committed by those who had persecuted his followers, and those who had faithfully persevered would finally enjoy their rewards.Until his messianic return, the guidance of the Shi'is was carried out first by a series of the Imam's agents (wakil, pi. wukala*) (260-329/873-941) and then by the Shi'i jurists (mujtahidun) (329/941—

Although the third fitna was the catalyst for the beginning of sectarian Shi'ism, the development of a coherent Shi'i ideology occurred only gradually. Certainly there could not be a complete ideology until after the ghayba of Muhammad al-Mahdi, and the Shi'i theorists credited with the formulation of the Shi'i doctrine outlined in the preceding paragraphs flourished during the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries. Yet in looking at the development of sectarian Shi'ism, it is important to consider the influence of the ideas of the qhulat in the years before the third fitna and the contributions made by the sixth Imam, Ja'far as-Sâdiq (d.148/765), whose life coincided with the third fitna.

The term or label qhulat (sing, qhall, lit. one who exaggerates or goes too far) was applied by Muslims, including 'Alid partisans and later Shi'is, to individuals whose ideas and speculations appeared extreme or "unorthodox" by the gradually developing standards of the day. Many of these qhulat attached themselves to 'Alid partisan 47 movements and made what others viewed as extreme claims about their candidates. One of the earliest figures to be charged with qhulüw,

‘Abd Allah b. Saba', for example, preached that ‘Ali was the wasiy (pi. awsiya'; heir or legatee) of Muhammad, that just as Muhammad was the

Seal of the Prophets, so ‘Ali was the Seal of the awsiya*, that ‘Ali had not really died and would return (ruju‘), and that the first three _ 29 caliphs had usurped ‘Ali's rightful rule. In addition to ascribing super-human qualities to various candidates, many of the qhulat also actively speculated on such subjects as the possibility of recurring prophecy, the nature of God, the meaning of the Qur'an, and the extent to which its prescriptions could be interpreted.^^

Why these qhulat attached themselves in particular to ‘Alid parties and whether there were also qhulat associated with other partisan groups are questions that cannot yet be fully answered.

Hodgson has suggested that the ill-fated movements of Hujr b. ‘Adi and al-Husayn may have symbolized to some ”a growing tendency [in Umayyad rule] to discard the old Arab sense of the inviolable dignity of the tribesmen" and thus encouraged in a partisan loyalty "an emotional and 31 moral, and therefore a religious turn." Furthermore, mawâli may have been attracted to ‘Alid movements— Mukhtar, for example, appears to have stressed the equality of the mawâli and they also seem to have played an significant role in the movement that brought the ‘Abblsids to power— and may have drawn on a syncretistic milieu in voicing their 32 support for an ‘Alid candidate.

Many of the views of the qhulat— that ‘Ali's right to rule was 48 decreed, that the first three caliphs' rule had not been legitimate, that *Ali or another Imam had not really died and would return, or that

‘Ali and his descendants had a special and divinely endowed knowledge— were of course adopted by a later sectarian Shi'ism. But at a time when support for ‘Ali or one of his descendants reflected partisan not sectarian loyalty, many of the claims of the qhulat would naturally appear extreme and unwelcome to those on whose behalf they were made. ‘Ali reportedly wanted to execute Ibn Saba' for denying the legitimacy of the first three caliphs' rule; Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya felt far from sanguine about Mukhtar's claims; and al-Baqir and then

Ja'far repudiated such qhulat as Abu al-Khattab and al-Mughira.^^

Beginning with the Imâmate of Ja'far as-Sâdiq (d. 148/765), however, some of the qhulat were brought into the fold of a nascent Shi'i sectarianism and their ideas, appropriately tamed, contributed to the movement's vitality.

What made this change possible was the development, during

Ja'far's lifetime and through his efforts, of the notions of the designated (mansus) Imam whose authority derived from that designation and from his possession of a special knowledge ('ilm). Ja'far did not originate the doctrine of nass, but he did stress the idea that through explicit designation the Imâmate was always located in one specific individual, regardless of whether that person actually claimed or held the rule. Furthermore, Ja'far emphasized that the designated Imam had a special knowledge that gave him a unique authority to decide religious and legal questions. 49

By giving primacy to the doctrine of nass, Ja'far obviated the holding of political power as a criterion of the Imâmate. On a practical level, this doctrine helped to institutionalize a non-confrontational attitude in Shi'ism that Ja'far and subsequent

Twelver Imams adopted. That is, since it was the explicit designation that gave each Imam his authority, he did not, therefore, need to try to attain political power. On a doctrinal level, Ja'far's formulation of the idea of nass helped to give an ongoing identity to the Shi' a in the years after his death. Although the Shi'a could accept a separation of political and spiritual authority, this acceptance could easily imply or lead to messianic expectations of a time when the two would be joined in the person of the Mahdi. In the mean time, however there was now a kind of guarantee of a continuity in the authoritative guidance of the designated Imâmate. The Shi'a could now insist that because true authoritative guidance lay only with their Imam, a figure distinguished from all others of his age by his special knowledge, those who did not accept his leadership were perpetually in danger of 34 erring. The years after Ja'far's death certainly witnessed conflicts within the Shi'a that had been loyal to him. Indeed immediately after his death his followers split over which of his sons Ja'far had designated as his successor, and it is from this split that the two major Shi'i groups— the Imimis and Isma'ilis— emerged and developed in quite different ways. For both groups, however, the Imâmate of Ja'far as-Sâdiq was equally important. His thinking helped to shape the ways in which each evolved and the ways in which each came eventually to 50 understand the history of the Umma and the roles that earlier * 35 and non-‘Alids had played in it. More generally, Ja'far's contributions helped to transform a partisan loyalty for ‘Alids into what came to be a sectarian loyalty.

While those who espoused a Shi'i loyalty gradually evolved an ideology and identity based on their allegiance to descendants of 'Ali, the rest of the Umma slowly developed a quite different kind of allegiance. After the third fitna the majority in the Umma abandoned partisan loyalties and focused on the importance of membership in and loyalty to the entire Muslim Umma, by now a large and varied population linked by a common religion. For the sake of order and stability most in this majority accepted the new 'Abbasid rule; although some sought through the development of the law for a way to limit the rulers' powers while others sought to increase them. Eventually this majority would identify itself as the Ahl as-Sunna wa al-Jami'a ("supporters of the sunna and the community") in contrast to the Shi'at 'Ali, who also accepted the value of the sunna but never the majority's failure to acknowledge the Imâmate. 51

Political Background; 809-945 (194-334)

The significance of the third fitna in shaping the orientations of

Muslims who lived in the years after that event is apparent in a variety of ways in the accounts of the Battle of the Camel on which this study focuses. These accounts also reflect develogments in the community during the period in which the authors of the accounts flourished— between the first decades of the ninth and tenth centuries. This hundred-year period marked a turning-point in

Islamicate history; It began with the empire and the caliphate at the height of its power— the so-called "Golden Age"— and ended with the almost complete fragmentation of the empire and dissolution of caliphal authority. The effects of this transformation on historians who were still part of a tradition that held that there could be but one Islâmic empire and one caliph ruling over all of it cannot have been insignificant. The specific ways in which the events of this period influenced historians’ accounts of the Battle is treated in subsequent chapters. However, a broad outline of the weakening of caliphal authority will help to contextualize the discussions in the following chapters. 52

In 194/809, the fifth ‘Abbasid caliph, Hârün ar-Rashid determined that upon his death the empire would be divided into two independent zones. The western half was to be ruled by his son al-Amin, who was to have the title of caliph, and the eastern half (east of Rayy) was to be governed by another son, al-Ma'mün. The latter was to succeed to the caliphate if al-Amin predeceased him. In the meantime he would have autonomous powers, that is, his own army and bureaucracy and the revenue from taxations but, should the need arise, he was required to provide his brother with military aid.^^

Ar-Rashid's reasons for splitting the empire may have been due in part to his attempt to find a solution to a problem that had plagued him throughout much of his reign. When he had come to power, the military had consisted primarily of the so-called "Abnâ' ad-Dawla" (the sons of the revolution), the descendants of the Khurâsâni troops who had brought the ‘Abbasids to power. These descendants had continued to enjoy the privileged status of their forefathers, but as a military force, they had largely ceased to resemble them. They had beccane increasingly involved in the flourishing commerce of and begrudged leaving the city for military campaigns. From an early point in his reign, ar-Rashid had begun to recruit new troops from KhurSsân.

He was in immediate need of reinforcements for his ambitious campaigns on the Byzantine frontier, but he may also have planned to replace the

Abnâ' with a more manageable army, or at least to balance their power.

His policy had created significant tensions between himself and his new recruits on the one hand and the Abnâ' and parts of the populace of 53

Baghdad who supported them on the other. In splitting the empire he may have sought to alleviate the tensions his policy had caused without abandoning it— al-Amin would control the Abnâ’ and al-Ma'mun the newer 37 troops from Khurasan.

Ar-Rashid's divided empire was short-lived. Within two years of his death, al-Amin and al-Ma'mün were engaged in a civil war for control of the entire Dâr al-Islâm. After a protracted struggle and a year-long , al-Ma'mün eventually prevailed. That he did so was due in part to the skill of one his generals, Tâhir b.

Husayn from Pûshang in south-west Khurasan, who was able to muster a 38 large army to support al-Ma'mün. Tâhir continued in al-Ma'mûn's service, after the civil war, serving eventually as governor of the military forces of Baghdad. At the same time, he also continued to 39 control much of Khurâsân. In this "dual capacity," Tahir and his family were able to help al-Ma'mün consolidate his rule. Yet the power of Tâhir posed a serious potential threat to the authority of the caliphate. Al-Ma'mün depended on the Khurâsâni troops to maintain his rule, but these troops were ultimately loyal not to him, but to Tahir.

Thus when the latter wanted his son, Talha, to succeed him, al-Ma'mûn had no choice but to agree and, in effect, to sanction the creation of 40 an essentially independent dynasty within the empire.

In addition to the potential threat which the Tâhirid power implied, al-Ma'mim also had to cope with several more immediate threats to his rule. His defeat of al-Amin gave'al-Ma'mün technical control of

Baghdad, but hostility to him there and in other parts of *Iraq 54

continued. Much of the populace of Baghdad still supported the Abn3' and strongly resented al-Ma'mün's dependence on the Khurâsâni troops who, as Hodgson points out, were "frankly IraniansIn 199/814, a

Shi'i rebellion broke out in Kûfa. Although one of al-Ma'mûn's generals

successfully put it down, the rebellion may have prompted al-Ma'mCfn to try to gain the support of the Shi'a by naming as his successor 'All ar-Ridâ, the grandson of Ja'far as-Sâdiq. Although this move may have mollified some of the Shi'a, it caused rioting in Baghdad and other parts of'irâq and led to the Baghdadis' recognizing as caliph one of al-Amin's sons. Ibrahim. This turn of events compelled al-Ma'mOn to go to Baghdad (in 204/819), where he had not been since before the death of his father, and to make the city his residence. He had little difficulty in removing Ibrahim, but his relations with the populace remained strained even after he had clearly abandoned the idea of a

Shi'i successor— 'All ar-Ridâ had died the year before. Some of the strongest opposition to al-Ma'mun came from the more conservative of the Ahl al-Hadith— those who gave primary religious authority to hadith about the Prophet. They had been especially opposed to al-Ma'mün's designation of ar-Ridâ and were, more generally, extremely intolerant of any who did not agree with them. Moreover, some of these Ahl al-Hadith, the in particular, may have been informally allied with the wealthier merchants amongst whose numbers were some of the more influential Abnâ'. Shaban has suggested that the Hanbalis supported a taxation law that conceded significant breaks to the urban 42 population, especially the wealthier sections. Shortly after his 55

arrival in Baghdad, al-Ma’mûn instituted a religious policy to weaken

the power of the more intolerant of the Ahl al-Hadith. He made the

Mu'tazili doctrine the official creed of his government and through a kind of test (the ) he insisted that those who held important bureaucratic and judicial posts formally denounce the view of the Ahl al-Hadith concerning the uncreated nature of the Qur'an,

The mihna probably did weaken the power of the Ahl al-Hadith, at least by preventing them from using official posts to impose their views on others. Yet in adopting a policy which received very little public support, al-Ma'mun moved the caliphate further away from the

interests of the majority and encouraged the spirit of independence 43 amongst the ‘ulamâ'.

Before his death in 218/833, al-Ma'mün designated his brother a-Mu‘tasim as his successor. Al-Mu‘tasim continued to support the

Mu'tazilis, but even before he assumed the rule, he had embarked on a new military policy. While he was in charge of campaigns on the

Byzantine frontier, al-Mu'tasim had begun to build a private army or guard that consisted primarily of slaves, many of whom were Turkish. As caliph, he continued to enlarge this army and he put in charge of it other purchased slaves, rather than assigning the command to free 44 Muslims. Al-Mu tasim's plan was to give the caliphate its own power base and thus to free it from dependence on one of the military factions, the loyalty of which could not always be trusted. Indeed, even before the first year of his rule was over, al-Mu‘tasim learned of two plots to replace him with al-Ma'mûn's son, al-'Abbas. The second 56

of these was almost certainly engineered by the Tahirids and the

Abnâ *.

Although his guard gave al-Mu'tasim at least a measure of his

desired independence from the military factions, this independence came

with a price; His guard, by design, had no links with the rest of the

population and on more than one occasion showed a violent disregard for

the welfare of the people of Baghdadi The resulting tension probably

contributed to al-Mu‘tasim*s decision to construct north of Baghdad the 46 city of Sâmarrâ, to which he moved in 222/836. There, he was even

further removed from his Muslim subjects than his predecessors had

been. He was "... indeed an absolute monarch, but one increasingly 47 out of touch with the socially dominant elements of the empire." He had not solved the problem of dynasts, such as the Tahirids who

continued to control much of Khurâsân. Finally, in the construction of the guard, he had introduced a force that would shortly have a

seriously debilitating effect on the caliphate.

Under the relatively short reign of al-Mu'tasim*s son, al-Wàthig

(r. 227-32/842-47) the guard continued to grow in strength and numbers. His successor, al-Mutawakkil (r. 232-47/847-61), quickly

realized that the strength of the guards was now a threat to the

caliphate and embarked on a policy of military reform designed to check

their growing power and to strengthen his control over the military

forces more generally. In order to introduce factional rivalries and

to weaken their ethnic homogeneity, he tried to consolidate the guard 48 with troops drawn from other areas. At the same time, he tried to 57 weaken the power of the Tahirids by replacing some of them with others 49 from their family to whom he gave less authority. Al-Mutawakkil also abrogated the government's support of the Mu'tazilis and gave almost free rein to the Ahl al-Hadith who, with a vigor stemming from pent-up frustration, began to persecute Shi'is and dhimmis.Al-Mutawakkil was not himself an intellectual and probably had nothing in common with the

Mu'tazilis; but his support of the Ahl al-Hadith may also have answered to the more practical needs of gaining the support of the populace of

Baghdad and particularly the Abnâ'— the same groups al-Ma'mün had 51 sought to weaken,

Al-Mutawakkil's military reforms were not successful, and he was the first victim of their failure. He had weakened the power of the guard, but only temporarily. From the rivalries that he had tried to encourage, a dominant faction emerged that was able to control the rest. This faction supported the candidacy of al-Muntasir, the eldest son of al-Mutawakkil. When the latter designated one of his younger sons as his successor, the guards killed al-Mutawakkil and put their candidate on the throne. What ensued demonstrated the accuracy of al-Mutawakkil's fears; the next ten years saw four caliphs, each made and unmade by factions of the guard who were able to achieve temporary dominance.

At the end of this decade, temporary order was restored by al-Muwaffaq (257-278/870-891), the ^ facto ruler during the ^ jure reign of his brother al-Mu'tamid. Al-Muwaffaq proved more able than his predecessors to control the guard, yet for much of his rule his 58

energies were occupied with putting down a serious Khâriji revolt of

the Zanj slaves in the economically important region of lower*IrSq. As

a consequence he could do nothing to prevent the formation of

independent dynastic states on the peripheries of the empire— by the

Tülünids in Egypt and parts of Syria, by a Zaydi Shi'i group in

TabaristSn, and by the Saffârids of Khurâsân who had been able to 52 overthrow the Tâhirids.

Under the next two caliphs, al-Mu'tadid (r. 279-89/892-902) and

al-Muktafi (r. 289-95/902-08), some of the stability of al-Muwaffaq's

reign continued. Al-Muktafi was even able to bring Egypt and Syria

back under caliphal control. But the guards once again interfered and

replaced al-Muktafî with al-Muqtadir (r. 295-320/908-932) who was at

first too young to be competent,- and the fragmentation of the empire

continued at an accelerated rate; Egypt was lost to the Ikhshidids in

324/935; much of North Africa came under the control of the Fatimids in

297/909; two branches of the Arab (Shi'i) Hamdinid clan established independent rule in (293/905) and later in (334/945); and

in the East, the Sâmânids, who had been in virtual control of

Transoxania since the last quarter of the third/ninth century, defeated

the Saffârids and added to their territory much of Iran. When, in

334/945, one of the co-founders of the seized control of

Baghdâd, the process of fragmentation, which had begun in the first decades of the preceding century, was complete. The caliphate

continued for several more centuries, but as one local state among many, with consistent symbolic power and fluctuating political power. 59

The continuance of the caliphate, even under Shi'i Buyid control, provides a kind of retrospective insight into the dissolution of the empire. As Hodgson has observed, only the Fatimids made universal claims that competed with the ' for the loyalty of all

Muslims. The many dynastic movements and rebellions that occurred during the century after the death of Hârün ar-Rashîd weakened the

caliphate to be sure. But all were localized in their effects and in their efforts; they commanded only local allegiance and tried neither 53 to reform the caliphate nor to present an alternative to it. NOTES

CHAPTER II

Shaban, for example, in asserting that ‘Ali perceived a need to expand the powers of the caliphate makes the following observation;

‘Ali was laying claim to some religious authority in order to solve political problems. This is the origin of the view of ‘All held by his partisans, shi‘a, as the Imam who would apply his knowledge to the achievement of justice for every Muslim. This notion of Imam-Amir al-Mu*minin became the basic objective of all later Shi‘ite sects. Islamic History, p. 73. 2 Roy Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, p. 12, perhaps overestimates the significance to ‘All's followers of his kinship to the Prophet and his marriage to the Prophet's daughter.

^I am indebted to Professor Marilyn Waldman for suggesting the possible importance of partisan loyalties for this period. 4 One of the best studies of the growth of Makka as a commercial center and the relationship between this development and the rise of Islam is Eric Wolf, "The Social Organization of and the Origins of Islam," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 7 (Winter 1951): 329-56; reprint The Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series in the Social Sciences, no. A-247. In addition see Marilyn R. Waldman, s.v. "The Islamic World," forthcoming in The Encyclopedia Britannica, pre-publication draft, pp. 7-9; and Mahmood Ibrahim, "The Social and Economic Background of the Umayyad Caliphate: The Role of Mu‘lwiya b. Abi Sufyan" (Ph.D. dissertation , The University of California at Los Angeles, 1981), chaps. 2 and 3.

^Waldman, "The Islamic World," p. 8.

^Ibid., p. 15. 7 Cf. Goitein’s remarks in his "Introduction" to vol. 5 of al-Balidhuri's Ansab al-Ashraf, ed. S.D.F. Goitein (: University of Jerusalem Press, 1936), p. 11.

60 61

[The ashrâf were] 'nobles,' primarily all those whose status is fixed by their receiving from the government a grant of 2000-2500 annually; then, in general terms, Arabs of pure descent (on the father's side), themselves men of importance or the scions of important families. 0 They were also called al-Shurât, i.e. those who sell (shSri"' their souls to God and a1-muhakkimûn after the original dissenters supposed assertion that "judgement belongs to God alone" ( " ^ hukm ila li-llahi"). On this point see G. Levi della Vida, s.v. "Khâriàjites," E.I.3. Individual Khâriji groups also took the name of their leader, e.g. the Azraqiyya or the Ibidiyya. In addition to Levi della Vida's article also see Hodgson, Venture, vol.l, pp. 214-16 and passim (all subsequent references to the Venture are to volume one, unless otherwise noted); and J. Wellhausen, The Reliqio-Political Factions in Early Islam, Ch. 1. 9 Hodgson provides a helpful chart of the events of the second fitna. Venture, p. 220.

10 — • 'Abd Allah b. Mu'àwiya was a great-grandson of 'Ali's brother, Ja'far. Az-ZubayrI, Kitib Nasab al-Quraysh,ed.-E.Levi-Provencal, 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dâr al-Ma'àrif, 1953), p. 80.

^^Before his death, Abu Hashim probably designated as the leader of his partisan followers Muhammad b. 'Ali b. 'Abd Allah b. 'Abbas. On this point see Moshe Sharon, Black Banners form the East: The Establishment of the 'Abbasid State, Incubation of a Revolt, The Max Schloessinger Memorial Series, vol. II (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1983), pp. 125-28; and Hodgson, Venture, vol. 1, p. 273*

^^Ibid., p. 274.

^^Ibid., pp. 241-66,

^^Ibid., p. 235.

^^Ibid.

^^Ibid., p. 252. The behavior of the prophet and his Associates came to constitute the sunna, a term that originally meant 'custom' or 'practice.' In the course of the second/eighth and third/ninth century the sunna, as it was contained in the hadith, came to have a primary place in the law. 17 Witness how quickly the 'Abbasids severed their their ties with the 'Alid shi'a that had helped to bring them to power. 62

18 In terms of the characteristics of the first three fitnas, the fourth fitna was scanewhat enigmatic. It did not involve the majority of the community or several partisan groups, but was limited to a struggle between two of Hârün ar-Rashid's sons, al-Amin and al-Ma'mun. Furthermore, unlike the third fitna, "no Islamic principle seems to have been at stake." Hodgson, Venture, p. 300. 19 Cf. Hodgson's discussion of "caliphal absolutism," ibid., pp. 280-83. Notice also that the 'Abbasid caliphs took honorific titles that symbolized their Islamic, non-partisan, status.

2°lbid., p.276.

21 — The classic study of the development of sectarian Shi'ism is Marshall Hodgson's "How Did the Early Shi'a Become Sectarian?" Journal of the American Oriental Society 75 (1955); 1-13. On the Shî'Is more generally also see Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, Islamic Messianisme The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981); Mahmoud Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of 'Âshûrâ' in Twelver Shi' ism. Religion and Society, vol. 10 (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978); and S.H.M. Jafri, Shi'a Islam. 22 In general usage, the term imam refers to the leader of the prayer. The sectarian Shi'a, like the partisan supporters of one 'All's descendants were not a monolithic group. The following discussion describes the essential tenets of the Imânii or Ithna 'ashari Shi'is. 23 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, p. 137. 24 Ibid., pp. 19-21. According to the Shi'a, the Prophet designated 'Ali at Ghadir Khum. See below, pp. 213-14; L. Veccia Vaglieri, s.v. "Ghadir Khintn," E.I.S; and Jafri, Shi'a Islam, pp. 19-21. 25 Cf. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, pp. 6 and 23.

^^Ibid., p. 78. 27 Ibid., p. 100, and Hodgson Venture, p. 376. 28 - - For example, Kulayni, the compiler of Al-Kafi, a work of hadith (d. during the first quarter of the fourth/tenth century); al-Mufid, a theologian and jurist (d. 413/1022-23); and at-Tusi, also a theologian and jurist (d. 450/1067)— See Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, pp. 30-38 and passim. 63

29 “ — On Ibn Saba' see at-Tabari, Ta'rïkh ar-Rusul wa al-Mulük, 10 vols., ed. Muhammad Abu Fadl Ibrâhim (Cairo; Dir al-Ma‘ârif, 1967), vol. 4, p. 341; al-Baghdadi, Farq bayn al-Firaq, ed. M. Muhyî ad-Din ‘Abd al-Hamid (Cairo: Muhammad ‘Ali Sabih, n.d.), pp. 233 ff.; Ibn Abi al-Hadld,Sharb, vol. 2, pp. 98ff.; Hodgson, s.v. "‘Abd Allah b. Saba'" E.ljs; and his "How Did the Shi‘a Become Sectarian?" p. 6. See also Steve Wasserstrom's "The Moving Finger Writes; Mughira ibn Sa‘id and the Interplay of Past and Future in the Institutionalization of the Dajjal Myth," History of Religions 25 (1985);l-29', a study of another early qhili.

^^Hodgson, "How Did the Shi‘a Become Sectarian?" p. 7.

^^Ibid, p. 3. Hujr b. ‘Adi led an unsuccessful revolt in Kufa against Mu‘awiya after the death of al-Hasan. 32 Ibid. See also S. Wasserstrom, "The Moving Finger Writes;" pre-publication draft, pp. 2-4. 33 _ _ - Al-Baghdidi, Farq, p. 235; Jafri, Shi‘a Islam, p. 303; and Hodgson, "How Did the Early Shi‘a Become Sectarian?" pp. 6 and 13.

^^On Ja‘far's Imamate see ibid., pp. 9-13; Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, pp. 14-17; and Jafri, Shi‘a Islam, pp. 259-83.

^^Ibid., p. 282.

^^Hodgson, Venture, p. 299; M.A. Shaban, Islamic History; A New Interpretation 2, A.D. 750-1055 (A.H. 132-448) (Cambridge; Cambridge Uniyersity Press, 1978), p. 39.

^^Shaban offers this explanation of ar-Rashid's motiyes, ibid., pp. 30-31 and 36-39. 38 Ibid., p. 43; Hodgson, Venture, pp. 300 and 475. 39 Ibid., p. 475. 40 Ibid., p. 478; Shaban,Islamic History 2, p. 50. 41 Hodgson, Venture, p. 478. 42 Shaban, Islamic History 2, p. 46. 43 Hodgson, Venture, p. 480. 44 Ibid., p. 481; D. Sourdel, "The Abbàsid Caliphate," The Cambridge , 2 vols., ed. P.M. Holt, A.K.S. Lambton, and 64

B. Lewis (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1977), vol. la, p. 125; Shaban, Islamic History 2 ,pp. 63-66.

^^Ibid., p. 62. 46 Hodgson, Venture, p. 482; Sourdel, "The‘Abbàsid Caliphate," p. 125; and Shaban, Islamic History 2, p. 63. Shaban daims that al-Mu‘tasim's decision to move to Sâmarrâ was not due to any threat his guard posed to the people of Baghdad since it was the latter who threatened the former. 47 Hodgson, Venture, p. 482.

^^Ibid., p. 486; Shaban Islamic History 2, pp. 72-80. 49 Ibid., pp. 73-74.

^"^Hodgson, Venture, p. 486.

^^Shaban, Islamic History 2, p. 73. 52 Hodgson, Venture, p. 489. 53 Ibid., pp. 488-90. CHAPTER III

KHALIFA IBN KHAYYÂT (d. 240/854)

The earliest extant account of the Battle of the Camel was written

fay the Basran historian Khalifa fa. Khayyât. He came from a family of

noted '' and muhaddithûn, and himself attained a reputation for

knowledge and reliability in these 'fields.' Contrary to the custom of

his day, Ifan Khayyât did not travel to other cities for his education,

faut stayed in , where he studied under a number of leading scholars

including Ifan al-Kalfai, al-Madâ'ini, and Yazid fa. Zuray* (d. 182/798), with whom he was especially close.^ According to an-NadIm, Ifan Khayyât wrote a work on the Qur'an, a history of those suffering from maladies

and physical defects, a "biographical dictionary" (tafaaqât), and a

history of Islamic(ate) society covering the period from the birth of 2 . the Prophet to the year 232 A.H. (845). His history (Ta'rikh Khalifa

fa. Khayyât) and his "biographical dictionary" (Kitâfa at-Tafaaqât) have

survived intact.^

Ifan Khayyât's Ta'rikh is the earliest Arabic annalistic history that survives intact and is probably one of the earliest Arabic annals

to have been written. In a short note that appeared in 1969, Joseph

Schacht contended that Ifan Khayyât's history was characteristic of 4 "... the most archaic form of Muslim historiography." On the basis

65 66 of evidence supplied by the Ta'rikh and an earlier examination he had made of a fragment of the "Kitâb al-Maghâzi" of Mùsâ b. ‘Uqba (d.

141/758),^ Schacht argued that "... the earliest historical recollections of the community of Muslims . . . consisted of lists of persons who took part in certain important events, lists of the events themselves, and a sprinkling of traditions referring to them. . . . by far the greater part [of Ibn Khayyât*s Ta'rikh] consists of dry enumerations of persons, of events, of appointments and dismissals, of deaths, etc., year by year."^

Schacht's argument is overgeneral, ignoring the many ways in which

Khalifa b. Khayyat's work differs from other early works. The annalistic structure of the Ta'rikh is different from the structure of the "Kitâb al-Maghâzi" to which he compares it. Since Schacht does not say whether he sees the structure of Ibn Khayyat's work as incidental to its list-like features or integral to them, it is not clear how he would evaluate the differences in structure. Furthermore, the list-like features that he notes appear not to have been representative of all of the works of historians who lived before Ibn Khayyât. The surviving manuscripts attributed to Abu Mikhnaf, Ibn al-Kalbi, Ibn

Ishâg, and Nasr b. Muzahim and the edited works of Ibn al-Kalbi, Ibn

MuzShim, and al-Wâqidi usually employ a more sustained narrative style 7 than Ibn Khayyat's history, even when they have a hadith format.

Moreover, many of the authors just mentioned and others mentioned in the preceding chapter wrote what can be termed 'single-event' histories— works on such events as "the killing of ‘Uthmin," "the 67

Battle of the Camel," "the Battle of Siffin," "the ,"

"the killing of *Ali," "the killing of Husayn," and so forth. There is

thus evidence to suggest that the attention of many of the earliest

historians was engaged not by the overall span of the Umma's history,

but by specific events that appeared especially important to its

development. Not surprisingly, many of these events figured

prominently in the debates and thoughts of Piety-minded Muslims.

For all of these reasons, it seems unlikely that there was one

type or style of writing history that was representative of the

earliest Arabic historiography and that Ibn Khayyât typified it.

Rather, he drew on one or more of several existing styles of techniques in the composition of his Ta'rikh and was probably not the first to

compose an annalistic history. Conversely, some of his younger

contemporaries, who wrote histories that covered an equally large time

span, employed regnal and genealogical structures (or others less

easily characterized), and still others compiled single-event histories.® 68

Ibn Khayyat’s Account of the Battle

In Ibn Khayyat's Ta'rikh, an entry for a year usually includes allusions to notable events, a necrology of important individuals, and the name of the person who led the . For years that mark the death of a caliph, Ibn Khayyât also lists persons with government posts. The descriptions of the years' events become progressively shorter until, for some years, he gives nothing more than the name of the person who led the hajj. The hadith format is prevalent in the work, but not pervasive. As a general rule, notable events of a year are usually introduced with the expression "fihâ" (in it [the year]). In the case of some of these events, Ibn Khayyât provides elaboration through a sequence of hadith. A summary of his entries for the year thirty-six, the year of the Battle of the Camel, will illustrate these features and provide the basis for a more elaborate discussion of them and of his account of the battle.

Ibn Khayyât begins by mentioning several different events that occurred during the year. Although several of these events are connected to the Battle of the Camel, the connection is not made g explicit.

1. ‘Ali was given the bay‘a.

2. Talha, az-Zubayr, and ‘À'isha went to Basra. When they neared the city, ‘Ali's governor, ‘Uthmân b. Hunayf, sent Hukaym b. Jabala who met 69

them in az-Zâbüqa, outside of Baçra. Hukaym and Mujâshi* b. Mas'üd (an

Associate) were killed. 'Uthmân left the city.

3. 'Ali put Sahl b. Hunayf in charge of Madina and left the city. He

sent his son al-Hasan and 'Ammàr b. Yasir to solicit aid from the

Kufans.

4. 'Ali arrived in Basra and the Battle of the Ccimel took place at an edge of the city on Friday, the tenth of Jumâdâ II (4 December, 656).^^

5. Talha was killed on the battlefield by an arrow. Two hadith

elaborate: The first states that Marwân b. al-Hakam shot Talha (vowing as did so that "he [Talha] would not seek vengeance after today"). The

second confirms the first and adds that az-Zubayr left the battlefield and was killed at Wadi as-Siba' by 'Amr b. Jurmuz, and that Muhammad b. Talha and 'Abd ar-Rahmin b. 'Attâb b. Asid were also killed. This hadith also mentions that Hukaym and Mujâshi' were killed before 'Ali's arrival.

6. Hudhayfa b. al-Yamân died at the beginning of the year. A hadith

from Abu al-Yaqzan and al-Madâ'ini mentions that Mâhüya came to 'Ali

from to make peace; but when he returned to Merv, he broke his

^ 11 treaty.

7. ‘Imran b. al-Fadil al-Burjumi and Ibn 'Attàb al-Habati raided far into the area of SijistSn,

8. 'Ali went from Basra to KOfa. He put Abu Mas'ud 'Uqba b. ‘Amr al-Badri in charge of Kufa and departed to meet Mu'âwiya.

9. The Battle of the Camel: Here Ibn Khayyât provides a more detailed description of the event than occurs in the preceding references, in 70 the form of thirty-nine hadith and two lists of those who fell at the battle. The sequence of the hadith on the battle, however, follows the same order as the earlier references to it and to a large degree focuses on the same subjects. That is, Ibn Khayyât first describes

‘Â'isha, Talha, and az-Zubayr's arrival in Basra, then ‘Ali's journey to that city, and finally the fighting between ‘Ali and the Ahl 12 al-Jamal and the deaths of Talha and az-Zubayr.

When they arrived in Basra, ‘Â'isha, Talt\a and az-Zubayr encountered considerable opposition from the Basrans, who pelted them with stones and drove them from one quarter of the city to another.

The Ahl al-Jamal eventually met ‘Uthmân b. Hunayf, accompanied by an army, and the two sides fought a pitched battle in the area of az-Zâbüqa. When night approached, they agreed to peace, the terms of which stipulated that until ‘Ali arrived, ‘Uthmân would maintain control of the city; that Talha and az-Zubayr were free to leave whenever they chose; and that none would obstruct or interfere with another. The next day however, ‘Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr set off with some of his companions to find provisions and encountered Hukaym b.

Jabala accompanied by a force of seven hundred men of the Bakr b. Wâ'il and ‘Abd al-Qays. The two sides began to fight and Hukaym, his brother, his brother's son, and Ibn Mas‘ûd, among others, lost their lives (see above, p. 69).

While ‘Ali was on his way to Basra, he sent al-Hasan and ‘Ammàr b.

Yasir to Kufa to ask its people for help. The hadith furnishes an interesting extract fr

‘Ali moved on to Basra; and, after his arrival, he appointed commanders over the flanks of his army and prepared for battle. The two armies met by the castle of ‘Ubayd Allah b. Ziyid on Thursday, the 14th of 15 Jumâdâ II and joined battle the following day.

Ibn Khayyat's description of the battle, in twenty short hadith, highlights the severity of the fighting. Talha and Ka‘b b. Sûr were two of the first to die, the latter while he was reciting the Qur'an to the two sides and imploring them to make peace. There are several hadith that describe the death of Talha. Most of these mention that

Marwân was his killer (see above page 69), and two focus on Talha's repentance— in one he asked God to punish him for ‘Uthmân's death and in a second he told one of his clients, who was trying to remove an arrow from his knee, to leave it since God had directed its flight.

Only one hadith mentions az-Zubayr's death at Wadi as-Sibâ‘, in a description that is quite similar to the one that appears in the

'overview' of the year (see above page 69).^^ After he has mentioned the deaths of Talha and az-Zubayr, Ibn Khayyât cites a number of hadith that give widely varying figures for the number who fell and two lists 72

of the names of some of the victims. The first is genealogically

arranged and includes the names of those who fought on both sides; the

second, which is much shorter, is only of those who had fought on - . 17 Ali's side. The final few hadith on the battle consist of recollections of the event; Two participants remember that so many

spears had been thrown that it would have been almost possible to walk on their ends. The second hadith adds that those on both sides

continually recited the and the takbir.

Khalifa b. Khayyât ends his account of the year thirty-six with

some brief references to other events, which he introduces with the expression "fiha": Salman al-Fârsi and Qudama b. Maz*ûn died, ‘Ubayd

Allah b. ‘Abbas or ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Abbas led the hajj, and al-Hârith b.

Murra al-‘AbdI led a raid into the area of Hind.

One of the more puzzling features of Ibn Khayyat's narrative of the year is the nature of the relationship between the initial references to the events of the battle and the titled description of it that he subsequently presents in a sequence of hadith. Should the first be read as an 'introduction' to the fuller account, or are the two in some way independent of each other? There are other Arabic annalistic histories, for example, at-Tabari's Ta'rikh or Ibn al-Athir's Kâmil, in which events of a year are briefly introduced at the beginning of the

'chapter' that covers that year, and perhaps in Ibn Khayyat's work the different passages prefaced by fihâ serve a similar introductory function. There are, however, factors that militate against this view. For one, the level of detail is relatively consistent from the 73 beginning passages through to the titled account. Put differently, either the "introduction" is too long or the account is too short. In addition, there are variations in twice-told events. We are first told, for example, that Hukaym b. Jabala and Mujâshi' b. Mas'ud, as representatives of 'Uthmin b. Hunayf, died fighting against Talha and az-Zubayr immediately after the latter two arrived in Basra. But in the titled account of the Battle, Ibn Jabala and Ibn Mas'üd die fighting against Ibn az-Zubayr after the Ahl al-Jamal have first fought against

Ibn Hunayf and then agreed to suspend fighting until ‘Ali arrived (see above, pages 69 and 70). Furthermore, the fuller account of the battle comes after Ibn Khayyât has already mentioned ‘Ali's going from Basra to Kufa and then leaving Kufa to meet Mu'âwiya, not after the first reference to the battle where it would more logically fit.

Perhaps, then, Ibn Kliayyât first wrote out major events of the year, those he precedes with fihâ, and later went back and added additional details on the battle without, however, checking the new material against the original entries or integrating it with them.

Among the works of other early authors there are demonstrable examples of this type of composition. Al-Bukhâri (d. 257/870), the compiler of the most valued of the six "canonical" collections of hadith, organized his work in such a way as to facilitate a user's locating hadith that dealt with specific problems or issues of . He divided his collection into "books" that covered general topics (fasting, the hajj, zakit, and so forth) and further subdivided these books into

"paragraphs (abwab) to which he prefaced brief statements of his own 74

(taraiim,sinq. tarjuma) in which he indicated the practical or legal applicability of the hadith that followed. The fact that some of these tarajim do not contain any hadith indicates that al-Bukhâri wrote the chapter headings first and then provided appropriate hadith wherever possible.•U-. 18

There are other features of Ibn Khayyat's work, however, that suggest that its structure was intentional. The whole is annalistically arranged and most of the chapters are similarly organized and focused. Ibn Khayyât may have purposely separated the initial "survey" from the titled account and positioned the two in such a way that they would highlight or point to each other. The

juxtaposition of the two certainly produces an interesting effect. In the "summary" of the year, the actions and deaths of Talha and az-Zubayr are as noteworthy and important as the battle. The initial section foregrounds the actions of Talha, az-Zubayr, ‘Â'isha, and ‘Ali and subordinates the battle to them. The battle is mentioned in the context of ‘Ali's actions, not vice versa. It is apparent from the sequence of events that Talha and az-Zubayr's deaths resulted from their fighting against ‘Ali, yet it is their deaths that are important and worthy of mention, not the setting or context in which they occurred.

By treating their actions in this manner, Ibn Khayyât protected the reputations of Talha and az-Zubayr by deemphasizing the connections between their actions and the battle and by insulating the separate stages of the event. The first passage that deals with these two men 75 has them go to Basra to fight and kill Hukaym b. Jabala who was, according to Ibn Khai'yât and others, one of the leaders of those who 19 attacked the caliph 'Uthmân. This action is made to seem worthier of praise than condemnation because it is divorced from the battle.

Similarly, Ibn Khayyat's only reference to the bay'a is quite brief— "In it [the year 36] 'Ali b. Abi Tâlib was given the oath of allegiance (buyi'a). The event of the bay'a was an issue for subsequent historians, and some furnished versions that described opposition to 'Ali's accession and even the use of force to exact an oath from Talha and az-Zubayr. Since Ibn Khayyât used works by Ibn al-Kalbi and al-Madâ'ini, he could have included a more detailed narrative of the event than he did; therefore, the brevity of his description should not go unnoticed. His use of the passive (buyi'a) rather than the active (baya'a ) frees him from having to indicate who gave 'Ali the oath or who did not give it; nor does he need to discuss the circumstances surrounding it. Although his brief description raises no doubts about the legitimacy of 'Ali's rule, it also does not raise doubts about the characters of Talha and az-Zubayr by suggesting that they may have violated their sacred oaths.

Whereas the initial section subordinates actions or events to individuals, the titled account of the battle does the opposite. Here, individuals are subordinated to the event, which determines the significance of their actions. As a consequence of this different focus and the explicit connection between the actions of Talha, az-Zubayr, and 'Â'isha and the battle, these three persons fare less 76 well than in the initial section. In the titled account Ibn Khayyât provides additional details that reinforce this effect. He describes the hostility that many of the Basrans showed towards the Ahl al-Jamal. He shows that the Ahl al-Jamal violated the treaty that they made with Ibn Hunayf. He has Marwân b. al-Hakam blame Talha for the death of *Uthmin, and Talha repent in his "death-bed" confession (see above, page 71). Finally, he has 'Ammir b. Yasir imply that those who

"follow" *A'isha are not following God (see above, page 71).

Unlike Talha and az-Zubayr, 'Ali emerges essentially unsullied in both the initial section and in the titled account, not because Ibn

Khayyât says much about him, but because he describes events and structures his narrative so as to portray 'Ali and his caliphate in a generally positive light. Ibn Khayyât does not cast any doubt on the legality or popularity of the bay'a; he does not describe, as other authors do, opposition to 'Ali's caliphate or Talha and az-Zubayr's assertion that they were forced to pledge to 'Ali their allegiance.

Although he says little about Talha and az-Zubayr's supporters and even mentions the unfriendly reception the Basrans gave them, he specifically mentions that 'Ali was supported by four thousand

Madinans, (including four hundred Ansâris who had been with Muhammad at

Hudaybiya) and was joined by six to seven thousand Kufans (see above, page 70). In addition, Ibn Khayyât's references to the performance of the hajj and the expansion of the Daf al-Islâm could be perceived to support the legitimacy of 'Ali's caliphate; because they were centrally 77 controlled, they possessed at least symbolic value as barometers of caliphal stability and legitimacy.

Overall then, Ibn Khayyât consistently supports the legitimacy of

'Ali's rule and by implication suggests that he acted correctly in opposing 'Â'isha, Talha, and az-Zubayr and eliminating the threat they posed to the stability of the Umma. At the same time, however, the way in which Ibn Khayyât organized his material gives an ambiguous quality to his account of the conflict and to his depiction of 'Â'isha, Talha and az-Zubayr. His account is ambiguous primarily because it defines and juxtaposes two settings or contexts within which the battle is to be presented. In the first, he presents the activities of the Ahl al-Jamal so as to obscure the connections between their actions and the first fitna and to find some merit in what they did. In the second he depicts Talha, az-Zubayr, and 'Â'isha in a much less favorable light; it is difficult to find merit in their actions or to avoid the conclusion that they are primarily responsible for the first fitna. NOTES

CHAPTER I I I

^The chief biographical sources on Ibn Khayyât are the following; An-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 288; Ibn Hajar, Tahdhib, vol._2, p. 160; al-Bukhârî, Ta'rikh, vol. 3, p. 191; adh-DhahabI, Mizin, vol. 1, p. 664; Al-Asyûti, Tabaqât al-Huffâz. ed. 'Ali Muhammad 'Urnar (Cairo: Maktaba Wahba, 1973), p. 196; GAf., vol. 1, p. 172, SI, p. 271; Suhayl Zakkar, s.v. "Ibn Khayyât al-'Usfuri," E.I.s and his "Introduction" to his edition of Ibn Khayyat's history— Ta'rikh Khalifa b. Khayyât, 2 vols.(Damascus: Wizâra ath-Thaqâfa wa al-Irshâd al-Qawmi, 1967), vol. 1, p. 2.

^An-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 288; Zakkar, "Ibn Khayyât."

^Suhayl Zakkar has also edited his Kitâb at-Tabaqât, 2 vols., (Damascus: n.p., 1966); Dr. Akram al-Umarl has also edited Ibn Khayyat's Ta'rikh, 2 vols. (Baghdad: n.p., 1967). All subsequent references to Ibn Khayyat's Ta'rikh and his Tabaqât are to the Damascus editions. 4 _ Joseph Schacht, "The Kitâb at-Ta'rikh of Khalifa b. Khayyât," p. 79.

^Idem, "On Musa b. 'Uqba's 'Kitâb al-Maghâzî'," Acta Orientalia 21 (1949): 288-300.

^Idem, Ibn Khayyât," p. 79.

^For example; Abu Mikhnaf, "Fadâ'il al-Husayn b. 'Ali" (Dâr al-Kutub, Ta'rikh Taymûr, # 1086), "Maqtal al-Husayn"; Ibn al-Kalbi, "Kitâb Manâqib al-*Arab;" Ibn Isljàq, "GhazwatMadlnatTakrit;" Nasr b. Muzâhim, "Kitâb Maqtal al-Husayn b. 'Ali."

^Ibn Ishaq is supposed to have written a history of the caliphate arranged chronologically ("Ta'rikh al-Khulafl'"). See Abbott, Arabic Literary Papyri, vol. 1, pp. 80-100; and an-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 105. Al-Madi'inI may have written an annalistic history down to the reign of al-Mu'tasim (r. 218-227/833-842). See S.D. Goitein's "Introduction" to vol. 5 of Balâdhuri's Ansib al-Ashraf, p. 14.

78 79

9 Each number in the following summary corresponds to an introductory fihâ.

^^If the battle was fought on ten Jumâdâ II» it would have been on a Sunday not a Friday. See below, note no. 15 and L. Veccia Vaglieri, s.v. "al-Djamal."

^^Cf. Ad-Dinawari, Akhbâr at-Tiwâl, ed. ®Abd al-Mun'im ®Amir (Cairo; ®îsâ al-Babi al-Halabi, 19Ô0), pp. 139-40; and at-Tabari Ta'rikh, vol. 4, pp. 557-58. MShûya was Yazdagird's governor of Sistân.

^^The Ahl al-Jamal ("people or supporters of the camel") was the name given to those who fought on the side of 'Â'isha, Talha, and az-Zubayr.

^^Of these eight hundred, four hundred had witnessed the bay'at ar-Ridwan, the oath of allegiance given to Muhammad after he had made the Treaty of Hudaybijyawith the Makkan Quraysh. Ibn Khayyât, Ta'rikh. vol. 1, p. 49; al-Waqidi, Kitâb al-Maghâzi, vol. 1, p. 254; W.M. Watt, Muhammad at Madina (Clarendon; Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 50.

^^Dhu Qâr was an oasis near Kufa. Al-Yaqût, Mu' jam al-Buldan, 5 vols. (Beirut; Dâr al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya, n.d.), vol. 4, p. 293.

^^Thursday and Friday, the ninth and tenth of December, 656.

^^Wadi as-Siba' was an oasis about five miles (amyal) south of Basra. Yaqilt, Mu'jam al-Buldan, vol. 5, p. 343. 17 The lowest figure cited is seven thousand and the highest is twenty thousand.

^^Al-Bukhiri, Sahih al-Bukhâri. 9 vols. (Cairo;_Kitâb ash-Sha'b, 1958). For examples'o^ tarâjim without following hadith see; vol. 1, pp. 23, 45, 195; vol. 2, pp. 199, 218; vol. 3, ppZ 3, 10, 72, 117; vol. 4, pp. 63, 75, 84, 86, 92, 159, 166; vol. 5,_p. 32; vol. 7, pp. 58, 73. See the discussion of al-Bukhâri and his Sahih in I. Goldziher, Muslim Studies, vol. 2, pp. 216-26. Cf. also Marilyn'R. Waldman, "Primitive Mind/Modern Mind; New Approaches to an Old Problem Applied to Islam," in Richard C. Martin (ed.). Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies (Tucson; The University of Arizona Press, 1985), p. 102. Applying Jack Goody's thesis that literacy and writing resulted in cognitive changes rather than reflected them, she suggests that the consolidation of "sound" hadith into the canonical collections may have led to a more fixed concept of the sunna. 19 Ibn Khayyât mentions that Hukaym led the Basran opposition against 'Uthmân, Ta'rikh, vol. 1, p. 181. Cf. , Jamharat Ansab al-'Arab, 4th ed., ed., 'Abd as-Salâm Muhammad Hârùn (Cairo; Dâr 80 al-Ma*ârif, 1971), p. 298; at-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. 4, pp. 375 and 378; and Muhammad b. Sa'd, Tabaqât, 9 vols., ed. Ihsân 'Abbâs (Beirut; Dâr Sâdir, 1968), vol. 3, pp. 71 and 72.

20 * * ^ Khalifa b. Khayyat, Ta'rikh, vol. 1, p. 199. CHAPTER IV

IBN QUTAYBA (213-276/828-889)

Abu Muhammad‘Abd Allah b. Muslim ad-Dinawari, better known as Ibn

Qutayba, was born in KOfa in 213/828 and died in Baghdad in 276/889. As a youth he studied in several cities, although he probably concentrated his efforts in Basra. When he was in his early thirties, he traveled to Baghdad and there attracted the attention and favor of the ‘Abbàsid court. He received secretarial appointments in Baghdad and then, from approximately 237-258/851-871, he served as the (judge) in the city of Dinawar, near HamadhSn.^

Ibn Qutayba was influenced by the complex literary-cultural phenomenon of adab. In its original meaning, adab referred to

"normative" or "proper" conduct in much the same way as "sunna" did.

By the third/ninth century, adab connoted the refined or cosmopolitan qualities engendered by urban life and a well-rounded education, as well as the literature that expressed these qualities.^ The ideal adib

(pi. udaba*), one versed in adab, had some knowledge of science, philosophy, history, geography, poetry, shari‘a law, and other subjects. Adab literature often included information from diverse fields of study, organized in such a way as to edify and amuse.

81 82

Adab was cultivated by many in third/ninth and fourth/tenth century Islamdom, particularly the wealthier members of the urban populace, but it was especially favored by and associated with the class of professional government servants, the kuttâb (sing, kâtib). As the culture of the court, adab also had a pragmatic component which focused on courtly protocol, on how to conduct oneself in person and express oneself in writing.

Ibn Qutayba's works reflect adab in its widest conception. He wrote at least sixteen works, all of which survive— a fact that might 3 • well indicate that they were highly valued by subsequent generations.

His writings cover an impressive range of subjects, and include manuals on etiquette and style, collections and critical studies of poetry, theological and legal works, a philological work on the Qur'an, and one 4 on Qur'anic rhetoric. His account of the Battle of the Camel appears in his Kitâb al-Ma'ârif "Book of Information," a work that has been characterized as an "historical manual with encyclopaedic appendices on varied subjects."^ It contains a wealth of interesting and curious information that an adib might have found useful. An abbreviated

"table of contents" may help to indicate the scope of his work:

- Creation, Prophets, and Prophecy before Islam - The Arab tribes and tribes of the The life and prophecy of Muhammad and the early raids - The Râshidûn - Associates and Successors - Names of the Caliphs [Umayyads and‘AbbSsids] - Famous notables (al-mashhürûn min al-ashrâf) - Proponents of the use of ra'y (reasoning in (fiqh) - Muhaddithün (transmitters and scholars of hadith) - Qur'an reciters - Genealogists Historians 83

Teachers Pairs who feuded with each other Those who said or did something first The of different cities The conquests (al-futuh) Disagreements between early and later Muhâjirûn Those whose lives spanned the Jahiliyya and Islam Respectable trades (sinâ‘ât al-ashrâf) Those with physical defects and ailments Those who were tall Religions of the Arabs in the Jahiliyya Sects (firaq) Pre-IslSmic kings and kingdoms

Much of the first two-thirds of the work is prosopographical. In the first seven chapters, Ibn Qutayba adheres to a set pattern of presentation. He identifies individuals by their genealogy (and sometimes lists their descendants), and then locates them historically. The nature of the context varies. When he deals with individuals who lived during the Prophet's lifetime, Ibn Qutayba frequently draws an explicit connection between each of them and

Muhammad; for example, he might repeat something that the Prophet said about the figure, or mention that the person fought by Muhammad's side at Uhud, Badr or one of the other early battles. For individuals who lived after Muhammad, the context might be a battle of conquest in which they participated, or a government post which they held.

In the chapters on those who favored the use of ra'y, on muhaddithün. Qur'an reciters, and others, Ibn Qutayba, as a general rule, provides genealogical information, death dates, the names of an individual's associates, and, where appropriate, the names of those to whom and from whom he transmitted hadith. The subsequent chapters, the titles of which give an indication of their contents, cannot be easily 84 summarized. Throughout the work, Ibn Qutayba includes lines or verses of poetry— some composed by the individual Ibn Qutayba is discussing, others his own verses composed in order to illustrate or embellish a point.

The Kitâb al-Ma* ârif is thus a showpiece of Ibn Qutayba*s own adab— of his erudition and his literary skill. At the same time, he may have intended the work to have a didactic value for those who aspired to acquire the refinement that adab conferred. In his introduction he suggests as much;

This is a book in which I have collected the information (ma* ârif) that is imperative to one who would attain the dignity of rank (sharaf al-manzila). By virtue of good manners (ta'addub), he would be above the rank and file; and by virtue of knowledge (‘ilm) and eloquence (bayàn), he would be preferred to one of the masses. Let him bring himself to its study and practice its restraint. It [the book's content] will be indispensable to him in the councils of kings if he would sit with them; in the gathering of nobles (ashrâf), if he would associate with them; and in the circles of those who are learned (ahl al-*ilm), if he would talk with them.

He continues with additional reasons for why the information in his book merits attention and laments the many men he has come across,

Arabs and Persians, who had almost no knowledge of their peoples' pasts or their genealogies.

Ibn Qutayba's account of the Battle of the Camel occurs at the beginning of a section about *Ali's caliphate and is part of a larger

"biography" (akhbâr) of *Ali and his family. The relative brevity of the account makes it possible to include a full translation here. 85

Ibn Ishâq said: When ‘Uthmân was killed, ‘Ali b. Abi Tâlib (may God be pleased with him) was given the bay‘a of the common people in the of the Messenger of God. The Basrans gave him the bay‘a [by proxy] and Talha and az-Zubayr gave him the bay‘a in Madina.

‘Â'isha had left Madina to perform the hajj when ‘Uthmân was besieged. When she finished the’hajj she departed for Madina; but when she was in Sara£, she learned of the death of ‘Uthmân and the accession of ‘Ali and she turned around and returned to Makka. Talha, az-Zubayr, Marwân b. al-Hakam, ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Âmir, and Ya‘lâ b. Munabbih, the governor of the Yemen joined her there. When they had all settled in Makka, they consulted amongst themselves about what they should do to get help to avenge ‘Uthmân's death. [At first] they inclined towards [getting help from] Syria because of Mu‘awiya's status there; but ‘Abd Allah b.‘Âmir dissuaded them from that and convinced them to go to Basra. In Basra they seized ‘Uthmân b. Hunayf, ‘Ali's governor of the city, and imprisoned him. They killed fifty of ‘Uthmân's men who were in charge of the treasury and other government posts (‘amal), and committed unprecedented acts (ahdathû ahdâthan).

When news of their journey reached ‘Ali, he set off after them. He sent to Kufa for help, then went with them [the Kufans] to Basra. ‘Ali's forces numbered 14,000 in all. Talha, az-Zubayr, and ‘Â'isha and the Basrans went out to meet ‘Ali and the two sides fought a great battle: Talha was killed and those with him were defeated, Az-Zubayr withdrew and was killed in Wadi as-Siba' by ‘Umayr b. Jurmuz, and ‘Â'isha was surrounded and taken [prisoner], ‘Ali and those with him entered Basra and the city's people gave him the bay‘a . He removed ‘Uthmin b. Hunayf [as governor] since Ibn Hunayf did not have much support in the city.

When ‘Ali left for Kufa, he appointed ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Abbâs over Basra. And he prepared for war with Mu‘awiya. He set out with the Iraqis and others who supported him and Mu‘iwiya approached him, accompanied by the Syrians and those who supported him. The Battle of Siffin occurred and then the Arbitration. ‘All continued to fight until he was killed. He did not make the hajj in his years [of rule] because he was occupied by war. He was killed on a Friday evening, ten days after the beginning of Ramadhân in the year forty. His reign lasted for three months sh^rt of five years. ‘Abd ar-Rahman b. Muljam killed him. 86

The brevity of Ibn Qutayba's account suggests that he was quite

selective in choosing the material for it. Even the passages which Ibn

Abi al-Hadid cites from Ibn Ishâq— Ibn Qutayba*s only cited

source— that pertain to the Battle of the Camel, are far longer than

Ibn Qutayba's short account.® This brevity probably reflects a g pragmatic concern to provide a kind of "readers' digest" version of

the event— a version which would instruct an adib in the "who, where,

when, what, and why" of the event without encumbering him or her with

'unnecessary' details.^® Yet this brevity appears not to have prevented

Ibn Qutayba from shaping his description in ways that accorded with his

loyalties.

Like Ibn Khayyât, Ibn Qutayba furnishes a very brief description

of the bay*a. Yet, whereas Ibn Khayyat's account is essentially neutral, Ibn Qutayba's is not. One's attention is immediately focused

on Talha and az-Zubayr because they are the only ones whose names Ibn

Qutayba mentions in his short description of the bay'a. He draws

further attention to the two (and to the Basrans) by his use of the active voice, baya'a, to describe their oaths and the passive, buyi'a, when he refers to the Madinan populace's oaths. The first few

sentences of his account also foreshadow the rest of it (by language and by reference) inasmuch as they highlight the actions of Talha and az-Zubayr and the Basrans.

After his description of the bay'a, Ibn Qutayba switches the scene from Madina to Makka and from Talha and az-Zubayr to 'Â'isha in order to establish the context in which he then brings together the forces 87

that becOTie the Ahl al-Jamal. His description of their consultation

about avenging ‘Uthmân's death must surely be weighed directly against

his subsequent description of the unprecedented action which the Ahl

al-Jamal took immediately after they arrived in Basra. From Ibn

Qutayba's standpoint, it would appear that Talha and az-Zubayr's motives were transparently self-serving; their ostensible interest in

vengeance was only a pretext for their attempts to gain power. In this

regard, it is also interesting that Ibn Qutayba, unlike many of the

authors of accounts of the battle, makes no attempt to mitigate

‘Â'isha's role in the affair. He positions her at the center of ‘All's

enemies by including her in those who plot against ‘All and those who

subsequently go out to meet him in battle.

There is relatively less information on ‘Ali than on Talha,

az-Zubayr, and ‘Â'isha. Yet the account certainly presents ‘Ali in a positive light and raises no doubts about the legitimacy of the bay‘a

given to him. In addition, just as Ibn Qutayba did not include material that mitigated the guilt of Talha, az-Zubayr, and ‘Â'isha, he

also excluded some material that might cast ‘Ali in a less favorable

light. Thus, for example, Ibn Qutayba appears to have edited out some

material from Ibn Ishâq, which Ibn Abi al-Hadid included, which

suggested that ‘Ali had a difficult time raising Kufan support.

Ibn Qutayba's account is structured to highlight the legitimacy of

‘Ali's rule and the guilt of ‘Â'isha, Talha and az-Zubayr— ‘Ali was the

rightful caliph because he had received the bay‘a, whereas Talha and

az-Zubayr were guilty of violating the sacred oaths they had given ‘Ali 88 and of opposing him as the duly elected caliph. Almost every sentence in the short account relates to this point or theme. However, although the account is categorical in its support of 'Ali and condemnation of the Ahl al-Jamal, there is no suggestion that ‘All was special by virtue of his kinship with the Prophet or that he had special abilities that other men did not; rather his caliphate was legitimate because his succession was by due process. The account also pays no attention to the problem of preserving the status of the transmitters of the sunna, in the way that other accounts do, by attempting at least a partial exoneration of Talha, az-Zubayr, and ‘À'isha. On the contrary, it stresses their guilt.

Ibn Qutayba's streamlined narrative thus unequivocally upholds the legitimacy of ‘Ali's rule and the guilt of ‘À'isha, Talha, and az-Zubayr. It does not allude to the last-minute repentance of az-Zubayr or Talha, to their decision not to fight, to ‘Ali's sorrow over their deaths, or to his concern for ‘Â'isha's well-being— topics that many of the other accounts mentioned. The leaders of the Ahl al-Jamal remain wholly unredeemed. Yet in spite of this unambiguous focus there is a tone of distance that pervades the account. Compared with other authors, Ibn Qutayba appears uninvolved with the events that he narrates and with the personages involved in those events. ‘Ali,

‘À'isha, Talha, and az-Zubayr appear more as figures playing roles than as some of the most prominent Companions of the Prophet. From his depiction, one does not get a sense of the gravity of the conflict and 89 of the issues that it came to raise for other Muslims, including some of Ibn Qutayba's contemporaries.

It is possible that for Ibn Qutayba the battle was not, in fact, such an important or controversial event, and he could therefore compose an account that briefly and simply described what had happened. It is also possible, however, that Ibn Qutayba constructed his narrative of the Battle of the Camel so as to address what he perceived as a problem of his own day. Ibn Qutayba lived during the time when the authority of the caliphate was being weakened by aspiring dynasts, a factional guard, and an often contentious populace. More specifically, his life (213-276/828-889) coincided with the the Sâmarrâ caliphate (222-279/836-92)— a period that witnessed eleven caliphs, many of whom were placed on the throne by one faction of the guard and removed by another. He probably wrote the Kitab al-Ma‘ârif in his last twenty years; certainly he did not finish it before the reign of al-Mu*tamid (r. 256-279/870-892), whose accession Ibn Qutayba 12 mentions. It is difficult to say how the weakening of caliphal authority influenced Ibn Qutayba; but perhaps he believed that the stability of the caliphate was one factor that contributed to the wellfare of society. Accordingly, in his account of the battle, he intentionally de-emphasized the issues with which some other authors of his time were concerned and de-personalized his portrayal of ‘Ali,

‘À'isha, Talha, and az-Zubayr, in order to draw attention to the general impropriety of rebellion against duly constituted authority. 90

In other words, Ibn Qutayba's account could display a kind of non-partisan caliphal orientation or loyalty. He supported the legitimacy of ‘Ali's rule because his succession was by due process; that is, he supported ‘Ali the caliph, not ‘Ali the man. Therefore, he did not allude to ‘Ali's status as a Companion and a relative of the

Prophet or to episodes of the battle that reflected well on ‘Ali as a person because these distinctions had no bearing on the legitimacy of

‘Ali's caliphate. Similarly, Ibn Qutayba condemned the attempts of

‘À'isha, Talha, and az-Zubayr to subvert ‘Ali's rule. He did not dwell on their status as close Companions of the Prophet and did not attempt to redeem their reputations or attenuate their guilt because such qualifications would weaken the force of his condemnation of their

"illegal" opposition.

This non-partisan caliphal orientation may have been conditioned by Ibn Qutayba's occupation as a kâtib. As a servant of the court for part of his life, he had a first-hand view of the changing fortunes of the caliphate, and what he witnessed may have helped to convince him of the importance of giving loyalty to the holder of that office.

Furthermore, if, as his introduction suggests, Ibn Qutayba was writing for other udabâ' and kuttâb, he may have intended that his account have a didactic value, that it demonstrate to others of his "craft" the importance of allegiance to the caliphate. Yet the kind of values that

Ibn Qutayba's account evinces should not be linked exclusively to his occupation. Rather, they can be linked more generally to the ■i demise of partisanship and the gradual institutionalization of the 91 caliphate after the third fitna, developments not limited in their influence to professional bureaucrats. NOTES

CHAPTER IV

^For biographical information on Ibn Qutayba see Lecomte, s.v. "Ibn Qutayba," E.I.*; Ahmad Zakî al-Adwâ's "Introduction" to Ibn Qutayba's ‘Uyun al-Akhbar (4 vols, Cairo; Dâr al-Kutub Press, 1930), vol. 4, pp. 12ff; an-Nadlm, Fihrist, p. 85; and Ishaq Musa Huseini, The Life and Works of Ibn Qutayba (Beirut: The American Press, 1950). 2 F. Gabrieli, s.v. "Adah," E.I.2;and Marilyn Waldman, Toward a Theory of Historical Narrative, p. 36; Hodgson, Venture, pp. 444-46, and 451-72.

^To these sixteen another seven can be tentatively added. See G. Lecomte, "Ibn Kutayba." On the question of his authorship of an 8th, the Kitab al-Imama wa as-Siyasa "The Book of Religious Leadership and Proper Governance," see below, pp. 94f.

^For a list of his works see Le Comte, "Ibn Kutayba;" A W a d Zaki al-'Adwâ, "Introduction," vol. 4, pp. 5-40; Huseini, Ibn Qutayba, pp. 47-86; and an-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 85f.

^Lecomte, "Ibn Kutayba," p. 845.

^Ibn Qutayba, Kitâb al-Ma*ârif, p. 1.

^Ibid., pp. 90-91.

^Ibn Abî al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, vol. 4; pp. 290ff., 323ff., 352f., 377ff., 407ffJ, 838f., and vol. 5; p. 207. It is possible that Ibn Qutayba was using Ibn Ishaq's "Ta'rikh al-Khulafâ'" rather than his "Kitâb al-Jamal,:" that the former work gave an abbreviated version of the event, and that Ibn Qutayba simply quoted this version in its entirety. Notice, however, that even the fragment of Ibn Ishaq's account of the shürâ is longer than Ibn Qutayba's account of the battle. See Abbott, Literary Papyri, vol. 1, pp. 80f. 9 Marilyn Waldman, Toward a Theory of Historical Narrative, uses this phrase, p. 70.

92 93

^^The amount of space that Ibn Qutayba devotes to ‘Ali is about average for the length of his discussions of the Associates of the Prophet.

11 - Ibn Abi al-Hadid, Sharh, vol 4, p. 291. Many of the other accounts also mention the initial unwillingness of many of the Küfans to help ‘Ali; several of these mention that ‘Ali had to send two or even three separate requests and deal sternly with Abu Mûsà, the governor of the city. 12 Ibn Qutayba Kitâb al-Ma‘ârif, p. 172. CHAPTER V

PSEUDO-IBN QUTAYBA (d. after 196/811)

The next account of the the Battle of the Camel appears in a two-

volume work entitled Kitâb al-Imâma wa as-Siyâsa, ("The Book of

religious Leadership and Proper Governance") also known as Ta'rikh

al-Khulafâ'("History of the Caliphate").^ Although the work has been

published under Ibn Qutayba's name. Middle Eastern and European

scholars (Abu Bakr al-Ma‘ârifi, Ahmad Zaki ‘Adwa, I.M. Huseini, P. de

Gayangos, Dozy, and de Goeje) have doubted his authorship for several

reasons : None of the biblio-biographical sources attributes a work of

either this title or type to Ibn Qutayba; the method and approach of

the Kitâb al-Imâma differ from those found in Ibn Qutayba's surviving works; the authorities that he cites in these works appear nowhere in

the Kitâb al-Imâma; and it appears that the author of this work lived 2 in Damascus, which Ibn Qutayba never visited.

These objections to Ibn Qutayba's authorship are, however,

circumstantial; The bibliographical and biographical sources are far

from infallible. Differences in content and style need not indicate a different author, but could reflect stages in the life of one author or different aims or goals that called for a different compositional

94 95 approach. With respect to the question of the sources of Ibn Qutayba and the author of Kitâb al-Imâma, the evidence is quite uncertain since the latter rarely cites authorities (most sections begin with qâlù,

"they said" or dhakarû, "they mentioned") and Ibn Qutayba does not cite sources consistently. However, the author(s) of both works was (were) at least familiar with al-Madâ'ini.^ Finally, whether Ibn Qutayba did not in fact ever visit Damascus and whether the author of the Kitâb al-Imàma was in fact from that city seem difficult to determine.

Clearly a solution to the problem of the identity of the Kitâb al-Imima* s author will require a careful study of that work and comparison of it with those known to have been witten by Ibn Qutayba.

The Kitab al-Imâma is arranged regnally and covers the caliphate from Abu Bakr (r. 10-12/632-34) through the reign of Hàrûn ar-Rashid

(r. 170-194/786-809). The work consistently focuses on the caliphate; individuals and events are treated in the context of discussions of the reigning caliph. Because it has this focus, the work contains little information on the "conquests," the wars of the Ridda, or events in the amsâr. The account of the Battle of the Camel comes at the beginning of a relatively long section on ‘Ali's caliphate— 116 out of 220 pages in the first volume are devoted to his rule.

The Account of the Battle of the Camel

The section on ‘Ali's reign begins with a discussion of the circumstances surrounding the bay‘a sworn to ‘Ali on the day after the 96

killing of ‘Uthmân. The people of Madina, gathered in the mosque,

accused Talha and az-Zubayr of causing the caliph's death. Neither

actually denied the charge; Talha remarked that, although killing

‘Uthman had been hateful, so too had been the caliph's stubborn refusal

to repent; now ‘Uthman was in God's hands. Az-Zubayr said much the

same thing and added that since the members of the shûrâ convened by

‘Umar had been satisfied with ‘Ali, the people should go to him and

swear the bay‘a to him. The people accepted az-Zubayr's suggestion and went to ‘Ali, but he was unwilling to accept the bay‘a from them

because he did not consider them a valid elective body— only the

members of the shûrâ or those who had fought by the Prophet's side at

Badr, ‘Ali maintained, could elect a new caliph. However, the Madinans

reconsulted and decided that for the sake of the community's security,

they had to have a leader and that they preferred ‘Ali. Al-Ashtar then

went to ‘Ali and convinced him to accept the rule, and he and the

Madinans with him gave ‘Ali their oaths. Then the people went to Talha

and insisted that he give ‘Ali the bay‘a. At first Talha refused and

then complied only to the extent of giving ‘Ali the oath, but not the

accompanying handshake. Later that day, when the Madinans convened in

the mosque, Talha repeated his oath and this time also gave the

handshake. Then az-Zubayr, Sa‘d b. Abi Waqqâs, and many other

Associates of the Prophet who were in the city also gave the bay‘a.

Marwân and a group of the Banü Umayya had fled Madina immediately after -4 ‘Uthman was killed and did not swear loyalty to Ali. 97

Some who had not been in Madina learned of the caliph's death and the bay'a in the days following those events. ‘À'isha, who was in

Makka, was informed of the death and left for Madina in a distraught

state. When she reached the outskirts of the city, she met Talha who repeated the news about *Uthman's death and added that ‘Ali had been made caliph. He also told her that people had forced him to give his oath to ‘Ali. After learning this news, ‘À'isha refused to enter Madina and turned around and went back to Makka.

Another who learned of the event was ‘Amr b. al-‘Às, who was in

Palestine. From different messengers he learned first about the siege of ‘uthman and then about his death and the accession of ‘Ali. One messenger also told ‘Amr that ‘Ali was doing little to punish the killers and ‘Amr wrote a note to Sa‘d b. Abi Waqgis asking for more information on the caliph's death. Sa‘d replied that ". . . he was killed by a sword that ‘À'isha had unsheathed, that Talha had sharpened, and that ‘Ali had poisoned. Az-Zubayr had said nothing

[against ‘Uthman] but pointed with his hand [against him]." Sa‘d added that he and others could have protected ‘Uthman but chose not to. He explained that ‘Uthman had changed, either for the better or for the worse. If he had changed for the worse, then those who had killed him and those who had done nothing to prevent his death had acted well. If

‘Uthman had changed for the better, then they had acted wrongly and would ask for God's forgiveness.^

In Madina, ‘Ali consulted with different individuals about how best to consolidate his rule. Both Ibn ‘Abbas and al-Mughira b. Shu‘ba 98 advised ‘All to confirm the appointments of 'Uthman's governors, at least for the time being. Once ‘Ali had the loyalty of the troops in the different amsâr, he could then make changes in the governors as he saw fit. ‘Ali did write to the amsâr with the news of ‘Uthman's death and his own election and he received the bay‘a of all of the governors except that of Syria. ‘Ali tried to convince al-Mughira to accept the governorship of Syria, but al-Mughxra refused because he feared that

Mu‘awiya would blame him for ‘Uthmin's death. He again suggested to

‘Ali that if he wrote to Mu‘awiya and confirmed his appointment over

Syria, Mu‘awiya would accept his rule. ‘Ali did as al-Mughira suggested, but Mu‘awiya sent back to him not his bay‘a but a declaration of hostility; "The only thing between me and the Qays ‘Attâb

[will be] a pierced kidney and a crushed shoulder."^

After he received Mu‘awiya's note, ‘Ali had a lengthy conversation with his son. Al-Hasan criticized his father for ignoring advice that he had given him; Before ‘Uthman had been killed, he had told ‘Ali to go to Madina so that he could not be blamed for anything that might happen to ‘Uthman. ‘Ali had refused. When ‘All was offered the bay‘a, al-Hasan had warned him against accepting it until there had been consultation and the offer of the rule was unanimously supported. Then

‘Ali's position would have been secure. He had also urged his father not to force Talha and az-Zubayr to give their oaths. Now he urged

‘Ali to release Talha and az-Zubayr from what they had sworn and to relinquish the rule until all the people supported him, Al-Hasan concluded his advice with the warning that many were thinking of 99 betrayal, that he had seen treachery and hatred in their faces. 'Ali rejected his son's advice, dismissed his fears, and swore to fight against those who opposed him with the help of those who supported him. But al-Hasan was not satisfied; he feared that Mu'awiya would be victorious if 'Ali fought him. Since Mu'awiya was the next of kin of the wronged 'Uthman, God would give strength to him— "One who is killed unjustly. We will give power to his kin [wali] (17; 33) 'Ali, however, was unconcerned since he claimed innocence in 'Uthman's death; he had, after all, sent al-Hasan and al-Husayn to stand guard at 'Uthman's door. Furthermore, he had at first refused the proffered bay'a. Once more, al-Hasan pleaded with his father to relinquish the rule and to let "... God on the pass judgement (yahkumu) on 7 that over which His servants quarreled." (2:113)

After al-Hasan left, 'Ali had another conversation with al-Mughira b. Shu'ba. He pledged his general support to 'Ali, but asked 'Ali to permit him not to become involved in any fighting that might occur. 8 Ali agreed.

Talha and az-Zubayr also visited ‘All after his conversation with al-Hasan. They told ‘Ali that they had given him the bay'a because they expected that he would share his rule with them by giving each a governorship— Talha wanted the rule of the Yemen and az-Zubayr that of

Iraq. However, when it became clear to them that ‘Ali had no intention of giving them appointments, the two complained to a group of Quraysh in Madina and tried to rouse them against 'Ali. Then they went back to

‘All and asked his permission to go to Makka to make the 'umra. 100

Although ‘Ali suspected that they had other plans, he nevertheless 9 permitted them to leave Madina.

After Talha and az-Zubayr left Madina, ‘Ammâr b. Yisir, one of

‘Ali's close companions and supporters, tried to convince several prominent Associates to support ‘Ali (on the battlefield): ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Umar, the son of the second caliph, claimed that he felt no hostility for ‘Ali; however, he was confused by the nature of ‘Ali's involvement in ‘Uthman's death. Moreover, he was a man of peace, not of war. ‘Ammâr left him and went to Muhammad b. Maslama and then to

Sa‘d b. Abi Waqqâs; both of them also refused to fight for ‘All.^^

In Makka, Talha and az-Zubayr joined ‘À'isha and entered into protracted discussions about what they should do.^^ For a time they considered going to Syria to join forces with Mu‘awiya, but then ‘Abd

Allah b. 'Âmir convinced them that their interests would be better served if they went to Basra. Talha and az-Zubayr wrote letters to some of the tribal leaders in Basra to ask for their support, but none of the Basran leaders was willing to commit himself until the question of

‘Uthman's death and Talha and az-Zubayr's role in it had been 12 settled. When they failed to get Basran support, they turned to ‘Abd

Allah b. ‘Umar. They suggested that with his support it would be possible to restore order and let the issue of the caliphate be decided by a council (shûrâ). Ibn ‘Umar refused their request. For one, he argued, ‘Â'isha's place was in her house, not in a haudaj. Furthermore, he reminded the two, there had been a shürâ [i.e., the one appointed by his father] and it had preferred ‘Ali to either of them. Talha and 101

.az-Zubayr tried without success to gain the support of some other

prominent Madinans, Then, with the financial support of Ya*l5 b,

Munahfcdli they prepared to leave for Basra.

At the end of the fourth month of his caliphate, *Ali left Madina

with nine hundred Muhàjirûn and and many other supporters and

began to travel towards Syria. Shortly after his departure, he received

a note from his brother, 'Aqil. The note advised him that ‘À'isha and

Talha and az-Zubayr and their relatives were heading towards Basra,

accompanied by a large number of rabble (awbàsh) and ne'er-do-wells

(buqhât). ‘Aqil added that Talha and az-Zubayr did not intend to honor

the oaths they had given ‘Ali and were now claiming that he was

responsible for ‘Uthman's death. The note also informed ‘Ali that a

group of forty abnâ' tulaqâ' ("sons of the tulaqâ'— those Makkans who

did not convert until after the conquest) from the Banü Umayya had set

out from the Hijaz to join Mu‘awiya. Further along, ‘Ali was joined

by ‘Adiy b. Hatim and a large and enthusiastic group of supporters from 14 his tribe, the ^ayy .

When the Ahl al-Jamal reached Awtas, near , they met

al-Mughira b. Shu‘ba and Sa‘id b. al-‘Âs. Mughira and Sa‘id tried to

convince both ‘À'isha and Marwân b. al-Hakam to forsake Talha and

az-Zubayr; they were the ones responsible for the killing of ‘UthmSn

and they were not seeking vengeance but rather power for themselves.

Al-Mughira and Sa‘id failed to convince ‘À'isha and Marwân, nor did

they have any better luck when they addressed the group that

accompanied Talha and az-Zubayr. 102

Shortly after they left Awtis, the group passed through the oasis of al-Haw'ab and the dogs there began to howl. ‘À'isha asked the name of the place and when Muhammad b. Talha told her that it was al-Haw'ab,

she became very distraught and insisted that she be returned to Madina.

When Ibn Talha asked her why, she explained that the Prophet had once had a premonition that al-Haw'ab's dogs would bark at one of his wives and he had warned ‘À'isha against being the one. Ibn Talha tried to persuade her to forget what she had heard and then ‘Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr lied to her and told her that the place was not al-Haw'ab, that Ibn Talha had been wrong. As a consequence, ‘À'isha agreed to go 17 on.

When the Ahl al-Jamal neared Basra, ‘Ali's governor of the city,

‘uthman b. Hunayf tried to rally the city's people against them. He reminded the Basrans that their bay‘a to ‘Ali was, at the same time, a bay‘a to God— a point he illustrated with an appropriate verse from the

Qur'an: "God's hand is over your hand. Then whosoever breaks his oath breaks it to his own hurt, and who fulfills his covenant made with God,

God will give him a mighty wage." (48:10) [Arberry] ‘Uthman went on to argue that ‘Ali would not have accepted the bay‘a if he had known of one more suited to the rule than he and that if the people had selected someone else, ‘Ali would have given that person his bay‘a and his obedience. Furthermore, Ibn Hunayf continued, Talha and az-Zubayr had never intended to honor the oaths that they had sworn to ‘Ali; therefore their assertion that they had been coerced should not be taken seriously. Ibn Hunayf concluded with a reminder to the Basrans 103 that in general the majority follow the right path and that in this case the majority had accepted the rule of ‘Ali. As soon as Ibn Hunayf finished his speech, Hukaym b. Jabala rose and swore to fight the Ahl al-Jamal— an act which he equated with seeking what was right (haqq).

Shortly after Talha, az-Zubayr, ‘À'isha, and their army reached

Basra, Ibn Hunayf sent ‘Imran b. al-Husayn and Abû ai-Aswad ad-Du'li to meet with them. The two envoys spoke first with Talha and then with az-Zubayr and questioned both about their contradictory behavior.

First Talha and az-Zubayr had attacked ‘Uthman; they had not consulted the Basrans, but had expected their support. Then the two had given the bay‘a to ‘Ali, Again, they had not talked with the Basrans but had expected that they too would support the caliphate of ‘Ali, Now Talha and az-Zubayr expected the Basrans to turn against ‘Ali, Neither Talha nor az-Zubayr offered much in the way of an explanation for their behavior. Then the two envoys turned their attention to ‘À'isha, who simply claimed that ‘Uthman had been killed unjustly and that his death 19 had to be avenged.

When ‘Ali was not far from Kùfa, he made camp and then dispatched

‘Ammâr b, Yasir and Muhammad b, Abi Bakr to Kûfa to ask its people for help, ‘Ammâr and Muhammad addressed the Kûfans, several of whom then went to Abu Müsà, the governor of the city, to ask his advice, Abu

Müsâ suggested that those who were only interested in things of "this world" should go to help ‘Ali, but those who aspired to the "next world" would be better off to stay in their houses. Later, Abû Mûsà spoke to many of the Kûfans assembled in the mosque. He urged them not 104

to become involved and cited a hadith from the Prophet about the evils of fitna;

During this fitna one who sleeps is better than one who is awake. One who sits is better than one who stands. One who stands is better than one who runs. One who runs is better than one whg^rides. Sheathe your swords until this fitna has ended.

‘Ammâr b. Yasir immediately responded to 's advice with

some appropriate verses from the Qur'an:

If two groups of Muslims fight each other, make peace between them. If one oppresses the other, fight the one that oppresses until it shifts back to God's order. And if it shifts back, make peace between them equitably, and be just. (49:9) Fight them until there is no fitna and the religion is God's entirely. (8:39) [Arberry]

He then asked the Kûfans to go with him and ‘Ali to Basra and there to decide for themselves who was right. None of the Kûfans was willing to go, however, so ‘Ammâr and Ibn Abi Bakr returned to ‘Ali. ‘Ali sent

‘Ammâr back to Küfa with al-Hasan and Qays b. Sa‘d and a note to the

Kûfan people. ‘Ali's note stressed several points: ‘Ali had been completely innocent of responsibility for ‘Uthman's death, Talha and az-Zubayr had not been. ‘All's bay‘a had been legitimate and Talha and az-Zubayr had been two of the first to swear loyalty to him, but they then had violated their oaths because they coveted the rule for themselves, and they had forced ‘À'isha to join them. Al-Hasan and

‘Ammâr stressed several of the points which ‘Ali had made in the note, and ‘Ammâr also reminded the Kûfans that ‘Ali was one of the earliest converts to Islam and one of the closest relatives of the Prophet. Qays b. Sa'd added that if there had been a shûrâ after ‘Uthmin's death, it 105 would have elected ‘Ali and it would then have been incumbent on the rest of the Umma to fight any who opposed the council's decision.

Since Talha and az-Zubayr had sworn loyalty to ‘Ali, their subsequent actions were unjustifiable. Many of the Küfans were this time swayed by the envoys' arguments and joined ‘Ali.^^

Meanwhile, the Ahl al-Jamal had entered Basra. ‘À'isha made a short speech in which she denounced those who had killed ‘Uthman and insisted on avenging his death. The Basrans were divided after her speech and their heated debates turned to fighting. Eventually calm was restored, but the Basrans remained split— some supported the Ahl al-Jamal and others ‘Ali and his governor, ‘Uthman b. Hunayf. The two sides agreed to a treaty that recognized ‘Uthman's control of the city

(the governor's quarters, the mosque, and the treasury) and guaranteed to both sides freedom of movement. A few days later, however, Talha, az-Zubayr, and Marwân attacked Ibn Hunayf, killed many of his guard, 22 and seized control of the Basra.

‘Ali reached the outskirts of Basra not long after Talha and az-Zubayr had taken control of the city, and both sides began preparations for battle. ‘Ali tried several times to avert the battle:

He wrote notes to Talha and az-Zubayr and to ‘À'isha in which he swore that l)he would not have accepted the bay‘a from the people if they had not wanted to give it to him; 2)Talha and az-Zubayr had been among those who had given him the bay‘a; 3)they had no choice now but to honor their oaths; 4)he was innocent in the affair of ‘Uthman. In addition, he reminded ‘À'isha of her special status, which she had 106 ignored by leaving her house, and he questioned the sincerity of her motives since she had before been opposed to ‘UthmSn, His notes had little impact on the three; each wrote back short replies that, in so many words, told ‘Ali that things had gone too far to turn back.^^

‘Ali met face-to-face with Talha and az-Zubayr before the battle started and again he defended his right to occupy the caliphate, the legitimacy of his succession to it, and his innocence in the death of

‘UthmSn. Talha made a rude reply to ‘Ali, but az-Zubayr was troubled by what ‘Ali had said. Shortly thereafter, ‘Ali mounted the Prophet's grey mule and rode out to meet with az-Zubayr. He reminded az-Zubayr that the Prophet had once predicted: "Oh az-Zubayr, you will fight ‘All 24 and treat him unfairly." Az-Zubayr remembered the Prophet's words, and promised ‘Ali that he would not fight. When ‘All returned to his camp, he told his troops that az-Zubayr would not fight and they were all relieved since az-Zubayr had been che only one they feared.

Meanwhile, az-Zubayr had returned to his camp, told ‘À'isha and his son

‘Abd Allah that he would not fight, and departed for Madina. (On the road, he met ‘Amr b. Jurrauz, who tricked az-Zubayr into disarming and 25 then treacherously killed him.) After his brief meeting with az-Zubayr, ‘Ali also spoke with Talha and tried, without success, to dissuade him too from fighting.

The battle began shortly after the meeting between ‘Ali and Talha.

‘Ali gave his banner to his son Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya and instructed him to advance against the Ahl al-Jamal,but for the first part of the battle, during which time his left and right flanks were being 107 defeated, ‘Ali himself was inactive.At the end of the seventh day of fighting, ‘Ali's forces finally succeeded in defeating the Ahl al-Jamal and in hamstringing ‘Â'isha's camel. When Talha realized that the battle was lost, he confessed his guilt in the affair of ‘Uthman ("Oh

God, we cheated in the affair of ‘Uthman and we treated him unjustly.

Punish us today for his sake until You are satisfied") and Marwân 28 struck him a fatal blow. Many of the Ahl al-Jamal were taken prisoner and ‘Ali released all of them so long as they gave him the bay‘a.

Towards ‘À'isha in particular, he showed mercy and courtesy and arranged for and provisioned a large escort to take her back to Madina.

The Bay‘a

From one standpoint, the Kitâb al-Imâma's account of the Battle of the Camel is an account of the bay‘a from the perspectives of different individuals and groups. The narrative continually returns to the subject of the bay‘a; it is an element central to the account's focus on the legitimacy of ‘Ali's caliphate, and a major factor in the motivations of those who supported ‘Ali against the Ahl al-Jamal.

Indeed, if a distinction can be made, the account stresses that Talha and az-Zubayr's sin was not so much their opposition to ‘Ali per se but 29 their violation of their sacred oaths. It is true that the description of the event of the bay‘a mentions that Talha resisted 108 giving ‘ Ali the oath and that Malik al-Ashtar forced Talha to go to

‘Ali and swear loyalty to him (see above, page 96). However, against this point must be weighed several others: After he had received the bay‘a from Talha, ‘Ali went to the mosque, where many of the Madinans had assembled. There, Talha was the first to climb into the and publicly give ‘Ali an oath of allegiance, with the accompanying hand-shake. Az-Zubayr, Sa‘d b. Abi Waqqâs and other Associates followed Talha in swearing allegiance to ‘Ali.

Later, when Talha and az-Zubayr were in Makka trying to get support, Marwân suggested to them that they could also receive a bay‘a from the people and by this means oppose ‘Ali. Talha and az-Zubayr rejected the suggestion since "the people" had already given allegiance to ‘Ali. When that had happened, the two men remarked, they had made no objection and now they could not nullify the bay‘a.^^

Shortly after he arrived in Basra, Talha had a interesting conversation with one of the ashrâf of Basra. The man confronted Talha with a note that he had sent to the Basrans. In the note, Talha had written that after ‘Uthman's death ‘Ali had offered to give the bay‘a to either Talha or az-Zubayr because both were older. The two had refused ‘Ali's offer and had insisted on giving him the bay‘a because of his kinship (qarâba) [with Muhammad] and his early conversion

(sabiqa) to Islam. Talha explained to the sharif, somewhat lamely, that neither he nor az-Zubayr had considered ‘Ali to be sincere in his offer of the bay‘a and that both had sworn loyalty to ‘Ali because they knew that neither the Muhàjirûn nor the Ansar would have been willing to 109 accept the caliphate of either of them. He and az-Zubayr had therefore sworn loyalty to ‘Ali out of fear for their own lives if they refused.^ j 31

Thus, Talha and az-Zubayr themselves admitted in several places in the account that they had pledged loyalty to ‘Ali. In addition, the account consistently and frequently upholds the legitimacy of ‘Ali's election and rule and, with equal consistency, emphasizes the treachery of the motives and actions of Talha and az-Zubayr. While they were in

Makka, Talha and az-Zubayr asked ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Umar to support their attempt to restore order by letting a council (shürâ) decide the caliphate. Ibn ‘Umar refused any support. He reminded them that there had been a council (i.e., the one his father had convened) and that it • 32 had preferred ‘Ali to either of them. On the verge of their departure for Basra, the two had a brief conversation with ‘Abd Allah b. Khalaf who was very critical of them for violating their own oaths and for opposing the legitimacy of ‘Ali's rule, which had general support. In addition, Ibn Khalf expressed extreme suspicion about the sincerity of their desire to avenge ‘Uthman's death since they had been two of the caliph's most virulent critics.

Sa'id b. al-Âs and al-Mughira b. Shu‘ba also connected Talha and az-Zubayr with ‘ Uthman's death when they met the Ahl al-Jamal on the road to Basra. Sa‘id and al-MughIra talked first with ‘À'isha, then with Marwân b. al-Hakam and finally addressed the army. Each time they stressed the same thing; Talha and az-Zubayr had been among those who killed ‘Uthman and they were now seeking power for themselves. 110

Therefore, for those who wanted to avenge the caliph's death, it made no sense to go to Basra. Sa'id and al-Mughira warned the army against two fitnas in one year and urged them to take ‘À'isha back to the

Hijaz.^^

Discussion of the account's treatment of the bay'a has thus far focused on conversations in which Talha and az-Zubayr were involved.

In situations that did not involve these two, the account also stresses the legitimacy of 'Ali's caliphate and the treachery of Talha and az-Zubayr.

When 'Uthman b. Hunayf, 'Ali's governor of Basra, learned that the

Ahl al-Jamal were approaching his city, he urged the Basrans to oppose

Talha and az-Zubayr and to support 'Ali. The thrust of his argument, it will be recalled, was that 'Ali had received the bay'a and was therefore the legitimate ruler. Consequently, obedience to him was, as such, obedience to God since the bay'a was sworn in God's name (see above, page 102). Talha and az-Zubayr had behaved treacherously from the first since they had not intended to honor the oaths they had 34 sworn.

'Ali made a similar point in the note he sent to the Kûfans; Those who swore loyalty to him as caliph were under no duress. Talha and az-Zubayr had been the first to give him the bay'a, which was governed by the same conditions as the oaths they had sworn to the first three caliphs. Later, 'Ali had permitted the two men to make the 'umra, but in Makka they had broken their oaths and prepared for war.^^ 'Ammâr b.

Yasir also told the Kûfans that Talha and az-Zubayr had been the first Ill to swear loyalty to ‘Ali; but they had violated their oaths when ‘All had not met their expectations by giving them appointments.

Finally, at the end of the account, 'All was asked how he could fight two men after he had made the Hijra with them and the Prophet and had served with them in the shûrâ. ‘Ali replied that he was justified in fighting them because they had not lived up to the oaths which they had made. He added that Abû Bakr or ‘Umar would have done the same as he had.^^

The subject of the bay‘a is thus treated in the same manner from the beginning to the end of the account. At no point is there any indication that ‘Ali's accession was other than legitimate, or that

Talha and az-Zubayr's claims had any foundation in truth. Relative to many of the other accounts of the battle, one of the interesting features of Pseudo-Ibn Qutayba's is not just the frequency with which

it stresses the legitimacy of the bay‘a and of ‘Ali's rule and the treachery of Talha and az-Zubayr, but also the ways in which it does so.

First, there is a kind of narrative consistency in the account that supports ‘Ali, but not Talha and az-Zubayr. The way in which ‘Ali or one of his supporters describes an event closely resembles the way in which the author of the work narrates that event. ‘Ali and 'Ammâr, for example, maintained that Talha and az-Zubayr had been among the first to give the bay'a. In the description of the bay'a, the two are in fact described as among the first to swear loyalty. Similarly,

‘Ammâr explained (to the Küfans) that Talha and az-Zubayr violated 112 their oaths after they realized that ‘Ali was not going to appoint them as governors. In an earlier passage the two men did tell ‘Ali that their oaths had been contingent on ‘All's "sharing" the rule with 37 them.

This consistency extends beyond the account of the Battle of the

Camel. Shortly after his father received the bay‘a, al-Hasan became concerned that ‘Ali would be implicated in ‘Uthmin's death. ‘Ali dismissed his son's fears and pointed out that he had sent al-Hasan and al-Husayn to guard ‘Uthmin's when the caliph was besieged. The earlier narrative of the death of the caliph contains just such a 38 description. In contrast, little of what Talha and az-Zubayr say finds support elsewhere in the account. Their assertion, for example, that ‘Ali was partly responsible for ‘Uthmin's death is not borne out by the earlier description of that event.

Second, this narrative consistency is also apparent in another sense in conversations between Talha and az-Zubayr and their opponents. Several of these conversations are in the form of debates; those who support ‘Ali ask Talha and az-Zubayr a series of questions by means of which they disclose the self-serving motives beneath the two men's pretenses. Two examples from the account will illustrate this feature. The first, to which an allusion has already been made, occurs shortly after the Ahl al-Jamal have arrived in Basra. One of the ashrâf of Basra confronts Talha with a note he had earlier written to the

Basrans inciting them against ‘Uthman. The second, between ‘Ali and

Talha, occurs immediately before the start of the battle. 113

One of the ashraf of Basra came to them [Talha and az-Zubayr] with a note that Talha had written in which he incited the Basrans to kill ‘Uthmân. He said to Talha: "Do you recognize this note?"

Talha said: "Yes."

The sharif said: "What has changed your mind? Yesterday you wrote to us inciting us to kill ‘Uthmân, and today you call on us to avenge his death. [In the note] You also asserted that 'All offered the bay*a to one of you two because of your greater age; but you refused and put him forward because of his kinship with Muhammad and his early conversion. And you both gave him the bay*a. How can you violate your oaths after what he offered to you?"

Talha said: "He offered us the bay* a after he had usurped it and the people had sworn allegiance to him. We knew when he offered to us [the rule] that he was not sincere. If he had been, the Muhâjirûn and the Ansar would have refused and we were afraid that if we refused his bay ^a, we would be killed; so we unwillingly gave him our oaths."

The sharif said: "And what of your opinion of ‘Uthmân?"

Talha said: "We mentioned our criticism of him and our forsaking him. We can find no expiation for that except by avenging his death."

The sharif said: "What do you want us to do?"

Talha said: "Give us two the bay*a for the sake of fighting *Ali and invalidating his bay*a."

He said: "What would be your opinion be if someone came to us after you and called on us to do what you just suggested? What should we do?"

Both said: "Do not give him the bay*at"

The sharif said; "You aren't being fair. Aren't you ordering me to fight *Ali and invalidate his bay*a while it binds you, but forbidding me from from giving allegiance to one who has not given allegiance to you? We have given *Ali the bay* a; but if you like, we will give the two of you the bay*a with^gur left hands."[i.e. a false or non-binding oath?] 114

**********

‘Ali said: "Oh Abu Muhammad [i.e^Talha], what brought you here?"

Talha said: "I am seeking vengeance for ‘Uthmân."

‘All said: "God curse those who killed ‘Uthmân."

Talha said: "Then free the way between us and those who killed ‘Uthman. Don't you know that the Messenger of God said; 'killing a Muslim is permitted in only four cases: [when one commits] Idolatry, curses God, apostatizes from Islam or when one Muslim intentionally kills another Muslim. Do you know if ‘Uthmân did any of those things?"

*Ali said: "No."

Talha said: "You ordered his death."

‘Ali said: "By God, no."

Talha said: "Withdraw from this affair [i.e. the caliphate] and put the matter before a council of Muslims. If they are satisfied with you, I will accept their decision [lit. enter into what the people do]. But if they accept someone else, I am one of the Muslims" [i.ew bound by their decision],

‘Ali said: "Didn't you already give me the bay‘a , Abu Muhammad, willingly and without force? Why should I foreswear my oath?"

Talha said: "I gave you the bay‘a while a sword was held over me."

‘Ali said: "Don't you know that I did not force anyone to give me the oath? If I had forced anyone, I would have forced Sa‘d [b. Abi Waqqâs], [‘Abd Allah] Ibn ‘Umar, and Muhammad b. Maslama. They refused to give me the bay‘a and withdrew, and I left them alone."

Talha said: "There were six of us in the shürâ. Two have died [i.e. ‘Uthmân and ‘Abd ar-RahmSn b. ‘Auf] and three of us [who remain] are opposed to you" [i.e. Talha, az-Zubayr and Sa‘d].

‘Ali said: "You two only had the right to object before there was agreement and before the bay‘a. As for now, the two of you have no choice but to consent to it unless you can point to some innovation (hadath) on the 115

basis of which I received the bay* a. If I was guilty of an innovation, tell me about it. You [however] took your mother 'Â'isha [from her home] and left your own wives behind. That was a grave innovation on your part. Would it please the Messenger of God that you destroyed the protection he had placed around her and took her from it (an tahtikû sitran darabahu * alayhâ wa tukhrijûhâ minhà)?”

Talha said; "We only brought her in order to restore order."

'Ali said: "By the life of God, she is in greater need of someone who will put her affair in order. Oh shaykh, accept sound advice: Be content with jgpentance accompanied by shame rather than shame and Hell."

In the form in which these conversations are cast, none of what

Talha says rings true. In the first he is unable to gain the support of the Basran because he cannot provide a convincing explanation for his vacillating behavior. In the second, Talha cannot demonstrate any weakness in 'Ali's position, and with each attempt he makes to do so he lays himself open to a charge against which he has no defense. In both passages what is evident is Talha's inability (and by implication az-Zubayr's) to justify rationally his actions and his motives.

Indeed, the passages imply that because he is morally or religiously wrong, by virtue of his perjury and other acts, he is also rationally wrong. He cannot justify what he has done because those acts are rationally unjustifiable. In contrast, 'Ali and those who support him can show themselves to be rationally right because they are morally and 41 religiously right.

Finally, the author also frequently adduces authoritative

"texts"— Qur'an and hadith from the Prophet— in support of 'Ali, but not of Talha and az-Zubayr. 'Uthmân b. Hunayf recited to the Basrans, 116

"Those who swear fealty to thee swear fealty in truth to God, God's hand is over their hand. . . . " (48:10) to remind them that their bay'a to ‘Ali was at the same time a bay‘a to God and, thereby to encourage them not to support the Ahl al-Jamal (see above, page 102). When Abu

Musi had urged the Kûfans not to become involved in what he believed to be a fitna, and had supported his advice with a hadith from Muhammad,

‘Ammlr b. Ylsir replied with an appropriate verse from the Qur'an; "If two groups of Muslims fight each other, make peace between them. If one oppresses the other, fight the one that oppresses until it shifts 42 back to God's order. . . ." (49:9 [Arberry]; see above, page 104).

The hadith that describe the Prophet's prediction about the barking dogs of al-Haw'ab and az-Zubayr's fighting ‘All also help to show that

‘Â'isha and az-Zubayr were wrong (see above pages 102 and 105).^^ To a similar effect, Muhammad b, Abi Bakr asks ‘A'isha after the battle if she did not remember the Prophet saying "‘Ali is associated with the _ 44 truth (al-haqq) and the truth is associated with Ali."

The Portrayal of Characters

The account's emphasis on and consistent treatment of the bay‘a significantly shapes the way it presents the major characters involved in the conflict. Talha and az-Zubayr, for example, are severely criticized for taking ‘Â'isha with them. As one of Muhammad's wives

(and, according to some, his favorite one) she occupied a special place 117 in the community after his death. On Muhammad's orders her movements were subject to restrictions, and her involvement in the battle fell well outside those restrictions. In the account, some Muslims who were opposed to Talha and az-Zubayr were as critical of them for bringing

‘Â'isha into the affair as they were for the two men's violation of - 45 their oaths to Ali.

Talha and az-Zubayr's treachery, which the material on the bay‘a establishes, is also evident in their failure to honor the treaty they made with ‘Uthmân b. Hunayf. A few days after they agreed to this treaty, Talha and az-Zubayr, accompanied by Marwin, attacked Ibn

Hunayf, subjected him to humiliating abuse (Marwàn plucked all the hair from his head), killed many of his guard, and evicted him from the city.46

In contrast to the bulk of the account, which is critical of

Talha, az-Zubayr, and ‘Â'isha and largely blames them for the fitna, there are a few passages that at least partly exonerate them. The episode at al-Haw'ab establishes (by means of a hadith from the

Prophet) that ‘Â'isha should not have been there (see above, page 102).

Yet because she only agreed to continue after she was told untruthfully that the place was not al-Haw'ab, her participation in events in Basra and in the battle stemmed from the deception played on her. She would not, presumably, have continued if ‘Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr and others had not lied to her. In a similar manner, az-Zubayr quits the battle as soon as ‘Ali reminds him of the Prophet's prediction (see above, page 105). Here the implication is that az-Zubayr never would have 118 opposed ‘All's caliphate if he himself had remembered the Prophet's prediction. The exoneration of both is admittedly somewhat tenuous, and perhaps the passages that accomplish it function primarily to support ‘All in the conflict. At least, however, these particular portions of the account show that az-Zubayr and ‘Â'isha respected the memory of the Prophet and would not knowingly act contrary to his wishes.

The author of the account does not show the same kind of concern for Talha as he does for ‘Â'isha and az-Zubayr, Talha remains intransigent. Only when he sees that defeat is inevitable does he suddenly confess to God that he (and others) had "cheated in the affair of ‘uthmân," and he asks God to "take from us today for his [‘Uthman's] sake until you are satisfied" (Inna kunna gad dâhannâ fi amri ‘Uthmân 47 wa zalamnahu. Fakhudh lahu al-yawm minnâ hattâ tarda).

It is more difficult to characterize the account's presentation of

‘Ali. It is possible to discern two different, though complementary, levels of portrayal. The one focuses primarily on the legitimacy of

‘Ali's succession and his caliphate. The other focuses on several qualities or traits that qualified ‘Ali to rule.

l)As has already been noted, the author stresses time after time that ‘Ali had received the bay‘a from the majority of the people and that all had given it voluntarily, that is, under no duress.

Furthermore, the author mentions that ‘Ali was initially unwilling to accept the rule until those who had fought at Badr and those who had served in the shürâ offered it to him. In this regard, several of his 119 supporters later pointed out that ‘All would not have accepted the bay* a if he had known of one more qualified to rule, nor would he have desired the rule if the people had chosen someone else. These supporters also argued that if a council had met, its members would have undoubtedly chosen *Ali.

Other material in the account supports this positive presentation. After he arrived in Basra, ‘Ali went out of his way to avoid battle; In order to try to dissuade them from conflict, ‘Ali met with Talha and az-Zubayr and sent them notes. Then, once the two armies faced each other on the field of battle, he forbade his men to shoot any arrows until after the Ahl al-Jamal had killed several of his troops. Even after battle was joined, ‘Ali at first took little 48 interest in its course.

As victor, ‘Ali was merciful with the vanquished Basrans. He forbade his men to kill the leaders of the other side, either those taken prisoner or the wounded, and he permitted as booty only what remained on the field of battle. When some of his men protested his orders not to take women and children prisoner, he pointedly suggested that they cast lots to see who would get ‘Â ' i s h a . Furthermore, he pardoned all those who had fought against him so long as they gave him the bay‘a. ‘Ali was especially grief-stricken when he learned that

Talha had been killed and took his son, Müsâ b, Talha, under his wing.

Finally, ‘Ali treated ‘Â'isha with all the respect due her. He settled her comfortably in Basra and provisioned a large caravan with an escort to take her back to the Hijâz.^^ 120

2) The first level, then, stresses the legality of 'All's bay'a and thus the legitimacy of his rule in terms of such concepts as ijtimS' (agreement) and mashwara (consultation). The second level focuses on 'Ali's close kinship with the Prophet (garâba), 'Ali's early conversion (slbiga), and more implicitly, his knowledge (' ilm). That is, the second level maintains that 'Ali's caliphate not only had procedural legitimacy but also was enhanced by his piety and knowledge and his kinship with the Prophet.

In a number of places in the account, 'Ali or his supporters draw attention to the particular qualifications that 'Ali brought to the rule. 'Ali himself stresses these qualifications in a letter to his brother 'Aqil. ('Aqil had written to 'All to inform him that forty of the Banû Umayya who were sons of the tulaqa' had gone to Mu'âwiya and that Talha and az-Zubayr had broken their oaths to 'Ali.)

Surely the Quraysh have agreed on fighting your brother [i.e.,'Ali] as in the past they banded together against the Messenger of God ( s^). They are ignorant of my right (haqq) and deny my merit"(fadl). They make war against"me and strive to extinguish God's light. Oh God, punish the Quraysh on my behalf for their actions; they severed the bonds of my kinship and aided against me. They deprived me of the authority () of my cousin [lit. son of my uncle, i.e., Muhammad] and gave it [i.e. the caliphate] to one who is not of my family. My right (haqq) is vested in Islam and in my early conversion, qualifications that no other claimant (mudda‘i)can make, except by claiming something with which I am nor acquainted and with which I do not think God is acquainted (much praise to him for that).. . . I am in the right (muhiqq) and God is with those in the right. How insignificant is death in the face of truth (haqq). The best of everything is after death for one who is ggdowed with reason and who proclaims what is true (haqq).

Similarly, 'Ali stresses his closeness to God and the Prophet, his 121 early conversion, and his defense of the Prophet, in a short 52 conversation he has with Talha and az-Zubayr,

Others than *Ali stress his particular qualifications to rule.

When a large force of the joins *Ali, one of its shaykhs explains to *Ali why the tribe gave its support so willingly:

Even if you had come to us at the head of apeople who had not given you the bay‘a, we would still help you because of your kinship (qarâba) with the Messenger of God (s) and your pious behavior (ayylmuka saliha ). Surely if tHe good that is said of you is true trien in your affair with the Quraysh an astonishing thing [i.e., how can they oppose you?]

In the same vein, Abu Müsâ, when he agreed to ask the Kûfans for help, reminded them of ‘Ali's early conversion to Islam and his kinship with 54 the Prophet. Finally, Muhammad b. Abi Bakr reminded his sister after the battle that the Prophet had once remarked that "‘Ali is associated with what is right and what is right is associated with ‘All" (‘Ali ma‘a al-haqq wa al-haqq ma‘a ‘Ali)

These two levels— the one that stresses the legitimacy of ‘Ali's succession and thus of his caliphate and the other that emphasizes his kinship with the Prophet, his early conversion, and the excellence of his character— are intermingled. Many of those characters in the account who mention the popularity of ‘Ali's bay‘a also stress his early conversion or his kinship with Muhammad. Yet the second level, which focuses on ‘Ali's early conversion, his kinship with the Prophet, and so forth, is subordinate to the first. That is, the author of the account emphasizes primarily the legitimacy of ‘Ali's succession and secondarily the particular qualities and qualifications that ‘Ali 122 brought to the "office." What makes *Ali's rule legitimate, in other words, is the bay'a that Muslims had sworn to him. ‘Ali's personal qualities and his genealogy are important, to be sure, and they may make him the most qualified to rule, as ‘Ali himself suggests in his letter to ‘Aqil. But what legitimizes his rule is the bay‘a, not his piety or kinship with the Prophet. Indeed, ‘Ali is made to stress these distinctions at one point in the account. After he had defeated the

Ahl al-Jamal, ‘Ali had a short conversation with Ibn al-KawwS'. The latter asked ‘Ali how he felt when he saw the community splitting and found himself fighting against Talha and az-Zubayr (see above, p. Ill):

"Did you think that you were the most entitled of them to this rule because of your kinship (qarâba) with the Messenger of God (£)? If that was the opinion you held, we agree with with you. If there was a covenant (‘ahd) that the Messenger of God (s) entrusted to you, you are trustworthy, reliable For the Messenger of God in what you transmit on his authority."

‘Ali said: "I was the first who believed him, but I will not be the first to lie about him. As for whether I have a covenant from the Messenger of God ( s^), by God, I do not. But when the people killed ‘Uthmân, I'considered my own affair: The two caliphs who took the rule from the Messenger of God had died and neither of them had a covenant (‘ahd). The caliph who took over the rule as a result of consultation of the Muslims had been killed and loyalty to him ended when he was killed (lit. his rope went from my neck) and he did not have a covenant."

Ibn Kawwl' said: "You have told the truth and been honest. But what of Talha and az-Zubayr. How could you make it legal to fight them after they made the hijra with you and the Messenger of God and after they were with you in the shürâ of ‘Umar b. al-Khattab?"

‘Ali said: "They gave me the bay‘a in the Hijiz and broke [their oath of] loyalty to me i n ‘Iraq. I fought them because of their disobedience. If they had done that with 123

Abu Bakr or ‘Umar, both those rulers would have fought them."

The whole tone of of this conversation puts ‘Ali on an equal footing with the first three caliphs. He specifically rejects the suggestion that he had a covenant from the Prophet and at least implies that his rule is not different from that of the first three caliphs.

The ways in which pseudo-Ibn Qutayba's account describes ‘Ali are in keeping with what Hodgson has terms ‘Alid loyalism— a deeply felt respect for ‘Ali and his descendants, in recognition of their rank or status as Ahl al-Bayt. ' ‘Alid loyalists venerated ‘Ali for his piety and wisdom, for his bravery, and for his early conversion and unflagging support of the Prophet, and they believed that ‘All and his descendants had inherited some of the Prophet's knowledge. Yet, inasmuch as the basis of the veneration was kinship with the Prophet,

‘Alid loyalism was not limited to ‘Ali and his immediate relatives, the

Banû Talib, but could include all of the Banü Hâshim. With this point in mind,, it is possible that the ways in which pseudo-Ibn Qutayba's account describes ‘Ali could also reflect a kind of pro-‘Abbasid _ 58 loyalty.

A central doctrine of ‘Abbâsid legitimizing claims was that only the Ahl al-Bayt could be legitimate rulers— a distinction that they insisted included the descendants of Hâshim. Pro-‘Abbâsid authors would obviously focus on descent from ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Abbas; but they could not easily extol the virtues and qualifications of these descendants without implicitly doing the same for the offspring of Abu Tâlib since 59 the very basis of their claim was membership in the Ahl al-Bayt. 124

Consequently, a pro-'Abbâsid historian writing about the the Battle of the Camel might understandably stress the significance of 'All's kinship with Muhammad since the same principle lay at the heart of

'Abbâsid claims to legitimacy. At the same time, this historian would not support the idea that there had been a special covenant between the

Prophet and 'All.

The suggestion of a pro-'Abbâsid alignment accords with the way in which the author of the account treats some of the BanO Umayya. Notice, for example, that 'Aqil, in his letter to 'Ali, refers (perhaps unnecessarily) to some of the Banû Umayya who joined Mu'âwiya as abnâ* tulaqâ*. Similarly, Marwân b. al-Hakam shares with Talha and az-Zubayr the ignominy of the violation of the treaty they had made with Ibn

Hunayf. It is also Marwân who treats Ibn Hunayf so harshly and who treacherously kills Talha at the end of the battle.

As has been pointed out by many scholars, 'Abbâsid propaganda emphasized the essential justice of the 'Abbâsid cause and the injustice of Umayyad rule. Moshe Sharon, in a recent study of 'Abbâsid propoganda, for example, suggests that some 'Abbâsid propogandists drew parallels between the rise of the Banû 'Abbas and the "biography"

(sira) of the Prophet.

Just as the Prophet had appeared with the idea of Islam, presenting it as the renewal of the religion of Abraham, and had fought for it against the unbelieving Makkans led by Abu Sufyan, the leader of the Umayyads, so did the 'Abbasids appear as the fighters for the renewal of the Islam of the Prophet against the successors of Abu Sufyan, the Umayyad caliphs. . . The Umayyads represented 125

the jawr and the zulm— the injustice and oppression; the *Abbâsid Caliphate represented the rule of ^gdl and haqq— the justice and uprightness of Islam.

Needless to say, a harsh treatment of individuals of the Banû Umayya

could be understood to be a denigration of Umayyad rule in the same

manner that a favorable treatment of ‘Ali could support the ‘Abbasids.

The author's focus on the bay‘a would also serve ‘Abbâsid

interests. By stressing the procedural correctness of the bay‘a and

the untenable claims of Talha and az-Zubayr, the account advocates the

importance of giving allegiance to the ruler who has received the bay‘a

and of fighting those who oppose him. The second and third decades of

the third/ninth century witnessed the beginning of the disintegration

of caliphal power. In the context of these conditions, the need to

assert the legitimacy of the caliph's rule, and the importance of

paying allegiance to him, must haye seemed especially acute.

Finally, the emphasis on the procedural correctness of the bay‘a

may also help to explain the relative lack of attention paid in the

account to ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Abbas. In some other accounts of the battle

and more generally in pro-‘Abbasid works, he figures far more

prominently. There he is portrayed as an invaluable advisor to ‘Ali

and is praised for his religious knowledge and political

perspicacity. Yet it is important to note, as other scholars have

done, that there was not a uniform pro-‘Abbâsid historiographical

tradition.Pseudo-Ibn Qutayba's account need not be seen as less

pro-‘Abbâsid because of the absence of passages that deal with Ibn

‘Abbas. On the contrary, the passages that stress, by implication, the 126 qualifications of the Ahl al-Bayt, and others that emphasize the procedural correctness of the bay*a, and the importance of giving allegiance to the properly designated ruler effectively support

‘Abbâsid legitimizing claims. NOTES

CHAPTER V

^Ibn Qutayba [pseud.]^Kitâb al-Imâma wa as-Siyâsa# 2 vols. (Cairo: Mustafâ Bâbi al-Halabi, 1969).

^Atoad Zaki 'Adwâ, "Introduction," to *Uyûn al-Akhbâr by Ibn Qutayba (Cairo: Dir al-Kutub Press, 1930), vol. 4, p. 37; and Huseini, Ibn Qutayba, pp. 55 and 56, summarize the arguments concerning Ibn Qutayba's authorship. See also Lecomte "Ibn Kutayba," p. 845.

^Ibn Qutayba, 'Uyün al-Akhbâr, vol.l, pp. 13 and 186, vol. 2, p. 59, vol. 3, p. 48; Pseudo-Ibn Qutayba, Kitâb al-Imâma, vol. 1, p. 159. 4 Ibid., vol. 1 pp. 46-47. All subsequent references to the Kitâb al-Imâma are to volume one, unless otherwise noted.

^Ibid., p. 48.

^Ibid., p. 49.

^Ibid., p. 49.

^Ibid., p. 50. Notice that at this point, 'Ali sees Mu'âwiya, not Talha and az-Zubayr, as the chief threat to his rule.

^Ibid., p. 51.

^^Ibid., p. 53. It would appear that 'Abd Allah b. 'Umar went to Makka after he refused 'Ali his support.

^^Por the sake of clarity, this summary reorganizes some of the material in the account. The author first mentions the departure of Talha, az-Zubayr, and 'Â'isha from Makka early in the account (p. 52) and then later gives a much more detailed description of theirplanning in Makka before they left for Basra, pp. 59-64.

12 — The leaders were Ka'b b. Sûr, over the Yemenis; al-Mundhir b. Rabi'a, over the Rabx'a; and al-Ahnaf b. Qays, over the , p. 60.

^^Ibid., pp. 54-56.

127 128

14 Ibid., pp. 57-58. In another version, while he is still in Madina, *Ali learns from a letter frcxn Qutham b. al-'Abb5s that Talha, az-Zubayr, and *Â'isha had gone. As a consequence, he elects to go to Kûfa to get support and then to go to Basra. 'Ali shares the news with some of his Madinan supporters and what upsets them the most is that 'Â'isha is with the two men, p. 62.

^^Ibid., p. 63.

^^YiqQt, Mu'1am al-Buldan, vol. 2, p. 314. 17 Pseudo-Ibn Qutayba, Kitab al-Imâma, p. 63. The author "interrupts" to point out that Ibn az-Zubayr's lie was supposedly "the first false testimony in Islam."

Ibid., pp. 63-64. Recall that Hukaym was reportedly one of the killers of the caliph 'Uthmân. 19 Ibid., pp. 64-65. As these conversations are occurring, a young ghulam from the tribe of Jahina asked Muhammad b. Talha about the killing of 'Uthmân. Ibn Talha told him that three were responsible for the shedding of 'Uthman's blood: 'Â'isha, Talha, and 'Ali.

Ibid., p. 6 6 . This hadith, in various forms, appears in several of the accounts of the Battle of the Camel and in many of the standard collections of hadith. See for example, Muslim, Sabib Muslim bi sharh an-Nawawl, 18 vois (Cairo: n.p., 1930), "KitSb al-Fitan," badith no. 7, vol. 18, p. 8 ; al-Bukhârî, Sahib al-Bukhârî, "Kitâb al-Fitan," bib no. 8 (bâb takûn fitna al-ql'id fîhâ etc.); vol. 9, p. 64; Abu Dâwüd, Sunan, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dàr Ihyâ' as-Sunna at-Tabawiyya, nd), badith numbers 4256 and 4259. 21 Ibid., pp. 65-67.

^^Ibid., pp. 69-70.

23lbid., p. 71. 24 Ibid., p. 72. 25 Ibid., p. 73. The author interrupts his narrative of events to relate the story of az-Zubayr's death. In the Kitâb al-Imâma, az-Zubayr's killer is identified as 'Amr b. Jurmûz, while in some accounts he is identified as ‘Umayr b. Jurmûz.

^^Ibid., p. 74.

Curiously, the author describes 'Ali as dozing (yakhfiqu 129 nu*âsan) while his flanks were being defeated, ibid., p. 76, 28 Ibid., p. 77. 29 See above, p. 17; and Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, p. 46:

The seriousness of oaths is shown most dramatically by the shock and horror with which the medieval Islamic historians discuss those occasions when men openly perjured themselves. . . . few of the acts described in the chronicles of our period could so arouse the moral outrage of the Near Eastern Chroniclers as could acts of perjury. 30. Pseudo-Ibn Qutayba, Kitâb al-Imâma, p. 59. 31 Ibid., p. 6 8 . 32. Ibid., p. 61. 33, Ibid., p. 63. 34, Ibid., p. 63. 35, Ibid., p. 67. 36. Ibid., p. 79. 37, Ibid., p. 51. 38, Ibid., p. 44. 39, Ibid., p. 69. 40^ Ibid., PP . 74 Waqqâs had not given him the bay*a whereas at the beginning of the account Sa'd is mentionedas one who did swear loyalty to ‘Ali but was unwilling to fight on ‘Ali's side. 41 The form in which the author "quotes" these debates may resemble a kind of dialectics— jadal or kalâm in Arabic. The dialectical method was especially prevalent in the study of law, and the presence of a kind of dialectical approach in this account of the battle in conjunction with a definite interest in the bay‘a as a binding oath might indicate that the author of the Kitab al-Imama had a legal education. On the use of kalâm in the study of law, see especially G. Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981). On its use in early theological debates see Josef van Ess, "Early Development of Kalâm," Studies on the First Century of Islam, ed. G.H.A. Juynboll, 130

Papers on Islamic History, vol. 5 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), pp. 109-25; and "The Beginning of Islamic Theology," The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning, ed. J.E. Murdoch and E.D. Sylla (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Co., 1982), pp. 87-111. 42 Pseudo-Ibn Qutayba, Kitâb al-Imâma, p. 6 6 . 43 Ibid., pp. 63 and 75. 44 Ibid., p. 78. Haqq can be a difficult word to translate. Its original meaning in Arabic was "established fact," which could include the law. From that come secondary meanings of "truth" and "that which is right." Haqq is also one of the names of God. In the passage just quoted and in others below, haqq seems to mean both what is "right" and what is "true." See D.B. Macdonald [E.E. Calverley], s.v. "Hakk," E.I.3. 45 Pseudo-Ibn Qutayba, Kitâb al-Imàma, pp. 65 and 67. 46 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 47 Ibid., p. 77. Perhaps the author's apparently greater concern for az-Zubayr stems from az-Zubayr's being related on his mother's side to the Prophet. His mother Safiya was Muhammad's aunt. *Ali stresses this kinship when he returns to his troops after talking with az-Zubayr and tells them that he was talking with "az-Zubayr b. Safiya, the aunt of the Messenger of God." See az-Zubayri, Kit5b Nasab al-Quraysh, p. 20; and Ibn Qutayba, Kitâb al-Ma*arif,~p. 219.

^^This is where *Ali is described as drowsing off as the battle rages and as both the flanks of his army suffer defeat. Beyond indicating a kind of disinterest, the significance of his drowsing is not clear. 49 Pseudo-Ibn Qutayba, Kitâb al-Imâma, p. 78.

^^Interestingly, the author mentions that the escort *Ali sent consisted of women disguised as men. This detail about the escort could be construed as a sign of 'Ali's consideration for 'Â'isha's status. Perhaps it is also a veiled reminder of the "Affair of the Lie." The latter idea was suggested to me by Professor Cornell Fleischer.

^^Pseudo-Ibn Qutayba, Kitâb al-Imâma, pp. 55-56.

^^Ibid., p. 72.

^^Ibid., p. 58 131

^^Ibid., p. 67.

p. 78.

^®Ibid., p. 79. 57 Hodgson, Venture, p. 260.

There is an unavoidable measure of circularity in the following discussion. We do not know what a normative pro-^bbisid account would have been like, or even if such a thing existed, and we can only use the available texts to try to establish what could have been normative. 59 On the‘Abbâsid insistence that they were members of the "Ahl al-Bayt," see Moshe Sharon, Black Banners from the East, pp. 75-82. This work is the most recent and comprehensive study of the Shi'i origins of the'Abbâsid caliphate. See also Elton Daniel, "The Anonymous History of the Abbasid Family," International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 14, no. 4 (1982): 419-34. Both Daniel and Sharon's discussions are based primarily on the anonymous Akhbâr ad-Dawla al-‘Abbâsiyyah, wa-fihâ Akhbâr al-‘Abbâs wa Waladihi, ed. A.A. Dûri and A.J. Muttalibi (Beirut: 1971).

^^Sharon, Black Banners From the East, p. 187.

^^Abbâsid interests might also have been served by the description of al-Hasan's criticisms of 'Ali which he voiced after 'Ali had accepted the bay'a. Some'Abbâsid propogandists, in order to stress the superior qualifications of the offspring of 'Abd Allah b. 'Abbâs, emphasized al-Hasan's weakness, Sharon, Black Banners, p. 93. Notice also that at the start of the battle 'All specifically passes over al-Hasan and al-Husayn and gives his banner to his son Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya who was, of course, far more important to the'Abbâsids, Kitâb al-Imâma, p. 75.

^^Ibid., pp. 83 and 234-37; Daniel , "Anonymous History," pp. 426-27.

^^Ibid., p. 426. CHAPTER V I

M.-BAIÂDHURÎ (d. 279/892)

Atoad b. Yahyâ b. Jabir al-Balidhuri was born (in the early part of the ninth century) in Baghdad and died there, probably in the year

892/279. We know very little of his life.^ In his youth he traveled in the lands to the west of Baghdad and during that time probably studied with or at least heard the "lectures" of such historians as al-Mada'ini, Muhammad b. Sa'd, and Mus'ab az-Zubayri.^ He was associated with the ‘Abbâsid court in Baghdad and Sâmarrâ during the reigns of al-Mutawakkil (r. 847-61/ 232-47), al-Muntasir (r.

861-62/247-48), al-Musta‘in (r. 862-66/248-52), and al-Mu‘tazz (r.

866-69/252-55). His position at court, however, is not clear, and it may have changed from one caliph to the next. He is frequently referred to as the "boon companion" of al-Mutawakkil; and given the fact that his grandfather was a kâtib and that that profession tended to be hereditary, there is reason to suppose that al-Baladhuri too was 3 a kâtib. He apparently fell out of favor with the court after the reign of al-Mu‘tazz.

In the years after his death, al-Baladhuri was remembered as a poet, as a translator of Persian, and especially as the author of two

132 133 histories. One, the Futüh al-Buldân, dealt with the "raids" during

Muhammad's lifetime and with the and the conquests of Syria,

"Iraq, Persia, North Africa, South-East Africa, Spain, and Armenia in 4 the first century after Muhammad's death. There is some evidence that the Futuh al-Buldân as we have it is a short version of a longer work that al-Balàdhurî never completed.^ The Futuh resembles other works about the conquests such as al-Waqidi's Kitâb al-Maqhâzi and his Futüh ash-Shâm and Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam's Futuh al-Misr.^ Like them, the Futüh deals successively with the conquests of different regions rather than describing the conquests chronologically. In addition, al-Balâdhurï, like Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam and al-Wâqidi, prefaces much of his material with an isnad.

Al-Baladhuri's other work, the Ansab al-Ashraf (The Genealogy of 7 the Nobility), is anomalous: in its content, the Ansab resembles the histories of at-Tabari, pseudo-Ibn Qutayba, or al-Ya'qübi; but in its genealogical organization, it resembles such works as Ibn al-Kalbi's

Jamharat an-Nasab, az-Zubayri's Kitâb Nasab Quraysh, Ibn Hazam al-Andalusi's Jamharat Ansab al-^ab, and to a lesser degree Ibn Sa‘d's

Tabaqât.^ The first part of the work names the different Arab tribes descended from Isma‘il; the rest covers the history of the Ummah down to the reign of the ‘Abbâsid caliph Hârün ar-Rashid

(r. 786-809/170-193). The overall organization of the Ansab is conventional for genealogical works.^ Al-Baladhuri begins with the Banû

Hâshim; he deals first with Muhammad, describing his prophethood and his life; then come sections on the ‘Alids and the ‘Abbasids. 134

Relatively little space is devoted to the ‘Abbasids; of the 2400 pages in the Ansab, sixty-three (pp.526-589) deal with the family of al-‘Abbâs and eighty-eight (pp.590-678) with the first several ‘Abbasid caliphs. In contrast, more than nine hundred pages are devoted to the

Umayyads (vol.l, pp.698-1196; vol.2, pp.1-405).^^ The ‘Abd Shams, i.e., the Umayyads and others, follow the Banû Hâshim. The final parts of the work concern the other tribes of the Mudar.

The Ansab contains an unusual amount of historical narrative for genealogically organized work. Other "ansab" or "tabaqât" works certainly contain historical narrative; but they seem to use historical material to place a biographical entry in a context. In these works the historical narrative is rarely sustained and biographical entries are generally independent of each other. However, in al-Baladhuri's

Ansab, sustained historical narrative is the norm. Individuals who are mentioned are rarely discussed outside of this narrative.

Nevertheless, because of the genealogical organization, the overall work seems at times disjointed, since it does not always proceed chronologically; for example, the ‘Abbasids come before the Umayyads and the ‘Alids before either.

Al-Baladhuri organized his Ansab according to genealogical conventions— conventions that were established before his lifetime. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we may assume that he chose the genealogical scheme in preference to the annalistic or the regnal, both of which were utilized by some of his contemporaries who were also writing "universal histories." In light of this choice, we should be 135 prepared to look beyond some of the seeming limitations in order to • discover less apparent advantages.

In the first place, even though the work does not proceed chronologically , important events are usually described in the sections on the caliph during whose reign the event occurred. Thus, for example, the descriptions of the "counter-caliphate" of ‘Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr and the "revolt" of Mukhtâr are placed in the sections on the reigns of Yazid (r. 680-83/60-64) and ‘Abd al-Malik

(r.685-705/65-86), respectively, rather than in the sections on their tribes of the ‘Abd al-‘Uzz3 and the Thaqlf. Similarly, al-Baladhuri puts his description of the Battle of the Camel in his discussion of

‘Ali's caliphate.

The genealogical organization may also have overcome some of the limitations of an annalistic or regnal scheme. In the latter two it was difficult to connect events or elements that, although not chronologically contiguous were causally related. In the Ansab, the

"biography" of‘Uthmân, for example, which comes after that of Mu'âwiya, is followed immediately by the "biography" of Marwin (r.684-85/64-65) whose rise to power occurred several decades after the death of‘Uthmân

(d.35/656). By treating Mu'âwiya before ‘Uthmân, al-Balâdhuri can show in a graphic way the links between ‘ Uthmân and the Umayyads and the importance of ‘Uthman's rule and death in the Umayyad rise to power.

Furthermore, some of Marwân's activities during‘Uthmân’s caliphate may 12 have helped to pave the way for his rule thirty years later. In a similar manner, the juxtaposing of information on the ‘Abbasid family 136 before their rise to power with the section on the early ‘Abbâsid 13 caliphate might help to explain their political success. “ Finally, the period on which the majority of the Ansab focuses was the period of partisanship. The families or clans whose history the Ansab deals with were the partisan leaders who vied with each other for control of the

Umma. The genealogical organization of the Ansab highlighted this characteristic of the first century and a quarter of the Umma's history in ways that regnal or annalistic organizations could not.

In addition to its use of a genealogical organization, al-Balidhuri's Ansab can also be contrasted with contemporary histories in its use of the hadith format of composition (the account of the

Battle of the Camel consists of 117 hadith) and in its frequent provision of different versions of events or episodes. These two features, which at first seem to give a disjointed and confusing quality to his account of the battle, may in fact have facilitated the kind of interpretation which al-Balâdhuri sought to propose.

The Battle of the Camel

The following summary generally adheres to the order of al-Balâdhuri's account; where elements are mentioned out of order, they ^ . 14 are so noted. 137

Al-Balâdhuri's descriptions of the bay* a come at the beginning of his lengthy history of * All's caliphate.Compared with many of the other histories, al-BalAdhuri's treatment of the bay* a is quite exhaustive; most of the first thirty hadith deal primarily with it.

Some simply describe the bay*a's occurrence and mention the names of those, usually including Talha and az-Zubayr, who gave it.^^ In others

*AlI more or less invited people to give him the oath and they did.^^

In addition, several mention that *Ali was initially quite hesitant to accept the bay* a and did so only under significant pressure from the

Madinan populace.In two of these versions *Ali claimed that he was more qualified as an advisor (wazir) than as a caliph. When he finally agreed to accept the bay* a, he insisted that it be given in the main 19 mosque in order that the "ceremony" would be public.

Not all of the hadith about the bay* a, however, describe such an unopposed "election." One lengthy hadith describes several well-known

Companions who either refused to give the bay* a or did so only under duress.The beginning of the hadith mentions that the [common] people clamored to give the bay*a to *Ali, who was at first unwilling to accept it, but finally yielded to their pressure and accepted their oaths. After this occurred, Malik b. al-Ashtar escorted Talha to *Ali.

Talha pleaded that he was unwilling to give *Ali his bay* a until he had seen what the rest of the people would do, but al-Ashtar nevertheless forced him to give *Ali his oath. In a similar manner, Hukaym b.

Jabala forced the bay* a from az-Zubayr. Subsequently, Hukaym escorted several other companions to *Ali, but all of them successfully resisted 138 pressure to give the oath. ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Umar and Sa'd b. Abl Waqqas promised to give the bay‘a when all others had. Muhammad b. Maslama,

Wahb b. Sayf, and Usama b. Zayd claimed that they feared that there would be trouble between Muslims and they would be forced to be part of that trouble if they swore loyalty to *Ali. This hadith concludes with a warning frcan ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Umar to ‘Ali that he had taken control of 21 the Umma without consultation (mashwara).

All of the hadith discussed thus far are descriptions of the event of the bay‘a— they describe individuals in Madina giving ‘All the bay‘ a or refusing to do so. There are also in this first section several hadith that are discussions of the bay‘a, rather than descriptions of it. Two mention favorable comments made by the caliph ‘Umar 22 (r.534-44/13-23) on ‘Ali's qualifications to rule. Others focus on correspondence between ‘Ali and Mu‘âwiya, on ‘Ali's concerns about

Mu‘awiya's intentions, and on conversations ‘Ali had with al-Mughira b.

Shu‘ba and ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Abbas about Mu'awiya. In the correspondence,

‘Ali informed Mu‘awiya of the bay‘a and invited him to enter into loyalty. In his conversations with Ibn ‘Abbas and al-Mughira, ‘Ali voiced his concerns over Mu‘awiya's probable unwillingnees to support him.

At the time of'uthmân's death and ‘Ali's bay‘a, ‘Â'isha had been in Makka for the hajj. There she learned of the death of ‘Uthmin and of the designation of a new caliph, who she first believed to be Talha. On her way back to Madina, however, she learned that ‘Ali, not Talha, was the new caliph. This news displeased her and she returned to Makka and 139 defended 'Uthmân against his killers. In Madina, Talha and az-Zubayr asked * Ali's permission to make the^umra. Although "Ali suspected that they really intended to go to Syria or 'Iraq, he nevertheless permitted them to leave Madina. The two went directly to Makka and there claimed that they had been forced to give the bay"a to ®Alx.^^

The reports on activities in Makka vary. In one version, Talha, az-Zubayr, and "Â'isha met with "Abd Allah b. "Amir b. Kurayz, one of

"Uthman's cousins and the governor of Basra frcxn 649-555/29-35, and

Ya'ilk b. Munabbih, "lüthmân's governor of the Yemen, to consider their options. They rejected the idea of going to Madina and fighting "Ali there since they had no supporters in the city. For similar reasons they also rejected a suggestion that they go to Syria— Mu"iâwiya was its governor and had the people's loyalty; they would not, therefore, be able to control him or the Syrians. They eventually agreed on going to

Basra, where az-Zubayr had a group of supporters (shi"a). Both "Abd

Allah b. "Âmir and Ya"la b. Munabbih gave them money and mounts and the three departed from Madina, accompanied by nine hundred Makkans and

Madinans. Along the way they collected another twenty-one hundred followers.

According to another version, Talha and az-Zubayr first consulted with "Â'isha after they reached Makka.They told her that she could help restore peace to the Umma if she told the people that "lUthmàn had been unjustly killed and urged them to insist that the question of the rule be put before a council (shûrâ), which would be bound by the same conditions as "Umar had imposed on the first shûrâ. 140

Meanwhile several of the Banû Umayya (Sa®iid b. al-®Âs, Marwân b.

al-Hakam, ®Abd ar-Rahman b. ®iAttab b, Asîd b. Abu al-®Âs, and

al-Mughira b. Shu'ba) had arrived in Makka from Madina and they, with

Talha, az-Zubayr, and 'A'isha agreed on separating (firaq) from 'Ali

and seeking vengeance for 'lUthmhn. Al-Mughira and then 'Â'isha called

on the people to give their support. 'Â'isha in her speech repeated

almost verbatim Talha and az-Zubayr's argument to her.

spoke briefly after 'Â'isha and urged the people to remain obedient to

'Ali since they had given him the bay'a and since he was the most qualified to rule.

After these speeches Talha, az-Zubayr, and 'A'isha departed for

Basra with a following of nine hundred Makkans and Madinans which was augmented along the way by another twenty-one hundred. On the course of the journey, 'Â'isha heard dogs howling and learned from someone that they were passing the oasis of al-Haw'ab. The information upset her since, as she explained, Muhammad had once warned her against being the one at whom the dogs of al-Haw'ab barked. She insisted on being returned, but relented when Ibn az-Zubayr untruthfully swore that the person who had told her that the place was al-Haw'ab was lying and when fifty of the Banu 'Âmir "swore falsely" to the truth of Ibn az-Zubayr's oath.

When the group drew near to Basra, 'Ali's governor of the. city,

'Uthman b. Hunayf, sent 'Imran b. al-Husayn and Abu al-Aswad to meet them and find out their plans. Talha and az-Zubayr told Ibn Hunayf's envoys that they intended to avenge the caliph's death and put the 141

question of the rule before a council. To no avail, the two envoys

rhetorically asked 'Â'isha if she was not Muhammad's wife and if she

was not ordered to stay in her house. After hearing his envoys'

reports, Ibn Hunayf armed his men and met Talha, az-Zubayr, and 'Â'isha 27 with their followers in the main Basran market, al-Mirbad. Both Talha

and az-Zubayr made khutbas to the assembled people; Uthmin [b. ®Affan],

in spite of his excellent character, had done unprecedented things that

had earned him the just condemnation of the people. However, when they

had called on him to repent and mend his ways, he had done so.

Therefore, his death had been uncalled for and must be avenged.

The Basran crowd was divided by the two speeches. They argued for

a time and then 'Â'isha delivered a khutba; she said much the same as

Talha and az-Zubayr and added that the caliph should be chosen by a

council. Again the crowd was split and this time fighting broke out.

Calm was eventually restored when Ibn Hunayf and Talha and az-Zubayr agreed to a truce the terras of which would remain in effect until 'Ali arrived: Ibn Hunayf would retain control of the treasury, the [main] mosque, and the governor's residence (Par al-Imara); no man would obstruct another in the markets or on the roads, and Talha, az-Zubayr and their followers could camp where they chose.

After a few days of peace, however, Talha convinced az-Zubayr that their cause could be lost if they waited passively for 'Ali to arrive.

One evening, when 'lUthman was leading the prayer, they seized him and then sent 'Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr and a small force to take control of the treasury, which was guarded by a group of forty (or four hundred) 142

Siyâbàja.»^® The Siyàbaja refused to relinquish their control, fighting broke out, and many of them were killed,

Hukaym b. Jabal?, accompanied by several men, arrived in Basra after Talha and az-Zubayr had seized control of the city. He insisted that they reinstate Ibn Hunayf and accept *Ali's rule. When they refused, more fighting broke out, and Ibn Jabala and several of his followers were killed.

Following this lengthy hadith, there are some shorter ones that provide additional or variant information on events in Basra. In two of these a group of Basrans confronted Talha and az-Zubayr with letters the two men had earlier sent that incited the people of Basra against

*Uthraan. The Basrans asked them to explain the disparity between their current position and the positions they had taken in the letters. In one version, neither Talha nor az-Zubayr said anything; in the other version, Talha replied that "where 'ütllmân is concerned, only 29 r repentance and vengeance were [now] appropriate." Another hadith briefly describes a letter which Sahl b. Hunayf, the brother of

®iUthman, sent to Talha and az-Zubayr in which he told them to release

'uthmin and warned them that whatever they did to '.Uthmin, he would do to their relatives in Madina. They did release 'Uthmin and he left

Basra and joined 'Ali, Finally, a short hadith mentions that al-Ahnaf b. Qays' insisted on remaining neutral because he was unwilling to fight either the Messenger of God's cousin ['Ali] or his wife.

When 'Ali learned of the actions of 'Â'isha, Talha, and az-Zubayr, he put Sahl b. Hunayf in charge of Madina and set off in pursuit of the 143 three. He got as far cis Dhù Qar and learned there that the Ahl al-Jamal had already passed and that he would not be able to overtake them before they reached Baçra.^^ He made camp at Dhü Qâr and then s nt

®Ubayd Allah b. 'Abbas and 'Ammâr b. Yâsir to Kufa to ask its people for help. They arrived in Kufa and addressed the people in the [main] mosque. After they spoke, the city's governor, Abu Musa al-Ash'ari, appealed to the crowd; He reminded them that they had thus far remained safe from fitna and urged them to isolate themselves until the Ummah was once again united. His appeal was successful and the Kilfans refused to leave the city and help 'Ali.

'.Ubayd Allah and 'Ammâr returned to 'Ali with the news and this time he sent his son al-Hasan with instructions to remove Abu Musa from office, Al-Hasan was more successful; he replaced Abu Musa with Qaraza b. Ka'b al- and returned to 'Ali with approximately ten thousand 31 Kufans. The large army traveled on to Basra.

In another version, 'Ali learned, while in Madina, that Talha, az-Zubayr, and 'Â'isha had gone to Basra, and he set out in pursuit with a number of Madinan supporters. From ar-Rabadha, 'Ali sent a note to Abu MÛsâ, by the hand of Hashim b. 'Utba b. Abi Waqqas, which ordered the governor to send aid. Instead of complying with 'Ali's wishes, however, Abu Musa cautioned the Kufans against involvement in a fitna and thereby discouraged any from joining 'Ali.

Hashim reported Abu Musa's actions to 'Ali and he sent 'Abd Allah b. 'Abbas and Muhammad b. Abi Bakr with a note to Abu Müsâ that castigated him and instructed him to turn his office over to Qaraza b. 144

Ka'b. *Ali journeyed on to Fayd, where he was joined by a group of Tayy - 32 and from there, he sent al-Hasan and 'Ammâr b. Yasir to Kufa, They were more successful. They saw to it that Qaraza b. Ka'b replaced Abu

Mùsà and collected ten or perhaps twelve thousand Kufans with whom they returned to 'Ali.^^

'Ali, with these reinforcements, completed the trip to Bagra. When he reached the city, he appealed to its people to return to the community (jamà'a), not to separate from it. Three thousand Rabi'a of

Ba?ra complied and joined 'Ali, and al-Ahnaf b. Qays promised that six 34 thousand of his tribesmen would remain neutral.

The two sides lined up for battle on the morning of the tenth of

Jumâdâ II, the day after 'Ali's arrival.Al-Baladhuri mentions the names of the commanders of the flanks of both armies and then describes

'All's continuing efforts to avoid battle. 'Ali reminded 'Â'isha that she had been ordered to stay in her house and criticized Talha and az-Zubayr for taking her from it. They replied that they only wanted vengeance for ‘Uthmân and the question of the rule to be decided by a council. 'Â'isha then delivered a short khutba; she admitted that there had been legitimate complaints against*Uthmân, but argued that he had 'mended his ways.' His killers had no justification for what they had done; they had "shed inviolable (haram) blood in an inviolable month in an inviolable land."^^

After this exchange, 'Ali gave orders to his own army concerning their conduct in the battle. He forbade them to begin the battle, to kill the wounded, mutilate corpses, enter houses without the owners' 145

permission, threaten women, or take anything as booty except what they 37 found on the battlefield. Then, as the two armies advanced towards

each other, *Ali asked a man of the tribe of ®Abd al-Qays to go between

the armies with a page of the Qur'an raised over his head and to call

on the Ahl al-Jamal to turn back and avoid disunion. The man did and a

barrage of Basran arrows immediately killed him. Al-Balâdhurî adds

that according to someone else, the Ahl al-Jamal attacked the man and

cut off his right hand; he then raised the Qur'an in his left hand and

that too was hacked off. Finally, the man died with the page clenched

between his teeth. Then a man of the Tamim took the place of the *Abd

al-QaysI and met with the same fate.^® After these two deaths, the two

sides joined in battle.

Al-BalSdhuri's description of the battle focuses on the fighting

around the camel and particularly on the deaths of Talha and

az-Zubayr. Several short hadith describe the valor of different individuals who held the halter of the camel and died or lost their 39 hands. After these hadith there is a titled section on the death of

Talha (maqtal Talha b. ®Ubayd Allah). Of the hadith in this section, the first four deal exclusively with Talha while the rest describe the deaths of other individuals and the success of several of ®Ali's men in finally hamstringing 'À'isha's camel.

The four hadith on the death of Talha are quite similar. In the evening, when the Ahl al-Jamal were near defeat, Marwân remarked that

Talha would no longer seek vengeance and shot him with an arrow that pierced Talha's thigh. Marwân then turned to ®Abban b.'Uthmân and told 146 him that he had spared him the trouble of having to deal with one of his father's killers. Talha was carried off the battle field by one of his clients. Near death, he marveled at how confused things had become and prayed to God to exact vengeance from him for^Uthman until He was 40 satisfied. In a shorter version of this hadith, the client tried to remove the arrow and Talha told him to leave it since God had directed 41 its flight. A third hadith resembles the first two, but contains 42 additional information on where Talha was buried and a fourth 43 mentions that he was hit in the chest, not the thigh.

After describing Talha's death, al-Baladhuri returns to the fighting around the camel and to the eventual success of a group of

'Ali's close companions, his "shl'a," in hamstringing 'A'isha's mount.Three hadith describe 'Ali's conversation with 'Â'isha after her camel falls. In the first, 'Ali punished one of his soldiers who had insulted 'Â'isha; then he made provisions for her to stay in Basra while he arranged for an escort to return her to Madina. This hadith ends with the remark that whenever 'Â'isha recalled the Battle of the 45 Camel, she wished that she had died a year before it occurred.

In the second, the narrator of the hadith, Ibn Hâtib, and 'Ali approached the overturned haudaj. 'Ali was quite angry and claimed that 'Â'isha had wanted to kill him just as she had 'Uthmân. Yet in spite of his anger, he showed concern for her well being and turned her

— 46 over to the care of her brother, Muhammad b. Abi Bakr.

The third, like the second, depicts 'Ali's anger with 'Â'isha for stirring up the people and causing them to fight each other. 'Â'isha 147 replied curtly that since he had won the battle he could [afford to] 47 show mercy.

Al-Balâdhuri provides several more hadith on the death of az-Zubayr than he does on Talha's death. Most of these describe the same chain of events; *Ali and az-Zubayr met and 'Ali reminded him of

Muhammad's prediction that az-Zubayr would one day fight 'All and treat him unjustly. Az-Zubayr remembered Muhammad's words, turned away from the battle, and departed for Madina. ^ route he was killed by Ibn

Jurmüz. Some variations in this chain of events are worth noting.

According to some of the hadith, the conversation between 'Ali and az-Zubayr occurred before the battle had begun; in others, it occurred when the battle was almost over; and in one, az-Zubayr decided not to leave, after his son accused him of cowardice.Two hadith indirectly implicate al-Ahnaf b. Qays in his death. In these, al-A^af saw az-Zubayr departing and observed wryly that az-Zubayr was seeking the safety of his home after he had brought the Muslims together in battle. Ibn Jurmüz overheard al-Ahnaf's criticisms, followed az-Zubayr, and killed him at Wadi as-Sibâ'. In one version, Ibn Jurmüz took az-Zubayr's head and his sword to 'Ali, who cursed Ibn Jurmüz and ordered that the head be returned to Wadi as-Siba' and there buried 49 with the body.

The final passages provide a kind of conclusion to the battle. In separate hadith, al-Baladhuri mentions, among other subjects, the number of men of different tribes who fell in the battle, 'Ali's leniency towards both those who fought him and those who eschewed 148 involvement in the affair, his grief over some of those who died, and

'À'isha's undiminished regret at her participation in the battle.

Al-Balâdhuri and the Hadith Format

From the preceding summary it should be apparent that al-Baladhuri's account of the Battle of the Camel is replete with multiple versions of the event, all presented in the hadith format, and that some of these versions in the account differ in detail from others. The prevalence of these versions and the form of the account deserve discussion prior to an analysis of al-Baladhuri's values.

Many modern scholars have tended to see the hadith format of composition and the plethora of versions, which hadithi histories often contain, as two features that typify Arabic histories and reflect the limitations of Muslim historical "scholarship." The separate hadith and the different versions are understood to reflect Muslim historians' overriding concern for the accurate transmission of material and their inability either to interpret or analyze the material in their construction of an account. At most, Muslim historians sought to describe what had happened; they never tried to explain why it had happened or what its having happened "meant." In the views of some modern scholars, these features of Muslim histories may even reflect an 52 "atomistic” outlook on the part of the Muslim historians. This 149 assessment of the histories has at once both necessitated and justified treating them as "mines of information" or as the "raw material" for the history of the IslSmic(ate) community. It is the task of the modern scholars, who view the texts in these terms, to extract from them the information with which they can then construct the coherent picture that the texts do not provide. Significant variety of style in the histories, however, vitiates the validity of these assumptions and questions the uses that have been made of the histories. The hadith format and the multiple versions that some histories contain need to be considered as techniques that facilitated the process of historical composition.

1) As already noted, al-Baladhuri was not unique in his use of the hadith format. Several of his predecessors had used it in historical works, for example. Khalifa b. Khayyât, Ibn Ishiq/Ibn Hishim, al-Waqidi and Ibn *Abd al-Hakam. Others after al-Baladhuri also used the hadith format, most notably at-Tabari, but also, for example, Ibn

A^tham al-Kufi (d. 314/926) and Ibn *Asakir (d. 572/1176). However, the hadith format should not be viewed as normative for the histories produced in the first three centuries after the hijra.^^ Many of al-BalSdhuri's contemporaries, such as Ibn Qutayba, ad-Dinawari, and al-Ya‘qubi did not use the hadith format. The available evidence suggests that the format was especially common in sira/maghâzi and related futüh works and may have been less common in works by professional bureaucrats. Whether it was typical of the "monographic" works of such historians as Abu Mikhnaf, Sayf b. 'Umar, al-Madi'ini 150 and Ibn al-Kalbi is uncertain. The few surviving works attributed to

Abu Mikhnaf, for example, are largely without isnads.^^ The absence of isnads could be explained in two ways: Either Abu Mikhnaf did not cite them or the copyist of the work excised them. The evidence from the works of later authors who use the hadith format and cite these

"monographs" is equally ambiguous. In some cases al-Baladhuri or at“Tabari, for example, simply cite these earlier historians with no fuller isnad. In other cases, Abu Mikhnaf, Sayf, or another appear at 55 the beginning of a "full" isnad.

Some uncertainty must thus inevitably attend a discussion of the use of the hadith format in medieval Arabic historiography, due to the paucity of surviving works from the seventh and eighth centuries. In spite of this uncertainty, however, one fact stands out clearly;

Historical composition in the hadith format during al-Baladhuri's time was an option; the hadith format was not the only mode or style of composition that an historian could employ. Just as al-Baladhuri chose to organize his Ansab according to a genealogical arrangement, he also chose to use the hadith format.

Furthermore, not all historians who used the hadith format did so for the same reasons. For Ibn Khayyât, who sought to assert the legitimacy of 'Ali's election and rule, but also to preserve the reputations of Talha and az-Zubayr, a hadith format provided a way to present two narratives of the battle, each of which accomplished one of his goals. The format offered other advantages to al-Balâdhurî and at-Tabari. 151

2) Histories possessed of multiple versions were commonly, although not invariably, cast in the hadith format. Yet there are histories in the hadith format that do not contain multiple versions, or at least not many, and some not in the hadith format that do, Ibn

Khayyât's Ta'rikh, (in spite of the above example) does not contain many multiple versions and pseudo-Ibn Qutayba*s Kitâb al-Imâma, which is not in the hadith format, does contain some. More importantly, even if the majority of histories notable for their possession of multiple versions are in the hadith format, this correlation stems frcxn convenience,not from necessity. Given the range of choices that an historian such as al-Baladhuri had and the examples of the choices that he made, we cannot inextricably link multiple versions with the hadith format and adduce the two as evidence for either al-Baladhuri’s

"atomistic" mindset or as evidence for his single-minded concern for factual accuracy.

In short, multiple versions were not a defining characteristic of hadithi histories, however much they might be associated with them.

The hadith format appears to have facilitated citing different versions, but it did not require doing so. And if multiple versions were not a defining characteristic of hadithi histories, then their presence in them must be significant insofar as it reflects the authors selection of material, indicates a reason behind that selection, and suggests that the medium that was used may have furthered the message that was intended. With these points in mind, we can turn to a 152 discussion of a.l-Balâdhuri's values and of the relationship between them and the style in which he cast his account.

Al-Balâdhuri*s Values

There are many hadith in al-Baladhuri's account that emphasize the legitimacy of 'Ali's rule and others that stress his wisdom, knowledge, and rectitude as qualities that qualified him to govern. Several of the hadith on the bay'a mention the widespread support for 'All and some of the people's belief that he was the most qualified to assume the caliphate. In addition to those versions, and perhaps in support of them, there are two hadith in the early part of the account that describe the musings of the caliph 'Umar about future rulers of the

Umma, In the first, 'Umar asked an Ansiri who he thought would be the next caliph. The man enumerated several Ansari and Muhâjirüh, but not

'Ali (none of the possible candidates are named), 'Umar asked him his opinion about “Ali and added that he thought that 'Ali would lead the

Umma on the right path if he were in charge,In the second hadith, like the first, 'Umar brought up the question of his successor. One man suggested 'Ali and 'Umar opined that they would never appoint 'All and if they did, he would force them to do right and they would hate . . ^ 57 him for it. 153

In a twice-told hadith, one of "Ali's followers, al-Harith b.

Hut, asked "Ali if he thought it likely that Talha, az-Zubayr and

"Â'isha would all agree on something false (batil). "Ali replied that al-Harith was confused and instructed him:

truth and falsehood cannot be determined on the basis of man's actions. Know truth and you will know ^gs people. Know falsehood and you will know its people.

These passages, and others that mention "Ali's several attempts to avoid battle, his grief over fallen enemies, and his mercy towards survivors of the Ahl al-Jamal, all contribute to a positive treatment of "Ali. Such a treatment affects the account's presentation of Talha, az-Zubayr, and "Â'isha in predictable ways. The onus of the responsibility for the beginning of the first fitna falls on Talha and az-Zubayr. Yet there are parts of the account which may ultimately protect their status as Companions by describing their remorse at their responsibility for the battle. Similarly, the description of the episode of al-Haw'ab both affirms "À'isha's guilt and partially absolves her. It affirms her guilt because the Prophet had specifically warned her not to be the one at whom the dogs barked. At the same time, the story absolves her because, after hearing the dogs, she only agreed to continue to Basra when "Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr 59 untruthfully told her that the place was not al-Haw'ab.

Other hadith in al-Baladhuri's account, however, present versions less favorable to "Ali. Most of these hadith are those that describe significant opposition to the bay"a. In one hadith, several Associates,

"Abd Allah b. "lUmar, Sa"id b. Abi Waqqas, Muhammad b. Maslama, Wahb b. 154

Sayf, and Usama b. Zayd, refused to give 'Ali the bay'a. The first two pledged that they would give the oath when all other Muslims had. The other three's refusal focused implicitly on significant opposition to

'Ali's accession and on the potentially serious consequences of that opposition. Ibn Maslama claimed that he had instructions from the

Prophet to break his sword and stay in his house when there was disagreement amongst the Muslims. Wahb b. Sayf informed 'Ali that

Muhammad had told to use his sword to fight the mushrikûn; but when there was a fitna amongst the Muslims, he was to break his sword and stay in his house. Usama b. Zayd told 'Ali that he had no enmity for him, but he pleaded that he had sworn an oath that he would never fight a man who had professed the shahada. Usama's refusal is followed by a short passage that describes 'Ali's receipt of the bay'a from the common people after which Ibn 'Umar warned 'Ali that he has assumed control of the Umma's well-being without consultation (mashwara)

These doubts about 'Ali's accession are echoed in other hadith (in the initial section). One hadith suggests that people were prepared to give the bay'a to Talha and only gave their support to 'Ali when he

"opened up the treasury.In one, a man questioned his father about why some said that 'Ali's bay'a was not complete. His father remarked that 'Ali had received the oath only from the people of Makka and

Madina (ahl al-Haramayn). Another hadith suggests that the bay'a was somewhat more widespread insofar as 'Ali had received oaths of loyalty * 63 “ from all of the garrisons (amsar) except Syria. However, this hadith 155 also suggests that the leading or influential people (khawass min

64 an-nas) in the Hijâz may have also refrained from giving the oath.

These latter versions of the bay'a support quite a different reading of al-Baladhuri*s account of the battle than do those versions that describe the bay'a as receiving widespread support. If 'Ali's accession did not have procedural legitimacy, if Talha and az-Zubayr had been forced to give the oath, and if other companions, whose views necessarily mattered, were opposed to 'All's caliphate, then the whole question of the battle and the beginning of the first fitna becomes more complex. 'Ali's willingness if not eagerness to assume the rule, in spite of significant opposition to his doing so, makes the nobility of his own character seem far from certain and the duplicity and treachery of Talha and az-Zubayr far more doubtful.

Due largely, therefore, to the different versions of the bay'a and associated descriptions of 'Ali, al-Baladhuri's account of the battle presents the reader with quite different interpretations of the event and with no explicit indication of how to read the account (or weigh the versions). Modern scholars, who have seen this problem as

"typical" of the histories and as a reflection of the uncritical and unanalytical standards of Muslim historians, have approached accounts such as al-Baladhuri's with the assumption that the text's meanings will not be apparent until conflicting versions have been harmonized or one has been shown to be more valid than another.

The harmonizing readings combine versions or parts of them and produce an average account of what happened. The rationale of this 156 approach is, however, specious, because the average rarely characterizes any one version. If, for example, three different versions of the number who were killed in a battle cited the figures of five hundred, seven hundred, and fifteen hundred, there would be no evidence for stating that about nine hundred fell since none of the versions mentioned that figure. By the same token, we cannot say that al-Baladhuri describes the majority as supporting the bay* a when some of his hadith mention unanimous approval, but others describe the objections of a few. We can only say that the majority supported the bay*a if there is a hadith that says that and al-Baladhuri included it.

Readings that validate one version over another can also be problematic if the criteria of validation are based on untested assumptions. Modern scholars' mistrust of material from Sayf b. *Umar, for example, may not be unfounded. Yet in reading an author like at-Tabari, who ott«n cites Sayf, it is important to try to understand why at-Tabari included material from him before material from other transmitters whom at-Tabari cites is preferred.

Conflicting versions are present in an account because the historian put them there. Had he chosen, ha could have excluded one of the versions or even quoted another which resolved the conflict. An interpretation of an account that harmonizes conflicting versions or gives greater validity to one over another can derive meanings that the author may not have intended and miss those that he did intend. An understanding of the account must accommodate its versions, not try to 157

remove them. In the case of al-Baladhuri's account» the different

versions of events and attitudes appear to reflect the wide variety of

loyalties and values held by Muslims of al-Baladhuri's day and perhaps

al-Baladhuri's own attitude towards this variety.

By al-Baladhuri's lifetime, Muslim attitudes towards *Ali and the

Battle had been significantly shaped by two develojanents in the Umma's

history: the 'Abbisid succession and the contributions of Ja'far

as-Sadiq towards the development of a sectarian Shi'i ideology.

Although the exact nature of the 'Abbâsid movement prior to 750

remains uncertain, due to a lack of sources, the consensus of modern

scholarship is that the movement was linked closely with one branch of

'Alid partisans that favored the rule of Abu Hashim, a son of Muhammad b, al-Hanafiyya,^^ Abu Hashim appears to have have designated as his

successor and leader of his shi'a Muhammad b, *Ali b, *Abd Allah b,

'Abbas, the father of the first 'Abbâsid caliph, as-Saffâh,^^ In any event, the 'AbbSsids came to power on a platform that stressed their membership in the Ahl al-Bayt and the need to avenge the death of

al-Husayn and other 'Alids by overthrowing the family responsible for

their deaths.

Yet the 'Abbâsid victory proved not to be a victory for partisan

supporters of'Alid rule, many of whom had supported the Banû 'Abbas,

Shortly after the 'Abblsids gained the rule, they severed their ideological ties with 'Alids.This shift must certainly have helped the new rulers to gain the support of the majority of the community that had not supported an 'Alid candidate. Among this majority, not 158 all, by any means, gave their unhesitating support to the *Abbâsid house. However, the caliphs' outward concern for the development of the shari* a and the respect they paid to the jurisconsults (fuqaha),

linked with the difficulties of finding a basis for opposition, led to most giving recognition to the 'Abblsids as the sole legitimate rulers.For the partisan followers of descendants of 'Ali, the

'Abbâsid victory served as a catalyst in an existing trend towards more quietistic behavior and as a stimulus for the development of a coherent and distinct ideology that did not aspire to immediate political 70 authority or encourage active opposition to 'Abbâsid rule.

The sixth Shi'i Imam, Ja'far as-Sàdiq (d. 148/765), is generally credited with laying the major foundations of the ideology of the

Imamate. Ja'far helped to give a coherency to the doctrine of the

Imamate and, in the process, helped to transform partisan support for — 71 descendants of 'Ali into a sectarian ideology. He maintained that the

Imamate was "located in a specific individual, whether he claims rule or not; and was transferred from one to another by explicit 72 designation, nass." Ja'far also emphasized that each Imam was endowed with special knowledge, 'ilm, that gave him a unique authority to decide disputes, determine proper behavior, and generally guide the 73 Umma.

The notion of the designated Imam who possessed a special 'ilm became a doctrinal cornerstone of Shi'ism as it was gradually developed into a sectarian ideology. At the same time, this notion helped to make

Inâm Shi'ism non-confrontational. Since each Imam was designated by 159 his predecessor and since each possessed special * ilm, he did not depend on a human institution— the caliphate— for the authority that he wielded. Consequently, the Imam, having rights and abilities conferred by God, had no reason to seek the status of ruler that the office of caliph conferred. Furthermore, Shi*Is had little reason to oppose the caliphate since it could not detract from the status or authority of the Imamate.

The evolution of a partisan loyalty for an *Alid towards a sectarian ideology had its affect on those who were not *Alid partisans. Whereas before the time of Ja'far and the 'Abblsids, *Alid partisanship was a political movement that sought to put an *Alid or a

Tâlibid into power, after the time of Ja'far and the demise of partisanship, political aspirations ceased to be a defining characteristic of Shi'i loyalty. As a result, the 'Abbasids nolonger viewed most Shi'is with the same suspicion as had the Umayyads at a time when 'Alid partisans did aspire to political power. One consequence of this change may have been that Muslims who did not favor

'Alid rule were able to alter the parameters of their own ideology and adopt a view of 'All that had in earlier times been held by some 'Alid partisans, but not by others. These Muslims now accepted without reservation the legitimacy of 'Ali's caliphate and believed that he shared some of the attributes that had made the Prophet so special. As

Shi'ism itself gradually became sectarian, a pro-'Alid sympathy or loyalty need no longer have implied a criticism of the status quo. Put in different terms, the "‘All or 'Uthmân question" ceased to be so 160 controversial and potentially disruptive. The legitimacy of the rule of both could be accepted.

These changes in the nature of values received additional impetus from important contributions which the fugahâ* (jurisconsults) made to the law. Their activities centered on attempts to standardize the law by systematically deriving it from the Qur'an and the sunna of the

Prophet, as the latter was contained in the body of hadith. The importance that the fuqaha* increasingly placed on the sunna led 75 eventually to "certain exalted ideas about Muhammad's person," and, to a lesser degree, about the entire body of the Associates who had witnessed the Prophet's actions, heard his words, and stood as the primary transmitters of his sunna. With the increasing importance placed on the sunna, there developed an aversion to faulting any of the

Associates, including 'Ali, who'was now recognized as one of the

Prophet's closest associates and one of his most committed supporters.

It is fitting also to note here that the term Râshidûn (rightly guided), referring to the rule of the first four caliphs and more generally to the quality of that time, appears to have come into usage at the beginning of the third/ninth century— the time of significant developments in fiqh and in Shi'i and 'Abbâsid ideology.

The 'Abbâsid succession, the gradual demise of partisanship, and the intellectual activities of Ja'far as-Sadiq thus led to the transformation of Shi'ism from a political platform towards a sectarian

ideology that favored political quietism. This transformation and 161 concomitant developments in legal theory that stressed the importance of the Sunna helped to popularize an 'Alid loyalism.

In spite of this popularization, some third/ninth century Muslims still held 'Ali in disrepute and denied the legitimacy of his caliphate. Al-Baladhuri's contemporary, the historian Abu Zur'a ad-Dimashqi (d,281/894) for example treats the period 36-40/657-560 as an interregnum;

When 'uthmân was killed, the people disagreed [about his successor]. There were no raids or conquests until the Umma agreed on Mu'awiya in the year 40 and they nat^^d that year 'the year of the community’(sanat al-jamâ%a)ê

The passages in al-Balâdhurï's account that describe the misgivings of some of the Companions about 'All's accession, ‘All's acceptance of the use of force to extract the bay'a from Talha and az-Zubayr, the refusal of Mu'awiya and the Syrians to acknowledge 'Ali as the legitimate caliph, the hesitation of tlie Kufans to give 'Ali assistance, and the willingness of the Basrans to fight against him, may accurately describe the significant opposition to 'Ali at the time of his accession. They also reflect the survival of anti-'Alid sentiments down to al-Baladhuri's time.

The different versions in al-Baladhuri's "account," especially of the bay'a, may thus represent extremes in a spectrum of values. Since there is no overt indication that al-Baladhuri endorsed one version in preference to another, it is likely that he accepted both "extremes" as well as positions or views that fell between them. In this sense, his account may have had a conciliatory function. By including a range of 162 values that those of his day may have held, al-Baladhuri may have sought to indicate his aversion to supporting only one. Such selective support necessarily entailed questioning if not denying the legitimacy of other loyalties held by those who saw themselves as members of the community.

Al-Balâdhuri witnessed the sometimes violent struggles between the

Ahl al-Hadîth and the Mu*tazilis when the latter enjoyed the court's 79 favor. He also witnessed the official and popular reaction against the Mu'tazilis under the caliphate of al-Mutawakkil (r. 232-47/847-61) who supported, or at least did nothing to curb the more intolerant of the Ahl al-Hadith in their persecution of the Mu'tazilis, the Shx'a, 80 and other Muslims with whom they did not agree. With the benefit of first-hand experience of this tumultuous time, al-Baladhuri may have concluded that the interests of the Umma were better served by making a place for legitimate conflict between its members than by condemning one or another party to the conflict. However, in light of the influence of the more intolerant of the Ahl al-Hadith and of his own position at the court (he received the patronage of al-Mutawakkil and his two successors), al-Baladhuri may have felt constrained to convey his irenic values in an indirect manner. A genealogical framework and the hadith format may have been especially well suited to his needs.

The former, in contrast to chronological frameworks, cast events in the context of "biographies" and may thereby have softened the impact of events which questioned an historicist view of the community's history— a view that may have been especially common the Ahl 163 al-Hadith. The hadith format foregrounded the words of his authorities, and it was, after all, one that would be eminently acceptable to the Ahl al-Hadith.

A slight clarification of the term "hadith format" is in order.

As noted, not all of al-Baladhuri's predecessors may have employed the hadith format. Such authors as Abu Mikhnaf or Ibn al-Kalbi, on whom al-Baladhuri relied, may have employed a more continuous narrative style in which they did not frequently identify their authorities by means of isnads. Yet irrespective of the form of al-Baladhuri's sources, he could cast the information from all of them into the hadith format simply by identifying the source(s) from which he had taken each passage. For example, if a work by Abu Mikhnaf was not in the hadith format, al-Baladhuri could nevertheless put information he had taken from the work into that format by prefacing passages he used with Abu

Mikhnaf's name. That is, he could legitimately create a "kind" of isnâd (see above, page 150). This ability greatly facilitated the production of the kind of history that al-Baladhuri wrote.

The isnSd of each hadith served as a kind of boundary marker to set off or separate hadith from each other. This feature simplified the inclusion of conflicting versions and gave each equal weight in its effect on the rest of the account. The different versions of the bay*a, for example, help to produce quite different interpretations of the battle.

The hadith format was also ideally suited to the kind of

'catholic* account that al-Baladhuri composed. By means of the isnâd. 164 it recognized, in ways that non-hadithi histories could not, the value of the contributions of different individuals to the Umma's "memory" of its history. By virtue of their membership in the Umma, their views mattered and hence it was important to give them credit— to indicate through the isnâd the names of those who had helped to preserve the 81 Umma's history. What mattered much less was the uniformity of the

"remembrance." Whether pne ultimately preferred Abu Mikhnaf's version to ad-Dawarqi's, for example, one should listen to both, for both were

Muslims and therefore members of the Umma. The isnâd reflected particular views of communal conflict. It implicitly accepted that conflict had occurred; indeed, it is a graphic representation of the conflict. Yet the isnâd simultaneously provided a means or context for minimizing the harmful effects of the conflict. By citing the extremes of non-Shi'i loyalties and, through the isnâd, providing the names of some of the individuals who may have been associated with the extremes, al-Baladhuri's account defused the conflict by recognizing the validity of different values or loyalties. Whereas non-hadithi histories may have exacerbated tensions by focusing on one side or another, a hadithi history such as al-Baladhuri's may have soothed these tensions.

Al-Baladhuri's account of the Battle of the Camel and of the beginnings of the first fitna was addressed to a wide spectrum of his community. He, like other historians, saw the topical importance of the battle and compiled his account in accordance with his perception.

Unlike other historians of the battle, al-Baladhuri produced an account that recognized the validity of conflicting interpretations of the 165 battle. In using the hadith format, he selected a medium that most effectively conveyed his message. NOTES

CHAPTER VI

^See C.H. Becker, s.v. "Al-Baladhuri," [revised by P. Rosenthal]. S.D.F. Goitein, "Introduction" to al-Balâdhurî's Ansâb al-Ashrâf, vol. 5, pp. 9-28; P. Hitti, "Introduction" to his translation of al-Baladhuri's FutOh al-Buldân (The Origins of thi- Islamic State) (New York: Columbia'University Press, 1916; reprint ed., Beirut: Khayyàt, 1966), pp. 1-11; al-Yâqüt Mu' jam, vol. 5, pp. 89-102. 2 Yâqût, Mujam, vol. 5, p. 91.

^Goitein "Introduction," p. 14f.; Becker, "al-Baladhuri," p. 971. 4 _ Al-Baladhuri, Futüh al-Buldân, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1866). 5 An-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 126.

^Al-Waqidi, Futüh ash-Shân . 2 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Jil, n.d.); Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Futüh Misr, ed. Charles Torrey, Yale Oriental Series, no. 8 (New Haven: Yale"University Press, 1922; reprint ed., Baghdad: Maktabst al-Muthannâ, n.d.). 7 Only a portion of the work has been edited: vol. 1 (dealing with creation and the life of Muhammad), ed. Muhammad Hamid Allah (Cairo: Dâr al-Ma'ârif, 1959); vol. 3 (dealing with al-Hasan and al-Husayn), ed. Muhammad Bâqir al-Mahmüdi (Beirut: Dâr at-Ta'arruf, 1966); vol. 4a (dealing with Mu'âwiya), ed. M.J. Kister (Jerusalem: University Press, 1973); vol. 4b (dealing with al-Yazid and other Sufyanids), ed, M, Schloessinger (Jerusalem: University Press, 1936); and vol. 5 (dealing with ‘Uthman, Marwan b. al-Qakam and events during the reign of the latter), ed. S.D.F. Goitein. The complete manuscript of the work is in Istanbul (Reisülküttap 597 & 598 in the Sülemaniye Kütüphanesi). 8 Ibn al-Kalbi, Jamharat an-Nasab, edited and put into tables by Werner Caskel and Gert Strenziok, 2 vols. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966).

166 167 9 Goitein, "Introduction," , the order in the Ansâb is that found in genealogical works. . . . Arab genealogy, like , when it first appears in literary form, is already a complete and consolidated structure»" (P« 12)

^^Page references to the edited portion of the Ansâb refer to the editions mentioned above in note 7. All other page references are based on the "table of contents" to the Istanbul manuscript provided by Dr, Hamid Allah in his preface to vol. 1 of the Ansâb, pp. 34-53.

^^Cf. Margoliouth's comments in his Lectures on Arabic Historians, p. 118. 12 Goitein makes this suggestion, "Introduction," p. 21.

^^Ibid. Still, there is much more to the Ansâb than "political history" and suggestions on the significance of al-Baladhuri's use of the genealogical organization are speculative sincethe latter sections of the Ansâb, which deal with the 'tribes' other than the Quraysh, have not been edited and the entire work has yet to be carefully studied. 14 The following chart indicates the pages in the Istanbul manuscript on which the hadith are located.

Hadith nos. Page nos.

1 341 2-5 342 6 - 1 2 343 13-16 344 17-27 345 28-31 346 32, 33 347 34 347-49 35-38 349 39, 40 350 41-45 351 46-50 352 51-53 353 54-58 354 59-62 355 63-69 356 70-76 357 77-79 358 80-85 359 86-95 360 96-104 361 105-109 362 110-117 363 168

^^Material on *Ali before this section (pp. 336-341) deals with his birth and in a brief way with his children,

^^Nos. 1, 24, and 25.

^ \ o s . 11, 19, and 21. 18 Nos. 2, 9, 10, and 23.

^^Nos. 9 and 10.

^°No. 3.

^^Some of the details of this hadith are repeated in other shorter hadith. See, for example nos. 4, 29) and 72. 22 Nos. 16, 17, and 18, In the second, an unnamed individual predicts that 'Uthman will succeed 'Umar, 'Ali will succeed 'Uthman, and that az-Zubayr will contest 'All's rule. 23 No. 28.

^^No. 32.

^^No. 31. This hadith is preceded by a short hadith that mentions that 'Abd Allah b. 'Âmirhad both property and supporters in Basra and invited Talha and az-Zubayr there, no. 30. It is followed by one that mentions that Talha, az-Zubayr, and 'À'isha agreed on going to Basra and that Ya'lâ b. Munabbih gave them 400 camels, one of which was‘Askar, the camel that 'Â'isha rode.

^®No. 34. 27 Al-Yâqût, Mu' jam al-Buldan, vol. 5, p. 97. 28 The Siyabijeh were mercenaries, probably from India, 29 Nos. 36 and 37 respectively.

^^Nos. 31 and 32. 31 No. 38.

^^No. 40, this hadith has no information on al-Hasan and 'Ammâr in KÛfa. The following details of their mission are given in no. 42. Fayd was located approximately half way between Makka and Kùfa, Yâqût, Mu' jam al-Buldân, vol. 4, p. 282. 169

^^Al-Balâdhuri gives detailed information on the tribal affiliations of the groups that joined *All and in many cases he provides the names of these tribes' leaders. In addition, he mentions that the divisions remained as military divisions at the Battles of the Camel, Siffin, and Nahrawàn. 34 No. 45.

^ \ o . 49. 30 " No. 49; the hadith following this gives another quite similar version of 'Â'isha's khutba.

^^No. 51.7 cf. no. 93, where 'Ali gives similar orders after he has defeated the Ahl al-Jamal.

^®No. 51. 39 See nos. 52, 53, 54, 58, and 59. Here, as in other accounts, the protecting 'À'isha,

% o . 60.

4lNo. 61,

4 ^ 0 . 62,

43NO. 63, 44 - Those mentioned are 'Adi b. Hâtim, Abu Târiq, Mâlik al-Ashtar, Ammâr b, Yisir, and al-MuthanriSb

4 \ o . 67,

4**0, 69,

47*0, 70,

In nos, 72 and 73 their conversation occurs before the battle has begun; in no, 82 the conversation occurs when the battle is almost over. In no, 78 az-Zubayr extricates himself from keeping his oath to 'Ali by manumitting one of his slaves at his son's suggestion, 49 No. 76,

^^On those who fell, see nos. 97,98, and 99; on 'All's leniency, see nos, 92, 93, 95, 96, and 114; on his grief see no, 8 8 ; and on 'Â'isha's grief see nos, 100, 101, 103, and 104. 170

^^For examples of modern scholars* comments on the standards of medieval Muslim historiography, see Philip K, Hitti, "Introduction " to al-Balâdhurî's Futüh, pp. 3 and 7; Elma Marin, "Introduction," in at-Tabari, Abu Ja*far Muhammad b. Jarir at-Tabarî*s The Reign of ai-Mu'tasim (833-212) (Ta*rikh ar-Rusul wa al-Mulûk),translated by Elma Marin, American Oriental Series, vol. XXXV (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1951), p. xvi E.L. Petersen, All and Mu'âwiya, p. 16. Also see the related discussion, above, pp. 1-6, and 16-18. 52 See for example , The Arabs in History (New York; Harper and Row, 1966), p. 141. Cf. Joel Kraemer, "Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: A Preliminary Study," Journal of the American Oriental Society 104.1 (1984): 105-54, p. 143. 53 See above, pp. 16-18 and nos. 40 and 42.

^^Abu Mikhnaf, "Waq'àt Siffin" and "Magtal al-Husayn."

^^See, for example, nos. 59, 83, 85, and 8 6 , where al-Wâqidi, ®Abbas b. Hishim al-Kalbi, and al-Madi'ini appear at the beginning of long isnads and nos. 55, 64, 76, and 77, where Abu Mikhnaf and al-Madâ'ini are cited without any additional isnads. Al-Balâdhurî often alludes to a fuller isnâd with such expressions as "al-Madâ'ini in an isnâd of his [said]" (no. 77), or "Abu Mikhnaf and others said" (no. 55). Cf. Goitein, "Introduction," p. 17.

S^No. 16. 57 No. 18.

Nos, 49 and 117. J. Kraemer, "Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam," cites another version which he compares with a saying of Clement of "... judge the truth by what is said, not who says it." Cited in H. Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition (New York; Clarendon Press, 1966).

^^No. 34.

G°No. 3.

"^No. 19.

4.

^^No. 13, cf 64^^_ Khassa (pi distinguished or distinct'from others; in reference to people the term is frequently contrasted with the "common people" (al-®amma); see Edward 171

Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, (London; n.p., 1865-93), s.v. "khassa." However, in the passage in question, the khawâss min an-nâs could refer to a small group of people distinguished from'others by their refusal to give the bay* a.

^^On the 'Abbisid movement, see Claude Cahen, "Points de vue sur la révolution *abbâside'", 295-338j Hodgson, Venture, pp. 272-74 and his "How did the Early Shi*a become Sectarian?" pp. 7 and 9; Moshe Sharon, Black Banners from the East; B. Lewis, s.v. "*Abbasids," E.I.^; and M.A. Shaban, The *Abbâsid Revolution, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 138-58.

^^Sharon, Black Banners from the East, pp. 121-28; Hodgson, Venture, p. 273.

Hodgson, Venture, p. 273.

^^See above, pp. 40-47; Sharon, Black Banners from the East, p. 87; Hodgson, Venture, p. 275.

®®Ibid., pp. 275f. 70 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, p. 16; Jafri, Shi*a Islam, p. 281.

^^See Hodgson, "Early Shi*a", pp. 8 ff. 72 Ibid., p. 10; idem. Venture, p. 373; Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, p. 17; and Jafri, Shi*a Islam, p. 281. 73 For a fuller discussion of Ja*£ar*s Imâmate and its significance for the development of a sectarian ideology see above pp. 40-47.

^^Hodgson, "Ecirly Shi*a," p. 11; Jafri, Shi*a Islam, p. 281; and Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, p. 17. 75 Hodgson, Venture, p. 372

^^On the term Râshidûn see A. Hasan, Early Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 112, n., 38.

^^Abü Zur'.a ad-Dimashqi, Ta'rikh Abu Zur*a, 2 vols, ed. al-Qawjani (Damascus; N.D.),vol. 1, p. 188. 78 - ^ Cf. E.L. Petersen, *Ali and Mu*awiya, part 3, ch. 2; and A.A. Duri,The Rise of Historical Writing Among the Arabs^ p. 54.

^^The Mu'tazilis were Piety-minded Muslims who insisted on the absolute justice of God and the responsibility of humans for their actions. During the first half of the third/ninth century the 172

Mu'tazilis carried on a protracted and heated debate with the Ahl al-Hadith over the sources of the law and the methods used to derive it._ The Mu'tazilis were suspicious of the validity of many of the hadith and maintained that through reasoning (ra'y), careful Muslims could interpret the Qur'an to provide accurate solutions to problems. The Ahl al-Hadith, especially the followers of Ahmad b. Hanbal, insisted that human reasoning was innately fallible and that its role in matters as important as the law must be severely restricted. They maintained that there was a large body of valid hadith that, in conjunction with the "literal meaning" of the Qur'an, could serve as the basis of the law. During the latter part of the reign of al-Ma'mûn and of his two successors, the court endorsed the Mu'tazili's views and sporadically tested officials and others for their compliance with the court's 'creed.'

Hodgson, Venture, p. 486.

For some of these thoughts on the implications of the isnâd, I . am indebted to Professor Marilyn Waldman. CHAPTER V II

AD-DÏNAWARÏ ( d . 2 8 2 /8 9 3 )

Abu Hanifa Ahmad b. Dâwûd ad-Dinawari was a contemporary of Ibn

Qutayba, al-Balâdhurî, and al-Ya‘qûbî. Biographical details on ad-Dinawari's life are minimal: He was born in the early part of the third/ninth century in Dinawar, a town near Hamadhin in western ïrân.^

In his youth he traveled widely and spent time studying in Basra,

KÛfa, Baghdad, and . In Baghdad, ad-Dinawari studied in particular with Ibn Sikkit and his son, Ya'qub, both of them scholars noted for their knowledge of Arabic language and grammar. After

"completing" his studies, he returned to his birthplace where he 2 resided until his death in 282/893.

In his studies and in the wide variety of subjects on which he wrote, ad-Dinawari exemplified adab culture of the third/ninth century. The twenty works attributed to him treat a wide range of subjects that include mathematics, algebra, astronomy, geography, botany, Qur'anic , philology, rhetoric, grammar, poetry, and history. In his own lifetime and in the years after his death, ad-Dinawari was particularly noted for his skill in mathematics, astronomy, and especially for his knowledge of plants and vegetation.

173 174

Indeed, he was most remembered for his multi-volume Kitâb an-Nabât,

(Book of Plants, of which two volumes remain) a comprehensive work in which he brought together available information on fauna and

supplemented it with his own observations.^

The only other work of ad-Dinawari*s that survives is his

Al-Akhbar at-Tiwâl. In the most general sense, his Akhbàr is a

"universal history" that begins with and ends with the reign of

the *Abbâsid al-Mu*tasim (r, 218-227/833-42), The first quarter of the

work focuses on the pre-Islâmic and other peoples

and civilizations. The organization here, as in the rest of the work,

is broadly chronological and, as a consequence, the Arabs, Yemenis,

Persians, Greeks and Romans, and others are treated in more than one

place, especially the Persians, in whose history ad-Dinawari shows some 4 interest throughout the work. Although his interest in Persian history has not been thoroughly studied, it may reflect the sources on which

ad-Dinawari relied and an interest in his own Persian heritage.

Whether it reflects a more specific Shu'ubi sympathy is uncertain, and

it would be unwise to assume so on the basis of his Persian background.^

The balance and focus of the other three-quarters of the Akhbar, which deals primarily with Islamic history, are noteworthy; There is

almost nothing on Muhammad or his lifetime; thirty pages are devoted to

the caliphates of Abu Bakr, 'Urnar, and *Uthman (pp. 110-29),

seventy-eight to the caliphate of 'Ali (pp. 140-218), 156 to the 175

Umayyads (pp. 214-370), and thirty-five to the *Abbâsids (pp. 371-406).

More than half of the 156 pages on the Umayyads deal with partisan groups, especially *Alid, that threatened Umayyad rule— the bay*a sworn to al-Hasan, the deaths of Muslim b. *Agil and al-Husayn, the 'revolt' of Mukhtir, the "counter-caliphate" of 'Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr, and

Khâriji revolts— and another fifteen pages deal with the 'Abbasid da'wa in Syria and Khurasan. This balance and focus has led at least one modern scholar to attribute to ad-Dinawari a Shi'i loyalty.^

Ad-Dinawari's history is composed in a continuous narrative style 7 and he only rarely refers to his sources. Even such expressions as

"they said" (qâlü) or "they mentioned" (dhakarü) by means of which pseudo-Ibn Qutayba or al-Ya'qubi refer in an unspecific way to their sources, are almost entirely lacking in ad-Dinawari's work.

Furthermore, ad-Dinawari provides almost no alternate or parallel versions.

Ad-Dinawari's Account of the Battle

The account of the battle begins three days after the death of

'uthman. 'Ali received the bay'a from the people (an-nâs) and then delivered a short khutba;

Oh people; You gave the bay'a to me on the same conditions on which it was sworn to those before me. There was a choice in the matter before the bay'a occurred, but now there is no choice. 176

Righteousness (al-istiqâma) is incumbent on the imam and obedience (tasllm) is incumbent on the populace (ar-ra'iyya). This was a popular bay*a (bay*a *amma); one who opposes it ^ loathes the religion of Islam. It was surely not a mistake.

After he had delivered his khutba, *Ali announced that he intended to go to Iraq. All those in Madina agreed to go with him, save three— Sa*d b. Abi Waqqas, *Abd Allah b. *Umar, and Muhammad b. Maslaraa. Then *Ali turned his attention to the appointment of new governors of the provinces.^ Sahl b. Hunayf, whom *Ali appointed over Syria, got as far as Tabuk, where he was met by a group of Mu'awiya's troops who barred his way.^^ Sahl returned to the Hijâz, told 'Ali what had happened, and added that the Syrians had given a bay*a to Mu'awiya, who would not obey *Ali.

Shortly after Sahl's return, Talha and az-Zubayr received *Ali's permission to make the hajj. The two men went to Makka and there met with 'Â'isha, who had gone to the city for the *umra twenty days before

* Uthman's death.

Meanwhile, *Ali sent a note to Mu'awiya; "You have learned of what befell * Uthman (r), of the consensus of the people concerning my rule, and of the bay*a they swore to me. So enter into peace or prepare for war.Mu'awiya read the note and sent his own messenger to the Hijâz, carrying a reply, of sorts, to *Ali. Mu'awiya's note contained nothing more than an "address"— "from Mu'awiya b. Abi Sufyân to 'Ali b. Abi

Talib." The messenger, however, added that he had left in Syria "... fifty thousand shaykhs who were weeping into their beards while 177 standing under 'Uthman*s shirt, suspended from a spear-tip." They had

"... sworn not to sheathe their swords until they had avenged his death or died."^^

Although some of 'Ali's supporters dismissed the news from Syria, al-Mughira b. Shu'ba advised 'Ali not to replace 'Uthman*s governors

(especially Mu'awiya) until he had received their obedience and their oaths of loyalty. 'Ali promised that he would consider the advice and the next day al-Mughira returned to him. This time he suggested that

'Ali should remove all of 'Uthman* s governors and thereby determine which of them would be loyal to him and which would not. Later, 'Ali told Ibn 'Abbas of al-Mughira*s conflicting advice and Ibn 'Abbas strongly endorsed what al-Mughira had first advised.

After these conversations, 'Ali ordered those in Madina to prepare 13 - _ to depart with him for ‘iriq. Sa'd b. Abi Waqqas, 'Abd Allah b. 'Umar, and Muhammad b. Maslama, who had earlier disagreed with 'Ali's plans to go to Iraq, now joined by Usama b. Zayd, met with 'Ali and refused to accompany him. In short speeches, each pleaded aversion to fighting against other Muslims.

When al-Ashtar learned that some would not accompany 'Ali, he went to him and stressed that his rule was valid because the Muhâjirün and

Ansar had supported it. He urged 'Ali to reason with those who would not go with him and if they still refused, he should imprison them.

'All, however, refused to take such harsh measures and ordered al-Ashtar to leave them alone. Then, shortly before 'Ali left, he met 178 with a group of Ansari ashraf. Their spokesman, 'Uqba b. ‘Àmir, reiterated and defended the pious concerns of Ibn 'Umar, Ibn Maslama, and others, ‘Ali could not sway them and he left with those who supported him.

Meanwhile, Talha and az-Zubayr met with ‘Â'isha in Makka and asked her to join them in seeking to avenge ‘Uthman’s death. They claimed that some of the killers were among the most prominent of ‘Ali's followers and insisted that if she went with them to Basra, her presence would guarantee the support of the Basrans. ‘Â'isha agreed, and she and Talha and az-Zubayr set out for Basra, accompanied by some who supported their cause.

When ‘Ali, who was on the road to Kufa, learned that Talha, az-Zubayr, and ‘Â'isha were on their way to Basra, he decided to try to overtake them, lest they reach Basra first and gain control of its wealth. At Dhû Qâr, however, he learned that the three had already reached Basra and the city's people, with the exception of the Banü

Sa‘d, had sworn loyalty to them. Before proceeding further, ‘All sent

Hishâm b. ‘Utba b. Abi Waqqas and then al-Hasan and ‘Ammâr b. Yisir to

KÛfa to get support. These envoys arrived in Kùfa in time to hear its governor, Abu Musi, attempting to dissuade the people from involvement in what he insisted would be a fitna. Al-Hasan and ‘Ammâr interrupted

Abu Müsâ and evicted him from the mosque and then called on the assembled people to help ‘Ali. A large number of Kufans immediately agreed and the next morning 9650 of them joined ‘Ali at Dhû Qâr. 179

On the verge of his departure from Dhû Qâr, 'All was obliged to defend his recent actions against the criticisms of his son, al-Hasan.

Al-Hasan pointed out that he had urged 'Ali not to accept the bay'a until all of the people in the provinces as well as the Hijâz had accepted his candidacy. He had advised 'Ali to return to Madina when they had learned that Talha, az-Zubayr, and 'Â'isha were going to

Basra. And finally, when 'üthmân had been besieged, al-Hasan had advised his father to leave Madina so that he could not be implicated if the caliph were killed.

'Ali defended his actions; There was no reason to await the allegiance of those in the provinces since the Muhâjirün and the Ansar in Madina had constituted a valid elective body. If those two groups chose a man, obedience to him was incumbent on the rest of the Umma.

When he had learned of Talha and az-Zubayr, he could not return to his house; that would have been treachery. Even if he had wanted to leave when 'Uthmân was besieged, the caliph's killers would not have allowed 14 him to do so.

'Ali reached Basra, put his troops in battle formation, and appointed commanders and flag-bearers over the flanks and tribal sections of the army. Talha and az-Zubayr did likewise and then the two sides remained, poised for battle, for three days.^^ During that time 'Ali made several attempts to avoid battle by sending several messengers to the Basrans to urge them to accept his rule and preserve the community's unity. These attempts proved unsuccessful, and on the 180 fourth day the two armies advanced towards each other and took up battle formation, *Alî sent a note to az-Zubayr to ask him to meet and when they did, *Ali reminded him of the Prophet's prediction that az-Zubayr would fight *Ali and treat him unjustly. Az-Zubayr remembered the 'prediction' and the two men separated, *Ali returned to his camp and told his men that they had already won [since az-Zubayr would not fight] and ordered them to prepare to attack, Az-Zubayr repeated to his son, *Abd Allah, the Prophet's prediction and explained that because of that and because he had no insight into the affair, he was leaving Basra, *Abd Allah refused to accompany his father and az-Zubayr left alone,

Talha learned that az-Zubayr had quit the battle and decided to do the same. But when he confided in Marwan b, al-Hakam his intentions to leave, Marwan shot him with an arrow and Talha bled to death from the wound,

Al-Ahnaf b, Qays saw az-Zubayr leaving Basra and asked one of his fellow tribesmen to find out "his story," 'Amr b, Jurmûz agreed and caught up with az-Zubayr, When the two men reached Wadi as-Sibi', they stopped for the prayer and ®Amr killed az-Zubayr when he bowed his head. He then took az-Zubayr's coat of mail, his horse and his sword to 'All who, instead of being pleased, was filled with grief over az-Zubayr's death and anger with Ibn Jurmûz for killing him,^^

Meanwhile, the fighting raged, especially around 'Â'isha's camel.

Scores of the Banù Dabba died while defending her mount against the 181 attacks of * Ali's troops, many of whom also fell. Finally, one of

'Ali's soldiers was able to hamstring the animal and kill it and the

Ahl al-Jamal were then quickly defeated. When the battle was over,

'Ali forbade his men to kill any of the Ahl al-Jctmal or to take prisoners or booty (explaining that both the freedom and property of other Muslims was inviolable) and ordered Muhammad b. TVbi Bakr to see to 'Â'isha's safety. Then he entered the city's main mosque, where the

Basrans had assembled, and delivered a short and scathing khutba;

. . . What is one to think, oh Basrans, of the army of a woman, following a camel. It froths at the mouth and you fight; it is wounded and you are routed. Your characters (akhlâq) are frail and you oath is not to be trusted; your water is bitter, and your land is near the sea and far from the sky. By God, the two will someday destroy it [Basra] and only the tops of mosques will be visible, looking [in the wajgr] like ships' prows. Get out of here and go to your houses.

'Ali remained in Basra long enough to arrange for a caravan to escort 'Â'isha back to Madina. Then he went to Kufa to make preparations for his battle with Mu'awiya.

Ad-Dinawari's Loyalties

Ccmipared with the accounts of the battle by al-Baladhuri, pseudo-Ibn Qutayba, or at-Tabarî, ad-Dinawari’s appears less complex.

The bay'a is not an issue in the ways that it is in other accounts and, on the whole, the guilt of 'Â'isha, Talha and az-Zubayr and their 182 supporters is well established, although in a brief manner relative to some of the other accounts.

Ad-Dinawari alludes to the "people" giving *Ali the bay^a three days after the death of 'üthmân, but he does not provide any details on the election. In his description of the short khutba that 'All delivered after the people had sworn loyalty to him, of 'Ali's note to

Mu'awiya, and of his conversation with al-Hasan, ad-Dinawari makes 'Ali stress that his accession to the rule was legitimate by virtue of his receipt of a "popular bay'a" (bay'a 'âmma) into which the Muhâjirün and the Ansar had entered. The implication in each place is that the

Muhâjirün and the Ansar constitute a kind of 'elective body' that the

Umma at large has invested with the authority to designate the caliph.

Consequently the decision of this body is binding on the rest of the

Umma. Al-Ashtar, in a short conversation with 'Ali, also emphasizes the 19 legitimacy of his rule because he had received a 'popular bay'a.'

Although ad-Dinawari describes in some detail Mu'awiya's unwillingness to accept 'Ali's caliphate, he does not include any of the passages, found in many other accounts of the battle, that suggests that some of the Muhâjirün or Ansar were opposed to 'Ali's election: In particular, there are no references to Talha and az-Zubayr's being forced to swear loyalty, nor do these two ever claim coercion as a pretext for their opposition. In addition, whereas some other authors mention that Sa'd b. Abi Waqqâs, Muhammad b. Maslama, and 'Abd Allah b.

'Umar resisted pressures to swear loyalty to 'Ali, ad-Dinawari 183 describes their unwillingness to fight with *Ali against other Muslims, not their reservations about the election.

Ad-Dinawari thus casts his account of the battle in the context of

'Ali's legitimate succession to the caliphate— a succession that was endorsed by the Muhâjirün and the Ansar. Additional details provided by ad-Dinawari, that describe 'Ali's repeated attempts to avoid battle, his grief over the death of az-Zubayr, and his mercy with the defeated

Ahl al-Jamal, contribute further to the favorable presentation of his character. In contrast, within this framework, Talha and az-Zubayr were necessarily guilty of violating their sacred oaths. Furthermore, those two and others who opposed 'Ali were also wrong to rebel against community consensus which, in matters of caliphal succession, the

Muhâjirün and the Ansar, determined.

This generally favorable depiction of 'Ali could reflect a kind of

'Alid loyalism, here characterized by a belief that 'Ali's caliphate was legitimate, that his actions during the battle were above reproach, and that the opposition of the Ahl al-Jamal and Mu'awiya was

21 — unjustifiable. It is also possible that ad-Dinawari's loyalties were similar to Ibn Qutayba's. Ad-Dinawari supported 'Ali as caliph because his accession was uncontested and was endorsed by the Muhâjirün and the

Ansar. Moreover, ad-Dinawari may also have been influenced by the declining authority and stability of the caliphate; and in formulating his account, he too may have sought to stress the importance of paying allegiance to the legitimate ruler. 184

It is difficult, however, to overlook in ad-Dinawari's account the speeches of Sa'd b. Abi Waqqâs, Muhammad b. Maslama, 'Abd Allah b.

'Umar, 'usama b. Zayd, 'Uqba b. 'Àmir and Abu Müsâ, all Associates of the Prophet whose piety and/or concern for the Umma's unity prevented them from fighting against other Muslims to support 'Ali's caliphate;

[Sa'd] Give me a sword which can distinguish a believer from an unbeliever so that with it I can fight by your side.

['Abd Allah b. 'Umar] I implore you in God's name that you excuse me from [doing] what I do not understand.

[Muhammad b. Maslama] The Messenger of God ordered me to fight with my sword so long as idolaters would be killed by it. But if people of prayer would be killed, I was to strike it on the rocks of Uhud until it broke. I broke it yesterday.

[Usama b. Zayd] Excuse me from going with you on this trip. I swore to God that I would ggver fight one who testified that 'there is no god but God'.

Ibn 'Amir defended the neutrality of these four and reminded 'Ali of the bravery they had displayed in fighting for the cause of Islam in such early battles as Qadisiyya. Finally, when al-Hasan and 'Ammâr asked the Kufans to help 'All, Abu Müsâ cautioned the city's people against the disruptive dangers of fitna and urged them not to become involved in the fighting:

Oh people, obey me and you will be among the strongest of the Arabs. The wronged will seek refuge with you and those who fear will find safety with you. When a fitna approaches, it makes things [seem] equal, but when it leaves there is inequality and discord. This fitna will cause disunion. It is not know from where it comes . . . Sheathe your swords, remove your spear-heads, cut your bow-strings and stay in your houses. Oh people, one who sleeps during a fitna is better than one w^g is awake and one who is awake is better than one who walks. 185

None of these speeches expresses opposition to *Ali per se.

Indeed, as already noted, in other accounts several of these figures were unwilling to give their bay‘a to ‘All until they had seen what the rest of the Umma did. In ad-Dinawari's account there is at least a strong implication that all (except perhaps Abu Musa) had sworn allegiance to *Ali— Ibn 'Àmir addressed 'Ali by the caliphal title

'Amir al-Mu'minin.* Yet if the speeches do not express opposition, they certainly imply reservations about the wisdom of 'Ali's intentions. The events that constitute the narrative's conclusion prevent these reservations from being a central theme in the account; that is, the battle occurs in spite of the reservations, and it is with the battle and events leading up to it that the narrative is primarily concerned. Nevertheless, the speeches significantly affect the tone or texture of the account by proposing a reasonable alternative to the fighting between Muslims that occurred— an alternative that would have 24 avoided the fighting and preserved the community's unity.

The role that these speeches play in the account may reflect ad-Dinawari's own ambivalence towards the question of the fitna, and more generally that of conflict in the Umma. The weakening of caliphal authority that was one "theme" of his own lifetime may have helped to condition what he saw in the Battle of the Camel and what he chose to include in his account of it. He endorsed 'Ali's rule because he was the legitimate caliph. Yet at the same time, ad-Dinawari may have identified most closely with and supported the positions of those who. 186 in his version, refused to go so far in their support of ®Ali as to fight other Muslims. Ad-Dinawari may have accepted the diversity that characterized his age; cind in accepting it he saw that what counted was the brotherhood or unity of Muslims in Islam. What mattered less was their loyalty to and support of a "temporal" leader, especially if that support fragmented the Umma.

Ad-Dinawari, like al-Baladhuri and at-Tabarx, affected by events of the third/ninth century, saw in the the Battle of the Camel one example of the dangers that inhered in linking the stability of the 25 community too closely to the caliphate. He did not sanction opposition to the caliph— there is certainly no evidence that he approved of Talha and az-Zubayr's actions— rather, he saw in adherence to Islam a way to protect the community from the vicissitudes of political power. Ad-Dinawari was not, so far as can be determined, a student of fiqh or hadith, the two "fields" associated with attempts to develop the shari”a as a source of guidance that would be independent of the ruler. Yet empirical and historical evidence may have led ad-Dinawari to conclusions similar to those of the scholars of the law. NOTES

CHAPTER V II

^yâqût. Mu* jam al-Buldân, vol. 2, p. 545. 2 For biographical details and information on his works see An-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 8 6 ; Yâqût, Mu* 1am, vol. 2, pp. 26-33; *Abd al-Mun'im *Âmïr's_"Introduction" to ad-Dinawari's Akhbar at-Tiwâl; B. Lewin, s.v. "Ad-Dinawari," E.I.Z; Kahhâla, Mu* jam, vol. 1, pp. 218-19; GAL, SI, p. 187; and I. Kratchkovsky, Ad-Dinawari, "Akhbar at-Tiwâl." Preface, variantes et Index (Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1912). Kratchkovsky's work supplements the text of the AkhbSr edited by V. Guirgass (Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1888). On Ibn Sikkit and his son see An-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 79; and Yâqüt, Mu* jam, vol. 20, pp. 50-52. According to Yâqût, Mutawakkil had Ya*qûb b. Sikkit put to death for his Shi*i loyalties.

^For a discussion of the Kitâb an-Nabât see B. Lewis's article on "Ad-Dinawari" in the E.I.z. 4 ^ ^ • Several modern scholars have commented on ad-Dinawari's interest in the Persians; see for example, A. Duri, The Rise of Historical Writing Among the Arabs, pp. 74 and 149; *Abd al-Mun*im *Àmir, "Introduction," p. "ra'"; Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs, p. 349; Rosenthal, Muslim Historiography, p. 133; and Margoliouth, Lectures on Arabic Historians, gp. 112-14»

^Margoliouth, ibid., doubts a shu*ùbi tendency in the history. The Shu*Qbiyya ’movement,’ which flourished during the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries, especially among the kuttâb and udaba', stressed the equality and even superiority of the Persian civilization over the Arab. On the movement see H.A.R. Gibb, "The Social Significance of the Shuubiya," Studies on the Civilization of Islam, pp. 62-74; Hodgson, Venture, pp. 460-69; Roy Mottahedeh, "The Shu*ubiya and the Social History of Islamic Iran," International Journal of Middle Eastern History 7 (1976); 161-82; M. Carter, "The Kâtib in Fact and Fiction," Abr Nahrain, XI (1971); 42-56; and Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies, vol. 1, pp. 137-201.

^Petersen, *Ali and Mu*àwiya, pp. 161 ff.

187 188 7 _ Some of the sources he mentions are al-Asma*i (d/ 217/832), (an-Nadim,1 — Fihrist, p. 61); ^ ash-Sha*bi f(d. r»aca. Tin/79R^. 110/728), f (an-Nadim, a n —MarlTn Fihrist, p. 28); Ibn al-Kalbi; and al-Haytham b, *Adi (d, 207/822), (an-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 112). Others whom he mentions do not appear to have composed books that an-NadIm or Yâqùt knew of cind might have been oral sources. Petersen maintains that ad-Dinawari in his narrative of *Ali's caliphate relied heavily on Nasr b. Muzahim's Wag*at Siffin, p. 161.

8 - Ad-Dinawari, Akhbar, p. 140. 9 His appointments were *Uthman b. Hunayf over Basra, 'Umira b. Hasan over Kufa, ®Abd Allah b. *Abbas over the Yemen, Qays b. Sa'd over Egypt, and Sahl b. Hunayf over Syria, ibid., p. 141.

^^Tabûk was on the border of the Hijâz and Syria, Yâqût, Mu' jam al-Buldan, vol. 2, p. 14.

^^Ad-Dinawari, Akhbar, p. 141.

^^Ibid., p. 142. 13 - - Notice that ad-Dinawari does not here or earlier mention *Ali*s reasons for going to'Iraq. Given the passage's focus on Mu'âwiya's refusal to swear loyalty to 'All, the implication is that 'Ali planned to gather 'Iraqi support with which to fight Mu'awiya.

l^Ibid., p. 145.

^^Ibid,, pp. 146-47; ad-Dinawari furnishes details on the names of the different tribes that participated and their leaders.

^^Ibid., pp. 148-49; 'Ali recalled that with his sword, "az-Zubayr had many times removed worry from the Prophet's face." Notice also that he curses Ibn Jurmuz as the killer of Ibn Safiyya, az-Zubayr's mother and 'Ali's aunt. 17 Ad-Dinawari furnishes details about the fighting and about the heroics of individuals on both sides. 18 - - Ibid., pp. 151-52. Cf. Ibn Abi al-Hadid, Sharh, vol. 1, p. 206 . 19 Ad-Dinawari, Akhbar, p. 143. 20 Ad-Dinawari, like other historians, goes some way in limiting az-Zubayr's culpability by describing his conversation with ‘Ali, his admission of his error, and his subsequent departure from the battlefield before the fighting began. 189

Cf. Petersen's contention that ad-DÎnawauri was a "shiitizing" author because 1) he devoted a disproportionate amount of space in his work to *Ali and his caliphate, and 2) his chief source^ for much of 'Ali's reign was the Wag'at Siffin of the reputed Shi'i historian, Nasr b. MuzShim al-Mingarl (d. 212/827), (pp. 158-65). Certainly an interest in the reign of 'Ali or in the activities of toe early ®Alid partisans more generally need not be evidence of a Shi'i loyalty, assuming that we can talk of such for ad-Dinawari's lifetime. The opposition to the Umayyads by those who favored the rule of an 'Alid was intertwined with many of the most noteworthy events of the first century of the Umma's history.

It is also difficult to share Petersen's certainty that Nagr b. Muzal>im's Waqa'at Siffin was ad-DÎnawari's main source for 'All's caliphate. Ibn MuzShim does not describe the Battle of the Ceimel, although his work on Siffin does allude to it several times. There is thus material in ad-Dinawari's account that does not appear in Ibn MuzShim's. More importantly, however, even if ad-Dinawarf did rely chiefly on the Wag'at Siffin, there is not necessarily in this reliance evidence of ad-Dlnawarr's loyalties. Muslim historians enjoyed considerable flexibility in using their sources and were certainly not constrained to use only the works of historians whose alignments they shared. An historian quoting from a work could easily excise passages that supported a loyalty he did not share.

22 - Ad-Dinawari, Akhbar, p. 143. 23 Ibid., p. 145. Notice more generally that ad-Dinawari does not cite, as do other authors, many of the speeches that 'All and others make in support of his rule and in opposition to Talha and az-Zubayr. 24 Notice that all of the speeches, except for Abu Musa's, occur in a section entitled "The Bay'a of 'Ali" and therefore condition ad-Dinawari's description of the Battle of the Camel and the Battle of Siffin. 25 Cf. Marshall G.S. Hodgson, "Two Pre-Modern Muslim Historians," p. 55. CHAPTER VIII

AL-YA*QÛBÏ (d. ca. 284/897)

Almost no details of al-Ya‘qûbï's life are known.^ The date of his birth and his birthplace are uncertain. He was a kâtib attached to the

Tâhirid court in Iran, and it was probably while he was there that he wrote his Ta'rikh. When that dynasty fell in 259/873, al-Ya'qubi took 2 up residence in Egypt, where he died in about 284/897.'

Al-Ya'qubi's Ta'rikh is a "universal history" that, in two volumes, covers the period from Creation through the reign of the

‘Abbisid caliph al-Mu‘tamid (r.256-279/870-892)The first volume deals with Creation, the Biblical Patriarchs, the kings of Israel, and the and kingdoms of the Greece, Rome, Byzantium, Persia, Egypt under the , India, China, and Africa (especially the Maghrib), and, in the last eighty-five pages, with the Arabs and Arabia of the

Jahiliyya. The first 130 pages of the second volume are a kind of sira of the Prophet. Al-Ya'qübi describes Muhammad's marriage to Khadija, his revelations, the Abyssinian hijra, the hijra to Madina, the several battles between the nascent Islamic community and the Makkans, and finally the death of the Prophet. The remaining chapters of the second volume comprise a history of the caliphate, arranged regnally.

190 191

Al-Ya*qübi employs a continuous narrative style rather than the hadith format. He occasionally introduces a section or paragraph with the phrase "some of them transmitted" (rawa ba* duhum) or simply "he" or "they said" (gala, qâlù), but he rarely cites the names of his authorities, nor does he provide alternate versions of events. In the introduction to his second volume, al-Ya‘qübî mentions that he did not rely on the work of only one scholar because he had found that authors disagreed with each other in their datings and descriptions of events.

Therefore, he continues, he relied on the works of many scholars (such authors as al-Madi'ini, Ibn al-Kalbi, al-Waqidi, and Muhammad b. Ishaq, and others whom he does not name) to produce a work that was reliable, 4 but unencumbered with poems and long narratives.

The overall plan of al-Ya'qubi's history is not unlike that followed by al-Baladhuri, ad-DÎnawarî, or at-Tabarl, all of whom also begin their works with Creation— a feature that probably reflects a

Qur'inic view of history according to which Muhammad's prophecy occurred after many other peoples, to whom God had sent messengers, had refused to submit to His will. But whereas most Muslim historians treat pre-Islimic history in a relatively superficial manner, al-Ya'qubi devotes a significant proportion of his work to it.

Approximately one-quarter of his history focuses on pre-Islàmic and non-Arab peoples, kings, kingdoms, and empires. By way of contrast, only the first volume and a quarter of at-Tabari's ten-volume history, the first fifth of ad-Dinawari's history, and the first quarter of the first volume of al-Baladhuri's Ansab deal with the history of non-Arabs 192 before Islam. Furthermore, whereas other historians* discussions of the pre-Islimic period are usually limited to the "Ahl al-Kitab"— those to whom Muslims believe that God had previously sent prophets (principally the Jews and the Christians)— al-Ya*qObi discusses not only the Ahl al-Kitib, but the Indians and Chinese as well. In this latter feature, his work resembles some of the geographical texts, a resemblance that al-Ya'qûbi*s own interest in and familiarity with geography may help to explain.

Al-Ya qûbi's Account of the Battle

Al-Ya'qùbi's account of the the Battle of the Camel begins with the election of *Ali on Tuesday, the 23rd of Dhu-l'Hijja in the year thirty-five (Tuesday, June 21, 656).^ Talha, az-Zubayr, the Muhâjirûn and the Ansar all gave *Ali the bay*a, and of all of the people, Talha was the first to do so.^ Al-Ya*qubi adds that several individuals gave the bay*a, by proxy, for groups of people; Malik al-Ashtar swore the loyalty of the Küfans; Talha and az-Zubayr that of the Muhâjirûn; and

Abu al-Haytham b. at-Tayhan, *Uqba b. *Amr, and Abu Ayyûb, that of the

Ansaris. Only three, Marwan b. al-Hakam, Sa*id b. al-*Âs, and al-Walid b. *Uqba were at first unwilling to swear loyalty to *Ali because of grudges they held against him: *Ali had killed the fathers of Sa*id and al-Walid at Badr and he had insulted Marwan's father. However, by 193 promising to rule on the basis of the Qur'an and the Prophet's sunna,

*Ali was able to convince them to swear loyalty to him.^

As the new caliph, ‘Ali replaced ‘Uthmin's governors with men of his choice, except for Abu Musa at Kufa. Talha and az-Zubayr then came to ‘All, after he had appointed new governors, and insisted that he share his rule with them by giving them governorships, but ‘All refused. In what seems to be an alternate version, al-Ya‘qùbi adds that ‘Ali had (originally) appointed Talha over the Yemen and az-Zubayr over Bahrain, but had then withdrawn the appointments for fear that the two men would be corrupt. This decision by ‘Ali met with the disapproval of al-MughIra b. Shu‘ba, who advised ‘Ali to give Talha and az-Zubayr the governorships of the Yemen and Bahrain and to confirm by letter Mu‘awiya's position in Syria. Once things had settled down, al-Mughira argued, ‘Ali could make whatever changes he chose. To al-Mughira's annoyance, ‘Ali rejected this advice.®

Shortly thereafter, Talha and az-Zubayr asked ‘All's permission to go to Makka to make the ‘umra. ‘Ali had misgivings about their real intentions, but he nevertheless gave his permission. Before the two men reached Makka, ‘Â'isha, who was returning from the hajj, learned of

‘Uthmân's death and the election of ‘All and promptly retraced her steps. Talha and az-Zubayr met with her after she had arrived back in

Makka and induced her to join them in opposing ‘All. ‘Â'isha then tried to enlist Umm Salama in their cause. She asserted that ‘Uthman had been killed unjustly, that most of the people, including many Basrans, were not pleased with the election of ‘Ali, and that Umm Salama could 194 help her and Talha and az-Zubayr restore order to the Prophet's Umma.

Umm Salama refused to join them and reminded ‘Â'isha of the restrictions Muhammad had placed on his wives, which ‘Â'isha wouldbe 9 violating if she joined Talha and az-Zubayr,

‘Â'isha departed for Basra with Talha and az-Zubayr and a large force, which Ya‘li b. Munabbih, ‘Uthmân's governor of the Yemen, provisioned. One evening, on the way, the group passed by the oasis of al-Haw'ab. The dogs there began to howl and ‘Â'isha asked the name of the place. When she was told that it was al-Haw'ab, she became extremely agitated and insisted on being returned to Makka because, she recalled, the Prophet had once warned her not to be the one "at whom the dogs of al-Haw'ab howl."^^ She only agreed to continue after forty men swore [untruthfully] that the place was not al-Haw'ab.

When the group reached Basra, the governor of the city, ‘Uthman b.

Hunayf, barred ‘Â'isha and her companions' entry into the city.^^ Talha and az-Zubayr swore to ‘Uthman that they had not come to fight, but to restore order and they agreed to a treaty with the governor; Talha and az-Zubayr agreed not to do anything rash (IS yuhdithun hadathan) until

‘Ali arrived and each party guaranteed the other's safety. Yet very soon after Talha and az-Zubayr had gained entry to Basra, they broke their treaty with ‘Uthman, attacked him, and plucked every hair from his head, and then seized the city's treasury.

As masters of the city, the two men could not agree on who would lead the prayer; and as they argued, the time for prayer passed. 195

Finally, *A'isha intervened and insisted that Muhammad b. Talha and

— 12 'Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr would alternate in leading it.

When he learned that Talha and az-Zubayr had taken control of

Basra, ‘Ali hurried towards the city, accompanied by four hundred

Associates of the Prophet. Along the way, he was joined by six hundred men from the tribes of the Asad and the Tayy'. When he reached the area of Dhü Qar, he dispatched his son, al-Hasan, and ‘Ammir b. Yisir to

Kufa to ask its people for help. The two men were only partially successful, since Küfa's governor, Abu Müsâ, convinced six thousand

Küfans to remain in the city.

‘Ali moved on to Basra and, on the outskirts of the city at a 13 place called al-Khurayba, he and his troops made camp. He exchanged notes with Talha and az-Zubayr and learned that they sought to avenge

‘uthmân's death.Eventually the two sides lined up for battle, but

‘All refrained from giving the order to fight until three of his men had been killed by arrows shot by the Ahl al-Jamal.

Early in the fighting Marwan shot Talha in vengeance for ‘Uthman 15 and Talha died on the battle-field, confused by the whole affair. The most violent fighting centered around ‘Â'isha, in whose defense many of the Banu Dabba and the died.

During the fighting, ‘Ali met az-Zubayr and asked him if he remembered something that the Prophet had once said.^^ Az-Zubayr did and decided to depart from the battle; but before he could leave, he encountered his son, ‘Abd Allah, who accused him of cowardice. In anger, az-Zubayr grabbed a spear and attacked the two flanks and the 196 center of ‘Ali's army which, at ‘Ali's command, parted before az-Zubayr and did not strike at him. Then az-Zubayr departed, asking his son as he passed him if a coward would have done what he just did. Al-Ahnaf b. Qays saw az-Zubayr's departure and wondered at the irony of the situation;

I've never seen anything like this. He brought the Messenger of God's wife, urging her on. He tore from her the veil of the Messenger of God (i.e. took her from the protected seclusion in which the Prophet had placed her) while he secluded hig^own wife in his house. Then he forsook her [‘Â'isha] and left.

‘Amr b. Jurmuz overheard al-Ahnaf, followed az-Zubayr, and killed him in Wadi as-Siba‘.

The battle lasted for only four hours and by its end some three thousand had died. Once the fighting was over, ‘Ali forbade his men to kill any of the wounded or to track down any who had fought against them, and he guaranteed safety to all who laid down their weapons. He also sent ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Abbas to instruct ‘Â'isha to return to Makka and then himself provisioned a caravan for her and a guard of forty . . 18 women disguised as men.

Al-Ya‘qübi's Loyalties

Al-Ya‘qûbi's account does not make an issue of the bay‘a in the way that some of the other narratives do. The repeated emphasis on the procedural correctness of the bay‘a in pseudo-Ibn Qutayba's account, for example, is central to that author's assertion of the legitimacy of 197

*Ali's rule and the perfidy of Talha and az-Zubayr. The bay* a does not play the same kind of role in al-Ya*qûbi's account. His description of it is relatively brief and he does not refer to it elsewhere. To be sure, there is not, on the basis of his account, any cause to doubt the legitimacy of *Ali's accession.Talha and az-Zubayr made nc- objections to *Ali's election, they did not resist giving their oaths to him, and they never claimed that irregularities in the way that the oath had been sworn, nullified it or justified their opposition to him.

What is especially interesting in al-Ya*qûbi's narrative is a set of five speeches made after the bay* a had been sworn. These speeches, which were made by some of *Ali's supporters, suggest that the bay*a was important only insofar as it reflected popular recognition of

*Ali's innately superior and de facto qualifications to rule.

[Thâbit b. Qays al-Ansari] Oh Commander of the Faithful, surely if they [the first three caliphs] preceded you in sovereignty (wilâya), they did not proceed you in religion (ad-dln). If they outdistanced you yesterday, you have outdistanced them today. Neither they nor you could hide your rank (mawdi*) nor could they be ignorant of it. They were in need o£ you because of what they did not know; but you are in need of no one because of the knowledge that you possess.

[Khazima b. Thâbit al-Ansâri] Oh Commander of the Faithful, We desired no one but you for this affair of ours, and there was no turning except to you. If we believe what we have said of you, you are the first of the people in faith, the most knowing of the people about God, and the nearest of the believers to the Messenger of God. You have what they have, but they don't have what you do.

[Sa*sa*a b. SGhân] Oh Commander of the Faithful, you embellish the caliphate, but it cannot embellish you. You 198

raise its stature, but it cannot raise yours. It is more in need of you than you are in need of it.

[Malik b. al-Ashtar] Oh people, this [man] is the legatee among the legatees (wasiy al-awsiya*) and the heir to the knowledge of the prophets (warith 'ilm al-anbiya*). His bravery and abilities are exceptional. It is he to whose faith the Book of God and the Messenger in Paradise attest. Moral virtues (fadà'il) are complete in him. No one can doubt his early conversion, his knowledge, or his superiority.

[*Ugba b. 'Amr] He is the one who has a day like the day of ' and a bay'a like the bay'a of consent (ridwan). He is the imâm most rightly-guided, whose tyranny is not feared. He is thg^knowing one ('âlim), whose ignorance is not feared.

These five speeches contain terms that were employed by Shi'i theologians perhaps within al-Ya'qubi's lifetime and certainly by the fourth/tenth century to describe a sectarian vision of 'Ali. As the warith 'ilm al-anbiya*, 'Ali had a superior and God-given knowledge similar to that of the prophets. This knowledge, in the theologians' view, made 'Ali protected from error (ma'süm) and thus superior to all 21 other men of his age. Indeed, this knowledge was one of the defining characteristics of his status as "the imâm most rightly guided." As the imâm, possessed of this knowledge, 'Ali was therefore more qualified than any other to rule and guide the Umma. And because his knowledge was innate and of divine origin, he derived no greater authority from the "office" of caliph, inasmuch as none of his powers were conferred upon him by this man-made institution.

In seeking to understand al-Ya'qubi's account, it is important to avoid projecting into it doctrines held by Shi'i theologians. If such terms as imâm, wasiy and warith 'ilm al-anbiya' had been given 199 sectarian connotations in Shi'i theology, perhaps even during al-Ya'cjübi's lifetime, the terms may not have had those connotations outside of that theological context. The designation of 'Ali as the wasiy (legatee) may have implied nothing more than a recognition that

'Ali, as a kin of the Prophet, was one of his legal heirs. Similarly, the belief that 'Ali had inherited [some] of the knowledge of the

Prophet (warith 'ilm al-anbiya') was within the parameters of a non-sectarian 'Alid loyalism. It is also quite significant that none of the speakers allude to the doctrine of nass— the belief that

Muhammad had specifically designated 'Ali to rule the community.

Again, from the context of Shi'i theology, this doctrine may be implicit in at least al-Ashtar's speech; 'Ali could not be the wasiy the one who had received the wasiyya, if he were not mansûs, since the wasiyya was a formal sign of the nass. However, this connection, even if necessary to Shi'i theology, was not necessary in a more general context.

The purpose of the remarks in the foregoing paragraph is not to dismiss the significance of the five speeches, but to caution against understanding them out of context. The speeches are significant; they do not appear in any other surviving account nor do any of the other historians describe 'Ali as the speeches do. That is, it is significant that only al-Ya'qubi employed some of the terminology that many Imâmi Shi'i theologians used to describe 'Ali (and the other

Imams) and that only al-Ya'qubi suggested, through the speeches, that

'Ali's innate "right" to rule was more important than the legal "right" 200

conferred by the bay*a. On the basis of these facts, al-Ya'qubi's

loyalties could be described as a kind of heightened 'Alid partisanship, but not as a fully developed sectarian Shi*ism. The chief

support for this description lies in al-Ya'qubx's account as a whole.

Even if one assumed, for the sake of cirgument, that Shi'x

theologians had articulated the essential tenets of Shi'i theology by

the end of the third/ninth century, it would still not be possible to point to parts of the account other than the speeches that reflect this

theology. The most that could be said is that the speeches affect the tone of the account on an implicit level. An act of interpretation is

therefore required to explain the significance of most of the account

in a way consistent with a Shi'i theology. From this perspective, for example, 'Â'isha, Talha, az-Zubayr and those who supported them were

irremediallywrong to oppose 'Ali because he was God's chosen Imâm. In

opposing 'Ali, the Ahl al-Jamal were therefore opposing God. But the account certainly does not make these points explicitly, nor can it be

said that it implies them if the implication requires a perspective in which al-Ya'qûbi as an historian, not a theologian, did not fit.

The fact that a Shi'i loyalty does not explain most of the account

suggests then, at the very least, that in the late third/ninth century

a Shi'i theology was not yet "popularized" to the extent that it could

influence in fundamental ways the composition of historical works.

Consequently, it is not possible to posit, for al-Ya'qubi's lifetime or before, Shi'i traditions of historiography that resulted in histories

that could be termed Shi'i. This contention raises considerable doubts 201

about many modern scholars' expectations about works by historians

whose loyalties were reputedly Shi'i. In some cases these expectations

have resulted in a skepticism about the ability of a "Shi'i" historian

to write "objective" history; other cases are characterized not so much

by a skepticism as by an underlying assumption that "Shi'i" historians wrote history differently than did other historians. Yet these

scholars often qualify their own expectations when they focus on particular works by historians presumed to be Shi'i. Shaban, in his

study of the'Abbasid "revolution," for example, compliments al-Ya'qûbi

(and Ibn A'tham al-Kufi) because ". . . in spite of their Shi'a tendency, they did not attempt to present a biased picture of events in 22 the early history of Khurasan."

Similarly, Richter, in his discussion of al-Ya'qubi's Ta'rikh. has difficulty reconciling his own expectations for the influence of a

Shi'i loyalty on the writing of history with his impressions of al-Ya'qubi's work.

Al-Ya'qûbî was a Shl'ite and his history was probably the first attempt to embody the Shl'ite idea in a world history. Of course, the treatment of pre-Islamic history here is not different from that in other works. The new tendency begins with Muhammad, that is to say, with the 1st caliph in whose time the Shl'ite opposition had originated historically. But it must be taken into consideration how Shii' ite ideas are woven in cautiously and without diverging from the main base of the historical picture drawn by at-Tabarl. . . The real Shl'ite basic idea was not given as much attention as to weaken the main structure of the usual historiography.

Richter goes on to observe that the Shi'i conception of the Imâmate as a mediator resulted in their seeing the relationship between humanity and God in very different ways from the Sunnis; but he questions 202 whether Shi'i historians could incorporate this conception into their histories ;

Because of the constant suppression of the Shl'ite literature it is very difficult to say whether or not this idea, which differs considerably from Sunnite history writing, has had further fruitful effects on its historiography. Al-Ya'qûbi's world history was certainly not able to introduce the Shl'ite conception of history into Islam and into its authentic historical literature.

Richter assumes a very early ideological division of the community into

Sunni and Shi'i camps and posits a distinct historiographical tradition associated with each. But then he has to argue for the restraint of

Shi'i views in order to explain why al-Ya'qubi's work does not "diverge

from the main base of the historical picture" and reflect these 23 views.

Finally, Petersen, in his historiographical study of Arabic accounts of the Battle of Siffin, assumes that al-Ya'qubi was a Shi'i and that his loyalties shaped his account. However, Petersen does not

show in particular cases how the configurations of al-Ya'qubi's 24 depiction of the battle actually reflect his loyalties.

Each of these scholars assume that a Shi'i ideology was developed

and popularized enough by al-Ya'qObi's lifetime to result in a distinct historiographical tradition associated with the tenets of that

ideology. Yet Petersen does not adduce specific examples from

al-Ya'qubi's work to support his assumption; and Shaban and

Richter, in order to explain why al-Ya'qubi's Ta'rikh does not differ

from other histories that reflect a posited non-Shi'i ("Sunni") norm, 25 must suggest that he controlled his own biases. The three scholars. 203 but especially Shaban and Richter, thus approach al-Ya*qûbi's text with the assumption that it should display certain Shi*i characteristics, and then they must make yet other assumptions to explain what they find, or do not find. But if we approach the Ta * rikh without these assumptions, then the text itself might suggest 1) that Shi*ism was not yet a developed ideology in the late third/ninth century or 2 ) that the beliefs of Shi*i theologians had influenced in only limited ways the views of Muslims who shared the theologians' veneration of *Ali and his descendants. In either case, we would not expect to find a Shi*i tradition of historiography.

In the end, the most that can be said is that al-Ya*qûbi's loyalties may represent a kind of heightened *Alid partisanship. His account as a whole certainly accepts the legitimacy of *Ali's accession, the propriety of his actions, and the impropriety of the Ahl al-Jamal's actions. At the same time that he supports ‘Ali as caliph, he also emphasizes 'Ali's personal qualities by depicting *Ali as imâm, as wasiyal-awsiya', and as warith * ilm al-anbiya'. It is significant that none of the authors of accounts of the battle employ these terms in their descriptions of *Ali, and perhaps by means of them al-Ya*qübl sought to express a personal loyalty to ‘Ali that went further than a

Muslim's loyalty to the caliph. Yet it would be a mistake to make too much of al-Ya'qubi's use of the terms and to assume that they reflected on his part a developed sectarian Shi*ism. NOTES

CHAPTER V I I I

^Yâqût lists only works that al-Ya'qübï is supposed to have written and gives the year of his death. Mu' jam, vol. 5, p. 152. See also A. Duri, The Rise of Historical Writing, pp. 66-67, 150, and 158; and W.G. Millward, "Al-Ya*qûbl's Sources and the Question of Shi*a Partiality," Abr Nahrain XII (1971-72): 47-75.

^Petersen, *Ali and Mu'awiya p. 169 [citing Houtsma's "Preface" to the Ta'rikh (Leiden; E.J, Brill, 1883), pp. iiff], Al-Ya*qùbî's only surviving work, other than his history, is a geography— Kitàb al-Buldân, ed. M. de Goeje (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1873).

^Al-Ya*qûbi, Ahmad b. Abi Ya'qub Ta'rikh, 2 vols.(Beirut: Dâr Sâdir, 1960). 4 _ Ibid., vol. 2, p. 6 . "Wa ja*alnahu kitâban mukhtasaran, hadhafnâ minhu al-ash'ar wa tatwll a1-akhbar." Unless otherwise‘noted,‘all further references to’al-Ya*qûbi's Ta'rikh are to volume two.

^Al-Ya'qûbi used multiple "calendars" for dating some events. For example, in addition to giving a hijri date for *Ali's election, al-Ya'qûbi also wrote (p. 178):

In the months of the non-Arabs (al-'ajam [it occurred in] Haziran [the Syriac month of June], The sun that day was in Gemini by 26 degrees and forty minutes; the moon was in Aquarius by 18 degrees and forty minutes; Saturn was in Virgo by 25 degrees; and Mars was in Capricorn by 7 degrees.

^It is interesting that al-Ya'qûbi mentions that at the time of the bay* a a man of the Banu Asad observed that: "The first hand that gave the bay*a [i.e. Talha's] was withered (shalla') or undeveloped (nâqisa)." The implication may be that a withered hand giving the bay*a boded ill for 'All's caliphate. Cf. Pseudo-Ibn Qutayba, Kitâb al-Imâma, vol. 1, p. 47; and al-Baladhuri, Ansib, p. 242 (Ms).

'Al-Ya'qûbi, Ta'rikh, pp. 178-79.

204 205

^Ibid., p. 180. Al-Ya'qûbi does not describe 'Ali's answer, but only al-Mughxra's reaction to it: "By God, I never offered him ['Ali] advice before and I won't do so again."

^Ibid., pp. 180-81.

l°Ibid., p. 181.

^^Ibid. In the Arabic, 'Â'isha is one of the objects of the sentence: "'Uthman prevented her and those with her from entering." 12 Ibid. Leading the prayer or designating someone to lead it was one of the responsibilities of the leader and was thus symbolic of leadership. Notice, for example, that Muhammad's entrusting the prayer to Abu Bakr was taken by some as proof of the Prophet's confidence in Abu Bakr's suitability to rule.

^^On al-Khurayba see Yâqût, Mu' jam al-Buldân, vol. 2, p. 363.

^^Notice that in al-Ya'qubi's version of the killing of 'Uthman, Talha, az-Zubayr, and 'Â'isha were the most active in inciting Muslims against the caliph, al-Ya'qûbi, T a 'rikh, p. 175.

^^Ibid., p. 182. As he was dying, Talha lamented: "I've never seen a day like today or a shaykh of the Quraysh more forlorn than me. I never before participated in something without knowing my part in it."

^^Al-Ya'qübi does not explain what it was that the Prophet had said. 17 Ibid., p. 183. Fahataka 'anhà h i jâb rasûl Allah, wa satara haramatahu fi baytihi. Thumma aslamaAa wa'nsaraf.

Ibid. Both Ibn 'Abbas and 'All reminded 'Â'isha that she had disobeyed the Prophet's wishes when she left the house in which he had ordered her to stay.

^^Recall that the three who were at first averse to giving 'All the bay' a— Marwân, Sa'id b. al-Âs, and al-Walid b. 'Uqba— did eventually swear loyalty. 20 Ibid., p. 179. The "day of 'Aqaba" in 'Uqba's speech refers to a pledge of Loyalty which a group of Madinans gave to Muhammad shortly before he made the hijra. The bay'at ar-ridwin occurred at the time of the Treaty of Hudaybiyya in 7/628. The Prophet, with a group of Muslims, had gone to Makka to perform the 'umra. He was prevented by the Makkans from entering the city and, in order to avoid a battle, he had agreed to the treaty of Hudaybiyya (a place on the outskirts of Makka), by the terms of which he would be able to return for the pilgrimage the following year. In the course of negotiations which 206

ended with the treaty, the Prophet had sent ‘Uthman as his representative to the Makkans, A rumor reached Muhammad, and the Muslims with him, that the Quraysh had killed ‘Uthman, and the Prophet caused those with him to pledge their support, even with their lives. See Ibn Hisham, Sira an-Nabawiyya, 2 vols., ed. ‘A. ash-Shibli, M. as-Saqa, and I. al-Abyàrî (Cairo: n.p., 1955), vol. 2, pp. 315-16. Cf. Qur'an, 48:18. 21 See Sachedina.Islamic Messianism (pp. 106 and 135-38) for a discussion of ‘isma in Imâmi Shi‘ism. Sh£‘i and Jama‘i-Sunni theologians also'maintained that Muhammad and perhaps all prophets were ma‘sum. See, for example, I. Goldziher, s.v. "‘Isma," Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, ed. H.A.R. Gibb and J.H.‘Kraemers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965); and Goldziher's Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, translated by Andras and Ruth Hamori, with an introduction and additional notes by B. Lewis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 186.

^^Shaban, ‘Abbâsid Revolution, p. xx. Ibn A

^^The assumption that al-Ya‘qûbi's loyalties were Shi'i is quite common; in addition to the above titles see also H.A.R. Gibb, , p. 79; Jafri, Shi'a Islam, pp. 28, and 38-40; N. Abbott, Arabic Literary Papyri, vol. 2, p. 212; A. Duri, The Rise of Historical Writing, p. 158; W.G. Millward, "Al-Ya'qubi's Sources and the Question of Shi'ia Partiality;" Nicholson, Literary History, p. 349; and Yves Marquet, "Le Si'isme au ix siecle à travers l'histoire de Ya'qübi," Arabica XIX (1972): 1-45, and 101-38. CHAPTER IX

AL-GHAIÂBÏ (d. 298/910)

Abu Abd Allah Muhammad b. Zakariyyâ' b. al-Basri, commonly known by his al-Ghalâbi, was born in Basra and died there in

298/910.^ He was noted as an authority in the fields of sira, maghâzi, and ta'rikh and was held in good repute for his extensive knowledge and reliable transmission of information. He compiled a number of monographs that dealt with famous individuals and events in early

Islamic(ate) history— works on Zayd b. 'Ali, Fatima, ‘Ali and al-Husayn, and long and abridged works on the battles of the Camel and

Siffin.^

Of al-Ghalâbi*s works, all that survives is a part of his Waq‘at al-Jamal— it begins with ‘Ali's arrival in Basra and ends with his victory over the Ahl al-Jamal. Muhammad Hasan Â1 Yasin, the editor of the manuscript, suggests that the work may be the complete text of al-Ghalâbi's abridged account, rather than a fragment of a longer one.

There is some support for this suggestion in the manuscript itself inasmuch as it begins with a lengthy isnâd that lists al-Ghalâbi's authorities and those to whom he transmitted the material, and because the account ends, as do others, with the end of the battle.^ That is,

207 208 if his work, in the form in which it survives, had been accidentally separated from a longer work, one would not expect it to begin with a complete isnâd. Furthermore, the text has a coherence that one might not expect to find in an unintentional fragment. With the exception of two references to the death of ‘Uthman, there are no allusions to events that occurred in the Hijâz or on the road to Basra.

Al-Ghallbi's account is narrated by a group of elderly men and women of Bapra and begins with their description of ‘Ali's arrival with his army in az- a small village on the shores of the 4 between Wâsit and Basra. The elderly people explained that they watched the arrival from the vantage point of roof-tops and upper windows. With one voice, they described each group and its leader, mentioned that one of themselves asked the identity of each leader, and that another gave an answer. One such passage reads:

Then another rider on a reddish horse passed. The rider was wearing a yellow turban the ends of which flowed down in front of him and in back of him. He was girt with a sword and had a bow over his shoulder. He was accompanied by a group of people.

One of us said:"Who is this?"

Someone else said: "‘Ugba b. ‘Âmir al-Juhani, one of those who fought at Badr.”

These descriptions, of thirteen men in all, end with an elaborate description of ‘Ali and three of his sons, al-Hasan, al-Husayn, and

Muhammad b.al-Hanafiyya.

After ‘Ali made camp, his herald ordered the troops to refrain 209 from fighting the Basrans until ordered to do so and then *Ali sent two separate envoys to ^Â'isha, Talha, and az-Zubayr to try to convince them not to fight. When both embassies failed and the Basrans began to pelt *Ali's troops with arrows, *Ali asked for a volunteer to go between the ranks with a part of the Qur'an, "calling them [the

Basrans] to what is in it."^ A young man (ghulâm), appropriately named

7 Muslim, volunteered and was immediately killed by the Basrans.

Then ‘Ali himself rode out between the ranks, unarmed, and called for Talha and az-Zubayr to come out to talk to him. Eventually az-Zubayr, armed to the teeth, went out to meet him. The conversation that occurred between them is similar to that described in several other accounts and had the same result: ‘Ali asked az-Zubayr what he hoped to accomplish. When az-Zubayr explained that they were seeking vengeance for ‘Uthman, ‘Ali cursed the caliph's killers and then reminded az-Zubayr of the day when the two of them and Muhammad were together: Az-Zubayr had suggested to Muhammad that ‘Ali could not lay aside his vanity (zahw). Muhammad had replied that ‘Ali was not vain and had asked az-Zubayr if he cared for ‘Ali. Az-Zubayr had asserted that he did and Muhammad then predicted that one day az-Zubayr would fight ‘Ali and treat him unjustly. Az-Zubayr remembered the prediction and swore that if he had remembered earlier, he would never have set out. However, he complained, things had now gone too far for him to withdraw without suffering disgrace. ‘All argued that whatever disgrace az-Zubayr might be forced to suffer [in this world] could not 210 compare with the suffering he would experience in Hell if he persisted.® Az-Zubayr then agreed not to fight and returned to his 9 camp, reciting a poem in which he explained his decision. At his camp, he explained to his son, ‘Abd Allah, that he was leaving because ‘Ali had reminded him of something he had forgotten. ‘Abd Allah rejected his father's excuse and opined that his real reason for leaving was that he had become afraid when he saw ‘Ali's army. To prove his son wrong, az-Zubayr attacked the two flanks and the center of ‘Ali's army with a spear, the head of which he had first removed. Then he left

Basra for the Hijâz.

The fighting began after az-Zubayr's departure and quickly became heated. Curiously, ‘Ali dozed off in the midst of the fighting as his right and left flanks were being defeated. Eventually some of ‘Ali's nephews (the sons of his brother ‘Aqil) came to him and expressed wonder at his odd behavior in the face of imminent defeat. ‘Ali, in some irritation, replied that his appointed time had not come and that, in any event, he was unconcerned about death.He did, however, rouse himself and gave the army's banner to Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya with orders to attack. When Ibn al-Hanafiyya faltered, ‘Ali harshly took the flag from him and led the attack himself. Under ‘Ali's leadership the fighting became much more heated, especially around‘Â'isha's camel.

In the course of the fighting, ‘Ali and Talha came face-to-face.

The first part of their conversation is almost identical to ‘Ali's 211 earlier conversation with az-Zubayr: ‘Ali asked Talha why he was fighting, Talha replied that he was seeking vengeance for ‘Uthman, and so forth. ‘Ali then reminded Talha that Muhammad had once prayed that

God would: "treat as a friend one who treated him [‘Ali] as a friend and as an enemy one who treated him [‘Ali] as an enemy. Talha, like az-Zubayr before him, rued his actions and turned away from the battle. Before he could leave, however, he was spotted by Marwân b. al-Hakam who exclaimed with disgust: "It no longer matters whether I shoot my arrows here [against ‘Ali's forces] or here [against the Ahl al-Jamal]," and he shot and killed Talha.

The fighting continued after Talha's death. In both prose and poetry al-Ghalâbi describes the endeavors of different tribes to guard the camel, some of the individual combats that occurred, and finally the success of ‘Ali's soldiers in hamstringing the animal.

The battle finally came to an end when the camel fell. ‘Ali's first concern was for ‘Â'isha's well-being, and he sent Muhammad b. Abi

Bakr, ‘Â'isha's brother, to see if she was harmed. Then ‘Ali went to her himself and asked if she had been following Muhammad's orders in her recent behavior and criticized Talha and az-Zubayr for leaving their wives at home while they exposed Muhammad's wife to the dangers of war. ‘Â'isha defended her behavior by claiming that she was duped into believing that she could help to restore peace to the Ummah. ‘Ali rejected that excuse on the grounds that she had no business becoming involved in the affair since Muhammad had ordered her to stay in her 212

12 house. 'Â'isha replied, with some acerbity, that since he had won he could afford show mercy. 'Ali agreed, told her that no blame will be laid on her and that God would forgive her, and then made provisions for her housing. Al-Ghalâbi ends his narrative with a description of

*Ali grief-striken over the body of Talha, which he came upon as he was walking among the dead on the battle field.

Al-Ghalâbi*s Loyalties

A determination of al-Ghalâbi's possible loyalties is hampered by the fact that his narrative does not begin with the death of 'Uthmân and the election of 'Ali, but with 'Ali's arrival in Basra. There is, thus, no description of the bay'a, nor are there any indications of the motives of 'Â'isha, Talha, and az-Zubayr. Nevertheless, the account does provide some clues to al-Ghalâbi's loyalties.

Al-Ghalâbi's work begins, it will be remembered, with a description of the arrival of 'Ali and his army at the outskirts of

Basra. The description of 'Ali and his three sons (the last group in the procession) bears closer examination;

Then another group of about one hundred passed us. Each man was muffled with a scarf. The group was led by a man on a grey mule. He was wearing armour and a black turban and was girt with a sword and was carrying a staff. On his right was a handsome youth with hair that hung to 213

his shoulders and gently struck his face when the wind blew. On his left was a handsome youth with hair like the first. Both youths were armed with weapons. A third youth, younger than the first two, and carrying a black banner, preceded the man on the mule.

We said; 'Who is this and who are those [three] with him?'

Someone said: 'That is *Ali b. Abi Talib and those three are ai-Hasan, al-Husayn, and Muhammad. That is the banner (raya) of the Messenger of God is), which is called al-‘Uqab; that is the coat of mail, called Dhu'1-Fudûl, which the Messenger of God wore. That is his sword, Dhu'1-Fiqâr, and that is his staff, al-Mamshüq. That is his mule, al-Duldul, which ®Ali is riding; al-Hasan is riding the Prophet's horse, as-Sakb; al-Husayn is riding al-Murtajiz, another of the Messenger's horses; and^^ Muhammad is riding the Messenger's horse, al-Bahr.'

Some of the objects mentioned in this passage had particular importance for the Imami Shi'i theologians of the fourth/tenth century, and perhaps earlier. They believed that the Prophet's banner was last carried by 'All at the Battle of the Camel and that the next person to carry it would be al-Qa'im or the Mahdi who would unfurl it on the day of^ whis return. 14

The sword and the coat of mail were even more important in Shi'i theology. Shi*i theologians maintained that Gabriel had brought the sword, Dhu'1-Fiqâr ('possessed of piercing qualities') from Heaven and had given it to Muhammad. Muhammad had passed the sword on to 'Ali who had passed it on to al-Hasan and so forth. Similarly, Muhammad was the first to wear the coat of mail, Dhu'1-Fudûl ('possessed of excellent qualities'), and he gave it, with the sword, to 'All. These objects, according to the theologians, were visible emblems of the wasiyya, and 214 the one who possessed them was the designated (mansûs)

The brief description of the conversation that occurred between

Talha and ‘Ali during the fighting is also relevant to a consideration of al-Ghalabi's loyalties (see above, page 211). When Talha told ‘Ali that he was fighting in order to avenge ‘Uthman's death, ‘Ali reminded him that the Prophet had once asked God that He " . . . treat as a friend one who treated ‘Ali as a friend and as an enemy one who treated

‘Ali as an enemy.The Prophet's words that ‘Ali quoted were part of a short "prayer" that Muhammad supposedly made at Ghadir Khum after his

"farewell pilgrimage." There, before a small group of Muslims,

Muhammad took ‘Ali by the hand and asked the others if ‘Ali was not ■ worthier (awla) than them. The others agreed that ‘Ali was; and then the Prophet said: "He whose (master, patron, leader, or friend) I am, so too is ‘Ali. Oh God, treat as a friend one who treats ‘Ali as a friend and as an enemy one who treats ‘Ali as an enemy.Shi‘i theologians understood the term mawla to mean master or leader and cited the prayer as irrefutable proof of Muhammad's specific designation of ‘Ali as his successor.

The same qualifications that shaped an attempt to understand al-Ya‘qubi's loyalties must also apply to a consideration of al-Ghalabi's. In spite of his allusions to ‘Ali's possession of the

Prophet's armour and to a part of the Prophet's speech at Ghadir Khum, a Shi‘i loyalty cannot explain the majority of al-Ghalabi's account, nor do the allusions need to reside only in a sectarian perspective. 215

Although Shi'i theologians, perhaps as early as al-Ghalabi's lifetime, considered the Prophet's armour to be part of the wasiyya and, therefore, considered possession of it proof of the Imamate, there is no explicit eyidence that al-Ghalâbi drew these conclusions.

Similarly, the part of the Prophet's speech at Ghadir Khum that al-Ghalâbi quoted does not haye to imply the rest ("He whose mawla I am, so too is *Ali)— in the context of the battle, the line quoted makes perfect sense since Talha was treating *Alî as an enemy. And eyen if al-GhalAbi intended to imply the first part of the short speech, there is no evidence to suggest that he understood mawlA to mean "master" or "leader" rather than "friend" or "patron." It is significant that al-Ghalâbî alluded to 'Ali's possession of the

Prophet's armour and to a part of the speech at Ghadir Khum, and certainly these allusions help to make al-Ghalâbi's representation of

'All a favorable one, but they do not necessarily make that representation Shi'i. There is no indication in the narrative that al-Ghalâbi understood the armour as emblematic of the wasiyya or the speech as proof of specific designation (nass). Rather these elements could have provided al-Ghalâbî with one way to express a heightened

'Alid partisanship or even a kind of 'Alid loyalism. Other parts of his narrative bear out this suggestion.

Unlike other accounts, in which the focus alternates between 'Ali and the Ahl al-Jamal, al-Ghalâbî focuses consistently on 'Ali. No doubt this focus is due in part to the fact that the narrative begins with 2.16

‘All's arrival in Basra; in other accounts significant material on the

Ahl al-Jamal— their deliberations in Makka, their journey to Basra and the episode at al-Haw'ab, their negotiations with ‘Uthman b. Hunayf and their eviction of him— comes before ‘Ali reaches the city. Still, as these other accounts also demonstrate, there was ample material that dealt with the Ahl al-Jamal after‘Ali reached Basra, and it is interesting that al-Ghalâbi chose not to include any of it. There are no references to discussions between Talha and az-Zubayr and the

Basrans; al-Ghalâbi mentions that ‘Ali sent two envoys to try to dissuade ‘À'isha, Talha, and az-Zubayr from battle, but he says nothing about the exchange that occurred between the envoys and the three. The omission of even a reference to az-Zubayr's death is especially apparent. In short, ‘Ali is at the center of the narrative and controls almost all of its events, either physically or through his knowledge, even if he does not participate directly in them. Az-Zubayr leaves because of his conversation with ‘Ali. Talha also intends to leave after talking with ‘Ali and it is because of his intention that

Marwan kills him. Even the course of the battle appears inconsequential until ‘Ali takes an active part in it.

The dominance of ‘Ali in the account may also help to explain the narrative's coherence in spite of its beginning with ‘Ali's arrival in

Basra. Perhaps because al-Ghalabi's interest was in ‘Ali, he could create a coherent account that did not need to allude to events that occurred before ‘All reached Basra, to Talha, az-Zubayr and ‘Â'isha's 217

19 actions and motives, or to the causes of the war more generally. What

mattered was *Ali, what he said and did. The actions of others were

important only insofar as they helped to illustrate a facet of 'Ali's

character.

Al-Ghalâbi, like al-Ya'qubi, and in contrast to Ibn Qutayba, for

example, appears to be primarily interested in 'Ali the man, rather

than in 'Ali the caliph. His narrative appears to reflect a personal

support of ' Ali rather than a more abstract support of a principle— the

necessity of giving obedience to the legitimate rule. This interest in

‘Ali could reflect, on al-Ghalabi's part, a kind of 'Alid loyalism— a

veneration of 'Ali as one of the Prophet's closest relatives, one of

the great champions of Islam, and one of the Râshidûn caliphs; or it

could reflect a heightened 'Alid partisanship— an 'Alid loyalism

combined with the conviction that 'Ali and his descendants were the most qualified to rule the Umma. On the basis of the material at hand,

and in light of the uncertainty about the extent to which Shi'i

theology might have "filtered down" to an historian, it is unwise to

categorize al-Ghalâbi as an 'Alid loyalist but not an 'Alid partisan or vice versa. Indeed, although al-Ghalâbi and al-Ya'qûbi's accounts have

certain features in common, the many differences between them remind us

that loyalties were far from monolithic. NOTES

CHAPTER IX

^ For biographical details see M.H. Â1 Yisin in the "Introduction" to his edition of al-Ghalabi's Wag*at al-Jamal (Baghdad; Matba'a al-Ma'arif, 1970).

^Â1 Yasin lists the different works attributed to him in his "Introduction," pp. 13-14; see also an-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 121; adh-Dhahabi, Mizan, vol. 3, pp. 58f.; and Kahhala, Mu* jam, vol. 10, p. 6,

^The Wag*at al-Jamal begins with the works full title Juz* Wag*at al-Jamal and a brief statement that the work is a part of the "hadith" on the Battle of the Camel transmitted on the authority of Muhammad b. Yahyâ b. al-*Abbis as-Süli and is the narrative or version (riwaya) of al-Khatib al-BâghdSdi. Following this opening comment, there are two isnads. The first ends with al-BighdSdi (Abu A ^ a d *Abd al-Wahhâb b. *Ali b. *Ali b. *Ubayd Allah al-Amîn Ibn Sakin < Abu Bakr Muhammad b. *Abd al-Baqx b. Muhammad b. *Abd Allah b. Muhammad al-Ansarl al-Bazz3z < al-Khatib al-Baghdadi); the second isnad begins with ai-Baghdâdi, includes among other râwîs , as-Süli and al-Ghalâbi, and ends with the "eye-witness" narrators of the Wag*at al-Jamal, a group of elderly Basrans (Al-Baghdadi < Kuludhani < as-Süli < al-Ghalâbî < * Ubayd Allah b. Muhammad b. *Â'isha < Ma*n b. *îsâ Abu *ïsâ b. Ma*n al-*Abdî < his father < elderly Basrans).

Two of the râwîs in the isnad are generally more well-known than al-Ghalâbi. Al-Bâghdâdi (d. 454/1071) was the author of the famous Ta'rikh a1-Baghdad. As-Süli (d. ca. 335/9466) wrote, among other works, a history of the early *Abbisids, which also paid special attention to poets and poetry. On as-Süli see an-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 167; GAS vol. 1 p. 331; GAL, vol. 1, pp. 143-45; Yâqùt, Mu' jam, vol. 19, p. 109; and Kahhâla, Mu' jam, vol. 12, p. 105. In fact, the Waq*at al-Jamal is attributed to as-Süli in the Fihrist of the Zihiriyya Library in Damascus, which holds the manuscript of the work (folios 135a-137a, Ms. no. 129, "tasawwuf"), and in the Fihrist of the Ma'had al-Makhtûtât al-*Arabiyya in Cairo, which has a micro-film copy of the Damascus manuscript ("ta'rikh" no. 640). F. Sezgin, apparently relying on the Zahiriyya cataloguing, also names as-Süli as the author of a

218 219

Waq*at al-Jamal, GAS, vol. 1, p. 33.

On the other hand, an-Nadîm mentions that al-Ghalâbi wrote a work on the Battle of the Camel (Kitâb al-Jamal.; Fihrist, p, 121). Ibn Abi al-Hadid in his Sharh also cites al-Ghalâbi as a source for a number of events o f ‘Ali's lifetime, including the Battle of the Camel, but he does not mention the titles of any works (see, for example, vol. 4, pp. 825, 827, 839; and vol. 5, p. 172). An-Nadim and other sources do not mention any such title in entries on as-Süli. The beginning of the Waq*at al-Jamal furnishes additional evidence for al-Ghalabi's authorship of the work. The part of the isnad in which he is mentioned reads: "He [as-Süli] said: 'Muhammad b. Zakariyya*al-Ghalâbi transmitted to us in Basra in the Mosque of Abü al-Hârith as-Safâr in the year 273 [8 8 6 ] . . 1 " (p. 29).

^yàqût. Mu*,jam, vol. 3, p. 128.

^Al-Ghalâbi, al-Jamal, p. 31.

^Ibid., p. 37. 7 In the narrative, his death is followed by a poem cited by his mother.

"Oh God, a Muslim went to them, reciting God's book, not fearing them. They stained their spears with his blood, while his mother stood by watching them.

Ibid. p. 38; cf. at-Tabarï, Ta'rikh, vol. 4, p. 511.

^Al-Ghalâbi, al-Jamal, p. 39. ■

*Ibid. 10 Ibid., p. 40 11 Ibid., p. 42 12 Ibid., p. 46 13 Ibid., p. 35 14 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism (p. 175),mentions the significance of the banner in Imami Shi'i . Cf. Muhammad Bâqir Majlisi, Bihâr al-Anwar, 102 vols (Tehran: Islandyya, 1964): "The sixth Imam said:" 'I see him [al-Mahdi] that he has entered the city of Makka wearing the apparel of the Prophet and a yellow turban on his head. He 220 has put on the patched sandals of the Prophet and the letter's stick is in his hands . . .'"(vol. 2, p. 972; translated and quoted in Sachedina, Islamic Messianism. p. 161).

^^Ibid., p. 21; Jafri, Shi'a Islam, p. 293; and Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering, p. 6 6 .

^^Al-Ghalâbî, al-Jamal, p. 42.

^^The complete speech is cited in al-Ya*qübi, Ta'rikh, vol. 2, p. 112; and al-Mas'udi, Kitâb at-Tanblh wa al-Ishraf, ed. M.J. de Goeje, Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, vol. 8 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1894; reprint ed., Beirut: Khayyat, 1965), p. 255. See also L. Veccia Vaglieri, s.v. "Ghadir Khumn," E.I.^; and S.H.M. Jafri, Shi*a Islam, pp. 19-23.

^^"The Shi*a unequivocally take the word in the meaning of leader, master, and patron, and therefore the explicitly nominated successor of the Prophet. The Sunnis, on the other hand, interpret the word mawla in the meaning of a friend, or the nearest kin and confidant." (Ibid., p. 21.) Jafri has a good discussion of the possible meanings of the term mawla; the different translations of the term in the passage quoted above are Jafri's. 19 Talha and az-Zubayr's references to the death of 'Uthman are the only exceptions. In al-Mas'ùdl's account, which is based on as-Sùli's narrative and is in many respects quite similar to al-Ghalâbî's, 'All reminds ^alha that he had been the first to swear the bay'a. See al-Mas'üdi, Murüj adh-Dhahab wa Ma'àdin al-Jawhar, 7 vols., ed. Charles Pellat (Beirut: Publications de l'Université Libanaise, 1966-79), vol. 3, p. 104. CHAPTER X

AT-TABARÏ [224-311/838-923]

The last account of the Battle of the Camel to be considered in this dissertation is in at-Tabari's Ta'rikh ar-Rusul wa al-Mulûk ("The

History of Prophets and Kings/') a work that many modern scholars consider to be the culmination of the classical Islamic historical tradition.^ Abu Ja'far Muhammad b. Jarir at-Tabari was born in Âmul,

Tabaristân in 224-25/838. He apparently showed an aptitude for learning 2 from an early age. After he had mastered the educational essentials, he traveled to Baghdad to study with the muhaddith/faqih Ahmad b.

Hanbal, who, unfortunately, died shortly before at-Tabari's arrival in the city. From Baghdad at-Tabari traveled extensively in other parts of ^Iriq, in Syria and Egypt and studied all branches of learning, especially hadith and fiqh, the latter with masters of the ,

Shafi'i, and Iraqi schools (madhahib,sinq. ) of law. He eventually returned to Baghdad, where he continued his studies and taught.^

Although at-Tabari's interests were eclectic and his grasp of different branches of learning apparently thorough, his primary 4 interest was in the law. He wrote several works on fiqh and, after

221 222 studying other madhâhib, formed his own (the Jariri), which lasted for only a short time after his death.^

At-Tabari is better known today for his masterful commentary on the Qur'an and his detailed history than he is for his contributions to fiqh.^ His Ta'rikh is a remarkably detailed work that covers the history of humanity, especially the Ahl al-Kitâb, from "creation" to the rise of Islam and the history of Islâmdom, arranged annalistically, down to the year 303/915, just eight years before at-Tabari's death in

310/923. Throughout most of the work at-Tabari employs the hadith format and only rarely makes comments that are explicitly his own.

From his isnads it is apparent that he made extensive use of the works of his predecessors, such as Abü Mikhnaf, Sayf b. 'Umar, Nasr b.

Muzahim, al-Wâqidî, al-Madâ’ini, al-Ju'fi, Ibn Sa'd, and Ibn al-Kalbx.

A consequence of this feature, as Hodgson has suggested, has been that

"many scholars have underestimated Tabari's own work, looking on him only as a remarkably useful source of earlier material." Thus for example, Goldziher comments on

. . . the great brain work this Asiatic author displayed in the collection and critical examination of historical tradition, having preserved so to speak its archival sources. His method of ranking together, in an Oriental manner, the various and often contradictory items of his information, instead of amalgamating his inferences from them into a compact unity, is sure to diminish its literary value but for that it enhances its usefulness in the matter of sources, by having preserved many of them in their literal texts, withou^ which we should be compelled to use unilateral information only.

Similarly, Gibb, although he criticizes at-Tabari's preference for the

"pseudo-historical" Sayf b. 'Umar over al-Waqidi (a preference that he 223

sees as a reflection of at-Tabari's 'traditionist' training), elsewhere remarks that "... only since the publication of at-Tabari's history has it been possible to obtain a clear and trustworthy picture of the early history of Islam.

This estimation of at-Tabari's Ta'rikh surely helps to explain the ironic fact that even though his work has been the single most important source for modern scholars of medieval Islamic(ate) history, there have been almost no studies of any part of it.^^ Apparently, assumptions about the narrowness of at-Tabari's own goals have eliminated the need to understand his work as more than a thorough compilation of sources to which at-Tabari had access. The only important exception to this trend is an article Marshall Hodgson published almost two decades ago, part of which deals with at-Tabari's account of the killing of 'Uthman. Hodgson noted that at-Tabari's account contained two very different versions of the event.

One version, from Sayf b. 'Umar (d.180/796), presented the death as the result of almost aberrant circumstances that were linked neither to problems in the structure of the community nor to the actions of the majority of its members and leaders. The killers of the caliph were a small body of misguided and unimportant men; 'Uthman was both righteous and innocent of any wrong doing, and many of the major Associates bravely defended him until he ordered them to withdraw lest they die along with him.

The other version was primarily from the historian al-Wiqidi (d.

208/823), but was emended by others. This version depicted the 224

caliph's death as a complex event that defied simple attribution of blame. Those who killed him were not rabble but were some of the major

Associates; and other Associates, who did not participate directly in the event, did little to prevent it. 'Uthman was not free from all guilt and may have helped to bring on his death by failing to respond to legitimate complaints against his rule.

Hodgson hypothesized that at-Tabari employed this technique of presenting two versions in order to address two kinds of readers. He included Sayf's straightforward version for the undemanding reader who believed that the Umma's history was unblemished and that all of the

Associates, including 'Uthman, were above reproach. For the more demanding and perceptive reader, at-Tabari provided an account the complexity and ambiguity of which explored the basic dilemmas of power;

Although the Umma needs a ruler, it must also be protected from any corruption on his part, as well as from the justified opposition that such corruption might provoke. Hodgson also perceived subtle indications of at-Tabari's own solution to the dilemma : an all-encompassing law that would limit the powers of the ruler and thereby enable the members of society to live up to the religious vision that had created it, irrespective of the vicissitudes of political power.

Hodgson's approach to at-Tabari was pioneering. By focusing on the multiple narratives, he was able to highlight the role of selection in the construction of an account. By attributing the multiplicity of narratives to conscious selection, Hodgson no longer needed to 225 harmonize conflicting versions of an event or to choose one version over another.

His approach also makes significant contributions to our understanding of the hadith format as a technique or mode of composition that facilitated the selection and organization of material. The dramatic shifts in at-Tabari's account, for example, or the effect of juxtaposing two different versions could hardly have been achieved with the same effectiveness had at-Tabari eschewed the hadith format in favor of a continuous narrative style.

Hodgson's article is, above all, a persuasive warning about the dangers of source mining or reductivism: "... the habit of mind of those historians who occupy themselves indeed, with a great piece of work, but who treat it as merely the sum of ingredients that are not 13 great." Scholars who are primarily interested in verifying details of

‘uthman's death can so easily fail to see the larger issues that at-Tabari's account addresses, issues that in turn affected his treatment of the details.

Hodgson's approach works equally well with at-Tabari's account of the Battle of the Camel. Here too, at-Tabari provides two versions of the event. One, from Sayf b. ‘Umar, explains the battle in such a way as to protect the reputations of the Associates and to preserve the image of the unity of the early Umma. The other, primarily from al-Mada'ini, presents a considerably more ambiguous picture of the conflict— a picture which attributes to the Associates a major role and 14 suggests that much of the community was seriously divided. 226

Furthermore, the thematic concerns that Hodgson noted in the account of

'uthman's death are also apparent in the narrative of the battle.

The length and complexity of at-Tabari's account would produce too long a prose summary. Instead, the following chart summarizes the contents of each hadith, identifies its transmitter(s), and indicates its number and location in the text of at-Tabari's Ta'rikh. In addition to avoiding the confusion that would attend a prose summary, the chart highlights at-Tabari's methods of selection and organization and, more generally, the advantages that the hadith format conferred. No. Page Transmitter Hadith

427 Ja'far b. 'Abd Allah al-Muhammadi The Associates came to 'Ali after 'Uthman's death Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya and urged him to accept the rule since he was the most qualified. 'Ali resisted their pressures; but when they persisted, he agreed, so long a the bay'a would be sworn in the main mosque. Ibn 'Abbas urged ‘Ali not to accept the oath, but 'Ali ignored his advice. In the main mosque, the Muhâjirûn and the Ansâr and then the rest of the people gave 'Ali the bay' a.

427 al-Muhammadi < Abu Bashir al-'Âbidi Talha and az-Zubayr and other Muhâjirûn and Ansâr went to 'All and offered him the rule. ‘Ali re­ fused their offer and claimed that he would be satisfied with anyone they selected. Eventually they wore down 'All's resistence and he agreed to accept the caliphate, reminding them that he could not rule without their help. In the mosque, the Muhâjirûn and the Ansar and the rest of the people gave the bay'a.

428 Al-Mada'ini ‘Ali was in the market and the people clusterd around him and tried to give him the bay'a. Fi­ nally, Talha and az-Zubayr prevailed on him to ac­ cept the rule. (An onlooker predicted that the affair was not yet settled since the first hand to "swear" loyalty— Talha's— was withered.) Then Sa'd b. Abi WaqqSs and 'Abd Allah b, 'Umar were brought to 'Ali so that they could give their oaths. Both refused to swear loyalty until all the other people had. 'Ali accepted their refusals and prevented

al-Ashtar from forcing them. to to No. Page Transmitter Hadith

4 429 Muh. b. Sinan < al-Hasan Al-Hasan saw az-Zubayr give his bay*a to 'Ali in a date grove near Madina.

5 429 Ahmad b. Zuhayr < az-Zuhri 'Ali received the bay'a from the people (an-nas) and then sent for Talha and az-Zubayr. Both men hesitated and al-Ashtar drew his sword and threa­ tened to kill them if they did not comply. After they had sworn loyalty, they asked 'Ali to appoint them over Kûfa and Basra. 'Ali refused. Az-Zuhri adds that he had heard that 'Ali had first offered to give the bay'a to either Talha or az-Zubayr, but both had refused the offer since they preferred his rule. Later the two claimed that they had refused the offer because they did not think that 'Ali had been sincere in making it.

429 Al-Mada'ini < Abu Mikhnaf After 'uthman's death, the people went to 'Ali to give him the bay'a. 'Ali at first declined, claim­ ing that the caliph should be selected by a council (shûrâ). When the people insisted, 'Ali agreed on the condition that the oaths be sworn to him in the mosque. There, all but a few swore loyalty to him. Talha observed that he and others had no choice in the matter.

429 Al-Mada'ini All but a small group gave the bay'a. The group that abstained are identified as 'UthmSnij^'a.

8 430 Az-Zuhri Some fled from Madina after 'Uthman's death and did not give 'Ali the bay'a. "Others" added that Talha

and az-Zubayr may not have sworn loyalty to 'Ali or to at least not done so willingly. œto No. Page Transmitter Hadith

9 430 Al-Marûzi < Küfan shaykhs When 'uthman was first besieged, *Ali was at Khay- bar. When he returned to Madina,‘ Ali talked with ‘uthman and agreed to try to help him. ‘Ali went to Talha, but found him in the company of others [‘uthman's enemies] and unwilling to help. ‘All went to the treasury, broke down the door, and began to distribute money to the people. When those with Talha learned what ‘Ali was doing, they deserted Talha. Later Talha went to ‘uthman and asked him for pardon— he claimed that he had de­ sired the rule (al-amr), but God had intervened.

10 431 Ibn Sa'd and al-Wàqidi According to Sa'd b. Abi Waqqas, Talha claimed that he only gave ‘Ali the bay'a to save his own life. Sa'd did not know if ?alha had been threatened, but he did think that he had not willingly sworn loyalty. Sa'd along with six others (Ibn 'Umar, Suhayb, Zayd b. Thâbit, Muh. b, Maslama, Salama b. Waqsh, and Usama b. Zayd) had abstained from swear­ ing an oath to ‘Ali

11 432 Az-Zubayr b. Bakkâr < Abü Habiba ‘All visited az-Zubayr after the bay'a and noticed that az-Zubayr had concealed a sword under the rug on which he was sitting. ‘All left and reported to some people that he had found az-Zubayr obedient.

12 432 Sayf b. 'Umar Five days after ‘Uthman's death the community was still without a leader and the group who had killed him decided to select the caliph. The (O to among them offered the rule to ‘Ali, the Kufans offered it to az-Zubayr, and the Basrans offered it No. Page Transmitter Hadith

to Talha, but each of the three men refused.The killers then tried to persuade Sa'd b, Abi Waqqas and 'Abd Allah b. ‘Umar to accept the rule and both of them also refused.

13 433 Sayf b. 'Umar Similar to no. 13.

14 433 Al-Madâ'inî The people were eager to give the bay'a to 'Ali. He urged them to think more about the matter and reminded them of the shûrâ that 'Umar had appoint­ ed. But when al-Ashtar and others warned 'All that things might become unstable if Muslims returned to the amsar with the news that 'Uthman had been killed and a new caliph had not been chosen, 'Ali agreed to accept the rule.

15 433 Sayf b. 'Umar Five days after the death of 'uthman, the Egyptians charged the Madinans (the people of the shûrâ) with selecting a new ruler. The Madinans chose 'Ali.

16 434 'Ali b. Muslim < ‘Auf According to Muhammad b. Sirin, 'Ali offered the bay'a to Talha, but he insisted that 'All was worthier (ahaqq) of the rule and gave him his oath.

17 434 Sayf b. 'Umar The Egyptians [who had led the attack against 'uthman] warned the Madinans that they had tarried too long in selecting a ruler and promised that they would kill ' Ali, Talha, az-Zubayr, and many others if the Madinans did not quickly act. The Madinans offered the rule to 'Ali, but he declined. They pleaded with him to accept the rule for the to w sake of the community. 'Ali agreed on the con- o No. Page Transmitter Hadith

dition that he would govern in accordance with his knowledge. If the Madinans could not accept that condition, *Ali pledged to obey whoever they chose. The Madinans went off to consult and decided that if Tal^a and az-Zubayr accepted ‘Ali's rule, the matter would be settled. They sent a Basran (Hukaym b. Jabala) to talk to az-Zubayr and a Küfan (al-Ashtar) to talk to Talha. They warned both messengers not to antagonize or threaten, but Hukaym and al-Ashtar ignored the warning. On the first Friday after ‘Uthman's death, ‘Ali went to the main mosque which was packed with people. From the m inbar he addressed the people and reminded them that only they had the right to chose the new ruler. Then Talha and az-Zubayr were brought to ‘Ali and told to swear loyalty to him. The two men did; but both asserted that their oaths were not given willingly. (One of the crowd pre­ dicted that the matter was not settled since the first hand to swear loyalty — Talha's — was withered.) Then the common people (al-‘a m m a ) swore loyalty.

18 435 Sayf b. ‘Umar Once the people had agreed on ‘Ali's caliphate, al- Ashtar told Talha to give ‘All the bay‘a. Talha wanted to wait until he had seen what others would do, but al-Ashtar gave him a hard push and Talha gave his bay‘a .

19 435 Sayf b. ‘Umar Hukaym _b. Jabala forced az-Zubayr to swear loyalty to ‘Ali. lO w No. Page Transmitter Hadith

20 435 Sayf b, *.Umar All of the people swore the bay*a.

21 436 Sayf b, ®iUmar In a khutba, ®Ali reminded the Muslims of things that God permitted and forbade.

22 436 Sayf b. 'lUmar After the bay'a. agroup, including Talha and az- Zubayr. asked 'Ali what he intended to do about those who had unjustly killed 'lUthman, 'Ali was concerned about the matter, but he claimed that so loner as the killers were still in Madina in force, no action could be taken against them. He cautioned the others to bide their time until the right moment came,

23 438 Sayf b. ®iUmar 'Ali urged the and the Saba'iyya in Madina to go back to their homes. The bedouins complied, but the Saba'iyya refused, Talha. az-Zubayr and others went to 'Ali and he cautioned them against stirring up trouble, Talha and az-Zubayr asked 'Ali to appoint them over Basra and Kûfa respec­ tively, If trouble occurred there, they reasoned, they would be able to contain it, 'Ali promised to consider their requests, Al-Mughira b, Shu'ba advised 'Ali not to make any changes in 'Uthman's governors (especially Mu'âwiya and 'Abd Allah b, 'Âmir)until he received pledges of loyalty from the armies. The next day. al- Mughira offered 'Ali the opposite advice— he should make whatever changes he thought appropriate, 'Abd Allah b, 'lAbbas endoresed al-Mughira's first position. He added that 'Ali should have withdrawn to Makka when 'Uthman was besieged and expressed No. Page Transmitter Hadith

his fear that the BanG Umayya would probably impli­ cate 'Ali in 'uthman's death.

24 439 Ibn Sa'd and al-Wâqidi Similar to no. 23. Here Ibn 'AbbSs argued that Mu'âwiya and his supporters would not show grati­ tude to 'Ali if he confirmed their appointments; but if he revoked them, they would implicate him in 'uthman's death and accuse him of assuming the ca­ liphate before a council (shûrâ) could be convened. 'Ali adamantly refused to accept Ibn 'Abbas' advice and announced his intention to fight Mu'âwiya if necessary. He offered the governorship of Syria to Ibn 'Abbas; the latter declined, fearing that Mu'âwiya would kill him as soon as he arrived in Syria. 25 440 Hishâm b. Sa'd Similar to nos. 24 and 23. Ibn 'Abbas also told 'Ali that he had met Talha and az-7.ubayr and some other men of the Quraysh in an-Nawasif. 'Ali opined that even though they had been partly re­ sponsible for 'Uthmân's death they would probably announce their desire to avenge it.

At-Tabari ends his chronicle of the year 35/655 with a brief report from al-Waqidi that describes a raid led against the Muslims by the Byzantine emperor .

26 442 Sayf b. 'Umar At the beginning of the year 36/656, 'Ali sent out new governors. He sent Sahl b. Hunayf to replace Mu'âwiya, but when Sahl reached the border of Syria, he was met by some of Mu'âwiya's supporters whj w No. Page Transmitter Hadith

and sent back to the Hijàz. Other governors fared better.

27 444 Sayf b. * Umar ‘Ali gave Talha and az-Zubayr permission to make the ‘umra (lesser pilgrimage) to Makka. After they had gone, ‘Ali made preparations to march against Mu‘awiya— he appointed commanders over the flanks of his army and wrote to his governors, commanding them to send him men. On the eve of his departure, he learned that Talha and az-Zubayr had joined ‘À'isha and that the three planned to go to Basra. ‘Ali decided to try to intercept them. He assured the Madinans, whose help he sought, that the two men had not been forced to accept his caliphate. Ibn 'Umar refused to join ‘Ali unless other Madinans did.

28 447 Sayf b. ‘Umar ‘All called on the Madinans to help him restore order. Among the others who agreed to help were two Ansâri veterans of Badr, All other veterans of the famous early battles had died during ‘Uthman's reign.

29 447 Sayf b. ‘Umar Similar to last part of no. 28— a discussion of how many veterans of early battles were still alive at the beginning of ‘Ali's caliphate.

30 447 Sayf b. ‘Umar At most, seven veterans participated in the "fitna."

31 447 Sayf b. ‘Umar Similar to no. 30. wto No. Page Transmitter Hadith

32 447 Sayf b. 'Umar Whenever four Associates strove for the good of the community, 'Ali was one of them.

33 448 Sayf b, 'Umar 'uthman was killed and 'Ali received the people's bay'a on Friday, the 25th of Dhu-l'Hijja (June 24, 656). Many of the Banu Umayya went from Madina to Makka and several of them told 'À'isha (who was there for the 'Umra) that 'Uthmân had been killed and no one had been appointed to succeed him. She started to travel back to Madina and on the way met an uncle who told her that 'Ali had been elected caliph. 'À'isha returned to Makka and made a rousing speech calling for vengeance for 'Uthmân.

34 449 Al-Madâ'ini 'À'isha left Madina while *Uthman was under siege. In Makka she first heard that 'Uthmân had killed the Egyptians and then that the Egyptians had killed 'Utlimln.

35 449 Sayf b. 'Umar On her way back to Madina, 'À'isha met one of her uncles who told her that 'Uthman had been, killed that 'Ali had been elected caliph, and that the rabble (al-ghawqha')were in control of the city. She returned to Maltka and convinced many, including Talha and az-Zubayr, to seek vengeance for the dead caliph. After deliberation, she and the others decided to go to Basra to get more support.

36 450 Sayf b. 'Umar Many, including Talha and az-Zubayr answered 'Â'isha's call to avenge 'Uthman's death. Ya'la b,

MunabbLh ['Uthman's governor of the Yemen] con­ to tributed camels. The group deliberated on where to w No. Page Transmitter Hadith

go and eventually decided on Basra. Umm Fadl bnt. Hârith wrote to ‘Ali, informing him of the group's plans.

37 451 Abu Mikhnaf Abu Qatâda vowed to support ‘Ali whatever the risk. Umm Salama sent her son to help ‘Ali (she would not risk God's wrath by going herself).

38 452 Al-Mada'ini Ya*lâ b. Munahtodh gave az-Zubayr a large sum of money, provided mounts for seventy men, and a camel for ‘À'isha, for which he had paid eighty dinar.

39 452 Sayf b. ‘Umar Al-Mughira b. Shu'ba and Sa'id b. al-Às decided to remain neutral since they reckoned that the Ahl al- Jamal had little chance of success.

40 452 Ahmad b. Zuhayr < az-Zuhri Talha and az-Zubayr arrived in Makka four months after the death of ‘Uthmân. They and others met in ‘Â'isha's house to discuss their plans. They even­ tually decided that they lacked the strength to challenge ‘Ali and that they should go to Kûfa or Basra where Tal^a and az-Zubayr had supporters. They set off with seven hundred Makkans and Madinans and were joined along the way by another three thousand men. When 'Ali learned of their departure he placed Sahl b. Hunayf in charge of Madina pursued them until he reached Dhû Qâr. ro 41 453 Ahmad b. Mansur < ‘Alqama al-Laythi From Dhû ‘irq, Talha and az-Zubayr sent back to the U) Hijàz two boys whom they deemed too young to fight. No. Page Transmitter Hadith

42 453 Al-Madâ'ini Sa'id b. al-'Âs met Marwan and the rest of the Ahl al-Jamal at Dhû 'irq. He urged Marwan to turn back. Talha and az-Zubayr told Sa'id that they would give the rule to whomsoever the people pre­ ferred, but they rejected his suggestion that one of 'uthman's sons be made caliph. Sa'id and some others departed and the Ahl al-Jamal, after some debate, decided to go to Basra.

43 454 Sayf b. 'Umar Talha, az-Zubayr and some of the Banu Umayya met in Makka. The two men claimed that they had been forced to give 'Ali their bay'a. They decided to seek aid in Basra and to avenge 'Uthmân's death by fighting the Saba'iyya. 'À'isha publicly endorsed their decision.

44 454 Al-Mada'ini The Ahl al-Jamal set off for Basra, accompanied by six hundred. En route, Talha and az-Zubayr argued about who would lead the prayer. 'A'isha intervened and decided that 'Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr (the son of her sister) would lead it.

45 455 Sayf b. 'Umar 'Ali learned of the Ahl al-Jamal's plans. He placed Tammâm b. al-* Abbas in charge of Madina and Qutham b. al-'Abbas over Makka and then set off in pursuit of the Ahl al-Jamal. When he reached ar- Rabadha, he realized that he would be unable to overtake them.

46 455 Sayf b. 'Umar Similar to no. 45; adds that one 'Abd Allah b. as- w Salam pleaded with 'Ali not to go lest 'j^the power w -j of the Muslims would never return to Madina." No. Page Transmitter Hadith

47 455 Sayf b. 'Umar < Ibn Shihâb I bn Shihâb left Küfa to perform the 'umra and reached ar-Rabadha at the same time as 'Ali and his army. There he overheard an 'argument' between 'Ali and al-Hasan. Al-Hasan claimed that; 1) When 'Uthman was besieged, 'Ali should have left the city; 2) When 'Uthmàn was killed, 'Ali should not have accepted the bay'a until delegations from the ams5r had arrived; 3) When 'Ali learned of Talha and az-Zubayr's departure for Basra, 'Ali should have stayed in his house until peace was restored 'Ali responded; 1) Those who attacked 'Uthman would not have allowed him to leave Madina; 2) The Madi- nans were the only valid elective body, so there was no reason to wait until others reached Madina; 3) As caliph, it was his responsibilty to deal with Talha and az-Zubayr.

48 456 Al-Fazari < al-'Urani Someone asked Al-'Urani to sell his camel, Al- 'Urani agreed to sell it for one thousand dirhams (because it was so fast); but when he learned that the animal was for 'Â'isha, he insisted on making a gift of it and also agreed to act as a guide for the Ahl al-Jamal. During the night, they passed by an oasis and the dogs there began to howl. Al'Urani told someone that the place was called al- Haw'ab; 'Â'isha overheard him, became very dis­ traught, and refused to go further. After several hours, az-Zubayr insisted that 'Ali would catch up with them if they did not push on and 'Â'isha agreed to continue. Al-'Urani left the group and soon met up with 'Ali wto CD and his army. He told 'All what had happened at No. Page Transmitter Hadith

al-Haw'ab and agreed to guide him to Dhu Qâr, There, al-'Urani overheard a conversation between al-Hasan and *Ali. Al-Hasan argued that *Ali should have refused to accept the rule until the news of ‘UthmSn's had been circulated in the lands outside of the Hi jaz and waited to pursue the Ahl al-Jamal until he had more support. *Alî scoffed at his son's criticism: He had accepted the rule of AbO Bakr, *Umar, and 'Uthman even though he had seen himself more qualified than the three. After ‘Uthman's death, the people had, without hesi­ tation, chosen him. As legitimate caliph he vowed to fight those who would not obey him.

49 458 Al-Minqari < Sayf b. *Umar ®A'isha was returning to Madina after the * umra when she met Ibn Umm Kilâb. He told her that *Uthmân had been killed and that *Alx had been elected caliph. Ibn Umm Kilâb could not understand why 'Â'isha became so upset at the news since she had been one of 'uthman's most virulent critics. 'Â'isha returned to Makka and there publicly an­ nounced her intention to avenge the caliph's death.

50 459 Sayf b. 'Umar 'Ali was somewhat heartened when he learned that the Ahl al-Jamal had gone to Baçra not Kufa since he feared that they might find more support in the latter city.

51 460 Sayf b. 'Umar When Talha and az-Zubayr and others decided to go to Basra, they tried to get Ibn 'Umar to join them. to He refused. w VD No. Page Transmitter Hadith

52 460 Sayf b. 'Umar Az-Zubayr forbade some of his sons to accompany him.

53 460 Sayf b. 'Umar The day that the Ahl al-Jamal left Makka was called the "day of weeping" since so many wept at their departure.

54 461 Sayf b. 'Umar Near Awtas, the Ahl al-Jamal met Malih b. *Auf as- Sulami who questioned them about their plans. They explained that 'Uthman had been killed by rabble and that the killers must be brought to justice. If they were not, no ruler would be safe.

55 461 Sayf b. 'Umar 'uthman b. Hunayf, 'All's governor of Basra, learned that the Ahl al-Jamal were heading toward his city and sent two men to talk with 'Â'isha, Talha and az-Zubayr, 'Â'isha told the two that the rabble that had killed the caliph had acted without cause and must be brought to justice. She had made it her duty to see that the death was avenged, and she quoted the Qur'an in support of her motives (4:114).

56 462 Sayf b. 'Umar Ibn Hunayf's agents then questioned Talha. He told them that they sought vengeance for 'Uthman and added that he had been forced to give his bay'a to 'All. When they talked with az-Zubayr, he repeated what Talha had said. The agents returned to Ibn Hunayf and advised him to prepare for battle. lO When the Ahl al-Jamal reached the outskirts of ifc. Basra, they were met by many of the city's people. o No. Page Transmitter Hadith

some of w h o m immediately joined them. Talha and then az-Zubayr urged the Basrans to lend their sup­ port in avenging the caliphs death. These two speeches divided the Baçrans; some supported Talha and az-Zubayr, but others thought them treacherous since the two men had already sworn allegiance to 'Ali. Before long, the two Basran groups began to fight with each other. 'Â'isha restored a temporary calm and recounted to the crowd the treachery of those who had killed the caliph. She urged that avenging his death was the only course of action open to them (cited Qur'an, 3:23). Again the crowd was divided and again fighting broke out.

57 465 Al-Minqari < Sayf b. 'Umar A Basran told 'Â'isha that he considered her in­ volvement in the affair a more serious crime than 'Uthmân's death and urged her to return to the Hijaz. Another man reminded Talha and az-Zubayr of the special affection the Prophet had had for them and asked them if they had brought their own wives with them since they had brought the Prophet's. A third man asked Muhammad b. Talha about 'Uthmân's death and he replied that the guilt was shared by three: 'Â'isha, Talha, and 'All.

58 466 Sayf b. 'Umar ("Hadith returns to Sayf s.") Hukaym b. Jabala led the Basran forces against 'Â'isha. The fighting continued until nightfall and resumed the following morning. Hukaym was especially vicious in slurring 'Â'isha. The two sides eventually agreed to a truce and Ibn (O Hunayf sent Ka'b b. Sur to Madina to find out if No. Page Transmitter Hadith

Talha and az-Zubayr had been forced to give *Ali their bay*a, as they claimed. (If they had been forced, Ibn Hunayf would surrender the city; if not, the Ahl al-Jamal would leave the city.) In Madina, Usama b, Zayd told Ka'b that Talha and az- Zubayr had been forced to swear loyalty. Ka'b arrived back in Basra at the same time that Ibn Hunayf received a note from 'Ali in which he swore that the bay'a had not been coerced. Ibn Hunayf gave more credence to 'Ali's 'version' and refused to leave the city. Talha and az-Zubayr siezed Ibn Hunayf as he was leading the prayer and would have killed him but for 'Â'isha's intervention. They did, however pluck out all his hair.

59 468 Al-Madâ'ini < Abu Mikhnaf 'Â'isha at first wanted to kill Ibn Hunayf but changed her mind when a Basran woman intervened on Ibn Hunayf's behalf. All of Ibn Hunayf's hair was plucked out.

60 469 Ahmad b. Zuhayr < az-Zuhri On the way to Basra, 'Â'isha heard dogs barking. When she found out that the place they were passing was called al-Haw'ab, she insisted that she be re­ turned to Madina because the Prophet had once ex­ pressed alarm that the dogs would bark at one of his wives. She eventually agreed to go on when 'Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr insisted that whoever had told her that the place was al-Haw'ab had been lying, When they reached Basra, Talha and az-Zubayr told Ibn Hunayf that they considered themselves as suited to rule as 'Ali. Ibn Hunayf agreed to write to No. Page Transmitter Hadith

'Ali about their complaints so long as the two would respect his governorship until an answer from 'Ali arrived. They agreed, but two days later they attacked Ibn Hunayf and only refrained from killing him because they feared the anger of the Ansar. Talha and az-Zubayr then assured the Basrans that they had wanted 'Uthman b. 'AffSn to mend his ways, they had not desired his death; but the situation had gotten out of control and rash people had killed him. One of the Basrans, however, asked Talha to explain the contradictions between what he had just said and what he had earlier written in letters he had sent to the Bagrans. Talha and az- Zubayr killed him and several other Basrans the next day.

61 470 Sayf b. ®Umar ("Hadith returns to Sayf's.") Hukaym b. Jabala and others who had been with him in the attack against 'uthman fought against the Ahl al-Jamal. The latter won, Hukaym died during the fighting, and others who had participated in the siege of 'Uthman were brought to Talha and az-Zubayr and "slaugh­ tered like dogs." After the battle, 'Â'isha and Talha and az-Zubayr wrote to other cities details of what had happened at Basra. Their notes stressed the righteousness of their cause and the treachery of those who opposed them. ('Â'isha's note explained that a note from Madina had fur­ nished proof that Tal^a and az-Zubayr had been forced to give their bay'a to 'Ali.)

w No. Page Transmitter Hadith

62 474 Al-Madâ'ini The name of the man who killed Hukaym b, Jabala.

63 474 Al-Madâ'ini Talha and az-Zubayr released Ibn Hunayf after he warned them that if they killed him, his brother, Sahl b. Hunayf [the governor of Madina], would exact revenge.

64 474 Al-Madâ'inî After the Ahl al-Jamal had taken control of Basra, *Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr and a group of men met Hukaym b. Jabala and his band. Hukaym insisted that Ibn Hunayf be released and that the Ahl al- Jamal honor the treaty they had made. Fighting broke out and Hukaym was killed.

65 475 Al-Madâ'ini A Basran asked Talha and az-Zubayr if they were acting on the Prophet's instructions. Talha said nothing and az-Zubayr remarked that they had come to share in the wealth of Basra.

66 475 Al-Madâ'ini After Talha and az-Zubayr had taken control of Basra (its people had given them the bay'a), az- Zubayr suggested that he should take one thousand riders and intercept and perhaps kill 'All. When no one approved of his suggestion, he opined that the fitna that they had been warned against was upon them and admitted to feeling unsure about what he was getting into.

67 476 Ahmad b. Mansûr < 'Algama b. Waqqâs 'Alqama asked Talha why he seemed to be upset and ai- Talha confided that he had misgivings about the affair and premonitions of his own death. to 4^ No. Page Transmitter Hadith

68 476 Al-Madâ'ini < Abu Mikhnaf After she reached Basra, 'Â'isha sent a note to Zayd b. Sûhân, instructing him to send aid or at least to keep his men from giving aid to 'Ali, Zayd wrote back and pledged to support 'Â'isha, but only if she immediately returned to the gijaz and severed all ties with the affair; otherwise, he promised to oppose her,

69 477 Sayf b, 'Umar 'Ali, still in Madina learned that ‘Â'isha, Talha, and az-Zubayr were on the road to*Irâq, He went after them and reached ar-Rabadha several days after they had been there. He was releived when he learned that the group intended to go to Basra since he believed he could get support in Küfa,

70 477 Al-Madâ'ini 'Ali wrote a short note to the Kufans in which he praised them for their piety and asked them for their aid.

71 477 Al-Madâ'ini 'Ali sent Muhammad b, Abi Bakr and Muhammad b. 'Auf to Küfa, The Kufans sought the advice of their governor, Abu Musi, He told them that they should remain in Küfa if they aspired to the next world and added that before anything else was done, 'uthmân's killers had to be brought to justice

72 478 Al-Madâ'ini < Abu Mikhnaf At ar-Rabadha, a group of the ?ayy joined 'All. One of their men pledged always to support 'All because of his moral excellence (fadl) and his kin­ ship (qariba) with the Prophet, (O A, U1 No. Page Transmitter Hadith

73 478 Sayf b. 'Umar While at ar-Rabadha, ®Ali sent Muhammad b. Abi Bakr and Muhammad b. Ja*far to solicit Kûfan aid. He also delivered a khutba to his followers— he pledged to mend the rift in the community caused by the killers of ®Uthman (who the devil had incited) and cautioned them not to let the Umma be divided into seventy-three sects (firaq).

74 479 Sayf b. *Umar ®Ali stressed his intention to avoid bloodshed. He left ar-Rabadha for Kùfa. On the road, he learned that Abu Mùsâ would support him if he intended to restore order, but not if he intended to fight,

75 480 Al-Mada'ini *Uthman b. Hunayf joined ®Alî at ar-Rabadha. His news prompted ®Alx to wonder why Talha and az- Zubayr had broken the oaths they had given him; they had accepted the rule of Abu Bakr and *Umar, neither of whom was superior to him.

76 481 Sayf b, 'Umar ®Ali learned of the eviction of ®Ibn Hunayf, the death of Hukaym, and other events in Basra as he was marching towards it. The two re­ turned to him from Kùfa with the news that Abu Müsâ had urged the Kufans not to become involved. *Alî sent ®Abd Allah b. *Abbas and al-Ashtar back to Kùfa. In Küfa, Abu Mùsâ warned the Kufans against in­ volvement in a fitna ("One who sleeps is better than one who is awake, one who is awake is better than one who walks ... sheathe your swords, cut N3 your bowstrings.") CTl No. Page Transmitter Hadith

77 482 Sayf b. *Umar When Ibn 'Abbas and al-Ashtar returned to 'Ali with the news of Abu Müsâ'a refusal to help, 'Ali sent al-Hasan and 'Ammar b. Yasir back to Küfa. The two debated with Abu Musa and several times the situa­ tion became quite heated, but eventually about nine thousand Kufans decided to help 'All.

78 485 Nasr b. Muzahim al-Minqari A Kûfan questioned Abu Mùsâ about whether Talha and az-Zubayr had given 'Ali the bay'a and if so whether the two men had a valid reason for vio­ lating their oaths. Abu Musi could not answer the question and the man observed that four groups (firaq) were vying for power; Tallja and az-Zubayr in Basra, Mu'iwiya in Syria, 'All near Kùfa, and a group in the Hijiz. As a consequence of the dis­ ruption, the man observed, taxes were not being collected nor were enemies being fought, Al-Ashtar convinced 'Ali that he could do a better job of getting Kûfan aid than the others 'All had sent. Al-Ashtar arrived in Kùfa as Abu Müsâ was urging its people not to become involved in the fitna (a sleeper better than a walker and so forth). Al-Ashtar walked among the people and col­ lected a large number of followers and with their help, took control of the city's fort.

79 487 Al-Minqari Abu Müsâ could not evict al-Ashtar from the fort and many of the Kufans decided to support 'Ali,

80 487 Sayf b, 'Umar 'Ali greeted the Kufans as they arrived at Dhu Qâr, He praised them for coming and promised them that to he would make every effort to avoid a battle. -o No. Page______Transmitter Hadith

81 487 Sayf b. 'lUmar *Ali sent al-Qa®qa®i b. *Amr to Basra to try to reason with Talha and az-Zubayr. They told al- Qa'qâ®' that "uthmân's death had to be avenged. Al-Qa*qa®, however, argued that the two had thus far done more to harm the community than to help it. In killing six hundred, they had angered six thousand; would they fight them too? The only hope for the community, he argued, lay in unity; they should calm down and support "lAli. Talha and az- Zubayr agreed and pledged that if "All was of the same mind, they would consider the matter settled. Al-Qa'qâ®'s report pleased "All and "the people were on the verge of peace, some of them willingly and some of them not."

81 490 Mus"ab b. Salâm < al-Jirmi During the reign of "Uthman, al-Jirmi saw in a dream a woman standing at the head of a man who lay sick in bed. People rushed against the man and, because the woman did nothing to stop them, they killed him. Later, al-Jirmi and some of his com­ panions arrived in Basra and were surprised to find "Â'isha, Talha, and az-Zubayr there, debating with the Basrans. The three stressed the need to avenge "uthmân's death and swore that they had only given "Ali the bay"a because they were forced. Al-Jirmî and his companions decided to find "Ali and hear his side. When they neared "Ali's army, they were met by a man who resembled the woman in the dream, and when al-Jirmi learned that the man was Muhammad b. Abi Bakr, he knew that the woman had been "Â’isha. Later, "Ali told them that he had been away when "Uthmân was killed and that when he re­ 00 No. Page Transmitter Hadith

turned, the people had prevailed upon him to accept the rule. Talha and az-Zubayr had sworn an oath to him and then had broken it, gone to Madina, and convinced * Â'isha to do what they would not have wanted their own wives to do. Al-Jirmi and his companions gave ®Ali their bay®a and then returned to Basra with ®Ali. They told some of the Basrans that ®Alx only sought to restore order, but as they were talking the youths in the two armies began to pelt each other with stones and soon fighting broke out.

83 493 Sayf b. ®Umar *Ali delivered a short khutba [at Dhu Qâr] after al- Qa®qâ®! returned and a delegation of Baçrans came to him. He stressed that those who had killed ®UthmSn sought only to advance their own cause and cared little for the wel fare of the community. Mean­ while, several of those (in ®All's camp) who had attacked ®iüthmân met to discuss their own fate. They feared that if a battle were averted and the people reunited, they would quickly be killed for their role in the murder of ®iüthmân. They were unable, however, to agree on how best to achieve their own interests. The two armies lined up for battle, but neither Talha and az-Zubayr nor ®Ali was willing to order an attack since they hoped to avoid battle. To that end, ®Ali sent two messengers to Talha and az- Zubayr to find out if they had changed their views since talking with al-Qa®qa®. Al-Ahnaf b. Qays promised to keep his tribesmen out (O No. Page Transmitter Hadith

of the battle after ®Ali promised him that he would not enslave the Basrans if he won.

84 497 Ya*:qûb b, Ibrahim < al-Ahnaf b. Qays ("Muhadaithun differed from Sayf in what they trans­ mitted about Ibn Qays,") Ibn Qays explained that he was in Madina at the time when hostilities a- gainst ®Uthman were mounting. He asked Talha and az-Zubayr what they thought he should do if ®Ûthmân were killed and both men told him to give his bay®a to ® Ali. Ibn Qays went on to Makka and there met with ®Â'isha who also told him to swear loyalty to ®Ali. Accordingly, he went back through Madina, gave 'Ali his bay®a and then returned to his home in Basra, thinking that the matter was settled. Not long after he returned home, Ibn Qays was shocked to learn that ®Â'isha, Talha, and az-Zubayr were near Bagra and that they sought his help in avenging ®.üthmân's death. He went to the three and reminded them that they had only just told him to swear loyalty to ®AlI. They claimed that "things had changed," but Ibn Qays refused to lend his support to either them or to ®AlI. When the two armies met, Talha was one of the first to die and ar-Zubayr left the battle. Ibn Qays commented onl az-Zubayr's irresponsible behavior, one of his men overheard the comment, and went after az-Zubavr and killed him.

85 499 Ya®iqüb b. Ibrahim < one of the Tamim Ibn Qays praised God for His resolution of the affair. (O Ul o No. Page Transmitter Hadith

86 499 Al-Madâ'ini *Ali learned (when he reached ar-Rabadha) that Abu Mûsà had refused his request for help (tendered by Ibn Abi Bakr). He sent back to Abu Mûsà a note ordering him to either send help or resign his post. When Abu Müsâ still refused, *Ali sent to Küfa al-IJasan, *Ammâr b. ' Yasir and with them Qarazah b. Ka*b al-Ansiri to replace Abu Müsâ. When the three arrived in Kûfà, Abu Müsâ left and al-Hasan and 'Ammar read to the Kufans a note from 'All. In the note, 'All stressed his innocence and the guilt of Talha and az-Zubayr and urged the Kdfans to help him restore order.

87 500 Al-Madâ'ini < Abu Mikhnaf 'All correctly predicted that 1,201 KOfans would join him at Dhu Qâr,

88 500 Al-Madâ'ini Twelve thousand men organized into seven tribal groupings joined 'Ali at DhO Qâr.

89 500 Al-Mada'ini 'lAli camped for several days at az-Zawiya [near Basra). While he was there, Ibn Qays offered (by messenger) to join 'lAli or to keep four thousand men away, 'Ali asked him to stay away. Then the two armies moved towards each other and met by the [site of the] castle of 'Ubayd Allah b, Ziyad,

90 501 'lUmar b. Shabba < Qatâda The two armies met by the castle of Ibn Ziyâd on Thursday, the 15th of Jumâdâ II in the year 36, 'All met with Talha and az-Zubayr between the two armies, Talha claimed that their actions were jus­ to tified because 'Ali had incited people against in 'uthmân, 'Ali denied the charge and reminded az- No. Page Transmitter Hadith

Zubayr of the Prophet's prediction that az-Zubayr would unjustly fight against "Ali. Az-Zubayr re­ membered and swore that he would not fight against "All. Az-Zubayr returned to his army and confided in "Â'isha his doubts about the whole affair. "Abd Allah, however, accused him of being a coward and suggested that he could violate his promise not to fight if he manumitted one of his slaves.

91 502 Sayf b, *Umar ("The hadith returns to Sayf's.") "Imran b. al- Husayn refused to shoot even a single arrow against either side.

92 503 "Amr b, "lAli < Hujayr b. al-Rabi* "Imran told Ibn Rabi®. that he would sooner die on a moutaintop than shoot a single arrow.

93 503 Sayf b. "Umar ("The hadith returns to Sayf's.") The Bai^rans were split Into three groups: one supported the Ahl al- Jamal, one supported "All, and one was opposed to conflict.

94 504 Sayf b. "Umar Hilll b. Waki*! b. Malik b. "lAmr tried to convince al-Ahnaf b. Qays to support "Â'isha, but Ibn Qays ins isted on remaining neutral. He went to Wadi as- Sibl'i with the Banü Sa"d.

95 504 Sayf b. ".Umar Tribal leaders in Basra debated over whether to participate in the battle or withdraw from it.

96 505 Sayf b. "Umar The names of the tribes that participated in the battle. On the eve of the battle, none of the Ul tribes that made up the Ahl al-Jamal was in doubt lO No, Page Transmitter Hadith

that peace would be made, 'Ali arrived with twenty thousand men.

97 506 Al-Madâ'inî 'Ali left Madina with seven hundred men; seven thousand Kufans and two thousand (or six thousand) others joined him along the way,

98 506 Sayf b, ®iUmar ("The hadith returns to Sayf's,") After the two armies had made camp, 'All met with Talha and az- Zubayr and the three agreed that their differences were due to misunderstanding and they decided not to fight,

99 506 Sayf b. 'lUmar 'lAli sent 'Abd Allah b, 'Abbas to Talha and az- Zubayr's camp and they sent Muhammad b, Talha to 'All's, Everyone with whom the envoys talked wanted peace and so it seemed that peace was at hand. However, those (in 'All's camp) who had been at the heart of the attack on 'Uthmân feared that their own lives would be lost if there was peace, so in the middle of the night they launched an attack against the Ahl al-Jamal, Talha and az- Zubayr believed that 'All had been lying and they ordered their men to repulse the attack, 'lAli thought that Talha and az-Zubayr had been lying and he ordered his men to fight, but not to kill the wounded or to follow and kill tribal leaders.

100 507 Sayf b, '.Umar Ka'b b. Sûr roused 'Â'isha, but she was unable to stop the fighting. Az-Zubayr left, Talha's leg N) was pierced by an arrow and when his boot filled (j) No. Page Transmitter Hadith

with blood he withdrew from the battle, repentant at his role in it.

101 508 Alimad b. Zuhayr < az-Zuhri ("Others disagreed with what Sayf transmitted about the battle and about az-Zubayr's departure.") *Ali approached Basra with twelve thousand men after Talha and az-Zubayr had already killed seventy men in the city. Before the battle, he met with Talha and az-Zubayr and questioned tliem about their mo­ tives. Az-Zubayr told *Ali that he was not more entitled to the rule than himself or Talha. ®iAli reminded az-Zubayr of the Prophet's prediction (see no. 90) and az-Zubayr promised not to fight, (How­ ever, when az-Zubayr told his son of his decision, "Abd Allah accused him of cowardice, and az-Zubayr broke his promise by manumitting a slave.) "lAli criticized Talha for exposing "Â'isha to the dan­ gers of war and for breaking the oath he had sworn. Talha claimed that he had been forced to give his bayja. "All asked for a volunteer to take a page of the Qur'ân between the ranks and "call the Basrans to what is in it," A young man volunteered, the Basrans immediately killed him, and Wie battle started. After serious fighting, "lAli's forces were victorious, Talha was killed by a spear which, according to many, Marwin threw, "All chas­ tized "Â'isha and then organized and provisioned a caravan to escort her back to Madina, N> 102 510 Muhammad b. "lUmara < Ibn, al-Harith "Amr b. Jurmuz killed az-Zubayr in Wâdî as-Sibâ"!, < ji No. Page Transmitter Hadith

103 511 Al-MadS'inx A more graphic version of the youth with a page of the Qur'an, calling the Basrans to peace— the youth, clad in white, was the only one to volun­ teer; but because he was so young, *AlI twice asked for another volunteer before finally accepting the youth's offer.

104 512 Al-Madâ'inî < Abu Mikhnaf The BanO pabba and the Azd guarded 'Â'isha who was secluded in the haudaj on her camel. The fighting lasted from noon until sunset.

105 512 Al-Madâ'ini *Ammâr attacked az-Zubayr during the battle, but refrained from killing him.

106 512 Sayf b, 'lUmar ("The hadith returns to Sayf's,") When the Ahl al- Jamal were near defeat, az-Zubayr departed for Wadx as-Siba'i, Talha was wounded and one of his slaves took him to Basra, 'Â'isha sent Ka'ib b. Sur with a page of the Qur'an to call 'Ali's troops to "what was in it," but the Saba’dyya, still fearing peace, shot Ka'ib, 'Â'isha rallied her troops and the fighting around the camel grew intense.

107 514 Sayf b, 'lUmar The fighting was at its most intense in the middle of the afternoon; it was then that az-Zubayr de­ parted and that Talha was wounded and left the field, 'Â'isha rallied her troops and they began to get the upper hand,

108 514 Al-Mada'inx 'All gave his army's banner to his son Muhammad b. w al-Hanaf iyya and ordered him to advance. When he oi No. Page Transmitter Hadith

began to falter, *Alî rudely took the flag from him and led the attack himself.

109 515 Sayf b, "lUmar Many who held 'Ali's banner died.

110 515 Sayf b. 'lUmar The battle was the most intense that any had wit­ nessed, The field was littered with limbs and many continued to fight after they lost an arm or a leg.

111 516 Sayf b, 'Umar The Banü Dabba took turns holding the halter of 'Â'isha's camel. Many engaged in individual com­ bat.

112 518 Al-Madâ'inî Similar to no. Ill; the Banü Dabba guarded 'Â'isha's camel.

113 518 Al-Madâ'inî At least forty of the Banü Dabba died while guarding 'Â'isha's camel. 'Amr b. Yathribx and 'Ammlr b. Yasir (who had just turned ninety) fought each other 'Amr was taken prisoner and executed on 'Ali's orders.

114 519 Al-Madà'inî < Abu Mikhnaf 'Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr recalled that all of the men with whom he traveled to the battle were either killed or wounded. He and al-Ashtar had fought with each other. 'All ordered his troops to try to wound 'Â'isha's camel and when one finally succeeded, the battle came to an end. Afterwards, 'Ali instructed Ibn Abi Bakr to find out if 'Â'isha had been wounded. to in No. Page Transmitter Hadith

115 520 Ishaq b. Ibrahim After the battle, al-Ashtar explained that he had fought against Talha and az-Zubayr because they had sworn loyalty to *Ali and then had broken their oaths, Ibn az-Zubayr had forced ®iÂ'isha to join his father and Talha.

116 520 Al-Mughïra < ®iAbd Allah b. az-Zubayr Al-Ashtar and ®iAbd Allah b. az-Zubayr met and fought during the battle.

117 520 Al-Madâ'ini < Abu Mikhnaf 'Â'isha felt remorse long after the battle.

118 521 Al-Madâ'inî Al-Ashtar remembered fighting against'Abd ar-Rahman b. 'lAttâb b. Asid.

119 521 Al-Madâ'inî Al-Ashtar's recollections about some who had fought each other.

120 520 Al-Madâ'ini < Abu Mikhnaf The names of some of the leaders of both sides and some of those who fell.

121 522 Al-Madâ'inî The BanG Dabba and the Azd guarded 'Â'isha's camel. Finally, one of the BanG Dabba who was fighting on 'lAlI's side was able to wound the camel. When he was later asked why he had wounded the animal he explained that he was afraid that if he did not all of his people woule die.

122 523 Al-Madâ'ini One of the BanG 'Uqayl mutilated the corpse of Ka'b b. Sûr.

123 523 Al-Madâ'ini The battle lasted until sunset. (j\to • j No. Page Transmitter Hadith

124 523 A1-®Abbas b, Muhammad < Abu Raja' The story of a man who lost an ear during the battle.

125 524 Al-Madâ'inî Similar to no. 124.

126 524 Sayf b. *,Umar The Band Dabba bravely defended "Â'isha.

127 525 Sayf b. ®iUmar A short poem about the battle.

128 525 Sayf b. "lUmar Many of the Mudar died defending "Â'isha,

129 525 Sayf b. "lUmar "Â*isha became very upset when "Abd Allah b. az- Zubayr took the camel's halter. Al-Ashtar atttacked "Abd Allah and the two fought for a while before each was rescued by his companions.

130 526 Sayf b. "lUmar Muhammad b. Talha took the camel's halter and fought bravely until three men attacked him at once and killed him.

131 526 Sayf b, ®iUmar All of the Banü "lÂmir who participated in the battle were killed while defending "Â'isha.

132 527 Sayf b, ®iUmar Many of "Ali's soldiers who attacked the camel died and al-Qa"iqâ"i urged that the animal be killed before more, including "lÂ'isha, lost their lives. Eventually, Ibn Dulja succeeded in bringing the animal down.

133 Sayf b. *Umar Similar to no. 131 (O cn 00 No. Page Transmitter Hadith

134 527 Sayf b. *iUmar During the fighting, Talha prayed that God would punish him for his role in the killing of “Uthman, An arrow pierced his thigh and he bled to death.

135 528 Sayf b. "lUmar The troops were arranged by tribe on the day of the battle. Many of the Band SuhAn were killed,

136 528 Sayf b, °iUmar A man criticized the Mudar for fighting against each other,

137 528 ®iAbd Allah b. Ahmad < Abu Jubayr Ka“ib b. Sûr held the halter of “Â'isha's camel,

138 528 Az-Zubayr b. al-Khurrayb ®iAlI elegized Ka'ib b. Sûr,

139 529 Sayf b. ®iUmar Ka'ib took 'Â'isha and 'Ali's Qur'ins between the two armies and implored both sides not to shed blood. Both sides shot at him, and he was the first Kûfan to die,

140 529 Sayf b. ®,Umar Muslim b, 'Abd Allah was killed as he called the people to peace.

141 529 Sayf b. ®iUmar By the time evening came, both Kufans flanks had been routed. Several men volunteered to attack the camel and Ibn Yathribi, who was guarding it, either killed or wounded all of them.

142 530 Sayf b, ®iUmar Seventy Quraysh died while defending the camel,

143 530 ®iAbd Allah b. Ahmad < Abu Rajâ' Ibn Yathribi recited poetry while he defended the w in camel. vD No. Page Transmitter Hadith

144 530 Sayf b. 'iLimar 'lAmmar b. Yasir finally succeeded in wounding Ibn Yathribi.

145 531 Sayf b. ®iUmar The Banû Dabba recited poetry as they defended the camel.

146 531 Sayf b. “^lUmar One of the Banû Dabba who fought on 'All's side wounded the camel.

147 532 Sayf b. ®iUmar Al-Qa':qa*i recalled that only the Battle of Siffin was as violent as the Battle of the Camel.

148 532 'lisa b. 'Abd ar-Rahman < al-Kahili The two sides pelted each other with arrows until they had no more. Then they threw so many spears that cavalry could have ridden on top of the butt ends. When they had exhausted their supply of spears, the two sides began to fight with their swords.

149 532 'lAbd al-A'ila b. Wasil < Fitr Similar to no. 147.

150 532 'lisa b. 'Abd a r-RaWan < 'lîsâ By the end of the battle, so many arrows were b. Hattan sticking in 'Â'isha's haudaj that it resembled a hedgehog.

151 533 'Abd Allah b. A Wa d < Abu Raja' Similar to no. 150.

152 533 Sayf b. 'lUmar Mjihammad b. Abi Bakr and 'Ammar b. Yasir carried 'Â'isha (still in her haudaj) to a house in Bagra.

to cn 153 533 Sayf b. '.Umar Al-Qa'iqa'i and Z u - f a r b. al-Harith took the haudaj o off the camel and carried it to a house in basra. No. Page Transmitter Hadith

A^yun b. Dubay'ia showed too much curiosity in the haudaj and "Â'isha cursed him. Later he was killed, "Ali . and "Â'isha met and made peace,

154 534 Sayf b, *Umar "Amraar b, Yasir and Muhammad b, Abi Bakr took the haudaj off the camel and Muhammad made sure that "A'isha was unharmed. Then "Ali came and he and "Â'isha resolved their differences.

155 534 Sayf b, "lUmar Muhammad b, Abi Bakr settled "Â'isha in a house in Basra.

156 534 Sayf b, "lUmar After the Ahl al-Jamal were defeated, az-Zubayr left Basra, Al-Ahnaf b, Qays saw him leaving and asked for a volunteer to go after az-Zubayr and find out his story, "Amr b, JurmQz volunteered and caught up with az-Zubayr, The two traveled to­ gether for a time and then stopped for the prayer. When az-Zubayr bowed his. head, "Amr killed him and returned to al-Ahnaf with az-Zubayr's sword, Al- Ahnaf took the sword to "All who was upset over az- Zubayr's death and recalled the many times that az- Zubayr had defended the Prophet, He asked al-Ahnaf if he had ambushed az-Zubayr and al-Ahnaf replied that as far as he was concerned he^had acted in "Ali's interests and added that "Ali's future was uncertain and he would need all the help he could get.

157 535 Sayf b, "lUmar "Amr b, Jurmuz killed az-Zubayr, Some of the otlier to Ahl al-Jamal, including Marwan and "Abd Allah b, o\ az-Zubayr sought protection with different tribes. No. Page Transmitter Hadith

'Â'isha had Marwan, ®iÜ3<î Allah, and others brought to her.

158 537 Sayf b. "lUmar 'Â'isha told al-Qa'qa'i that she wished that she had died twenty years before the battle.

159 537 Sayf b. ®Umar 'Â'isha inquired after the fate of different people who had fought in the battle.

160 537 Sayf b. ®'iUmar 'Ali recalled that the prophet had been especially fond of verse thirty of Ash-Shürâ ("Whatever af­ fliction may visit you is for what your own hands have earned; and He pardons much." [Arberry]) and the Prophet had added that afflictions that visited Muslims in this world were as penance for their sins; and God would not hold these sins against Muslims in the afterlife.

161 538 Sayf b. 'iUmar 'Ali camped with his army outside of Basra for three days while the dead were buried. He had weapons and other objects that littered the battle­ field collected and sent to the main Basran mosque. And he ordered that survivors could collect their property but the property of Muslims who had died was forbidden to others.

162 539 Sayf b. 'lUmar Ten thousand men died at the battle— five thousand of the Ahl al-Jamal and five thousand of '/Ali's troops. (Additional details about the losses that individual tribes suffered) [O (OCTi No. Page Transmitter Hadith

163 539 Sayf b. *iUmar ®iAli entered Basra and after praying at the main mosque he visited *Â'isha. She was with many other women, some of whom blamed 'All for the deaths of their husbands or kin. One woman was especially vehement in her criticism and ®Ali pointed out that he knew that many who had fought him were hiding in Basra, but did not intend to take any action a- gainst them. Later, al-Qa®qa®i told him that some men were talking about punishing 'Â'isha and ®iAli gave orders that they were to be whipped.

164 540 Sayf b, ®iUmar Similar to no, 163,

165 541 Sayf b. “lUmar Al-Ahnaf gave ®Ali the bay®a after which all of the Basrans did, *Ali then divided up the treasury among those who had fought for him and promised his followers that they would receive the same amount if he had another victory in Syria, His actions upset the Sabl'iyya and they slandered him.

166 541 Sayf b, *iUmar It was ®AlI's custom after a battle not to pillage, rape, or kill the wounded. He reminded his men that the Ahl al-Jamal were Muslims,

167 541 Abu Kurayb < ®iAsim b, Kulayb After the battle, al-Ashtar told Ibn Kulayb's fa­ ther to buy a camel and take it to ®Â'isha, She refused to accept the camel because al-Ashtar had killed Muhammad b, Talha, her sister's son,

168 542 Sayf b. ®iUmar ®Â'isha went to Makka and stayed there until the N) haii after which she returned to Madina,

169 542 Sayf b. ®iUmar ®Ali wrote letters to his governors to inform them about the battle. He accepted the bay®ia from the Basrans and appointed Ibn ®Abbâs governor of the city. He instructed Ibn ®Abbas to govern as he saw fit and to seek his t®iAlî’s] advice if he needed it. The Saba'iyya tried to dissuade ®iAli from appointing Ibn ®;Abbâs and then left Bagra without ®Ali's permission. He went after them to prevent them from causing trouble.

170 544 Sayf b. ®iUmar The Madinans knew about the battle the same day that it occurred because a vulture dropped in the city a hand with a signet ring that had belonged to one who had fought in the battle.

171 544 Sayf b, ®iUmar ®:Ali provisioned a caravan to escort ®Â'isha back to the Hijaz; he placed Muhammad b. Abi Bakr in charge of it and sent forty cultured women of Basra to accompany her. Before she left, *Â'isha assured the Basrans that she and ®Ali harboured no ill feelings towards each other.

172 545 Al-Mada'inI More than six thousand died at the battle.

173 545 Lammaza b. Ziyad A man claimed that he was justified to insult ®Ali since ®Ali had had killed 2, 500 men in one day.

174 545 Sulayman < Jarir Poem by the brother of one who was killed at the battle.

175 545 ®Abd Allah b. Ahmad < Abu Yazid al-^fedînî ®Ammâr b. Yâsir criticized ®Â'isha for her role in % the battle. 265

At-Tabari's Loyalties

Many of the features that Hodgson noted in Sayf's narrative of

'.Uthman's death are also apparent in his account of the battle. In general, Sayf's version attempts to preserve the reputation of the

Associates and the essential cohesion of the Umma by making the killers of ‘.Uthmin primarily responsible for the battle.

These killers were the ones who controlled affairs in Madina after the caliph's death; they forced the question of the succession, pushed through the nomination of *Ali, and made Talha and az-Zubayr swear loyalty to him. ®Ali did not seek the caliphate. When it was offered to him, he at first refused because the offer was not tendered by a duly constituted elective body; and he only agreed after some of the

Madinans convinced him that the stability of the community would suffer if word spread that ',Uthman had been killed and that no one had been appointed to succeed him. Talha and az-Zubayr, for their part, seem to have objected more to being forced to swear loyalty than to *Ali's caliphate per se. When they later sought to avenge '.Uthmin's death, they directed their hostility not so much towards 'All as towards "the killers," some of whom happened to be among 'All's supporters.

Similarly, other Associates who refused to give 'All the bay'a did so on the grounds that the election was hasty and not by due process (i.e. through consultation). They, like Talha and az-Zubayr, appear not to 266 have objected to *Ali and his rule, but to the circumstances under which the succession occurred.

The conciliatory spirit that underlies Sayf's description of the bay'a persists in the rest of his narrative (as at-Tabari transmits it). When the Ahl al-Jamal arrived in Basra, the main opposition to them came from Basrans, led by Hukaym b. Jabala, who had participated in the killing of 'Uthman. Talha and az-Zubayr defeated this group and, true to their stated motives, killed several hundred men in vengeance for 'iUthmin. Furthermore, they did not evict Ibn Hunayf and take control of the city until the governor failed to live up to his part of the agreement that he had reached with Talha and az-Zubayr when they arrived in the city.^^

Later, al-Qa*qa'. b. 'lAmr, ®Ali's envoy, had little trouble in convincing Talha and az-Zubayr that the interests of the Umma would be better served if they abandoned their vendetta and supported ®Ali.^^

The two men confirmed their willingness to quit their cause when they met with ®Ali after he arrived in Basra.

'All went out [from his army] and Talha and az-Zubayr went out [from theirs] and the three met and talked about their disagreements. They could not find a solution (amr) more ideal than turning to peace and away from war when they realized that the affair was obscure and not understood. And they separated on the basis of their shared opinions about the affair. 'All returned^^o his army and Talha and az-Zubayr returned to theirs.

The majority of the troops in both camps rejoiced at the news of peace, and the responsibility for the beginning of the battle, according to 267

Sayf, lay with those in *Ali's camp who had attacked 'Uthmân and were 18 now fearful that their lives would be lost if a battle were averted,

Sayf cannot avoid the "reality" of the battle, and he does not shy away from detailing its severity. Yet in his final hadith he attempts to attenuate its impact on the community and to suggest a return to the normal order. He describes ®Ali's grief over some of the fallen and his mercy with survivors of the Ahl al-Jamal. He describes ®Â'isha's repentance of her role in the battle. Finally, he mentions that

®Â'isha and *Ali assured the Basrans that they harbored no ill-feelings towards each other.

In short, Sayf links the battle to the actions of ®iUthmân's killers and thereby attempts to protect the reputations of the

Associates and the stability of the community's history. In doing

this, Sayf alludes several times to the devious role played by one

faction of the killers— ®Abd Allah b. Saba' and his followers, the 19 Saba'iyya. Ibn Saba' was probably from the Yemen and converted to

Islam during the reign of 'lüthmân. He is reputed to have been an early

ghaii and the father of the early Shi®a. According to at-Tabari, Ibn

Saba', while in Egypt preached the doctrine of the wasiyya and incited

the people against ®,Uthmân since he had usurped ®Ali's rightful rule;

There have been 1,000 prophets and each prophet had a wasiy(legatee, pi. awsiyS'). ®Ali is the wagiyof Muhammad. . j Muhammad is tlie g^al of the Prophets and ®Ali is the Seal of the awsiya'.

After ®Ali's death, Ibn Saba' supposedly insisted that ®Alx had not 268

really died, but had ascended to heaven, where he would reside until he 21 returned to this world to wreak havoc on his enemies.

Given Sayf's conciliatory concerns, it is likely that ®iAbd Allah

b, Saba' and the Saba'iyya served as scapegoats in his version of the

battle and of the events of the first fitna in general. During Sayf's

lifetime (the latter part of the second/eighth century) the extremist

doctrines of the qhulat were reviled by most Muslims. Jafri, in his

study of the origins of "Shi®a Islam," mentions that

. . . from al-Baqir [the fifth Imam] onwards, all the subsequent Imams always cursed them [the qhulat] and repeatedly warned their followers not to accept traditions from them, Kashshi [a Shi®i author of a biographical work on famous Shi'as] quotes Ja®far, who complained of al-Mughira [an early "extremist"], for example, as misrepresenting al-Baqir, and adds that all the qhulûw ascribed to al-Baqir was from Mughira. In fact Ja®far and all the Imams who followed him were always unequivocal in violently ggrsing the qhulat and condemning their teachings.

As , the Saba'iyya resided, in the view of most Muslims, at the

very edge of the Umma; Sayf could conveniently blame the battle on them

and leave relatively intact the reputations of the important

Associates.

Such a treatment of the battle as at-Tabari provides through

Sayf's hadith may have appealed to the relatively undemanding reader

for whom it was important to believe that no fault lay with the

Associates or in the structure of the early community. The second set

of hadith, from al-Madâ'inî, also suggests that the causes of the battle lay in the killing of ®Uthman; yet it never mentions the 269

Saba'iyya or the role of the killers more generally. Instead# it links the battle to the actions of the major actors in the event— 'Â'isha#

®iAli, Talha, and az-Zubayr— but it suggests that their actions were due in large part to the chaos that resulted from ®:Uthmân's death.

The material# from al-Mada'ini and others# does provide more varied descriptions of the bay®ia than does Sayf. One hadith from al-Mada'ini# which resembles Sayf's# mentions that the people were eager to give ®Ali the bay®a# but he was at first unwilling to accept their oaths and thought that the offer should come from a shûrâ like the one that ®Umar had convened. ®Ali changed his mind# however, and agreed to accept the caliphate# after al-Ashtar and others warned him that the stability of the community might be threatened if people returned to the amsar (garrison towns) with news that ®Uthman had been killed and that a new ruler had not been elected. Yet other hadith from al-Mada'ini describe opposition from Talha# az-Zubayr# Ibn ®Umar#

Sa®id b. Abi Waqqas# and many others, and mention that Talha and az-Zubayr did not willingly swear loyalty to ®Ali and that others - 23 either refused to give their oaths or simply left Madina.

The conflicting descriptions in al-Madi'ini's hadith are equally evident in others in the second set. Some mention that the "common people" and the Associates# including Talha and az-Zubayr# wanted ®Alx to become caliph and that ®Alî was at first unwilling to accept their offer. When they persisted# he agreed on the condition that the

"election ceremony" be held publicly and endorsed by all. In the main mosque of Madina# the Muhâjirûn and Ansar# and then the rest of the 270 people, swore loyalty to ®iAli.^^ With regard to Talha and az-Zubayr, one hadith mentions that az-Zubayr swore loyalty to ®AlI in a date grove near Madina, and two others mention that *Ali had offered to swear loyalty to either Talha or az-Zubayr, but both men refused the 25 offer.

Here too, however, there are several reports of opposition to

'Ali's succession. In one, six Associates, Abd Allah b. *Umar, Sa*d b. Abi Waqqas, Suhayb b. SinSn, Zayd b. Thlbit, Muhammad b. Maslama,

Salama b. Waqsh, and Usama b, Zayd, refused (at least for the time) to give their oaths to ®Ali.^^ This report and two others also claim that T 27 Talha and az-Zubayr did not willingly swear loyalty to "All.

The absence of allusions in al-Madâ'ini's narrative to the role that the "killers" played in the election and the conflicting versions of it makes the bay"a seem more confused than in Sayf's version. This depiction of confusion continues in the hadith from al-Madâ'ini and others : "Â'isha, who was in Makka for the "umra at the time of

"uthman's death, was first told that "Uthman had killed his opponents 28 (specifically the Egyptians), and then told that they had killed him.

When Talha, az-Zubayr, "Â'isha, and others came together as the Ahl al-Jamal, they could not at first decide whether to go to Madina and 29 challenge "Ali, or go to Syria, or'Iraq. On the road to Basra, Talha and az-Zubayr argued over who would lead the prayer and "Â'isha had to intervene.Later, when the group passed al-Haw'ab and the dogs there began to howl, "Â'isha felt sudden reservations about her involvement in the affair and wanted to be returned to the Hijaz. 271

In Basra, Talha and az-Zubayr told Ibn Hunayf that they did not think that *Ali was more qualified to rule than they (they said nothing about avenging 'lUthman's death), Ibn Hunayf agreed to write ®Ali about their complaints if they would honor his rule of the city until a reply from *Ali arrived. Talha and az-Zubayr agreed; but two days later, for reasons that are not explained, they attacked Ibn Hunayf and his guard and evicted him from the city. However, the two men then had a difficult time winning the Basran populace over to their side. One

Basran wondered whether the Prophet would have approved of their actions and was especially upset that they had brought "Â'isha and had

32 left their own wives at home. Both Talha and az-Zubayr assured the

Basrans that they had not intended 'uthman's death, they had only wanted him to mend his ways; but the situation had gotten out of control and he was killed. Several of the Basrans, however, rejected this explanation since Talha and az-Zubayr had earlier written the

33 Basrans and incited them against "lUthman. Eventually, Talha and az-Zubayr overpowered Basran opposition, yet two reports suggest that 34 neither felt sanguine; Az-Zubayr suggested that they might launch a surprise attack against 'Ali, but when no one approved of his plan he admitted that he felt uncertain about what he was doing and feared that the affair might be the fitna against which they had been warned.

Talha also confided that he had misgivings and a premonition of his own death.In the case of az-Zubayr at least, the doubts reemerged at the start of the battle, when 'Ali reminded him of the Prophet's

. . . . 36 prediction. 272

The sense of confusion and uncertainty is also evident in the reports that focus on *!Ali, In these reports ®iAli himself was free from

Uie doubts that afflicted Taiha, az^'Zubayr, and 'Â'isha, although he did wonder why the two men would not accept his rule when they had 37 accepted that of his predecessors; but he did have a difficult time gaining the Kufans' support. Abu Mûsâ, the governor of the city, repeatedly refused to endorse 'Ali's requests for help and warned the people of the city that their salvation might depend on their remaining neutral during the impending fitna. Several thousand Kufans did join

'Ali, but not until after Abu Mûsâ's hold over the city and its people was wbroken. , 38

Furthermore, some of 'All's closest supporters were critical of his stubborn refusal to adopt, for the time, a policy of moderation.

'Abd Allah b. 'Abbas and al-Mughira b. Shu'ba counseled 'Ali not to replace any of 'lUthman's governors until he had consolidated his rule, lest some of them (Mu'awiya and 'Abd Allah b. 'Âmir in particular) incite the people against him by charging that * All had conspired against 'lUthman and then seized the rule. Ibn 'Abbas also pleaded with

'All to stay in his house until things calmed down. 'Ali was deaf to the advise al-Mughira and Ibn 'Abbas and swore to fight any who opposed 39 his rule. Later, al-Hasan recalled advice he had given his father and criticized him for failing to accept it— al-Hasan had warned 'Ali not to accept the bay'a until some of the chaos created by 'lUthman's death had subsided, and he had urged his father to stay in Madina and gather reinforcements before he set off after Talha and az-Zubayr. 'Ali 273 pointed out that he had sworn allegiance to the first three caliphs even though he had thought himself worthier (ahaqq) of the rule. After

'uthman’s death, the people had willingly offered him the bay'a. As the legitimate caliph he vowed to fight with the help of those who 40 supported him any who opposed him.

Other details in hadith from al-Mada'ini and others reinforce the sense of confusion. One report (from al-Mingari) mentions that when

Abu Musi urged the Kufans not to become involved in the conflict, one man implied that action had to be taken. The Umma was split into four groups (firaq); i.e. 'Ali, who was near Küfa; Mu'awiya in Syria; Talha and az-Zubayr in Basra; and a fourth group in the Hijaz [presumably those who refrained from swearing loyalty to 'Ali, but were not in competition with him for the rule]. As a consequence, the fay’ (state revenue) was not being collected, nor were enemies of the "state" being 41 fought. The dramatic depiction of thâ death of the youth, clad in white and clutching a part of the Qur’an, who volunteered to call the

Basrans to peace, and the macabre reports about the violence of the 42 conflict surely also reflect the chaos that was the fitna.

The reports from al-Madâ’inî, and the others that complement or emend his reports, taken as a whole, present a graphic picture of the confusion that followed 'Uthman’s death and culminated in an unprecedented civil war. It is true that some of the reports just examined can also be found in Sayf’s version. However, because his version attributes an overarching importance to the actions of the killers, and because it depicts these killers as a "fringe" group, it 274 cannot convey the same sense of confusion at the heart of the Umma. In

Sayf's version, in the final analysis, the conflict was between the killers and the Umma, They were responsible for ®iUthmân*s death, while good Muslims tried to save him; they started the fighting, while both sides had embraced peace; and they did what they could to keep the battle raging. In al-Madi'ini's version, the conflict was very much between segments of the Umma. But although his version, as at-Tabari presents it, links the battle to some of the most important Associates, it nevertheless suggests that their behavior was due largely to the confusion that ‘lUthmln's murder created, and that the "real" causes of the conflict did not lie only in the actions or motives of men.

In his discussion of at-Tabari's account of 'Uthman's death,

Hodgson saw in the set of narratives from al-Wiqidi and others, which present "a realistically ambiguous picture" of events surrounding the caliph's death, a reflection of at-Tabari's belief "... that the fault lay in basic dilemmas of power, which evoked honest differences of opinion"— "the dilemma of how to have power at once practically 43 effective and morally responsible."

In particular, Hodgson drew this interpretation from the first and last hadith of at-Tabari's titled account of the caliph's death. The • * account, which is preceded by descriptions of mounting dissatisfaction with 'uthman's rule, begins with an "editorial" comment from at-Tabari in which he promises to explain how 'Uthman's death came about. The first hadith that immediately follows this comment pertains, however, to the people's dissatisfaction: 'Uthman had distributed to some of his 275 family camels that had been given as alms tax (sadaqa). ®Abd ar-Rahmin b. ®Auf, an Associate, had learned of Uthman's actions and had sent 44 two men to take back the camels and distribute them properly. The second hadith, which comes after '.Uthman's death has already been narrated and describes a dialogue between 'uthman and his opponents, stands as a kind of reflective conclusion to the account and at the 45 same time foreshadows the Battle of the Camel. In the dialogue,

'uthman defends his rule and warns his opponents of the consequences that would ensue from his death. They, in reply, denounce his rule and defend their right to oppose it;

. . . ['uthman said] Do you say that God did not know how I would rule? In some of my rule I did well and the faithful were satisfied. Since then, I have not in my rule done anything to invoke God's displeasure nor has anything provoked your displeasure that God (may He be exalted) did not know of on the day he chose me and clothed me with the robe of his glory. . . Do not kill me. For killing is permitted in only three cases— when a man commits adultery after marriage, when a man apostatizes after becoming a Muslim, and when a man takes a life except in retaliation. If you kill me you will put the sword over your own necks and God (the mighty and powerful) will not lift it from you until the Day of Judgement. Do not kill me. If you kill me, you will never again pray together, you will never again as one group divide up the booty, and God will never again settle your disagreements.

They replied: . . . As for what you have mentioned concerning the affliction which would befall us if we killed you, surely [our] failure to uphold the truth against you because of fear of impending fitna is not proper. As for your saying that killing is only permitted in three cases, we find in the Book of God [lawful] killings other than the three that you mentioned; namely, killing one who viciously spreads evil in the land, killing one who oppresses then fights to defend his oppression, and killing one who, without cause, deviates from truth (hagq) and obstructs it and then fights against it and opposes it. You oppressed and you obstructed truth and deviated 276

from it [s path] and opposed it. You refused to punish yourself for those whom you intentionally oppressed. You have held the rule over us and have deviated in your government and in your oath. You assert that you did not treat us with contempt and that those who stand before you and protect you from us are fighting without your orders; but they are only fighting because of your hold on the rule. If only you had deposed ^gurself, they would have ceased to fight on your behalf,

Hodgson suggests that ®Abd ar-Rahman's actions in the first hadith

symbolize at-Tabari's solution to the insuperable dilemma that the last

hadith poses: The community must have an all-embracing law that each

Muslim could follow, a law that would bind the ruler and thereby protect the good Muslim life from the ill effects of corrupt or

incompetent rule,

Al-Madâ'ini's version of the Battle of the Camel, as at-Tabari

relates it, fulfills 'Uthman's predictions about the effects that his death will have on the community. And because 'Uthman was killed and his predictions came true, at-Tabari continues topically with the dilemma illustrated in the dialogue and points with equal force, in his

account of the battle, to the need for an all-embracing code of law.

The same lack of agreement on what is the law, which is the subject of

the debate between 'Uthman and his opponents, is at the very heart of

the Battle of the Camel, as at-Tabari depicts it.

The lack of a definitive law on caliphal succession hampered

'lAli's caliphate from its beginning— a problem that the conflicting

reports on the bay'a underscore. As caliph, 'lAli had no ^ jure means

to enforce his rule or to insist on the obedience of others. In his

attempts to gain support, 'Ali could only employ persuasion in his 277 dealings with the Madinans, persuasion and the threat of force with the

Kufans, and outright force with Talha, az-Zubayr, and the Basrans, His attempts to defend the office that symbolized the unity of the Umma only fractured that unity, a fracture reflected in the bay",a that many 47 of the Basrans swore to Talha and az-Zubayr.

Talha and az-Zubayr asserted "Ali's complicity in "Uthman’s death and made vengeance for that death the platform from which they opposed

'Ali's rule. Yet their platform had no foundations, not because "Ali was innocent of their charge or because they themselves were perhaps guilty of it. Rather, because neither ",Uthman nor h.ls killers were clearly guilty or innocent, any attempt to redress his death could not be legally constituted and would therefore founder.

In the chaos of the fitna, the Associates either contested or ignored the Prophet's sunna. "Â'isha continued on from al-Haw'ab in spite of her recollection of the Prophet's warning. Az-Zubayr fought in the battle even after "Ali reminded him of Muhammad's prediction.

Abu Musa based his appeal to the Kufans on a hadith from the Prophet and "Ammir b. Yasir contested its general validity:

"Ammâr said; "Did you hear this [the hadith] from the Messenger of God (£)?"

Abu Musi said; "Here is my hand."

"Ammir said; "The Messenger of God (^) only said this to you in particular. 'During it [the fitga] you are better off sitting than you are standing."

In the account of the battle, such Associates as Sa"d b. Abi

Waqqas, "Abd Allah b. "Umar, and Muhammad b. Maslama, and, most 278 explicitly, Abu Müsâ, play roles similar to ®Abd ar-Rahmân b. *Auf's in the account of *iUthman*s death; they tried, as good Muslims, to do the right thing and to persuade others to do likewise. Yet the chaos of the fitna compounded the dilemma with which ®iüthmân's rule had confronted them. As good Muslims, should they fight other Muslims whose guilt was far from certain, in order to restore unity to the

Umma, or should they refrain from action and watch as that unity was further destroyed? Either way, the fitna abrogated the efficacy of 49 their actions.

In the years that followed the "Abbasid rise to power, the "lulama* labored to provide in the shariSa a complete set of laws and a rigorous methodology to derive those laws. The early failure of the "Abbasids to live up to the expectations of the Piety-minded opposition to

Marwanid rule resulted in a kind of compromise settlement; The majority of the heirs of the Piety-minded opposition accepted "Abbâsid rule for the sake of stability in the community. But they sought to base the law on the Qur'an and the Prophet's sunna and thereby to make it largely independent of the caliph and his court. They expected the ruler to provide security in the lands and to support their efforts, but they gave him no role in the development or application of the law. The caliphs, for their part, did support the efforts of the

"ulamâ' and expected the qâdi courts to adhere to the shari"ia as the jurisconsults were developing it.^^

It is against the background of these developments that Hodgson understood at-Tabari's account of 'Uthman's death, and it is these 279

developments that also inform al-Madâ'ini's description of the battle.

At-Tabari flourished at a time of crucial activity among the

jurisconsults and scholars of hadith and made his own contribution to

their efforts in the form of a school of law (madhhab) and a renowned

commentary on the Qur'an, and, in at least parts of his Ta'rikh, he

illustrated in a graphic way the importance of what he and other

fuqaha' were attempting.

At-Tabari's life also coincided with the weakening of caliphal authority and stability. Whereas other historians, such as Ibn Qutayba and pseudo-Ibn Qutayba, who witnessed this decline may have thought it

important to uphold the strength and stability of the caliphate, at-Tabari, as a faqih, may have thought it important to develop a comprehensive law that would function largely independently of the ruler. Such a law would preserve the quality of Muslim life whatever the merits or demerits of the reigning'caliph and insulate that life

from the vicissitudes that attended the age. As an historian, at-Tabari incorporated his perceptions into parts of his Ta'rikh. The need for a comprehensive law undergirds the more complex versions in both his account of the death of ®iUthman and the Battle of the Camel.

Lack of agreement on what was the law led first to the shedding of the

caliph's blood and then to a conflict of unprecedented severity that

engulfed much of the community and, in the view of later Muslims, permanently robbed it of unity.

In his use of the hadith format, at-Tabari employed a medium that most effectively conveyed his interpretation and yet also enabled him 280 to conform to "generic" and social constraints of his age. His inclusion of conflicting hadith. each accompanied by an isnad. enabled at-Tabari, as it had al-Baladhuri, to address in his account a range of loyalties. The official rejection of the Mu*.tazilis brought back into

"power" the Ahl al-Hadith, some of vrtiom were as intent as the

Mu'itazilis had been on seeing that people believed properly and as intolerant of those who did not agree with them. At-Tabarî reportedly ran afoul of the Ahl al-Hadith on at least two occasions.Perhaps his inclusion of Sayf's version may have answered (pragmatically) to the tastes of the many who identified with the Ahl al-Hadith and who believed that the Urama's past was essentially unblemished and that its early leaders were blameless.

Yet the overall simplicity of Sayf's version draws constant attention to the reports presented by al-Mada'ini and others. By means of this contrast and the generally more complex picture that al-Mada'ini provides, at-Tabari was able to present effectively his own interpretation without ever having explicitly to voice his own views.

As Carradine. Inspector Grant's "research assistant," somewhat naively observed: "After all, the truth of anything at all doesn't lie in 53 someone's account of. It lies in all the small facts of the time."

At-Tabari furnished his reader with "all the facts" of the battle, carefully identified his source for each of them, and on the surface let these facts "speak for themselves." As full as his account is, however, it does not contain all the information that was available on the barcle. At-Tabari carefully selected his information, his facts. 281 and organized them in such a way as to indicate to the perceptive reader the ineluctable need for a comprehensive code of law. NOTES

CHAPTER X

^H.A.R. Gibb, "Tarikh," p. 118; and A.A. Duri, The Rise of Historical Writinqr p. 69. There are several editions of at-Tabari's Ta'rikh; all references in this chapter are to Muhammad Aba Fadl Ibràhîm's (Cairo, 1967). This edition has in the margins the pagination for the de Goeje edition, Muhammad b. Jarir at-Tabari, Ta'rikh ar-rusul wa al-muluk, 15 vols., ed. M.J. de Goej^ et al. (Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1879-1901). 2 He reportedly memorized the Qur'an by the age of seven, led the prayer when he was eight, and began writing and transmitting hadith at the age of nine. See Yâqût, Mu* jam, vol. 18, p. 49.

^At-Tabari did not hold a government position; for a while he was the tutor of the son of Mutawakkil's vazir, but may have spent lengthy portions of his youth with little income, and throughout his life he seems to have supported himself primarily through teaching. See R.A. Nicholson A Literary History of the Arabs, p. 350. But cf. S.D.F. Goitein's "Introduction" to al-Baladhuri's Ansab al-Ashraf (p. 16), where he remarks that at-Tabari was a "landed proprietor." 4 In the words of one admirer, "He was like the qâri' (the specialist in the different readings of the Qur'an) who knew nothing but the Qur'an; he was like the muhaddith who knew nothing but hadith; he was like the faqih (jurisconsult) who knew nothing but fiqh (jurisprudence); he was like the nahwl (grammarian) who knew nothing but al-nahw (grammar); he was like the hasib (mathematician) who knew nothing but al-hisab (mathematics), . (al-Yâqüt, Mu*jam, vol. 18, p. 61).

^For a list of his works see an-Nadim Fihrist, p. 291; and al-Yâqüt Mu* jam, vol. 18, pp. 44 and 45. The demise of his madhhab was probably due to an insufficient number of followers to keep it alive after his death. At at-Tabari's time there were several hundred madhàhib. His school may also have suffered setbacks as a result of some critical remarks that at-Tabari apparently made about Aljmad b. Hanbal. See George Makdisi's The Rise of Colleges, pp. 8 and 146; M.G.S. Hodgson's Venture, p. 352; above p. 280; and below, n. no. 51.

282 283

^Jâmi* al-Bayân *an Ta'wîl Ây al-Qur'ân, 30 vols. (Cairo; n.p., 1955). Some scholars have, however, commented on connections between at-Tabari*s interest in the law and his history and his commentary. See, for example, Hodgson Venture, p. 352; A.A. Duri,Rise of Historical Writing, pp. 69ff.; and Gibb, Arabic Literature, pp. 80-81 (citing O. Loth in Zeitschrift der Deutschen morganlandischen Gesellschaft, xxxv, pp. 589ff). 7 One of the most complete discussions of at-Tabari*s sources is Jawâd 'Ali’s "Mawarid Ta'rikh at-Tabari," Majaliat al-Majma' al-'llmf al-'Iraqi. 1 (1950); 143ff.; 2 (1951); 135ff.; 3 (1954); 16ff.; 8 (1961): 425ff.

^Hodgson, Venture, p. 356, n. 14. 9 I. Goldziher "Historiography in Arabic Literature," in his Gesammelte Schriften, 4 vols., ed. and trans. Joseph De Somogyi (Hildesheim: n.p., 1967-73), vol. 3, pp. 359-394, p. 361; G. Richter, "Medieval Arabic Historiography," pp. 139ff; Margoliouth, Lectures on Arabic Historians, passim; E.L. Petersen,'Ali and Mu'awiya, pp. 149-59, and passim where he discusses historians whom at-Tabari cited; R.A. Nicholson A Literary History of the Arabs, pp. 350-52; F. Rosenthal Muslim Historiography; passim, and Elma Marin "Introduction," in At-Tabari's Reign of al-Mu'tasim. pp. xv-xvi.

^^Gibb, "Tarikh," p. 118; and Arabic Literature, p. 81.

^^With regard to the work's importance to modern scholars see, for example, J. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom; L. Caetani, Annali dell'Islam. 10 vols. (Hildesheim; Georg 01ms, 1905-26); M.A. Shaban, Islamic History and Islamic History 2; and Michael Morony, Iraq After the Muslim Conquest (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1984). These authors rely far more on at-Tabarî's Ta'rikh than on any other work. Perhaps more useful essays on at-Tabari will result from the National Endowment for the Humanities sponsored project to translate into English the entire Ta'rikh. 12 Hodgson, "Two Pre-Modern Muslim Historians." Hodgson presents many of this article's ideas in his Venture, pp. 352-57.

^^Hodgson, "Two Pre-Modern Muslim Historians," p. 64. 14 It is interesting to note that in both the account of 'Uthman's death and of the battle, the more credible versions come from historians who were native to the areas in which the major events of the narrative occurred— al-Waqidi spent much of his life in the Hijaz and al-Mada'ini was a native of 'irig. 284

One notable difference between at-Tabari's account of the killing of *iUthman and the battle is that in the former, Sayf's narrative comes as one piece or block which interrupts al-Waqidi's report. In the account of the battle, neither set is presented completely in one place; rather, throughout the account at-Tabari alternates between material from Sayf, al-Mada'ini, and others— a feature that highlights some of the differences between the transmitters' versions. Compare, for example, no. 58 with nos. 59 and 60; no. 83 with no. 84; and nos. 98-100 with no. 101.

^^On the fighting between the Ahl al-Jamal and Hukaym, see nos. 58 and 61; cf.. Khalifa b. Khayyât's first version of the battle between Hukaym and the Ahl al-Jamal. On the agreement that Talha and az-Zubayr reached with Ibn Hunayf, see no. 58.

^^No. 80. 17 No. 98.

No. 99; no, 83 also describes the "killers'" aversion to peace. 19 Nos. 23, 43, 83, 99, 106, and 169, all from Sayf.

^^At-Tabari, Ta'rikh vol. 4, p. 341, from Sayf b. *iUmar.

^^Al-Baghdadi, Farq bayn al-Firaq, pp. 233ff.; and Ibn Abi al-HadldySharh, vol.2, pp. 98ff. See above pp. 46-48; M.G.S, Hodgson, s.v. "®Abd Allah b. Saba'," E.I.Z; and his "How Did the Early Shi®a Become Sectarian?" pp. 2f. and 6 ; Jafri, Shi'ia Islam, pp. 300 f . ; Wellhausen, Religio-Political Factions, pp. 17-18 and 151-53; Petersen, ®Ali and Mu'awiya, pp. 77ff.j and Martin Hinds, "The Murder of the Caliph ®iUthmân," p. 456. Hinds does not refer to Ibn Sabi' but does mention Ibn Harb, a name by which Ibn Sabi' was called, according to Hodgson ("®Abd Allah b. Sabi'"). The Saba'iyya are probably implied in other references that Sayf makes to the Egyptians since ®Abd Allah b. Sabi' was so closely linked with Egyptian opposition to ®Uthman. 22 Jafri, Shi®ia Islam, p. 301. Also see Hodgson "How Did the Early Shi'ia Become Sectarian?" p. 5; and his "®Abd Allah b. Sabi'." Both Baghdidi (Farq, p. 233) and Ibn Abi al-Hadid (Sharh, vol. 2, p. 99) mention that ®:Ali repudiated Ibn Sabi'. On Mughira and the early ghulat more generally also see Steve Wasserstrom, "The Moving Finger Writes." 23 Nos. 3, 6 , and 7. 24 Nos. 1 and 2. 25 Nos. 4, 5, and 16. 285

^®No. 10. 27 Nos. 5 and 8 .

^®No. 34. 29 No, 40.

^ % o . 44.

^^Whereas Sayf says nothing about the episode at al-Haw'ab, it is mentioned twice in the second set, nos. 48 and 60. 32 No, 57. See also no, 6 8 — Zayd b. Çûhàn, responding to 'Â'isha's request for aid, promised her that he would oppose her if she did not immediately return to the Hijaz and sever all ties with the affair.

^^No, 60. 34 - Material from al-Mada'ini and others also mentions that the Ahl al-Jamal killed Hukaym b. Jabala; but, relative to Sayf's reports, this set downplays the opposition from Hukaym and also casts him in a different light; In Sayf's versions, Hukaym appears consistently murderous and especially vicious in his slander of 'Â'isha, In the second set Hukaym appears more reasonable— he and his men encountered a group of the Ahl al-Jamal, led by 'Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr, and Hukaym insisted that Ibn Hunayf be released and that the Ahl al-Jamal honor the treaty that they had made with the governor; see no. 64. 35 Nos. 66 and 67 respectively.

^^Nos. 90 and 101. 37 No. 75.

The second set provides two versions of these events. In one, from al-Mada'ini, 'Ali finally replaced Abu Mûsâ with Qaraza b. Ka'b, no. 71 and 8 6 . In the second, which is from Nasr b. Muzâ%iim al-Mingari, al-Ashtar won the support of many Kufans after he took control of the city's fort, no. 78. 39 Nos. 24 and 25. 'Abd Allah b. 'Amir was 'Uthman's governor of Basra. 40 No. 48. 41 _ - _ • No. 78. Notice that Abu Mûsâ claims that those in the Hijaz are "the best of the people." 286

42 On the death of the youth see nos. 101 and 103; on the violence of the fighting see nos. 113, 114, 120, 121, 122, 124, 148-151, 172, and 173. 43 Hodgson, "Two Pre-Modern Muslim Historians," p. 57 and Venture, p. 356, respectively. 44 Hodgson, Venture, p. 354. At-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. 4, p. 365. The hadith following this first one do explain how *Uthman's death came'about. Notice that 'Abd ar-Rahmân was ultimately responsible for the shûrâ's decision to elect 'uthman rather than 'All. 45 The pages, in at-Tabari, that separate the dialogue from the beginning of 'Ali's caliphate (vol. 4, pp. 396-426) consist of an encapsulated biography of 'uthman. 46 Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 395-96. Cf. William H. McNeill, gen. ed.. Readings in World History, 10 vols. (New York; Oxford University Press, 1973), vol. 6 : The Islamic World, ed. William H. McNeill and Marilyn R. Waldman, pp. 77-79.

^ \ o . 66.

^^No. 78. See above, p. 128, n. No. 20. 49 The conversation that Abu MÛsâ had with one of the Kufans also illustrates the dilemma. The man implied that action must be taken because four groups were contesting the rule and Islam was not being spread. Abu MÛsâ insisted that because the affair was a fitna right-minded Muslims should stay out of it, no. 78.

^^On the efforts of the 'ulama' and particularly the fuqaha' to develop the shari'a see Hodgson, Venture, vol. 1, bk. 2, ch. III. Noel J. Coulson has an interesting discussion of the aversion that many of the fuqaha' reportedly had to serving as qâdis; "Doctrine and Practice in Islamic Law; One Aspect of the Problem,"Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 18 (1956); 211-26.

^^On one occasion, when he objected to an literal interpretation of a Qur'ânic verse that described Muhammad sitting next to God, the Ahl al-Hadith and the followers of Ahmad b. Hanbal (al-hanabila) pelted him with stones. On another occasion, he was asked why he had not mentioned Ahmad b. Hanbal in his Ikhtilaf al-Fuqaha' and he replied that Ibn Hanbal was a muhaddith,not a faqih. See Yaqut, Mu' jam, vol. 18, p. 58; Frederick Karn's "Introduction" to his edition of at-Tabari's Ikhtilaf al-Fuqahâ', 2nd ed. (Beirut; Muhammad Amin Rabh, 1902), p. 8 ; and Hodgson, Venture, p. 391. Cf. George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges, p. 146. 287

^^Perhaps at-Tabari's opinions about the Hanbalis had mellowed by the time he wrote his history. The chronology of at-Tabari's works is not certain. He probably did not start the history until he had completed his commentary on the Qur'an in 290/902 and reportedly finished the T a 'rikh in 303/915. See Yâqût, Mu* jam, vol. IB, pp. 42 and 44; and Muhammad Abu Fadl Ibrahim's "Introduction" to at-Tabari's Ta'rikh, vol 1, pp. 16 and 23. 53 Josephine Tey, The Daughter of Time (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951; Pocket Books, 1977), p. 103. CHAPTER X I

CONCLOSION

Many Muslims living in the first three Islamic centuries saw the

Battle of the Camel and events surrounding it as a watershed in their history, a watershed that they came to term the "first fitna." In their views this conflict marked the end of the time when the Umma had accepted and lived by the Prophet's sunna and the Qur'an and the beginning of the time when a no longer unified community debated what constituted authoritative guidance and proper Muslim conduct. The fitna held a central place in these debates since Muslims often defined their values and loyalties in terms of their position on the conflict. As a consequence of the fitna's importance, every account of the Battle of the Camel and related events was potentially an interpretation.

This dissertation has sought to identify interpretive themes or motifs in accounts of the Battle of the Camel in order to describe the religious and political values of the authors of those accounts. To describe the historians' loyalties requires a sensitivity to the methodologies that they employed. The configurations of medieval

Muslim historical texts, taken by many modern scholars as evidence of

288 289 the uninterpretive nature of medieval Muslim historiography, may have been due to techniques that in fact facilitated the historians' ability to formulate and express their interpretations.

Ideology

Above all else, this dissertation demonstrates the tremendous

diversity of values held and espoused by medieval Muslim historians and the variety of compositional styles and techniques that they

employed to articulate their values. Ibn KhayySt supported the

legitimacy of 'Ali's rule and the propriety of his actions. Yet he

also tried to attenuate the guilt of *Â'isha, Talha, and az-Zubayr.

By means of the hadith format, he was able to establish a context in

which some of the actions of the three Associates appeared

meritorious. Ibn Qutayba, in his short narrative, absolutely

supported 'Ali's caliphate and made no attempt to excuse 'À'isha,

Talljia, and az-Zubayr. His account, however, does not appear to

reflect a personal loyalty to ®Ali so much as it does a depersonalized

support of the office of caliph. Pseudo-Ibn Qutayba also endorsed

*Ali's rule and condemned the three Associates' opposition to it.

Like Ibn Qutayba, he stressed the importance of paying allegiance to

the duly elected ruler; yet the particular way in which Pseudo-Ibn

Qutayba focused on 'lAli as one of the Ahl al-Bayt appears to reflect a 290

kind of pro-Abbâsid loyalty. By means of the hadith format and the

presentation of alternate versions, al-Balâdhuri was able to create an account that gave equal standing to quite different values.

Ad-Dinawari endorsed the legitimacy of *Ali's caliphate, but his

narrative seems to sympathize with those Associates whose aversion to

fighting other Muslims compelled them to adopt a neutral position in

the conflict. Al-Ya®iqubi*s support of ®Ali's caliphate and his

rendering of. the several speeches made by 'Ali's supporters may

reflect a kind of heightened ®Alid partisanship. Al-Ghalâbi's

allusion to 'All and his sons' possession of several objects that had

belonged to the Prophet, his quotation of a part of the speech that

the Prophet reputedly made at Ghadxr Khum, and his consistent focus on

'Ali may also reflect a heightened 'Alid partisanship that was similar

but by no means identical to al-Ya'qübi's. Finally, at-Tabari’s

description of the confusion that followed 'Uthman's death and of the

variety of views that the death elicited reflects his own belief in

the need for a law that would justly adjudicate legitimate

di sagreeraents.

The variety of loyalties seems to defy useful categorization.

Certainly the conventional Jama'i-Sunni/Shi'i dichotomization cannot

be applied to the accounts. Indeed, this dissertation has argued that

since the ideologies generally characterized by these terms were in

the third/ninth century still inchoate, there could not yet have been

Shi'ii or Jamâ'i-Sunni traditions of historiography. It is true that 291 the accounts of al-Ya®igübi and al-Ghalabi contain some elements that came to be characteristic of a later, developed ShïMsm and that the accounts of the other six historians display elements that came to bé^ ‘ characteristic of a later, developed Jama®i-Sunnism. Yet too much should not be made of this observation. All of the accounts have features in common, and al-Ya®qûbi and ai-Ghalabi's differ as much from each other as they do from the other accounts. More to the point, the eight historians certainly could not know that their descendants would, in at least some situations, define themselves as

Jama® i-Sunnis or as Shi®,is and would, in doing so, appropriate and elaborate on some of the ideas that the historians themselves had employed in their accounts.

The variation between the accounts, the relatively brief period during which the historians lived, and the relatively small number of accounts that have survived also seem co defeat an attempt to discern patterns of development in the loyalties held. Although the birth-dates of most of the eight historians are uncertain, the lives of the majority of them probably overlapped (at-Tabari was sixteen when Ibn Khayyât died in 240/854). Indeed, these "figures" underscore the fluid state of loyalties during the third/ninth century.

In this study, the accounts of the historians have been discussed as reflections of the diversity of loyalties and values that co-existed during the third/ninth century. At the same time, some of the accounts have also been understood as attempts to formulate 292 loyalties and values; at-Tabari's, for example, points to the need for the development and implementation of a comprehensive legal system; al-Balâdhuri's to the desirability of tolerating divergent values; and

Ibn Qutayba's to the necessity of supporting the legitimate ruler.

Some of the other accounts may also be formative, although in a less obvious and demonstrable way. Al-Ya®qubi and al-GhalSbx, as Muslims who appear to have shared a heightened 'Alid partisanship, may have been attempting to find a way of talking about 'All (and his descendants) that would help them to articulate their loyalties and distinguish them from those held by other Muslims. Similarly, pseudo-Ibn Qutayba's account, while reflecting a kind of 'Abbasid loyalty, may also represent an effort to develop an "'Abbisi school of historiography." In fact, until we know much more about Muslim

loyalties of the first three centuries we should probably assume that

every history that is a reflection of a loyalty is also an attempt to

formulate it.

Methodology

It is apparent from an-Nadim's Fihrist, al-Yâqüt's Mu' jam

al-Udabâ', and Ibn Abi al-Hadid's Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, from the

isnads in the histories of Khalifa b. Khayyât, al-Balâdhuri, and

at-Tabarl, and from briefer allusions to sources by Ibn Qutayba and 293 al-Ya'.qûbi, that there was a body of accounts of the battle written by historians of the first/seventh and second/eighth century that third/ninth century historians could utilize in compiling their own accounts. The differences among accounts of the battle that survive indicate that the body was sizable and that later historians enjoyed considerable flexibility in selecting material from it. Once these two facts are appreciated, then it becomes possible to view the histories from the third/ninth century as original and interpretive works rather than as essentially uncritical collections of materials from the earlier centuries. Selection and organization assume tremendous importance as a means of interpretation in an intellectual and cultural milieu in which interpretation was usually not overt.

This dissertation has also maintained that historians had a choice of narrative styles in which to cast their works. It has argued against the view that the hadith format was typical of early histories and was was replaced by a more continuous narrative style in the course of the third/ninth century. Although our knowledge of histories composed during the first two centuries is quite incomplete, evidence suggests that not all were in the hadith formatj and certainly the histories of Nasr b. Muzâhim, Ibn Khayyât, Ibn *Abd al-Hakam, al-Baladhurl, at-Tabari, and Ibn A‘tham al-Kufi, all in the hadith format and all written during the third/ninth century or latter, cannot be ignored. And if historians from the first two centuries did not consistently use the hadith format, then we cannot ------294 view its appearance in third/ninth century histories as a moribund carryover. On the contrary, passages in al-Balàdhurî and at-Tabari's works suggest that when these historians used a source that was not in the hadith format, they created a kind of hadith by prefixing the name of their authority to the material they cited.

It is apparent then that the two styles co-existed during the third/ninth century and that historians chose to employ one of them.

These considerations underlie the contention that some historians may have employed the hadith format because it facilitated the process of composition and the articulation of interpretation. Although Ibn

Khayyât, al-Balâdhuri, and at-Tabari developed different themes in their accounts- for each, the hadith format was the central medium; By means of it, Ibn Khayyât was able to endorse the legitimacy of * All's rule yet also mitigate the guilt of Talha and az-Zubayr, al-Balâdhuri could compile a conciliatory account that accepted the validity of a range of values, and at-Tabari could stress the need for a law that would transcend the powers of the ruler.

By viewing the hadith format as a mode or style that some historians chose to employ, it is also possible to understand why other historians eschewed itt. The continuous narrative style was clearly far more appropriate to the direct and thoroughly unambiguous accounts that Ibn Qutayba, pseudo-Ibn Qutayba, al-Ya'qübi or al-Ghalabi created. 295

In the end, this dissertation has done more to complicate than to simplify. It has questioned categories more than it has either supported them or proposed new ones. It has, perhaps most importantly, pointed to the need to refine the ways in which we understand and use medieval Arabic histories by demonstrating their value as sources that can help to illuminate the fluid and varied state of loyalties in third/ninth century Islamic society. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Ibn al-Kalbi. Jamharat an-Nasab. 2 vols. Edited and put into tables by W. Caskel and G. Strenziok, Leiden; E.J, Brill, 1966.

Ibn Qutayba, (pseudo). Kitâb al-Imâma wa as-Siyâsa. 2 vols. Cairo: Mustafa al-Bâbi al-Halabi, 1969.

Ibn Qutayba, ad-Dinawari. *Uyun al-Akhbar. 4 vols. Edited by Ahmad Zaki al-*Adwa. Cairo, Dâr al-Kutub, 1925.

______. Kitâb al-Ma'ârif. 3rd. edition. Edited by Muhammad Ismâ*il 'Abd Allah as-Sâwî. Beirut: Dar Ihya' at-Turath ai-'Arabi, 1970.

Ibn Sa'd, Muhammad. Tabaqât al-Kubrâ. 9 vols. Edited by Ihsan 'Abbas. Beirut: Dâr Sàdir, n.d.

Kahhâla, 'U.R. Mu'jam al-Mu'allifin. 15 vols. Damascus: n.p., 1957-67.

Khalifa b. Khayyât. Kitâb at-Tabagât. 2 vols. Edited by Suhayl Zakkâr. Damascus; n.p., 1966.

Ta’rikh Khalifa b. Khayyât. 2 vols. Edited by Suhayl Zakkâr. Damascus: Wizâra ath-Thaqâfa wa al-Irshâd al-Qawmi, 1967.

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The Koran Interpreted. Translated by Arthur J. Arberry. The World's Classics, 4th ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Majlisi, Muhammad Bâqir. Bihâr al-Anwâr. 102 vols. Tehran: Islâmiyya, 1964. *

Al-Mas'ûdi, Abu al-Hasan 'Ali b. Husayn. Murüi adh-Dhahab wa Ma'âdin al-Jawhar. 7 vols. Edited by Charles Pellat. Beirut: Publications de 1'Université Libanaise, 1966-79.

______. Kitâb at-Tanbih wa al-Ishrâf. Edited by M.J. de Goeje. Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, vol 8. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1894.

Al-Minqari, Nasr b. Muzâhim. Waq'at Siffin. Edited by 'Abd as-Salâm Muhammad Hârùn. Cairo: A1-*Arabiyyaal-Haditha, 1981.

Muslim. Sahih Muslim bi Sharh an-Nawawi. 18 vols. Cairo; n.p., 1924.

An-Nadîm, Abu Faraj Muhammad b. Abi Ya'qûb. Kitâb Fihrist an-Nadim. Edited by Ibn 'Ali Zayd al-'Abidin al-Mlzandarâni. Tehran: n.p., 1979. 299

At-Tabari, Abu Ja'far Muhammad b. Jarir. Ta'rikh ar-Rusul wa al-Mulûk. 10 vols. Edited by Muhammad Abu Padl Ibrahim. Cairo; Dâr al-Ma'ârif, 1967.

______. Ta'rikh ar-Rasul wa al-Mulûk. 15 vols. Edited by M.J. de Goeje, et al. Leiden: E.J, Brill, 1879-1901.

______. Abu Ja'far Muhammad b. Jarir at-Tabari's The reign of al-Mu'tasim (833-42) (Ta'rikh ar-Rùsùl wa al-Mulûk). Translated by Elma Marin, American Oriental Series, vol. XXXV. New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1951.

______. Jami' al-Bayan 'an Ta'wil Ây al-Qur'ân. 30 vols. Cairo: n.p., 1955

Ikhtilâf al-Fuqahâ'. 2nd edition. Edited by Frederick Karn. Beirut; Muhammad Amin Rabh, 1902.

Al-wSqidi, Muhammad b. 'Umar. Kitâb al-Maqhâzl. 3 vols. Edited by Marsden Jones. London: Oxford University Press, 1966; reprint ed., Beirut; 'Âlam al-Kutub, n.d.

. Futûh ash-SKâm. 2 vols. Cairo: Dâr al-Jil, n.d.

Al-Ya'qübi, Ahmad b, Abi Ya'qûb b, Ja'far b. Wahb b. Wadih. T a 'rikh al-Ya'qubi. 2 vols. Beirut: Dir Sidir, 1970.

______. Kitâb al-Buldân. Edited by M.J. de Goeje. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1873.

Al-Yaqut, Shihâb ad-Din Abu 'Abd Allah. Mu'jam al-Udabâ'. 20 vols. Cairo: Dâr al-Fikr al-‘Arabi, 1980.

_. Mu'jam al-Buldân. 5 vols. Cairo: Dâr Maktabata1-'Arabi, n.d.

Az-Zubayri, Abu 'Abd Allah. Kitâb Nasab al-Ouravsh. Edited by E. Levi- Provençal. Cairo: Dâr al-Ma'ârif, 1953.

Books in European Languages

Abbott, Nabia. Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri. 3 vols. The University of Chicago Oriental Institute Publications no. 76, 300

Vol. 1: Historical Texts. Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1957. Vol. 2: Qur'anic Commentary and Tradition. Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1967.

_. *Â*isha, The Beloved of Muhammad. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942,

Ayoub, Mahmoud.. Redemptive Suffering in Early Islam: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of 'Âshürâ' in Twelver Shi‘ism. Religion and Society, vol. 10. The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978

Azami, Mohammad Mustafa. Studies in Early Hadith Literature. Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1978.

_. Studies in Hadith Methodology and Literature. Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1977.

Bosworth, Clifford Edmund. The Islamic Dynasties. Islamic Surveys, no. 5. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1967.

Brockelmann, Carl. Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur. 2 volumes and 3 supplements. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1937-49.

Caetani, L. Annali dell'Islam. 10 vols. Hildesheim: Georg 01ms, 1905-26.

Chadwick, H. Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition. New York: Clarendon Press, 1966.

Coulson, N.J. A History of Islamic Law. Islamic Surveys, no. 2. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964.

Crone, Patricia. Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Duri, A.A. The Rise of Historical Writing Among the Arabs. Modern Classics in Near Eastern Studies. Edited and translated by L. Conrad with an introduction by Fred M. Donner. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Faruqi, Nisar Ahmad. Early Muslim Historioqarphy; A Study of Early Transmitters of Arab History from the Rise of Islam to the end of the Umayyad Period. Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 1979.

Fleischer, Cornell H. Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the : The Historian Mustafa &li . (1541-^1600). Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1986.

Gibb, H.A.R. Arabic Literature. 2nd ed. Clarendon; Oxford University Press, 1963. 301

Goldziher, Ignaz. Muslim Studies. 2 vols. Edited by S.M. Stem, translated by C.R. Barber and S.M. Stern. Vol. 1: London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966; reprint ed., Chicago; Aldine Publishing Co., 1967. Vol. 2: London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971.

______. Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law. Modern Classics in Near Eastern Studies. Translated by Andras and Ruth Hamori, with an Introduction and additional notes by Bernard Lewis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

Goody, Jack. The Domestication of the Savage Mind. Themes in the Social Sciences. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1978,

Hardy, Peter. Historians of Medieval India: Studies in Indo-Muslim Historical Writing. London: Luzac, 1960.

Hasan, Ahmad. The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence. Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1970.

,• The Doctrine of lima' in Islam. Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1976.

Hodgson, Marshall G.S. The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization. 3 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.

Holt, P.M. and Lewis, B., eds. Historians of the Middle East. Historical Writings on the People of Asia. London: Oxford University Press 1962.

Holt, P.M., Lewis, B., and Lambton, A.K.S., eds. The Cambridge History of Islam. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

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Jafri, S.H.M. The Origins and Early Development of Shi*a Islam. Arab Background Series. London and New York: Longman Group Ltd., 1979.

Juynboll, G.H.A. Muslim Tradition; Studies in Chronology, Provenance and Authorship of Early Hadith. Cambridge Studies in Islamic History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Khalidi, Tarif. Islamic Historiography: The Histories of al-Mas'udi. Albany; State University of New York Press, 1975. 302

Kratchkovsky, I, Ad-Dinawari, "AkhbSr at-Tiwâl." PrAace, variantes et index. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1912.

Lane, Edward. An Arabic-English Lexicon. 8 vols. London: n.p., 1866-93.

Lewis, Bernard. The Arabs in History. 3 rd. ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1966.

Little, Donald. An Introduction to Mamluk Historiography. Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1970.

Mahdi, Muhsin. Ibn Khaldun’s Philosophy of History: A Study in the Philosophic Foundation of the Science of Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951; geprint edi, Chicago: ’Hioenix Books, 1971.

Makdisi, George. The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981.

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McNeill, William H., general ed. Readings in World listorv. 10 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Vol. 6: The Islamic World. Edited by William H. McNeill and Marilyn R. Waldman.

Morony, Michael. Iraq After the Muslim Conquest. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Mottahedeh, Roy. Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society. Princeton Studies on the Near East. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Muir, William. Annals of the Early Caliphate. London: n.p., 1883; reprint edition, Amsterdam: Oriental Press, 1968.

______. The Life of Muhammad. Edited by T.H. Weir. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1923.

Nicholson, R.A. A Literary History of the Arabs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

Noldeke, Theodore. Sketches from Eastern History. London: n.p., 1892; reprint ed., Beirut: Khayyât, 1963. 303

Petersen, E.L. 'All and Mu*iwiya in Early Arabic Tradition; Studies on the Genesis and Growth of Islamic Historical Writing. Copenhagen; Munksgaard, 1964.

Rasul, M.G, The Origins and Development of Muslim Historiography. Lahore; Muhammad Ashraf, 1968.

Rosenthal, Franz. A History of Muslim Historiography, 2nd ed. Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1968.

Schacht, Joseph. Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence. 4th ed. Clarendon; Oxford University Press, 1967.

Sezgin, Ursula. Abu Mibnaf; Ein Beitrag zur Historiographie der umaiyadischen Zeit. Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1971.

Sezgin, Fuad. Geschichte des arabischen Schrifturns, 5 volumes to date. Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1967— .

Shaban, M.A. The . Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1970.

______. Islamic History; A New Interpretation, A.D. 600-750 (A.H. 132). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

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Sharon, Moshe. Black Banners from the East: The EstablisLtJcnt of the Abbasid State,Incubation of a Revolt. Max Schloessinger Series- vol. 2. Leiden: E.J. Brill and Jerusalem; The Hebrew University Magnes Press 1983.

Shboul, Ahmad M.H. Al-Mas'udi and His World. London: Ithaca Press, 1979.

Sinnigen, W.G., and Boak, A.E.R. A History of Rome to A.D. 565, 6th edition. New York; The Macmillan Publishing Co., 1977.

Tacitus. Complete Works of Tacitus. Translated by A.J. Church and W.J. Brodribb. Edited with an Introduction by M. Hadas. New York; Random House Inc., 1942.

Tey, Josephine. The Daughter of Time. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951; Pocket Books, 1977.

Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War. Translated by Rex Warner with an Introduction and Notes by M.I. Finley. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1975. 304

Waldman, Marilyn R. Toward a Theory of Historical Narrative; A Case Study in-Perso-Islamicate . Historiography. Columbus; Ohio State University Press, 1980.

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Articles

Cahen, C. "Points de vue sur la révolution ®abbâside." Revue historique 230 (1963): 295-338.

Carter, M. "The Kâtib in Fact and Fiction." Abr Nahrain XI (1971): 42-56.

Coulson, N.J. "Doctrine and Practice in Islamic Law: One Aspect of the Problem." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies XVIII (1956): 211-26.

Daniel, Elton. "The Anonymous History of the Abbasid Family." International Journal of Middle East Studies 14, no. 4 (1982); 419-34.

De Somogyi, Joseph. "The Development of Arabic Historiography." Journal of Semitic Studies 3 (1958): 373ff.

Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. S.v. "'Abd Allah b. Saba'," by Marshall G.S. Hodgson.

Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. S.v. "Adab," by F. Gabrieli.

Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. S.v. "Al-Balâdhuri," by C. Becker; revised by F. Rosenthal. 305

Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. S.v, "Al-Djamal," by L. Veccia Vaglieri.

Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. S.v. "Fitna," by L. Gardet.

Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. S.v. "Ghadir Khumm," by L. Veccia Vaglieri.

Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. S.v. "Hakk," by D.B. Macdonald.

Encyclopedia of Islcun, 2nd ed. S.v. "Al-Kalbi," by W. Atallah.

Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. S.v. "Khâridjites," by G. Levi della Vida.

Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. S.v. "Ibn Khayyât al-*iUsfuri," by S. Zakkar.

Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. S.v. "Ibn Kutayba," by G. Lecorate.

Gibb, H.A.R. "The Social Significance of the Shuubiya." Studies on the Civilization of Islam. Edited by S.J. Shaw and W.R. Polk. Boston; Beacon Press, 1952; reprint ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. 62-74.

. "Tarikh." Studies on the Civilization of Islam. Edited by S.J. Shaw and W.R. Polk. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962; reprint ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. 108-34.

Goitein, S.D.F. "Introduction" to al-Balâdhuri, Ansâb al-Ashrâf, vol. 5. Edited with an introduction by S.D.F. Goitein, Jerusalem; Jerusalem University Press, 1936. Pp. 9-28.

______. "Historiography in Arabic Literature." In his Gesammelte Schriften. 4 vols. Edited and translated by Joseph De Somogyi. Hildesheim: n.p., 1967-73. Vol. 3, Pp. 359-94.

Hinds, Martin. "KÜfan Alignments and Their Background." International Journal of Middle East Studies 2 (1971): 346-67.

______. "The Murder of the Caliph *Uthmân." International Jouurnal of Middle East Studies 3 (1972): 450-69.

_. "The Siffin Arbitration Agreement." Journal of Semitic Studies XVII (1972): 93-129.

Hodgson, Marshall, G.S. "How Did the Early Shi®a Become Sectarian?" Journal of the American Oriental Society 75 (1955): 1-13. 306

"Two Pre-Modern Muslim Historians: PitfalL; and Opportunities in Presenting them to Moderns." Towards World Community. Edited by John U. Nef. World Academy of Arts and Sciences Publications, Vol. V. The Hague: Junk Publishers, 1968, Pp. 53-68,

Kraemer, Joel. "Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: A Preliminary Study." Journal of the American Oriental Society 104 (1984); 135-64.

Little, Donald. "The Historical and Historiographical Significance of the Detention of Ibn Taymiyya." International Journal of Middle East Studies 4 (1973): 311-27.

Marguet, Yves. "Le SÎ'dsme au IX^ siècle à travers l'histoire de Ya'qûbi." Arabica XIX (1972): 1-45 and 101-138.

Millward, W.G. "Al-Ya®iqübi's Sources and the Question of Shî*a Partiality." Abr-Nahrain XII (1972); 47-74.

Mottahedeh, Roy. "The Shu'iûbiyah and the Social History of Early Islamic Iran." International Journal of Middle East Studies 7 (1976): 161-82.

Richter, G. "Die Geschichtsbild der Arabischen Historiker des Mittelalters." Translated by M.S. Khan as "Medieval Arabic Historiography," Islamic Culture 33,34 (1959 and 1960); 240-45.

Robson, James. "Tradition in Islam." Muslim World 23 (1950): 98-112.

______. "The Material of Tradition." Muslim World 23 (1950); 167-80.

______. "Muslim Tradition: The Question of Authenticity." Memoirs and Proceedings of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society XCIII (1951-52); 84-102.

______. "Tradition: Investigation and Classification." Muslim World 41 (1951): 98-112.

. "Tradition: The Second Foundation of Islam." Muslim World 41 (1951): 22-33.

. "The Isnad in Muslim Tradition." Transactions of the Glasgow University Oriental Society 15 (1953-54); 15-26.

. "The Form of Muslim Tradition." Transactions of the Glasgow University Oriental Society 16 (1955-56): 38-50.

. "Standards Applied by Muslim Traditionists, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 43 (1961): 459-79. 307

. "Traditions from Individuals." Journal of Semitic Studies 9 (1964): 327-40.

Schacht, Joseph, "On Musa b. ®iUqba's Kitâb al-Maghâzî," Acta Orientalia 21 (1950-53): 288-300,

"The Kitâb at-Ta'rikh of Khalifa b. Khayyât." Arabica 16 (1969): 79-81.

"A Revaluation of Islamic Traditions." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1949): 143-54.

The Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam. S.v. "‘’Isma," by I. Goldziher.

Van Ess, J, "Early Development of Kalâm." Studies on the First Century of Islam, Papers on Islamic History, Vol. 5, Edited by G.H.A. Juynboll. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982. Pp. 109-25.

______. "The beginnings of Islamic Theology." The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning. Edited by J.E. Murdoch and E.D. Sylla. Dordrecht; Reidel Publishing Co. Pp. 87-111.

Waldman, Marilyn R. "Primitive Mind/Modern Mind; New Approaches to an Old Problem Applied to Islam." Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies. Edited by Richard C. Martin. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1985. Pp. lOOff.

. "'The Otherwise Unnoteworthy Year 711': A Reply to Hayden White." Critical Inquiry 7, no.4 (1981): 784-792.

_. "The Islamic World." The Encyclopedia Britannica. forthcoming.

Wasserstrom, Steve. "The Moving Finger Writes: Mughira b. Sa®dd and the Interplay of Past and Future in the Institutionalization of the Dajjàl Myth." History of Religions 25 (1985): 1-29.

Wolf, Eric. "The Social Organization of Mecca and the Origins of Islam." Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 7 (Winter 1971): 329-56; reprinted in The Bobbs-Merill Reprint Series in the Social Sciences, no. A-247. 308

Unpublished Materials

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______. "Waq'iat Siffin." Berlin. Qu. 2040 [Cited in Sezgin, U., Abu Mitoaf. p. 124].

Al- Balidhuri, Ahmad b. Yahyâ. "Ansâb al-Ashrâf." Istanbul, Sûlemaniye Kütüphanesi. Reisülküttap, nos. 597 and 598.

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Ibrahim, Mahmood. "The Social and Ecxjnomic Background of the Umayyad Caliphate: The Role of Mu*^iâwiya b. Abi Sufyân." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of California at Log Angeles, 1981.

Nasr b. Muzâhim al-Minqari. "Kitâb Maqtal al-Husayn b. *Ali." Cairo, Dar al-Kutub. Ta'rikh Taymûr, no. 3461.

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