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Huei-ying Kuo Nationalism Against Its People? Chinese Business and Nationalist Activities in Inter-War Singapore, 1919-1941 Working Papers Series No. 48 July 2003 The Southeast Asia Research Centre (SEARC) of the City University of Hong Kong publishes SEARC Working Papers Series electronically. ©Copyright is held by the author or authors of each Working Paper. SEARC Working Papers cannot be republished, reprinted, or reproduced in any format without the permission of the paper's author or authors. Note: The views expressed in each paper are those of the author or authors of the paper. They do not represent the views of the Southeast Asia Research Centre, its Management Committee, or the City University of Hong Kong. Southeast Asia Research Centre Management Committee Professor Kevin Hewison, Director Professor Joseph Y.S. Cheng Dr Vivienne Wee, Programme Coordinator Dr Graeme Lang Dr Zang Xiaowei Editor of the SEARC Working Paper Series Professor Kevin Hewison Southeast Asia Research Centre The City University of Hong Kong 83 Tat Chee Avenue Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong SAR Tel: (852) 2194 2352 Fax: (852) 2194 2353 http://www.cityu.edu.hk/searc email: [email protected] NATIONALISM AGAINST ITS PEOPLE? CHINESE BUSINESS AND NATIONALIST ACTIVITIES IN INTER-WAR SINGAPORE, 1919-19411 Huei-ying Kuo2 Dept. of Sociology State University of New York at Binghamton [email protected] Abstract: This paper examines the rationale and impact of accelerating Chinese- led anti-Japanese nationalist activities in Singapore from the late 1920s within the context of Chinese sub-ethnic cleavages and business networks in Southeast Asia. More specifically, despite the fact that leading Chinese business elites were mobilized by the nationalist calls to confront Japanese interests, not only Japanese agents but also some Chinese were targeted. I further point out that within Singapore’s Chinese business communities the division between those who led the nationalist campaigns and those importing Japanese goods fell into Chinese sub-ethnic categories. The term ‘sub-ethnic economic nationalism’ is advanced to interpret these relationships. Introduction From late spring to autumn of 1928, several Chinese stores trading Japanese goods announced that ‘due to the current economic depression, we must cease business activities for the time being’ (NYSB, 24 September 1928) 3 . Any Chinese business carrying Japanese goods that did not close, would be condemned publicly or, in the worst cases, their stores would be destroyed (NYSB, 2 October 1928). 1 An earlier version of this paper was presented in the joint seminar of the Southeast Asian Research Centre and the Department of Applied Social Science, City University of Hong Kong, on 27 March 2003. The author acknowledges the exchanges with scholars in the seminar, particularly those from Professor Kevin Hewison and Dr Vivienne Wee. The research is partially assisted by the Small Grant Program of the China and Inner Asian Council of the Association for Asian Studies (2002-2003) (funds provided by the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation). Materials on Japanese intelligence reports were collected during my visit in the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, Taipei, under the guidance of Professor Ka Chih-ming. Acknowledgment also goes to professors from the Department of Sociology of Binghamton University, particularly the comments and encouragement from Professor Mark Selden, Dale Tomich and Frederic Deyo 2 The author is a Visiting PhD Fellow at the Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong. 3 Note on romanization: Most of the Chinese terms are romanized in Mandarin pinyin with several exceptions: First, terms of Chinese sub-ethnic groups are written in according to their most familiar English spellings. For example, Hakka [Mandarin: Kejia], Hokkien [Mandarin: Fujian], Cantonese [Guangdong ren]. Second, for some famous names that have recorded according to the pronunciation in their particular dialect, I will follow the conventional records. For example, Tan Kah Kee [Chen Jiagen in Mandarin pinyin], Dr. Sun Yat-sen [Sun Zhongshan in Mandrin pinyin]. Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003 1 These were among the responses to the surging anti-Japanese boycotts of 1928. From early May, when news of China's military clashes with the Japanese army in Jinan (the Jinan Incident) were confirmed, anti-Japanese sentiments spread throughout the Chinese communities in Singapore. Chinese hostility against Japan led to the development of anti-Japanese boycotts, causing a heavy slump in Japanese exports to British Malaya in general and Singapore in particular. In the first month of the strike, Japan's exports to British Malaya plummeted to 81% of the amount in the previous year. As the boycott continued, Japan's trade with British Malaya reached to its lowest in July and August 1928, that is, only 16% and 20% of Japan's exports during the same periods last year.4 The 1928 anti-Japanese boycott was far from the first nationalist activity organized in Singapore. Neither was it the last one prior to World War II. Throughout the inter-war period, Chinese nationalist sentiment surged whenever relationship between China and Japan was in a collision course, such as during the 1919 May Fourth Movement, the 1928 Jinan Incident, the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the 1932 Shanghai Incident and after the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937 untill Japan's occupying Singapore in December 1941 (TTK, 1942). But the 1928 anti-Japanese boycott was a watershed for both Chinese nationalist activities and Sino-Japanese business connections in Singapore. In contrast to previous anti-Japanese activities, the 1928 event was directly backed by Chinese elites through their organizing of and subscribing to nationalist fund-raising campaigns. Although these campaigns did not directly carry out economic boycotts, they mad up the institutional framework to channel and reinforce Chinese discontent against the Japanese. Why were Singapore Chinese provoked so profoundly by the distant affairs of China? Why did anti-Japanese boycotts accelerate from the late 1920s onward? Why did Chinese business elites respond enthusiastically to the nationalist events? To answer these questions, the rest of this paper will center on two recurring themes. First, rhetoric of Chinese nationalism strategically boosted some Chinese businesses, although at the same time damaging other Chinese 4 Japan's exports to British Malaya from May through August 1927 as well as the amounts for the same period in 1928 are as follows: May 1927 $ 2,782,293 Straits Dollars, May 1928 $ 2,254,738 June $ 2,626,516 June $ 1,148,154 July $ 2,773,540 July $ 443,490 August $ 2,521,169 August $ 501,852 These figures are based on surveys conducted by the ad hoc organization of Japan's business expansion in Singapore, the Japanese Commercial Museum of Singapore. This institute was founded in 1918, managed under the Singapore Branch of the South Seas Association (the Nanyô Kyokai). The South Seas Association was the most critical intelligence institute erected for Japan's business expansion in Southeast Asia. It was financially supported by the Office of the Government-General, Taiwan, and the Department of Commerce and Industry of Japan (based on my survey of the monthly reports of the South Seas Association, the Nanyô Kyokai Zashi [NKZ], 1915-1942. The figures above are cited from NKZ: V. 15, N. 7: 41-42. For an introduction to Japan's intelligence works in Southeast Asia, see Chong (1998; 1999). Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003 2 businesses. Second, divergent positions toward Chinese anti-Japanese activities were, to a certain extent, attributable to Chinese sub-ethnic cleavages. These sub-ethnic cleavages, characteristic of trans-national Chinese business networks, evolved during China’s long-term maritime activities between the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries. The concept of ‘sub-ethnic economic nationalism’ set forth in my conclusion emerges from revisiting the previous literature on Singapore Chinese nationalism as well as my interpretations of nationalist activities during the inter- war period. The economically motivated nationalist appeals shaped the patterns of nationalist activities, taking the form of economic boycotts. These boycotts involved not only Chinese against the foreign business competitors but also conflicts among Chinese sub-ethnic business networks. The overlap between Chinese sub-ethnic cleavages and conflicting positions toward Chinese-led anti- Japanese boycotts is explained by the diverse Chinese sub-ethnic business networks that emerged over a long historical perspective. Rationale of Chinese Nationalist Activities in Singapore Ardent supporters of Chinese nationalist activities in early twentieth-century Singapore have caught the attention of scholars on pre-war Southeast Asian Chinese societies. The correspondence between the surges of Chinese nationalist sentiment in mainland China and those in Singapore suggests that Singapore Chinese nationalist activities were ‘implanted’ by mainland intellectuals and partisans (Yen 1976; 1986; 1989; Wang 1976; Yong 1987; Yong and McKennon 1990). But compared with the overall nationalist development in China, one may well query why Singapore was free from significant anti-British strikes during the inter-war period.5 Nationalist calls and Chinese partisans obviously carried much weight with Singapore Chinese, but the latter had their own rationale

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