50 SOCRATIC KNOWING AND NOT-KNOWING SOCRATIC KNOWING AND NOT-KNOWING 51

of the techne concept for attaining a clear concept of knowledge of the good and of the nature of arete. The Meno is particularly crucial in this regard, for the exposition here is advanced one Hans-Georg Gadamer's "Socratic Knowing and Not- step further. At first the dialogue deals with the same problem as Knowing" appeared in his book The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy from pages 33 to 62. It the Protagoras, namely, teachability. And in essence it reiterates was published by Yale University Press in 1982. the paradox in which the claim that arete can be given justifica- tion gets caught: if it can be given justification, then it can also be taught. Once again, the claim that arete is knowledge found- ers on the facts of our moral and political experience. The sons of great men, who have had the best education and upbringing thinkable, are often grave disappointments. Hence something In the Protagoras, in contrast, Plato displays the falsity of so- other than knowledge must play the decisive role here, some- phistic pseudo-knowledge and of the claim to teach it by con- thing that Plato calls theia moira-- divine dispensation. fronting this "knowledge" and claim with Socrates' claim to And now we have arrived at a truly crucial test for the tradi- know. And the conclusion with which the dialogue ends says tional interpretation of Plato. Socrates' own demand that justifi- a great deal: Socrates forces the sophist to agree that arete is cation be given, which he pursues relentlessly, seems weakened knowledge, but for his part he disputes that it can be taught. But when Plato substitutes "divine dispensation" —the latter ap- if Socrates really took arete to be knowledge similar in character pears to provide only half an answer to the problem. Subtle in- to the knowledge of techne, he would have to maintain that it terpreters of Plato see in this divine dispensation an indication can be taught. What sort of knowledge, then, is this knowledge that Socrates himself is the only true teacher of arete. It is cer- that he has in mind that is evidently unteachable? The reader is tainly correct to say that the end of the failed discussion with meant to put this question to himself. In any event, he has to see Meno points to Socrates as the actual and only teacher. But one clearly that the knowledge and justification for it that Socrates has already forfeited the truth of this insight if, at the same time, seeks has nothing to do with sophistic techne thinking. That it one misses the general point implied here. Plato's concern is not does not is obvious from the start. The doubt about the teacha- to sanctify this charismatic Socrates, even if in Plato's eyes he bility of arete dominates the discussion from beginning to end. certainly was charismatic. Rather, he is much more concerned Even in the opening scene it lurks in the background. Thus the with overcoming the false conception of learning and knowing logical point of the comedy-like ending that Plato invents for the that prevails in the young Meno, as it does in his teacher Gor- Protagoras dialogue is most of all this: knowledge in arete can gias. It is to this end that he adverts to divine dispensation." have the character of neither knowledge in techne nor the The whole discussion with Meno is devoted to this task. One knowledge of this new paideia, which boasts of being techne. The whole series of the Socratic discussions whose conclusions 17. The allusion to divine dispensation at Republic 492e is also aimed polem- are negative could be advanced to demonstrate the inadequacy ically against sophistic paideia.

52 SOCRATIC KNOWING AND NOT-KNOWING SOCRATIC KNOWING AND NOT-KNOWING 53 need only ask oneself Plato's question: Who was this Socrates be forced to place himself in question. Thus he is just the right and what was his knowledge? After all, he had declared that pre- foil for allowing us to see what knowing and recognizing actu- cisely knowing that one does not know is the real human wis- ally are. The doctrine of anamnesis (recollection) brings out the dom. His teaching could never be different from what it always true sense of the Socratic question. As one who himself only "re- is, namely, demonstrating that his partner does not know, and minds," Socrates is a teacher. And in portraying Socrates' deeds, by doing that, making it urgent that one know and give justifica- Plato at the same time reminds us that knowledge is recollection, tion. For someone who has come to seek and question on his knowing again. own, the pretentious assumptions that Meno, for example, has The idea of recollection is introduced here as a myth, which is learned from the likes of Gorgias and advances himself are to say, apparently not as an argument per se but as a sort of reli- empty. And emptier still is a sophistry that would argue someone gious truth. But one has to view the myth of anamnesis in the out of seeking and questioning altogether—such a sophistry, light of the question we are raising. Is it a myth at all? Certainly that is, as Meno produces with blind acuity. The significance of this doctrine is introduced in the Meno like a myth—with refer- the Meno is that here Plato expressly thematizes the aporia (per- ences to verses from Pindar and the Pythagorean doctrine of the plexity) in which the other Socratic dialogues tend to end. transmigration of souls. But the authorities upon whom Socrates Like these other dialogues, the Meno begins with a series of relies already sound odd. For here we find priests and priestesses failed attempts to define arete that disclose sometimes more, who are able to give justification! In the context of Greek reli- sometimes less, clearly that the sole reality behind moral conven- gion there is something absurd about that. For Greek religion tions is the pursuit of power. The last answer that Meno ven- was not a religion of scripture and orthodoxy but of individual tures virtually says as much. He appropriates the poet's line: awe and piety and of regular public honoring of the divine. charein to kaloisi kai dynasthai (to delight in the beautiful and Moreover, the thesis that seeking and learning is recollection is have power) in such a way that arete would mean nothing else then demonstrated quite soberly with no reference at all to reli- but having the power to acquire the beautiful thing that one de- gion. The famous lesson that Socrates gives Meno's slave is far sires (77b). But Plato takes a new step here. He shows that reach- removed from a proof of the religious doctrine of the preexis- ing the aporia in which Meno's attempts to determine the nature tence of souls. Of course, in every step of this lesson Socrates of arete end is the precondition for raising the question of arete carefully adheres to the premise that the slave is not taught any- in the first place. But here, raising the question means question- thing but instead grasps each of the steps himself, the negative ing oneself. The knowledge in question can only be called forth. ones as well as the positive. In other words, the slave displays a All cognition is re-cognition. And in this sense it is remembrance kind of knowledge without ever having "learned" mathematics. of something familiar and known. But given the lengths to which Socrates goes it is all the more The conversation with Meno makes this fact clear e contrario. striking that the conclusion drawn at the end is not viewed as Meno appears on the scene as one who wants to acquire the new validly proved—the conclusion, namely, that there was a time wisdom as cheaply as possibly, and he bolts when he is about to before human beings existed at which the soul already knew

54 SOCRATIC KNOWING AND NOT-KNOWING SOCRATIC KNOWING AND NOT-KNOWING 55 things, and that the soul is consequently immortal. On the con- of nonsense, it would appear. And with that Simmias's objection trary, any such claim that it has been proved is explicitly re- seems to have been disposed of. Or, in the final analysis, is this a tracted (86b). The only thing accepted is the practical certainty hint that we should examine in earnest the concomitance of that we are better off holding firmly to the belief that one can in- knowing and not-knowing? For if we do, we might perceive in deed seek the truth, and that one should not allow oneself to be this concomitance an intrinsic interweaving of cognition and rec- misled in this search by sophistic objections. And it is accepted ognition that splits apart into a mythical prior life and a subse- logoi kai ergoi (in word and deed) (86c). Hence the mythical ho- quent recollection only in mythological thinking." Whatever the rizons within which Plato places this certainty—and not with- case may be, we must abstract from Plato's mythical mode of out ironic ceremoniousness—serve essentially only to display presentation if we want to understand what he is getting at. And and explicate the capacity of the human mind to place things in that requirement holds in regard to the Meno as well as the question. Phaedo. Let us, then, attempt to conceptualize some of the The Phaedo demonstrates fully and convincingly that we are things he has in mind. not dealing with a religious truth here. There the anamnesis After he has put the false solutions behind him, the slave in the theme is taken up anew, and once again it is explicated quite Meno recognizes that a square constructed on the diagonal has unmythologically. The way in which the doctrine of preexistence the double area he seeks. That he does so implies that he already is "proved" here—by the "prior knowledge" that underlies all knows what "double" means—he must know Greek (82b)— knowledge—even has a comical side to it. To be sure, it is made and that he keeps his attention focused on doubling and what is clear here that as religious heritage what this preexistence proof double. Accordingly, we have a real seeking here. The slave has demonstrates with its pseudo-stringency, is worthy of solemn re- enough of an idea of what is sought to recognize that his first at- spect. But this comical aspect of the argument makes clear that 18. One of the essential tenets of Gadamer's thought underlies this interpreta- what is 'proved' hardly lends itself to a rational legitimation in a tion, namely, that human beings never have insights that are fully clear and dis- style such as this. In particular, the sharpening of the argument tinct, but only partial insights within persistent obscurity. Thus any aletheia, or after Simmias's objection that knowledge could, after all, be truth, that they know is embedded in lethe, or forgetfulness. This concomitance of knowing and not-knowing (which Heidegger would call, Gleichurspriinglich- given to one at birth makes the discrepancy between the mythi- keit) has far-reaching consequences. For one thing, it renders the project of Car- cal claim and the logical concepts with which the argument pro- tesian methodology incapable of execution: since there is no certain starting ceeds especially palpable. Obviously it is with this discrepancy in point, no certain conclusions can be drawn. For another, it makes systematic unity and conclusiveness unachievable: we always find ourselves in media res- mind that Plato has Socrates now venture the following argu- under way in the middle of things whose beginning and end are beyond the hori- ment (Phaedo 76d): since knowledge cannot be attained after zons of our knowing. Gadamer finds this principle of human finitude throughout birth, it must derive from a "previous" life—unless, that is, it is Plato and, in particular, in his doctrine of ideal numbers, the one (unit) and the indeterminate two. For Plato, Gadamer maintains, any unitary thing we know is acquired at the moment of birth. But after all, as the initial igno- given to us within the indeterminacy that surrounds it. Consequently, our inquiry rance of the newborn shows, it is not present at birth. So at one will remain inconclusive (unabschliessbar). See "Plato's Unwritten Dialectic." and the same time, it would be acquired and lost—a pretty piece TRANSLATOR.

56 SOCRATIC KNOWING AND NOT-KNOWING SOCRATIC KNOWING AND NOT-KNOWING 57 tempts to solve the problem by doubling are wrong and to recog- sumption is. Thus, what is displayed here is the nature of seeking nize the true solution when it is presented to him. As we know, and learning (zetein, manthanein) (81d). Seeking and learning he does not find it on his own. Socrates has to show it to him presuppose that one knows what one does not know, and to (85e). That fact is of no concern, however. The point is that he learn that, one must be refuted. Knowing what one does not himself recognizes it as the solution he seeks. know is not simply ignorance. It always implies a prior knowl- It should be noted that we are dealing with a mathematical in- edge which guides all one's seeking and questioning. Cognition sight here, that is, not with a result of empirical generalization. is always re-cognition. The slave already knows enough of mathematics to accept with- Plainly that holds especially in regard to areté. And though the out question that the problem put to him is eidetic-universal and Meno too does not say so explicitly either, Meno's renewed eva- to grasp it as such without giving it a second thought. The entire sion of the issue at 86c makes clear even so that the question of path along which the slave is guided to his eidetic insight pro- what areté is would necessarily lead us to knowledge of the good ceeds through eidetic terrain. Even his first mistaken attempts at (see Meno 87 b — d). Knowledge of the good is always with us in solving the problem are meant to be eidetic. They are wrong only our practical life. Whenever we choose one thing in preference to mathematically. For him, unlike his master, the insight that his another, we believe ourselves capable of justifying our choice, proposals are false is not anything that might cripple him. In- and hence knowledge of the good is always already involved. stead, it actually makes the right insight possible—an insight Socrates' recapitulation of the doctrine of anamnësis in the that would require only sufficient repetition of the exercise to be Phaedo is no less instructive. In a masterful analysis he unfolds stabilized in him as genuine mathematical knowledge (85c ff.). the argument that shows why all knowing is recollection, and Here, however, this mathematical example stands for every- leads us through it step by step. He begins with clear instances of thing that Plato would call real knowledge or insight. One al- our being reminded of something. A lyre reminds us of a beloved ways has aletheis doxai (true beliefs) in oneself concerning what friend. A friend reminds us of his friend. Even the picture of a ones does not know (Meno 85c). Indeed, just this fact emerged in friend also reminds us of the other friend. And, yes, the picture the mathematical lesson: the refutation of false assumptions is of a friend also reminds us of the friend himself. We are being led needed in order for these to be recognized as false, but that en- along very artfully here, and the final step is astonishing. In this tails that one always already19 has some idea of what the true as- last case we would not say that we are reminded of the friend, but instead that we recognize him in the picture. Exactly because 19. Immer schon. This common turn of speech has special importance in Heidegger's work and also in Gadamer's. It underscores the fact that I actually recognition emerges here as a kind of recollection, or being re- never was, and never will be, in the state of unprejudiced objectivity which the Enlightenment considers prerequisite for valid knowing. Put another way, I am dispensability of tradition and authority for any understanding of our human never in an "original position" (Rawls); rather, I can understand what I encoun- world. His point is that the "condition of the possibility" (Kant) of my under- ter within my world only because of the pre-knowledge that I "always already" standing my world is not so much consciousness's interpretive acts or perfor- have. Implied here is Heidegger's and Gadamer's theory of the circularity of un- mances as it is consciousness of and recollection of, what is always already pre- derstanding. Gadamer extends Heidegger's line of thought in arguing for the in- given in the traditional authority of language and customs (Sitten). TRANSLATOR.

58 SOCRATIC KNOWING AND NOT-KNOWING SOCRATIC KNOWING AND NOT-KNOWING 59 minded of something, Socrates succeeds in establishing what he hold for every sort of real knowing. The dialectical art of making set out to demonstrate. In this way recognition is set apart from distinctions allows us to distinguish the good from the bad or, as all learning. we might say with moral reserve, to distinguish the right thing to It could be important that this example is not a genuine in- do from everything which would not be right. But in its full ex- stance of being reminded. After all, seeing the lyre of his friend tent this art has to be applicable to knowing anything worth does not remind the lover of someone he had forgotten! The knowing. In the end, the structure of anamnesis proves to be co- friend, in fact, is so close and present that the lover is made to extensive with all possible questioning. Questioning is seeking, think of him by all sorts of things. It is as if he sees all things— and as such it is governed by what is sought. One can only seek and hence the lyre—in the light of his passion. That is signifi- when one knows what one is looking for. Only then, only with cant. The assimilation of this being reminded to being reminded what is known in view, can one exclude the irrelevant, narrow of something forgotten is completely contrived. This fact is made the inquiry down, and recognize anything. That is what the clear negatively by the insertion of malista mentoi (better yet) at Meno teaches us. 73e. In truth, what we have here is far more a matter of mneme Another illustration, albeit negative, of what Plato has in mind (remembering) than of anamnesis (recollecting, being reminded is the failure of Socrates' sophist interlocutors when they want to of something)." And properly speaking, knowing, or cognition, do the questioning themselves. The questioner seems to them to too, is not being reminded of something forgotten. Rather, it is a ,play a superior role, to which, accordingly, one should aspire. new revelation about something already known. When I recog- But questioning is not a technique of role playing. The ques- nize something as something, I view something I know in the tioner is always one who simultaneously questions himself. The light of what I take it to be. I interpret it in regard to something question is posed for him just as it is for the other person. What which, for its part, is also known to me and present to mind, "tes we have here is the dialectic of dialogue, and its logical structure physeos hapases syggenos ouses" (since the whole of nature of is simultaneous synopsis (seeing things as together one) and akin) (Meno 81d). dihairesis (division, or differentiation). Both recognition of what We can see that this phenomenon of prior understanding one knows oneself to be—that is, recognition of how one under- applies above all to our self-understanding in areté and to the stands oneself— and recognition of everything one knows are al- question about the good. After all Meno wanted to evade just ways at one and the same time synoran eis hen eidos (seeing to- this supposition [that we already know the good] and by trying gether as one form) and kata gene dihairesthai (separating to evade it, he induced Socrates to advance the theory of anam- according to species), which is to say, differentiation. We always nesis. But there can be no doubt that even in the Meno Plato in- find ourselves in dialectical tension with the prejudices which tends anamnesis to have a much broader sense which should take us in and parade themselves as knowledge but which really mistake the particularity and partiality of a given view for the 20. With regard to the relationships here, compare the extensive excursus in J. Klein, A Commentary on Plato's Meno (Chapel Hill, 1965), pp. 108-72. Klein whole truth. That holds for both the person asked and the per- is right in bringing in the Philebus. son asking. Plato's most abstract way of expressing this phenom-