Introduction 1. in My Conversations with Senior Polish Military
Notes Introduction 1. In my conversations with senior Polish military personnel, this argument was raised repeatedly by the officers, including Chief of the General Staff Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki. This might be dismissed as institutional self-justification were it not for the fact that it was also raised by junior rank officers, as well as by several civilians within the Ministry of Defense. All interviews were con ducted by the author between January 1995 and July 1995 in Warsaw, Poland. 2. These observations have been confirmed in my contacts with Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Russian, and Ukrainian officers, all of whom tended to define professionalism in terms that presupposed autonomy within society and subordination to one power center within government, without much room for additional institutional oversight arrangements. Chapter One 1. See, for example, A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, East European Military Establishments: The W'arsaw Pact Northern Tier (New York: Crane Russak, 1982) and Timothy J. Colton and Thane Gustafson, eds., Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). 2. In addition to Samuel Huntington's classic The Soldier and the State (Cam bridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957), some of the better works on civil-military relations include Amos Perlmutter and Valier Plave Bennett, The Political Influence of the Military (New Haven and London: Yale Uni versity Press, 1980), Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Pat terns in Brazil (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), John Samuel Fitch, The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process: Ecuador, 1948-1966 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), and Claude E.
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