The London School of Economics and Political Science WESTERN
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The London School of Economics and Political Science WESTERN POLICY-MAKING IN THE POLISH CRISIS (1980-83): THE PROBLEM OF COORDINATION Thesis submitted to the University of London in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations. HELENE SJURSEN February 1997 1 UMI Number: U615426 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615426 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Tl-hrScS F iwzz 5°\ (>&>% Abstract The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the Western states responded to the Polish crisis (1980-83), both severally and collectively, with particular reference to their capacity for coordinated action. The thesis concentrates on the interaction between the major Western states (France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States) inside the broader Western institutional framework (looking in particular at NATO, the European Community, European Political Cooperation and CoCom). It assesses the impact and relative importance of the various Western institutional networks and of longer term conflicting Western aims in Poland for the success and failure of coordination. It also analyses the relevance of wider transatlantic disputes over detente for coordination. It is argued that the domestic Polish crisis gradually spilled over into East-West and West-West relations, ultimately triggering one of the most serious crises in the history of the Western alliance. The thesis is different from that of other studies of international crises in that most such studies concentrate on relations between governments who identify each other as "enemies", whereas the main concern here is with relations within one "enemy camp". Highlighting the political and economic, as well as security dimensions to the crisis, the thesis also shows that the Western states were faced with a more complex problem than a classic foreign policy crisis. Finally, the complexity of the issues raised as a result of the Polish crisis meant that the Western states were faced not only with the problem of reconciling different and sometimes conflicting national objectives, but also with the need to reconcile contradictory economic, political and security concerns cutting across national borders. Against this backdrop the thesis argues that the problem of coordination is more complex than what is implied by the neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist perspectives, and that the success and failure of coordination rests with the individual states, navigating within the constraints of domestic politics, alliance politics and international [in this case East-West] relations. 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS page Abstract ............................................. 2 Table of contents .................................... 3 Acknowledgements ..................................... 6 Chapter one. Introduction ............................ 8 Transatlantic relations and the crisis in Poland......................................... 21 Coordinating foreign policies .................. 31 Conclusion ..................................... 45 Chapter two. Western policies in Eastern Europe Introduction ................................... 47 Western policies in Eastern Europe: national trends and traditions .......................... 52 Britain ................................... 52 France .................................... 67 Germany ................................... 81 The United States ......................... 98 Conclusions ................................... 115 Chapter three. The Western alliance: rudiments of a coordination system Introduction .................................. 121 Eastern Europe: a marginalpreoccupation for Eastern Europe ........................................ 129 NATO ..................................... 129 CoCom .................................... 135 European Political Cooperation ........... 140 The European Community .............. ...... 146 Consultation, coordinationand crises .......... 153 Institutional multiplicity: fragmentation or flexibility? .................................. 163 3 Summit meetings: the mirage of a new institutional order? .......................... 175 Conclusions ................................... 179 Chapter four. Development of a crisis in Poland (June- December 1980) Introduction .................................. 185 Origins of the crisis in Poland ............... 189 The two-edged sword of the Polish crisis ...... 196 Economic implications of the strikes in Poland Polish strikers and Western political dilemmas The necessity and risks of a coordinated response ...................................... 213 The ostrich method, or how to solve problems by ignoring them ................................. 226 Conclusion .................................... 233 Chapter five. Spillover to East-West relations (December 1980- December 1981) Introduction .................................. 238 Change of direction in Western policy ......... 242 Muddled perceptions, muddled objectives ....... 252 Bounded rationality............................ 262 A reluctant economic response ................. 273 Conclusion .................................... 285 Chapter six. After the imposition of martial law: a crisis in the Western camp Introduction .................................. 290 Confusion in the Western camp ................. 294 Towards an intra-mural crisis ................. 307 4 A wider Western crisis ........................ 322 Muddling together ............................. 337 Conclusion .................................... 351 Chapter seven. Revisiting the Western crisis Introduction................................... 362 Polish and Atlantic crises .................... 365 West European responses to martial law Old and new in Europe: martial law and the German problem ........................... 372 France and Britain, a matter of sovereignty? France .............................. 384 Britain ............................. 394 Europe's American pacifier?.................... 402 Conclusions ................................... 422 Chapter eight. Conclusions ......................... 429 Polish and Western crises .................... 430 The Atlantic Alliance ........................ 432 The problem of foreign policy coordination .... 438 Western coordination and Poland .............. 449 Appendix 1 Changes in Western governments during the Polish crisis ....................... 455 Appendix 2 East-West trade relations... ......... 456 Appendix 3 The Western institutionalframework .. 458 Appendix 4 Chronology .......................... 459 Biblioqraphv ...................................... 464 5 Acknowledgements This thesis was written under the supervision of Professor Christopher Hill of the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. I would like to thank him for all his advice and encouragement, and for being such an inspiring supervisor. I would also like to thank Dr. Christopher Coker for his guidance during Professor Hill's research leave, and Dr. Margot Light for being so generous with her time. Of my friends in London I am particularly grateful to Dr. Leticia Pinheiro, Dr. Monica Herz and Tracy Dilks. Their friendship made the inevitable lows more bearable, and the highs all the more enjoyable. I am also grateful to my sister, Annette Sjursen, for her unfailing support. I would like to thank my colleagues in the Department of Politics at the University of Glasgow, in particular Professor Stephen White and Dr. John Peterson. The Department of International Relations at the LSE awarded me a Montague Burton Studentship in International Relations for 1991-93; the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies offered me a "Seniorstipend" for 1993-94. I am grateful to both institutions, as well as to Utvalget for Studium av Fellesmarkedet and to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who also supported this thesis. As a small token of my appreciation, this thesis is dedicated to my parents, Nina and 0rnulf Sjursen. It goes only a short way towards thanking them for all the help and encouragement they have given me throughout my life. I remain solely responsible for any errors in this work. 6 To my parents, Nina and 0rnulf Sjursen CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the Western states responded to the Polish crisis of 1980-83, both severally and collectively, with particular reference to their capacity for persistently coordinated action. According to Timothy Garton Ash, the Polish crisis marked the beginning of the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe: "The Polish revolution of 1980-81 was the first great contraction in the birth of [the] new Europe. If Yalta began in Poland, there is a real sense in which the end of Yalta also began in Poland."1 The crisis was triggered by the development of strikes across Poland over the summer of 1980. In August, the Polish authorities were forced to sign