Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski and His Unique Mission: a Juxtaposition Of

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Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski and His Unique Mission: a Juxtaposition Of 1 COLONEL RYSZARD KUKLINSKI AND HIS UNIQUE MISSION: A JUXTAPOSITION OF THE POST-COLD WAR OUTLOOKS A dissertation presented by Dariusz G. Jonczyk to The Department of History In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field of History Northeastern University Boston, Massachusetts September 2010 2 COLONEL RYSZARD KUKLINSKI AND HIS UNIQUE MISSION: A JUXTAPOSITION OF THE POST-COLD WAR OUTLOOKS by Dariusz G. Jonczyk ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Northeastern University, September, 2010 3 Abstract The spy case of Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, a Polish Army officer who collaborated with the CIA between 1972 and 1981, has generated passionate debate in the post Cold War geopolitical transition in the world after the fall of Communism. Perceived as a traitor of his nation by his opponents and a hero of the Cold War era by his enthusiasts, Kuklinski accomplished his lonely mission by channeling some 35 thousand top secret documents in both Polish and Russian to the agency. Unlikely fully explored by the American strategists, the files nonetheless disclosed some important technical, operational, and strategic plans of the former Warsaw Pact and the plans for the imposition of the martial law in Poland in 1981. Though sentenced to death in absentia in 1984 in Warsaw, Kuklinski was formally vindicated by Poland‘s judicial system in 1997. Upon his triumphant return to Poland in 1998, Kuklinski witnessed Poland‘s joining NATO and other new democratic developments after the fall of Communism in 1990. Kuklinski‘s solitary efforts proved their validity in the eyes of the public opinion in a prophetic manner no one could ever dare to predict. Yet the significance of his act underwent a discombobulated scrutiny in the court of public opinion in Poland and elsewhere. Consequently, it resulted in a never ending hero-traitor debate. Interestingly, even after Kuklinski‘s death in 2004, the hero-traitor discourse over his spying, which originated in the mid 1980‘s still continues. The chaotic voices of his critics, enthusiasts, and those who remain undecided perpetuate the debate and apparently distort the meaning of Kuklinski‘s accomplishments and his identity. In addition, the debate prevents viewing the meaning of his spying in a broad context of the social and political developments in the world after the fall of Communism. The fluctuation and dynamics of the individual and social memory of Kuklinski as expressed in the public pronouncements of Kuklinski himself, his 4 opponents and enthusiasts in the time period of 1982 and 2004 and shortly after parallels the transformation of the world geopolitics in that period of time. As a result, Kuklinski and his commentators express their opinions in the context of the post Cold War reality which projects the old East-West divisions on their perceptions of Kuklinski and his act. Consequently, the Americans acknowledge Kuklinski‘s heroism a priori, the Russians consider him a traitor, and the Poles scrutinize Kuklinski in the ethical context of his spying and politicize the significance of his act. Amidst all diverse opinions of Kuklinski‘s critics and adherents and Kuklinski‘s own peculiar perception of his mission which aimed to free Poland from the Soviet oppression and prevent the atomic holocaust, the need to find another way to approach Kuklinski‘s affair is essential. The petty hero-traitor discourse limits the perception of Kuklinski in a complex way of some key historical issues related to his espionage, such as the fluctuation of the individual and social memory of Kuklinski, the nature of the former Polish People‘s Republic, the dynamics of the post Cold War set of mind of Kuklinski‘s commentators, and others. 5 Acknowledgements I would like to thank my advisor Prof. Jeffrey Burds for his guidance, constant support, vast expertise, and inspiration to write this dissertation. I would like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee: Prof. Patrick Manning and Prof. Hiroaki Kuromiya for their advice. I would like to acknowledge Prof. Suzanne Fournier and her valuable and exceptional editorial suggestions. In a special way, I would like to express my gratitude to the Northeastern University History Department Faculty and Staff for their help and guidance in my PhD training. Although there are many teachers whom I would like to single out, I would like to thank Prof. Christine Gilmartin for her help, generous guidance, and inspiration. In addition, I want to express my gratitude to Prof. Harvey Green for his exceptional teaching in public history. I want to thank Prof. Józef Szaniawski from Warsaw, Poland for accepting my invitation to be interviewed on the person of Kuklinski and for letting me experience first hand who was indeed his dear friend, Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski. I would like to thank the Staff of the Public Library in Katowice, Poland, the Staff of the Public Library in Częstochowa, Poland, as well as the Akademia Jana Długosza Library in Częstochowa, Poland for their help in locating the many articles and books on the subject. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, my family and friends and all who helped make this dissertation a reality. 6 Table of Contents Abstract 3 Acknowledgments 5 Table of Contents 6 Introduction 7 Chapter I: Memories of the Spy. The Perspective of Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski 23 Chapter II: Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski. Traitor and American Spy 80 Chapter III: Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski. Hero of the Cold War Era And Polish Patriot 151 Conclusion: Mission Accomplished Amidst Neverending Debate 225 Bibliography 240 7 Introduction In December 2008, the country of Poland learned about the new film Gry Wojenne (War Games) produced by Dariusz Jabłoński and portraying the heroic figure of Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski. A CIA source in the Polish People‘s Army for nine years (1972-1981), Kuklinski supplied the CIA with some 35, 000 pages of secret documents, his own reports pertaining to Warsaw Pact military strategies and equipment, and detailed plans of the martial law eventually imposed in Poland in 1981 by the Jaruzelski regime. The film‘s premiere took place on 23 January 2009 in the National Conservatory in Warsaw,1 and it inspired fresh debates about the choice which Kuklinski made at the beginning of the 1970s. Ryszard Jerzy Kuklinski was born in Warsaw, Poland on 13 June 1930. He grew up in a working class family on Dzielna Street in Warsaw. The outbreak of the Second World War dramatically influenced the childhood of Kuklinski. Assisted by his friends, the young Kuklinski smuggled food and other necessities to the Warsaw Ghetto to help the starving Jews. In 1943, the Gestapo arrested his father Stanisław, who died shortly after in the concentration camp in Sachsenhausen. After the war, Kuklinski moved to Wrocław. He began working in the City Hall and simultaneously studied in high school. In 1947, Kuklinski was accepted in the Military Academy in Wrocław. In the 1950‘s, Kuklinski began his military career as an officer in Piła and then in Kołobrzeg, where he was in charge of the battalion of the airborne-landing brigade. The duty of an Army officer did not prevent Kuklinski from marrying his girlfriend Hanka in 1952 and fathering two sons: Waldemar and Bogdan. Kuklinski‘s intelligence, sense of humor, and impeccable work ethic helped to advance his career steadily. Upon his graduation with distinction from the Academy of the General Staff in Rembertów, Kuklinski joined the General Staff of the Polish People‘s Army in Warsaw in 1963. Commended by his superiors (Generals 1 ―Powstał film o płk Kuklińskim‖(The Movie About Colonel Kuklinski Was Made), Nowy Dziennik, 9 Dec 2008, 3. 8 Chocha, Jaruzelski, Kiszczak and others) for his hard work and brilliant strategic perceptions of modern warfare, Kuklinski joined the International Control Commission in Vietnam in 1967. Upon his return to Poland in July 1968, Kuklinski briefly served under the command of Marshal Ivan Jakubovski, Chief of the Warsaw Pact headquarters in Legnica. Next, he returned to the General Staff in Warsaw in August 1968. The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the suppression of the striking workers in Poland in 1970 inspired Kuklinski to undertake a solitary struggle against the Soviet empire and its ideology. He contacted the American Embassy in Bonn, Germany while sailing with his comrades on a reconnaissance trip across the Baltic Sea coast in 1971. Until his exfiltration from Poland in November 1981, Kuklinski carefully camouflaged his secret bond with the CIA and his clandestine operation even from his immediate family until the last moment, when he was to be exposed at a meeting with his superiors in the General Staff. Kuklinski justified his collaboration with the CIA in purely patriotic terms; namely, he aimed to inform the world about the nature and military strategies of the ―evil empire‖ and to reveal the different Soviet and Polish plans to resolve the developments in Poland in 1981. Kuklinski believed that his revelation of the Soviets‘ strategic plans to invade Western Europe in the late 1970s would protect Poland from an atomic holocaust. Although the credibility of this threat has never been proven, Kuklinski was motivated by his fear that this holocaust would be the consequence of NATO forces‘ use of atomic weapons to rebuff any Soviet invasion of Western Europe. After his exfiltration from Poland in 1981 and his exoneration in 1997, Kuklinski was able to return to Poland in 1998. This historic visit reassured Kuklinski that his mission was worthwhile. (Although he claimed on several occasions that he did not expect to be compensated 9 for his efforts, he earned a salary from the Department of State after 1981) He saw a new democratic Poland and was acclaimed a hero of Poland and America.
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