Seafarer Training in Somalia As a Deterrent to Piracy Koki Matsushima World Maritime University

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2016 Seafarer training in Somalia as a deterrent to piracy Koki Matsushima World Maritime University

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Malmö, Sweden

SEAFARER TRAINING IN SOMALIA AS A DETERRENT TO PIRACY

KOKI MATSUSHIMA

Japan

A dissertation submitted to the World Maritime University in partial

Fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE In MARITIME AFFAIRS

(MET)

2016

Declaration

I certify that all the material in this dissertation that is not my own work has been identified, and that no material is included for which a degree has previously been conferred on me.

The contents of this dissertation reflect my own personal views, and are not necessarily endorsed by the University.

(Signature):

(Date): .,YitL%p

Supervised by: Michael Ekow Manuel Associate Professor World Maritime University

Assessor: Maximo Q. Mejia Jr. Professor World MaritimeUniversity

Co-assessor: Peter M. P. Muirhead Professor Emeritus World MaritimeUniversity

11 Acknowledgement

I would like to express sincere thanks to all the people who gave me support to complete this work. It is impossible to express my gratitude to all considering the number of persons who supported me and limitations of space. I appreciate your help!

I would like, however, to specifically thank the following persons for the significant support given me.

Special and sincerest thanks to:

- Dr. Yohei Sasakawa, the Chairman of the Nippon Foundation, who gave me the

fellowship and this great opportunity to study at the World Maritime University.

- Mr. Mohamoud Boss Ahmed, who coordinated my research field visit to

Somaliland and kindly welcomed and hosted me there.

- All the people who cooperated with me in my research in Hargeisa and Berbera,

Somaliland, especially the staff and students of the Berbera Maritime and Fishery

Academy.

- Dr. Michael Ekow Manuel, Associate Professor at the World Maritime University,

who supervised this research.

- Mr. Eisuke Kudo and Mr. Shinichi Ichikawa of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation,

who supported my life and study in Malmö.

- All people at the World Maritime University who inspired me.

iii

Abstract

Title of Dissertation: Seafarer Training in Somalia as a Deterrent to Piracy

Degree: MSc

This dissertation is a study into the development of seafarer training in Somalia as a deterrent to piracy off the coast of Somalia. The number of piratical attacks attributed Somali pirates has decreased dramatically in recent years due to the deterrent of private armed security guards on-board commercial vessels and naval patrols by stakeholder nations. However, these anti-piracy measures cannot be said to have addressed the root causes of the piratical problem in Somalia, such as poverty and absence of good governance. The development of seafarer training in Somalia is therefore examined, in this study, as a new potential solution to the piratical problem off the coast of Somalia.

Online questionnaires and semi-structured interviews were used as research instruments. Questionnaires were sent to Japanese shipping companies and students of a maritime academy in Somalia. Semi-structured interviews of maritime stakeholders were conducted in person (by the researcher) on site in Somalia.

From the analyses of the data collected using the research instruments, it was found that there is quite high interest level of Somali people for the development of seafarer training. The steady found grounds to conclude that seafarer training in Somalia could be a deterrent to piracy.

KEYWORDS: Somalia, Somaliland, Seafarer, Maritime, Training, Education, Piracy,

Deterrent

Table of Contents

Declaration...... ii

Acknowledgement ...... iii

Abstract ...... iv

Table of Contents ...... v

List of Tables ...... ix

List of Figures ...... x

List of Abbreviation ...... xi

Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1

1.1 Background ...... 3

1.2 Purpose of the Study...... 4

1.3 Research Questions...... 4

Chapter 2: Literature Review ...... 6

2.1 Introduction ...... 6

2.2 Piracy ...... 6

2.2.1 Definition of Piracy ...... 6

2.2.2 Legendary and Modern Pirates ...... 8

2.2.3 Somali Pirates ...... 10

2.3 Impact of Education on Crime ...... 14

2.4 Somali Traditional Clan System and Common Law ...... 16

2.4.1 Clan-based Society ...... 16

2.4.2 Somali Traditional Customary Law ...... 23

2.4.3 Summary ...... 25

2.5 Modern History of Somalia ...... 26

2.5.1 Colonial period ...... 26

2.5.2 Independence ...... 28

2.5.3 Muhammad Siad Barre Regime ...... 29

2.5.4 South Central Somalia after Siad Barre Regime ...... 30

2.5.5 Somaliland ...... 31

2.5.6 Puntland ...... 32

2.6 Current Situation of the Three Regions in Somalia ...... 32

2.6.1 South and Central Somalia ...... 33

2.6.2 Puntland ...... 35

2.6.3 Somaliland ...... 36

Chapter 3: Research Methodology...... 43

3.1 Introduction ...... 43

3.2 Selection of Participants ...... 44

3.2.1 Shipping Company ...... 44

3.2.2 Location - Comparison of Three Regions in Somalia ...... 44

3.3 Instrumentation ...... 46

3.4 Research Ethics ...... 47

3.5 Questionnaire Instrument ...... 47

3.6 Interview Instrument ...... 48

3.7 Data Collection...... 48

3.7.1 Quantitative Method ...... 48

3.7.2 Qualitative Method ...... 49

3.8 Data Analysis ...... 49

3.8.1 Quantitative Analysis ...... 49

3.8.2 Qualitative Analysis ...... 50

3.9 Summary ...... 50

Chapter 4: Presentation and Analysis of Data ...... 51

4.1 Introduction ...... 51

4.2 Interview in Somaliland and Questionnaire for BMFA ...... 51

4.2.1 Characteristics of Somali people ...... 51

4.2.2 Deterrent to the Piracy ...... 55

4.2.3 Interest level to engage in the international shipping ...... 59

4.2.4 Feasibility ...... 63

4.3 Questionnaire for shipping company ...... 67

4.3.1 Counter measures to piracy off the coast of Somalia ...... 67

4.3.2 Employing African Seafarers and Employing Somali Seafarers ...... 69

4.3.3 Deterrent to the Piracy ...... 71

4.4 Summary ...... 72

Chapter 5: Discussion of Findings...... 73

5.1 Summary of the Study ...... 73

5.2 Discussion of the Findings ...... 75

5.2.1 Research Question 1 ...... 75

5.2.1 Research Question 2 ...... 77

5.2.1 Research Question 3 ...... 77

vii

5.3 Implications of the Findings ...... 78

5.4 Limitation and Future Research ...... 80

5.5 Conclusion ...... 81

References ...... 83

Appendix 1: Interview Consent Form ...... 90

Appendix 2: Semi-Structured Interview Questions ...... 91

Appendix 3: Questionnaires ...... 93

viii

List of Tables

Table 1: Pros and Cons in each region ...... 46

List of Figures

Figure 1: Genealogical table of major Somali clans ...... 18

Figure 2: Map by Lewis...... 21

Figure 3: Map by Abikar ...... 22

Figure 4: Disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland ...... 40

Figure 5: Colonial Borders ...... 41

Figure 6: Traditional Residential Area of Somali Clan ...... 42

Figure 7: Interest in seafaring (BMFA students) ...... 60

Figure 8: Interest level of the BMFA students ...... 60

Figure 9: Employment after graduate BMFA ...... 66

Figure 10: Counter measures to the piracy off the coast of Somalia ...... 68

Figure 11: Annual cost for the counter measures to the piracy ...... 69

Figure 12: Begin or increase the employment of African seafarers? ...... 70

Figure 13: Begin or increase the employment of Somali seafarers? ...... 71

List of Abbreviation

AMISOM African Union Mission to Somalia

BMFA Berbera Maritime and Fisheries Academy

CPC Counter Piracy Coordination

CSR Corporate Social Responsibility

EASO European Asylum Support Office

FGS Federal Government of Somalia

GPS Global Positioning System

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

ICU Islamic Courts Union

IMF International Monetary Fund

IMSS International Maritime Shipping Services

IUU Illegal Unregulated Unreported

MDTF Multi Donor Trust Fund

MET Maritime Education and Training

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company

NFD Northern Frontier District

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

SFG Somalia Federal Government

SNA Somali National Army

SNF Somali National Front

SNM Somali National Movement

SPM Somali Patriotic Movement

SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front

SSF Somali Salvation Front

SYL Somali Youth League

TFG Transitional Federal Government

TNG Transitional National Government

UN United Nations

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

USC United Somali Congress

USP United Somali Party

WMU World Maritime University

xii

Chapter 1: Introduction

For five years, since 2007, the number of piratical attacks (actual and attempted) attributed to Somali pirates ranked first in the world. In the peak year, 2011, 200 attacks attributed to Somali pirates were reported (ICC International Maritime Bureau,

2012). This number decreased dramatically due to the deterrent of private armed security guards on-board commercial vessels and naval patrols by stakeholder nations. According to the latest annual report published by ICC International Maritime

Bureau (2016), the number of piratical attacks attributed to Somali pirates decreased greatly from 2012 to 2014; no piratical attack attributed to Somali pirates was reported in 2015. Have Somali pirates disappeared from the world? Not quite. The afore- mentioned anti-piracy measures, armed security guards and naval patrols cannot be said to have addressed the root causes of the piratical problem in Somalia.

The root causes of piracy off the coast of Somalia may include a lack of control by the coastal state, Somalia, and poverty (Osei-Tutu, 2011). After the collapse of the Siad

Barre regime in 1991 till the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia

(FGS), there was no formal central government in Somalia. Somalia was called a

"failed state" in the world (Endo, 2015).

Because of the absence of the central government, there was no naval or police control over Somalia waters. It allowed foreigners to exploit the resources in the waters off the Horn of Africa. Many foreign vessels invaded the water and conducted

Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) activity (Murphy, 2011). IUU activities were conducted on a large scale with modern methods by large fishing vessels, compared to local fishermen who only used was small boats and traditional fishing gear. The fish stock off the coast of Somalia was severely impacted by these IUU activities.

Moreover, illegal dumping by foreign vessels, exacerbated the damage to the environment and fish stock. The local population, who in many cases, was heavily reliant on fishing, lost this source of income and became increasingly poor.

Consequently, they took up the arms to protect their waters. Later, piracy off the coast of Somalia was transformed in style and scale to become a big business; it is no longer fishermen's defensive activity (Osei-Tutu, 2011).

Given that these conditions that started the phenomenon of piracy of Somalia has not changed, it can be argued that the root cause of piracy has not changed. Unless the problem of poverty in Somalia (often triggered by external factors), is solved, the piratical problem of Somalia would not be solved. Therefore, current anti-piracy measures relying on military power cannot be expected to be the ultimate solution to root out piracy off the coast of Somalia in the long term. These measures are just suppressing the pirates. If the IUU activities in Somali waters were to continue, poverty remain at current levels, and military power suppressing piracy were removed,

Somali pirates could be expected to the surface/increase again (Stewart, 2015). It is reasonable; therefore, to suggest that a new solution (unlike the current measures) is required to root out this phenomenon.

Development of education and the creation of employment opportunities have been shown to improve poverty and reduce crimes. The Association for the Development of Education in Africa (2016) note, for example, that “education is key in addressing the root causes of conflict and instability in Africa”. Similarly, Moretti (2005) and the

Chicago Urban League (n.d.) respectively indicate that “increased educational achievement in young men reduces the probability that they will engage in criminal activity, and thereby decreases crime-related costs” and that “youth employment opportunities reduce crime”. This research work puts forward the hypothesis that

"seafarer training in Somalia could serve as a deterrent to piracy" and seek to analyze the effectiveness and feasibility of this approach.

1.1 Background

Piracy is of great concern to the world. Piracy threatens maritime security and the safety of seafarers' lives. In the last five years, 2,742 seafarers were assaulted, held as hostages, injured, kidnapped, went missing, threatened, or killed by pirates in total

(ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2016). At the end of 2010, approximately 500 seafarers from more than 18 countries were held hostage by pirates. Piracy damages the international economy and disrupts world trade. Stakeholders in the shipping

industry have been forced by threats and actual acts of piracy to pay large amounts of money for ransoms, insurance, re-routeing, security equipment, armed guards and naval forces, piracy prosecutions, and anti-piracy organizations. Between 7 to 12 billion USD. were spent for these measures related to piracy (Bowden, 2010). There is an urgent need for piracy to be eradicated to secure maritime security and the world economy.

1.2 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to analyze the merits of a suggested new approach/solution to the piratical problems attributed to Somalia. The suggested approach/solution is the development of seafarer training in Somalia. In this research effort, the effectiveness and feasibility of development of seafarer training in Somalia as a deterrent to piracy, will be analyzed.

1.3 Research Questions

The research will be conducted based on the following questions:

 Could the sustainable development of Somali seafarers be a deterrent to the

Somali piracy?

 Do the Somali people have an interest in developing the Somali seafarers for

employment in the international shipping industry?

 Do shipping companies have an interest in employing Somali seafarers?

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses and examines the literature on piracy, impact of education on crime, traditional social system in Somalia, modern history of Somalia, and current situation in Somalia. Examining the literature about piracy would help develop an understanding of current piratical issues in Somali waters. Similarly, examining the literature about the impact of education on crime would help interrogate the possible impact of seafarer training on piracy. Moreover, interrogating the traditional social system and modern history of Somalia would help to understand the background of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Furthermore, examining the current situation in

Somalia with respect to its different regions, would help the selection of the location for developing seafarer training.

2.2 Piracy

2.2.1 Definition of Piracy

Piracy is categorized as "hostis humani generis" - common enemy of the humankind.

This definition allows for universal jurisdiction over this crime, in terms of arrest and prosecution. However, it is not easy to clamp down on piracy conducted on the open sea. Historically, coastal states and the international community have made great efforts to clamp down and root out it (Itsumi, 2009). To understand piracy correctly, it is essential to understand the definition of piracy. The New Oxford Dictionary defined it as "the practice of attacking and robbing at sea" (Pearsall, 2001, p.1411). However, the international maritime community has given a narrower definition drawn from the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS in article 101

(1982), defines piracy as:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for

private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft,

and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or

property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the

jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with

knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(a) or (b).

This means piracy is conducted only for private ends. The UNCLOS definition of piracy does not include similar acts committed in territorial waters.

Counter measures by the international society against piracy have been conducted in the context of this UNCLOS definition. Given the notion of hostis humani generis, any state can arrest pirates on the high sea and prosecute them within its jurisdiction.

While this remains true, the practice of piracy itself as well as the international community has changed. The current state of piracy is quite different from piracy in earlier centuries. Pirates are no longer people wearing eye patches or with the sword artificial hook hands. The scope of 21st century piratical activities is broad and use is made of advanced weaponry. In addition, the state of Somalia – perceived by some as a “failed state” (Endo, 2015, p.55) made the situation surrounding the potential for piracy in the waters off the horn of Africa more complicated. To gain a correct understanding of piracy, a discussion of its history is as essential as the legal definition.

2.2.2 Legendary and Modern Pirates

Piracy has origins in very early centuries. Actually, it has been called the second oldest profession (Manuel, 2012). Moreover, it could be seen in many places in the world.

Bradford (2007) classified the age and the place of piracy as follows:

1. The Greeks (800–146 BC)

2. The Romans (753 BC to AD 476)

3. The Vikings (AD 793–1066)

4. The Buccaneers (1650–1701)

5. The Barbary Pirates (1320–1785)

6. The Tanka Pirates (1790–1820)

7. America and the Barbary Pirates (1785–1815)

One of the oldest piratical activities is the one in the ancient Greece. In the beginning, it was not viewed as a criminal act but as "the industry of the ancient Mediterranean"

(Irving, 2012). Originally, pirates in many cases were fishermen, but when their income was not enough to live, they restored to petty “piratical activity”. Subsequently

Roman pirates appeared in ancient Mediterranean regions. Initially, Roman pirates were “tolerated” by the society and were involved in slave trading for profit. However, they became more radical; culminating in an attack on the port of Ostia and the kidnapping of two senators. As a result of this incident, Rome promulgated anti-piracy laws and started clamping down on piracy. The pirates, shut out from the then legal industry of activities such as slave trading turned to more radical activities involving significant ransoms (Irving, 2012). Pirates became the enemy of states, a criminal group of people.

In the early middle ages, one of the most famous names of such groups appeared the

"Vikings". They lived in Scandinavia, on agriculture, fishing, trade, and robbery. Their scale and geographical scope of their piratical activity were quite broad. They acted over the east Europe and attacked, pirated, and colonized. Their activities were quite different from today's piracy (Fjalldal, 2015). Buccaneers were lawful seafarers and soldier in Caribbean Sea. They attacked and robbed from Spanish ships under the colonial government's official permission. For Spanish people, they were just pirates, but they were more like a navy. They were organized and used powerful weapons.

However, after the end of the war between England and Spain, piratical activity was prohibited by law, and Buccaneers disappeared from the sea (The Way of the Pirates, n.d.). Barbary pirates, based on the north of Africa, also acted vigorously with ample funds and official authorization as privateers. They were mainly Muslims with African origins, but some were Europeans who having converted to Islam joined this piratical group.

Today the pirates with official authorization such as privateers no longer exist. Piracy is now carried out by individuals or group of gangs. However, the nature of pirates has not changed from legendary pirates. They all seek to assault the ship, seize cargo and ship, kidnap crew as hostages for ransom. However, their way of perpetrating such act has changed dramatically. Pirates use night vision equipment, speed boats with modern equipment such as Global Positioning System (GPS) devices and radar, and are armed with heavy weapons such as “bazookas” and machine guns (Maritime

Connector, n.d.). As shipping develops and globalizes, they have deepened their status as hostis humani generis at a global level.

2.2.3 Somali Pirates

One of the most significant factors that contributed to the genesis of modern piracy off the coast of Somalia was the absence of an “in-control” central government. In fact, no piratical attack on commercial vessels had been reported until the end of 1980s, the years that the national government of Somalia (the Siad Barre regime) began to

weaken. The first reported piratical attack attributed to Somali pirates was reported in

December 1989 (Samatar, Lindberg, & Mahayni, 2010). Subsequently, the number of piratical attacks attributed to Somali pirates increased radically from 2009, and peaked in 2011 (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2013). After 2011, due to increasing anti-piracy measures, such as naval patrols by stake holders and the use of private armed security guards on-board commercial vessels, the number of piratical attacks attributed to Somali pirates decreased greatly. In 2015, no piratical attack was reported (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2015). However, the piratical attacks reported in 1989 and those reported in the 2000s were somewhat different in nature.

Their motivation and objectives were not the same. To understand the piratical problem attributed to Somalia, it is essential to consider not only the number of attacks, but also the nature of piracy, such as motivation and objectives. According to the research of Samatar, Lindberg and Mahayni (2010), from 1989, there were four types of pirates off the coast of Somalia; they were "political pirates", "resource pirates",

"defensive pirates" and "ransom pirates".

Political pirates had been seen from 1989 to 1990. Their activities were conducted as a part of anti-government movement. To weaken the power of the national government, anti-government organizations tried to block the seaborne trade of

Somalia. As a significant example of the political piracy, on December 1989, the Italian ship "Kwanda" was seized by one of the major anti-government organizations, Somali

National Movement (SNM), and was released 27 days later. Their aim was to weaken the government; therefore, after the disintegration of the Siad Barre regime in 1991,

political pirates disappeared from the sea (Samatar, Lindberg, & Mahayni, 2010).

After the collapse of the Siad Barre regime however, due to the absence of good governance by the government, Somali fishery was despoiled through IUU fishing by foreign vessels. Moreover, Somali waters were polluted by illegal dumping conducted by foreign vessels. Samatar, Lindberg, and Mahayni (2010) called these foreign (non-

Somali) vessels engaged in IUU activities, resource pirates.

As a counter movement against the resource pirates, the former coast guard of

Somalia and local fishermen started confronting IUU fishing vessels and the vessels conducting illegal dumping using weapons. As an example, they seized a commercial vessel, "MV Bonsella", on 9th September 1994. Cargoes and money in the vessel were looted, but ransom was not demanded, because their aim was to use the vessel for eliminating the resource pirates (Murphy, 2007). Samatar, Lindberg, and Mahayni

(2010) called these Somali “resistance forces”, defensive pirates. Murphy (2011) concurs with this terminology, calling the counter actions of the local Somali fishermen against IUU fishing "defensive piracy".

Defensive pirates appeared as opponents against resource pirates, IUU fishing and illegal dumping. Their aim was to protect their waters from illegal activities. However, defensive pirates gradually evolved from their originating rationale and the nature of their activities. On 15th December 1994, two fishing vessels were captured by Somali pirates; and they demanded a ransom from the owners, a fishing company.

Consequently, 1,000,000 USD was paid as ransom to the pirates (Ocean Beyond

Piracy, 2015). The objectives of the pirates thus changed from protection of the waters to earning money as ransom. Defensive pirates had transitioned in nature to the ransom pirates.

It may be said that the pirates who have threatened international shipping off the coast of Somalia in the last few decades are “ransom pirates”. Their motivation is to earn money from the sea through criminal means. Moreover, the origin of ransom piracy was in defensive piracy triggered by IUU fishing and illegal dumping. To develop an adequate solution to the piratical problem off the coast of Somalia, the current motivation for piracy and the background of exploitation of IUU fishing and illegal dumping, as well as the absence of a strong functional central government, have to be acknowledged. To understand the cause of the absence of central government, knowing the modern history of Somalia is quite important. Similarly, understanding the traditional clan-based society of Somalia is essential to gaining an understanding of the modern history of Somalia. Furthermore, given that “increased educational attainment and improved school quality can significantly reduce crime rates”

(Hjalmarsson & Lochner, 2012, p.49) the relationship between education and crime has to be explored. The following section, therefore, reviews the Somali traditional clan system, the modern history of Somalia as well as the impact of education on crime.

2.3 Impact of Education on Crime

The impact of education on crime has been studied by many researchers. Moretti

(2005) concluded in his paper that education reduces crime due to five reasons. First of all, it increases opportunity cost. Schooling increases individual’s wage earning capacity thus increasing the opportunity cost of crime. For the person who earns higher wages, the amount of “loss” gets bigger when crime is discovered. Secondly, there is a big loss where incarceration is a consequence of this person’s crime. When incarcerated people cannot, in most cases, work for profit. Therefore, for highly educated persons and high earners, the loss from incarceration would be bigger.

Thirdly, education increases individual's patience and risk aversion. These characteristics could draw people away from crime. Fourthly, education encourages a law-abiding mindset. It could be psychic break with respect to crime. Finally, schooling keeps people away from the crime physically. Schools bind the youth to classrooms during day time. School attendance keeps students off the streets which could be the hotbed of crime. In this way, increase of education has positive impact on crime. Education could reduce crime.

Quantitative values of the crime-reducing effect of education have been estimated by some researchers. Lochner and Moretti (2003) estimated that 10% of increase of high school graduation could reduce 20% of murder and assault, 13% of vehicle theft, and

8% of arson. Machin, Marie, and Vujić (2011) estimated from the case study of

England and Wales that one-year increase of schooling reduces violent crime more

than 20%. In contrast to this, however, Moretti (2005) also indicates not only the positive impact of education on crime, but also a possible negative impact. Certain white collar crimes, such as fraud, cybercrime, money laundering, and insider trading are mainly conducted by educated people. Moreover, education could help criminals to evade detection and punishment. Therefore, education also could have negative impact on crime, especially on white collar crime. Despite this fact, when the quantitative estimates of previous research (as mentioned earlier) are considered, the positive impact of education is likely to be much bigger than the negative impact.

Especially regarding violent crime, education has a great impact as those estimated numbers show.

As noted by the German Seamen's Mission (n.d.) piracy is a "violent crime against seafarers". Moreover, as mentioned previously, current Somali pirates are ransom pirates, whose aim is earning money (criminally) at sea. Therefore, the deterrent of education against crime introduced previously, could also have similar impact on piracy. Turkkahraman notes that "schools are an indispensable part of the general social system of societies" (2015, p.381) and thus, understanding a particular local society is quite important in interrogating exactly how that society can be developed through education. Moreover, the historical background that generated Somali pirates is also important. Accordingly, the literature on traditional Somali society and history are reviewed subsequently.

2.4 Somali Traditional Clan System and Common Law

2.4.1 Clan-based Society

"Somali society is highly structured, anchored in the system of clans and sub-clans that bind and divide Somalis" (CHF International, 2006, p.12). Traditional Somali clan- based society has been influenced by colonial rule by European countries, dictatorship, anarchy, disunion and democratization. Hence, its influence and status are not completely the same as before and depend on regional location. However, definitely the clan system exists in today's Somalia, and understanding it is essential to understand Somalia.

The majority of Somalis belong to clans which are believed to be descendants of

Prophet Mohammed. The clan system is a patrilineal structured system. Hence,

Somali children belong to their father's clan, fathers belong to grandfather's clan, and grandfathers belong to great-grandfather's clan. Generally, Somali people can trace their genealogy via their clan family and learn this by heart. In Somali's original nomadic culture which did not settle down in one place, knowing one’s clan and its origin was quite important to identify oneself. The clan system consists of a hierarchical structure. It starts from clan families, and branches from clan family to clan, clan to sub-clan, sub-clan to sub-sub-clan, and so on. The sense of belonging for the clan is stronger than that for the clan family, and the one for the sub-clan is stronger than the one for the clan. In smaller groups, loyalty becomes stronger (EASO,

2014). Especially to the primary lineage group, people pay money called "diya" or

"mag" (translated literally "blood money"; generally, this is used as “compensation” when members of one diya paying group harm the other diya paying group members), and constitute a community (Sage, 2005).

Clan families are divided in two group by their origin. The clan families which have their origin in nomadic pastoralists called "Somale", and the clan families which have their origin in pastoral people called "Saab". Somale has four clan families "Darood",

"Hawiya", "Isaaq", and "Dir". The Darood clan family is divided into five clans,

"Ogaden", "Mareexaan", "Majeerteen", "Warsangeli", and "Dhulbahante". Moreover, the federation of the three clans, Majeerteen, Warsangeli, and Dhulbahante is called

"Harti". The Hawiya clan family is divided into six clans, "Gurreh", "Ajoran", "Mobilen",

"Habr Gedir", "Sheikkel", and "Abgal". The Isaaq clan family is divided into four clans,

"Habar Garhaji", "Habar Awal", "Habar Yunis", and "Habar Jeclo". The Dir clan family is divided into four clans, "Gadabursi", "Issa", "Samaroon", and "Bimaal" (Abbink,

2009). Saab has a clan family called "Rahanweyn"; and it is divided into two clans,

"Digil", and "Mirfle" (Endo, 2015) (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Genealogical table of major Somali clans

Somali society does not consist of only majority clan families, but diverse minority groups, such as ethnic minority groups, religious minority groups, and occupational minority groups. Major ethnic minority groups do consist of the descents of migrants.

They have different cultural and language backgrounds from majority Somalis. To be exact, they are not clan, but they are regarded and treated like clan by others. There

are five main ethnic minority groups, "Bantu", "Benadiri", "Sheikhal", "Ashraf", and

"Bajuni". There is no exact data about the population of the ethnic minority groups.

The population rate of the ethnic minorities is estimated between 6% and 33% of the population of Somalia (EASO, 2014). According to the Pew Research Center (2012), the population of Somalia was approximately 9,330,000 and 98.8% of them are

Muslim. The remaining 0.2% people constitute the religious minority groups. The occupational minority groups have same cultural and ethnical backgrounds. However, they traditionally engage in the occupations considered impure or dishonorable. In the past, they were ranked as the lowest level of the social hierarchy. For example, the occupations, such as hunting, leather tanning, shoemaking, and blacksmith were discriminated against. There are many occupational minority groups in Somalia, such as "Midgaan", "Tumaal", "Yibir", "Galgale", "Gaheyle", "Yahhar", "Jaaji", "Musa

Dheryo", "Guuleed Hadde", "Hawr Warsame", "Habar Yuqub", "Medgal", and

"Warabeeye" (EASO, 2014). In addition, Hill (2010) consider "Boni" and "Eyle" as occupational minority groups also. They are not clans, but some of them have systems similar to the system major clans have.

Generally, the clans and the minority groups mentioned above have their own territory or residential area. They fall, not only in the present territory of Somalia, but also in parts of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. For example, Majeerteen is dominant in

Puntland, Hawiye is dominant in South Central Somalia, Isaaq is dominant in

Somaliland, and Ogaden is dominant in the Ogaden region in Ethiopia as the name indicates. The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (2014) introduced two

detailed clan distribution maps made by Lewis, and Abikar (see figures 2 and 3). They are the only two maps which cover the lower level such as sub-clans, and sub-sub clans.

Figure 2: Map by Lewis

Source: EASO. (2014). Map by Lewis (1955) [Map]. In EASO Country of Origin Information

report South and Central Somalia Country Overview. Retrieved September 10, 2016, from

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/COI-Report-Somalia.pdf

Figure 3: Map by Abikar

Source: EASO. (2014). Map by Abikar (1999) [Map]. In EASO Country of Origin Information

report South and Central Somalia Country Overview. Retrieved September 10, 2016, from

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/COI-Report-Somalia.pdf

As the maps show, many Somali clans and minority groups are distributed in a rather confused manner in the Horn of Africa.

2.4.2 Somali Traditional Customary Law

There is an essential factor to understand Somali traditional clan-based society. It is

Somali traditional customary law, "xeer". Xeer has been exist since long time ago.

Even under the anarchy, Somalia was in order in certain level, due to the xeer. The influence of the xeer is not same as before. The rise of Islamist group in South, demilitarization of the clans, development of regular army and police, development of laws; these factors have weakened the influence of the clans and the xeer (Sage,

2005). Nevertheless, xeer is still important in Somali society. EASO emphasized the influence of the xeer in the country of origin information report as following; "the protection mechanism exists all over Somalia, working best in rural areas" (2014, p.61). Moreover, the influence of the xeer is reinstating in specific areas where Al-

Shabaab withdrew (EASO, 2014). To understand Somali society, the xeer is still one of the indispensable factors.

The xeer, apart from being the traditional customary law, is also a contractual arrangement between the clans. In this context, the size of the clans is not big like clan family, but small groups; diya/mag paying groups consist of between hundreds and thousands of men. The xeer can be divided in two parts; an unchangeable part

"xeer guud" and a contractive part "xeer gaar". Furthermore, the most general

principles of xeer are called "xissi adakaaday" (Sage, 2005). The xissi adakaaday provides collective payment of diya/mag, maintenance of inter-clan harmony, family obligations, and resource-utilization rules (Indarat Maritime, 2011).

An English translation of the word, "diya" or "mag" would be "blood money", as generally diya/mag is the money for the compensation for acts of murder or manslaughter or injury. It is not for the individuals but for the clans (diya/mag paying groups). For example, if a man belonging to diya/mag paying group "A" killed a man belonging to group "B", diya/mag collected from all individuals in group "A", is paid as compensation to group "B". Later, the compensation is shared in group "B" with the bereaved family getting a greater share. Generally, the xeer provided compensation for a male death as one-hundred camels, and for a female death fifty camels (CHF

International, 2006). A noteworthy point is that the diya/mag paying group is obligated to compensate another group for an act committed by an individual. Individuals are protected by the group, but individual behavior could be a nuisance for the whole group. This fact helps restrain the acts of individual group members.

The xeer is also applied to conflicts between clans. Traditional clan leaders determine adequate precedent(s) or find a new solution for new cases under the xeer to give judgments in respect of conflicts (Sage, 2005). Moreover, even in the state of war, the xeer restricts people's behavior. In the xeer, there is a rule called "Biri-ma-Geydo"; it is the traditional Somali customary code of war. In the context of Biri-ma-Geydo,

"women, children, those innocently caught up in fighting, the wounded and the

captives would be protected and treated humanely during the conduct of hostilities"

(ICRC, 2008). The xeer restrains not only individual behavior but also that of clans even in times of war.

Thus, Somali people and clans are bound by the clan system and traditional customary law and contracts. In other words, they are protected by clan influence and the xeer. In the main, however, these social norms apply only for majority clans.

Nevertheless, minority groups also can be protected by clan society and the xeer.

They can establish client relationships with majority clans. This client relation is called

"gaashaanbuur" (pile of shields). Through the gaashaanbuur, minority groups can also subscribe to the protection of the majority clans and the xeer. The gaashaanbuur is not mandatory but voluntary. Both of them, protection provider and protection receiver, can choose, by their own decision, to renounce the relationship (EASO, 2014).

2.4.3 Summary

Generally speaking, it is difficult for foreigners to identify to which clan a Somali individual belongs by appearance. The xeer is not written law, but oral law. These two factors make it difficult for foreigners to understand them. Nevertheless, to understand

Somali history and present condition and to visualize potential scenarios about future of the Horn of Africa, making best efforts to know and understand the clan system is very important. It can be the cause conflicts, and it could be the key of the peace as well and affect the behavior (either criminal or non-criminal) of individuals and groups,

including behaviors and motivations that support the growth or otherwise of piracy.

Somalia is still under the influence of clan system.

2.5 Modern History of Somalia

2.5.1 Colonial period

Somalia has experienced three significant events in its modern history. They are colonial rule by foreign countries and subsequently, independence from these nations as well as a number of civil wars. Originally, Somali -as an ethnic group- lived in the horn of Africa regardless of national borders. However, in the period of colonial rule, they were segregated into five regions; Italian colony, British colony, French colony,

Ethiopia, and British Kenya (Endo, 2015). After the end of colonial rule, today, their original inhabiting area in horn of Africa is divided in four countries, Djibouti, Ethiopia,

Kenya, and Somalia. Colonial rule, in particular by Italy and Britain, influenced the civil wars after the independence and still greatly influences the current situation of

Somalia.

In 1887, Britain started to govern the north-western part of the horn of Africa as a protectorate called British Somaliland. However, Britain was not so active in respect of the colonial administration of this protectorate, probably because it was a place with limited resources, poor mineral resources and poor agriculture resource. That was one of reasons that nomadic culture had earlier developed in this area. In fact, British

Somaliland was ranked lowest among the colonies which brought economic benefits

to the British Empire, resulting in Britain not having much interest in this colony. Britain governed this colony in an indirect way as part of British India, and through powerful local individuals (Millman, 2013). As a result, the earlier clan system of ruling this region was not destroyed by the colonial rule, but amplified (Center for Justice and

Accountability, n.d.). However, Britain tried to convert the people to Christianity even though Islam was the established religion there. It aroused people's antipathy, and led to an intense resistive movement. Britain oppressed and attacked militarily the people who supported the resistance movement, until they overwhelmed the movement in

1920. However, the resistance movement conducted by Abdullah Hassan and his votaries called "Dervishes" fought tenaciously for twenty years; the movement, organized within the frame work of the traditional clan system and encompassing many clan groups aroused Somali nationalism leading to Pan-Somalism – the aim for one great Somalia (Endo, 2015).

Italy started to rule the north-eastern, central and southern part of the horn of Africa as a colony named Italian Somaliland. In contrast to the passive attitude of Britain to the British Somaliland, Italy administrated this colony positively and directly. Originally, the soil of this region was richer compared with the soil of British Somaliland. As a consequence, Italy made strategic plans to develop the agriculture potential of the area. Moreover, Italy developed infrastructures during the period of its colonial rule especially in Mogadishu. The resulting disparities between the north and the south increased over time and continued to be fueled by the different colonial rule styles of

Britain and Italy (Center for Justice and Accountability, n.d.). Despite the “development”

of the Italian regions, Italian Somaliland was still a colony, and not a self-ruled State.

There was discontent against colonial rule such as laws that were against the Somali people. In 1946, the Somali Youth League (SYL) was established, and appealed for the rectification of the unfair legal framework, development of education, and development of the Somali language. As with British Somaliland, the “resistance” movement from the local people, in this case the movement of SYL was conducted within the clan framework and gained many supporters. SYL stimulated Somali nationalism here (Africa Japan Forum, 2006).

2.5.2 Independence

After World War II, many countries gained their independence including many in Africa.

On 26th June 1960, British Somaliland became independent of Britain and called itself the Republic of Somaliland. Five days later, on 1st July 1960, ex Italian-Somaliland which was a trust territory under UN after the defeat of Italy in World War II, became independent and merged with Somaliland to become the Somali Republic (BBC News,

2016a). Actually, the Republic of Somaliland disappeared only five days after its birth.

The Somali Republic was established by the merging of two countries, British

Somaliland and the Trust Territory Somaliland (ex-Italian Somaliland) under the name of great Somalia. Consequently, Pan-Somalism was one of the most important policies of the government. The government of Somali Republic tried to gain the support of African countries to achieve the great Somalia. However, this was difficult.

On June 1963, Kenya became independent from the Britain. Subsequently the nationality of the north-eastern region known as the Northern Frontier District (NFD) was discussed between Kenya and Somalia. Since the NFD was historically a Somali residential area, and the percentage of Somali in the population at the time was more than 60%, there was a basis for possible Somali nationality. However, Britain decided that NFD to be a part of Kenya regardless of the will of the people. This decision made the establishment of the great Somalia even more difficult. Moreover, African countries were afraid of the influence of Pan-Somalism on the determination of borders of sovereign states in Africa. Consequently, the government of Somali Republic could not gain the support of other African countries, and became increasingly isolated. In addition, inside the government, clan-based nepotism and corruption took root.

Popular discontent with the government consistently increased. The person who significantly changed this situation was Muhammad Siad Barre (Endo, 2015).

2.5.3 Muhammad Siad Barre Regime

After the assassination of the second president, General Muhammad Siad Barre seized power in a bloodless military coup in 1969. The name of country was changed to the Somali Democratic Republic. The Muhammad Siad Barre regime continued for twenty years. Under this regime, specific clans were given favorable treatment, while some other clans were treated coldly or oppressed in contradiction with the regimes formal policy. In particular, the Isaaq and Majeerteen clans were strongly oppressed

(Endo, 2015). These despotic oppressions significantly increased people's discontent

(Elmi & Barise, 2006).

Because of the defeat of the Ogaden war (1977 – 1978) against Ethiopia, the power of the Siad Barre regime was weakened. Consequently, the anti-government movement in Somalia briskly increased. In 1979, the first resistance movement,

Somali Salvation Front (SSF) was established by the Majeerteen people. SSF changed its name to Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and merged with two smaller anti-governmental groups in 1981 (INS Resource Information Center, 1993).

In 1981, the Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed by the Isaaq people. In addition, the Hawiye people formed the United Somali Congress (USC) and started an anti-government movement (Terdman, 2008). Against these anti-government movements, the Siad Barre regime strongly retaliated. In particular the northern region occupied by SNM was severely bombed, and Hargeisa, the capital of the state, was ruined completely with tens thousands killed (The East African, 2016). However, the anti-government resistance further weakened the Siad Barre regime. Ultimately, on 26th January 1991, a USC army led by General Mohamed Farrah Aideed occupied

Mogadishu, and the Siad Barre regime was overthrown (Country Information & Policy

Unit, 2004).

2.5.4 South Central Somalia after Siad Barre Regime

After the USC brought Mogadishu under its control and overthrew the Siad Barre regime, it declared the establishment of a new government. However, USC was split

into two groups, and started fighting to establish a hegemony. South Central Somalia entered period of anarchy. About ten years later, the Somalia Transitional National

Government (TNG) was established in 2000 through peace conferences. However,

TNG could not gain any advantage over the hegemony. Later, in 2004, the Somalia

Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established, and fought against Islamic

Courts Union (ICU) over the hegemony and succeeded in putting a major part of

South Central Somalia including Mogadishu under its control (U.S. Department of

State & Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). Finally, in 2012 TFG finished its transitional period, and officially the Federal Republic of Somalia was established.

Today, South Central Somalia is under the control of the government of the Federal

Republic of Somalia; the period of anarchy is over. However, Al-Shabaab, a violent extremist group split from ICU, is still conducting many terrorist attacks (Endo, 2015).

2.5.5 Somaliland

When the Siad Barre regime collapsed, the SNM declared independence for the

Republic of Somaliland in the North West Somalia, which was the territory of the

British Somaliland on 18th May 1991. At present, one of the biggest issues preventing the recognition by UN of this declaration of the independence of Somaliland is the unofficial rule that prohibits the change of African colonial borders (Fisher, 2012).

Against this issue, Somaliland has insisted its lawfulness based on the border fixed on 26th July 1960, and which existed for five days (Somalilandlaw.com, n.d.).

Somaliland has however, still not been recognized as an independent country by the

UN. Despite this, so far, there is currently relative political stability, democracy, and public security (Hesse, 2011).

2.5.6 Puntland

After the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, SSDF tried to secure a safe and stable area in North East Somalia. Consequently, SSDF formed the Puntland State of

Somalia in 1998. While the South Central Somalia entered a period of anarchy as stated earlier, this autonomous region established its democracy and was relatively stable, though there were many problems including piracy, clan based conflicts, and security issues (Johnson & Smaker, 2014). Puntland maintained better governance condition than pertained in South Central Somalia.

2.6 Current Situation of the Three Regions in Somalia

As mentioned previously, current Somalia can be divided in the three regions, South

Central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland. They are governed by different

“governments”. Naturally, the current diversity of the different regions means that the pros and cons for the provision of the seafarers are different. Therefore, a review of the current situation of these regions for developing seafarer training and education is essential for this research.

2.6.1 South and Central Somalia

In South Central Somalia, there has been a formal government recognized by UN since 2012. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recognized the federal government of Somalia formally in 2013. In addition, IMF launched a Multi Donor Trust

Fund (MDTF) in 2015. For this fund, some organizations, such as the Arab Fund for

Economic and Social Development, the Canadian Department for Foreign Affairs,

Trade and Development, and the United Kingdom's Department for International

Development, have decided to contribute: and the IMF is still collecting more contributions. Over nine million dollars will be budgeted by 2018 to assist the improvement of the macroeconomic system in Somalia (IMF Communication

Department, 2015). Thus, due to the international recognition since 2012, South

Central Somalia is open to the contributions of and collaboration with other countries and foreign companies. This could be an advantage to launch the seafarer training in this region.

In South Central Somalia, a good security situation has not yet been established.

Establishment of the formal government in 2012 was a key step, but it did not lead to the instant realization of peace. South Central Somalia is still under a state of a civil war. The Somali National Army (SNA), a regular army of the Federal Republic of

Somalia, and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is engaged in severe fighting against the Al-Shabaab. The power of the Al-Shabaab has been weakened compared with years ago. However, Al-Shabaab still keeps approximately 7,000 to

9,000 soldiers and some areas in the South Central Somalia are still under their control (U.S. Department of State, 2016). Even areas under the control of the federal government are always threatened by invasions or terrorist attacks by the Al-Shabaab

(BBC News, 2015). For example, more than 50 soldiers were killed by Al-Shabaab near Mogadishu on 26th June 2015. An AMISOM's base in Janale was attacked by

Al-Shabaab and more than 20 persons were killed on 1st September 2015. In 2016 also, there were multiple terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab; and more than 100 people were killed (BBC News, 2016b). Their targets are not only soldiers, but also civilians including people working for non-governmental organizations (NGO), the UN, and diplomatic missions. Al-Shabaab is seriously threatening the security of South Central

Somalia. On the other hand, agencies of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) which maintain public security, such as SNA and the police have some problems themselves. Their sense of belonging to the clan is generally stronger than the identification with the FGS (U.S. Department of State, 2016). Therefore, they often do their security work with more focus on their clan (IRIN, 2014). This could make them almost a “private army” of the clan and especially when a conflict among the clans arises, their greater allegiance to the clan could lead to abuse of the security power.

Moreover, the Somali National Army (SNA) has been known to have setup illegal check points and imposed a toll on civilians at least until 2015 (U.S. Department of

State, 2016). The weak loyalty to the government and abuse of the security power worsens the security situation of South Central Somalia.

2.6.2 Puntland

Puntland is not insisting on independence from Somalia. As the name "Puntland State of Somalia" suggests, they view their position as being a part of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Therefore, as a part of UN recognized country Puntland can have access to the international society. Accordingly, as the formal central government, FGS was established in 2012, and the international organizations, such as IMF started funding to the Federal Republic Somalia, Puntland also could increase its accessibility to the international fund. Moreover, Puntland government maintained its stability even in the absence of the central government (Murphy, 2011). When South Central Somalia was in anarchy, Puntland still maintained its territory in order, and even maintained the democratic mechanisms such as elections (Puntland Development Research Center,

2015). Accessibility to the international society, stable government, and democracy, could be the positive factors to launch the seafarer training.

However, the international recognition of Puntland exists only to the point that it is seen as a part of the Federal Republic of Somalia. The Puntland government itself has not recognized formally by the international society. Access to the international grants and loans is thus still limited. Because of the lack of major industries, most of revenue of Puntland relies on port revenue; and most of this revenue is used for the maintenance of the administration, police, and military (Johnson & Smaker, 2014).

Puntland has a stable government, but still there are some problems that affect its

stability, such as conflict between Somaliland, and poor public security. Somaliland declared its independence in 1991, and determined its territory following the area which was British Somaliland. The independence movement was led by the SNM consisting of Isaaq people, but the territory of the British Somaliland includes other clan people's residential areas. In the eastern part of Somaliland, for example, the majority of people belong to the Darood clan. On the other hand, Puntland has not recognized the independence of Somaliland. Puntland, regarding Somaliland as just an Isaaq residential area, decided to set its territory over the Darood residential area including part of British Somaliland. This has generated ongoing conflict over the territory between Somaliland and Puntland since their origin (Mesfin, 2009). Moreover, public security inside Puntland is not secure regardless of this conflict with Somaliland.

In the worst period of Somali piracy, many piratical businesses were established and conducted in this region (Endo, 2015). It was even suspected that there was a beneficial relationship between governmental officers and Somali pirates (Murphy,

2011). In addition, Al-Shabaab having lost its southern territory after 2012, is threatening the security situation (Endo, 2015). Limited access to the international society, conflict between Somaliland, and poor public security - these are serious problems preventing Puntland stability and development.

2.6.3 Somaliland

First of all, public security in Somaliland is much better than other regions in Somalia.

It is not temporary security, but Somaliland has maintained the peace over the

decades (Hesse, 2011). After the declaration of independence of the Republic of

Somaliland in 1991, clan-based civil wars happened many times. However, since the

Hargeisa conference, a peace conference held in the capital of Somaliland, in 1996, unity of the people, democratization, and disarmament proceeded with certainty and peacefully (Endo, 2015). There has been no civil war inside Somaliland since the

Hargeisa conference. On the other hand, as Al-Shabaab gained power in the South,

Somaliland was also exposed to its threat. On 29th October 2008, synchronized terrorist attacks happened in Hargeisa (Somaliland), and in Bosaso (Puntland). At least 30 people were killed by these attacks (McKenzie & Adow, 2008). However, because of the reinforcement of the maintenance of public security after the attacks and deterioration of the power of Al-Shabaab, Somaliland has not had any terrorist attack for eight years. Security situation in Somaliland has been secured to a degree.

Somaliland has developed its own democracy since the declaration of the independence in 1991. Somaliland has bicameral legislature consisting of the House of Elders (Guurti) and the House of Representatives. The House of Elders consists of eighty-two traditional leaders, and the House of Representatives consists of eighty- two members elected through democratic election (United Kingdom Home Office,

2013). Furthermore, the President of Somaliland is elected through direct elections.

Politics in Somaliland has shifted from clan to individual. There are, however, difficulties and doubts regarding the fairness of elections. Because of some of the people's nomadic life style, registration of voters is particularly difficult, and it could be used as the excuse for the delay of elections. However, some occurrences, such as

the election as president of an individual belonging to a minority clan, and the change of government through the elections in 2010, prove that democracy exists in

Somaliland to a degree (Johnson & Smaker, 2014).

In Berbera, the main port of Somaliland, there is a maritime academy named Berbera

Maritime and Fisheries Academy (BMFA) established in 2012. BMFA provides a

Bachelor degree program in Marine Engineering, Nautical Science, and Fishery as the only MET institute in Somaliland. They do not have enough facilities or human resource yet. They do not have any latest ship simulator, and enough numbers of lecturers. However, they are - with these limited resources - producing seafarers to the shipping industry every year. Furthermore, they are trying to establish relationships with foreign organizations. For example, BMFA and World Maritime

University (WMU) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2014. There exists a basis for developing MET (World Maritime University, 2014).

The biggest problem of Somaliland is that they are not recognized by the international society. It makes it difficult to access the international community, be funded by foreign organizations, and engage in international shipping. In the UN view, Somaliland is just a part of the Federal Republic of Somalia. However, the desire for international recognition has enhanced the development of Somaliland (Johnson & Smaker, 2014).

Gaining the recognition is "the number one priority" (Somaliland Government, n.d.) for them. Somaliland people have made great efforts to be recognized by the international society; improved public security, enhanced democratization, and

developed their economy (Johnson & Smaker, 2014). To achieve the number one priority, Somaliland will keep making efforts and developing themselves.

As mentioned previously, there is a disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland

(see figure 4). The major clan in Somaliland is the Isaaq; and the most major clan in

Puntland is the Majeerteen. Somaliland insists its territory is based on the territory of the British Somaliland, including the residential areas of Warsangeli and Dhulbahante clan (see figure 5 and figure 6). However, Puntland has not recognized the independence of Somaliland. Moreover, Puntland regards Somaliland just as a residential area of the Isaaq clan. Therefore, in the context of Puntland, the residential areas of Warsangeli and Dhulbahante clan should not be included in Somaliland. On the other hand, the Puntland government defines itself as the community of Harti clan- collective. Majeerteen, Warsangeli, and Dhulbahante clan, all of them belong to Harti clan-collective. Accordingly, Puntland is insisting its territory is based on the residential areas of Harti, including the residential areas of the Warsangeli and Dhulbahante clans. However, Somaliland regards Puntland as a community of the Majeerteen.

Consequently, the residential areas of Warsangeli and Dhulbahante clans are still under dispute between Somaliland and Puntland. This is a quite sensitive problem which could lead to military conflict; and could reduce the stability in Somaliland

(Mesfin, 2009; Endo, 2015).

Figure 4: Disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland

Source: Gagale, I. H. (2015, June 16). Somaliland Puntland Disputed [Map]. In Somaliland:

Focus on Border Dispute with Puntland. Retrieved August 30, 2016, from

http://www.somalilandsun.com/contact-us/36-in-depth/in-depth/7580-somaliland-focus-on-

border-dispute-with-puntland

Figure 5: Colonial Borders

Source: Center for Justice and Accountability. (n.d.). Somalia Colonial Map [Map]. In

SOMALIA: COLONIAL LEGACY. Retrieved August 30, 2016, from http://cja.org/where-we-

work/somalia/related-resources/somalia-colonial-legacy/

Figure 6: Traditional Residential Area of Somali Clan

Source: United States Central Intelligence Agency. (2012) Somalia Country Profile.

[Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency] [Map] Retrieved from the Library of

Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2012594293/.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The aim of this research is to analyze the feasibility of developing a sustainable supply of Somali seafarers, and the effect this could have as a deterrent to sustainably avoiding the resurgence of piracy off the coast of Somalia. The research methodology described was aimed at answering the following questions:

 Could the sustainable development of Somali seafarers be a deterrent to the

Somali piracy?

 Do the Somali people have an interest in developing the Somali seafarers for

employment in the international shipping industry?

 Do shipping companies have an interest in employing Somali seafarers?

The mixed method approach was used to answer those research questions. In this chapter, the research methodology and associated approaches and methods are discussed. It includes a discussion of the selection of research participants, the research instruments used and how data was collected and analyzed.

3.2 Selection of Participants

3.2.1 Shipping Company

According to the Cabinet Secretariat of Japan (2015) approximately 1,700 Japan related vessels sailed through the Gulf of Aden in 2014. This means about 10% of vessels passing through the Gulf of Aden was owned/managed by Japanese shipping companies. Therefore, to interrogate the interest level of shipping companies in employing Somali seafarers, workers of selected Japanese shipping company operating ships off the coast of Somalia were targeted as participants in the research.

Moreover, to examine the relationship between the level of interest to employ Somali seafarers and the ability of such employment to act as a deterrent to Somali piracy, the participants were selected from only the shipping company operating the ships off the coast of Somalia.

3.2.2 Location - Comparison of Three Regions in Somalia

Considering the current situation reviewed in previous chapter, South Central Somalia,

Puntland, and Somaliland have different pros and cons with respect to the development of MET. To select the most adequate region to develop seafarer training and education, four aspects, access to the international loan, political stability, democratic situation, and public security will be compared.

First of all, access to the international loan. South Central Somalia has a formal

government recognized internationally. Therefore, they have good access to the international loan, such as IMF. Puntland is recognized internationally as part of the

Federal Republic of Somalia, but not as a government itself. Therefore, access to the international loan is limited compared with South Central Somalia. Somaliland has no international recognition. Therefore, access to the international loan is quite limited, but efforts to gain such access have been made continuously.

Secondly, political stability. In South Central Somalia there has been a formal federal government since 2012, but this is still relatively new. Political stability is poor, or at least difficult to expect. Puntland and Somaliland have maintained their stable government.

Thirdly, democratic situation. Somalia Federal Government (SFG) is quite new; therefore, they have not developed certain democratic systems, such as democratic elections and a constitution. Puntland has developed its own democracy. However, it is still a clan-based system. Somaliland has developed its own democracy, and the change of government was done through the election.

Finally, Public security. In South Central Somalia, there is poor public security. Many terrorist attacks are conducted up till now. Moreover, the police and military are not organized strictly and their allegiance to the State is questionable. In Puntland, conflict with Somaliland, threat of terrorism, and piracy exist. These factors lower the level of public security. Somaliland has conflict with Puntland, but disarmament of civilians

has been completed, and there is a greater likelihood that public security will be successfully maintained (see table 1).

Table 1: Pros and Cons in each region South Central Puntland Somaliland Somalia Access to International Loan ○ △ △ Political Stability × ○ ○ Democracic Situation × △ ○ × △ ○ Public Security “○” indicates “good”, △ indicates “average”, and “×” indicates “poor”

Considering the comparison of the four factors between the three regions, Somaliland seems to have the most positive factors for developing the seafarer training and education. Consequently, Somaliland was selected as the place to conduct this research.

3.3 Instrumentation

To collect the data about specific issues of interest, the use of questionnaires is one of the more simple instruments available (Kirklees Council, n.d.-b). Interviewing is however, a research instrument which is used to know and understand people's feelings, perceptions and experiences and to research new topics particularly where existing data is limited (Kirklees Council, n.d.-a). In this research, questionnaires were used to know the current situation and interest level of the participants. Interviews were conducted to know the experiences and various opinions of the participants.

Especially for the research about the Somali people, interviewing was decided to be the most beneficial research instrument considering the relatively small numbers in the sample. Consequently, two electronic questionnaires and semi-structured interviews were constructed as research instruments.

3.4 Research Ethics

Every research instruments used for this research was approved by the WMU

Research Ethic Committee. All respondents of the interview consented to being interviewed and for the use the contents of the interview for the research. All respondents were assured that private information collected through the research instruments would be treated completely confidentially, and data collected are to be used only for academic purposes.

3.5 Questionnaire Instrument

Two types of electronic questionnaires were prepared. One was designed to be answered by workers in shipping companies, and another for the students of Berbera

Maritime and Fisheries Academy (BMFA) located in Somaliland. The questionnaire for shipping company consisted of twelve items in the form of multiple choice questions, (either by checkbox or dropdown menus, or open/free comment. The questionnaire for BMFA students consisted of thirteen items required multiple choice, checkbox, or free comment. All of them were sent to the respondents by email.

3.6 Interview Instrument

The semi-structured interviews were prepared for faculty of BMFA and governmental officials in ministries. The questions for the interview were constructed to ask the opinions about current and future MET in Somaliland, generic characteristics of the

Somali seafarer, interest in the provision of seafarers to the international shipping, and potential impact of the existence of maritime education and training in Somali on the continuation or otherwise of piracy. All interviews were conducted in English, and in person (by the researcher) on site in Somaliland.

3.7 Data Collection

3.7.1 Quantitative Method

As quantitative research instruments, two questionnaires were constructed. One was for shipping companies, and the other for the students of the maritime academy in

Somaliland. The questionnaire for the shipping companies was distributed to the workers of multiple Japanese shipping companies by email. It was distributed to more than thirty persons, and ten answers were sent back (a response rate of 30%). The questionnaire to the students of maritime academies was conducted with the cooperation of BMFA, the only MET institute in Somaliland. Through the faculty of

BMFA, the questionnaire was distributed to the students. However, it was the time for the summer vacation for the students, and they were not in the academy.

Nevertheless, eleven answers were sent back. Receiving answers to the

questionnaires was closed on August 20, 2016 12:00, due to time limitation. The answers of questionnaires were compiled by google form automatically.

3.7.2 Qualitative Method

As qualitative research instrument, semi-structured interviews were conducted. Some members of faculty of BMFA and governmental officers of the ministries were approached as interviewees. Faculty, students and graduates of BMFA, an executive of Somaliland Counter Piracy Coordination (CPC) Office, the General Manager of a

Shipping and Multi-Service Agency, officers of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine

Resource, officers of Berbera Port Authority, and seafarers in Berbera port participated as interviewees. All interviews were conducted in Somaliland between

July 26 and July 29, 2016, by the researcher in person.

3.8 Data Analysis

3.8.1 Quantitative Analysis

Quantitative analysis of the data from questionnaires responses was mainly done using descriptive statistics and presented in pie charts, tables, and graphs. They were used to validate/augment the findings from the qualitative analysis. Graphics for descriptive statistics were generated from Google Form.

3.8.2 Qualitative Analysis

A qualitative analysis software "ATLAS.ti" was used to analyze the transcribed interviews and open comments from the questionnaires. Transcribed interviews and questionnaires were coded and analyzed on a comparative basis.

3.9 Summary

The objective of the methods chosen was to know the shipping company's anti-piracy measures and prospective employment of African seafarers including Somali, interest level of the Somali people for engaging in international shipping, and deterrent to the piracy of having Somali seafarers on-board. The mixed method approach (with an emphasis on the qualitative side) was deemed suitable to analyze the collected data.

In the next chapter, findings and results of the data are presented.

Chapter 4: Presentation and Analysis of Data

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, analyses of the responses obtained from the research instruments - interviews and electronic questionnaires - is presented, together with the findings.

First of all, the analyses of responses obtained from the interviews conducted in

Somaliland, and from the questionnaire to students of the Berbera Maritime and

Fisheries Academy (BMFA) are presented. Subsequently, the analyses of the responses from the questionnaire to the shipping companies will be presented.

4.2 Interview in Somaliland and Questionnaire for BMFA

4.2.1 Characteristics of Somali people

Stereotypical labeling of the characteristics of the people in specific ethnic groups and nationalities can be dangerous, annoying, and harmful (Lambert, 2014). Decision- making based on stereotypes can lead to failure at a minimum. However, knowing how the people in specific groups generally think or feel about themselves compared with others could be productive when carefully done. In the interviews all persons who

were asked about the strength of Somali seafarers mentioned that Somali people are hard workers. The following analysis and discussion contain direct quotes from the interviews (verbatim).

Graduates of Berbera Maritime and Fisheries Academy (BMFA)

"We work hard".

Faculty of BMFA

"We are hardworking people".

"Hard workers, they work very hard even if the salary is less".

"They are hard workers, polite, acceptable for any working pressure, friendly to

colleagues and open minded".

"Somali seafarers are good in character and hard workers, honest, very patient

In the job, so it’s good for international companies to hire this kind of people".

Somali sailor

"We work hard".

Egyptian deck officer

"They are hardworking people, and obey orders well".

Governmental officer of the Ministry of Fisheries

"Somali people work very hard, and they are low cost labor force (for the

international shipping companies)".

Obviously, many Somali people (as represented by those interviewed) believe that they are "hard workers". In addition, a non-Somali person, an Egyptian deck officer, who was working with Somali ratings also mentioned the diligence of Somali ratings.

Actually, persons who visit Somaliland would notice that staffs engaged in the service industry, such as hotel staffs and restaurant staffs, work busily and diligently.

On the other hand, some respondents of the interview mentioned the inflexibility and limited level of tolerance as a weakness of Somali seafarers.

Faculty of BMFA

"They are hard workers, but it is difficult for Somali people to tolerate injustice".

"They are very hot in blood. They can’t take any violation. If they saw any abuse,

they immediately react".

Somali sailor

"When they felt that they were betrayed by someone, they fight. But because of

experiences it is getting better".

They said that Somali people cannot overlook injustice, and this could lead to conflict between them and others. If conflict happens often on-board due to this characteristic, it could be a problem for international shipping companies. However, one respondent

in discussing "injustice" noted the following:

Faculty of BMFA

"(sometimes the origin of "injustice" is) less understanding to the foreign cultures,

because they do not have many chance to meet foreigners".

Poor public security due to the civil wars, absence of a dominant central government and piracy have kept away foreigners from Somalia. Therefore, there has not been much opportunity for the people of Somalia to learn about foreign cultures. As a result, conflict between them and foreigners could arise because of cultural misunderstandings. However, as the Somali sailor also indicated "because of experiences, it is getting better". The situation could be ameliorated as they learn. In addition to this issue of culture, one respondent noted another possible causative factor for a perception of "injustice" as follows:

Faculty of BMFA

"Misunderstanding for the others because of language problem".

Language barrier seems to one of the biggest challenges for Somali seafarers, even in the Somaliland. Actually multiple respondents mentioned this language issue.

Faculty of BMFA

(What are the challenges to a young person in Somaliland to pursue MET in

BMFA?) "Language barrier".

(What is the weakness of Somali seafarers?) "Language barrier".

Egyptian deck officer

(What is the weakness of Somali seafarers?) "English".

Governmental officer of the Ministry of Fisheries

(What kind of factors would be needed to improve on the provision of Somali

seafarers to the international shipping companies from Somaliland, and make

sure of its sustainability?) "Education and training including language".

If the origins of the perceptions of injustice that Somali seafarers feel is mainly based on the language issues, it could be improved by English training. A BMFA faculty who indicated language issue also mentioned that they were good language learners.

4.2.2 Deterrent to the Piracy

It is difficult for the shipping companies to employ seafarers from all over the world.

To engage in international shipping significantly, it would be better for any potential labor-supplying State to have a selling point to make it appealing for potential employers. If the existence of Somali seafarer on-board could be a deterrent to the

Somali piracy, that would constitute such a strong point.

Could the existence of Somali seafarer on-board affect piracy off the coast of

Somalia? To this question, all respondents answered "Yes"; and piracy off the coast of Somalia will decrease because of it. For example, some respondents mentioned as following:

Graduate of BMFA

"Pirates will hesitate to attack the ship".

Student of BMFA

"This (existence of Somali seafarers on-board) will reduce the risk of piracy".

Egyptian deck officer

"The pirates will hesitate to attack Somali seafarers, if they realized it they would

stop attacking the ship".

It is noteworthy that two reasons were given for why Somali seafarers could be a deterrent. The first was the identical ethnic group they belong to - "Somali" - and secondly the clan-based structure of Somali society.

Graduate of BMFA

"(Piracy will decrease because) Somali seafarers know Somali pirates, Somali

knows Somali".

Faculty of BMFA

"Generally, for Somali people, it is easy to identify Somali pirates. So if Somali

pirates attack Somali seafarer, it could lead to clan conflict".

"Usually Somali pirates do not attack Somali, but only foreigners".

"Somali people, they know each other, so if the pirates saw any Somali on the

ship, they will leave".

Manager of the Shipping & Multi-service Agency in Somaliland

"It will decrease, because if they have same nationality they will be afraid.

Somali cannot attack Somali - each other".

"Somali knows Somali". As these words suggest, the deep relationships among

Somali people based on clan-based structure of Somali society could be the deterrent to the piracy.

To underpin this idea, some respondents mentioned some precedents or their experiences.

Faculty of BMFA

"There is an example, many Somali ships record and announce that they are

Somali ships in Somali language to avoid piracy".

"(as far as I know) The graduates of BMFA never had piratical attack before,

because pirates knew there were Somali".

Somali sailor

"I have never had any piratical attack in my career, because Somali seafarers

can be the deterrent to the piracy. 100% they have some influence to the pirates".

Secondly, some respondents mentioned its deterrent as an employment measure.

Graduate of BMFA

"(for some Somali people) piracy is the only way to get money from the sea, but

if they could be seafarers, they would stop (piracy). Then all Somali pirates

would be removed from the sea".

Executive of the Somaliland Counter Piracy Coordination (CPC) Office

"If the young people got the opportunity to go to the sea, it could be the deterrent.

(If they can be employed as seafarer) why would they become pirates?"

Unemployment leads to poverty, and poverty has the potential of creating criminals.

There is causal relation between these two variables (Berrebi, 2015). People who are suffering from poverty could become pirates in Somalia. Thus, increasing the employability of Somali seafarers could be a solution for this piratical problem. Some respondents did indeed mention the role and potential of seafarer training as an employment measure.

Faculty of BMFA

"(in BMFA) Rate of employment after graduation is high".

"This knowledge (about seafaring) is very rare in our country (Somaliland) and

we have a long coast line. And we have a big port which is used every year by

more than 10,000 ships. These ships need to get crew and seafarers. So our

students more likely to get job than any other graduates from other universities

in Somaliland".

"(in BMFA) Easy to get the chance of employment compare with other schools".

4.2.3 Interest level to engage in the international shipping

If the Somali people are not interested in engaging in more significant ways in the international shipping, then it would be perhaps futile to continue discussing the issue, irrespective of whether they have good characteristics for seafarers or whether optimized MET would be a good intervention as a deterrent to piracy. However, if they have great interest in working at sea in an international context, then the discussion is worth pursuing. Motivation is one of the most important factors to achieve anything especially when it is intrinsic (The communication toolbox, n.d.).

Analyses of responses to the research instruments suggest that such an interest does exist. From the questionnaire for the BMFA students it was found that more than 90% of the students who answered the questionnaire (ten of eleven) answered that they were interested in working for the international shipping company (see figure 7).

Figure 7: Interest in seafaring (BMFA students)

Moreover, 70% of the respondents who answered indicated that they were interested in working for the international shipping company and rated their interest at the highest level (see figure 8).

Figure 8: Interest level of the BMFA students

It is noteworthy that students who have sea experience tended to have higher interest.

Actually, five of six respondents who have sea experience rated their interest at the highest level, and the other respondent rated it at the second highest level. Thus, most of the students of the maritime academy are significantly interested in engaging in the international shipping as seafarers. Moreover, after having sea experience their interest level to tended to be higher. This could be inferred to suggest that there would be the low turnover rates after employment.

Respondents who chose the highest interest level explained the reasons for the expressing that level of interest high interest level as follows:

"First, I like the life of sea. Second, I need to further may career. Third to get

experience. And finally, to get more income".

"To get experience and income".

"(because) It is my favorite subject".

"I like sea going jobs. I want to be one of Somali experts in this field".

"To get more experience, to know a lot of countries in the world, and to get

enough salary".

"To be the first Somalilander who reached this rank, to gain knowledge,

experiences, money, respect, famous etc."

A desire to learn more about the oceans and the world, and earning a relatively high salary are motivating the young Somali people to engage in international shipping. In addition, some of them are of the opinion that it would be make them more respectable.

These are the reasons for the high interest level and motivation of the young Somali people.

From the interviews done with the persons working for the maritime industry, all respondents indicated positive sentiments about providing Somali seafarers to the international shipping company.

Graduates of Berbera Maritime and Fisheries Academy (BMFA)

"It is good. Because it will increase bilateral relationships between Somaliland

and other countries".

"It is good for young people, because they will get more chance to be employed,

and they would have good experiences".

"It is good for Somaliland and BMFA. Because, it could be the connection

between them and the international shipping. Next generation Somaliland

people could get more experiences and employment".

"(It is good because) Somaliland people would get more income and information

of the world".

"Somaliland could improve the relationship between Somaliland and

international society".

Governmental officer of the Ministry of Fisheries

"100% agree, because it would create new job opportunities for young people".

In addition to the mentioning of inquiring mind and high salary as reasons for the significant interest of the young Somali people (BMFA students), respondents who were already employed in the maritime industry also mention “national interest”.

Gaining recognition from the international society is the earnest wish of the

Somaliland (Republic of Somaliland, Ministry of National Planning and Development,

2011). They are hoping for the establishment of good relationships between the international society and Somaliland through shipping. It could be a great motivation not only for the individuals in Somaliland but for the Somaliland government.

Furthermore, they are expecting the creation of new employment opportunities, and new knowledge and information for the next generation. Human resource development would enhance the development of the country. It also would motivate the people and the government.

4.2.4 Feasibility

As mentioned previously, it is obvious that the Somaliland people, maritime organizations, and the government would be interested in the improved provision of the seafarers to international shipping companies. However, to launch the project in practice, it has to be feasible. Respondents in Somaliland mentioned about its feasibility as follows:

Student of BMFA

"it is possible and it needs only to work closely the academy with the

international companies which have liner for Berbera port. Young Somaliland

seafarers will get from these international shipping knowledge, experience and

jobs".

"It is possible, if we got support from developed countries like Japan to

encourage their companies to take students and seafarers from Somaliland.

The other main important issue is to support the BMFA to produce good quality

students capable to work on the big ships of developed countries have".

"It is possible, but first we have to develop and equip BMFA as learning center.

It needs a lot of things, such as twinning university, foreign lecturers, facilities

and acceptable certificate".

"Yes (providing seafarers to the international shipping is good), we have a lot of

opportunities to be part of international seafarer. First, we have a long coast,

ports, and international ships that use our ports, but unfortunately our

government does not know how to request international shipping companies to

carry Somaliland seafarer as crew or as cadets".

"(It is) not possible, because we do not have any recognition from international

countries".

More than half of the respondents from BMFA students answered that it was feasible, but there were two negative answers as well. The reason for the negative answers is based on the issue that Somaliland does not have any formal recognition from the international society. Moreover, even the many of students who answered that it was feasible, mentioned the necessity of the assistance from outside.

However, some respondents also mentioned some positive facts in the interview.

Faculty of BMFA

"A lot of Somali seamen work (on ships) abroad traditionally."

"Our first graduates were fifty-one students, twenty-one of them are working now

on the international ships, like MSC (Mediterranean Shipping Company), IMSS

(International Maritime Shipping Services), Maersk Line, and Saudi livestock

ships."

Somali sailor

"They (Somali seafarers) are very competent in the tanker field, because of a

lot of experience. Many tankers sail off the coast of Somalia."

Manager of the Shipping & Multi-service Agency

"I think it is possible, because we have enough seafarers, engineers, and ratings.

Also good teachers and training include one-year training in sea service."

Governmental officer of the Ministry of Fisheries

"Somali is everywhere in the world."

Numerous Somali people are diasporic in many places in the world, adapting successfully to each place. This is seen as a positive factor. Moreover, providing

seafarers to the international shipping is not a completely new challenge for Somali people. They are already providing seafarers from BMFA to shipping companies including those trading internationally around Somalia. In fact, 36% of BMFA students who responded the questionnaire (four of eleven) answered that they have been given informal assurances of employment after graduation, from shipping companies; and half of such companies are engaged in the international shipping (see figure 9).

Figure 9: Employment after graduate BMFA

In addition, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Academic Cooperation was signed between BMFA and the World Maritime University (WMU) in 2014 (World

Maritime University, 2014). The door granting access to the international community is not closed completely for Somali people. Improving the employability of the Somali seafarer need not start from scratch.

4.3 Questionnaire for shipping company

4.3.1 Counter measures to piracy off the coast of Somalia

According to the answers received from the questionnaire to the shipping companies, all shipping companies are executing multiple counter measures when sailing off the coast of Somalia, even in the current situation where piratical attacks off the coast of

Somalia have substantially reduced 1 . Despite the reduction, shipping companies appear to recognize that the fall in piratical attacks may be short-term and that the waters off Somalia may still be dangerous. 90% of the shipping companies who answered the questionnaire still sail their ships under naval protection, and 70% of the respondents hire armed security guards as counter measures to piracy. All respondents indicated that their companies adopt at least one of these measures (see figure 10).

1 Number of actual and attempted attacks attributed Somali pirates decreased from 200 in 2011 to 0 in 2015 (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2016).

Sail under naval protection Hire armed security guards on-board Re-routeing

Sailing with high speed

Other

Figure 10: Counter measures to the piracy off the coast of Somalia

Piracy off the coast of Somalia has been reduced mainly by the use of military power.

This is not inexpensive. Half of the respondents indicated that they are spending more than one million USD per year (see figure 11).

Figure 11: Annual cost for the counter measures to the piracy

Counter measures to the piracy are very expensive.

4.3.2 Employing African Seafarers and Employing Somali Seafarers

As indicated earlier, a questionnaire was sent to multiple Japanese shipping companies to find out how they viewed the possibility of employing Somali/African seafarers. According to the responses to this questionnaire, employing African seafarers is not common for them at the moment. 30% of respondents (three of ten) answered that they were employing African seafarers; these seafarers constitute less than 5% of the total number of seafarers they were employing. However, there are three positive findings for employing African seafarers and Somali seafarers from the result of questionnaire. First of all, all the respondents who employ African ratings also

employ African officers. This is the proof that these companies value the African seafarers’ ability, and perceive them to have a promising future. Secondly, all these respondents employing African seafarers answered that they were going to or were interested in increasing the employment of African seafarers, if a sustainable supply of qualified competent African seafarers is assured (see figure 12).

Figure 12: Begin or increase the employment of African seafarers?

Finally, all those respondents who answered that they were going to or were interested in increasing the employment of African seafarers, also indicated that they were going to or interested in increasing/starting the employment of Somali seafarers as well (see figure 13).

Figure 13: Begin or increase the employment of Somali seafarers?2

4.3.3 Deterrent to the Piracy

“In your opinion, will the employment of Somali seafarers on board a ship act as a deterrent for Somali pirates?” To this question, 40% of respondents from shipping companies (four of ten) answered that they expect some positive influence more or less.

"It seems so. But I think the robbery by an act of piracy gives more income and

(is more) lucrative than working on vessels, and there will not be any necessity

2 It looks not logically that in figure 13 (answer for the question asked about begin or decrease of Somali seafarers) 20% of respondents answered “Yes”, although in figure 12 (answer for the question asked about begin or increase of African seafarers) only 10% of respondents answered “Yes”. However, these numbers are based on the collected answers strictly.

of study, exam, and so on".

"Yes".

"Yes, they will have jobs, but it doubts quality of education and training for

seafarers in this country".

Those who were positively inclined to employ Somali seafarers were more focused on their employment as a labor-supply measure and not as an anti-piracy. No respondent referred to the Somali ethnic groups or the clan-based structure of Somali society.

4.4 Summary

In this chapter, findings from the research instruments were presented. These findings were about the generic characteristics of Somali seafarers, Somali people's employment at sea as a deterrent to the piracy, the interest level of Somaliland people in seagoing and its feasibility, the current counter measures shipping companies are taking and the associated cost, the employment of African and Somali seafarers, and

Shipping company's perspectives of employment of the latter as deterrent to piracy.

These findings will be further discussed in the next chapter in light of the research questions.

Chapter 5: Discussion of Findings

5.1 Summary of the Study

As earlier stated, the purpose of this study was to interrogate validate the rationale for and feasibility of developing seafarer education and training in Somalia for enhanced provision of Somali seafarers to the international shipping industry, and the possible effect of this outcome of MET as a deterrent to piracy off the coast of Somalia. The questions were:

 Could the sustainable development of Somali seafarers be a deterrent to the

Somali piracy?

 Do the Somali people have an interest in developing the Somali seafarers for

employment in the international shipping industry?

 Do shipping companies have an interest in employing Somali seafarers?

Piracy is one of the biggest concerns for the international shipping community. Piracy off the coast of Somalia increased radically in 2008. The Gulf of Aden was called "the world's most dangerous water" (Kemp, 2013). Due to the anti-piracy measures conducted by stakeholders, the number of piratical attacks started decreasing from

2011, the peak year of the piratical attacks off the coast of Somalia. In 2015, there was no reported attack attributed to Somali pirates (ICC International Maritime Bureau,

2016). This development; however, should not be taken to mean that the phenomenon of Somali piracy has been eradicated. Military powers, such as naval patrol and armed security guards may be only suppressing the tendency for piratical attacks to be undertaken. To address the substantive problem at it causal roots and thereby to root out the piratical issues off the coast of Somalia, a new solution other than temporary suppression by military power, should be considered. This research was conducted to investigate the potential of improved maritime education and training in Somalia as a new solution.

Questionnaires and interviews were used as research instruments for the data collection. For questionnaires, ten answers were collected from shipping companies, and eleven answers were collected from the Berbera Maritime and Fisheries

Academy (BMFA). In addition, during the onsite data collection in Somalia (Hargeisa and Berbera, Somaliland) between 24th and 30th July 2016, thirteen interviews were conducted with different stakeholders in the maritime field. Collected data was analyzed mainly with a qualitative approach using the computer-aided qualitative analysis tool "ATLAS.ti". In this chapter, findings through the analysis will be used to answer/discuss the research questions. Furthermore, the implications of the findings and associated recommendations will be stated to conclude the paper.

5.2 Discussion of the Findings

5.2.1 Research Question 1

Could the sustainable development of Somali seafarers be a deterrent to the Somali piracy? Considering the findings through the analysis of collected data, the answer to this question is "Yes". Seafarer education and training in Somalia could be a deterrent to piracy off the coast of Somalia in two ways; as an employment measure, and as a result of the way Somali society is structured.

 As an employment measure

"Poverty and crime have a very "intimate" relationship" (Berrebi, 2015). It can be argued strongly that the primary root of the criminal piratical activity off the coast of

Somalia was poverty. In the past, the fishing industry off the coast of Somalia was despoiled and damaged by illegal, uncontrolled and unregulated (IUU) fishing activity of foreign vessels. This resulted in the poverty of Somali local fishermen. Counter activities against IUU fishing were conducted by local fishermen to protect the source of their livelihood and defend what is rightfully theirs. Regrettably however this led to the phenomenon of piracy. An internationally recognized expert on piracy, Martin N.

Murphy (2011) called this "defensive" piracy. Poverty is therefore a primary factor in the generation of piratical activity off the coast of Somalia. It is noteworthy however that "education in all its different forms is key to breaking the cycle of poverty”

(ChildFund International, n.d.). Development of seafarer training would raise the

education level in maritime field, and increase the employment opportunity. It could ameliorate the conditions of poverty in Somalia and by extension reduce the piratical problem off the coast of Somalia at its roots.

A graduate of BMFA mentioned that piracy was the only way to make money for them.

An executive of the Somaliland Counter Piracy Coordination (CPC) Office mentioned that if the pirates could become seafarers instead, they would never become pirates.

Moreover, multiple number of interviewees mentioned the high employment rate of the graduates of the maritime academy. Employment alleviates poverty, reduce the tendency to resort to piracy; seafarer training is a good educational intervention to increase the employment rate. Seafarer training in Somalia could be a deterrent to the piracy off the coast of Somalia as an employment measure.

 Through the influence of Somali social structures

"Individual security in the traditional Somali society was dependent on the clan"

(Landinfo, 2009, p.1). Somali people are protected by clans, and they respect the clan protection. Clan protection serves as a deterrent for ordinary crime, but does not work to restrain ideological or political crimes such as are manifest in terrorism (United

Kingdom Home Office, 2013). Piracy off the coast of Somalia in recent years has been conducted to get ransom. This is the crime, based on economical motivation, but not ideological or political motivation. Therefore, clan protection would be effective to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia.

5.2.1 Research Question 2

Do the Somali people have an interest in developing Somali seafarers for employment in the international shipping industry? Considering the findings and the analysis of the collected data, the answer to this question is "Yes, very much". More than 90% of

BMFA students who responded to the questionnaire answered that they were interested in working in the international shipping context as a seafarer. More than

70% of them ranked their interest at the highest level. They have a strong desire for jobs in that setting and also for income and for new experiences. Furthermore, all interviewees in the maritime field of Somaliland mentioned that such an interest was very strong. To develop the economy, and to develop the international recognition, the development of seafarer training is attractive for them. They would make great efforts if they could have a chance to develop the seafarer training in Somaliland.

5.2.1 Research Question 3

Do shipping companies have an interest in employing Somali seafarers? Considering the findings through the analysis of collected data, the answer to this question is "Not so much". Only 30% of them answered that they were interested in starting to employ

Somali seafarers. However, all participating shipping companies who already employ

African seafarers mentioned the possibility of increasing African seafarers' employment opportunity. Moreover, they also mentioned the possibility of the increasing Somali seafarers' employment opportunities to the same level. The

shipping companies are not interested in employing Somali seafarers so much at present. However, the shipping companies who already employ African seafarers have more interest, and the Somali seafarer has the chance to be employed at the same level that other Africans have.

5.3 Implications of the Findings

The most significant findings of this study are as follows:

 Employing Somali seafarers could be the deterrent to the piracy off the coast of

Somalia.

 Somali people are strongly interested in developing seafarer training.

 Shipping companies are not so interested in employing Somali seafarers at

present.

There are some implications for the international shipping companies and for Somalia.

First of all, the findings suggest that assisting MET in Somalia and developing good relationships should be beneficial for the shipping companies. Somali people, especially Somaliland people, are highly motivated to develop MET in their country.

Young Somali people are highly motivated to work in the international shipping as seafarers. Moreover, a basis for improved MET already exists in Somalia, the BMFA.

If that institution could have proper assistance from the external/global community, a sustainable provision of relatively cost-effective and hardworking seafarers to the international shipping industry would be possible.

Furthermore, employing Somali seafarers could lower the cost of anti-piracy measures. In the short term, the existence of Somali seafarers itself could be the deterrent to the piracy off the coast of Somalia. Employing Somalis on board ship would represent a Somali community on any particular ship, a community other

Somalis would not wish to attack. This is a low cost and completely legal measure, compared to counter measures with military power which are relatively costly and may involve legal problems. In the long term, employing Somali seafarers would increase the employment opportunities, and raise the educational level. It would lead to the alleviating of poverty in Somalia, and reduce the tendency to resort to crimes including piracy. Current anti-piracy measures cannot be deemed to solve or even address the root cause of piracy - poverty. The development of education and increase of employment opportunities could help address the root causes more significantly.

Contributing to the improvement of poverty in Somalia with company activity, would also help the development of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Consequently, assisting the development of MET in Somalia, and employing Somali seafarers are suggested to international shipping companies.

Finally, the findings indicate the importance of Somali people’s effort to develop their

MET system. At present, shipping companies are not so interested in employing

Somali seafarers. To attract the interest of the shipping companies, efforts to improve the MET by the Somalis themselves are needed. "Not speaking English well", and

"the lack of understanding of foreign cultures" are weaknesses of Somali seafarers

mentioned a lot in the interviews. Expensive and most contemporary simulators are not needed to learn language and about cultures. Making the best effort as much as possible to improve MET, and making it appealing to the shipping companies – these are the suggestions to the Somali people. They would not be starting from zero. In

Berbera, Somaliland, there is already a MET institute, BMFA. Some shipping companies are employing Somali seafarers. Their efforts could be made known to the international shipping society from this starting point.

5.4 Limitation and Future Research

Due to the scope and practical limitations of this work, intensive statistical analyses were not undertaken. It is recommended that future research be conducted with a greater number of participants to deepen the understanding MET in Somaliland and shipping companies' interest and increase the external validity of the work.

Unfortunately, when the field study in Somaliland was conducted most students of

BMFA were out for the summer vacation. To comprehend the level of MET in this country, observation and evaluation of BMFA under working condition are also recommended. Respondents for the shipping company questionnaire were limited to the Japanese shipping companies in this research. It is recommended that the sample size be increased in future research to the shipping companies from multiple countries again to improve external validity and judge better the views on employing Somali seafarers at a global level.

Furthermore, during location selection, it was decided to focus on Somaliland in this research. However, to get a more complete picture of the Somali seafarer, it would be worthwhile to consider not only Somaliland but also Puntland and South Central

Somalia. When the other regions are also examined, it is recommended that the following be addressed as was done in this study: examining available places to develop MET and undertaking rigorous research via field study. Somalia has been generally perceived as a "failed state" in the world. Such notions should be based on empirical research facts and undertaking research in multiple places in Somalia would result in more academically supported perceptions of the country.

5.5 Conclusion

The study has adequately demonstrated, through its findings and discussions that developing provision of Somali seafarers could be a deterrent to piracy off the coast of Somalia. Understanding piracy and the history of Somalia through the background/literature review significantly helped the selection of the research location and focus. Electronical questionnaires were used effectively to collect the answers from remote respondents. Semi-structured interviews were used effectively to listen to the “real voices” of Somali people. Furthermore, the field study to Somaliland gave a deeper understanding during the analyses of collected data and findings.

Employing Somali seafarers on-board could be a deterrent to piracy off the coast of

Somalia. Developing seafarer training in Somalia could contribute to the eradication

of the poverty, and by extension piracy, in Somalia. It is also beneficial for shipping companies. They can cut down the costs of the anti-piracy measures. They can be free from the complicated legal issues surrounding naval patrols and armed security guards. Moreover, sustainable provision of Somali seafarers, who are a relatively cost-effective and hardworking workforce, would help the sustainable development of international shipping. "Education is one of the most powerful instruments for reducing poverty" (The World Bank, n.d.). It should be possible to see a day when the possibility of Somali piracy is eradicated at its roots, not by military power, but by education!

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Appendix 1: Interview Consent Form

Title of Research: Seafarer Training in Somalia as a deterrent to piracy

Researcher: Koki MATSUSHIMA

I (Name)

of (Organization) have agreed to participate in this research project voluntarily.

I confirm that I have been made aware of the objectivities and purpose of the research and assured of the confidentiality of the interviews.

I agree / disagree with having the interview voice-recorded.

Pursuant to the above, I give permission for the appropriate use of the information gained from the interview in subsequent publications and writings related to the research.

Signature: Date:

Appendix 2: Semi-Structured Interview Questions

To faculty of Berbera Maritime and Fisheries Academy (BMFA)

Q.1 What is your position?

Q.2 What is your background?

Q.3 Are you interested in providing seafarers to the international shipping company from BMFA?

Q.4 Does the MET in BMFA satisfy the requirements of STCW? (if yes) Q.4-1 Do you have internal or external audit system to evaluate it? (if no) Q.4-2 What factors are lacking to satisfy the requirements of STCW?

Q.5 What are the benefits to a young person in Somaliland to pursue MET in BMFA?

Q.6 What are the challenges to a young person in Somaliland to pursue MET in BMFA?

Q7. What is the strength of Somali seafarers?

Q.8 What is the weakness of Somali seafarers?

Q.9 Could the existence of Somali seafarer on-board affect to piracy off the coast of Somalia? (if yes) Q.9-1 What kind of impacts could be expected?

Q.10 Kindly share any opinion about the provision of Somali seafarers to the international shipping companies from Somaliland.

To officers of the Somaliland Ministries of Education, Fisheries, and Transport

Q.1 What is your position?

Q.2 Is Somaliland government interested in the seafarer training and providing seafarers to the international shipping company?

Q.3 What kind of advantages could be expected for Somaliland?

Q.4 What kind of advantages could be expected for the international shipping industry?

Q.5 What kind of factors would be needed to carry out provision of Somali seafarers to the international shipping companies from Somaliland, and make sure the sustainability?

Q.6 Could the existence of Somali seafarer on-board affect piracy off the coast of Somalia? (if yes) Q.6-1 What kind of impacts could be expected?

Q.7 Kindly share any opinion about the provision of Somali seafarers to the international shipping companies from Somaliland.

Appendix 3: Questionnaires