Somalia, Clan and State Politics

The ITPCM International Commentary

Vol. IX no. 34 ISSN. 2239-7949

in this issue: SOMALIASOMALIA

CLAN AND STATE POLITICS

International Training Programme for Conflict Management December 2013

1 ITPCM International Commentary December 2013 ISSN. 2239-7949 ITPCM International Commentary December 2013 ISSN. 2239-7949

The ITPCM International Commentary SOMALIA CLAN AND STATE POLITICS

December 2013 ITPCM International Commentary December 2013 ISSN. 2239-7949

Table of Contents

Foreword by Hussein Bulhan, p. 7 Clan and State Politics - Intro Discussing the Puntland by Michele Gonnelli, p. 8 federal state’s priorities and other issues Clans’ and clannism’s control Interview with Mohamed Said over weak political institutions Samantar, p. 53 by Stephen Musau, p. 13 A renewed role for the United What can current leaders in Nations in Somalia? somalia learn from their past by Andrea de Guttry, p. 57 history? by Abdullahi M. Odowa, p. 19 Offshore Somalia: piracy, naval missions Somali politics and power and private security runs over women and their by Francesca Sterzi, p. 61 environment by Fatima Jibrell, p. 25 Humanitarian actors’ struggle for access, impartiality and How did Somaliland emerge as engagement with armed non- a stable and peaceful polity? state actors by Gedamu Kalewongel Minale, p. 29 by Marco Rotelli, p. 69 Internal and external The EU cooperation challenges to peace for with Somalia: channels of Somaliland implementation by Adam Haji Ali Ahmed, p. 35 by Chiara Franco, p. 75 Does successful peacebuilding Is Mogadishu a viable “internal lead to successful protection alternative”? statebuilding? by Emanuela Parisciani, p. 81 by Abdifatah Ismael Tahir, p. 41 Hydrocarbon exploration in Puntland: who has the legal right to enter into agreements? by Issa Mohamud Farah, p. 47

About the ITPCM Next Trainings in Agenda, p. 88 ITPCM International Commentary December 2013 ISSN. 2239-7949

the ITPCM International Commentary

Chief Director: Francesco Ceccarelli Scientific Director: Andrea de Guttry

Editor in Chief: Michele Gonnelli Contributors to this issue: Adam Haji Ali Ahmed, Andrea de Guttry, Issa Mohamud Farah, Chiara Franco, Fatima Jibrell, Stephen Musau, Gedamu Kalewongel Minale, Abdullahi Mohammed Odowa, Emanuela Parisciani, Marco Rotelli, Mohamed Said Samantar, Francesca Sterzi, Abdifatah Ismael Tahir

Proofreading & Copy Editing Thomas Taylor Di Pietro, Priya Mathews, Charlotte Reed, Helen Romito, Monica von Schlegell Art Director Michele Gonnelli ITPCM International Commentary December 2013 ISSN. 2239-7949

Thanks & Acknowledgements

We are particularly grateful for the precious insights given by Mohamud Said Samantar (Puntland State University) at different stages of this project, our conversations were worth many readings.

Special thanks go to Thomas Taylor Di Pietro, Priya Mathews, Charlotte Reed, Helen Romito, and Monica von Schlegell for their patience and kindness in performing the proofreading and copy editing services.

Finally, we are irremediably indebted to all contributors, western and local, for having embarked on this project and shared their invaluable insights and knowledge, often despite strenuous conditions and communication difficulties.

ITPCM International Commentary ITPCM International Commentary December 2013 ISSN. 2239-7949

Foreword

I feel honoured to write the Foreword seldom hold prisoners - they quickly do better than earlier peacekeeping for this compilation of articles written kill their opponents, real or imagined. efforts. But one cannot find lasting by authors from diverse disciplines reassurance that Al-Shabaab has been and cultural backgrounds. I am also Different and highly costly -inter pushed out of Mogadishu or other ar- pleased to offer, in the conventionally ventions were attempted to restore eas so long as we remain fixated on limited space of a foreword, a few peace and order in Somalia since re-inventing the flawed state by su- comments on some key themes that the collapse of the military regime perficial change of its names (e.g. call- I think the articles collectively under- in 1991. The United Nations and the ing it federal when it is still unitary score. While presenting them in a list United States sent peacekeeping and and centralized) or by changing lead- I express myself in words which some then peace-enforcing forces includ- ers (be they colonels, religious lead- may consider too cynical, but with the ing UNOSOM 1, Operation Provide ers, or professors) when the system intention of constructively highlight- Relief, Operation Restore Hope, and of corruption, inequity, and injustice ing central problems concerning So- UNOSOM II. These interventions prevails. malia. mostly failing and ending with frus- tration, attention and energy shifted The authors of the articles presented The Somali crisis has many and com- to reconciliation conferences. These in this issue of the International Com- plex aspects that no author or work conferences too did not bring about mentary describe well these and many can fully discuss; therefore academ- the intended outcome. other problems causing torment and ics, true to their trade, cautiously take turmoil in Somalia. But they go fur- up an aspect or two of the Somali cri- These interventions did not work ther than that: they also propose sis to makes sense of it and propose a mainly because they relied on top- valuable lessons and solutions to the solution. down approach. The peacekeeping specific topics of their specialty and or peace-making missions used for- chosen topic. The cost of what we often call ‘the So- eign forces and well equipped armies mali Crisis’ is so massive in scope, so to enforce peace and order. The rec- Obviously, the kind of analyses and devastating to human life and mate- onciliation conferences held in plush proposed solutions presented here rial resources that it is nothing short hotels abroad focused on reconciling do not directly change the world, but of a catastrophe. However, its cease- warlords and politicians who were they educate and inform, seeding lessness and tedious repetition in the the primary impediment to peace in more ideas, better decisions, and serv- media for nearly a quarter of a cen- Somalia. The peacekeeping and rec- ing as prelude to constructive action. tury (1990-2013) no longer shocks or onciliation conferences also sought to That in itself is a significant contribu- outrages people. Somalis experience re-establish the flawed, unitary, and tion, the best one can hope for analy- it as an inescapable and irresolvable central state- inherited from colonial ses and recommendations. Therefore, existential curse. Americans and Eu- rule, presided over by corrupt elite, I congratulate the authors and the in- ropeans view it as a stubborn, banal, and proven unsuitable to Somalis by stitution that published their valuable but distant problem. Politicians who culture and experience. articles. want to project an image of effective and compassionate leadership find it Not equal amount of investment and as an inconvenient thorn that does not attention was given to bottom-up ap- go away. proach in Somalia (i.e. the former Prof. Hussein A. Bulhan Italian colony). Numerous studies Key political actors in Somali soci- and common sense affirm the efficacy ety comprised mostly of warlords of solving human problems by en- and ‘dollar-lords’ - some of them un- couraging and building on successes deservedly anointed as presidents, and inner resources of people while prime ministers, ministers, or gover- helping those unable to attain such nors - do not take the kind of cautious successes and garner their resources. and deliberate thought as academics Somaliland and Puntland has shown do. They act instinctively and quick- the value of bottom-up approach not ly in pursuit of personal power and only with regard to cost efficiency but wealth at the expense of their peo- also sustainability of solution. Dura- ple, including members of their clan ble solution comes when people par- whom they use as fodder and foot ticipate in the search for solution and soldiers in their ascent to power. They own the outcome. Perhaps the Afri- practice winner-takes-all strategy and can Union Mission (AMISOM) may CLAN AND STATE POLITICS IN SOMALIA Between local governance and federalism, international actors and pirates.

The tree of life, long before being an for power and resource control. Eve- the 20th century, the Somali ‘nation’ American film released in 2011 from rybody was opposed to everybody has witnessed season after season director Terrence Malick, was a short in a looting practice and claim for of an alternation of elites in the rul- film shot in Somalia in 1987, bySo- legitimacy over the remains of the ing role over it - a common destiny mali writer and director Abdulka- State itself, its capital town and the for many peoples similarly affected dir Ahmed Said. The title in Somali neighbouring area. The dismissal of by the scramble for Africa. It was the is Geedka nolosha. Confronted with a a tyranny does not compare with the French, British and Italian colonial harsh environment, the Somali pasto- chopping down of a symbolic tree, all rulers first, the Fascist state later, and ralist nomads – the great majority of the more if the bulwark of such state- the British protectorate and the Ital- the population - can only make their hood laid in oppression and death. ian trust territory after WWII. This life sustainable and self-sufficient by But, it is also true that the authori- foreign rule lasted until 1960, when a respecting the load capacity of their tarian rule, ever since the bloodless power transition to an indigenous oli- land. They constantly negotiate with coup, had managed to accommodate garchy occurred. A new elite started their ecosystem the level of exploit- competing clans’ claims and rivalries, to administer the freshly independent able stock on the basis of its regen- or at least to constrict them at a sub- polity, comprised of all its inherited erative capacity, a shifting threshold, merged level. Only the Ogaden war institutions, by mimicking structures vertically and horizontally, that re- (1977) unveiled political cleavages. and forms of the previous era. sults in severe diet restrictions and nomadism. The film, environmental- Western analysis and perceptions re- Power and access to it was pursued ly conscious, portrays like in a loom- gard the collapse of Siyad Barre’s au- as an opportunity to promote, at the ing scenario, an unsustainable wood tocracy as a suitable example of state state and sub-state level, the vested cutting practice under the pressure failure. But, one should first wonder interests of the given class and/or clan of only implied new stringent forces. if a functioning state, as tested against to which that elite belonged. Too oc- The tree that sustains life itself, and in a western model, has ever actually cupied in making a living, the major- Somali culture represents also a sym- been in place in Somalia. Although 21 ity of Somalis kept herding livestock, bolic space for traditional powers as- years of firm state control can contra- and in some cases fishing/farming, sembly, is eventually chopped down. dict this interpretation, the following far away from such practices of patri- All this mercilessly leads to the deser- events and dynamics reveal that the monialism. At the central level, an al- tification and disorientation of the no- regime itself was sitting on the lid of leged representative scheme of power madic culture. a Pandora’s box, whose evils existed management, in which competing well before 1969. Due to irresponsi- clans advocated for their factional In 1991, 4 years after the release of ble policy, power greed and corrup- rights, peace, or the suspension of war the film, Somalis experienced the tion, those plagues and diseases kept between the parties, was guaranteed collapse of their state, the end of the growing during the scientific social- through benefits, resource partition, dictatorship and the outbreak of one ism’s interlude, with far-reaching con- oppression, promotions and demo- of the most devastating civil wars the sequences that were to be seen in the tions. Without a doubt it was a flawed African continent has ever witnessed. aftermath of its crumble. system, which has replicated itself In the vacuum left over by the old re- ever since independence. Even at the gime, warlords, clans, sub-clans and Ever since imperial partition, with times of the long and inconclusive Islamist movements took to the floor an exception made for the Dervish peace conferences, which western do- in an apparently never ending fight state/movement at the beginning of nors and horn of Africa brokers have

8 hosted and financed until recently, cal market in Berbera, adjustments companies, by looking at the inter- similar methods have remained in and compromises over economy and play between the Federal Provisional place. politics are already on the way. Constitution and Puntland’s State constitution. By doing so he provides Basically, the imported forms of gov- This issue of the International Com- an updated account of the state of ernance, while in the best professed mentary looks into all this and ad- implementation of Federalims in So- intentions of the ruling elites hop- dresses, among others, the on-going malia. In this respect Samantar, in his ing to unite and overcome common states’ building processes within the specially released interview, expands Somali issues, proved de facto instru- country. A first set of contributions, on some of the political and economic mental to sowing the seeds of discord reflecting indigenous knowledge and issues that the Federal Member State and destruction. Deluded by sup- understanding, looks at Somalia as a is currently facing. Ranging from the posed clan supremacy and mobilised whole. Musau takes on the challenge inviability of a political party system along kinship and loyalty lines, So- to tackle the pivotal role played by to Puntland’s geographical advan- malis have waged wars and disputed clans and clannism. He maintains that tage, they constitute invaluable in- each other for years, in an armed con- state building momentum will largely sights from within a still feeble but test and political competition that has depend on how quickly clans and tra- emerging political order. left everybody defeated. ditional leaders will connect and re- late to the emerging state institutions. From an international perspective in- Going back to the question raised Odowa argues that Somali political stead, Somalia acquires relevance in above, a Somali state, or a functioning leaders, historically, never possessed other regards than those thus far in- approximation of it, has failed to exist, a balance of vision and competence troduced. At the United Nations and maybe in the first place, in the hearts that could prompt a message of jus- African Union level, interventions and the minds of the Somalis them- tice and unity for all. Jibrell, while are mostly inspired by a security/war selves, at least so far. Stateness, like hinting at the salience of urban/rural on terror agenda that often fails to re- any other social construction, finds in dimensions, expresses her warnings alise the complexities at stake. In his collective experience and praxis those for environmental degradation and contribution de Guttry, after having founding elements that underpin its resources mismanagement (charcoal). reviewed the role of international and building up process. Such process, in Here, as well as in the political arena, regional organizations, calls attention the Somali case, and in different de- women’s empowerment would be to local traditions and values, as guid- grees in many other countries, has yet crucial. ing principles of their interventions. to produce the expected result, pro- By the same token, piracy is another vided that everybody agrees with the It is within this framework that the in- Somali plague whose root causes wished output. In this respect, several stitutional experiences of Somaliland have often been overlooked. In her years of civil war, toppled by an exac- and Puntland - in which traditional contribution, Sterzi extensively dis- erbated clan identity, could continue forms of governance are tentatively cusses counter-piracy strategies, costs to challenge the formation of a united absorbed within western models - and approach, as well as the legal im- polity above and beyond clan lines. acquire relevance. Distancing them- plications of the so called private mari- The possibility to reverse course is selves from the current South-Central time security. remote at best. At this stage of their Somalia stalemate, they are often re- history and development, Somalis ferred to as examples of what the So- As far as the humanitarian issues cannot disregard their own experience mali can achieve if they are left to do are concerned, Rotelli’s contribution of western state institutions. Starting it [almost] their own way, as Somalia draws attention on aid perceived im- again from scratch, with a locally de- emeritus specialist Ioan Lewis puts partiality and access issues, particu- veloped polity, reflecting exclusively it. Mingale’s contribution looks at larly in South-Central Somalia. Dis- traditional knowledge and character, what made Somaliland’s political en- cussing engagement dilemmas with would be highly improbable. The ter- terprise a success story - at least dur- armed non-state actors, he argues that tium non datur, Somalis can only go ing the peace-building phase - while United Nations integrated missions forward. pointing out the role played by tra- as mandated and implemented in ditional elders. Haji debates instead Somalia may compromise the princi- Within this framework, and in the threats and challenges with which pled aid in a blurring of lines between eternal present of the globalisation this de facto state is confronted. Tahir political and humanitarian action. era, life is dominated by the Internet is much more critical, he argues that and mobile phones. While politics are state-building, in contrast to peace- Franco expands on drivers, magni- dominated by multilateralism, press- building, has failed to shift Somali- tude and main sectors of the EU co- ing state protagonism and the market land from the past Somali experience, operation efforts, including the recent economy. Nomadic ways of life and replicating old cleavages and flaws. Somali Compact. Along development, traditional forms of power adminis- humanitarian and security lines, she tration are dramatically confronted As far as Puntland is concerned, also looks into the EU adopted ‘vari- with all this. Yet, if the most remote Farah discusses who has the legal able geometry’ approach, which al- camel breeder checks on his smart right to sign hydrocarbon and min- lows for regional and non-state actors phone the price of the meat at the lo- eral agreements with international oil as interlocutors. Yet, on the internal

9 ITPCM International Commentary December 2013 ISSN. 2239-7949

front and quite contradictorily, the EU policy towards Somali asylum seek- ers proves more and more restrictive on the claim of a supposed ‘internal protection alternative’. Parisciani ar- rives to this conclusion by examining the recent case law from the European Court of Human Rights and other na- tional courts.

There are some notable opinions ab- sent among the addressed topics of this issue. Some speak for themselves, some others reflect focus and time- space constraints. From South-Central Somalia, despite numerous attempts, potential contributors have for one reason or another declined the offer to participate in the project. A fed- eral government perspective on the very aspects introduced so far would have served to complete the picture, at least the hosted debate revolving around state building issues. Islam, in all its declinations and implications, also remains unaddressed, in a dedi- cated article as well as marginally. All authors circumvented touching upon religious issues. Commenting on that, a reputed scholar of Somali affairs stated: “the topic is for sure sensitive, mostly for fear of reprisal from two directions: the West that looks around for terrorists, real or imagine, and re- ligious zealots, who take upon them- selves the roles of morality police, judges, and executioners”.

Aware of the limits of the enterprise, this issue of the International Commen- tary tries to shed some light on the on-going rebuilding efforts in Soma- lia. In the epilogue of the film Geedka nolosha, the young nomad, lost in a bi- ological desert, comes across a small tree from which life will regenerate. But Somali are well beyond an insti- tutional desert. It is rather what and how many (competing) trees they are planting that matters today.

Michele Gonnelli ITPCM International Commentary December 2013 ISSN. 2239-7949

Our community is of people sincere and with great modesty made of silken thread pp. 12 - 85 they mistreat none they live in Allah’s grace they are vulnerable to feelings But, mind you, fools they are not.*

By Mohamed Ibraahim Warsame (Hadraawi), somali poet. Even the most religious man never abandons his clan for paradise*

Enslavement begins in fear*

Somali proverbs *All translations from Somali into English by Hussein A. Bulhan, from Politics of Cain, one hundred years of crises in somali politics and society, 2008 Contributions ITPCM International Commentary December 2013 ISSN. 2239-7949

SOMALIA, Buur-Hakba: In a photograph taken and released by the African Union- United Nations Information Support team 28 February 2012, an elder from the town of Buur-Hakba gestures during a meeting with Brig. Gen. Michael Ondoga, Contingent Commander for Ugandan troops serving with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Photo|Albany Associates

12 CLANS’ AND CLANNISM’S CONTROL OVER WEAK POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS Clan mobilisation and clannism presents strenuous challenges in the nascent Somalia Federal Government. Regaining state building momentum in the collapsed state of Somalia will largely depend on how quickly clans and traditional authorities connect and relate to the emerging state structures and institutions.

by Stephen Musau

Consultant for Human Rights and Institutional Building Nairobi, Kenya

Contextual background

Although there are more issues that positions of influence.1 Though clans have the right to claim some local unite the Somali people than just the existed even before colonialism, the power and the resources that go with clan affiliation, over the years, clans colonial institutional legacy cemented it.3 The biggest challenge in the coun- have become the bane of Somalia. this through the West state import, try is therefore, the clan identity and Clans, in Somalia, are culturally a enhancing the clan divide and rule how to strike a balance amongst the consensual identity inherited from tactics.2 clan interests as a resource for politi- patriarchal ancestors and clannism, cal power with the calls for big pow- as a political ideology, determines It is argued that whoever can claim ers to condemn the clan-based politi- everything else in the country - pow- to represent a clan in Somalia would cal formula currently being framed er, resource distribution, expansion for the federal political system.4 With of territory and even recruitment to 1 Abdi Dirshe, “Manipulating clan or ethnic political identity for power”, August 04, 3 Faisal A. Roble, “The Culture of Poli- 2013 tics: The Somali Experience” May 05, 2013 2 Ibid 4 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/

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clash of clan and political identities, determine and run the private sector safeguard the mutual interests and almost dualistic approaches are be- and businesses.8 Up to now, Soma- protect the members of these alli- ing deployed to manage the clan and lia lacks prominent local voices that ances. Remarkably those interviewed state interests. Whether the Somalia are non-clanist in nature; there are discerned that the problem in Somalia Federal Government will surmount no strong civil society organisations might be an oversupply of clans and these forces and endeavour towards to champion the SFG role. All of this sub-clannish attitudes that struggle the making of a Somalia state is a works against the genuine state mak- for power and with the Social Con- matter of interest to many actors.5 ing process, with no political parties tract or “xeer” being the most impor- This however, does not underrate the to galvanise the people’s voice. tant component that cements together increasing intermarriages amongst their alliances.13 Those outside these the Somali people, the improved life- At its best, the clan works for the so- alliances are considered as marginal- styles and the sense of pride associat- ciety- providing the required social ised groups and are vulnerable to at- ed with the Somalis, which came with security welfare system, and protect- tacks by the dominant clans. modernisation just like in any other ing the society members in all aspects. part of the world. However at its worst, the clan leads For instance, the Hawiye, which is the to conflicts, bloodsheds, xenophobia, big ruling clan, have several sub-clans The place and role of clans in the and masculine control9. It is also the including the Abgaal, Habargedir, Modern Somalia clan identity that influences the poli- Hawadle, Mursade, Rahwein, Mu- The deep divisions amongst the So- tics although by itself, the clan is not rule, Ajuran, and Garre among many malis started from the colonial era the cause of the conflicts but a com- others with their sub- sub- clans as where international borders greatly pelling mobilization instrument with well. On the other side, the Darod influenced internal conflicts leading any local political actor using this to have the Harti, Marehan, and Ogaden to intra and interstate wars due to pri- garner their support.10 This goes a sub-clans.14 The rift between the mordial clannism and sub-clannism.6 long way to define and form the So- Marehan and Ogaden over control of Even with these divisions, the Somali malia state, with clans being the bed- Jubaland and Kismayu demonstrates culture is still passed down orally, rock of Somali identity. how these sub-clans struggle for pow- and in detail, from generation to gen- er, yet both support the Darod for the eration with clans and clannism de- With the lack of any social and eco- larger control of the Somalia govern- termining ones origin, social standing nomic institutions beyond the clans, ment. It is important to note that the and access to territory, property, and, the political development in the coun- Harti sub-clans including the Ma- to a large extent, power at the societal, try ends up being controlled by two jerten control Puntland.15 economic and state level. The intellect major clans in Somalia, which ac- of Somali clannism is so mighty and cording to the interviewees are the On the other hand, the Dir, largely in mysterious that it is even exercised Hawiye and the Darod. All the other Somaliland, mix well with the Isaaq, by seasoned scholars with loyalty7, as clans rally around these two for state the Garre and the Degodia, with is observed by Dr Fatuma Lamungu power and control and are followed closer sub-clans being the Biyamal, Nur. by the Dir, Rahanweyn, Isaaq and the Gadsan, and Werdai among others. Digil.11 As expounded by Afyare Abdi The sub-clans closer to the Isaaq in- These divisions inform the schol- Elmi, these clans are seen as sources clude Habar Awal, Habar Jalo, Habar arly debate as to whether clans and of pride with the Hawiye, Darod, Dir Yunis, Edigale, and Ayub among oth- clannism would end up defining the and Isaaq being nomadic pastoralists ers while those closer to the Digil are embryonic Somalia Federal Govern- and the others agro pastoralists12. the Geledi, Shanta Aleen, Bagadi, and ment. Those interviewed grievingly Garre, among others. observed that the divisive nature of Somali clans are grouped into clan clans in the country makes it difficult bonds or clan alliances, formed to While most of these clans and sub- to identify the roles and functions clans are found in Somalia, large of the emerging state structures and numbers have also moved and live 8 These were interviews with various organs through the ongoing recon- persons of Somali origin in Nairobi on 10th No- in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Yemen, struction of the Somali state, as clans vember 2013. The interviews were conducted the Middle East, South Asia, USA and with consideration of all social science research Europe. In fact, a Somali in today’s ethics and factors. context can be a potential citizen of opinion/2013/10/a-new-deal-for-somalia-how- 9 Ibid can-it-work-20131021392150694.html [accessed several states in the Horn of Africa 10 http://www.nytimes. on 19th November 2013] com/2007/01/22/world/africa/22iht-soma- including Ethiopia, Somalia (Somali- 5 Dr. Fatuma Lamungu Nur, “Soma- lia.4295219.html?_r=0 [accessed on 7th Novem- lia: Cycles of endless clan revenge to push So- ber 2013] malia into a deep grave”, New York, USA Wa- 13 These were social interviews with 11 Abdi Ismail Samatar, “Debating So- [email protected] various persons of Somali origin in Nairobi on mali Identity in a British Tribunal: The Case of 10th November 2013. Through the interviews 6 http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/ the BBC Somali Service”. bloggers/2161502/posts [accessed on 7th No- conducted, the Harti are closer to the Dhulba- vember 2013] hante and the Wasigil while the Marehan are 7 Dr. Fatuma Lamungu Nur, “Soma- 12 Afyare Abdi Elmi, “Understanding closer to the Rerahmed, Bareduwal, Helwaa lia: Cycles of endless clan revenge to push So- the Somalia conflagration: Identity, political and Dolow who control the Getho Province. malia into a deep grave”, New York, USA Wa- Islam and peace building”, reviewed by Farah 14 Ibid [email protected] Abdulsamed July 14, 2011 15 Ibid

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land, Puntland, Jubaland and Central played a major role during the past with all sub-clans fighting to be close regions), Kenya and Djibouti.16 civil wars although there are simmer- to either the Hawiye or Darod. Thus, ing tensions.20 The President is from political clannism still remains a de- There are also the Somali Bantus the Hawiye clan and the Prime Min- mon that requires to be exorcised for who are the minority groups. They ister Shirdon is from the Marehan Somalia to score high on economic are largely the Mushunguli, Benadiri Darod clan, with almost 60% to 40% development, health, education and and Eyle. They are distinct from other representation respectively.21 other scientific achievements. Somalis in their ethnic identity, cul- ture and traditions, and are referred With a bicameral parliament com- Clannism has also affected the re- to as “Jerer”, which literally means posed of an upper and lower house, cruitment and loyalty of the Somali thick hair.17 There are also the white with 54 and 275 representatives re- security forces.24 According to the skinned semi Arabic Somalis includ- spectively, the SFG’s main agenda is last UN report on Somalia, the forces ing the Bajun, Barawa and Yemen. to advance national reconciliation, continue to face significant logistical Many of these are considered out- anti-corruption measures, socio-eco- challenges25. President Hassan called siders unless they have patrons or a nomic and security sector reforms on the UN to support the Somalia Na- patron clan that support their cause in Somalia; although formation of tional Army and AMISOM as the Al- from the large alliances. the upper house is still pending. The Shabaab had been driven back but is parliamentarians are nominated by yet to be vanquished26. The involve- The Baidari group with its sub-clans the clans themselves and are being ment of AMISOM under the AU, the occupy the north, central, and south- viewed as more representative than UN, IGAD, the League of Arab States, ern Somalia while the Wa Gosha the previous ones.22 and the World Bank among others, group also known as the forest people with no clear division of responsi- or the Oji, largely believed to be de- Regrettably, Somalia has never had bilities or lead actors, presents a huge scendants from Tanzanians, Mozam- cross-board social, economic and po- challenge and more so if they engage bicans, and Malawi were taken to So- litical institutions. The president’s different contacts on the ground. The malia in the 19th century during the political party, the Peace and Devel- overlapping roles of AU and UN re- Arab slave traders. Moreover, Faisal opment Party (PDP) is new and has main unclear. A. Robel notes that, the Mushunguli difficultly being marketed across the group have retained their Mushungu- country with the SFG still being a pro- The impact of the United Nations li language while almost all the other visional government. The SFG has a Assistance Mission for Somalia (UN- smaller clans have been fully assimi- de facto control over Mogadishu and SOM), that was formed on 3rd June lated into the local Somali communi- parts of the South including Baidoa, 2012, with a wide mandate that in- ties and speak Somali language18. Baladwein, Murku, Afgooye, Merca cluded- providing policy advice to and Barawe and it is still dependent the SFG and AMISOM on peace build- Outside Somalia, it is quite hard to on foreign troops to keep its enemies ing and state building in the areas of separate these clans. Despite the pre- at bay.23 governance, security sector reform vailing political realities, all Somalis and rule of law is yet to be felt. The are allowed, especially in time of war What ought to be appreciated is absence of domestic political institu- or famine, to move in and live any- that the SFG cannot stabilise Soma- tions coupled with no capacity to sup- where in the Somali geography. This lia through military measures alone port comprehensive transitional jus- means a Hawiya clansman fleeing a nor can it impose peace. Nationwide tice processes and how these would civil war in Mogadishu is welcome in processes of negotiations with the tra- relate with the clans, is constraining a Darod dominated territory, thus im- ditional authorities and clan leaders, the much-needed state building proc- plying that the Somali identity takes while providing options for power ess. primacy over clan lineage or kinship sharing with other political forces, system. Outside Somalia, they em- could lead to improved governance, if A changing Somalia with unclear phasise “otherness” despite their in- only Somalis take lead in these proc- state policies ternal differences of individuals or esses. With centralists, federalists and clan clans.19 divisions in Somalia, it remains diffi- Even with this however, federalism cult to establish a unified approach to Political institutions and how they with clannism remains a hard mix governance. The SFG faces a myriad relate with the clans and state poli- when it comes to reconciling different of challenges with minimal abilities cies positions on the devolution of power As recently constituted, neither Presi- 24 http://www.shebacss.com/docs/ dent Hassan Sheikh Mohamud nor 20 http://uk.reuters.com/arti - poeyh001-09.pdf [accessed on 7th November the Prime Minister, Abdi Shirdon cle/2013/11/12/uk-somalia-politics-idUKBRE- 2013] 9AB11F20131112 [accessed 19th November 25 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_ 2013] doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/239 [accessed on 19th 16 Ibid 21 These were interviews with various November 2013] 17 Ibid persons of Somali origin in Nairobi on 11th No- 26 http://www.somalicurrent. 18 Faisal A. Roble, “The Culture of Poli- vember 2013. com/2013/10/30/un-security-council-to-hold-a- tics: The Somali Experience” May 05, 2013 22 Ibid special-session-on-somalia/ [accessed on 19th 19 Ibid 23 Ibid November 2013]

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to assert its monopoly of violence and Extension of clan supremacy in the Group, and as a sign of the extension therefore its authority, hence influ- region of clan supremacy, the Kenyan-So- encing its state policies. The limited mali politicians and Kenyan military policy options SFG has could appear In the last few months Mandera and officers have allegedly been earning dualistic or even multilateral in ap- Wajir counties in Kenya have expe- large amounts of money from trade, proach, to manage those with central- rienced bloody clan wars’ pitting including illegal charcoal31, passing ised unified interests, federal interests the Garre, a sub clan that supports through Kismayu, although those in- and those purely protecting clan in- Hawiye against Degodia, a Dir sub terviewed could not deny or affirm terests irrespective of the system of clan, which does not support Darod these allegations. Moreover, the Kis- government in place.27 or Hawiye in Somalia. Wajir has the mayu area is alleged to have oil and Degodia, Ogaden and Ajuran Somali natural gas deposits. This has been a delicate move to en- sub-clans and Mandera has the Garre, sure that the state functions while at Degodia, Murule and others normally Further north in the Horn of Africa, the same time wooing the divergent called the “Corner Tribes”.29 Djibouti a former French colony is a interests to blend and connect with peaceful country. The country played the emerging structures and policies These clan feuds can be traced way a key role trying to restore the Somali of the State. This presents a serious back to even before Kenya became state after the 1991 collapse and still challenge as the lacuna, that was cre- an independent state. The dominant maintains close ties with Somalia al- ated since the state collapsed in 1991, clans in these two Kenyan counties, beit with Kenyan and Ethiopian close led to an emergence of various clan the Degodia in Wajir face off with the contacts. Also, due to the instability led structures. The clans through their Garre and Marehan, the dominant that had existed in the South and Cen- traditional authorities organised and Hawiye sub-clans in Mandera from tral Somalia, many Somalis moved to provided the necessary services such Elwak to Liboi. The minority clans Djibouti from Mogadishu, Baidoa, as security, devoid of the state infra- in these two Kenyan counties are and Beletweyne and went into busi- structure. disgruntled and frustrated as the big ness there. They remain concerned clans use violence to settle old scores. with what happens in Somalia.32 With the Hawiye clan alliances domi- nating the central, south and the It is interesting to note that, Mr. Puntland remains an autonomous greater Mogadishu in support of a Ahmed Mohamed alias Madobe, an region although it does not seek out- unitary Somalia, the Darod clan alli- Ogaden clan leader was elected to right independence from Somalia de- ances, that dominate Puntland and lead the Jubaland and is alleged to spite having its President, Abdirah- Jubaland (Kismayu), being strong be closer to both Ethiopian and Ken- man Mohamud Farole. Some of those proponents of federalism, and the Dir yan authorities than the SFG.30 One of interviewed alleged that President dominating Somaliland and Galmu- those interviewed stated that Ahmed Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is being ac- dug regions, the uncertainty of the refused to meet the SFG per an Addis cused of changing the provincial con- state policies remain conspicuous. Ababa Negotiation Agreement and stitution in favour of centralism with Kenya and Ethiopia are in support Puntland’s President Farole’s calcula- These differences are clear and define of the Jubaland Ogaden leadership tive influence, an issue also alleged by what Somalia is today despite the pre- despite Ethiopia having had, what Faisal A. Roble.33 vailing cyphers of tranquillity under was seen as, a disparaging role in the the SFG. Divided views still remain greater Somalia since 2006 leading to It can be argued that the divisions seen between those who support a strong the Transitional Federal Government. amongst the clans in Somalia, just like unitary Somalia state and those that many other African tribes, are largely fear a centralised government would Further, many Somalis do not see influenced by the close contacts some be dominated by a single clan or a Ogadens as pure Somali citizens but maintain with the former colonies; group of clans.28 The impact of this believe them to have strong links notwithstanding, external identities uncertainty of state policies has kept and connections to the clan wars as that were imposed on the Somali na- the Somali population in conditions they seek their federal Jubaland state tion since 1884’s scramble for Africa. of abject poverty, disease, starvation within Somalia. The Ogaden area is This is an issue that permanently ap- and irredeemable mental slavery, an still a contested region between the portioned different Somali clans and issue that ought to be of great concern greater Somalia and Ethiopia; more geographies to different competing to the international community. so as the region has significant secu- European and Ethiopian colonial rity interests in Somalia, and immedi- ate neighbours like Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. 31 http://www.un.org/News/Press/ docs/2013/sc11121.doc.htm [accessed on 28th 27 Interviews with various persons of According to the UN Monitoring October 2013] Somali origin in Nairobi on 11th November 32 Interviews with various persons of 2013 Somali origin in Nairobi on 10th November 28 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/ 29 These were interviews with various 2013 publication-type/speeches/2013/hogendoorn- persons of Somali origin in Nairobi on 11th No- 33 Faisal A. Roble, “ The Culture of security-and-governance-in-somalia.aspx [ ac- vember 2013. Politics: The Somali Experience,” May 05, 2013 cessed on 8th November 2013] 30 Ibid (accessed on 18th November 2013)

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powers and have not changed,34 hence The new UNSOM, working closely eralists and clans’ interests would be extending to the whole region. with AMISOM and the Somali Na- important. Incongruent policies to tional Army (SNA), could transform manage many diverse interests won’t Options for effective management of Somalia if the clan militia are also in- be sustainable in the long run. public affairs for a better Somalia tegrated, engaged and convinced of Somalia remains a country with high why a strong Somalia is beneficial to To avoid this approach, the federal economic potentials with its extended all devoid of Islamic fundamentalism system remains the hard path to fol- coastal strip but SFG policies remain especially in Mogadishu, Afgooye, low with integration of the militia far removed from the people due to Baidoa, Merca and Kismayu.37 into the state system and structures, the extensive divisions and interests. and with the sub-clans having their A lack of integration of the militia Many of those interviewed observed representatives in the deepened and groups and low levels of awareness that with this, those strong willed further devolved Federal System. combined with high levels of broker- and bend to liberate Somalis need not The formulae to share power from age of state processes, limits the state be trapped into the Hawiye clan, the the centre, where the presidency potentials. Darod clan, the Dir clan, and the Isaaq and the prime ministry is, with the or Rahanweyn clan.38 Rather, they peripheries, where the clans and tra- Property ownership, trade and busi- should be able to find avenues where ditional leaders are, should keep on nesses with the State, military and the sub-clans elect their representa- being sought; with recognition and economic aid to the SFG regime all tives into the SFG structures at the appreciation of the divergent views present grounds for deepened nego- districts, divisions, locations and sub- being presented by those supporting tiations with the clan and traditional location levels while also integrating a centralised and unified Somalia and authority leaders. The challenges the militias. those supporting a federalised system for the SFG are far too many to sur- with the recognition of the clan inter- mount, especially, as there is a lack A preferred view would be what has ests, to avoid further conflicts. of clear state policies and guidelines been tried and tested in Somaliland. on engagements and militias still act- This could as well have been tried The long journey should be made by ing as go-betweens, specifically from and tested in a Somalia devoid of the Somalis, with the necessary support Mogadishu to Kismayu. top-down centralized conceptions of from the international community. the state. The centralised governance This should be emboldened with av- However, due to the potentials that system is hard to sell in Somalia for it enues towards national security and Somalia has, the international com- does not easily accommodate the un- economic justice in identified areas, munity quickly recognised the new centralised and localised bottom-up both in the urban and rural areas. Of government and in September 2013, style which Somalis have got used to much importance is the restructur- the US pledged about $2.5 billion in over the years. ing of the relationship of the rest of a ‘New Deal’ conditioned on greater Somalia with Mogadishu as the capi- transparency and governance re- A federal democratic style will have to tal city and creation of urban centres forms.35 If allocated efficiently, this emerge from the clans were decision- that could serve as pillars of the new money could be a boon to the coun- making processes which have been Somalia to attract investments and in- try and its people. Nonetheless, many followed in Somaliland, with promis- vestors. already feel left out of the state proc- ing results so far, could as well be ap- esses and find that the policies are not plied, while allowing more room for permitting people to engage despite home grown patterns of governance their wiliness to do so. to emerge, hence forming the Somali state. Further, a lot of taxes and fees on trade transiting through ports and airports Conclusion in Somalia are not accounted for due Somalia remains an extremely poor, to corrupt officials, businessmen, and weak and fragile country. With the the local clan powers. Much of what SFG still generating very few of its these ports and airports generate is own resources, and with entrenched not known or documented36 despite clans and clannism in control of the Mogadishu slowly stabilising itself means of revenue generation, thus, with thousands of diaspora residents the state needs continued support. returning to do business. Prioritisation of nation-wide nego- tiations on the type of federalism that the SFG could implement while accommodating the centralists, fed- 34 Ibid 35 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/pub- lication-type/speeches/2013/hogendoorn-secu- 37 Ibid rity-and-governance-in-somalia.aspx [accessed 38 http://www.wardheernews.com/ on 5th November 2013] tribute-to-the-mighty-genius-of-somali-clann- 36 ibid ism/ [accessed on 8th November 2013]

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Once one of Mogadishu’s most luxurious hotels, the Al-Uruba lays in ruins after two decades of civil war. Though building work in Mogadishu is on the rise, it may still be several years before many of the city’s buildings will be restored

AU-UN IST Photo|Tobin Jones

18 WHAT CAN CURRENT LEADERS IN SOMALIA LEARN FROM THEIR PAST HISTORY? Somali leaders, in advancing their personal interests, keep creating political and social crises by exploiting and misusing the divisive face of the clan. Power and wealth greediness, as ultimate goals of political action, seem to continue to this day in Somalia, with no lessons learned from the past history.

by Abdullahi Mohammed Odowa

Director Observatory of Violence and Conflict Prevention Hargeisa, Somaliland Leadership in the Somali Context

Since pre-1991 history of Somaliland, I was encouraged to look briefly at experience in writing Politics of Cain. when it was tied either wholly or partially several past eras of Somali history in As I wrote about the disaster of decades, with the former Somali Democratic Re- order to better understand the lessons I could not help but grieve the loss of life public and the regions shared a common that they may hold for the country’s that Somalis could prevent if they intel- cultural heritage, can the terms ‘Somalia’ traditional and political leaders today. ligently analyzed their predicament and and ‘Somali’ be said to encompass both In seeking to undertake any examina- garnered that will to change their self- Somaliland and Somalia. tion of Somali history it is important destruction behaviour. (2008 p.15) to keep in mind the words of Dr. Hus- Inspired by the Danish philosopher sein A. Bulhan who wrote in his book This important work together with Soren Kierkegaar who said “We un- “Politics of Cain: One Hundred Years others such as Cost of Dictatorship, derstood life only backwards; but it of Crises in Somali Politics and Soci- Getting Somalia Wrong: Faith War and must be lived forward” and the So- ety” that: Hope in a Shattered State, Somalia a Na- mali poet Cabdiqaadir Shube who tion Without a State, Somali Phoenix wrote “Taariikhda dib u eega waa laga “Inquiry into Somali politics and history, and Understanding the Somalia Confla- dab qaataaye” which when translated full of peril and pain, is in some respects gration, which I read in preparation reads “you revisit the history as it akin to an onion. As you peel each layer, for this paper, do much to highlight provides light to the way forward,” you shed tears. That indeed has been my the toxic mix of rivalry, conflict, de-

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struction, displacement and famine traffic in slaves, and to exclude the in- In the region of British Somaliland that have characterized recent Somali terference of foreign powers.” (Sama- these ideas continued to grow and history in order to create what some tar 1989, p. 31) developed throughout the period of have described as the ‘worst humani- the 1950’s with the result that all reg- tarian crises in the modern history’. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that istered political parties were eventu- However, while much attention has even in the event of a successful oc- ally able to agree, in principal, to the been given in these and other studies cupation by these powers the im- idea of unification with the former to the issues of poverty, illiteracy, re- pact on Somalia and its development region of Italian Somaliland, which ligious extremism and clanism as the was in fact limited. it was during the at the time was administered as a root causes and drivers of Somalia’s brief period of Egyptian rule over the United Nations Trust Territory (Lewis misfortunes, there has been little simi- coastal towns of Somaliland, from 2002, p. 155). However, even at this lar attention given to the issue of lead- 1870-1884 that, some developmental time it was obvious that this enthusi- ership in helping to shape this history. projects were implemented that in- asm for unification failed to produce clude improvement of port facilities any meaningful debate or discussion This article will argue that historically in Zeila and Berbera, erection of piers regarding the timing and conditions Somalia and its citizens have never and lighthouses, restoration of the under which this would occur. had the type of leaders who possessed ancient Dubar channel that supplies a balance of vision, competence and fresh water to the town of Berbera, This failure by the political and tra- power to successfully promote a and the building of new mosques (pp. ditional leadership of Somaliland message of justice, unity and hope. 43-44). was famously discussed by Mr. Umar Rather, the evidence will suggest that Arte Qalib in an interview with the the experience in Somalia has been Although the British presence was BBC Somali Service1. Mr. Qalib told of leaders at the local, regional and minimal in Somaliland, the agree- the BBC that, in April 1960, following national level frequently choosing to ments it made with local leaders the passing of a resolution by the Leg- take advantage of opportunities to helped to fuel the anger of the famous islative Council of British Somaliland advance personal and clan interests in Somali Dervish Mohammed Abdul- requesting not only independence but a manner that has resulted in conflict, lah Hassan, who objected to any for- also union with the Trust Territory of corruption, weak institutions and so- eign, particularly Christian, presence Somalia. cial fragmentation. in Somalia. Following Dervish raids on clans in Somaliland between 1900 Nevertheless, following the granting The Colonial Era and 1920 the British fought a series of of independence by Britain the first Beginning in the late 19th Century, five military campaigns that resulted meeting of the Somaliland Legisla- during the ‘Scramble for Africa’ fol- in the destruction of the Dervish State tive Council sent a telegram to their lowing the 1884 Berlin Conference, and direct British rule over the region. counter-parts in the newly independ- it is with little surprise that interest It was the failure of traditional Somali ent Somali Republic requesting the turned towards Somalia given its stra- leaders in this region, who at the time unconditional unification of these tegic location along the approach to were divided into five major camps two countries. Although Abdulla Os- the Suez Canal. However, while pow- - Ise, Gadabursi, Habar Garhajis, man, the head of the parliament of ers including the Ottoman Empire, Habar Awal and Habar Tol Ja’alo - to the Somali Republic had previously Egypt, Italy, France and Abyssinia all effectively negotiate with the British welcomed this very idea, there was displayed an interest in occupying So- colonial to either support local social no official response to this message. mali soil, it was the periodic interven- and economic development or to al- Instead, a delegation led by Dr. Mo- tion of the British Empire that checked low other foreign power to have ac- hamed Sheikh Gabyow, at that time or else limited these ambitions (Lewis cess to Somali land and resources. the Minister of Constitutional Affairs 2002, 42). They neither served as an intermedi- and supported by an Italian lawyer, ate between the British Empire and was sent to Hargeisa where they met According to Lewis this interest by the Dervish insurgency nor stopped the with the Somali Officials Union head- British in preventing the occupation war and its impact. ed by Umar Arte. of Somalia by a rival power stemmed not from any sensitivity to the desires Events that impacted Events Leading According to Arte, the Somali Offi- of the Somali people but was rather to Unification cials Union, although not the ruling driven by a desire to maintain the Following the conclusion of the Sec- party in Somaliland, was held in re- supply of meat from Somaliland to its ond World War, the increasing levels spect among the community as well forces stationed in Aden (pp. 40-41). of contact between Somali communi- as the former Colonial authorities. It was during this time that the Brit- ties across the Horn of Africa region, This meeting between the delegation ish Somaliland protectorate was es- resulting from the travels of members tablished through a series of treaties of the elite, merchants and soldiers 1 The recorded interview of Mr. Qalib that included promises of protection serving with British forces, saw the was given to the BBC Somali Section during a between the British Empire and local spread of nationalist thought and ide- BBC series of programmes featuring Somali History. He gave this interview during session clans living in the region in order to as of pan-Somali unity (Bulhan 2008, 4 of the series that focused on the events that “secure a supply market, check the p. 46). led to the Unification of British Somaliland with Italian Somaliland.

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from the Somali Republic and the So- republic. However, these hopes were in the years immediately following mali Officials Union saw a proposal quickly dashed as the new political independence and unification some put forward whereby the positions of elite actively engaged in nepotism, progress was made in terms of build- President and Prime Minister would corruption, injustice and the theft of ing the state and its institutions, these be shared. In other words if the Presi- government resources (Elmi, 2010, p. efforts were limited in their effective- dent was from Somalia, the Prime 20). With the initial wave of national- ness due to the actions of leaders Minster should come from Soma- ist euphoria quickly dissipating, the more interested in enriching them- liland and vice versa. Additionally, famous Somali poet Ahmed Ismail selves and spending public resources each side would be awarded equal Diiriye (Qaasim) wrote: extravagantly rather than addressing numbers of parliamentary seats, the growing public disappointment shared ministerial positions, shared … Isma doorin Gaalkaan diriyo, (Bulhan, 2008, p. 61). These problems control of the armed forces as well as daarta kii galaye with corruption, as well as issues of an agreement that in the event that Dusha midabka Soomaalidaad, clan representation in politics, would one side had the national capital of dugul ka mooddaaye present an on-going problem for the the new country, the capital of the Misna laguma diirsado qalbiga, Somali Republic until Major General other should be host to consulates waa dirkii Karale. Mohamed Siad Barre overthrew it on from foreign countries. 21 October 1969, following the assas- Nothing changed with the sination of President Abdirashid Ali However, the proposal did not last white man I rejected, and with Shermarke in the town of Las Anod. long and when the delegation from those who replaced him the Somali Republic met with the So- In surface appearance, Soma- New Era of Dictatorship in Somalia maliland Parliament the members of lis, black in color they look (1969-1991) this institution insisted on an immedi- But they bring misery to the The assassination of President Ab- ate and unconditional union of these heart, being the offspring of dirashid Ali Shermarke by one of his two newly independent countries. Carroll2 bodyguards had the effect of creat- ing an unexpected power vacuum as Although it is impossible to try and Another popular poem by the late the Prime Minister was away at the predict the outcome of future nego- Haji Aadam Af-Qalooc voiced disap- United Nations headquarters in New tiations, had the recommendations of pointment with the incompetence of York. The Prime Minister was help- the Somali Officials Union been sup- the leadership of the first Somali civil- ing to fight for the rights of the Pal- ported by the members of the Soma- ian government in the 1960s writing: estinian people, as well as advocating liland Parliament, the occasion of the for the membership of the People’s union of an independent Somaliland …Halmaan bay ahayd darajaduye Republic of China into the interna- with the newly established Republic kuma habooneyn… tional organization, despite a number of Somalia, once again demonstrates of on-going crises back home includ- a lack of foresight and unity among It was mistake to honour them, ing the assassination of the President leaders in Somaliland. Whatever the as they are incompetent to and the Military plan to overthrow merits or shortcomings of the propos- lead3. the civilian government. al by the Somali Officials Union the An immediate power struggle rush to push for immediate unifica- While it is important to recognise that emerged behind the scenes, within tion without any meaningful negotia- the government and the members of tions or debate within the Somaliland the Somali parliament, with many op- Parliament resulted in unity on un- 2 Ahmed Ismaiil Diiriye, also known portunistically offering their support equal terms for Somaliland. Follow- as Qaasim, is well-known Somali poet. He to the highest bidder (Bulhan, 2008, p. composed this poem in 1964 to express his ing unification, politicians from other disappointment with the Somali post-colonial 167). This behaviour, scandalous as it regions of Somalia worked together leaders and how the colonial system remained was at the time, helped to create the to take the positions of President and unchanged with the exception that white co- ongoing popular image of a Somali Prime Minister as well as other key lonial masters been replaced by local black politician, whether from Somaliland, Somalis with a white man’s mentality. Qaasim cabinet positions at the expense of referred in his poem to a British man called Puntland or South-Central, as being representation for the region of Soma- ‘Carroll’ who represented the Queen during willing to sell his/her vote to the high- liland (Bulhan 2008, p. 59). the transfer of power from British authority to est bidder regardless of the interests Leadership Crises in the First Gov- Somalis. of the public. ernment of Somalia (1960) 3 The original Somali poem is quoted from the Book entitled ‘HOGGAAMIYE IS- The long period of colonization and BEDDEL HORSEEDA’ by Saciid Cali Shire, On 21 October 1969, a coup led by domination at the hands of foreign 2009, Buuh Consulting LTD. Haji Aaden Af- Major General Mohamed Siad Barre powers had created a strong de- Qaloof was a well- known Somali poet and took power amid genuine excite- sire among all Somali people for a Islamic Scholar who through his wisdom criti- ment by the people of Somalia, who cised the clanism, nepotism and bad leadership strong and prosperous Greater So- in the Somali content. His poem underscores had grown increasingly outraged malia [Somali: Soomaaliweyn] lead- public dissatisfaction with performance of the over the corruption, nepotism and ing to great expectations and hope first leaders of Somali aftermath of the indepen- injustice perpetuated by their elected being placed on the newly unified dence. representatives (Bulhan 2008, p. 168).

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In addition to the popular promises Ethiopia and in the emergence of the in Somaliland, even though they have of peace and justice, the new mili- Isaaq dominated Somali National been populated by a single clan and tary government also made the task Movement during the early 1980’s. related sub-clans. of eradicating clanism one of its ma- Between 1986 and 1990 the regime un- jor priorities. Although the clan had, leased a reign of terror against mem- It is the opinion of the author that for unknown centuries, provided the bers of the Majeerteen, the Hawiye, while the clan system has provided most basic social institution among and Isaaq clans, which included the the bedrock of Somali society it has the Somali people, this was viewed deployment of its feared Red Berets also left traditional, political and reli- as being incompatible with social- (Somali: Duub Cab). As the death toll gious leaders ill-equipped to respond ism and the root cause of society’s ran into the thousands, and the re- in a unified manner to shared threats problems. Speaking as the leader of gime struggled to defeat rebel forces, and opportunities. Unable to under- Somalia, Siad Barre argued that “[t] its support base and military position stand or reconcile their role as both ribalism and nationalism cannot go collapsed when the Hawiye clan fi- clan leaders and actors within a na- hand in hand… it is unfortunate that nally rose in active rebellion. tion state, these leaders, even at times our nation is rather too clannish; if all However, any hope held by the peo- in Somaliland, have attempted to Somalis are to go to hell, tribalism will ple of Somaliland and other Somali’s nurture and promote clanism believ- be their vehicle to reach there” (Lewis that the fall of the dictatorship would ing that it represents a better means 2002, p. 22). lead to a more peaceful and prosper- by which they can secure their own ous Somalia soon faded away as the personal interests. In describing how While the military regime, and the country descended into a still yet un- Somali politicians have gone about Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party finished civil war that saw the state encouraging clanism Bulhan (2008) it established in 1976 as the vehicle for replaced by warlords, clan militia notes that, “[t]hey also take from the its rule over Somalia, officially tran- and weak authorities (Harper 2012, clan systems its divisive and distort- scended clan lines and preached the p. 57). In Politics of Cain Bulhan aptly ed aspects that satisfy their greed for need for loyalty to the state, in real- described the cycle of hope and disap- power and wealth in the midst of pov- ity the practice of clanism continued. pointment in the Somali politics that erty and misery” (p.11). This was evident in the original com- is now repeated itself through the The failure of traditional and politi- position of the Supreme Revolution- civil war saying: cal leaders has also been mirrored by ary Council which took over in 1969, the so-called educated class which, of which, 40 percent were Daarood, “Often, the leaders and the led forget af- with some notable exceptions, have the same clan as the newly retitled ter victory the rhetoric of revolution and attempted to exploit clan politics to President Siad Barre. Similarly, the promises of change with which the armed assert themselves over their illiterate membership of the later Somali Revo- struggle for liberty started. Unantici- and ‘backwards’ countrymen for their lutionary Socialist Party, which also pated problems emerge and draw atten- own political, economic and personal drew its membership heavily from tion away from the realizing the promised ambitions. members of the Daarood clan, practi- change. Gradually, the old habits of mis- cally contradicts the regime’s message rule, corruption and tyranny return in Constant misuse of clan structure and of equality among Somalis despite imperceptible ways until they become as dynamics by local leaders has been their clan affiliation or region of ori- blatant as practices of the earlier regime, exposing the ugly and divisive face gin. giving rise for another call for regime of clan system in Somalia, making it change” (p. 311). difficult for many local and interna- This inability of the Saiad Barre tional commentators in the Somali regime to effectively address the What is wrong with Somali Leaders conflict and politics to understand the clanism issue, as well as the use of its and Politics? extent of the role of clan and clanism own notorious version of the KGB, the After only this brief examination of in Somali way of life. These issues National Security Service, turned the several periods of modern Somali his- aside, it must be remembered that country into one large prison camp. tory it is clear that the country and its this same clan system has also con- This undermined the popular sup- people have failed to produce leaders tinued to provide a source of kinship, port and goodwill that the govern- genuinely capable of rising above the justice and protection in the absence ment nonetheless managed to earn issues of clanism, corruption and dis- of a functioning national government. through improvements achieved in honesty in order to successfully ad- Likewise, this understanding should various fields, infrastructure, educa- dress the numerous political, social also apply to the system of Somali tra- tion, healthcare and national military and economic problems facing their ditional law (Somali: xeer), which also strength (Bulhan 2008, p. 220). communities, regions and nation. offers a similar paradox, in that it has Able to maintain power through a provided the benefit of a social safety combination of clan loyalty, fear and While some local initiatives in areas net and means of support and protec- repression, the first cracks in the pow- such as Puntland, Galmugug and Xiib tion for members, while simultane- er of the Saiad Barre were seen fol- & Ximan have restored a measure of ously creating poisonous and at times lowing the humiliation of Somalia’s peace and security, these initiatives violent relationships within commu- defeat in the unnecessary and badly have proven far less successful and nities and the wider society. handled 1977-1978 Ogaden War with resilient than what has been achieved

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Conclusion build a functioning and viable state Shire, Saciid Cali( 2009), Hoggaamiye Since the 19th century, traditional, institution, and current institutions Isbeddel Horseeda,Leicester, UK: Buuh political and religious Somali lead- are coming under increasing strain Publications. ers have been handicapped by their as they remain flawed and dysfunc- individual and collective inability to tional. WSP International Somali Programme overcome their failure to act in unison (2005). Rebuilding Somaliland, Asmara: to address threats and opportunities The political and social crises that The Red Sea Press, Inc. to the Somali people, including when have been created by Somali leaders these have involved foreign pow- by exploiting and misusing the divi- ers. Instead, Somalia and the Somali sive face of the clan, while advanc- people have failed to produce leaders ing their personal interest and their capable of rising above clan politics, greediness for power and wealth, even when ostensibly motivated by seem to be continuing to this day religion, in a manner that is not self- with no lesson learned from their past serving, either politically or materi- history. Unless Somali leaders learn ally. There is unfortunately no ques- and draw lessons from the past, and tion that the actions of some Somali practice a new way of politics that ad- leaders have continued to pose a chal- vances inclusion, justice and equality lenge to the creation of a functioning rather than distorted clanism, nepo- and viable modern state in order to tism and public fund misuse, factors preserve clanism as an alternative which have led to Somalia’s current form of governance. Somalia has seen situation, the misery and anarchy will the institutions of the modern state of- continue. ten used to serve personal and clan in- terests rather than those of the wider References community, making them ‘prizes’ to Bulhan, A. H. (2008), Politics of Cain: be fought over and captured. One Hundred Years of Crises in Somali Politics and Society (1st ed.), Bethesda, In Somaliland these historic lessons MA: Tayson International Publishing. were noted by local leaders follow- ing the violence and instability that Burns, J. M. (1978), Leadership. New preceded and then continued follow- York: Harper & Row ing the collapse of the central govern- ment, as well as the inter-clan conflict C. Otto Scharmer (2007), Theory U, that affected the region during the Cambridge, Massachusetts: Society early 1990’s. Through the Hargeisa for Organizational Learning National Conference, held from Oc- tober 1996 to February 1997, not only Elmi, A. A. (2010), Understanding the was peace restored, but an active ef- Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Polit- fort was undertaken to incorporate ical Islam and Peacebuilding, Oxford: traditional Somali power structures Pambazuka Press within a modern state, thereby avoid- ing the toxic experience of clanism Ghalib, J. M. (2013), Somali Phoenix, experienced in other regions of the self-published. former Somali state. This was most evident in the creation of a bicameral Happer, M. (2012), Getting Somalia legislature incorporating a House of Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a Shat- Elders (Somali: Gurti) in which rep- tered State, London: Zed Books. resentatives of the clans living in So- maliland sit in addition to the elected Hart, B. ( Eds). (2008), Peacebuilding House of Representatives. in Traumatized Societies, Lahman. MA: Even though this hybrid system of University Press of America. governance seems to be relatively working for the people of Somaliland Lewis, I. (2002[1980]), A Modern Histo- in preventing massive conflict among ry of the Somali: Nation and State in the various clans living in this part of the Horn of Africa, Oxford: James Currey. world, it has failed to build function- ing institutions and state. Even after Samatar, Abdi Ismail (1989), The State more than two decades of relative and Rural Transformation in Northern peace and stability in Somaliland, Somalia 1884-1986, Madison: Univer- there does not seem to be enough to sity of Wisconsin Press

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Somalia, women in the rain

Beledweyne, Hiiraan, Somalia | Photo Frank Keillor

24 SOMALI POLITICS AND POWER RUNS OVER WOMEN AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT Clan based governance is what emerged out of 21 years of civil war. If in pastoral contexts clan-ship trust is not questioned, in urban ones it is abused and manipulated by politically ambitious men. While internationals enter Somalia with many divergent agendas, the production of charcoal puts the livelihoods of pastoral communities at risk. The empowerment of Somali women would preserve the environment and improve politics.

by Fatima Jibrell

Executive Director and co-founder at ADESO co-founder of Sun Fire Cooking and Women’s Coalition for Peace

The views expressed in this contribution reflect stance and political views of Fatima Jibrell and do not pretend to consti- tute a scientific analysis on the matter.

The Context/Environment

Since time immemorial, Somalis have mised in various ways. The limited cilities. As a result, rapes and killings survived in the Horn of Africa by trees and shrubs that are available in are not major surprise, but habitual herding camels, sheep, and goats. the semi-desert, which remains a pas- occurrences. Pastoralism is their way of life and toral landscape, are turned into char- pastoral livelihoods are tied to the coal for job creation and for profit, Illegal fishing is one devastating ma- wellbeing of their environment. It is while putting livestock and the liveli- rine problem along the Somali coasts the women and children who are the hoods of pastoral communities at risk. facing the Indian Ocean and the Red first casualties of its degradation and Due to the influx of pastoral IDPs (in- Sea, stretching over 3330 km, the long- mismanagement, the luckier ones be- ternally displaced peoples), cities and est coastline in Africa. For the last 23 ing those who do make it to urban towns that do not offer healthy alter- years, international fishing fleets have centers, thus, dealing with displace- natives become over populated and been continuously destroying reefs, ment becomes a survival mechanism. crime remains unattended too. Thus using illegal methods and tools to cities become a jungle of insecurity, get as much fish as possible of highly The Environment in fact is compro- substandard health and hygiene fa- marketable species. By doing so they

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destroy all marine life that their tools society institutions and organized eyes, suppressing their hunger and catch. Artisanal fishing boats are also regional authorities wish to see it im- disillusionment with this drug that attacked and their nets cut by illegal plemented. In particular, they want numbs them till they die of TB, AIDs, fishing boats and fleets. As a result, the provision of the Federations of or hepatitis and similar diseases. fish factories and cooling facilities in States to be realized as the Constitu- Clan-youth are continuously pushed Alula, Lasqoray and Bosaso are all tion stipulates. Federalism is a well- to cities due to environmental de- closed. Mohamed Abshir Waldo, a liked concept which people think will struction. Thus, these pastoral clans- known Somali researcher, estimates give more independence to regions. men are a ready pool for hire trick- that in monetary terms the income So- Furthermore, trust has not been nur- ling to towns in search of livelihoods. malia loses on illegal fishing is worth tured and healed through effective more than all donated aid received reconciliation. Women and their children as well as from the international community thousands of unaccompanied chil- put together. The internationals come in with many dren, the elderly and the challenged divergent interests. Different interests are negatively affected by this politi- Political Leadership come in with the conflicting influences cal upheaval that created warlord-like Somalia is an interesting spot for di- guiding the new Somali Government. governance. They are left for women verse international interests. Since its Oil exporting and importing coun- to protect and fetch for. Women and independence in 1960, it expressed a tries are united in their interest of the the family members under their care, natural interest of wanting to unite Somali sea lanes to be free of pirates; in these horrible situations, are vul- all Somali regions in the Horn. This whereas, Somalis are more interested nerable, scattered, exposed and ex- was a very daring policy. It set a new- in securing the safety of their fishing perience rape over and over again ly independent Somalia against the communities and fish factories to be due to non-existent attention, care or World Order led by Somalia’s former able to function and harvest enough even human sympathy. They live in colonizers. Without the political back- to keep their fishing businesses afloat. open spaces or old and broken down ing of their colonial powers, Soma- Furthermore, some Gulf countries government buildings. Yet these, so lia’s first Prime Minister, Abdirashid want to keep Somalia out of the oil called shelters of the poor, are the first Ali Sharmarke, travelled to Moscow and gas competition. And some of the to be pulled down by government and made a long-term pact with the interested countries, upset and sur- forces for security or money-making former Soviet Union. Thereafter, So- prise the political contestations with schemes, without considering the malia has been in a foreign policy sudden buckets of money and buy human lives that call these places that puts most of its resources in the the whole political outcome for their home. These families are environ- Ministry of Defense. After a few wars favored Somali male political candi- mental IDPs displaced by repetitive with Ethiopia, the economy and for- dates. Unfortunately, nobody dares to droughts, insecurity or due to the eign policy both collapsed, affecting ask questions about corruption inflict- fact that their pastoral land is used internal security and creating the civil ed onto the system and about women for charcoal harvesting, that is in the war that set one clan against the other. in particular. A few needy women are business of snatching limited forests paid pennies so they may sing for the and shrubs used by livestock that sus- Clan based governance is what corrupt leaders. Women, in general, tained families’ livelihoods. Rich men emerged out of the 21 years of civil have no power and recognition with- in charcoal trade are shipping from war. Somaliland also, using clan poli- in clan or political/religious circles. South Somalia and Central regions to tics, managed to progress from clan the Middle East, in particular Dubai. elders’ politics by voting through In reality, money coming to Soma- political parties for parliamentarians lia through political and aid chan- Northern Somalia, nearly a desert, is and a president during the last two nels does not trickle down enough also crippled by charcoal harvesting free elections. The newly formed So- to the makeshift foot soldiers who from very limited trees and shrubs malia Federal Government instead are young, naive and from pastoral used for cooking energy in urban cent- has gained legitimacy mainly through environments. In pastoral contexts ers. The majority of charcoal traders support from International Donors clan-ship trust is not questioned. are women trying to raise their chil- and the UN despite the fact that it This clan-ship calls for total trust and dren and care for their extended fam- controls less than the city of Mogad- willingness from male members to ily’s unwanted members. These wom- ishu. Unfortunately, internal quarrels even, if needed, die for one’s clan all en traders use pastoral youth labor and fights between the President and in the name of support. This trust is that are already internally displaced his Prime Minister escalated and dis- abused and manipulated by urban- in urban centers. This activity is im- tracted general governance and nega- ized and politically ambitious men. poverishing pastoral livelihoods and tively divided the leadership. Thus, these young men are the ones is creating the fastest growing desert. who are disoriented, confused and The constitution of Somalia is in in military uniforms, whom one sees Somali Women in this context limbo. The cabinet and Parliament in displayed on streets as government The Somali constitution stipulates Mogadishu are busy trying to change security forces. They are usually high that women must receive 30% of all and revamp it without public consent. on the stimulant kaat/mira. They of- political and non political posts of- On the contrary, the majority of civil ten have gaunt figures with wide fered by Somali Governance at Lo-

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cal, Regional and National level. Yet penses including office space, trans- women leadership has been derailed port, media and most of the capital from fair political participation; even needed to involve the clan elders, also though, the constitution dictates that known as Sultans, Garads, Malaaqs less than 30% of women in Parliament and so on. The selection of a parlia- makes it unconstitutional. Unfortu- mentarian is done by clan leaders and nately, the United Nations Political clan leaders are not given any allow- Office for Somalia, who was the main ances by known institutions, they are referee in this regard, was unable to generally opportunistic and ask for a keep the constitutional promise. The high price when the time comes for proportion of women members in their services to be used. As a matter Mogadishu Parliament remains at of fact, the President is voted for by only 12%, less than half of their quota. the members of Parliament. The Par- liament also votes for the formation of With the funding and advice of In- the President’s Cabinet.1 This is a big ternational Community, this proc- opportunity for those who allow their ess further developed along the em- vote to be bought. Therefore, it is very braced direction, with the status quo difficult and in fact almost impos- accepted and justice compromised. sible for women to join such a huge The watchdogs, the Somali- political old boys club where money is eas- patriarchs, exposed their intent. They ily exchanged for favors all the time. never wanted to include women in decision making nor in management The urgency of the intervention positions of big companies and busi- needed is dire and women are dis- nesses, including political power that empowered by the fact that they are owns and gets contracts; wheeling not considered a partner or play- and dealing of power is dealt here er by internationals or UN repre- and only in this way. It is also difficult sentatives visiting the capital cities. to find professional women working Why is it a dire need for Somalia to in other sectors including contracts, eternalize and/or institutionalize transport, communication and money Women Political Participation? transfers, despite the fact that women are the biggest users of telephone com- • For Somali Children to have clean panies and money transfer services. water, education, and health care Women are less empowered because is a priority to women and wom- of their limited access to education, en only. their service-giving role and lack of • Women know that milk and meat collective organizational institutions are the main dietary require- and inputs from donor community, as ments for Somalis and liveli- well as disinterest of highly educated hoods will not be compromised women to join politics. Consequently, through charcoal production, if Somali women are left being behind. women are in political decision- making. If the international community • Women politicians are eager to strengthens their support for women move politics towards the ballot and add their voices to the present box as soon as possible. female campaign, that is trying their • Somali women will work very best to achieve 30% of representative well with donors toward self- seats, a greater number of women will reliance for Somalia and re- be encouraged to join, for example, spectful relationships and trade. the newly forming Puntland Parlia- ment. This will precipitate to other re- Missing this opportunity of support- gional and national governments that ing women to empower their political may get formed and include greater process is a major failure for Soma- participation of women. lia, International supporters, UN and Transparent Donors as well. Women’s groups who are interested in political participation and advo- cacy are all financially unable to pay what is required to overcome this 1 See International Crisis Group re- political struggle such as lobbying ex- port on the formation of the current Federal government.

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Hargeisa, Somaliland, bus station

Photo|Tristam Sparks

28 HOW DID SOMALILAND EMERGE AS A STABLE AND PEACEFUL POLITY? Notwithstanding the crucial role played by elders, peace and stability in Somaliland is an outcome of a convergence of pre-war and post war factors. The absence of international technical and financial help pushed Somalilanders to look to themselves and rely on domestic resources.

by Gedamu Kalewongel Minale

PhD candidate in Politics, Human Rights and Sustainability Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna

Introduction

In the backdrop of the crisis and in- is still weak and poor with very ru- other countries in Africa and the Mid- ter-clan violence in the South-central dimentary infrastructure and meager dle East.”3 Somalia, a self proclaimed republic resource basis.2 But it has managed to in the North West – Somaliland – has establish a degree of stability that ex- To be sure, just like its counterpart emerged as a peaceful, functional and cels much of other Somali territories in the South, Somaliland had its own relatively democratic polity in the and a democratically elected govern- critical moments of violence, war- past two decades. In contrast to the ment which in the words of Hansen fare, and banditry. However, it has faction ridden and unstable territory and Bradbury is “matched by few managed to fully recover from these of much of Somalia, Somaliland, had initial setbacks and realize a stable reinstated a functioning government Political Order: The Case of Somaliland” in De- polity that enjoys greater peace and and maintained a considerable de- velopment and Change 41(4): 723–746, p, 723; Fa- gree of political stability.1 The country rah, A. Yusuf and Lewis, Ioan. M (1997) Making peace in Somaliland In: Cahiers d’études africaines. 3 Hansen, Jarle and Bradbury, Mark Vol. 37 N°146. pp. 349-377. p. 349 (2007) “Somaliland: A New Democracy in the 1 Renders, Marleen and Terlinden, 2 Farah, A. Yusuf and Lewis, Ioan. M, Horn of Africa?” in Review of African Political Ulf (2010) “Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid 1997, p. 32 Economy 34:113, 461 – 476, p. 461

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legitimacy. Its successful efforts in the tributed to the role by traditional quite engaged in the war, provid- past two decades received a bunch leaders and institutions.7 Indeed, the ing the Somali National Movement of appreciation and applause from clan elders were quite crucial in the (SNM) – the movement fighting academics, policy makers, journalists fight against Siad Bare’s regime dur- against the Siad Bare regime – with and commentators. For Matt Bryden ing the war as well as in post war moral, logistics and human support. (2005), Somaliland represents a “rare reconciliation, institutional building A council of elders, as advisors to the success story” in a region that is and conflict resolution in Somaliland. movement, has in fact been part of the epitomized by endemic poverty, con- They are the “heroes” of Somaliland SNM leadership structure since the flict and home to some of the world’s who guided the country to victory mid 1980s.12 Despite their roles as ad- worst regimes.4 Mark Bradbury (2008) and post war peace, popular legitima- visors, the influence and authority of described the small polity as “one of cy and economic resurrection.8 the elders within the SNM grew stead- the most stable polities in the horn,” fastly. In early 1990, the elders were that boasts a “popularly elected gov- Yet this narrative centering on the already eminent and powerful actors ernment and a political system with clan elders alone obfuscates other within the SNM.13 Hence, in light of democratic credentials to rival any in critical contextual factors that enabled this, the post war role of elders was the region and most Muslim states.” – or rather forced – the elders to play not something that suddenly popped 5 According to Brickhill and Johnson the role they did play. The question up with the end of the war. Rather, it (cited in Jhazbhay, 2009), Somaliland of how the elders came to play the was an extension of their roles during represents an “inspiring story of resil- role that they played, has rarely been the war. The pre-war roles provided a ience and reconstruction, and a truly asked and properly addressed in the platform to play a similar role in the African Renaissance that has many literature. An incorrect perception is reconstruction of Somaliland after the lessons to teach the rest of Africa and that the elders chose their roles proac- war. the international community.”6 tively and as if this sprang essentially These statements are not mere con- from the Somali tradition. Although In addition, after the end of the civil tentions by anxious scholars and reconciliation has always been on the war in January 1991, there were some commentators. Somaliland’s bottom “to do list” of clan elders in accord- peculiar developments within Soma- up and indigenous state building ap- ance with the Somali tradition, prac- liland that forced the elders to contin- proach has in fact been at the centre ticing politics has not. The elders who ue the job they had started. Due to the of the burgeoning literature on hybrid have been engaged in the politics of trauma of persecution under the lead- state building. the war and the legislative branch ers of the South, there was popular of the post war state for instance are pressure not to return back to the 1960 The purpose of this article is to dis- referred to by Somalilanders as “po- Union with the Italian Trust territory cern the reasons and factors that led litically active clan elders,” revealing of Somalia.14 Against the intentions to the emergence of a peaceful Soma- the fact that these elders are involved and wishes of the top SNM leader- liland as compared to the crisis and in matters that supersede their tradi- ship, the elders had to be the mouth- violence in South-Central Somalia. tional clan responsibilities.9 Elders of- piece for these popular sentiments.15 The study forms part of an ongoing ten deal with clan politics rather than Moreover, the SNM, which was pre- field research project and is based on state politics.10 siding over a two years interim ad- data collected from interviews, obser- vations and informal discussions with Therefore, a proper analysis of the Somalilanders in Somaliland. post conflict reconstruction role of ones. The Issaq are in turn divided into major sub units of : Habar Yunis and Idagale (Ghra- elders in Somaliland shall be made in hajis together), Habar Ja’lo, Habar Awal (Issa Beyond the Master narrative- putting the background of the civil war and Musa and Saad Musa), Arap, and Ayub the role of the elders in context context of peculiar post-war devel- 12 Renders 2012, p. 75 The master narrative most frequently opments within Somaliland. Unlike 13 Ibid. p. 81, 85 presented accounting the develop- those in the south, the elders in the 14 Renders, 2012, p. 92; Bryden, Matt ment of a peaceful and widely legiti- north –particularly the Issaq11 – were (2004) “Somalia and Somaliland: Envisioning a Dialogue on the Question of Somali Unity” mate state of Somaliland is the key in African Security Review 13(2), p. 24; Soma- role played by clan elders. Peace in liland was created as a British colony in 1880s. 7 Renders, Marleen (2012) Consider Somaliland is almost invariably at- It was granted independence on 26 June1960, Somaliland: State-Building with Traditional Lead- but joined the Italian trust territory of Somalia ers and Institutions Leiden: BRILL, p. 3 in the South within five days on July 1, 1960. 8 Ibid, p. 86 Today, Somalilanders argue that the declara- 4 Bryden, Matt (2005) “Foreword” in 9 Renders, Marleen (2007) “Appro- tion of independence in 1991 was not a case of Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities. priate ‘governance-technology’? – Somali clan secession. Rather, it was an �act of termination WSP International Somali Program, Asmara: elders and institutions in the making of the of their marriage with the south to reclaim the Red sea press Inc, p. 1 ‘Republic of Somaliland” in Africa Spectrum sovereignty they forfeited in 1960. 5 Bradbury, Mark (2008) Becoming So- 42(2007)3:439-459, p,444 15 The SNM had no declared agenda maliland. Catholic Institute for International Re- 10 Bradbury, Mark (1999 ) The Somalia of secessionism. Even after taking control of lations , p. 1 conflict: Prospects of Peace An Oxfam working the northwest, there were steps by top SNM 6 Jhazbahy, Iqbbal (2009) Somaliland: Paper : Oxfam UK and Ireland, pp.70 leadership to take part in the peace conferences An African struggle for Nationhood and Interna- 11 The population of Somaliland is in the South. The declaration of independence tional recognition Institute for Global Dialogue composed of four major clans, namely, Issaq, was forced on the SNM leadership by the elders & South African Institute of International Af- Gadabuursi, Dhulbahante and Warsengeli. due to a strong popular pressure and pushed fairs, Johannesburg, p. 61 From these, the Issaq are the most populous by the rank and file of the SNM.

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ministration, was consuming itself level of the Somali segmentary line- position is hereditary.27 He enjoys re- and succumbed to an internal power age group. Members meet for delib- spect and is presumed to be wise and struggle. Once again, the elders need- eration when circumstance demand. knowledgeable. Although he might ed to step in to mediate between rival Over time, however, the nature and also be involved in tasks of mediation SNM factions and ensure a smooth scope of the guurti has changed. Since and peacemaking within his own clan transition to a civilian rule. Added to 1993 a national guurti of Somaliland and other clans, the authority of the all these, although independence was has, for instance, been formally and leader is essentially symbolic. In prac- declared four months after the end of permanently institutionalized as the tice, it is the elders who are engaged the war (18 May 1991), international upper house of the parliament. in the actual deliberation of the Xeer, recognition remained elusive. And The elders meet up in open councils tasks of reconciliation, conflict reso- without international recognition, (Shirs) to discuss relations between lution and decision making.28 These there was little aid and international groups, work out Xeer contracts, set- decisions by the elders are then ap- support for Somaliland. Hence, the tle disputes, or decide upon war or proved by the clan leader as the head people in the north had no one to de- peace.22 They are the “professional of the clan.29 pend on but themselves. They had to negotiators and mediators in all clan make peace conferences within the matters.”23 Yet, the acquisition of the Reconciliation, Conflict Resolution confines of their territories and at the authority of elder is not a matter of age and State building by Elders disposal of their own resources.16 only. Elders acquire their authority The major post conflict reconstruc- from a variety of attributes and quali- tion role played by the elders lies in Clan Elders in the Somali Tradition- ties. These include: wealth, wisdom, the extensive conferences they pro- al Law – the Xeer religious knowledge, political acu- pounded with the view to restore re- The Somali society is founded on a men, oratory skills or a combination lations between communities affected customary Somali law known as the of all these.24 Besides, the authority of by the war, mediating and resolving Xeer.17 As a form of ‘social contract,’ an elder is not an inherent attribute conflicts between various post war the Xeer constitutes a set of unwrit- of the individual. An elder rather is factions, and laying down the insti- ten laws that govern relationships a representative who receives a del- tutional foundation of the state.30 A between the various segmentary lin- egated authority. In council meetings, research output by Interpeace (for- eage groups of the Somali society18. he represents and is backed by his merly War-torn societies Project In- Personal and collective security is clan.25 ternational, Rebuilding Somaliland: Is- guaranteed by the application of the sue and Possibilities (2005), recounts 30 Xeer.19 Liability is shared collectively. The institution of elders is different community conferences undertaken If a man kills another man, for exam- from leaders. Elders are found in all between, 1991-1996.31 A publication ple, the decent group of the culprit segmentary lineages, and can be all by the same organization produced is responsible for compensating the adult married men, heads of fami- in partnership with the Somaliland descent group of the victim. The Xeer lies, heads of the so called diya paying Academy for Peace and Development is enacted, deliberated and transmit- groups, akils.26 Clan leaders, on the in 2008 put the number at thirty nine.32 ted by the clan elders.”20 The elders other hand, are found at the level of are a “clan’s adult married men who a clan only. Identified with different decide on an egalitarian basis and names (Sultans, Gaarads or Ugaases), are collectively responsible for the af- the clan leader acts as the chief of 27 Bradbury, 1999, p. 69 fairs regarding their descent group.” the clan. In contrast to the elder, his 28 Ibid; it is not always clear if the no- tion of elders also includes clan leaders. Much A group (council) of these elders who of the discussion on elders and post conflict gather for deliberation on specific is- and development, p.13 reconstruction in Somaliland rarely makes a sues of governance, conflict resolution 22 Bradbury, Mark (1999 ) The Somalia distinction between the two and other similar and general well being are known as conflict: Prospects of Peace An Oxfam working actors such as religious leaders. In practice, Paper : Oxfam UK and Ireland , p. 69 however, Somaliland’s peace conferences were Guurti.21 A guurti is found at each 23 Ibid, p. 69 characterized by a comprehensive participa- 24 Ibid; Farah and Lewis, p. 359 tion of all major traditional and religious ac- 25 Bradbury, 1999, p. 69 tors. Clan leaders participated, not simply in 16 Bradbury, et al, (2003) “Somaliland: approving decisions but also engaging in peace 26 The Somali social structure is di- Choosing Politics Over Violence” in Review of conferences themselves. Religious leaders vided into clan family, clans, sub clans, line- African Political Economy, no 97 :455-478, p. 458 made important interventions to resolve dead- age, and diya paying groups. The diya paying 17 Lewis, I. M (1999) A Pastoral Democ- locks among conference participants. group refers to a collection of closely related racy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among people who collectively receive and pay blood 29 Ibid the Northern Somali of The Horn Of Africa, New compensation – diya. The diya paying group 30 Interpeace and Academy for Peace Introduction by Said Samatar. Afterword by is the most politically stable unit in the Somali and Development, p. 13 Lewis. Oxford: James Curry Publishers. p. 161; societal structure. The head of the diya paying 31 Interpeace is an independent organi- In Somali language “X” is read as “H” groups, akils, were the core members of the zation based in Zurich, Switzerland. In partner- 18 Ibid elders and the guuriti who played a central role ship with local centres, interpeace carries out 19 Ibid, p.161-162 in post conflict reconstruction after the war. For research projects all over the Somali region. In 20 Interpeace and Academy for Peace on social structure of Somalis, see Lewis, I. M Somaliland interpeace collaborates with Acad- and Development (2008) Peace in Somaliland: (1999) A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pasto- emy of Peace and Development based in Har- An Indigenous Approach to State Building, p. 443; ralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of gieisa. Bradbury, Mark (1997) Somaliland CIIR Country The Horn Of Africa, New Introduction by Said 32 See Interpeace and Academy for Report, p. 4 Samatar. Afterword by Lewis. Oxford: James Peace and Development (2008) Peace in Somali- 21 Interpeace and Academy for peace Curry Publishers. land: An Indigenous Approach to State Building

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Some of these conferences were na- bahante and Warsengeli discussed Institutional Building tional involving all northern lineage wartime damages and reparations. The institutional contributions of the groups, while others were regional The negotiations culminated in the elders were particularly made in na- or local.33The objectives of the confer- signing of ceasefires and agreements tionwide clan conferences. In national ence varied according to the pressing on a return of looted properties such clan conferences (Shir beeles), the dele- needs of the time. Some were carried as land, pasture, buildings and ve- gates of all the northern clans, assisted for the purpose of reconciliation, oth- hicles to their right owners.37 Deaths by advisors, politicians, civil service ers for conflict resolution, still others and the injuries were mostly agreed professionals, military personnel and for purposes of reconciliation and to be forgiven and forgotten. secretaries has laid down the institu- institutional building. In most inter- tional framework of the state. 40 clan conferences, the proceedings Conflict Resolution - Mediation were a matter of negotiations between The other major role the elders took The Burco, the Boorama and the Har- the elders sitting under a shadow of was mediation of post war conflicts geisa conferences were the three ma- a tree. In the larger regional and na- that threatened to push Somaliland jor conferences whereby the direction tional conferences, the elders were into the mayhem and chaos of the and the nature of the state was de- supported by advisors, professionals, South. Following the end of the war, termined. In Burco (1991), the elders politicians, military officers, business- the elders instigated a number of made a decision to end the union with men, intellectuals and secretaries.34 peace and reconciliation conferences former Italian Trust territory of Soma- with the view to mend broken rela- lia. At the Boorama conference (1993), Inter-clan Reconciliations tionships between Issaq and non-Is- often described as “the height” 41 of all The first crucial task the elders picked saq clans. However, they did not do the clan conferences, the elders laid was reconciliation and confidence much to redress schisms within the out the hybrid institutional frame- building between communities SNM and various Issaq sub-clans. work of the state. A national guurti of whose relations has been damaged This has proved costly in the sense Somaliland was formally and perma- by the war. This is because the war that two rounds of violence between nently institutionalized as the upper in the north was not only between factions of the SNM and clan affili- house of the parliament and the high- the Issaq dominated SNM and the ated militias turned Somaliland in est organ of the state. Somali National Army but also be- to a battle ground. The first round of tween the SNM forces and non-Issaq fighting occurred between 1992-1993, The Hargeisa conference, held from clan militias, armed by Siad Bare to while the second – the more severe October 1996 to Feburary 1997, took fight against the SNM and the Issaq. and protracted one – happened be- the country to the next level. 42 It trans- Hence, when the SNM took control tween 1994-1996. Existing historical formed Somaliland from a clan based of the northwest following the end rivalries between intra Issaq clans, governance system into a multi party of the war, there were fears of retri- competition for power and control of democracy. At the conference, elders bution among non Issaq-clans. This, key resource centers – Burco, Berbera approved a draft constitution that re- however, did not happen to the credit and Hargeisa – were the major deriv- placed the national charter (adopted of elders. ers of the conflict. at the Boorama conference) and en- dorsed a schedule for a transition Reconciliation efforts are dated to as The violence raging between clan af- from the clan system of governance to early as 1989 in which Issaq elders, filiated militias of the Issaq, the reso- a democratic multi party system.43 who were members of the guurti of lution of these conflicts needed an 38 the SNM, signed a ceasefire with external third party intervention. was a transient organization established by So- 35 elders of the Dhulbahante. Such en- Initial efforts of mediation by the Is- maliland intellectuals in Dispora with the prime deavors were intensively carried out saq guurti met with resistance and objective of mediating the 1994-1996 conflict. locally, regionally and nationally af- proved unsuccessful. As a result, in The work of the committee illustrates the sig- 36 nificance of citizen and community based peace ter the end of the war. In a series of both cases, the violence was stopped initiatives. The committee facilitated meetings meetings and clan conferences, elders with an intervention of third party between elders of the parties in the conflict and from Issaq, the Gadabuursi and Dhul- mediators from Somaliland and the financed the negotiation processes. Their ef- Diaspora. The first round of violence forts bore fruit preventing the degeneration of Somaliland in to a Somalia type quagmire. For was brought to an end with an inter- 33 WSP International Somali Program more on the Peace committee, see Farah, A. Yu- (2005) Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibili- vention of Gadabuursi elders, while suf and Bryden, Matt (n.d) The Peace Committee ties. Asmara: Red sea presse Inc, p. 64; the Bur- the second one was stopped with me- for Somaliland: Case study of a Grass Roots Peace- co (1991), Boorama (1993) and Hargeisa (1997) diation efforts of a peace committee making Initiative, UNDP emergencies Unit from Ethiopia. conferences were the three major national con- from the Diaspora called Somaliland ferences that involved all the northern clans. Farah and Lewis, p. 358 39 40 The Sanaag Grand Peace and Reconciliation Peace Committee. 41 Farah and Lewis, p. 350 conference among clans of the Sanaag region 42 Bradbury, et al, 2003, p. 462 was the major peace conference at regional 43 Hansen and Bradbury, p.464; the level. Others were mainly local involving two 37 Renders, 2012, p.88 multiparty system kicked off with the conduct or more clans. 38 Farah and Lewis, 1993 in Bradbury, district elections in December 2002 and a presi- 34 Bradbury, 1999, p. 73 Mark (2008) Becoming Somaliland. Catholic In- dential election in April 2003. Yet the proper 35 Renders, 2012, p.88 stitute for International Relations; Interpeace functioning of the system was challenged by 36 Interpeace and Academy for Peace and Academy for Peace and Development, p.20 several factors, primarily, by the traditional and Development, p.15 39 The Somaliland peace committee kinship system. At times, elders were reluctant

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Other Explaining Factors history of intermingling, interaction Conclusions Although bottom up efforts of peace and intermarriage.48 Over the years, To conclude, notwithstanding the cru- and state building were crucial, there this has culminated in the develop- cial role played by elders, peace and were also other factors which contrib- ment a common Xeer.49 In addition, stability in Somaliland is an outcome uted to peace and stability in Soma- shared values among the northern of a convergence of pre-war and post liland.44 These include: the weight of clans were also reflected by the com- war factors. The elders in the north had indigenous institutions, the extent of position of the SNM. Although it the political space and platform due the war in the north, the existence of remained a predominantly Issaq or- to their active pre-war involvement. common values and cross cutting in- ganization, the SNM was also able to In addition, after 1991, the post war terests, and a limited resource base in attract members from the non-Issaq dynamics in Somaliland, particularly, the north. clans. These non-Issaq members of the absence of international technical the organization were instrumental in and financial help which other post Weight of Indigenous Institutions the reconciliation between Issaq and conflict countries receive, pushed So- Against all the purge under colonial non-Issaq clans after the war. Nego- malilanders to look in to themselves powers and post colonial state of So- tiations between the Issaq and Gad- and rely on domestic resources. This malia, indigenous institutions in the abuursi, for instance, were facilitated internal focus in turn has enhanced north seem to have survived better by the efforts of Abdirahamn aw Ali the legitimacy and effectiveness of than those in the south.45 In the wake Farah, one of the few SNM command- post war peace and state building ef- of the total collapse of the apparatus ers from Gadabuursi. 50 forts. In contrast, in southern and cen- of the Somali state in 1991, indig- Besides all these, there were also tral Somalia, there existed a number enous institutions in the north were strong shared economic interests of incentives to compete and fight for. on guard to shoulder their traditional among the clans in the north which Weakened by years of an anti-tribal- responsibility of reconciliation and served as powerful incentives to ism campaign, and with some of them peacemaking than those in the South. peace. The Dhulbahante and the aligning with warlords of their own Warsengeli, for instance, have invest- clans, elders in the south were not in The Extent of the War in the North ments in the traditional Issaq territo- a position to pick up their traditional Although there were clashes between ries of Burco, Berbera and Hargeisa.51 roles of reconciliation and peacemak- the SNM and non-Issaq clan militias, ing. Besides, the vast resource base the war in the north was mainly con- Too little to fight for made available from internal and ex- centrated in the Issaq held territory. The resource base which existed right ternal sources at the wake of the war The destruction and killing between after the end of the war is another provided an enormous motivation for northern clans in the north was rela- major explaining factor to peace and which to compete and fight. Further- tively limited compared to that in the stability in the north. As opposed to more, unlike the north where the Is- south.46 This limited scope of the war the south, there was relatively little saq dominated SNM has emerged as in the north has later on provided a incentive for fighting in the north.52 a powerful force, there was no any political space for a smooth process of Following the demise of the Somali clear dominant group that emerged reconciliation. In addition, in winning state in 1991, there was “a wealthy re- from the war in the south. Hence, in the war, the Issaqs had emerged as source base” in the south.53 Infrastruc- the absence of such a power to dictate powerful actors inducing non-Issaqs ture, industry and agriculture were peace, the various clan based militias to opt for peace rather than violence. developed in the south. Mogadishu, kept on fighting for years. In contrast, the armed forces in the the political capital to fight for, hap- South were more or less in a compa- pened to be in the South. Foreign aid rable fire power; and this has pushed was quite concentrated in the south. them towards more violence than ne- In the north, on the other hand, many gotiation.47 of these conditions were absent. The north has always been an economic Shared values and Common Interests periphery. Foreign aid was not avail- among Northern clans able. There was just little money; little It also appears that northern clans problem. have maintained relatively closer socio - cultural linkages and eco- nomic interdependence than those 48 Bradbury, 1999, p. 66 in the south. The clans in the north, 49 According to the elders I have spo- ken to, minimum codes of conduct (Xeer) which whose composition is not as diverse protect women, children and prisoners existed as those in the South, have a long among the northern clans during the war. See also Bradbury, Mark (1999) The Somalia conflict: Prospects of Peace. An Oxfam working Paper : to accept electoral results that do not properly Oxfam UK and Ireland reflect traditional power sharing formulas. 50 Interpeace and Academy for Peace 44 Farah and Lewis, p. 350 and Development, p. 17-18 45 Bradbury, 1999, p. 66 51 Bradbury, 1999, p. 66 46 Ibid 52 Farah and Lewis, p. 349 47 Farah and Lewis, p. 349 53 Bradbury, 1999, p. 68

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Berbera, Somaliland

6 June 2010, Somalia, Photo | YoTut

34 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGES TO PEACE FOR SOMALILAND Although Somaliland’s sovereignty remains unrecognized by any country, the state boasts a functioning constitutional democracy and has enjoyed relative peace, stability and a flourishing rule of law since 1991. Yet, the country is not free from social, economic and political hurdles that impede its progress towards the national vision of a brighter and secure future for its entire people.

by Adam Haji-Ali Ahmed

Director Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies University of Hargeisa, Somaliland

Introduction

Since the collapse of Somalia’s central the SNM leadership inherited a re- rently compounded and aggravated government in early 1991, the people gion devastated by war in which tens by poverty, unemployment, a youth- of Somaliland and their government of thousands of people were killed, bulge and poor economic conditions. have managed to survive and steer half the population was displaced, Some scholars even extend these chal- clear of the chaotic circumstances that the main cities of Hargeisa and Burco lenges up to political complications besieged South Somalia. The country were destroyed and the countryside inter alia lack of recognition, since no was able to avoid the depredation of was left littered with mines and unex- state recognizes Somaliland sover- the warlords and radical Islamists ploded ordinance (Abokor, 2005). eignty and political tensions and inse- that has afflicted the rest of Somalia curity exist in the eastern parts of the by organizing and holding locally In the present-day, the country is still country. driven reconciliation and peace con- reeling from and continues to experi- ferences convened and led by clan ence challenges that emanated from On the other hand, it is widely rec- elders and initially by the Somali Na- that decade long conflict (1982-1991) ognized that the Somaliland govern- tional Movement (SNM) leaders. between the people of Somaliland and ment does not have the adequate ca- In the early days of state-building, the Siyad Barre regime, which is cur- pability to bring effective solutions

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to address these issues, which need ence from the rest of Somalia and come goes to the large security forces quick-fixes and immediate remedies formed the Republic of Somaliland in with almost complete neglect of the so as to avoid, or at least to reduce, 1991. Nevertheless, in the early days social sector and other developmental their potential negative consequenc- of the state-formation, the country ex- services. It is the UN agencies and the es.1 perienced several years of inter-clan international NGOs6 that played a sig- conflicts and social disruptions which nificant role in the regeneration and CONTEXT ANALYSIS in turn exacerbated the destruction of investment in the basic social services the entire basic social and economic including health, education, water, The Republic of Somaliland is locat- amenities. Although the international and promotion of human rights etc. ed at the tip of Horn of Africa. It is community has not recognized So- geographically positioned at a junc- maliland’s declaration of independ- The existence of al-Shabaab, a radi- ture between the Horn and the Ara- ence, the people of Somaliland have cal Islamist movement with links bian Peninsula, with coastline on the successfully managed a process of to al-Qaeda, and the weak nature of red sea. Somaliland has experienced reconciliation, demobilisation of the Federal Government of Somalia, and suffered from the devastation of fighters, restoration of law and- or have negative implications for the many years of civil war and internal der and creation of a constitutionally peace and security of Somaliland, as conflicts that resulted in extensive based government. Furthermore, the demonstrated by the deadly 2008 ter- poverty, violence, heavy internal dis- government has been able to render rorist-attacks in Hargeisa, the capital placement and total collapse of basic some social and economic services to city of Somaliland. Thus, the presence infrastructures throughout the coun- its population and continued to build of al-Shabaab and its evolving mode try. The rate of life expectancy, infant and maintain peace and stability at all of operation are a clear indication and maternal mortality2, morbidity, costs. that there are growing and expected as well as, level of literacy3 have all threats to the peace of Somaliland in remained among the most severe in Despite all that, Somaliland faces particular, and the Horn of Africa re- the world. In 1988, the Siyad Bare re- some significant challenges that can gion in general. As a security expert gime committed war-crimes against damage its continued future sur- explained, the attack of al-Shabaab on the people of Somaliland, which was vival. The country is deprived of the Nariobi Westgate mall, where 67 among the events that led to the de- meaningful international aid due to were killed and lot of others were in- mise of Somalia’s central government the absence of international recogni- jured, was a significant and alarming through regional based armed rebel- tion, which prevents access to badly step which shows that al-Shabaab’s lions. As result, the people of Soma- needed external assistance. It also re- operations are expanding in the re- liland later declared their independ- stricts the possibilities for developing gion (AMISOM Daily Media Monitor- international trade relations and dis- ing, 2013). On the other hand, Richard courages inward investment. Thus, Dowden, head of Britian’s Royal Afri- 1 In order to respond to this arduous situation, the Institute of Peace and Conflict given the meager levels of interna- can Society, warned that the Westgate 4 Studies at the University of Hargeisa, as an aca- tional assistance recovery has largely mall attack was a clear indicator that demic institution, has devoted effort and time been achieved through the resources the operations of al-Shabaab have to produce this policy paper, with the existence of Somalilanders themselves, particu- shifted from Somalia alone, becoming of time constraints, to bring these alarming is- 5 sues into attention, since it’s quite evident that larly through Diaspora remittances a global threat like Al-Qaeda (iKenya, most of the people of Somaliland have little or (Abokor, 2005). 2013). On the same token, there are no information about the detrimental conse- local sympathisers of the al-Shabaab quences of these challenges to the peace and The government has also been fac- and groups who share the same ide- stability of the country. ing increasing budgetary constraints ology which can align them and pose 2 The infant mortality rate in the five years preceding the survey is 72 deaths per 1000 caused by a lack of a consistent and dangers across the eastern Africa re- live births and the under-five mortality rate is reliable taxation base coupled with gion, such as Kenya’s Islamist Al-Hi- 91 deaths per 1000 live births. This means one high expenditure on the security sec- jra group.7 in every 14 children die before reaching age tor. Almost 65% of the national in- one, while one in every 11 children does not survive to their fifth birthday. This data was INTERNAL CHALLENGES retrieved from http://www.unicef.org/somalia/ SOM_resources_somalilandmics4sum.pdf (ac- 4 Most of the international assistance Incompatibility of the Traditional cessed November, 15, 2013). comes from UN agencies and other internation- Structures and Modern Government 3 From the Net Attendance Ratios (ad- al non-governmental organizations related to justed), school attendance is low and only 51 soft aid including humanitarian aid, livelihood System percent of children at primary school age (6 to related support through local NGOs and some 13 years) are attending primary school and only short projects. Direct investment and loans are 21 percent of children of secondary school age not available due to the lack of international 6 The main UN agencies and other IN- (14 to 17 years) are attending secondary school. recognition. However, the Somaliland Trust GOs operating in Somaliland include: UNDP, More boys than girls are attending primary fund has recently been launched but not yet UNCEF, UNHCR, WFP, FOA, ILO, UNSOM school; the Gender Parity Index (GPI) is 0.9. fully implemented. , WHO, UNODC, IOM, Handicap interna- However, in secondary school the GPI drops to 5 The amount of money which comes tional, COOPI, NRC, DRC, SCF, Caritas, Life 0.7, indicating that even fewer girls than boys through remittances is estimated to be 500 Mil- and Peace, World Vision, COSPE , THET, DIA- attend secondary school, retrieved from http:// lion USD in comparison to the 1.5 Billion USD USAID, TIS-USAID, FCA-Finland, Action Aid. www.unicef.org/somalia/SOM_resources_so- GNP of the country as forecasted by the Minis- 7 UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, malilandmics4sum.pdf, (accessed November try of Planning, but no exact data on the issue final report July 2013 (UN Monitoring Group 15, 2013). exists. 2013).

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Reflections on Somaliland’s perspec- judicial10 systems should be realigned Youth-bulge tives on peace and development in rather than continuing as two parallel The majority of Somaliland popula- the last 20 years show that the tra- and conflicting systems. tion, for both genders, is below the ditional elders played the central age of 30 years and constitutes 75 per- and legitimate role in the creation of Economic Challenges cent of the entire population12. These peace in Somaliland. Furthermore, it As long as Somaliland is not officially youth are confronted with the exist- seemed obvious that they should be recognized it will be blocked from ence of difficult challenges including involved in the future formation of getting direct funding and interna- chronic unemployment13. Youth are state structures. The Somali culture tional loans apart from soft aid. As the key to Somaliland’s future exist- recognizes the traditional leaders as result of this, the country is plunged ence and continue to be relentless the representatives of the clans. They into a situation characterized by a players and advocates of social trans- speak on behalf of their clan and have semi-permanent economic crises and formation and development in many full authority to make decisions on financial dire straits which brought spheres of life. They make an essen- their behalf. However, it’s arguable about the inability of attending to es- tial contribution to today’s societies whether this traditional system is sential basic infrastructure. and are expected to prepare a better compatible with the modern political Obviously, lack of International rec- future for the coming generations. To- systems, such as multi-party democ- ognition may act as an impediment to day’s young people are considerably racy, since kinship politics provide economic growth, but it’s not the sole more educated and have high expec- fertile ground for patronage, corrup- reason for a lack of development in tations of a better life than the older tion, nepotism and clanism8. Somaliland. Flawed government poli- generation. cy choices and action is also to blame. Certain factors, which are of critical Hence, the foremost challenge that importance in realizing these expec- Somaliland is faced with today is The government11 should strive to put tations, are that youth are limited in how to strengthen governmental in- the economy at the heart of its poli- their access to quality education and stitutions and reduce the influence of cies and plans and not wait for an oil employment opportunities. Soma- traditional structures. Since Somali- boom or international recognition to liland’s young people have limited land’s government structures and its address the needs of its populace. The opportunities when it comes to job judiciary system were initially built government needs to substantially in- markets. The absence of proper in- on a clan based policy approach, crease the mechanisms of tax collec- frastructure and public commitment which has revealed numerous weak- tion and revenue generation. The So- produced chronic unemployment, ness, it is necessary today to reverse maliland government must also regu- which could turn into negative social that system and employ new modern late the economy to ensure its smooth momentum in the present and future. methods that allow institutions, such transition and economic growth. The Thus, to respond to this conundrum, as the executive, legislatives and judi- role of the central bank is currently the Somaliland government should ciary on the one hand and traditional bounded to limited services including strive to create more jobs through de- structures on the other to work jointly saving accounts and needs urging to velopment and infrastructure projects together and find a balance of power expand its services. to alleviate the saturated unemploy- and which particularly, produces and ment rate of the country. makes available capable law enforce- ment agencies. Moreover, the custom- to_somaliland_law.html (accessed November Human Trafficking 9 16, 2013). ary law xeer and the official or formal 10 As an unpublished UNDP-ROLS In recent years, Somaliland’s youth of Somali Report about ““the Judiciary system re- both sexes have become the victims of form strategy in Somaliland” mentioned, that locally and regionally organized hu- 8 The Monitoring Group has gathered there are 155 Judges across the country and 53 man trafficking operations. As noted information on growing commercial interest in prosecutors (26 Deputy Attorney General and Somalia’s oil and gas sector and has identified 27 Prosecutors) including female prosecutors. by the International Organization for 14 a number of conflicts of interest that could con- This is the first time for women to be included Migration (IOM) irregular migration stitute threats to peace and security as well as in the justice system in Somaliland and Soma- exacerbate the risks of corruption. There is cur- lia. rently growing hostility that could also repre- 12 The Population of Somaliland is 3.5 11 The government consists of three sent a possible threat to peace and security, re- Million, retrieved from http://www.unpo.org/ branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the trieved from http://www.securitycouncilreport. members/7916 (accessed November 16, 2013). Judiciary Branch. The separation of the power org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- 13 According to a survey by the UNDP, of these branches are set out in the Constitu- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_440.pdf (accessed the unemployment rate for the population be- tion. The Executive Branch (sometimes referred November 15, 2013). tween 15-64 years of age in Somaliland is 70.4%. to as “the Government”), is headed by the elect- For youth (ages 15-29 years) unemployment 9 Xeer is a customary Law which is ed President and consists of the President, The is 84.2%, UNDP, Somalia Human Develop- followed by different clans in Somalia and So- vice-President, and the Council of Ministers ap- ment Report 2012 retrieved from http://www. maliland while the formal judiciary system is pointed by the President. The Parliament of So- so.undp.org (accessed November 15, 2013).” based on the secular and other codified laws.. maliland consists of 164 members (House Rep- The interplay of customary law, Islamic law resentatives and the Guurti and each of them 14 Information regarding trafficking and the initially transplanted European-based consists of 82 members), The local councils of in Somalia remains extremely difficult to ob- statutory laws gave Somaliland a mixed legal Somaliland contain 375 members across the tain or verify. However, the Somali territory is system in which all three strands not only vied country, this information was retrieved from believed to be a source and transit country for for supremacy at various times and in different Somalilandlaw.com, (accessed November 13, men, women, and children subjected to forced areas of life, but also carved respective niches in 2013). labor and sex trafficking. As in previous years, which each played a dominant role, retrieved trafficking victims were primarily trafficked from http://somalilandlaw.com/introduction_ within the country from Somalia’s south and

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has dramatically increased among deemed reasonably free and fair by to the inability to obtain bi-lateral or the youth in Somaliland, particular- international observers. The Nation- multi-lateral aid and financial loans ly among school-leavers, secondary al Electoral Commission (NEC) also from the global community. There school and university students and proved its capacity and credibility in is a drastic economic lethargy and graduates in all the major towns. As overseeing the democratic process general under-development in the a result, there have been serious nega- (Abokor, 2005). However, Somaliland country that is impeding social and tive social, economic, and psychoso- elections have become a real threat to economic progress, and this requires cial repercussions on the country as a peace as the system of democracy is international assistance to deal with whole. a novelty with an unpredictable end effectively17. Otherwise, the country’s result or tail spin for the people and delicate peace may be disrupted and This ill-fated process of human traf- their way of life. it may fall into the bottomless pit of ficking generally involves two path- Apparently, although multi-party de- chaos that swallowed and destroyed ways. The first trend is taking peo- mocracy in Somaliland was intend- the South of Somalia. ple from Ethiopia to Yemen whereby ed to move Somaliland away from Somaliland acts as a corridor and clan-based politics, the influence of International and regional Terrorist another one is carrying people from clan politics on the elections remains Organizations Somaliland to Europe through Libya strong. Every election creates a po- It is a known fact that there are well- and the Mediterranean Sea. There are litically charged atmosphere, which organized terrorist factions, such as also well-organized human traffick- raises anxiety among the population. al-Shabaab, that have links with al- ing groups that operate as a network Thus, on the one hand, there is the Qaeda and other international terror throughout the region from Libya to fear of the possibility that every mi- groups, which have bases in Somalia Somaliland and from Somaliland to nor disagreement about the election and that carry out operations in the Yemen. This is a real danger that may results could escalate into more open region. These groups are very likely jeopardize the peace and stability of conflict among the competing politi- to inflict damage on Somaliland be- the country both now and in the near cal groups and on the other hand, the cause its security and anti-terrorist future. country cannot economically afford forces are inexperienced and have to hold elections every two years. limited capabilities. Therefore these The general public sentiment is that forces need to be trained, coached and the prevalence of irregular migration EXTERNAL CHALLENGES strengthened. The threat of terror- of youth in Somaliland has reached ism is an international phenomenon, alarming levels and is getting out of Lack of International recognition which Somaliland shares with the hand. Therefore, there is an urgent Lack of International recognition is rest of the world. A good example is public appeal for irregular migration a stumbling block to the peace and what took place at the Westgate Mall to be addressed in a holistic and com- progress of Somaliland since it denies in Nairobi, Kenya, in September 2013. prehensive manner by focusing on its the country access to international root causes, responding to its effects economic linkages and assistance. Talks between Somaliland and So- and improving international coopera- Thus the main economic and resource malia tion. The effort of containing this so- re-distributor and development of The current government of Somali- cial crisis should be spearheaded by the country is the small taxation land, led by President Ahmed Silan- the government in collaboration with 16that is imposed on its people due yo, approved of holding talks with regional and international bodies. the weak Federal government of So- malia (of course with public support) Frequent Elections which the Coun- to a number of political parties. However, the to determine the future relationship constitution limits the number of parties able to try Cannot Afford take part in the national elections to three. To of the two states. Two rounds of these The multi-party elections present a become an accredited party, political organiza- talks have already taken place18 with- number of challenges for Somaliland. tions held district council elections in 2001 and out any major breakthroughs and the In the first place, Somaliland has dem- 2012 and had to gain 20 per cent of the votes third round is due to take place early in four of Somaliland’s six regions. The current onstrated that it had the capacity to ruling party is called Kulmiye Party and there next year. These talks are surrounded hold peaceful elections15, which were are also two opposition political parties, UCID by many circumstances and challeng- and Wadani, retrieved from http://www.sonsaf. es that the government of Somaliland org/Files/SOMALILAND_ELECTIONS_RE- central regions to the Puntland and Somalil- VIEW.pdf (accessed November 17, 2013). and regions in the north, retrieved from http:// 16 The following are the different types 17, 2013). www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/192369.htm of taxes which the Somaliland state is collect- (accessed November 17, 2013). ing: Local Government Unified Tariffs Law No. 17 International support such as direct 12/2000 (Somali), Ports Tariffs Law (it is be- investments and loans from the international lieved that this law is based on the 1985 Regula- financial system are not possible in the current 15 The Somaliland constitution defines tions), Circulation Tax Law No. 82/96, Sales Tax status of Somaliland. 65% of the revenue that a political system that is based on a democratic Law No. 84/96, Registration Tax Law No. 83/96, Somaliland collects from its citizens is spent multi-party structure, in which the head of Aviation & Airport Tax Law 10/1999, Airports on security related activities. The government state, parliament and district councils are di- Security Tariffs Law - Law No. 61/2013, Post does not directly handle aid received from the rectly elected by the public through a secret & Telecommunication Taxes Law No. 11/1999, UN and INGOs. ballot. Since Somaliland’s politics is very much Public Contracts Law No. 79/1996, retrieved 18 The first meeting was held in June dominated by competing clan interests, the ad- from http://somalilandlaw.com/somaliland_ 2012 at Chevening House, UK and the second vent of multi-party politics in 2001 gave birth public_finance_law.html ( accessed November round was in Ankara, Turkey in 2013.

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needs to take into account. Firstly, • The youth migration must be these talks are non-binding and there- addressed by developing a lasting so- fore may lead nowhere; secondly the lution, such as by creating job oppor- Somalia federal government enjoys tunities for them. a critical advantage over Somaliland • The Somaliland political sys- including juridical recognition, which tem needs a concerted national effort, implies privileged access to external consultation and dialogue in order to resources19. Therefore, the govern- resolve the contradictions between ment of Somaliland needs to be very the traditional system and the democ- careful and conduct wider consulta- ratisation process, which Somaliland tion with both local and international has embraced. This will take some experts before taking the talks to any time but requires sound strategies. further serious stages otherwise it can cause an internal conflict and back- lash at home.

Recommendations References • The Somaliland government needs to prioritise the urgent national Abokor, Adan Y., Kibble, Steve, Brad- issues and shift the focus to solving bury, Mark, Yusuf, Haroon A. and the current circumstances within the Barret, Georgina (2005) Further Steps country that may put the peace and to Democracy: The Somaliland Parlia- stability of the country at risk. The mentary Elections. Progressio: Lon- above stated impediments and chal- don. lenges like weak institutions, unem- ployment, human trafficking and ter- Omar, J. 2000 ‘Somaliland: A model of rorist threats need to be reviewed and Community-Owned Peace and Gov- should be presented to Somaliland’s ernance Building in the Horn. ‘Insti- international supporters as immedi- tute for Practical Research and Train- ate concerns. ing, Nov 6, 2013. Available from http: • When it comes to challenges // www.iprt.org. Retrieved November from global or regional terrorist and 6. 2013 human trafficking actors, Somaliland has to work closely with countries Suleiman, Farhan A. 2013. ‘Soma- in the region in areas of security and liland: Unemployment the Youth Di- protection to tackle the issues effec- lemma’ Nov 4, 2013. Available from tively. http: //www.somalilandpress.com. • International recognition is Retrieved November 4, 2013. a significant issue, which needs the development of a new creative and Ikenya, “Al-Shabaab poses region- adroit strategy. Part of this strategy al threat after Westgate attack” is to proceed skilfully with the talks 2013, IKenya, http://www.ikenya. with Somalia. Somaliland-Somalia net/2013/10/18/al-shabaab-poses-re- talks should have a clear strategic gional-threat-after-westgate-attack/ agenda, which avoids the path to a new round of war. UNSC, “ Security Council re- • The areas of long running port concerned Somalia and Eri- conflict such as the eastern regions teria”, 2013, UNSC, http://www. must be settled peacefully and - for securitycouncilreport.org/atf/ mally. cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_415.pdf 19 The Agenda was to open dialogue for the future setting between Somaliland and AMISOM, “ Al-Shabaab Regional Somalia but the talks were very difficult be- Threats” AMISOM, http://somaliame- cause the two agendas prepared by the two diamonitoring.org/october-18-2013- parties were completely opposite each other. Somaliland wanted to convince their brother daily-monitoring-report/ Somalia to let go and accept their statehood but in contrast the delegation from Somalia attended in order to convince Somaliland that Unity is in the interest of both parties. From the international community, there has been no direct mediation but they are monitoring the negotiation between the two parties.

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Untying the camel

Photo | Shafi

40 DOES SUCCESSFUL PEACEBUILDING LEAD TO SUCCESSFUL STATEBUILDING? Somaliland’s 20 yearlong remarkable degree of stability has not translated into an effective state-building process. Diffused corruption, HYBRID institutions, misuse of power, and a half-baked democracy have failed to shift the country from the past Somali state-building experience.

by Abdifatah Ismael Tahir

Research Advisor at Observatory of Violence and Conflict Prevention PhD Candidate at Geography Dept University of Sussex, United Kingdom

Introduction

Peacebuilding in Somaliland1 is cel- it was established3, peacebuilding in ings between the clans opposed/loyal ebrated mainly because of the ab- Somaliland has yet to produce the to the Somali National Movement, an sence of a significant conflict, in sharp state envisaged by the people. This is armed group which was instrumental contrast with the prolonged wars in due to the fact that the emergent state in the removal of the Somali military south central Somalia where conflicts in Somaliland is not necessarily free dictator, Mohamed Siyad Barre, from rage between evolving factions. The from the conditions that led to the power. After the ousting of Barre, apparent assumption in this is that collapse of the Somali state of which most of the northern regions fell into peacebuilding and state-building are it was formally a part4. the hands of SNM and there was lit- mutually inclusive. However, if we tle or no resistance to their dominance go beyond the tendency to rationalise Building peace for statehood? by the less armed clans in the region. success by its face value2 and measure Peace in Somaliland begun at the This facilitated the SNM in pursuing the state against the object for which grassroots level with clan based meet- a policy of trying to win the hearts and minds of anti SNM clans by en- couraging inter clan dialogues (Farah 3 i.e. the need to establish an integral 1 Formerly, the northern regions of state & Lewis 1997). Lured by the success Somalia 4 Somaliland is not internationally of these small scale peace initiatives, 2 i.e. the restoration of rule of law recognised but is accepted as a de jure state.

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the SNM embarked on the bigger en- perceive that their due share in the While Somalia is yet to have an inte- deavour of organising the first major state is not given, those who have a gral state, the other forms described peace and reconciliation conference in solid interest in maintaining lawless- by Samatar and Samatar (2002) were Burao in 1991 (Bradbury 2008). In this ness, and those who are used to the at one point or another in place. For conference, the aim was to enhance status quo and seek to minimise the instance during the immediate post- SNM’s legitimacy in the region but it risks that may emerge from the new colonial context of 1960-1969 the state went far beyond this and declared in- state institutions. In Somaliland the could be categorised as prebendal due dependence from the rest of Somalia first category presented the most to the fact that most of those in power against the wish of SNM’s top leader- threat to peacebuilding and state for- were actively involved in state re- ship (Ismail 2009). In spite of initial mation and this is that which Egal was sources misappropriation. When the popular public approval following able to overcome. Egal’s neutralisa- military took over in 1969, the state the declaration of independence, po- tion of spoilers facilitated peace talks passed through a metamorphic proc- litical conflicts erupted initially in between the warring parties both at ess which initially started with a de- Burao and later in Berbera between the community and political level. velopmental approach in the 1970s the Isaq sub-clans mainly in relation At the community level, clan based at the expense of civil liberty, but to the sharing of the political and eco- peace initiatives aimed at healing the turned into a predatory form of state nomic resources of the newly found- scars of the conflict and at facilitating in the 1980’s in which public offices ed state. a conducive environment for politi- were treated as private property, and cal agreements between the warring finally became a cadaverous state in The second major peace conference sides began in various villages on which the remaining state structures in Somaliland was a response to this both sides of the divide while, at the were dismantled through an armed conflict and it occurred in Sheikh in political level, politicians from both conflict that sent the whole country October 1992 to bring the clashes to camps demonstrated a willingness to up in flames. In the immediate post an end and lay the foundation for a compromise for the peace to prevail Barre dispensation, there was a desire larger conference aimed at reinvent- and the state-building to continue. to depart from the past flawed state- ing and giving impetus to the new building approaches and create an state. This conference was held in Bo- Regardless of the strategies adopted integral state able to enhance a nation rama in 1993 and was largely manip- to overcome these hurdles, it is im- building process based on both indi- ulated by urban based elites such as portant to note that the central object vidual and communal rights. In this businessmen and professionals who of the peacebuilding process in Soma- form of state, the emphasis is placed organised and prepared the agendas, liland was to build a state. The impor- on two key elements: 1) the delivery of formed the core technical committees, tant question here then becomes what public goods in an accessible, equitable, and deployed secretariats to assist the kind of state Somaliland desired to accountable and transparent manner elders in their deliberations (Farah achieve. To understand this, it is im- and 2) a generation of ‘moral and intel- & Lewis 1997). The most significant perative to make reference to the re- lectual bonding’ where the citizens are state-building outcome of this confer- cent Somali state-building experience, treated as individuals with guaran- ence was the fact that the SNM ad- as this would allow us to comprehend teed civil rights. ministration was removed and that a the form of state Somaliland wished non SNM leader, Mohamed Ibrahim to avoid creating. In their book, Afri- Post Conflict Hybrid State-building Egal, was elected. Egal’s election did can state: reconsiderations, Samatar and While the peace process did not re- not, however, go unchallenged as Samatar (2002) identify five forms of sult in the expected form of state, it some sections of the major clans re- African states, namely: 1) the integral enabled Somaliland to experiment fused to recognise his administration state, where the state delivers public with a hybrid political order involv- which led to renewed armed conflict goods and generates ‘moral and intel- ing both the ‘traditional’5 institutions which broke out in the capital Hargei- lectual bonding’ with its populace; 2) such as the elders and ‘modern’6 state sa and Burao in 1994 and lasted until the developmental state where the state bureaucracies. This political order 1997. According to Balthasar (2013) focuses on the productivity and eco- attracted significant attention from Egal used this conflict as a means to nomic wellbeing of its people even at academic circles (See Walls & Kibble build a viable bureaucratic state by in- the ‘cost of civil liberty’; 3) the preb- 2010; Hagmann & Péclard 2010) cre- tegrating those perceived to be spoil- endal state where the state is ‘preoc- ating an impression that successful ers into his administration and doing cupied’ with the creation and main- peacebuilding in Somaliland led to away with them after neutralising tenance of the personal interests of successful state-building. Notwith- their spoiling ability. those in power; 4) the predatory state standing the fact that the hybrid state- where order and law break down and Egal’s strategy of neutralising the public services are openly abused, 5 Tradition is here used in a limited spoilers carries weight when read to- and 5) the cadaverous state where the sense of referring to the governance systems gether with Menkhaus’s (2003) prop- remaining skeleton of the state struc- that have their historical roots in the pre-colo- osition of the challenges a spoiler can ture are demolished and the state is nial Somali society present to peacebuilding. He identi- either on its deathbed or already in 6 Modern is used in a limited sense of referring to the forms of governance that have fies three types of spoilers in southern the coffin. been recently adopted from outside the Somali Somalia, namely: those spoilers who populated peninsula i.e. western or eastern models of governance.

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building processes were useful in the ing Abdirahman Ahmed Ali’s term7, While most parties in Somaliland immediate post conflict context of the emergent state was almost mod- present their commitment to genuine Somaliland, they have been rightly elled on the SNM’s organisational democratic changes, they also most critiqued for containing elements that structure. When Egal took over, the vigorously take clan lines on national limit progress and democratic devel- political landscape he created resem- issues and these could create a po- opment (Battera 2009). This is due bled the patrimonial state of the 1960’s tential political conflict. This was at to the fact that the Guurti – which is criticised by scholars as corrupt elite its riskiest moment in the 2010 elec- the arm of government rooted in the centric polity (Samatar 1989). Over tion where parties were campaign- ‘traditional’ system – have on many the course of Dahir Rayale’s8 tenure, ing along explosive clan lines and occasions hindered the democratic a securo-centric9 state mirrored on the stakes in this election were higher process by either extending their term Barre’s regime was reproduced, while than any other before it. The two op- in office or extending that of theex- the present administration stands position camps, Kulmiye and UCID, ecutive (Render 2007). accused of adopting a “clanist” ap- represented most of the population proach to governance which again is in the centre of the country and there Equally Hoehne (2013) criticised the the SNM’s favourite method of mobi- was a sense among their voters that hybrid order and outlined a number lisation. Taken together, the metamor- their desire to oust Rayale was not of weaknesses inherent to the ‘tradi- phosis of the state in Somaliland had less than a restoration of dignity and tional’ systems which get transferred produced a clan based politics (Adam pride. The leading opposition figure, to the state when the so called ‘tradi- 1994) which can best be characterised Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud Silan- tional’ and ‘modern’ systems are com- as divisive and a recipe for fragmen- yo, was a former SNM leader whose bined to form one political order. For tation. term in office was longer than any instance ‘traditional’ systems have a other. In the previous elections, he tendency of biasing against women Shifting towards democracy conceded defeat by a small margin (see also Seid & Jotte 2004) and there- As the fragmented nature of the of 80 votes and could not have pos- fore could present a threat to equita- emerging polity became clearer, there sibly allowed to accept defeat again, ble participation in the political proc- was an effort aimed at moving the as many of his senior party politicians ess in the country. This is evident in country away from clan based politics have publicly declared. the fact that there are only two female into a multi-party democracy (Brad- cabinet ministers and two members of bury et al. 2003). The aim here was to There is a general acknowledgement parliament in the national assemblies. mark a departure from the preceding that the adoption of multi-party sys- In addition, the hybrid order is char- forms of African state-building where tem of democracy in Somaliland was acterised by intrinsic imbalances de- greedy elites with a colonial mentality not successful in shifting the country monstrable by the fact that ‘modern’ assumed power through state engi- from clan based politics (Hansen & structures of the state dominate the neered elections aimed at guarantee- Bradbury 2007). In fact what the elec- incorporated ‘traditional’ structures ing the emergence of favourable can- tions have done is to recycle 1960s (Hoehne 2013). As is evident in these didates through various mechanisms multi-party politics in Somalia where critiques, the celebratory representa- that include the relegation of election every clan created its own political tion of the state in Somaliland over- exercises to friendly administrative party resulting in the formation of looks the problems inherent in the bodies, and the drawing or redrawing nearly 60 parties amid a corrupt po- interaction between ‘traditional’ and of constituency boundaries. These co- litical environment and of skewed ‘modern’ ways of governance which lonial and immediately post-colonial public perception towards the state. are ‘characterised by [not only] com- tactics of manipulating elections in In other words, the state was per- plementarity [but also] incompatibil- Africa (Branch 2006) continued into ceived as a resource and elections ity’ (Render 2007). the post-conflict political landscape of as a means to access this resource. A Somaliland. For instance Egal tailored good analogy of this is given by the More importantly, hybrid state-build- the constitution to his personal po- celebrated poet Mohamed Ibrahim ing failed to mark a departure from litical needs by including clauses ban- Warsame (1993) popularly known the preceding political orders as the ning certain political adversaries from as Hadrawi in a poem called Hal La state continues to recycle itself from contesting elections while Rayale al- Qalay10 loosely translated by Abdalla that which existed before it. Hoehne tered district boundaries to guarantee (2008) as the slaughter of a she-camel. In (2011) uses the concepts of mimesis emergence of favourable representa- the poem Hadrawi compares the state and mimics to demonstrate the re- tives in the houses of parliament and to a feast involving the sacrifice of a production of institutions on the ba- councils. large animal, a camel, but not large sis of those that existed before them. enough to be enjoyed by everyone. He His use of the concepts is limited but 7 Abdirahman Ahmed Ali popularly demonstrates how the state was con- could be expanded to make sense of known as Tuur was the first president of post- sidered as a shared resource and how the trajectory of state-building in So- conflict Somaliland and the leader of SNM maliland where the different adminis- when Barre was removed from power in 1991. trations reproduced certain aspects of 8 Rayale was the third president of 10 The poem was written in 1966 as a post-conflict Somaliland who took over the critique of the corrupt political order in Soma- the forms of institutions with which power following the death of Egal in 2002. lia where the state became the ultimate price they were familiar. For instance dur- 9 Concept of securo-centric was bor- for fiercely competitive and mostly corrupt rowed from Walls & Kibble (2011). elites.

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that ended in disappointment when former told me that public offices are as it shows how local people can re- those elected to office misappropri- full of corrupt people and if you send focus their mutual animosity and an- ated the resources themselves and did in a ‘clean man’ ‘your’ clan will miss tagonism – partly created by the poli- not bother about the well-being of the out on the national looting. Another ticians – into the positive energy of masses who put them in power. The informer also told me that a corrupt achieving peace and creating a state. poem was long but the part relevant official from your clan is better than On the other hand, however, state- to my point says: clean man from another clan. This building in Somaliland provides ex- perception feeds on the fact that when amples of avoidable drawbacks, self- A slaughtered she-camel, people are elected to office what more evident in the fact that a 20 year-long was fought over by many contenders. often than not happens is that the remarkable degree of relative stabil- In the ensuing confusion, close members of their clan become ity did not translate into an effective each person got hold of a tiny piece, empowered through the facilitation state-building process. This is due to and cooked it in the sun. of contracts or through employment the fact that the state of Somaliland Even the bones and skin, in the government. This practice leads has all the hallmarks of fragility, and were swallowed in the dry (read un- not only to an unsustainable level the list of examples that support this cooked). of employment in the government is long. They include rampant cor- What humors me most, where each appointed official brings ruption, weak institutions, misuse of are those who are still left, in several of his clan men thus putting power, and a half-baked democracy hungry for a share, a strain on the government coffers, that does not go far beyond the ques- seeing the smoke, but it also leads to a working environ- tionable periodic elections which the from high mountains, ment in which clan identity precedes International community often hails clambering down, merit and knowledge. If successful as free and fair for the obvious rea- to reach an empty spot state-building is to be understood as a son of avoiding to upset the delicate departure from past experience, this equilibrium. In other words calling a Two main things can be teased out of shows that the current processes were spade a spade could encourage losers the poem. One is the distinction be- unable to create a better environment to reject the outcome and undermine tween the elites and the masses. Here where ideas prevail as opposed to the stability in the region. If the peace the elites are those who assumed of- identity. process and state building are to be fice, looted the national resources successful, they have to be inclusive and spared nothing worth sparing for Conclusion and to reform context specific under- anyone else. The other group is com- In this article, I argued that peace- takings. prised of the masses who were made building and state-building proc- to believe that everybody should esses are mutually exclusive in the References have a share of the state’s resources Somaliland context. While the peace but who are yet to see this happen. It process led to the return of the rule of Abdulla, A., 2008. Somalia: As Predict- is important to understand that the law and stability, it failed to achieve ed by Hadrawi. Available at: http:// problem shown in the analogy does its object of creating an integral state www.hiiraan.com/print2_op/2008/ not so much lie in the manner through with institutional cultures and struc- feb/somalia_as_predicted_by_hadra- which those who got there shared the tures that are markedly different from wi.aspx [Accessed November 20, resource among themselves, but rath- the past Somali state-building expe- 2013]. er in the crisis that can emerge from rience. What instead it produced is the grievances of the masses whose a lopsided hybrid state in which the Adam, H.M., 1994. Formation and perception is now altered by the prac- ‘traditional’ structures, such as the recognition of new states: Somaliland tices of those in power11. Guurti, are practically marginal to the in contrast to Eritrea. Review of African state, making the public doubt about Political Economy, 21(59), pp.21–38. As the need for electing someone from its significance as a public institution. one’s clan became greater than ever This is not to say that Somaliland Balthasar, D., 2013. Somaliland’s best before, the elections in Somaliland are did not make a progress but rather kept secret: shrewd politics and war reminiscent of the poet’s description to acknowledge and interrogate the projects as means of state-making. of the Somali political landscape in peacebuilding object and outcome Journal of Eastern African Studies, 7(2), the 1960s where elections were seen so as to avoid masking our problems pp.218–238. as a means of accessing state resourc- and recommending our approach as a es via a kin in public office. One in- model on which other Somalis could Battera, F., 2009. Some Considerations base their peacebuilding and state- on State Building in Divided Socie- building efforts. Of course, there are ties and the Role of the “International 11 It is important to remember that in the 1960 parliamentary and presidential elec- lessons to be learned from Somaliland Community”: Somaliland and Soma- tion, many MPS were elected in areas where but there are also pitfalls to avoid. lia Compared. Northeast African Stud- they did not have strong clan presence but ies, 10(3), pp.225–247. in the subsequent election of 1964 people’s On the one hand, the peacebuilding perception towards the significance of electing someone from their clan had changed and this experience from Somaliland offers a Bradbury, M., 2008. Becoming Somali- was partly attributable to the elite’s misappro- commendable bottom-up approach land, London: Progressio. priation of resources.

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Bradbury, M., Abokor, A.Y. & Yusuf, Samatar, Abdi & Samatar, Ahmed, H.A., 2003. Somaliland: Choosing 2002. Introduction. In Abdi Samatar Politics over Violence. The Horn of & Ahmed Samatar, eds. The African Conflict, 30, pp.455–478. state: reconsiderations. Portsmouth: Heinemann. Branch, D., 2006. Loyalists, Mau Mau, and Elections in Kenya: The First Tri- Seid, M. & Jotte, Z., 2004. Alternative umph of the System, 1957-1958. Africa Dispute Resolution in Somali Regional today, 53, pp.27–50. State, Addis Ababa: Centre Français d’Etudes Ethiopiennes. Farah, A.Y. & Lewis, I.M., 1997. Mak- ing Peace in Somaliland. Cahiers Walls, M. & Kibble, S., 2010. Beyond d’Études Africaines, 37(146), pp.349– polarity: negotiating a hybrid state 377. in Somaliland. Africa Spectrum, 45(1), pp.31–56. Hagmann, T. & Hoehne, M.V., 2009. Failures of the state failure debate: Walls, M. & Kibble, S., 2011. Soma- Evidence from the Somali territories. liland: progress, state and outsiders. Journal of International Development, Review of African Political Economy, 21(1), pp.42–57. 38(128), pp.335–343.

Hagmann, T. & Péclard, D., 2010. Warsame, M.I., 1993. Hal karaan, Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Kleppe: Norske Somaliakomiteen. Power and Domination in Africa. De- velopment & Change, 41, pp.539–562.

Hansen, S.J. & Bradbury, M., 2007. Somaliland: A New Democracy in the Horn of Africa? Review of African Po- litical Economy, 34, pp.461–476.

Hoehne, M.V., 2013. Limits of hybrid political orders : the case of Somali- land. Journal of Eastern African Studies, (May), pp.37–41.

Hoehne, M.V., 2011. Mimesis and Mimicry in Dynamics of State and Identity Formation in Northern So- malia. Africa, 79(02), pp.252–281.

Ismail, E.A., 2009. Peace, Education, and Economic Development in Soma- liland. Northeast African Studies, 10(3), pp.275–279.

Menkhaus, K., 2003. State Collapse In Somalia : Second Thoughts. Review of African Political Economy, 30(97), pp.405–422.

Render, M., 2007. Appropriate “Gov- ernance-Technology”? Somali Clan Elders and Institutions in the Making of the ’Republic of Somaliland. Africa Spectrum, 42(3), pp.439–459.

Samatar, A.I., 1989. The state and ru- ral transformation in Northern Somalia, 1884-1986, Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press.

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Somalia Flag

Photo | Kylos85

46 HYDROCARBON EXPLORATION IN PUNTLAND: WHO HAS THE LEGAL RIGHT TO ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS? While Puntland has signed agreements with international oil companies, the Somalia Federal Government considers such operations as illegal. The Puntland State Constitution and the Somalia Federal Provisional Constitution help find an answer to the current legal and political debate between the two entities.

by Issa Mohamud Farah

Director General Puntland Petroleum and Minerals Agency Garowe, Somalia Introduction

Hydrocarbon explorations in Punt- spudding of Shabeel North, which was controversial Contract of Work (CoW) with land, a federal member state of the the Puntland Government in Dubai. In 2005, concluded in late 2012, followed. Both Somali Federal structure, reached that company sold 50.1% of the rights of that wells were dry, but they ushered in a a high point with the spudding of CoW to Range Resources Limited, a resources euphoric and hopeful period for all Shabeel 1 on 16 January 2012 in the exploration company, based in Australia, and Somalis, and even more so for the now listed on London’s Alternative Investment Dharoor Valley by Horn Petroleum Market (AIM: RRL) and the Australia Securities (a consortium of Africa Oil, Range Exchange (ASX: RRS). Range bought all of the Resources and Red Emperor).1 The remaining rights of the CoW in August 2007. In three companies; Horn Petroleum, registered January 2007, a Production Sharing Agreement on the Toronto Exchange, owns 60%, Range Re- (PSA) was signed between the Puntland Gov- sources Limited owns 20% and Red Emperor 1 On August 31, 2005, Consort Pty ernment, Range Resources Limited and Can- Resources NL, registered on Australia Securi- Ltd, an unknown company, registered in the mex (Bermuda) II Limited, which is registered ties Exchange (ASX: RMP), owns the remaining Indian Ocean Islands of Maldives, signed a in Bermuda. Currently the PSA is owned by 20%.

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Puntland diaspora across the world, POLITICAL ISSUES: Material Facts ish and Italians created British Soma- because these activities represented liland and Italian Somaliland respec- a brighter future and hope for eve- In 2004, after protracted negotiations tively, in the 1920s, after a long period rybody. Aside from the financial and and years of false dawns3, a repre- of dogged resistance by the Somalis technological capabilities of Horn Pe- sentative group of Somali politicians, failed.4 troleum and its partners, the people community elders, intellectuals and of Puntland made it possible because civilians determined to set the coun- These two colonies joined together they gave the operations their full try down the path of a democratic fed- and became an independent state on support. In addition, successive lead- eral political system. This agreement July 1, 1960. From 1960 to 1969 a ci- ers of the Somali Federal Government was made possible as all the Somali vilian government ruled the country. had fully supported the hydrocarbon factions had participated in the nego- However, after the Somalia Presi- and mineral explorations in Puntland. tiations. In the past boycotts from one dent Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was Only the election of President Hassan faction leader or another had derailed assassinated on October 21, 1969, a Sheikh Mohamud, in 2012, ushered the process. Furthermore, this confer- military junta, led by Major General in a period of unprecedented attacks ence shifted Somalis to a new frame- Mohamed Siyad Barre overthrew the against Puntland’s operations. work whereby political power was civilian government in a bloodless to be distributed to the lowest levels. coup d’état. 5 The military suspended Today, the Federal Government’s po- In the past, all economic and politi- and then repealed the Somali con- sition is that Horn Petroleum’s op- cal power had been centralized and stitution, banned all political parties erations in Puntland are illegal and concentrated in the hands of a few and imprisoned members from the that they are operating under an in the country’s capital, Mogadishu. former regimes.6 The military junta invalid contract. The only competent This agreement instead allowed both ruled the country from 1969 to 1991 authority with the legal right to en- economic and political decisions to be with an iron fist, by brutalizing the ter into agreements with them is the made at member state level. people and centralizing the economy Somali Federal Government and not of the country. As a result, a number a Somali Federal Member State such The selection of this particular system of armed oppositions waged war as Puntland.2 The Puntland Govern- must be understood and contextual- against the government, openly sup- ment challenges this right and coun- ized by the years of conflict and bru- ported by neighbouring countries. ter claims that, as the constitutions tal violence that Somalia has endured The regime, after its total failure to (both Federal and State) stand, it has since the country had spiraled into deliver political and economic secu- the legal right to enter into agree- civil war. During this period Soma- rity to Somali citizens, economically ments with international oil compa- lis fought bitterly against each other, weakened by failed military cam- nies willing to conduct hydrocarbon with conflict perpetrated and justified paigns against its neighbours, and and minerals exploration. The ques- along family, clan and religious lines. politically wounded by the successful tion I seek to answer in this paper is It is this fundamental well of anger guerrilla campaign of the armed op- who has the legal right to sign hydro- that has shaped the modern psych positions, finally collapsed in 1991. As carbon and mineral agreements with of the Somali people. To dismissively a result of the total collapse of govern- international oil or mining companies brush this factor aside totally ignores ment institutions and the lack of law that might be interested in exploring, the lasting impact this protracted and order, the country entered into developing and producing in Punt- conflict, which brought about brutal a brutal civil war. While the struggle land’s territories. To answer this, it is violence, mistrust, and ultimately, the was initially opposition to the regime, important to look closely at the key le- disintegration of the Somali nation- it later transformed itself into a tribal gal and political issues that underpin state, has had on the Somalis ability war conducted by warring factions. Puntland’s hydrocarbon explorations to set the past aside and build a new Subsequently, hundreds of thousands within the context of the Federal Pro- united future. That is why it is im- of Somali civilians and combatants visional Constitution and Puntland’s perative to discuss the socio-political were brutally killed simply for be- State Constitution. and economic issues that underpin longing to the wrong tribe and being the natural resources debate between in the wrong place. Thousands were the Puntland State of Somalia and the forcefully removed from their homes Somali Federal Government. in southern and central Somalia, be- 2 Although there have been times coming internally displaced people when the previous Transitional Somalia Fed- eral Governments in their various forms did Historical Perspectives not wholly support hydrocarbon exploration The Somali Democratic Republic in Puntland, they generally developed a very consisted of two colonies that were 4 I. M. Lewis, “A Modern History of strong relationship with the Puntland Govern- the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Af- brought together by their own wish- rica; revised, updated and Expanded”, Fourth ment and recognized the rights of the Puntland Government as enshrined by the State Consti- es to unite and build a nation state. Addition, Ohio State University, 2002. tution. The last two Presidents and their Prime These two colonies themselves where 5 Abdi Sheik-Abdi, ‘Ideology and Ministers significantly supported and encour- the product of colonization; the Brit- Leadership in Somalia’, in The Journal of Modern aged the continuation of hydrocarbon explora- African Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Mar., 1981), pp. tion in Puntland. However, the current Federal 163-127 Government opposes the exploration activities, 3 From 1991 to 2004, there were 6 I. M. Lewis, ‘The politics of the 1969 claiming that only it has the legal right to deal 14-failed peace and reconciliation processes for Somali Coup’, in The Journal of Modern African with international oil companies. Somalia. Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Oct., 1972), pp. 383-408.

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within the country, or refugees forced radical religious group. These chang- the 2001 constitution11 claimed that - through conflict and starvation - to es and the complete rejection of the Puntland was an independent state cross the border into Kenya, Yemen, structures and framework of the SDR (2.2); but that it would be an integral Ethiopia and Djibouti. Unfortunately, has significant implications when part of Somalia (2.4). These articles the carnage that began in 1991 con- considering the legal position of hy- were further re-enforced by Article tinues, albeit in different areas and in drocarbon activities and contracts in 10, which envisioned the ways pow- different forms through the activities Somalia today. ers would be shared between the of Al-Shabaab. Puntland State of Somalia and the The birth of Puntland’s Federalism future Somalia Federal Government, The collapse of the Nation-State and Puntland State was born out of the while the latter was yet to be estab- the subsequent civil war swept away ashes of the SDR, when in 1998, 480 lished. The article “Negotiations and the legal and political framework of delegates, consisting of community Federalism”12 stated that Puntland the country. The Somalia Democratic elders, intellectuals, politicians and would be ready to negotiate with any Republic (SDR) ceased to exist politi- civil society members, representing Somali political faction that was will- cally, physically and spiritually, and 5 regions from the northeast of So- ing to restore a national government of particular relevance to this paper, malia met in Garowe and decided to that was based on a Federal Political the nascent oil industry, that was establish a new state government that System (10.1). The assumption is that just starting to gain momentum, was could represent the people from these the Puntland State of Somalia was not abruptly halted with the International regions 9 This was a bottom up proc- willing to secede from the rest of So- companies declaring force majeure and ess with the impetus coming from the malia, but it was also not willing to abandoning their operations. grass roots of society, the citizens. The return to the previous centralized po- government was to be a democratic litical arrangements which had mar- In its place emerged new self-ruled government that consisted of an ex- ginalized and impoverished the peo- administrations, directly related to the ecutive, independent judiciary and ple of the northeast. As a result, the great tribal population movements parliament. The government was to Puntland State Government wanted that occurred as a result of the war. look after the economic and political to retain a substantial number of pow- Somali tribes who had lived for a long interests of the people from the Bari, ers while willing to hand over to the time in the south of Somalia, particu- Nugaal, Mudug, Sool, and Sanaag re- Somali Federal Government powers larly in Mogadishu and surrounds, gions that decided to unite and join such as immigration, foreign relations fled north, returning to the territories together to form the State of Puntland. and international co-operation, postal of their ancestors. Large numbers of This was a significant and progres- system, currency board, measure- people returned to the northwest of sive step as it ushered in democratic ment and units (10.2). Puntland State the country, and established a new governance, law and order, a relative would retain all other powers, but country called Somaliland in 1992. peace and economic development it was willing to negotiate over the Similarly, communities that returned that had not previously existed in the sharing and allocation of them when to the northeast established the Punt- area. Importantly, it established the the envisioned Somali Federal Gov- land State of Somalia in 1998. principle that the Government was ernment was effectively established there to serve the people and ensure (10.3). In April 2012, a Constitutional Today, 23 years after the collapse of equitable access to the commercial de- Assembly held in Garowe replaced General Mohamed Siyaad Barre’s velopment of the State. This forgot- the 2001 Puntland Transitional Con- regime, Somalia consists of five dis- ten corner of Somalia was determined stitution with the current Puntland tinct and different areas: Somaliland, not to return to a system of politics which has seceded from the rest of that centred power and wealth in the Somalia7; Puntland, a semiautono- hands of a few at the expense of the 11 UNDP, “Transitional Constitution of mous state within the Somalia federal majority. Puntland Regional Government [2001]”, Avail- political system;8 Jubba Administra- able at http://www.so.undp.org/docs/Punt- tion; a weak Somali Federal Govern- From the first Charter in 101998 , via land%202001%20English.pdf accessed Novem- ment that controls a small area of the the 2001 Transitional Constitution to ber 14, 2013. 12 For more, please see 2nd Section, country around Mogadishu with the the current Constitution, the Punt- Article 10. Negotiations and Federalism support of African Union troops; and land State of Somalia has consistently 1. Puntland Regional State shall be part of a So- central and southern Somalia which is sought a semiautonomous political mali Federal State, and shall negotiate with any controlled by Al-Shabaab, a ruthless structure. For example, Article 2.0 of party of the Somali factions who truly believe in the restoration and the membership of a So- mali Government based on the Federal System. 9 Puntland Development Research 7 Alexis Arieff, ‘De Facto Statehood? Centre, ‘Roots of Good Governance,’ Garowe, Put- 2. Puntland Regional Government shall hand The Strange Case of Somaliland’, in Yale Jour- land, Somalia, over to the Somali Federal State the institutions nal of International Affairs, Spring/Summer 2008, including immigration affairs, defense, foreign pp. 60-79. (November 2006), p. 6 relation and co-operation, postal official stamp, 8 Puntland Development and Re- 10 Puntland Development and Re- currency board and measurement units. search Center, The Puntland Experience: A Bot- search Center, “ Axdiga Dawlad Goboleedda tom-up Approach to Peace and State Building, Ga- Puntland.” Garowe, May 15, 1998, Available 3. Besides the issues mentioned here, other re- rowe, Somalia, 2010, available at http://www. at http://pdrcsomalia.org/wp-content/up- quired issues shall come through negotiations radiodaljir.com/audio/docs/ipThePuntlandEx- loads/2012/10/Axdigii-Puntland-1998-1.pdf ac- between the Federal Government of Somalia perience.pdf accessed November 2, 2013. cessed November 13, 2013. and the Regional State of Puntland.

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Constitution.13 This document and The Puntland Constitution amendments with respect to power those before reflected the aspirations The 2012 Puntland State Constitu- and responsibilities allocated to the of the people of Puntland. They en- tion covers the issues concerning the federal government as opposed to trusted the management of the State’s ownership, administration and the federal member states. Any amend- economy and internal politics to the revenue matters of the hydrocarbon ment drafted will be subjected to ref- elected Government of the Puntland and minerals operations in Puntland. erendum.15 State. The political principles en- The Constitution provides the legal shrined in these constitutions have right for the State to enter into con- The Somali Federal Constitution guided Puntland’s political relation- tracts with International Oil Compa- shapes a federal system16, which al- ships with the rest of Somalia and nies (IOC) that are willing to explore, lows two levels of government; the any Somali governments that have develop, and, if commercial discovery national and the federal member been established ever since. In addi- is attained, extract hydrocarbons and states. Article 1(1-3) states that Soma- tion, during this period, the state gov- minerals. Article 54(1) of the Punt- lia is a federal, democratic, and in- ernment saw the development of the land State Constitution states that the clusive country, and the sovereignty hydrocarbon and mineral sector as a Puntland people own the Puntland’s of the country is inviolable.17 Article significant aspect of the region’s eco- natural resources. Article 54(2) gives 48 further states that the Somali state nomic development. The first govern- the Puntland government responsi- “is composed of two levels of govern- ment, led by Abdulahi Yusuf, actively bility for its administration. In addi- ment (a) Federal Government level; engaged with international oil com- tion, Article 54(3) gives the Puntland (b) The Federal member States level, panies seeking to encourage invest- government responsibility to negoti- which is comprised of the Federal ment in the hydrocarbon and miner- ate agreements and issue petroleum Member State government, and the als sector. As a result a small number exploration contracts to foreign or local governments.”18 Under this defi- of companies visited the country to national companies. Furthermore, ar- nition and as noted above by choice inspect the abandoned oil exploration ticle 54(4) gives the executive branch through the State Constitution, Punt- wells in Nugaal and Sool regions. A the right to prepare the necessary doc- land is one of the Somali Federal classified document belonging to the umentation for these contracts, which Member States. government shows a number of Asian the parliament must approve after the and European companies arriving in government’s competent agency and The Federal Constitution the country and seeking contracts. It the international oil company sign the The Puntland Government argues is clear this did not include compa- contracts. Article 54(5) says that the that the current Somali Federal Pro- nies who entered contracts with the Puntland Government will promul- visional Constitution (Article 54) al- SDR prior to the civil war. gate a specific law to govern revenue locates only four legislative powers to sharing should there be a commercial the Federal Government. The Article THE LEGAL ISSUES: Somali Feder- discovery. When that law is finalized, states that: alism and the Hydrocarbon Explora- the Puntland Parliament needs to ap- tion. prove it. When there is a legal issue between 15 Please see Articles 132-137 of the the Puntland State of Somalia and the Somalia Federalism Somali Federal Provisional Constitution (ad- opted in 2012) Somali Federal Government, it is very After a long period of colonization, 16 In a nutshell, in a federalism political important to start with the constitu- military dictatorship and 23 years of system power and responsibilities are divided tions of the Somali Federal Member civil war, the Somali people decided between the national government and the fed- States and the Somalia Federal Gov- to unite in 2004 under the umbrella eral member states. Within this political sys- 14 tem the federal member states have their own ernment. Therefore, Puntland State of a federal political structure. This parliament, executive and judiciary branches Constitution and the Somalia Federal political system is enshrined in the that will make, enforce and interpret laws for a Provisional Constitution should help Somali Federal Provisional Consti- better governance of their citizens. In addition, find an answer to the legal issues con- tution, which was adopted by a So- members of the federal parliament, particularly the Upper House or the Senate, represent the cerning Somalia’s natural resources, mali constituent assembly, consisting interests of the federal member states. This particularly the hydrocarbon and of Somali civil society, community means, that the constitution gives the federal minerals operations in Puntland. elders, religious leaders, intellectu- member states certain autonomy, confidence als and Somali politicians on August and trust. This constitutional power will also give the member states the ability to govern 1, 2012 in Mogadishu, Somalia. This themselves, while, at the same time, to be part constitution, as it stands now, is still of a national government. 13 Somalia Family Service, “Timeline incomplete as numerous significant 17 The Federal Republic of Somali, For Puntland Constitutional and Democrati- powers are deferred until all the fed- Provisional Constitution, Adopted August 1, zation Process” available at http://ussfs.org/ eral member states are established. 2012, available at http://unpos.unmissions. sfs/timeline-for-puntland-constitutional-and- org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CqsW6PVY- democratization-process/ accessed on Nov 9, Thus the constitution requires further C4%3D&tabid=9708&language=en-US Ac- 2013. See also, Garoweonline.com, “Soma- cessed October 30, 2013. lia: Puntland Presidential Contender or Po- 18 The Federal Republic of Somali, litical Opportunists.” Available at http://www. 14 This was not a rushed or lightly Provisional Constitution, Adopted August 1, garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Edito- taken decision. Years of UN, EU and AU spon- 2012, available at http://unpos.unmissions. rial_29/Somalia_Puntland_presidential_con- sored negotiations resulted in Somali’s refusing org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CqsW6PVY- tenders_or_political_opportunists_Editorial. to come together under any other political sys- C4%3D&tabid=9708&language=en-US Ac- shtml accessed on Nov 9, 2013. tem. cessed November 1, 2013.

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“the allocation of powers and resources and that (b) all the Federated States Currently, the Puntland Government shall be negotiated and agreed upon by come together of their own free will, has no relationship with the Somali the Federal Government and the Federal to establish and agree upon, in a ne- Federal Government after severing its Member States (pending the formation gotiated settlement, a system of man- relationship on August 5, 2013, accus- of [all] the Federal Member States), ex- agement and revenue sharing from ing the Somalia Federal Government cept in matters concerning: (a) Foreign natural resources, which is to be in- of tampering with the Federal Provi- Affairs; (b) National Defense; (c) Citi- corporated into the finalized Federal sional Constitution, ignoring national zenship and Immigration; (d) Monetary Constitution. reconciliation efforts, and refusing to Policy, which shall be within the powers share power and foreign aid.24 and responsibilities of the federal Govern- In addition, this is conclusive legal ment.” and constitutional evidence which Conclusion shows that the Somalia Federal Gov- The Puntland Government and its In- Furthermore, the Somalia Federal ernment does not have any powers to ternational Oil Companies have been Provisional Constitution postpones legislate on natural resources whatso- successful in conducting onshore hy- the matters of natural resources until ever. However, it continues to inter- drocarbon exploration operations. all Somali’s Federal Member States are vene and hamper hydrocarbon explo- Collectively, the partners have con- established. Article 44 states that “[T] ration in Puntland. For example, in ducted seismic operations and two he allocation of the natural resources May 2013, the President of the Somali wildcat wells in Dharoor Valley. The of the Federal Republic of Somalia Federal Government claimed that previous Somali Federal Government shall be negotiated by, and agreed international oil companies should leaders were able to support and en- upon, by the Federal Government stop signing oil and gas exploration courage hydrocarbon exploration in and all the future Federal Member contracts with Somaliland and Punt- Puntland, but the current President States [when the remaining states are es- land.21 In October 2013, the Somali is against it. The Federal Government tablished, editor’s note] in accordance Federal Minister for Natural Resourc- claims that it has the legal right to is- with this Constitution.”19 This article es claimed22 that all regional contracts sue hydrocarbon exploration licenses operates parallel to Article 142 of the with international oil companies are to international oil companies. In- constitution, which stipulates that: invalid.23 ternational oil companies must deal with it, rather than the State Govern- “1) Until such time that all the Federated ments. Despite that, the Puntland States of Somalia are established and the Government continues its hydrocar- adopted Federated State Constitutions are 21 Katrina Manson, “Somalia: Oil bon exploration activities in Dharoor harmonized with the Somali Federal Con- thrown on the fire” available at http://www. and Nugaal Valley. Furthermore, the stitution, the Federated States existing ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/538e9550-b3e1-11e2-ace9- Puntland Government made it clear (such as Puntland) prior to the provisional 00144feabdc0.html#axzz2lAFtTF8X accessed to the Federal Government, the in- November 14, 2013 adoption (2012) of this Federal Constitu- ternational community and interna- 22 Eduard Gismatullin, “Somalia’s Fed- tion by a National Constituent Assembly eral Government Says Regional Oil Permits tional businesses that it has the con- shall retain and exercise powers endowed Invalid”, available at http://www.bloomberg. stitutional right to enter into contracts by their own State Constitution.”20 com/news/2013-10-07/somalia-s-federal-gov- with international oil companies. It ernment-says-regional-oil-permits-invalid. appears that these different views html Accessed November 14, 2013. This means that the Somalia Federal 23 There are two reasons why the gov- will continue until proper agreement Government does not have any con- ernment is saying this. The first one is that, is reached between the Federal Gov- stitutional rights with respect to hy- the Federal Government claims that if interna- ernment and the existing Somalia drocarbon explorations. Under these tional oil companies are willing to come into Federal Member States. the country to explore oil, gas and minerals, it provisions, therefore, the Puntland is the Somali Federal Government they have Government has the right to enter to deal with rather than state government, be- agreements and continue its hydro- cause only the Somali Federal Government has carbon and minerals operations until the legal rights to enter into agreements. But this is misleading, as the Somali Federal Pro- such time that (a) all Somali Federat- visional Constitution doesn’t give such a right ed States are completely established, to the Federal Government. The second one is that the Federal government is saying that in- ternational oil companies were operating in the 19 The Federal Republic of Somali, country before the civil war, and these compa- Provisional Constitution, Adopted August 1, nies declared Force Majeure and left the country 2012, available at http://unpos.unmissions. in 1990-91 because of the Somali civil war, and org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CqsW6PVY- that their contracts are still valid. This notion, C4%3D&tabid=9708&language=en-US ac- was also rejected by Puntland, which claims cessed Nov 2, 2013. that the previous political arrangement, were 24 Foxnews.com, “Somalia: Puntland 20 The Federal Republic of Somali, economic and political decisions were made by cuts ties with central government”, Available Provisional Constitution, Adopted August 1, the central government does not exist, and that at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/08/05/ 2012, available at http://unpos.unmissions. the Puntland people now determine the politi- somalia-puntland-cuts-ties-with-central-gov- org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CqsW6PVY- cal and economic development of their State. ernment/ Accessed November 20, 2013; See C4%3D&tabid=9708&language=en-US ac- Furthermore, the Puntland Government was also “Somalia Puntland Region to sever ties cessed October 30, 2013. able to contact some of these companies and with Government” Available at http://www.de- they totally and categorically declined to return mocracychronicles.com/somalia-puntland-ties/ to Somalia and fulfill their contact obligations. Accessed November, 2013, 2013.

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Somalia: Friday prayers

Photo | G. A. Hussein

52 DISCUSSING THE PUNTLAND FEDERAL STATE’S PRIORITIES AND OTHER ISSUES interview with Prof. Mohamed Said Samantar

Professor Mohamed Said Samantar teaches Economics at Puntland State University, Garowe (Somalia). He was born in Mogadishu on July 1, 1946; between 1973 and 1990 he served at Somali National University, he then relocated to Puntland following the outbreak of the civil war in January 1991. His extensive experience and long- lasting testimony of the Somali affairs make his insights and understanding of the issues currently at stake remarkable. He was interviewed by Michele Gonnelli on November 27, 2013.

by Mohamed Said Samantar

Professor of Economics Puntland’s State University Garowe, Somalia

As an economist, what do you consid- through rapid increase in productiv- ernmental organisations, traditional er to be the Puntland Federal State’s ity and industrialisation of all activi- elders as well as religious leaders who priorities in order to work as an ef- ties whether livestock, crop produc- play a relevant role. ficient administrative apparatus? tion, construction or services. The What are the main services offered by major service rendered by the Punt- What are the leading/strategic sec- the State? Are there any competing land Government is to strengthen the tors for a viable development in Punt- non–state actors in this respect? security situation of the state as more land? than 70% of its budget is earmarked to Puntland’s main priority is to ac- this sector. There are a good number The leading economic sectors in Punt- celerate GDP growth with stability, of non-state actors such as non-gov- land are livestock, fisheries and servic-

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es. Strategy wise the priority areas are ment. What can Puntland learn from strong mobilisation tool in the form divided into three pillars: sustaining this experience? What would be a of clannism, for both defending and macroeconomic stability, while im- possible way forward? offending purposes. How does the role proving macroeconomic fundamen- played by clan and clannism differ in tals, including inflation, GDP growth, Puntland has recently failed to estab- urban and in rural contexts? Is the and money supply, all of which will lish a political party system following Somali nation (still) transversally bring peace and harmony; capital- the example of Somaliland. After a perceived as a common value across izing on the geographical advantage popular outcry the process has revert- clans and regional partitions? Is it within the Horn of Africa region as a ed to the traditional system of select- somehow associated with statehood? natural port for livestock exportations ing members of parliament. A way (80% of the total) towards the Arabic out of this situation can only materi- The definition of clan differs from Peninsula; expanding employment, alise if the socio-economic structure that of clannism as the former estab- mainly among the youth. of Somalia changes. In any event you lish simply a blood relationship while need to changes the old system with the latter expresses an element of in- What is the role played by the remit- something of value for Somalia as the justice. Clan in the rural areas is not a tances from Somali diaspora? old Basuto (actually, Lesoto) proverb matter of choice but rather it is a coop- says: If a man does away with his tra- erative mechanism necessary to avoid Remittances play an important role in ditional way of living and throws away risks in the harsh environment for the the survival of many households in his good customs, he had better first make survivals of the people. In urban area Puntland. Remittances not only com- certain that he has something of value to clan is sometimes politicised to serve prise the largest contributor to the replace them. the interests of selfish politicians and household budget of migrant-send- warlords. ing households, in several cases they How would you describe the relation- are actually the only source of income ship with Somalia Federal Govern- The Somali culture is predominantly for them. On average they account for ment? Where do the main causes of oral, in fact the country still “teems the 60% of Puntlanders’ spending ca- concern and reasons for friction lie? with poets”, as explorer Richard Bur- pacity. Indeed, without remittances, ton observed and wrote already in a large proportion of the households At this moment in time the relation- 1854. The role played by poems and would have fallen deeper into pov- ship is stuck waiting for renewed talks songs remains unchallenged, even to- erty. between the two. The major obstacle day, as means for conveying knowl- reflects the adherence of the federal edge, traditions, criticism, political While Puntland elders and clan lead- constitution on the part of Federal support or opposition. Gaariye, a ers are designating the members of the government according to the claims nationally reputed poet, who among future Parliament (lower house), the put forward to the international press others opposed the military regime parliament is expected to elect a new by Puntland authorities. of Siyad Barre, wrote in one of his president on 8 January 2014. Howev- works “he who fosters clannism [is er, composition and formation of the Do you think federalism is an actual a fool] and foolishness is a disease”. legislative power reflect more a ‘clan option for Somalia nowadays or a Gaariye represented that portion of formula’ rather than the existence of confederation of states would bet- the Somali poets engaged with free- a proper party system. How would ter match the current scenario while dom and social justice beyond clan such a modern party system possibly overcoming the south-central im- disputes. Are there any new remark- fit into the Puntland context? And in passe? What is the role that the in- able trends in the poetry of the last 20 Somalia in general? ternational community in general years? Can we speak of a Somalilan- and the AU in particular could play der or Puntlander poetry? Or better As long as the largest portion of the in this respect? of Isaaq, Daarod, Hawiye, Dir, Digil/ Somali population live in the rural/ Rahanweyn etc... poetry? pastoral nomadic area it would be Federalism is the only option remain- difficult to establish a proper political ing for Somalis after the bad experi- It is true that poetry plays a vital role party system based on the one man ence of the last military-authoritarian in Somali culture. There are poems one vote formula. Furthermore, im- central government, which collapsed composed specifically for specific re- portant decisions are taken collective- in 1991. My experience of living in gions using specific dialects. These ly rather than individually. Switzerland in early 1960s tells me versions of poetry are not very popu- that confederation of states is an ad- lar among Somalis. The most quoted The Somaliland experience and the vanced system for rural Somalia. poems are those composed to reach on-going state building process is of- Somalis living in all Somali spoken ten quoted and looked at as a possible Clans are one of the most representa- regions of the Horn of Africa. model also for Puntland. Yet it seems tive and enduring traits of the Somali that at this stage of its development culture/history. As social organisa- Somaliland is experiencing some tions centred on kinship, providing clash between traditional and west- for individual and collective identity ern (modern) ways of power manage- dimensions, they constitute as well a

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55 ITPCM International Commentary December 2013 ISSN. 2239-7949

Somalis gather around a well under reconstruction by the African Union mission, AMISOM, in the district of Hamar Jabjab, Mogadishu. The new well will make the water both safer and more easily accessible for the district’s residents.

Mogadishu, Somalia. UN Photo|Tobin Jones

56 A RENEWED ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS IN SOMALIA? For years, after 1995, the UN has showed a cautious approach to the events in Somalia. With UNSC Resolution 2102 they have reaffirmed their willingness to play a major role in securing the future of the country.

by Andrea de Guttry

Full Professor of Public International Law Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna

Introduction

The relations between Somalia and carried out with the full involvement with the trust territory to form the So- the UN have been very troubled and of all relevant stakeholders and fully mali Republic. difficult in the last 20 years, especially respects the notion of local owner- A new wave of attention to the situa- after the failure of the two previous ship. tion in Somalia was registered at the field operations deployed by the UN very beginning of 1990 when Somalia in Somalia: the United Nations Op- The recent problematic history of was suffering a terrible humanitar- eration in Somalia I (UNOSOM 1) in UN-Somalia-relations. ian crisis, due not only to the ongoing 1992 and United Nations Operation The United Nations has been involved civil war but also to a severe drought. in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in 1993- in the history of Somalia from 1950 From 1992 the UNSC adopted several 95. The recent decision of the UN Se- when the UN decided to create the Resolutions imposing first, a general curity Council to deploy, after a long Italian Trusteeship Administration in and complete arms embargo on So- period of uncertainty, the United Na- a territory called Italian Somaliland malia and later, deployment of a small tions Assistance Mission in Somalia (the southern part of the present So- UN Operation (UNOSOM I) to moni- (UNSOM) could represent a new sign malia) to prepare it for independence tor the ceasefire agreed in Mogadishu of hope for the future of the Country; over a ten-year period. However, Brit- and to prepare for a bigger UN force provided that lessons learnt in the ish Somaliland (which corresponds to perform additional tasks. Due to past, from the region, are duly taken to the present Somaliland) remained the specific nature of the situation in into account and that the implemen- a British protectorate till 1960 when Somalia, the obstacles which were tation of the mandate of the Mission is it gained independence and merged created by the different opposing fac-

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tions to the distribution of humanitar- The recent decision of the UN Secu- report to the Council on, and help ian assistance, and the attacks direct- rity Council to deploy UNSOM prevent any abuses or violations of ed against it, the mission was almost UNSOM was established for a period human rights or violations of interna- unable to achieve the mandate. The of one year which could be renewed tional humanitarian law committed UNSC decided, therefore, to adopt a for further periods as appropriate in Somalia, through the deployment new acting under Chapter VII of the through UNSC Resolution 2102 (2013) of human rights observers and other UN Charter. UNSC Resolution 794(1 of May 2, 2013. Technically, UNSOM means and any violations or abuses 992) authorized the UN Secretary should have been called a “political committed against children and General (UNSG) and member States mission” rather than a “peace-keep- women in Somalia. wishing to cooperate, “to use all nec- ing” or “peace-building mission”; The physical protection of the UN- essary means to establish as soon as in any case the terminology is not of SOM personnel and of its infrastruc- possible, a secure environment for fundamental importance, as the dif- tures in Somalia is provided by AM- humanitarian relief operations in So- ferences among these typologies of ISOM, which has committed itself to malia”. The new mission, led by the operations are minimal. provide a guard force of 311 troops. USA, was called Unified Task Force The mandate of UNSOM is indicat- They will have to work in close co- (UNITAF) and operated more or less ed in para 2 of the Resolution which ordination with the Federal Gov- successfully in Somalia between 5 identifies 5 different areas which are ernment and with the directives of December 1992 and 4 May 1993 de- entrusted to the mission. the Integrated Security Management ploying approximately 37,000 troops First of all, UNSOM is expected to Structure of AMISOM within the of- in southern and central Somalia. On “provide United Nations ‘good offic- fices of the UNSRSG, who is designat- March 26, 1993 the SC adopted Reso- es’ functions, supporting the Federal ed responsible for UN staff security in lution 873 (1993) establishing UNO- Government of Somalia’s peace and Somalia. SOM II, a new UN Peace-keeping reconciliation process”. which replaced UNITAF. With 30,000 The second task assigned to UNSOM Future challenges for the UN and personnel, including 22,000 troops is, to “support the Federal Govern- the International Community in So- and 8,000 logistic and civilian staff, ment of Somalia, and AMISOM as malia. UNOSOM II was involved in several appropriate, by providing strategic UNSOM undoubtedly represents a major incidents, suffering severe loss- policy advice” on the following mat- clear signal about the renewed will- es, including many casualties mainly ters, amongst others: ingness of the UN to play a major among US soldiers. After which the (i) Governance; (ii) security sector role in shaping the future of Soma- United States President Clinton de- reform, rule of law (including po- lia. The challenges the UN and the cided to withdraw all US forces from lice, justice and corrections within International Community will be fac- UNOSOM II, the UNSC decided to the framework of the United Nations ing in the short and medium term are close the mission by 31 March 1995. Global Focal Point), disengagement complex and require a coherent and In subsequent years the UN adopted of combatants, disarmament, demo- integrated approach and an active a much more cautious approach to bilization and reintegration, mari- contribution from all main stakehold- the events in Somalia: the UN con- time security and mine action; iii) ers. Among the relevant issues which centrated its activities related to So- the development of a federal system; need to be dealt with in the coming malia on two main areas. First, the the constitutional review process and weeks and months the following UN supported the continuing ef- subsequent referendum on the consti- seem the most sensitive: forts to find a political and diplomatic tution; and preparations for elections solution to the internal situation in in 2016”. Security of the Mission and of its the country (authorizing the deploy- The third component of the mandate personnel in cooperation with AMI- ment of the Africa Union Mission in concerns the task to “assist the Fed- SOM. The continuing insecurity and Somalia –AMISOM - and adopting a eral Government of Somalia in coor- the recent increase in targeting of the sophisticated system of targeted sanc- dinating international donor support, international personnel, and of UN- tions, including an arms embargo and in particular on security sector assist- SOM more specifically, contribute a charcoal ban). ance and maritime security, working to making the good cooperation and The second issue which has been with bilateral and multilateral part- coordination between AMISOM, UN- constantly and actively monitored ners, and in full respect of the sover- SOM, and the local security forces a by the UN is the fight against piracy eignty of Somalia”. critical aspect on which the success or in the waters off the Somali Coasts. The fourth component of the UN- the failure of the UN Mission will de- The UNSC adopted several innova- SOM mandate concerns the delivery pend to a large extent. tive Resolutions to reinforce the fight of help to build the capacity of the against piracy and to authorize mem- Federal Government of Somalia to Working cooperation modalities ber States to deploy their navies to promote respect for human rights, among UNSOM, AMISOM and prevent and suppress piracy. The re- and especially to protect the rights of AU. The close relations between the cent decision of the SC to deploy UN- the more vulnerable part of the popu- two missions and, more generally, be- SOM has to be analysed against this lation. tween the UN and AU in the Somali background. The fifth task assigned to UNSOM theatre is fundamental not only for is to monitor, help investigate and the security related aspects but for the

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political implications as well. It is well that the EU will play a major role in known that the UN did make prom- this. The EU is very much involved in ises to the AU, for a long period, to the reconstruction process in Somalia; replace AMISOM with a UN Mission. the Joint Strategy Paper for Somalia This promise has not been kept for for 2008-2013 provided an allocation several years, notwithstanding the re- of EUR 215, 8 million from the EC’s peated assurances of the UN Security 10th European Development Fund Council in several Resolution deal- (EDF). It covers three main sectors of ing with Somalia. The deployment of cooperation: governance, education UNSOM represents a first step in this and rural development. This holistic direction (although much more has to approach to the Somali problem, link- be done before the actual replacement ing security with development, rule can take place) and creates a better of law and respect for human rights, condition for a reinforced and mutu- gender-related aspects and interna- ally beneficial cooperation between tional humanitarian law, has turned the UN and the AU. out to be the only way to address a very complicated situation. The re- Cooperation mechanism with local cent Conference on Somalia which authorities (including the Federal took place in Brussels in September Government and the local admin- 16, 2013 co-hosted by the European istrations). As UNSOM is a mis- Union and Somalia, must be wel- sion based on the full respect for the comed as a major positive step in this concept of local ownership, another process. major challenge it will face is to de- velop sound and strong relations not The UN and its members States, to- only with the Federal Government gether with all relevant regional and but with the local authorities, be they national stakeholders, need to act tribal leaders or representative of the cautiously, fully respecting the lo- self-proclaimed autonomous territo- cal traditions and values in order to ries (such as Puntland, Somaliland, make the Somali people the real ac- and the Jubba Interim Administra- tors of change. If this result is to be tion, the administrations of Galmu- achieved, the UN will regain its cred- dug, Hiraan, Himan and Heeb). ibility in the country, and Somalia will face a more promising future after its Humanitarian assistance to those long period of suffering. in need in all parts of Somalia (es- pecially to vulnerable groups). The lengthy Somali crisis has had a tre- mendous impact on the civilian pop- ulation, causing millions of IDPS and refugees (mainly, but not exclusively, in neighbouring countries). Accord- ing to the UNSG, more than 260.000 people died as a consequence of the 2011 famine. The situation has im- proved only slightly, there is still a desperate need of an additional effort by the whole humanitarian communi- ty to provide basic goods for the sur- vival of the affected population, and especially of the children.

Promotion of local development projects. There is general agreement that the stabilization and peaceful re- organization of the Somali States and the initiation of the national reconcili- ation process will depend, to a large extent, on the restarting of the econ- omy and the launching of small and quick-impact projects. It is expected

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EU Naval Force flagship ITS SanGiusto captures suspected pirates 2 - Nov 2012

European Union Naval Force Somalia Operation Atalanta | Photo EU Naval Force Media & Public Information Office

60 OFFSHORE SOMALIA: PIRACY, NAVAL MISSIONS AND PRIVATE SECURITY If international contrasting strategies to piracy have shown their limits, private maritime security instead seems successful. The booming armed contractors sector is a profitable business, but it raises several international and human rights law issues, while foreign and onshore root causes of the phenomenon are largely left unattended.

by Francesca Sterzi

PhD candidate in International Law Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna

Introduction

On the 12th of October 2013 the Seaman and about 5,000 rounds of ammuni- October 18, 2013 the crew, composed Guard Ohio, a Sierra Leone-flagged tion1. The vessel was engaged in an of ten sailors and twenty-five security fishery patrol vessel, owned and op- anti-piracy protection service in the guards of different nationalities, was erated by AdvanFort, an US-based so called High Risk Area (HRA)2. On arrested by coastal authorities. The Private Maritime Security Company episode caused a strong reaction by (PMSC), was detained at a port in Tuticorin, Tamil Nadu, for illegally 1 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-asia-india-24606031 place. For the purpose of BMP the High Risk entering Indian waters (yes, India, 2 According to the above mentioned Area is an area bounded by Suez and the Strait again) with a cache of 31 assault rifles BMP 4, “the High Risk Area defines itself by of Hormuz to the North, 10°S and 78°E”; see ibi- where pirate activity and/or attacks have taken dem, p. 4.

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AdvantFort, that claimed that all the be clear is that a purely public con- than 90% of global trade is carried procedures to lawfully enter Indian trasting strategy has not proven to by sea”6 and it is, therefore, easy to territorial waters have been duly re- be sufficient and functional in terms imagine the multi-billion interests at spected3. of its cost-effectiveness and, most stake. Not surprisingly, pirate attacks importantly, is not sustainable in the have relevant economic impacts on Besides the specific features of this in- long term. This article aims at putting shipping industry causing significant cident, the case is enlightening: armed the international naval presence in capital loss7. Moreover, one must also contractors protecting vessels, either Somali waters in a critical perspective, consider the payment of ransom in on board or on an escorting vessel, while highlighting the characteristics case of hijacking of the crew8. The av- present some interesting questions. and controversies of the employment erage ransom payment has increased Moreover, armed contractors against of privately contracted armed security dramatically: “in 2006, the average pirates seem to be a profitable busi- personnel (PCASP) on merchant ships ransom was estimated at a few hun- ness, which has started to grow as a as counter-piracy measure. dred thousand US dollars, rising to response to the global concern raised $0.5 million in 2007, $1.5 million in by pirate attacks off the coasts of So- Contractors in the Gulf of Aden: the 2008, $3.4 million in 2009 and up to malia. Although, in the last few dec- privatization of maritime security as $5.5 million in 2010”9. ades, pirate attacks have occurred in a response to the costs of Somali pi- different areas of the globe, Somali pi- racy However, due to the above-mentioned racy has proven to be quite unexpect- The magnitude of the problem posed reduction in the number of successful ed in its intensity, aggressiveness and by Somalia-based piracy, with the attacks, the overall amount of money dynamism. The international commu- number of attacks reaching its peak paid in ransoms in 2012 (31.75 million nity has provided a slightly delayed in 2011 with 243 reported attacks, has USD) has declined by 80.1% from 2011 response caused by a failure to under- generated an impressive concerted (159.62 million)10. Additionally, one of stand that the impressive evolution deployment of naval forces in the Gulf the most problematic effects has been of Somali piracy has “on shore” root of Aden. The latest figures highlight a the increase of insurance premiums causes and “off-shore” triggering ele- significant reduction of the pirate ac- for companies travelling through the ments such as: the illegal exploitation tivities off the Horn of Africa and in HRA that generates additional costs of Somali fishing resources and the il- the Indian Ocean. Indeed, according for the industry. The global estimated legal dumping of toxic waste;4 neither to the International Maritime Bureau of which can be addressed through Piracy Reporting Center, in 2013 the 6 See ibidem p. 7. an “emergency-oriented” approach number of successful pirate attacks 7 For example, the losses may be alone. Therefore, given the relevance has reached the lowest rate: eleven caused by the delays in shipment deliveries, of the economic interests concerned, reported incidents including two hi- or by the loss of the cargo value, or the costs favourable conditions for a private re- jacking. The general improvement of sustained in order to increase the speed to fast steam through the HRA. sponse have arisen. the Somali political scenario coupled 8 Given the “ransom-centered” model with the massive international naval of Somalia-based piracy, i. e. the large majority The rise of a maritime security in- presence have surely contributed in of its revenues derives from the ransoms paid dustry in relation to piracy is a recent addressing the issue by diminishing to release the hijacked vessels, the dramatic increase that occurred under this line is sig- phenomenon whose potentials, risks the frequency and the overall number nificant. Indeed, “the Somali pirate business and operational issues, especially in of pirate attacks off the coasts of the model relies heavily on onshore support infra- legal terms, have not been addressed country, at least in terms of deter- structure to conduct ransom negotiations. Ge- in their complexity. What appears to rence. Moreover, the adoption by the nerically a pirate operation consists of armed offshore operations with onshore support that shipping industry of the so-called Best provides shelter for returning pirates and ac- 3 Interestingly, AdvanFort claims that Management Practices to fend off the cess to markets for stolen goods and for the the authorization to enter into the port was attacks has played a significant role5. goods, services, and manpower needed for pi- granted by Indian coastal authorities, who also rate attacks”, see The World Bank,The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation, checked the regularity of all the paperwork Nevertheless, piracy is still dangerous needed to carry the weapons on board: see in http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ http://www.advanfort.com/Indian-Authorities- in both human and economic terms. It en/2013/01/17672066/pirates-somalia-ending- Favorably-Respond-to-Seaman-Guard-MV- is worth remembering that still “more threat-rebuilding-nation, 2013 Washington DC, OHIO-documentation.pdf p. XXIV. Interestingly, it seems that the ransom 4 It is worth remembering that Italy, amount can be predicted on the basis of three traditionally linked to Somalia for its colonial 5 The International Maritime Organi- variables: the nationality of the crew, the size of past, has played a major role in contributing to zation (IMO), the UN specialized agency, has the hijacked ship and the number of the vessels the pollution of Somali waters and in benefiting been engaged in the debate regarding piracy, already in the hands of the pirates at the mo- from this criminal activity; as the death in 1994 setting up a reporting mechanism and issuing ment of the hijacking (see ibidem, p. 96). of the Italian journalist Ilaria Alpi has tragically recommendations and guidelines. In particu- 9 See Van Ginkel B., Landman L., In proved. For more information on the issue and lar, the IMO has proposed the Best Management Search of a Sustainable and Coherent Strategy. As- its human rights related consequences, please Practices (BMP) which includes some non-lethal sessing the Kaleidoscope of Counter-piracy Activi- see Hussein B. M., The Evidence of Toxic and Ra- protection measures to be applied on ships in ties in Somali, in Journal of International Criminal dioactive Waste Dumping in Somalia and its Impact order to avoid an attack. The latest version of Justice 10 (2012), 727-748, p. 730. on the Enjoyment of Human Rights: a Case Study, the BMP is contained in Circular n. 1339, Piracy 10 See One Earth Future Foundation, Paper presented at the United Nations Human and Armed Robbery against Ships in Waters off the The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy 2012, Work- Rights Council, 14th Session, 8 June 2010, avail- Coast of Somalia, Best Management Practices for ing Paper, 2012, in http://oceansbeyondpiracy. able at http://somalitalk.com/sun/toxic_waste_ Protection against Somalia Based Piracy (MSC.1/ org/publications/economic-cost-piracy-2012 , dumping_somalia.pdf. Circ.1339, BMP 4, 14 September 2011). p. 3.

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cost of Somali piracy, which encom- in size from independent consultan- rated17 and has to be considered as passes a variety of indicators such as: cies to major multinationals”13. an exception to the general principle the costs related to insurances, mili- of freedom of navigation in the high tary operations, security equipment Concretely, PMSCs offer a variety sea18. International law has developed etc., was between $5.7 and $6.1 bil- of services to shipping companies, a set of norms aiming at criminalizing lion in 2012, with a drop since 2011 of which may vary from risk assess- and suppressing piracy at sea, which about $850 million11. ments, consultancy, and training of has been incorporated as customary the crew to the deployment of armed law in the 1958 Geneva Convention Despite these impressive figures, the and unarmed guards. It has been esti- on the High Seas19 and the 1982 Unit- human costs of Somali piracy are even mated that in 2012 the global expend- ed Nations Convention on the Law higher. It has been calculated that iture for armed guards was between of the Sea (UNCLOS)20. The corner- in 2012, a total of 851 seafarers have 1.15 and 1.53 billion USD, while in stone of the rules regarding piracy is been attacked with firearms by Soma- 2011 was around 530.6 million dol- the principle of collaboration among li pirates, out of which 381 have expe- lars14. The rate of armed guard use States to repress piracy “on the high rienced the boarding of their vessels is estimated to be around 50% there- sea or in any other place outside the and 349 have been taken hostage (plus fore it has doubled if compared to jurisdiction of any State”, stated in 240 hostages remaining from 2010-11, 201115. The cost shipping companies Article 100 of the UNCLOS. As for the for an overall total of 589). Although, have to sustain to hire PCASP seems following Article 101, piracy at sea as said, attacks have decreased sig- to range from 772.95 to 2,569.73 USD consists in: nificantly since 2011, “there was a rise per guard per day, with an average of in the reported success rate of pirate 1,115.94 USD16. “[…](a) any illegal acts of violence or de- attacks in 2012 (from 14% of seafarers tention, or any act of depredation, com- fired upon by Somali pirates to 41%). Some legal considerations: piracy in mitted for private ends by the crew or the This may be an indication that pira- the international law of the sea passengers of a private ship or a private cy tactics have improved, or that re- The disturbing nature of the acts of aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, porting anomalies have distorted the piracy: causing a breach of the “good against another ship or aircraft, or against true picture at sea. Furthermore, all order at sea” and troubling maritime persons or property on board such ship or hostages remaining in captivity have traffic, has led since antiquity to iden- aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, per- been held for over one year and are tify pirates as hostis humanae generis sons or property in a place outside the ju- considered to be at High Risk”12. and to look at piracy as a crimen iuris risdiction of any State; (b) any act of vol- gentium that is, a crime which nega- untary participation in the operation of a Although piracy is undoubtedly as tively affects all mankind. Indeed ship or of an aircraft with a knowledge of old as sea trade itself, and also the piracy is, historically, the first crime facts making it a pirate ship or aircrafts; set of norms international law have in relation to which the concept of (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally developed against it are in large part universal jurisdiction has been elabo- facilitating an act described in subpara- consolidated as customary law, the graph (a) or (b)”. practice of resorting to contractors as an anti-piracy measure is a pretty 13 See Security Association for the Mari- By reading this definition, some legal time Industry Annual Review, October 2013, p. recent development. Since 2008 there 8, available at http://www.seasecurity.org/wp- features appear crystal-clear: the in- has been a real “boom” in the mari- content/uploads/SAMI-ANNUAL-REVIEW- trinsically private nature of the ends time private security business; with FINAL-Low-Res.pdf. Formally launched in and the means by which the pirate existing companies adding security April 2011, SAMI defines itself as “s a not-for- activity is conducted; the requisite of profit membership organization representing services to their menus or new com- the maritime security industry […]”, see ibidem, its occurrence in international waters, panies being set up. Providing exact p. 2. For more references, please visit www.sea- in which the high sea, the contiguous figures remains a challenge, but ac- security.org. zone21 and the exclusive economic cording to the 2013 Security Associa- 14 See International Shipping Facts and Figures – Information Resources on Trade, safety, tion for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) Security Environment, International Maritime 17 See Kontorovich E. and Art S., “An Annual Review, “the international Organization Maritime Knowledge Centre, 6 Empirical Examination of Universal Jurisdiction for membership of SAMI encompasses March 2012, p. 7; available at http://www.imo. Piracy”, in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 104, No. 3 (July 2010), pp. 436-453, p. almost 180 maritime security provid- org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShipping- FactsAndFigures/TheRoleandImportanceo- 437. ers, consultants, trainers, and mari- fInternationalShipping/Documents/Interna- 18 The customary principle of freedom time security equipment, technology tional%20Shipping%20-%20Facts%20and%20 of navigation in the high sea is enshrined in and hardware manufacturers from Figures.pdf. It is further specified that “the Art. 87.1 of the United Nations Convention on across 35 different countries […]. observed increase comes as the result of an in- the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). creased proportion of ships employing armed 19 See Articles 14 to 22 of the Geneva These membership companies range guards (30% in 2011 and at least 50% in 2012) Convention on the High Seas, signed on 29th as well as a revised estimate of the number April 1958 and entered into force 30th Septem- of commercial transits through the HRA each ber 1962. 11 Ibidem, p. 1. year. Controlling for that latter methodologi- 20 See Articles 100 to 107 and article 110 12 See One Earth Future Foundation, cal factor, the cost of armed guards increased of the United Nations Convention on the Law The Human Cost of Maritime Piracy 2012, Work- 79.7% in 2012”, ibidem. of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed in Montego Bay, ing Paper, 2012, available at http://oceansbe- 15 See The Economic Cost of Maritime Pi- Jamaica, on 10th December 1982 and entered yondpiracy.org/publications/human-cost-mari- racy 2012, cit., p. 19. into force on 16th November 1994. time-piracy-2012, p. 4. 16 Ibidem. 21 The contiguous zone is regulated by

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zone are included22. Acts of violence tion, provided that the pirate activ- this old threat. In light of the constant and depredation occurring in territo- ity is ongoing on the high seas, or in escalation of attacks, the UN Security rial, internal or archipelagic waters, any other place outside the jurisdic- Council has approved a number of as defined by Resolution A. 1025 (26) tion of any State. What appears to Resolutions, which in fact represents of the International Maritime Organi- be relevant in order to legally frame an escalation in the fight against mari- zation (IMO)23, are to be considered and problematize the employment of time piracy. Evidence of the concern “armed robbery at sea”, falling under contractors for anti-piracy purposes raised by Somali piracy, the UNSC the jurisdiction of the coastal State24. is that the UNCLOS attributes the le- has considered it “a threat to interna- gitimate title to seize pirate ships only tional peace and security”, thus acting The above-mentioned duty of collab- to “warships or military aircraft, or under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. oration imposed on States to repress other ships or aircraft clearly marked Starting from this assumption, the piracy is further specified by Art. and identifiable as being on govern- UNSC has progressively broadened 105; which states the faculty of every ment service and authorized to that the original scope of international State to seize a pirate ship or aircraft effect” (Art. 107). It is therefore clear norms on piracy, authorizing States and arrest the persons and seize the that, from a legal perspective, the ac- and regional organizations, through property on board over which it has tive contrast and seizure of pirates Resolution 1816 of 2 June 2008 and the faculty (and not the obligation – through the use of force is attributed after the explicit request of the Tran- the non-binding nature of the provi- only to the organs of States, excluding sitional Federal Government, to en- sion has created a lot of issues with therefore any proactive operation by ter the territorial waters of Somalia reference to the actual prosecution private subjects, which possibly may in order to repress acts of piracy. Six of pirates)25 to exercise its jurisdic- only act in self-defense. months later, with Resolution 1851 of 16 December 2008, this “muscu- Art. 33 of the UNCLOS: “1. In a zone contigu- The usual international response to lar” approach has been extended to ous to its territorial sea, described as the con- the upsurge of piracy in the Horn of the on-shore, giving authorization to tiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the Africa : naval operations in the Gulf conduct “all necessary measures that control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary of Aden and a critical evaluation of are appropriate in Somalia”, clearly laws and regulations within its territory or their outcomes/cost effectiveness alluding to operations on mainland. territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the Although rightly seen as an unprec- The natural consequence of the UNSC above laws and regulations committed within edented example of good cooperation action has been the deployment of an its territory or territorial sea.2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles among States, international organiza- impressive naval military presence. from the baselines from which the breadth of tions and institutions, the naval pres- The European Union has deployed the territorial sea is measured”. ence in the Gulf of Aden is problem- EUNAVFOR-Operation Atalanta the 22 The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) atic. The international community first purely naval mission of the Un- is regulated by Artt. 55 – 75 of the UNCLOS, has given a rather late response26, not ion; the NATO has been involved which is also the first legal instrument to en- shrine this institution. According to Art. 55, immediately understanding the crim- through the deployment of Allied “the exclusive economic zone is an area beyond inal potential of the new version of Protector and Ocean Shield. The third and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the international entity is the Combined specific legal regime established in this Part, Maritime Force - Combined Task Force under which the rights and jurisdiction of the racy operations in the Gulf of Aden. This coun- 151, which represents what is usually coastal State and the rights and freedoms of ter-productive solution has been often justified other States are governed by the relevant provi- in the light of a presumed “insufficient legal named as a “coalition of willing”, led sions of this Convention” and, according to Art. basis”, which “results from difficulties with de- by the United States. In 2012, every 57, “the exclusive economic zone shall not ex- termining the appropriate jurisdiction, conflict day there were “between 21 and 30 tend beyond 200 nautical miles from the base- of laws, the inadequacy of domestic laws, evi- vessels participating in east African lines from which the breadth of the territorial dentiary procedures, and the cost of the judi- 27 sea is measured”.It is important to underline cial consequence” (see OSIRO D., Somali Pirates counter-piracy efforts ”. that the EEZ does not exist by itself, therefore Have Rights too, Judicial Consequences and Human it is not a prolongation of the sovereignty of the Rights Concerns, ISS Paper 224, July 2011, p. 1). Addressing all the specific features coastal State, but it is rather subjected to its ex- Specific agreements have therefore been signed of the three international naval task plicit declaration. Within the EEZ, the coastal with coastal States able and willing to exercise State has sovereign rights with regards to the jurisdiction, such as Kenya and the Seychelles, forces is beyond the purpose and exploration and exploitation of natural resourc- also in the light of the impossibility to extradite the limits of this work. Nevertheless, es and exerts jurisdiction over marine science pirates to Somalia, given the evident inability some features can be highlighted. research and environmental protection. of Somali judicial authorities to prosecute na- First of all, a simple but critical is- 23 International Maritime Organiza- tionals involved in piracy. tion, Resolution A.1025(26) “Code of practice for 26 Indeed, “although on earlier oc- sue: at operational level, the vast- the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed casions, the international community mainly ness of the HRA in which the navies Robbery against Ships”, 18 January 2010. relied on the coastal states to deal with the pi- operate challenges the possibility to 24 This implies that, as stated by Art. racy problem, the commitment of the interna- effectively intervene. The patrolling 111.3 of the UNCLOS, “The right of hot pur- tional community to countering Somali piracy 28 suit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters is significant. This shift reflects the geopolitical area is about 2 million square miles . the territorial sea of its own State or of a third importance of the region and the fact that the Indeed, although the institution of State”. sea lines of communication under threat in this an Internationally Recommended 25 The fact that the UNCLOS does not case partly run through the territorial waters of establishes an obligation upon States to try and nations that do not have the capabilities to ef- convict the seized pirates has originated the fectively address the problem”, see Van Ginkel 27 See The Economic Cost of Maritime Pi- practice of “catch and release” (bold added by B., Landman L., In Search of a Sustainable and Co- racy 2012, cit., p. 13. editor) by the warships engaged in counter-pi- herent Strategy, cit., p. 728. 28 Ibidem.

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Transit Corridor, where warships are Chief of Staff in February 2011: “The carriage of arms, especially when it pre-positioned to assist transiting military resource is finite and only comes to those States providing “flags shipping convoys, has proven to be a treats the symptoms. We’re only hold- of convenience” and thus very lim- smart solution, one of the side effects ing the line”32. ited inspection regimes. Moreover, of the international naval patrolling in the norms regulating the type and the area has been the pursuing of new An open (new) issue: effectiveness, the amount of arms PCASP can use routes by pirates, who have shifted business imperatives and legal con- may vary a lot among States. Compli- their attacks further into the Indian siderations on maritime contractors ance with International Traffic in Arms Ocean. Moreover, since the average It is necessary to make clear that the Regulations and with different gov- duration of an attack is about thirty growing employment of PCASP has ernments’ obligations is actually com- minutes, it is easy to imagine the diffi- one, very simple, reason: it works. plicated and expensive for PMSCs. culty of timely intervention while it is To date, no vessel with armed con- This fact had led to the solution of taking place. Another issue of concern tractors on board has been hijacked33 floating armoury ships: personnel are is the long-term sustainability of this and the above-mentioned increase embarked in port and firearms and naval endeavor: in 2012, the overall of insurance prices is mitigated by equipment are picked up from those cost of piracy-related military activi- the fact that there are premium dis- ships waiting outside territorial wa- ties29 in the Gulf of Aden was around counts if armed guards are on board. ters. From a legal perspective, as well, 1.09 billion USD. EUNAVFOR Ata- Although, until about two years ago the practice of armed patrol boats is lanta and Ocean Shield have prolonged the common approach of the shipping very enlightening. They operate in a their mandate up to the end of 201430, industry and of the IMO was far from more aggressive way by establishing even though they have already down- endorsing the employment of PMSCs exclusion zones around client ships sized their commitment by reducing on ships, the attitude towards it has and challenging suspicious boats. the number of deployed vessels (from changed since it has become clear that This solution is pretty attractive for 5-10 vessels in 2011 to 4-7 in 2012 in it was becoming a common practice. shipping companies because it does the case of Atalanta and from 4 in 2011 The IMO has failed to keep up with not imply the carriage of firearms on down to 2 by the end of 2012 in the the pace of the phenomenon, still af- board and therefore it does not com- case of Ocean Shield)31. firming that the authorization of the promise the right to innocent passage use of PCASP on board is essentially a through territorial waters. From the What appears clear in relation to So- flag state issue, even if in May 2012 it point of view of international law, mali piracy is that a purely military released the last version of the Interim however, these armed patrol boats response can be appreciated only on Guidance to private maritime security could be defined as pirate ships them- a tactical level. A strategic long-term companies (PMSC) providing contracted selves as they use aggressive force in solution must necessarily address the armed security personnel on board ships the high sea without having govern- root causes of this criminal phenome- in the High Risk Area. At the moment, ment authority. non, enhancing the capacity building however, the key role in regulating elements of the international commit- the issue is still played by States and Given this concentration of poten- ment. In this sense, particularly en- self-regulatory instruments. tially aggressive force, it is easy to lightening are the words by Colonel understand that the respect of human Richard Spencer, the EUNAVFOR There are various legal issues at stake. rights law standards is clearly chal- First and foremost, the lawful use of lenged. Highly equipped and trained force: in general terms, “the right of personnel operating in the high sea in 29 It includes “the administrative bud- PMSC personnel to use force is typi- protection of private interests without gets for the “big three” naval missions, the operating costs of surface vessels, their surveil- cally restricted to lawful acts either any, or very little, control are more lance detachments, and UAVs, personnel costs in self-defense or in the defense of likely to use force in a disproportion- associated with vessel protection detachments, others”34. But the acts and the degree ate way. There are already videos on and the cost of Shared Awareness and Decon- of force that could lawfully be encom- the Internet that are witnesses to the fliction (SHADE) meetings”, ibidem, p. 14. The SHADE mechanism was established in 2008 passed in the self-defense category indiscriminate shooting of the pirates in order to enhance cooperation and coordina- vary from State to State. Secondly, by the contractors. Therefore, the con- tion among the three different naval forces op- many concerns arise in relation to the crete activity conducted in the high erating in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea; sea by PCASP is clearly not easy to the meetings are held in Bahrain every three months. monitor. This fact constitutes a seri- 32 See No stopping them. For all the efforts ous threat to the respect of the most 30 It has recently put about that the to combat it, Somali piracy is posing an ever greater mandate of EUNAVFOR - Operation Atalanta threat to the world’s shipping, in The Economist, 3rd fundamental right, the right to life, could be extended up to 2016, following the February 2011, available at http://www.econo- which even pirates, who are engaged request by different stakeholders (see for ex- mist.com/node/18061574. in a criminal activity, obviously enjoy. ample http://www.ecsa.eu/news-and-media/ 33 The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy Moreover, in case of violation, a ques- latest-news/9-latest-news/96-armed-protec- 2012, cit., p. 19. tion-not-a-substitute-for-military-presence). tion arises on the real possibility that 34 Priddy A., Casey-Maslen S., Counter- However, so far, no official statement has been piracy Operations by Private Maritime Security perpetrator of abuses can be held ac- made (December 15, 2013), see http://www. Contractors. Key Legal Issues and Challenges, in countable, provided that the contrac- afriquejet.com/news/14155-operation-atalanta- Journal of International Criminal Justice 10 (2012), now-to-end-2016.html. tors may also be subjected to multiple 839 – 856, p. 845. 31 See The Economic Cost of Maritime Pi- jurisdictions (their national law, the racy 2012, cit., p. 13.

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law of the flag state, or the law of the there are two kinds of piracy: the one sented at the United Nations Human coastal State if they operate in territo- we all know and the so called “for- Rights Council, 14th Session, 8 June rial waters). In any case, the commit- eign fishing piracy”, which has been 2010, available at http://somalitalk. ment of private security providers, “poaching and destroying the Somali com/sun/toxic_waste_dumping_so- in cooperation with the International marine resources for the last 18 years malia.pdf Organization for Standardization’s, following the collapse of the Somali towards the elaboration of standards regime in 1991”35. Kontorovich E. and Art S., “An for PMSC providing contractors on Therefore, beside the military engage- Empirical Examination of Universal Ju- board must be looked at as a sign of ment, the employment of contractors risdiction for Piracy”, in The American good will and self-consciousness. and the advancement of Somali mari- Journal of International Law, Vol. 104, time policy, the elimination of the en- No. 3 (July 2010), pp. 436-453 Final remarks: the future of mari- demic poverty in Somalia is required time security in Somalia to defeat the country-based pirate ac- One Earth Future Foundation, The With a 3.025 km long coastline, it is tivity: providing young Somalis with Human Cost of Maritime Piracy 2012, clear that the future of Somalia is also valid alternatives to make a living in Working Paper, 2012, in http://oceans- bound to the destiny of its coasts and a safe environment will probably be beyondpiracy.org/publications/hu- sea. This concept has been clearly re- more effective than any kind of coun- man-cost-maritime-piracy-2012 iterated by President Hassan Sheikh ter-measure. at the Fourteenth Plenary of the Contact One Earth Future Foundation, The Group on Piracy held in New York on References Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy 2012, May 1st, 2013. The public debate has Working Paper, 2012, in http://oceans- frequently shaped the issue in the International Expert Group on Pi- beyondpiracy.org/publications/eco- wrong manner; often failing to pin- racy off the Somali Coast, Piracy nomic-cost-piracy-2012 point that piracy is only a dramatic off the Somali Coast, Workshop commis- consequence of the negligence that the sioned by the Special Representative of OSIRO D., Somali Pirates Have Rights international community has shown the Secretary General of the UN to Soma- too, Judicial Consequences and Human towards the twenty-years long crisis lia, Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Ab- Rights Concerns, ISS Paper 224, July of the country. Moreover, the illegal dallah, Nairobi 10-21 November 2008, 2011 exploitation of sea resources by dif- Final Report, Assessment and recom- ferent actors experienced by Somalia mendations, in www.icpat.org Priddy A., Casey-Maslen S., Counter- has played a crucial role in favoring piracy Operations by Private Maritime the upsurge of piracy and the issues International Maritime Organiza- Security Contractors. Key Legal Issues that Somalia have to face nowadays in tion Maritime Knowledge Centre, and Challenges, in Journal of Interna- the maritime domain. International Shipping Facts and Figures tional Criminal Justice 10 (2012), 839 - – Information Resources on Trade, safety, 856 The deployment of EUCAP Nestor, Security Environment, , 6 March 2012; the capacity-building mission of the in http://www.imo.org/Knowledge- The World Bank, The Pirates of Soma- EU testify an increased consciousness Centre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAnd- lia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Na- over the necessity to address the pi- Figures/TheRoleandImportanceofIn- tion, in http://documents.worldbank. racy problem in a comprehensive re- ternationalShipping/Documents/ org/curated/en/2013/01/17672066/pi- gional perspective and must be seen International%20Shipping%20-%20 rates-somalia-ending-threat-rebuild- as a good step forward on the way to Facts%20and%20Figures.pdf. ing-nation, 2013 Washington DC stable and safe waters off the coasts of Somalia. An effective maritime secu- Huggins J., The Cost of Piracy: Moving Treves T., Piracy, Law of the Sea, and rity strategy should bring Somali po- from Mitigation to Investment, 3rd UAE Use of Force: Developments off the Coast litical actors and international stake- Counter Piracy Conference, Brief- of Somalia, European Journal of Interna- holders such as donors, States, inter- ing Paper, in http://counterpiracy.ae/ tional Law, 20 (2), p. 399-414 national organizations, and maritime upload/2013briefing/Huggins%20 industry representatives to aim not Jon%20Sec2Ch1%20-%20Final%20 Van Ginkel B., Landman L., In Search only at the suppression of piracy but Briefing%20Paper-En-Website.pdf of a Sustainable and Coherent Strategy. also at the development of maritime Assessing the Kaleidoscope of Counter- infrastructures and law enforcement Hussein B. M., The Evidence of Toxic piracy Activities in Somali, in Journal of forces. and Radioactive Waste Dumping in So- International Criminal Justice 10 (2012), malia and its Impact on the Enjoyment of 727-748Waldo M. A., The Two Piracies This means that law enforcement has Human Rights: a Case Study, Paper pre- in Somalia: Why the World ignores the to also aim at avoiding any kind of fu- Other?, available at http://www.im- ture criminal exploitation by various csnet.org/imcs/docs/somalias_twin_ non-Somali actors, as it has shame- 35 See Waldo M. A., The Two Piracies sea_piracies_the_global_aramada.pdf in Somalia: Why the World ignores the Other?, fully happened in the past. In this available at http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/ context, it seems appropriate to recall somalias_twin_sea_piracies_the_global_ara- the clear-cutting idea that, in Somalia, mada.pdf, p2.

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67 ITPCM International Commentary December 2013 ISSN. 2239-7949

Somalia Famine Food Aid Stolen / Human Black Hole

By Surian Soosay

68 HUMANITARIAN ACTORS’ STRUGGLE FOR ACCESS, IMPARTIALITY AND ENGAGEMENT WITH ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS While being denied or granted only limited access in most of the country remains a reality, the UN integrated missions’ approach risks compromising the principle of impartiality of humanitarian action. Within this framework, humanitarian organizations are also confronted with dilemmas of engagement with armed non-state actors.

by Marco Rotelli

Secretary General INTERSOS Introduction Rome, Italy

Almost 20 years after the 1991 events, contaminated by corruption allega- insurgents, autonomous movements, Somalia adopted a new provisional tions is considered by most observers self-declared independents1, inter- constitution. The first regular parlia- as a landmark attempt to exclude war- ment was established in August 2012 lords and a step toward a more peace- 1 The issue of local autonomy in So- as a result of a consultative process ful future. malia goes well beyond the notorious self- that involved Clan Elders and a Com- declaration of independent state of Somaliland. mittee composed of Clan representa- A variety of actors Altough not as outstanding in strength and size, local statehood aspirations are still regis- tives supported by international as- The federal government is not the tered in various regions, Galmudug (Galgadug sistance. The process, despite being only player in today’s Somalia. Clans, and Mudug regions), Maakhir State, Hiraan State, and Banaadirland.

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national militaries, diplomats and actors and separatist movements, ac- local civilian population remain pre- international aid organisations are tive also in the South Central zones3. carious. The humanitarian situation key actors in contemporary Somalia. is extremely dire, with some of the The main clans of the South Central Despite instabilities, Somalia’s mo- worst indicators in the world, espe- regions, Hawiye, Darood, Dir, Ra- mentum has attracted the private sec- cially as far as the health sector is con- hanweyn, Somaliland’s Isaaq and the tor. Many members of the Somali di- cerned. 870,000 persons are in need of sub-clans, have always played a cru- aspora decided to invest in the coun- humanitarian emergency aid and 2.3 cial role in defining community life, try, benefiting from trading opportu- million are in severe distress. A wor- excercising power sharing and in nities and the construction boom. The rying indicator is the acute malnutri- many cases, replacing an inexistent diaspora has always played a crucial tion rate, which afflicts over 200,000 or ineffective government experienc- role, with remittance exceeding the children under the age of five8. Cur- ing two decades of turmoil. Clans and amounts normally needed to fund the rent conditions, with a physician sub-clans provided services, author- humanitarian response in the coun- available for every 25,000 persons, ity, security and were seen by a large try4. Remittances to Somalia are in fact cause 70,000 children’s deaths every part of the population as a fundamen- seen by many as a reliable indicator of year and reproductive health lies in a tal ingredient to the livelihood of the the interest, business propensity and desperate state, with more than 30% country. Yet, the early stages of the engagement of the diaspora within its of women of reproductive age dying hardliner opposition armed group al country of origin. Somalia has a long- due to pregnancy-related causes. In Shabaab, that for years has controlled standing international aid community other words, a pregnant woman dies almost 90% of the Southern and Cen- presence5. Many actors were present every two hours.9 In such a scenario, tral Somalia, constituted an exception, even before 1991, and continued their 2,1 millions are displaced, 1,1 million having been organized with an unu- activities over the last two decades of within the country’s boundaries and sual non-clanic structure and chain of chaos. The national civil society or- the remaining as refugees, mainly in command. ganizations6 also played a fundamen- the Horn of Africa and in Yemen. Yet, tal role, in some cases with fatal con- for the first time in years, considerable Somalia’s armed opposition and in- sequences for many of their workers numbers of refugees have voluntar- surgency is made up of a plethora of and leaders7. ily crossed the borders, returning to actors. The country suffers from grow- Somalia from neighbouring Kenya ing criminal groups and activities, but The numbers of a crisis and Ethiopia but it is too early to set a al Shabab is still considered the most In this context, the conditions of the trend given the volatile security condi- organized, effective and by far the tions10. deadliest of these. Despite the ‘tacti- cal withdrawal’ announced in August 3 In August 2013 a reconciliation The struggle for access 20112, the group has demonstrated on agreement was signed between the administra- The aid community works under ex- several occasions its capacity to carry tion of the Jubaland and the Federal Govern- treme pressure to deliver humanitar- ment. out devastating actions with complex 4 Senior lecturer Laura Hammond ian relief in a territory that remains attacks in the capital Mogadishu and at SOAS University, London, estimates that one of the world’s most extreme envi- in neighbouring countries. The promi- the amount of remittances of the Somali dias- ronments. The so-called Southern and nent international military presence, pora totals annually 1.3 to 2 billion US dollars. Central Zone, roughly from Galkayo http://www.soas.ac.uk/news/newsitem85230. represented by the 17,000 uniformed html to the Kenyan border, remains high- personnel of the UN-mandated Af- 5 For a list of the main humanitarian ly unstable. If born and raised in the rican Union Mission (AMISOM) has actors present in Somalia, consult the Consoli- rural areas of Somalia, young people so far significantly contributed to en- dated Appeal Process at http://reliefweb.int/ under the age of 20 have practically hancing the Federal Government’s sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Somalia%20 never experienced the tangible pres- Consolidated%20Appeal%202013-2015%20 territorial control, but a sizeable part MYR%202013.pdf ence of the government nor of the rule of the country remains exposed to 6 Among the most active organiza- tions: IIDA – Women development organiza- extreme risk due to a very volatile 8 Food Security and Nutrition Analy- tion SWDC – Somali Women development security environment where military sis Unit – Somalia – FSNAU: Food Security Center, SSWC – Save Somali Women and chil- and Nutrition Outlook; http://www.fsnau.org/ gains are often not followed by stable dren, WOCCA – Women and Child Care Orga- in-focus/food-security-and-nutrition-outlook- control or political legitimacy. On the nization despite-improvements-870000-likely-crisis- international side, governmental ac- OSPAD – Organization for Somali Protection and-emergency tors have changed over the years, to and Development 9 World Health Organization Statis- include players such as Turkey and 7 Examples involving media and tics – 2013, and trends in maternal mortality China, while internally, the map of So- NGOs are the assassinations of Ali Shamarke, 1990-2010 (WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA,WB) malia shows an intricate net of federal founder of Horn Afrik Media, assassinated 10 According to UNHCR Movement by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) ar- tracking 30,000 refugees have returned only ranged by militants in August 2007 in Mogadi- temporarily or seasonaly. On November 10th 2 The group’s spokeperson Sheikh Ali shu as he returned from the burial of Mahad a ‘Tripartite Agreement’ between the Govern- Mohamed Rage announced a tactical retreat Ahmed Elmi, a fellow journalist and producer ments of Kenya and Somalia and the United from Mogadishu in early August 2011, as a re- of Horn Afrik Radio shot earlier that day. NGO Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UN- sult of intense fighting with the African Union WOCCA Executive Director and founding HCR) has been signed. This agreement sets the Peacekeeping force AMISOM: http://www. member of the Peace and Human Rights Net- support and assistance to Somali refugees in theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/08/ work (PHRN), Mohammed Abdulle Mahdi, Kenya who wish to voluntarily return to their al-shabaab-mogadishu-somalia was assassinated in Mogadishu in June 2008. homeland.

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of law. For all of their life, they have one hand, this limits the capacity of Access remains perilous. In fact, as the been the object of competing interests organizations to independently moni- al Shabab transitioned from conven- of various armed groups, and, as a re- tor humanitarian needs and response, tional fighting to asymmetric warfare, sult, many of them play an active role but on the other hand, this stimulates using guerrilla and terrorist attacks as perpetrators or serve as witnesses an increased ownership and develop- against its targets, particularly the to massive human rights abuses and ment of capacity by local actors, with Federal Government, the humanitar- incredible atrocities. This is still occur- national personnel and local organiza- ian personnel and more importantly ing in today’s Somali society, coupled tions growing in competence and thus the civilian population, are exposed with a marked mistrust in the capacity in weight in the humanitarian fora. to lethal consequences in the rural and transparency of the government, areas as well as in the main urban ar- which undermines the government’s 2012 marked a slow change. Follow- eas, including Mogadishu. Analysts capacity to expand control and obtain ing AMISOM’s military successes and find many similarities between the a tangible support from communities. possibly some internal fragmenta- group’s current military tactics and To deepen the problem, government tions, al Shabab reduced its presence, the ones rolled out by armed opposi- troops and agents reportedly harass concentrating on rural areas and lim- tion groups in Afghanistan and in the communities, which adds friction and iting its control in towns and cities. Middle East. This brings enormous slows any government attempt to gain After more than three years of little to challenges to the humanitarian com- acceptance and legitimacy. no access, the relief effort today enjoys munity who seeks access to people in limited access that allows essential need of assistance. Denied or limited After 1991, access became more com- movement of aid workers in several access in most of the country remains plicated in Somalia. The international southern and central regions, partic- a reality, with a number of humanitar- community was forced to leave the ularly in the cities and surrounding ian actors, both international non gov- country on various occasions, as a con- areas. The international community ernmental organizations and United sequence of serious security threats resumed and intensified missions and Nations agencies frequently expelled and incidences. The most affected ar- visits to the country programmes. from the opposition controlled terri- eas, mainly concentrated in the South This enables a slow but progressive tory15, with allegation of hidden agen- and Central Zone, have experienced improvement of the delivery of aid, al- das, proselytism and of causing harm instability that resulted in expansions most exclusively limited to life saving to the local population16. and sudden contractions of the capac- actions, aimed to provide urgent and ity of humanitarian actors to deliver essential aid such as basic health care, The few international organizations aid, as well as alternate donors’ inter- including nutritional programmes for allowed to remain in the country were est in funding the action. As an exam- heavily malnourished children, water exposed to continuous harassment, ple, a comparison of the humanitarian and sanitation to reduce the impact of including kidnapping and killings access maps of June 2009 and January waterborne diseases and food security. and faced movements and activity re- 2012 show a dramatic increase of the The aid community is cautiously try- strictions dramatically reducing their areas considered extremely restricted ing to expand its capacity to deliver, capacity to deliver urgent and vital or inaccessible11. This has forced ac- considering the fragility of the access aid to communities17. Organizations in tors, particularly NGOs, to develop gained thus far. Today, it is estimat- new tools to ensure minimal imple- ed that almost 2 million persons are Humanitarian%20Dashboard%20October%20 mentation of life-saving programmes, in need of safe water in Somalia and 2013.pdf relying in most cases on the presence pertinent programmes have reached 15 Between 2010 and 2012, Al Shabab and work of national staff, who, in only 31% of them. Similarly, only 25% and other armed opposition groups controlled areas covering 90% of the South Central Zone some cases, are the object of political of the persons in need of food assist- of Somalia. Access maps are available at http:// pressure and interference. The pro- ance this season have been reached by www.nspsomalia.org/joomla/index.php/in- liferation of “remote management the assistance thus far13. Other activi- formation-and-analysis/nsp-resources-maps/ protocols”12 and increased collabora- ties related to education and protec- maps-of-reference/120-maps-of-reference tion with local actors has become the tion show different results, with 19% 16 With a document published by the Al Shabab Office for Supervising the Affairs of norm for many organizations. On and 0,8% of beneficiaries reached out Foreign Agencies (OSAFA) 16 NGOs and UN of the total population in need. This agencies were expelled from Somalia in 2011. 11 A comparison of the access shows how the assistance in Somalia Al-Shabab accused aid groups of disseminating maps is available at: http://reliefweb.int/ is still unbalanced and incomplete, a information on the activities of Muslims and militant fighters, financing, aiding and abetting sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DB3EC- trend confirmed also by the current D222370AC4F852575FC005073C9-map.pdf “subversive” groups seeking to destroy the humanitarian funding, with only 41% Islamic penal system, and of “persistently gal- http://reliefweb.int/map/somalia/somalia-hu- of the needed sum actually funded by vanizing the local population” against the full manitarian-access-map-jan-2012 donors14. establishment of Shariah law. Among the agen- 12 As in other countries, the organiza- cies: UNICEF, the World Health Organization, tions have developed tools to ensure an effec- UNHCR, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the tive management of programmes, while part of Danish Refugee Council, German Agency For the staff is located outside the area of operation, 13 Source of data: OCHA. 2.1 m per- Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Action Contre la normally for security reasons. Among the tools sons in need of Food Assistance, and 400,000 Faim, Solidarity, Saacid and Concern. The text counted are detailed planning, implementing per month reached is available at the following url: http://www. and monitoring procedures to be adopted also 14 For an updated status of humanitar- somaliweyn.org/pages/news/nov_11/28nov12. by the part of the team still able to remain in the ian figures in Somalia see: http://reliefweb.int/ html field. sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Somalia%20 17 Between 2006 and 2011, there were

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some cases were not authorized to car- ception of all humanitarian aid con- dent in the constant negotiations with ry out essential activities such as vacci- trolled by the SRSG, by considering these groups by humanitarian actors nation campaigns and children nutri- any agency or organization as a po- in order to ensure access and protect tion programmes. Movement outside litical tool in spite of their efforts to funding from key donors who are of cities was often denied (with heavy ensure compliance to the principles, concerned that public money may end consequences) and caused reductions leaving politically motivated pro- up fuelling terrorist activities. This has in access to affected populations. grammes, such as state building, to serious implications at an operational dedicated bodies of the UN system. level, as well as legal consequences, The principles & the blurring of lines If UN humanitarian aid work is con- leading to a self-censoring tendency In the current context, with slow sidered subordinate to the UN politi- by many NGOs boards and in some improvements and windows of op- cal authority, the predictable result is cases, time-consuming procedures portunity for the delivery of aid, two restricted access and aid blockage. In for procurement and activities that main issues arise and are the object of conclusion, the perception of humani- may fall under the concept of material an international debate: 1) the risk of tarian operations as a tool to achieve support to designated groups or indi- compromising the principled aid as political ends and not strictly aimed at viduals21. a consequence of the United Nations saving lives and reducing suffering, is integrated missions, and 2) the frame- likely to seriously affect Non-Govern- There are interactions that are worth work of engagement with opposition mental Organizations (NGOs) on the pointing out. In the Bay region for in- armed groups listed as main terrorist basis of the source of their funding19, stance, the rural areas are still control- organizations. undermining their capacity and end- led by Al Shabab, while the regional ing in a shrinking humanitarian oper- capital Baidoa is under Federal Gov- 1) UN Integrated Missions: The hu- ating space. ernment control. The International manitarian aid bases its action on the NGO INTERSOS is among the main principles of humanity, neutrality, im- 2) The prolonged control of large international actors directly involved partiality and independence. The ad- parts of the territory by opposition in the assisted voluntary return of In- herence to these principles is consid- groups, the impossibility for a signifi- ternal Displaced People (IDPs) to their ered fundamental for humanitarian cant number of agencies and NGOs to places of origin. Humanitarian organ- action and is seen by many as essen- operate, combined with massive hu- izations are not always authorized to tial to negotiate access to the affected manitarian needs, results in multiple directly deliver aid in remote areas, population and to contribute to the pressures on the remaining humani- while community elders are allowed safety of the humanitarian personnel tarian actors to implement expanding to collect it from Baidoa, according and beneficiaries.18 The concerns relat- aid programmes and equally heavy to a distribution mechanism that se- ed to the unanimously approved UN pressure and ingèrence on the armed lects and prioritizes the beneficiaries Security Council (UNSC) resolution opposition groups. These groups of- on the basis of vulnerability criteria, 2102, on the UN Assistance Mission in ten deny access to rural areas under such as age, gender, conditions of the Somalia (UNSOM), setting up an inte- their control, and attempt to divert family and number of disable persons grated mission, operational from early aid toward unverified needs or add in the household. In many cases, the June 2013, are linked to the blurring of requests for registration fees and taxa- organization is permitted to carry out the lines between the UN Political and tion to the humanitarian organiza- post-distribution monitoring activi- Humanitarian Affairs in Somalia. This tions. ties to ensure that aid is not diverted. occurs by concentrating the responsi- Clearly, this imperfect methodology bility on the UN Special Representa- As a matter of fact, the presence of al raises questions about the protection tive of the Secretary General (SRSG). Shabab in the main cities, even if today of the beneficiaries and at best, con- The fears are based on the risk of com- more confined to the rural areas, is fines humanitarian aid to the limited promising the principle of impartial- often referred by the Somali as ‘local and insufficient delivery of core relief ity. In fact, due to its direct ties and authority,’ even though code of con- items. Aware that this constitutes an support to the Federal Government duct and counter-terrorism measures option of last resort, and while care- and AMISOM, the opposition groups, and laws limit engagement with such particularly al Shabab, see the Assist- groups, particularly by regulating ance Mission, as a political partisan. the concept of material support as de- Designations and Specially Designated Nation- Subsequently, humanitarian actors scribed later.20 This dichotomy is evi- als List can be found at the US Department of the Treasury, Office For Asset Control web site loose the ground to negotiate access http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanc- as neutral and impartial players. tions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx 19 A large part of the UN’s work in So- 21 The US material support statues This generates an immediate misper- malia is carried out through NGOs, either local 18USC§2339A defines the provision of material or international. support to terrorists as: any property, tangible 20 Several NGOs committed in the or intangible, or service, including currency or NGO Position Paper on Operating Prin- monetary instruments or financial securities, over 150 security incidences against aid work- ciples and Red Lines, re-defining the core financial services, lodging, training, expert ad- ers in Somalia. principles that should guide the humani- vice or assistance, safe houses, false documen- 18 The fundamental legal framework tarian action http://somaliangoconsortium. tation or identification, communications equip- of the humanitarian principles is composed by org/docs/key/5/2012/1334569242.pdf and ment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, ex- General Assembly resolutions 46/182, 1991 and http://somaliangoconsortium.org/docs/ plosives, personnel and transportation, except 58/114 2004. key/5/2012/1334569908.pdf; Counter Terrorism medicine or religious materials

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fully ensuring that the aid reaches the Conclusions order to mitigate the negative effects intended persons, the organizations In a country at war, where the death of perceived particularistic agendas as are today dedicating energy and re- rate for pregnancy-related issues ex- described above. sources to ensure that engagement ceeds the death rate due to the con- with the present actors (al Shabab) flict, access to populations in need of In multiple ways, Somalia is chal- and the activities carried out do not urgent life-saving services constitutes lenging the international community. fall under the aforementioned mate- a priority for humanitarian organi- In the last 20 years, the country has rial support. In short, in particular cir- zations. There is a obvious need to pushed humanitarian action and state cumstances, humanitarian organiza- reconcile independent coordination building activities to their limits and tions are not only concerned and busy of humanitarian aid and counter-ter- probably beyond. The aid community, regulating aid, but also focusing on rorism measures, as well as a need to representing one of the few interna- the legal consequences of their forced resolve the growing requests of legal tional actors present in the country, engagement with actors designated as exemptions for selected humanitar- has often acted as a replacement for terrorists. Failing to engage would re- ian action, recognizing the operational the broader international community. sult in a dramatic deterioration of the circumstances where the action is car- This has contributed to remarkable humanitarian conditions of thousands ried out, and the presence and often- results in assisting the population in of people. Engaging recklessly would undeniable territorial control of or- need and to avoiding further puzzle- end diverting aid from taxpayers and ganizations designated as terrorist. ments. Conversely, the distinction be- private resources22. tween the mandate and priorities has Currently, the situation is slowly im- been excessively loosened, generating While the situation and access may proving, with expanded access and a perception of non-neutrality and appear slightly better in regions un- appeals to fund humanitarian activi- partiality. Growing global concerns der the Federal Government’s control, ties to consolidate the results thus far of terrorism, donor’s fatigue to fund a with less implications related to the achieved. This comprises a distinctive prolonged crisis and a changing glo- counter-terrorism prescriptions, the aspect of the complex and prolonged bal environment are new challenges situation is far from simple. The lack crisis and institutional void, where hu- that Somalia and the International of discipline, the tendency to concen- manitarian action and state-building Community cannot afford to face. trate governmental efforts in gaining efforts are urgent and simultaneous. control of the territory, and a poor The identity and the mandate of the Today, the priority is to deal with the knowledge of people’s real needs, actors becomes of utmost importance complexity of the situation, and to common to many newly-established as it appears extremely easy for front- adapt and rethink many of the op- institutions, provokes a dangerous line actors, such as NGOs, to be the erational approaches so as to comply mix of frustration among communi- unintended recipients of the above- with humanitarian principles of hu- ties who see their needs unaddressed mentioned blurred lines. Particularly manity, neutrality, impartiality and and worry about the future. for multi-mandated organizations, independence. This should be pur- In such circumstances, the role of humanitarian action is often non per- sued without abandoning the plan national staff is crucial to an interna- fectly compatible with a set of other for the reconstruction of a state able to tional NGO. Normally, national staff priorities on the agenda of other actors control its territory to provide safety are profoundly exposed to local dy- involved, namely government, oppo- and dignity by serving its population. namics, have greater leverage with sition groups, traditional authorities, The current mapping of stakehold- nationals, better knowledge of their federal administrations, international ers shows an interconnection of ac- interests, their roles in the society and institutions and donors. tors diverse in nature, status, power, a sounder understanding and compli- ideology, objectives, approaches and ance with the principle of neutrality. State building priorities, long-term means. To ensure that the Somali will This is essential for a NGO, interna- development and foreign policy may not surrender to a violent imposi- tional or local, hoping to maintain an easily conflict with the strict adher- tion of power and control, a careful effective presence. ence to humanitarian principles, restructuring around the diversity of which more than ever constitute the actors according to their contribution Operational restrictions and legal lim- only asset that leads to acceptance by may bring reorganization to Somalia itations are the basis of a growing con- and access to the people in need of life as a whole. A specific role, recognition cern for humanitarian effectiveness in saving aid. and operation, as well as legal space, complex crisis. The combination of the While in the case of Somalia, it is should be guaranteed by all parties aforementioned factors jeopardise the nearly impossible to set a priority be- genuinely active in the delivery of a delivery of principled aid in Somalia, tween humanitarian and state build- neutral, transparent and accountable as a consequence of blurred lines be- ing needs, a clearer policy for their humanitarian relief. This is the only tween political agenda and humani- distinction should be embraced soon. realistic answer to the life-threatening tarian imperative. To start, it is extremely important for risks millions of Somali face. each actor, including NGOs, to define sharply and publicly their role in So- 22 In the majority of cases, NGO ac- tivities are funded by a mix of privately raised malia, and to clearly assert OCHA’s funds and institutional funds provided by Gov- leadership on humanitarian issues, in ernments, UN, Regional Institutions, etc.

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Somalia: Jowle camp for the displaced in Garowe. Humanitarian activities run by Polish Humanitarian Action and funded by the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO). These are elders of the community having a meeting on water and resource management.

European Commission on DG ECHO | Photo Agata Grzybowska

74 THE EU COOPERATION WITH SOMALIA: CHANNELS OF IMPLEMENTATION The cooperation between the EU and Somalia addresses security, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. Despite professed country-owned and country-led pathways out of fragility, local non-state actors and NGOs are rarely involved, while engagement with regional authorities remains unofficial.

by Chiara Franco

Political Science and International Relations Graduate Student Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna

Introduction

The EU approach to Somalia is In the EU framework, the blurred (both broad and inclusive) insofar as deemed ‘comprehensive,’1 but the boundaries of this expression allow it encompasses the following three concept of a ‘comprehensive ap- for its adjustment to various dimen- areas of cooperation: 1) short-term proach’ still lacks a precise definition. sions. The approach towards a third as well as long-term aims; 2) civil- What is clear is that it cannot be re- country or region can be deemed ian and military instruments; and 3) duced to a civilian-military approach ‘comprehensive’ with a reference to involvement of multiple stakehold- to crisis management, as designated the fields of cooperation involved, ers. The general framework and the by the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept2. the time frame considered, the instru- aims of cooperation are set in various ments deployed and the stakeholders documents, among which the most engaged. relevant, listed from the broadest to 1 Council of the European Union, ‘EU the most specific, are the Joint Africa- engagement in Somalia’, In the case of Somalia, the extent of EU Strategy, the Strategic Framework http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ EU engagement is comprehensive for the Horn of Africa and the Joint cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/110106 Strategy Paper EU-Somalia, to which FACTSHEET EU ENGAGEMENT SOMALIA - version 10_EN01.pdf Security of the Members of the North Atlantic the recent Somali Compact must be 2 ‘Active Engagement, Modern De- Treaty Organization’, Lisbon, 19-20 November added. As an expression of its deep fence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and 2010.

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involvement in regional dynamics, ber 201310, have been provided to the tation phase. The ACP-EC Cotonou the EU maintains an EU Special Rep- AMISOM peace enabling mission, Agreement18, while recognizing cen- resentative for the Horn of Africa3, covering both allowances for mili- tral governments as the main partners alongside whom, since 20124, it has tary, police and civilian components in cooperation activities, acknowledg- appointed an EU Special Envoy to So- and the operational costs of the Nai- es the need to engage not only local malia, accredited as the first EU am- robi headquarters. Moreover, the EU authorities, but the private sector and bassador to the country5. is carrying out three missions under civil society organizations. Indeed, the CSDP: the EUTM Military Train- the Joint Strategy Paper, which consti- The first way in which the EU isin- ing Mission, the EU NAVFOR mission tutes the basis of cooperation under volved in development cooperation ‘Atalanta’ and the EUCAP NESTOR11. the EDF and the strategic framework with Somalia is by being by far the The EUTM mission, launched in 2010 of EU-Somalia cooperation in all largest donor of Official Development with a mandate that was later extend- fields, follows these guidelines. This Assistance6; the EU has provided €521 ed until March 201512, provides train- is also due to the fact that the Joint million over the period 2008-20137. ing to Somali soldiers, as well as polit- Strategy Paper is based on the Re- The funds, mainly addressed to the ical and strategic advice to members construction and Development Pro- areas of governance, economic devel- of security institutions, including the gramme (RDP)19, which in itself rep- opment and education, are currently Ministry of Defence13. The EU NAV- resents the output of a process of Joint allocated both under the 10th Euro- FOR mission ‘Atalanta,’ launched in Needs Assessment carried out since pean Development Fund (EDF, 2008- 2008 to support various UNSC reso- 2005 by international experts along 2013) and under different thematic lutions14, is aimed at the repression with federal and regional authorities, programmes as part of the EU budget of acts of piracy and the protection as well as Somali citizens (including (including food security, civil society of WFP vessels carrying food aid and members of the Diaspora)20. and human rights). vulnerable vessels sailing off the So- mali coasts. Finally, the complimen- State actors The second field of cooperation is tary EUCAP NESTOR mission is a ci- As far as cooperation at a state level, humanitarian aid, that, compared to vilian, non-executive mission. It was the problem to overcome, since the development assistance, is by its own launched in July 201215 for regional very beginning, was the lack of an nature aimed at short-term objectives maritime capacity-building. This internationally recognized govern- including the treating of acute mal- mission addresses five countries16 ment since the collapse of Siad Barre’s nutrition, the setting up of primary and has a specific focus on Somalia regime in 1991. This prevented Soma- healthcare services and the provi- as far as strengthening the rule of law lia from ratifying the 2000 Cotonou sion of shelter for displaced persons. sector, namely the development of a Agreement; however, cooperation The funds for humanitarian aid come coastal police force. Currently, the EU under the 10th EDF was made pos- from both DG ECHO and the hu- is providing a total of €49,5 million for sible under article 93.6 of the agree- manitarian title of the Development the three missions17. ment, providing for the possibility Cooperation Instrument. DG ECHO of the Council of Ministers ‘to accord allocated about €310 million over the Multiple stakeholders special support to ACP States who period 2008-20138. A peak of €77 mil- The EU’s comprehensive approach are party to previous ACP-EC Con- lion was reached in 2011, and it then includes different stakeholders and ventions, which in the absence of decreased to €60.8 million in 2012 and multiple actors (state, regional and normally established government in- €46.6 million in 20139. non-state) at various levels, both in stitutions, have not been able to sign the planning and in the implemen- or ratify this Agreement’. As a conse- Thirdly, the EU is engaged in security quence, the grounds for cooperation cooperation. Over the period 2007- were laid by the Memorandum of Un- 10 European Commission, http://eu- 2013, €594 million, plus an additional ropa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-816_en.htm derstanding signed by the European €124 million announced in Septem- 11 Complete names of the missions are: Commission and the Somali Transi- European Union Training Mission (EUTM); tional Federal Government21 in March European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR); 2006, followed by the drafting of the 3 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex- European Union Maritime Capacity Building UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:327:0062 in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor). Joint Strategy Paper EU-Somalia in :0065:EN:PDF 12 http://www.consilium.europa. 2008. The EC was also a major donor 4 In the aftermath of the elections of eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/ the new Government. foraff/134947.pdf 18 ACP-EC Agreement amending the 5 http://eeas.europa.eu/del- 13 For the updated mandate see Coun- Partnership Agreement, signed in Cotonou on egations/somalia/press_corner/all_news/ cil Decision 2012/174/CFSP of 23 March 2012 23 June 2000 and revised in Ouagadougou on news/2012/20120926_en.htm amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP 22 June 2010. 6 OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dac/ 14 UNSC Resolutions 1814/2008, 19 Somalia Joint Strategy Paper for the stats/SOM.gif 1816/2008, 1838/2008, 1846/2008. period 2008-2013, p. 25. 7 European Commission, http://eu- 15 Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP of 20 Somali Joint Needs Assessment, ropa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-789_ 16 July 2012. en.htm 16 Djibouti, Kenya, Seychelles, Soma- http://www.somali-jna.org/index.cfm?Module 8 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/about/an- lia, Tanzania. =ActiveWeb&Page=WebPage&s=introduction nual_reports_en.htm 17 Current budgets are: €11,6 million 21 Created in the aftermath of the Nai- 9 ECHO, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/ EUTM; €14,9 million EU NAVFOR; €23 million robi Somali National Reconciliation Confer- files/aid/countries/factsheets/somalia_en.pdf EUCAP Nestor. ence (SNRC) concluded in 2004.

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in supporting the National Reconcili- in the programmes dealing with the pean Commission acknowledges that ation Conference, which took place Federal Government and the Federal ‘Somalia has not functioned as a uni- in Mogadishu in July-August 2007, Parliament, whereas programmes fo- tary state since 1991 [...] the State has in the aftermath of the confrontation cused on the civil service (SIDP pro- effectively fragmented into three dis- between the TFG and the Union of Is- gramme) and the police and judicial tinct regional blocks, loosely reflect- lamic Courts (UIC), the intervention sectors (ROLS/GROLS programme) ing the territorial distribution of the of Ethiopian troops and the conse- are implemented by UNDP27. The UN major clans’32. It also acknowledges quent deployment of AMISOM. has been the main partner in the proc- that Somaliland, despite the lack of ess of constitution-making, leading international recognition, ‘has devel- The Joint Strategy Paper acknowl- to the Constitution of August 2012 oped its own political institutions, ju- edges that ‘fully functioning state which has been implemented through diciary, police, armed forces and cur- structures are not in place’22. As a the UNDP Constitution Making Sup- rency’, that Puntland ‘boasts its own consequence, cooperation at a state port Project (SCMSP), of which the constitution, political institutions and level has taken place in the form of EU was the main donor. armed force, and conducts its own creating and reinforcing state actors foreign and trade policies’ and that (statebuilding) more than simply en- Such policies follow the OECD Guide- the three regions (Somaliland, Punt- gaging pre-existing institutions. The lines for Good International Engage- land and South/Central Somalia) ‘are main areas in which the process of ment in Fragile States and Situations, distinguished by markedly different statebuilding has been carried out are which set statebuilding as the ‘central levels of political and institutional de- those of institutional support, stabili- objective’28. This principle has been velopment’33. However, it is also stat- sation, reconciliation, accountability, transposed by the EU into the Euro- ed that ‘in the case of Somaliland and outreach, democratisation and elec- pean Consensus on Development, Puntland [...] the issue of the interna- toral assistance23. stating the commitment to ‘[support- tional status of these autonomous re- ing] the prevention of state fragility gions prevents international partners In the initial phase, institutional sup- through governance reforms, rule of from engaging officially’34. port has been provided to the Federal law, anti-corruption measures and the Constitutional Commission and the building of viable state institutions’29; Nevertheless, some form of coopera- National Commission for Reconcilia- however, as recognized by the OECD tion with regional actors has indeed tion set up by the Transitional Federal in its 2011 report on Somalia30, the been established, according to what Charter24. Then, with the establish- Somali case is exceptional insofar as has been named the ‘variable geom- ment of the new Federal Government the traditional paradigm of a strong etry’ approach35. One major example in 2012, the EU provided financial and central state has largely proved un- of cooperation with regional authori- technical aid to the Federal Govern- suitable for the social and cultural ties has been democratization support ment, the Federal Parliament, the civil context of the country31. As a conse- in Somaliland and Puntland, through service and the police, judicial and quence, the statebuilding approach is the Democratization Programme military sectors. Apart from the train- necessarily complemented by projects Steering Committee (DSC), made up ing of the military, carried out by the aimed at strengthening regional and of seven donors (EU, Denmark, UK- EU through the CSDP Mission EUTM civil society actors. DFID, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland Somalia, most of the aid is channelled and USAID), among which the EU is through implementing partners. In- Regional actors the greatest contributor and co-chair terpeace25 and AWEPA26 are partners In the Joint Strategy Paper, the Euro- along with the US. The Committee supported the local council elections in Somaliland in November 2012 and 22 Somalia Joint Strategy Paper for the 27 The Somali Institutional and Devel- the Constitution’s revision process in period 2008-2013, p. 20. opment Project (SIDP) is aimed at training staff Puntland, which resulted in the adop- in central ministries and agencies working in 23 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delega- tion of the revised Puntland State tions/somalia/eu_somalia/development_coop- the field of public works, social affairs and ac- eration/governance_and_rule_of_law/index_ counting. Moreover, it supports the Public Fi- Constitution in April 2012. Moreover, en.htm nancial Management through the development the EU finances the UN Joint Program 24 http://www.so.undp.org/docs/Tran- of macroeconomic and financial frameworks. on Local Governance and Decentral- sitional Federal charter-feb 2004-English.pdf The Rule of Law and Security Programme (ROLS/GROLS) is in charge of the training of ized Service Delivery, established in 25 Interpeace was created in 1994 by April 2008 by the ILO, UNDP, UN- the UN, with which it maintains a partnership the police and the judiciary sectors. Moreover, even if it is an independent organization since it is aimed at providing access to justice for the Habitat, UNCDF and UNICEF with 2000. It promotes peacebuiding projects and it most vulnerable communities. the aim to improve transparency and is headquartered in Geneva. http://www.inter- 28 OECD Principles for Good Interna- peace.org/about-us/fast-facts tional Engagement in Fragile States and Situa- 26 AWEPA is the Association of Euro- tions, http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/38368714. pean parliamentarians with Africa. Its origins pdf 32 Somalia Joint Strategy Paper for the goes back to the Association of West-European 29 European Consensus on Develop- period 2008-2013, p. 9. Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid, ment, p. C 46/4. 33 Somalia Joint Strategy Paper for the created in 1984, which, after the overthrow of 30 http://www.oecd.org/dac/in- period 2008-2013, pp. 11-12. the apartheid regime, shifted its focus to the caf/48697962.pdf 34 Somalia Joint Strategy Paper for the promotion of democracy and human rights in 31 See for example: Menkhaus, K. (2011), period 2008-2013, p. 21. many African regions. http://www.awepa.org/ ‘Somalia and the Horn of Africa’, in World 35 Somalia Joint Strategy Paper for the about-us/ Bank, World Development Report 2011. period 2008-2013, p. 18.

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accountability, increase public invest- the EIDHR, ongoing projects are im- ing Liaison Office (EPLO)46, as well ment in basic services and strengthen plemented by Heinrich Boll Stiftung, as from the Final Report ‘Strengthen- civic awareness and participation in International Labour Organization ing Civil Society in Somalia’ issued the three regions36. (ILO) and UNICEF42. Aid given un- in March 2012 by the European Con- der the DCI is channelled through the sultants Organisations (ECO)47. In the Non-state actors specific thematic programme ‘Non Civil Society Consultation Meeting, In accordance with the ACP-EC Co- state actors and local authorities in participants advocated for a more tonou Agreement, the Joint Needs development’43. Assistance provided active involvement of the Diaspora, Assessment, the Reconstruction and under this programme is, in the case NSA engagement in the Security Sec- Development Programme and the of Somalia, addressed exclusively to tor Reform, more regular meetings EU-Somalia Joint Strategy Paper, the NSA, since projects in support of lo- between EU representatives and lo- EU supports the engagement of Non- cal authorities are financed only un- cal NSA, and an effective strategy to State Actors (NSA)37 in different fields der the EDF. In addition to some di- phase out the EU and give local NGOs of the cooperation framework, with rect agreements, most contracts for control over the projects48. The ECO a particular focus on marginalised projects to be financed under the NSA Final Report stressed the difficulty of communities and women38. The EU, thematic programme are awarded on local NSA to access information (all in partnership with the international the basis of calls for proposals. Pro- official information and communica- NGOs Interpeace and Saferworld, has posals can be submitted by NSA from tions on projects are in English) and also contributed to the development both European countries and ACP the unbalanced relationship between of three regional NSA platforms: partner countries. However, since international and Somali NGOs. SOSCENSA (South/Central Somalia), Somalia could not ratify the Cotonou PUNSAA (Puntland) and SONSAF agreement until June 2013, Somali or- The Somali Compact (Somaliland)39. ganisations have not been able yet to On the 16th of September 2013, the fulfil the eligibility criteria44. As a con- EU and Somalia, co-hosting in Brus- EU aid targeted to NSA is given un- sequence, projects under the NSA the- sels the ‘New Deal for Somalia Con- der the EDF, the Development Co- matic programme, like projects under ference,’ signed the ‘Somali Compact’ operation Instrument (DCI) and the the EDF and EIDHR, are implement- with the purpose of reviewing the European Instrument for Develop- ed by partner international NGOs, cooperation strategy during ‘a cru- ment Cooperation and Human Rights including Cesvi, Relief International cial time for the Somali people.’49 The (EIDHR). In all three cases, the EU UK and Terre Solidali ONLUS45. Compact follows the framework of finances projects implemented by the New Deal for Fragile States, estab- IGO or NGO partners. For instance, Some weaknesses of the EU NSA lished by the International Dialogue projects under the EDF are currently engagement strategy have emerged on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding50 implemented by Minority Rights from the Civil Society Consultation and endorsed by the EU in 2011 at the Group, Saferworld, Vétérinaires Sans Meeting organised in March 2010 in Busan OECD High Level Forum for Frontières (VSF)40 and African Devel- Brussels by the European Peacebuild- Aid Effectiveness.51 The New Deal opment Solutions (ADESO)41. Under strategy is based on the strength- ening of the partnership principle As far as support of civil society is concerned, and the principle of ‘country-owned 36 http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/ ADESO is in charge of the project “Promoting and country-led pathways out of fund/JSO00 Women’s Political participation for develop- fragility,’52 which means that recipi- 37 According to art. 6 of the Cotonou ment of peace and security in Puntland”. More- Agreement, the definition of ‘Non-State Actors’ over, the EU finances another project imple- encompasses ‘the private sector; economic and mented by ADESO in the field of rural develop- 46 http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2. social partners, including trade union organisa- ment and food security. Activities/Working Groups/Africa/EPLO_Re- tions and civil society in all of its forms accord- 42 The projects are: “Institutionalizing port_Consultation_Meeting_EU_and_Somalia. ing to national characteristics’. Democracy in Somaliland: Strengthening Civil pdf 38 The EU supports the UNDP’s Gender Society for Effective Participation” (Heinrich 47 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ Equality and Women’s Empowerment Strategy. Boll Stiftung), “Prevention of child recruitment somalia/documents/press_corner/20130612_ Moreover, it finances the project Empowering and reintegration of children associated with cs_strategy.pdf the Somali Women’s Agenda, implemented by armed forces and groups in south central So- 48 In this regard, a positive example COSPE, and it launched a Gender and Fragility malia” (ILO) and “Beyond Emergency: Build- can be that of the already mentioned coopera- Survey. ing a Child Protection System in Somalia” tion with ADESO, which, while registered in 39 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ (UNICEF). Kenya, has been founded by a Somali – Fati- somalia/documents/press_corner/20130612_ 43 Introduced in 2007 to replace the ma Jibrell - and includes many Somalis on its cs_strategy.pdf NGO cofinancing and decentralised coopera- board. 40 The projects are: “Overcoming mul- tion budget lines. 49 Final communiqué, tiple discrimination against Somali minority 44 They could apply as co-applicant or women” (Minority Rights Group), “Strength- affiliated entity, but not as applicant. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/somalia/doc- ening the participation of Somali Non-State Ac- 45 The projects are: “To strengthen the uments/press_corner/20130916_communique. tors in decision-making on peace, security and capacity of Somalilander Civil Society on how pdf development” (Saferworld) and “Promoting to plan and develop integrated approaches 50 http://www.newdeal4peace.org/ gender equality and women’s empowerment in in favour of the most vulnerable children” 51 http://www.oecd.org/dac/effective- Somalia” (VSF). (Cesvi), “Media Education for Development, ness/fourthhighlevelforumonaideffectiveness. 41 ADESO was founded in 1991 as the Inclusion and Awareness” (Relief International htm “Horn of Africa Relief and Development Orga- – UK) and “Support to Vulnerable Groups in 52 http://www.newdeal4peace.org/wp- nization,” and it took its current name in 2012. Somalia” (Terre Solidali ONLUS). content/themes/newdeal/docs/new-deal-for-

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ent countries should cooperate with development cooperation in the re- phase and the preference given to donors both in the phase of program- gion. international NGOs rather than local ming and implementation, in order to ones in the implementation phase. improve the effectiveness of projects Finally, non-state actors have been and to avoid dependency on exter- involved in the planning phase in nal aid through the development of rounds of consultations which took autonomous structures for political place in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Galkayo and economic administration at the and Garowe. Then, in September national level. Therefore, a major pri- 2013, the final multi-stakeholder ority is the involvement of multiple consultative meeting took place in local stakeholders in the phases of fra- Mogadishu to validate the Compact55. gility assessment, the development of The final text sets ‘inclusive politics’ a plan to transition out of fragility and as the first strategic objective, stating the implementation and monitoring. that ‘representatives from all seg- Accordingly, it remains important for ments of the communities in each the EU to actively engage state, re- region (women, youth, civil society gional and non-state actors. organisations, traditional elders, reli- gious leaders, diaspora and business In the statebuilding field, in addition communities) will have the oppor- to the renewal of the commitment tunity to contribute to this process.’56 in the security and justice fields and However, the involvement of non- the call for a stronger cooperation be- state actors has evoked the most criti- tween the Federal Government and cism. Indeed, some have claimed that the AMISOM mission, the EU en- the pre-conference consultations were dorses the roadmap approved by the too limited - they took place in only Parliament to adopt a Federal Consti- four towns - and that the content of tution by December 2015 and to hold the agreement is too focused on in- elections by 2016. Moreover, a So- ternational concerns - such as piracy malia Development and Reconstruc- - rather than on issues that directly af- tion Facility (SDRF) is established fect the lives of Somali citizens57. to enable the Somali Government to ‘oversee and guide the diverse activi- Conclusions ties of its development partners’53 so The strategy of involving different that aid is aligned with government stakeholders in cooperation activi- priorities, designed and delivered ties is set by the European Union in in partnership with government in- official documents, both as a general stitutions and channelled through statement (ACP-EC Cotonou Agree- preferred instruments of the govern- ment, European Consensus on De- ment. The SDRF is made up of a High velopment) and in the specific case of Level Partnership Forum and a Steer- Somalia (Joint Strategy Paper for the ing Committee, both of which include period 2008-2013, The Somali Com- representatives of the Somali govern- pact). Indeed, in the case of Somalia, ment, Somali regions, and interna- this strategy has proven particularly tional donors (the EU, the UN the Or- valuable due to the long-lasting ab- ganisation of the Islamic Conference, sence of a central authority and the the World Bank, the African Develop- particular social and cultural context ment Bank and bilateral donors). of the country. As a result, along with core statebuilding activities, the EU As far as regional actors are con- carries out projects in support of re- cerned, in addition to the above-men- gional and non-state actors, mostly by tioned participation in the SDRF, the financing programmes implemented EU expresses support for the estab- by IGO or NGO partners. However, lishment of regional authorities, as some major criticisms remain, espe- set in the Provisional Constitution, in cially in regard to the scarce involve- the view of creating federal States54. A ment of civil society in the planning Special Arrangement for Somaliland is provided, based on Somaliland’s Vision 2030, which set a strategy for 55 The Somali Compact, p. 3. 56 The Somali Compact, p. 5. 57 ‘Inclusivity is key to the success of engagement-in-fragile-states-en.pdf the Somalia New Deal Compact’, http://www. 53 The Somali Compact, p. 10. saferworld.org.uk/news-and-views/com- 54 The Somali Compact, pp. 4-5. ment/109 - _ftn2

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Former Al-Shabaab Stronghold in Mogadishu now an Animal Market

13 April 2013, Mogadishu, Somalia, UN Photo | Tobin Jones

80 is Mogadishu a viable “internal protection alternative”?

More and more Somalis seeking asylum in Europe are confronted with the risk of being sent back due to an available ‘internal protection alternative.’ An analysis of recent case law from the European Court of Human Rights and other national courts confirms this trend, although the risk of human rights violations remains high.

by Emanuela Parisciani

PhD candidate in International Law Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna

Introduction

In 2012, according to the figures pro- Every year, thousands of Somalis, tions are often at the mercy of unscru- vided by UNHCR, Somalia was the mostly from Central and Southern pulous smugglers. As the October second largest source country for Somalia, make the dangerous journey events in Lampedusa have shown, refugees.1 More than one million of its towards Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen, or many die during the journey, while nine million people live outside So- Libya. Refugee camps in Kenya host others are victims of abuse. malia, while an estimated 1.3 million more than half a million Somali refu- are displaced within Somalia. gees, while more than 200 thousand Somalis, and more general, boat peo- are registered in Yemen. Both Yemen ple travelling towards Europe consti- and Kenya recognize Somalis as pri- tute a complex phenomenon defined 1 UNHCR data as of January 2013: ma facie refugees and do not require by Western countries as mixed migra- 1.136.143 refugees from Somalia, mainly in Dji- travel documentation. Often, howev- tion flows. A mixed flow includes not bouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, and 1.132.963 IDPs); er, Yemen and Libya are only staging only ‘genuine’ refugees and asylum- for more details see table available at http:// points on the way to Saudi Arabia or seekers, but also “irregular” migrants, www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/ jun/19/refugees-unhcr-statistics-data [last ac- Europe, provided smuggled migrants defined as economic migrants or oth- cessed 22 October 2013]. However, in the past can survive the crossing of the Gulf ers travelling without the necessary year, Somalia saw a significant change, drop- of Aden or the Mediterranean Sea on documents. These migrants lack le- ping from 2nd place in 2008 to 9th place in 2012, leaky boats. Refugees fleeing from gal avenues to enter Europe and often and producing 17.800 new refugees in western countries. Available at http://www.tagesschau. conflict, abuse, human rights viola- pass through countries which offer de/ausland/unhcr108.pd [last accessed 22 Octo- tions, famine and dire living condi- ber 213].

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no effective international protection.2 in the EU is governed by the Qualifi- The notion of ‘serious harm’ encom- UNHCR has estimated that between cation Directive (QD)6. passes the risk of being subject to the 50% and 75% of those arriving on the In a few words, the Directive sets death penalty or execution, torture or European Union Southern shores by uniform standards for the identifica- inhuman or degrading treatment, and boat deserve some form of protection. tion of people in need of international to a serious individual threat to the life protection in the EU – either as refu- or person as result of indiscriminate International protection recognition gees or as beneficiaries of subsidiary violence in the presence of an armed rates for Somalis in the European Un- protection – and ensures a minimum conflict. The first two elements corre- ion vary from 34% to 89%, with some level of benefits and rights through- spond to Articles 2 and 3 of the Eu- countries, like Germany and United out the EU for both categories of ben- ropean Convention on Human Rights Kingdom, exclusively recognizing eficiaries of international protection. (ECHR) forbidding non-refoulement, refugee status, while others, like the Rights such as family unity, access to while the third element was meant to Netherlands and Sweden, mostly rec- employment, and health care are rec- cover people fleeing from armed con- ognizing subsidiary protection sta- ognized in each category. In regard to flict characterized by widespread and tus.3 the duration of the residence permit, indiscriminate violence, and unable as well as access to social welfare and to show a “personal risk” (hereinafter However, more and more Somalis integration facilities, States can still Article 15(c). seeking asylum in Europe are con- differentiate between the two status- fronted with the possibility of being es, lowering benefits for beneficiaries In view of the ethnic and political di- sent back due to an available “internal of subsidiary protection. The Direc- vision in Somalia and the conditions protection alternative” (IPA). Since tive defines a refugee as any “non-EU of single women, minority clans and international protection is best seen country national or stateless person internally displaced persons, many as a “surrogate,” and not a substitute who is outside of her/his country of asylum-seekers fleeing Somalia have for meaningful protection from one’s origin and who is unwilling or un- a well-founded fear of being perse- own country, asylum-seekers would able to return to it owing to a well- cuted based on one or more of the not qualify for international protec- founded fear of being persecuted for grounds outlined in Article 1 A(2) of tion4 if another area exists within reasons of race, religion, nationality, the 1951 Refugee Convention. How- their country of origin where they can political opinion or membership of a ever, even in the absence of persecu- find a protection alternative, which particular social group.” In addition tion based on one the five Convention they could reasonably be expected to to refugee status, the Directive recog- grounds, Somali asylum-seekers may reach and settle down in. An analysis nizes applicants who cannot return to qualify for subsidiary protection, ei- of recent case law from the European their country of origin due to a real ther because they suffer inhuman and Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and risk of suffering “serious harm” as de- degrading treatment due to the fre- other national courts confirms this fined in Article 15 QD, and their right quent human rights abuses, or, in the trend5. to subsidiary protection, unless exclu- areas of Southern and Central Soma- The present article surveys the criteria sion clauses apply.7 lia where there is still an ongoing con- used in recent case law to determine flict, they experience widespread and whether an “internal protection/flight indiscriminate violence due solely to alternative” exists in Somalia, and 6 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 their presence there. April 2004 on minimum standards for the qual- will contrast it with the actual compli- ification and status of third country nationals or cated military and political situation, stateless persons as refugees or as persons who Nonetheless, as mentioned in the in- especially in Mogadishu. otherwise need international protection and troduction, recognition rates for inter- the content of the protection granted. Recast national protection of Somalis among in 2011: Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Seeking asylum in Europe or getting Parliament and of the Council of 13 December EU countries vary significantly since protection in Somalia: criteria for the 2011 on standards for the qualification of third- the Directive is not applied in a con- Internal Protection alternative country nationals or stateless persons as ben- sistent manner. A comparative analy- The international protection system eficiaries of international protection, for a uni- sis of EU Member States’ application form status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of of the QD falls beyond the scope of the protection granted. Member States bound this research, although this issue has 2 Examples are Libya, Eritrea, Ethio- by the Directive are required to bring into force previously been addressed by the pia, and Sudan. domestic legislation necessary to comply with UNHCR, and revealed a wide diver- 3 Aggregated data from UNHCR it by 21 December 2013. study “Safe at Last? Law and Practice in select- 7 Exclusion clauses apply both to refu- gence across and within jurisdictions. ed EU Member States with respect to Asylum- gee status and subsidiary protection. The Qual- Yet, the presence of extensive and seekers Fleeing Indiscriminate Violence,” July ification Directive adds an additional exclusion binding jurisprudence from the Eu- 2011. clause to those already part of the 1951 Refugee ropean Court of Human Rights (EC- 4 The term “international protection” Convention and contained in Article 14 QD, includes both refugee status and subsidiary specific to subsidiary protection. This exclusion tHR) on the scope of Articles 2 and 3 protection. has its basis in Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refu- – the protection of the right to life and 5 German practice now corresponds gee Convention and precludes from subsidiary the absolute prohibition of torture or more closely to that of the UK and France. See protection status any person who “constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treat- J. Eaton, “The Internal Protection Alternative a danger to the community or to the security Under European Union Law: Examining the of the country in which he or she is.” See Mc- ment or punishment – clearly desig- Recast Qualification Directive” (2012) 24IJRL 4, ADAM J, Complementary Protection in Refugee nates standards of protection. These pp. 765 ff. Law, (Oxford, OUP, 2007), at 88.

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standards require the assessment of sent back there.11 The Court also used the evaluation of socio-economic and both objective and subjective criteria, reports from various international or- humanitarian conditions in a coun- namely the situation in the country of ganizations and NGOs, like UNHCR try of return. The Court stated that a origin and the personal circumstances and Amnesty International, and gov- situation of “serious deprivation or of the individual. In assessing whether ernmental reports. want” incompatible with human dig- there are substantial grounds for be- nity might well establish responsibil- lieving that the applicant would face Yet, the Court did not confine itself ity under Article 3 if, like in the case a real risk in the receiving country, as to the assessment of the situation in of Somalia, the humanitarian crisis outlined by the standards of Article 3 Mogadishu. It went on to explore is not solely attributable to poverty, of the Convention, the national and other viable solutions of repatriation lack of resources, draught or famine, international jurisprudence on Somali to Somalia but it was unable to find but is predominantly due to the direct asylum seekers in Europe points out any place without risk of ill-treat- and indirect actions of the parties to several objective criteria to take into ment or inhumane and degrading the conflict. In this specific case, the consideration in addition to the sub- conditions. The Court deemed that Court assessed the living conditions jective situation of the applicant. the areas under al-Shabaab’s control in IDPs’ camps in the Afgoye corri- were not safe since corporal punish- dor in South-East Somalia and in the In 2011, the ECtHR delivered the Sufi ment was inflicted on those who fail Daabab refugee camp in Kenya, find- and Elmi case8, which involved two to comply with al-Shabaab’s draco- ing that the lack of - or the very limited unsuccessful asylum seekers who nian version of Sharia’a, and women access to - water, sanitation facilities were returned to Mogadishu. In this were especially targeted, while young and shelters, the exposure to violent landmark case, the Court held that male adults and children faced forced crime, exploitation, abuses and forci- where the situation is particularly recruitement. The Court found that ble recruitment, and the impossibility grave and violence is widespread, the while the self-declared Republic of of any improvement of the situation general risk of torture or ill-treatment Somaliland and the autonomous re- represented dire humanitarian condi- may be high enough that the require- gion of Puntland were relatively safe, tions, and any returnee forced to seek ment of personal risk dwindles, essen- the Court would only admit failed refuge in these places would be at real tially resembling the interpretation of asylum seekers returning from Euro- risk of Article 3 ill-treatment. Article 15(c) QD given by the Court of pean countries who originated from Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Somaliland and Puntland’s territory Moreover, whenever the “risk fac- in Elgafaji.9 Moreover, the Court pro- or those who have close affiliations tors” in the country are not sufficient vided some criteria to evaluate the in- to their territory through clan mem- to give rise to a real risk, if taken alone, tensity of the conflict, like the number bership.12 Moreover, there were major “background factors” that may in- of civilian casualties, the violation of protection concerns around internally crease the possibility of the applicant international humanitarian law rules, displaced persons’ (IDPs) settlements, to be subjected to treatment contrary and whether the conflict is localized and minority groups continuing to to Article 3 – namely the personal sit- or widespread. suffer discrimination13 due to the uation of the applicant, such as gen- In assessing the condition of Somalia fact that Somaliland’s government is der, or her/his belonging to a minority at the time of the Sufi and Elmi judg- essentially a power-sharing mecha- group, the absence of a family, or the ment, the Court resorted to previous nism for the sub-clans of the Dir clan, fact of being a single woman –, should national case-law, and in particular namely the Isaak, Gadabursi, Isaa and also be taken into account. United Kingdom case-law,10 where Bimaal.14 it was already clear that Mogadishu Be that as it may, a recent judgment was not a viable internal flight alter- The ruling in Sufi and Elmi was also from the ECtHR has marked a sig- native, and, due to the situation of a landmark judgment with regard to nificant departure from the previ- general violence, it rejected the pos- ous national and international juris- sibility that asylum seekers could be prudence, as well as from European 11 AMM and others (conflict; humani- tarian crisis; returnees; FGM) Somalia CG countries’ general stance on the secu- [2011] UKUT 00445 (IAC) §350. rity situation in Mogadishu. Until last 12 See M.S. v United Kingdom, ECtHR September, when the ECtHR deliv- 8 Sufi and Elmi v. the United King- Application no. 56090/08, Inadmissible (Fourth ered the K.A.B. v Sweden judgment,15 dom, ECtHR Applications Nos. 8319/07 and Section), 16 October 2012; Sufi and Elmi v the 11449/07, Judgment of 28 June 2011 §217. United Kingdom, ECtHR Applications Nos. South-Central Somalia and its capital 9 M. and N. Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris 8319/07 and 11449/07, Judgment of 28 June Mogadishu were generally recog- van Justitie, Case C-465/07, Judgment of 17 Feb- 2011; § 217; see also United Kingdom Border nized as a place were no civilian is safe ruary 2009. Agency, Operational Guidance Note on Soma- due to indiscriminate violence and lia, 15 December 2011. 10 United Kingdom Courts have en- the flagrant violations of basic human gaged many times in evaluating the conditions 13 M.S. v United Kingdom, ECtHR Ap- in Somalia, and particularly in Mogadishu, plication no. 56090/08, Inadmissible (Fourth rights and international humanitar- both under Article 3 ECHR and Article 15 (c) Section), 16 October 2012. ian law rules committed by any party of the Qualification Directive. In fact, in the UK 14 See D. Farria, “Somalia: Between the to the conflict, from al-Shabaab and there is the largest Somali expatriate popula- Clan and Nationhood,” World Policy Blog (8 other Islamic groups, to the govern- tion in Europe. Moreover, retrieving cases from March 2012) available at http://www.worldpol- the UK is also easier due to the fact that there icy.org/blog/2012/03/08/somalia-between-clan- is a specialized appeal court, the Immigration and-nationhood [last accessed 4 November 15 K.A.B. v Sweden, ECtHR Application and Asylum Tribunal (IAT). 2013]. no. 886/11, Judgment of 5 September 2013.

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ment forces and AMISOM troops16; and a certain normalization of the day-by-day, the risk of human rights however, in this latest judgment of an daily life in the city, even if al-Shabaab violations is still high and the condi- unsuccessful Somali asylum-seeker was still present and continued to per- tions of those living in IDPs camps are claiming that his removal from Swe- form attacks mainly targeted at gov- extremely dire and totally dependent den would expose him to a real risk of ernmental organizations, but which on international humanitarian aid. being subjected to treatment in breach inevitably affected civilians caught of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, the Court in the crossfire. Pointing out the still Government reports and reports is- concluded that the level of violence fragile security situation and persist- sued by non-governmental organiza- in Mogadishu had decreased, due to ence of human rights violations, the tions like Amnesty International and fewer civilian casualties and a fragile Court found that the available coun- Human Rights Watch describe an im- recovery process, so that the situation try information does not indicate that proving situation in Mogadishu while was no longer one where everyone in the situation is of such a nature as to emphasizing that the improvements the city was at risk of ill- treatment place everyone in the city at a real and recovery underline the persist- solely on account of their presence risk of treatment, contrary to Article ent massive internal displacement of there. 3 ECHR. persons, the unpredictability of the still volatile situation in the Somali At first, the Court, reiterated that Ar- It seems, however, that the Court capital, and the lack of a functioning ticle 3 ECHR does not preclude States has given a premature conclusion on system for addressing human rights to rely on the existence of an internal the basis of a flawed analysis, as ex- violations. flight alternative – as long as the per- pressed by Judge Power-Forde in his son in question can safely travel to dissenting opinion. Even if, at present, Moreover, while the traditional clan the area in question, gain admittance the level of generalized violence in protection mechanism is not viable and settle there. Yet, at the same time, Mogadishu is not so compelling, in Mogadishu and other areas under it excluded again that the proposed the instability of the situation, the the control of al-Shabaab, in the self- repatriation to Somaliland would be persistent attacks of al-Shabaab, to- declared independent state of Soma- possible, because Somali nationals gether with the unresolved situation liland and the autonomous region of would not be able to gain admittance of human rights abuses and appall- Puntland, only those who originate there, unless they were born there or ing living conditions in IDPs camps, from those territories or those who had strong clan connections to the re- should have suggested more caution have close clan affiliations are admit- gion. in establishing that there was no risk ted.18 Then the Court assessed the feasibil- of an Article 3 violation. The impres- ity of Mogadishu as a viable alterna- sion that the Court leaves is that it Therefore, in view of the objective tive for relocation, as the applicant was trying to apply Article 15(c) QD situation of instability and violence, appeared to originate from there. to the present case, more than Article this article argues that meaningful Gathering information from various 3 ECHR. The court evaluated, in es- protection in Mogadishu and South- reports,17 as it did in Sufi and Elmi, the sence, only whether “the level of vio- ern-Central Somalia is not yet avail- Court stated that there have been im- lence was such that, without anything able and persons should not be for- provements for the ordinary citizens to render them a particular target, ci- cibly returned there, while returning vilians faced real risks to their lives or persons to Somaliland or Puntland 16 AMISOM, African Union Mission in personal safety.” should be considerated only when Somalia, created by the African Union’s Peace close clan affiliations make it possible. and Security Council on 19 January 2007 and It is odd to note that in Elgafaji, the When evaluating whether a person its mandated was approved by the UNSC on CJEU held that Article 15(c) protec- can find meaningful protection in her/ 21 February 2007. The mission has, since then, been reviewed every six months. tion went beyond that of Article 3 his country of origin, Article 3 ECHR 17 See among others: UNHCR’s Eligi- ECHR, while in Sufi and Elmi, the jurisprudence requires a thoughtful bility Guidelines for Assessing the International ECtHR pointed out that Article 3 of- examination of the personal condi- Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from So- fered comparable protection to that tion together with the situation in malia, published on 5 May 2010; United King- dom Government Report on Somalia: Report of afforded by Article 15(c) under the the receiving country. Gender, age, Fact-Finding Mission to Nairobi, 8 – 15 Septem- QD. However, in K.A.B., the ECtHR clan affiliation, the presence of fam- ber 2010; “The Security Situation in Somalia”, seemed to equate the two provisions ily members, region of origin, “ability issued by The Swedish Migration Board Coun- and neglected to take into considera- to cater for most basic needs, such as try Information Service (Lifos) on 24 October 2012. The Danish Immigration Service and the tion other risks or potential inhumane food, hygiene and shelter, vulnerabil- Norwegian Landinfo issued in January 2013 a and degrading situations that the ap- ity to ill-treatment and the prospect joint report, “Update on security and human plicant may face upon return. Like if of the situation improving within a rights issues in South-Central Somalia, includ- the ECtHR was experiencing an iden- ing Mogadishu,” based on their fact-finding mission to Nairobi in Kenya and Mogadishu in tity crisis. Somalia on 17 to 28 October 2012; they issued another report in May 2013, “Security and pro- Conclusions 18 See also the “UNHCR Eligibility tection in Mogadishu and South-Central Soma- In conclusion, although the situation Guidelines for assessing the international Pro- lia,” based on a fact-finding mission to Nairobi tection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Soma- and Mogadishu from 16 April to 7 May 2013. in South-Central Somalia and, in par- lia” of 5 May 2010, commenting on the internal See also Human Rights Watch World Report ticular, in Mogadishu, is improving flight or relocation alternative (IFA/IRA) in So- 2013 – Somalia, published on 31 January 2013. maliland or Puntland (at pp. 34-35).

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reasonable time,”19 and suitability of the place selected are all criteria that should be considered when evaluat- ing an asylum-seeker’s application and the possibility to send him/her back to his/her country of origin, de- spite the ill-taken decision in K.A.B. v Sweden. The court’s oversight in con- sidering whether Mogadishu is a vi- able “internal protection alternative” cannot overshadow what has so far been innovative and enlightened ju- risprudence.

19 See M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, ap- plication no. 30696/09, judgment of 21 January 2011 (§254) and Sufi and Elmi v United Kingdom, supra (§283-292).

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