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The Allied Counter-Offensive in the Somme Sector

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The Allied Counter-Offensive in the Somme Sector USI Vol69 No2 Jun18_USI Vol55 No4/2005 31/05/2018 3:01 pm Page 14 CONTRIBUTED HISTORY PAPER The guns of August 1918: the Allied counter-offensive in the Somme Sector Marcus Fielding Royal United Services Institute of Victoria1 After absorbing and eventually halting the German spring offensive by July 1918, the Allies launched a major counter-offensive. On 8 August, 31 divisions – 6 British, 5 Australian, 4 Canadian and 16 French – and an American regiment, each supported by tanks, artillery and aircraft, began what would become series of attacks over several weeks in the Somme sector. Applying tactics that had been learned over years of war, they tore a great hole in the German lines and, by the end of August, had driven the German Army back to the Hindenburg Line – regaining most of the ground that had been lost to the Germans in their spring offensive. More significantly, the counter-offensive caused the German Army’s morale to collapse – an end to the war seemed near. Key words: Great War; World War I; 1918; Western Front; Allied offensive; Somme; Amiens; Albert; Bapaume; Montdidier; Noyon; Hindenburg Line. The German spring offensive, which began with free the railway lines that ran through Amiens from Operation Michael in March 1918, had culminated by the German shellfire. Foch agreed on a proposal by Field Second Battle of the Marne in mid-July 1918. By this Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commander-in-chief of the time, the German superiority of numbers on the Western BEF, to strike on the River Somme east of Amiens with Front had sunk to a negligible lead which would be the objective of forcing the Germans away from the vital reversed as more American troops arrived. German Amiens–Paris railway. The Somme sector was chosen as manpower was exhausted. The German High Command a suitable site for the offensive for several reasons. The predicted they would need 200,000 men per month to Picardy countryside provided a good surface for tanks, make good the losses being suffered. Returning which was not the case in Flanders. Also, the German convalescents could supply 70,000–80,000 per month, defences, manned by the 2nd (German) Army, were but there were only 300,000 recruits available from the relatively weak, having been subjected to continual next annual class of 18-year-olds. raiding by the Australians in a process termed ‘peaceful The German failure to break through at the Second penetration’. At a meeting on 24 July 1918, Foch agreed Battle of the Marne, or to destroy the Allied armies in the to the plan but directed that the 1st (French) Army, which field, allowed Ferdinand Foch, the Allied Supreme held the front to the south of the 4th (British) Army, was to Commander, to proceed with the planned major counter- be involved. Foch appointed Haig to oversee the efforts offensive. By this time, the American Expeditionary of the two Armies. Force (AEF) was present in France in large numbers and The attack in the Somme sector was carried out by invigorated the Allied armies. Likewise, the British the BEF’s 4th (British) Army, under the command of Expeditionary Force (BEF) also had been reinforced by General Sir Henry Rawlinson, in the northern half of the large numbers of troops from the Sinai-Palestine sector and the 1st (French) Army, under the command of Campaign and the Italian Front, and from replacements General Debeney, in the southern half of the sector. previously held back in Britain by the prime minister, The 4th (British) Army was comprised of three David Lloyd George. sizeable (infantry) corps (each of four to six divisions) and a cavalry corps (of three divisions). The British III The Allied Counter-Offensive Plan Corps (with four divisions plus the 131st Infantry Foch began this counter-offensive campaign with an Regiment of the 33rd United States Division) was to attack in the Champagne-Marne sector (south of the attack north of the Somme; the Australian Corps (with Somme sector) between 18 July and 6 August 1918. five Australian divisions and one British division) was to Three French armies, with five American divisions attack south of the river in the centre of 4th (British) attached and supported by 225 Renault light tanks, Army's front; and the Canadian Corps (with four advanced 50km and cleared the Marne salient which Canadian divisions and one British division) was to threatened Paris. attack on the southern flank of the Australians. The The next stage of the counter-offensive was an attack Canadian and Australian Corps together comprised over in the Somme sector to reduce the Amiens salient and to 200,000 men and were the 4th (British) Army’s main effort. The Cavalry Corps was to be prepared to exploit a breakthrough in the German line. Rawlinson also maintained the 63rd Royal Naval Division and a tank 1E-mail: [email protected] battalion as a reserve. Page 14 United Service 69 (2) June 2018 Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies NSW www.rusinsw.org.au USI Vol69 No2 Jun18_USI Vol55 No4/2005 31/05/2018 3:01 pm Page 15 8 August 1918 In all, 31 Allied divisions, supported by thousands of guns, thousands of aircraft and over 600 tanks, were launched against the German positions in foggy con - ditions at 4.20 a.m. on 8 August 1918. Because they had fewer tanks, the French had to precede their advance with a 45-minute artillery bombardment to reduce the German barbed wire defences. Due to good Allied planning and excellent deception measures, the Germans were unaware of the pending attack. The attack achieved such surprise that German forces only began to return artillery fire after five minutes – at the positions where the Allied forces had assembled at the start of the battle but by then had vacated. In the 4th (British) Army’s zone, seven divisions led the first phase of the attack: the British 18th (Eastern) and 58th (2/1st London), the Australian 2nd and 3rd, and the Canadian 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions. For the first time, the Australians would attack side-by-side with the Canadian Corps. Both had a reputation for aggressive and innova- tive tactics and a strong record of success over the past two years. Map: Allied advances into the Amiens salient The attack broke through the German lines and tanks 8–25 August 1918 attacked German rear positions, sowing panic and con - [Source: The Map Archive at https//:www.themaparchive.com] fusion. The Australian units advanced about 2km and secured their first objective line by 7:30 a.m. The speed To achieve surprise, there was no pre-attack of their advance was such that a party of German bombardment. The artillery fire support plan for the 4th officers and some divisional staff were captured while (British) Army involved 1386 field guns and howitzers eating breakfast. and 684 heavy guns, comprising 27 medium artillery By 8:30 a.m., the Australian 4th and 5th Divisions and brigades and 13 heavy batteries, in addition to the the Canadian 4th Division were passing through the initial infantry divisions’ organic artillery. The fire plan allowed breach in the German lines and leapfrogged through the 504 out of 530 German guns to be hit at ‘zero hour’, lead units. The Canadian and Australian forces in the while a creeping barrage preceded the advancing centre advanced quickly to their second objective line, infantry. pushing the front line over 4km forward from its starting The 4th (British) Army’s attack was also supported by point by 11:00 a.m. The third phase of the attack was 580 tanks which helped to cut through the numerous assigned to infantry-carrying Mark V ‘Star’ tanks. The barbed wire defences employed by the Germans. The infantry, however, was able to carry out this final step Canadian and Australian Corps were each allocated a unaided. The Allies penetrated well to the rear of the brigade with 108 Mark V fighting tanks and 36 Mark V German defensive front. The cavalry – one brigade in the ‘Star’ tanks. The Australian Corps was additionally Australian sector and two cavalry divisions in the allocated an armoured car battalion. A single battalion of Canadian sector – then continued the advance and 36 Mark V tanks was allocated to III Corps. The Cavalry harried the retreating troops beyond the third objective Corps was allocated two battalions each of 48 Medium line. Mark A Whippet tanks. By the end of the day, a gap 24km wide had been torn Support to the 4th (British) Army by the Royal Air in the German line. The Canadians penetrated 13km, the Force consisted of an unprecedented 782 aircraft. They Australians 11km, the French 8km, and the British 3km. were used for reconnaissance, masking the sound of There was less success north of the Somme River, advancing tanks, countering German aircraft, directing where the British III Corps had only a single tank Allied artillery, and resupplying advancing infantry units, battalion in support, the terrain was rougher and a as well as bombing German positions in depth. The 4th German incursion of 6 August had disrupted some of the (British) Army’s attack became known as the Battle of preparations. Although the British gained their first Amiens. objectives, they were held up short of the Chipilly Spur, The 1st French Army was comprised of four infantry a steep wooded ridge. corps (each of two to five divisions) and a cavalry corps The 4th (British) Army took 12,000 prisoners while the (of three divisions).
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