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Property Policy Update Property Policy Update Province/ Status Date ministry City Related Policy Details Impact 29 October Tianjin HPR An official at the Tianjin DRC denied a rumour that the The local property market is reported to be 2020 city would relax HPR by allowing home purchases under pressure due to low demand. A certain Unconfirmed without a local hukou. degree of policy easing could be necessary to support the local economy. 23 October Hubei Wuhan Home Launched a liquidity-based risk management system for Home accumulation fund rules will be adjusted 2020 accumulation home accumulation fund management. more flexibly and frequently as a lever to control fund When the liquidity of home accumulation fund is ample the real estate market. (loan balance drops below 85% of total pool), the loan Confirmed and withdrawal policy will be relaxed; and when the ratio exceeds 85%, a three-level alert system will be applied to adjust the loan and withdrawal policy. The ratio stood at 89% on 15 October. 23 October MOHURD General Wang Menghui, Minister of MOHURD, stated that the The room for near-term policy tightening is 2020 real estate market had maintained steady and healthy limited as regulators shift focus from controlling Confirmed development, with the targets of stabilising land and demand to increasing supply. home prices as well as expectation “basically achieved" in the 13th FYP period. 23 October Jiangsu Nanjing Rental housing Orders to implement the record system for rental Increases rental housing supply and cultivates 2020 housing, with tax exemption or reduction for individual the market. and enterprise tenants. Companies and organisations Confirmed that rent homes or properties converted from commercial or industrial units to rental housing firms can also enjoy preferential property tax. 22 October Guangdong Shenzhen Housing loan Large state-owned and joint-stock banks have Reduces property speculation 2020 reportedly tightened the issuance of individual loans Unconfirmed pledged on properties. These loans are supposed to be used for consumption and businesses, but some were diverted into the real estate market. 1 Province/ Status Date ministry City Related Policy Details Impact 21 October PBOC Financing Pan Gongsheng, deputy governor at the PBOC, said the Real estate financing will be monitored and 2020 central bank would focus on improving the macro controlled with more standardised processes prudential monitoring, evaluating, and alerting systems and requirements. Aggressive debt-fueled Confirmed in key areas including real estate financing. growth models are becoming much less viable, requiring developers to create new business models. 21 October MNR Land supply Drafted tract development rules for public comment, Limited impact on housing market as it mainly 2020 which forbids approvals in any of the following cases: applies to industrial and commercial land. But it The plan includes permanent farmland. could increase the supply of rental housing or The city or county has a large amount of land that is residential places, e.g. employee dorms, as part Confirmed approved but not supplied or idled. of industrial parks. The land utilisation rate of development zones or new urban areas of all types is low. Tract development that fails to meet the annual implementation targets for two consecutive years. 21 October Anhui Hefei Rental housing Issued a number of measures to support converting Increases rental housing supply. 2020 commercial, industrial, R&D and educational buildings, Confirmed as well as entire residential blocks into rental housing. 21 October Beijing Policy The local MOHURD announced the launch of a 3-4 Enforces existing regulations and aims to 2020 execution month-long joint investigation, partnering with local maintain market order. Confirmed branches of PBOC, CBIRC, and Public Security Bureau, into the execution of HPR, presale funds administration, and the filing of home renting contracts. 20 October Guangdong Housing quality The provincial MOHURD stipulates that property Seeks to maintain build quality as developers 2020 projects with leaks, cracks, or other problems unsolved step up construction speed. Confirmed should not be accepted for completion. 19 October Guangdong Shenzhen General The local MOHURD pledges to deepen housing reforms, The city is very likely to follow the Singapore- 2020 including the social housing system, construction model in which the majority of the population Confirmed project approval system, and construction project live in social housing as a way to address tendering. affordability. 16 October Ningxia Yinchuan Presales The local MOHURD issued a new rule that orders Aims to strengthen the management of presales 2020 developers to support home buyers in transferring funds and ensure the proceeds are used in the Confirmed presale funds into the custody accounts directly and construction of property projects, instead of prohibits developers from using those funds outside the other purposes. specific project. 2 Province/ Status Date ministry City Related Policy Details Impact 16 October Guangxi Liuzhou Home Capped the quota of home accumulation fund loans at 6 Tweaks home accumulation fund loan lending in 2020 accumulation times the account balance and lowered the maximum a bid to mitigate tight liquidity. fund Confirmed quota from 600,000 yuan to 400,000 yuan. Removed the restriction that banned loan applications for purchasing a second-hand home over 15 years old. 15 October Jiangsu Wuxi Home Increased the interest rates of home accumulation fund Differentiates home accumulation fund policies 2020 accumulation loans for second-home purchase to 1.1x the rates for to prioritise first home buyers. Confirmed fund first-home purchases, ie 3.25% x 1.1= 3.575%. 14 October PBOC Developer Peng Lifeng, deputy director of the PBOC’s financial Some developers cutting prices to generate 2020 financing market department, said at the central bank’s Q3 cashflow, leading buyers to take a wait and see financial statistics press conference that the funds view. Impact expected to be highly tracking and financing administration rules targeted at differentiated by market. Confirmed certain key developers have launched, and that they would work with MOHURD and other departments to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness, improve the rules, so as to steadily expand the scope of such rules. 11 October Anhui Hefei Social/ rental The local MOHURD and branch of China Construction Increases rental housing supply to meet the 2020 housing Bank pledged to work together to raise 80,000 units of rising demand from new population inflows Confirmed policy rental housing in three years, with the purpose to attracted by the development of high-tech meet the temporary demand from new residents, industries. including non-hukou residents and college graduates. 11 October Guangdong Shenzhen Land approval The local government is granted of the power to Increases land supply for housing, other 2020 approve land conversion from qualified rural lands to properties, transport, factories, commerce. construction lands as part of pilot reforms in the city. Other pilot cities eg Shanghai are getting similar Confirmed powers. Lead city clusters will grow faster, leading urbanisation and economic growth. 11 October Hunan Changsha Land bids, Adjusted the proportion of self-held rental housing in Increases rental housing supply. 2020 rental housing land bids to 100% of the GFA once the price cap is Confirmed reached. 9 October Jiangsu Xuzhou Price control The local MOHURD and PBOC branch jointly stipulated Aims to contain Xuzhou home price increases, 2020 that the record prices of commodity housing should not which rose 11.6% yoy as of August according to Confirmed be adjusted within one year, and developers are banned NBS data. from forcing home buyers to choose refurbishing services. 3 Province/ Status Date ministry City Related Policy Details Impact 9 October Zhejiang Shaoxing Price control The local MOHURD stipulated that the sale prices of Increases land and home supply while 2020 new property projects should be set based on prices of controlling home prices. Mainly aims to cool similar properties in the same area or land prices and down the local property market which saw new construction costs taken into consideration; and prices home prices rising 13% yoy according to 3rd of newly introduced units should not exceed the prices party data. Confirmed on record. The city also looks to establish a land supply mechanism that links up land prices and home prices, with the purpose to increase land supply and strictly control price premiums and price growth. 9 October Jiangsu Suzhou Finished The overall furnishing price should be at least 5% of the Limited impact. Mainly aims to regulate the 2029 housing property price or 1,000 yuan per m2. finished housing market and guarantee property Confirmed quality. 30 September Ningxia Yinchuan Various Home buyers without a hukou in the province are only Controls home demand, increases home and 2020 allowed to purchase one home in the city land supply, guarantees demand from difficult Properties that newly obtain presale approvals need to groups. be held for two years before next resale Down-payment ratio should be at least 20% for first- This follows other cities that were summoned by home purchases and 40% for second-home purchases; the MOHURD to cool down the overheated mortgage loans are suspended for the 3rd or more home property market. New home price growth in the purchases city were
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