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Public Opinion of Lebanese Christians

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Public Opinion of Lebanese Christians Public Opinion of Lebanese Christians December 2012 © 2012 Ipsos. All rights reserved. Contains Ipsos' Confidential and Proprietary information and may not bedisclosed or reproduced without the prior written consent of Ipsos. Content 1. Research Objectives 2. Methodology 3. Key Findings . Sample profile . Christians’ Fears & Concerns . Political Forces Assessment . Christians’ Expectations . Christians and Elections . Media Consumption Habits 4. Conclusions 2 1 Research Objectives Research Objectives The main objective of this study was to better understand the opinion of the Lebanese Christian voters regarding certain issues. More specifically: . Identify their main concerns and fears. Assess their perception towards political events, parties, and people . Understand their aspirations for the future . Understand the importance of local and country issues . Understand what motivates / de-motivates them to vote or not . Identify their voting patterns 2 Methodology Methodology . 2000 interviews were conducted Face to Face. The survey was done in 13 voting Cazas having a majority of Christians, and not in all the Cazas. Cazas of execution are: Aley, Beirut one, Baabda, Batroun, Chouf, Jbeil, Jezzine, Kesrwan, Koura, Metn, Zahle & Zgharta. The sample was representative of the Christian voters of each Caza as per the voting registration lists, including both residents and non residents of the Caza. The fieldwork was done between 16th October –3rd December by the specialized interviewers of IPSOS. Each team of interviewers was directed by a full-time supervisor who was responsible for the interviewers on the field. 3 Key Findings Sample Profile Age, Gender, Religion, Marital Status Age Religious/sectarian affiliation Maronite 69% 18-20 5% Greek Orthodox 14% 21-34 27% Greek Catholic 9% Armenian Orthodox 35-49 32% 5% Armenian Catholic 1% 50+ 36% Other Christian / Minorities 2% Marital Status Gender Widowed Divorced 3% 1% Single Female Male 34% 49% 51% Married 62% Political Activity In the household N = 2000 No one 84% Myself 13% Other family 12% members Myself Other Family Member (s) N = 262 N = 234 Lebanese 46% Lebanese Forces 48% Forces Tayyar (FPM) 18% Tayyar (FPM) 20% Tashnag party 17% Kataeb 16% Kataeb 12% Tashnag party 14% Marada 3% Marada 3% Communist 2% PNSS 2% party National Liberal PNSS 1% 2% party Ramgavar 1% Communist party 2% party Hunchak party 1% Ramgavar party 1% M7a. Who in your family including yourself is active in a political party? M7b. In which political party are you/they active? Christians’ Fears & Concerns The Lebanese Identity Significantly more among voters of Proud 74% Jbeil, Kesrwan, Metn, & Baabda more than the other regions Significantly more among voters of Beirut Belonging 9% One more than the other regions Significantly more among voters of Chouf N = 2000 Pessimistic 6% more than the other regions Neutral 5% Optimistic 4% Significantly more among voters of Free 3% Zgharta more than the other regions Ashamed 3% Lost 3% Q1a. How do you feel towards holding the Lebanese identity? Feelings Toward Current Personal Situation 53% Feeling significantly stronger among female voters, and in Bcharre and Koura N = 2000 26% 13% 6% 2% I am happy, but I am unhappy and I am happy and I am unhappy, I don't know how worried about worried about the not worried about but not worried to feel / not sure the future future the future about the future Q2. In general, how do you feel regarding your current personal situation? Current Main Concerns Main Concerns Security situation of the country/ Significantly more among women, and in weapons with individuals/ army 83% weakness Kesrwan, Baabda, Metn and Jezzine Economic situation (expensiveness, 79% Significantly more in Bcharre and Beirut 1 unemployment) N = 2000 My personal safety and that of my family 47% First Mentioned My personal financial / work Main Concern situation 38% Security situation of the country/ weapons with 41% My health and that of my family 35% individuals/ army … Economic situation The events in Syria & the Arab (expensiveness, 22% countries 8% unemployment) My health and that of my The political situation in Lebanon family 15% (elections, leaders, government, 4% inter-Christians conflict My personal safety and 10% Fear for the future (migration of that of my family youth, children's future, third age) 3% My personal financial / work situation 5% Q3. What are your main concerns these days? Lebanon’s Greatest Danger Today Significantly more among voters of Zgharta War: civil/ Sunni-Chia/ ME/ with Israel 16% & Baabda than the other regions Significantly more among young women and The declining economy 16% voters of Chouf & Beirut 1 Significantly more among Hezbollah weapons 13% male voters of Bechare N = 2000 The lack of the state's control on the 11% security situation Significantly more among women The increased sectarian conflicts 5% Inter-Christian divisions 5% Lebanon getting involved in the 4% regional/Syrian crisis The illegitimate arms in the streets 4% The corruption 4% The increased presence of Salafists in 4% Lebanon The displacement of the Christians 3% Q5. In your opinion, what is Lebanon’s greatest danger today? Dangers on Your Future Least dangerous 1 2 3 Most dangerous Significantly more in Jbeil, Kesrwan, Metn, Chouf & Beirut 1 A declining economy 53% 1.89 Significantly more in Jbeil, Kesrwan, Metn, Baabda & Beirut 1 Weak Lebanese state 49% 2.02 Significantly more in Metn & Baabda Weak, corrupt or inefficient 48% politicians 1.78 N = 2000 Lebanese Christian divisions 45% 2.03 Terrorist attacks in Lebanon 33% 2.00 Hezbollah's weapons 29% 2.35 Increasing influence of Salafis in 20% Lebanon 2.12 Salafis or Ikhwan taking over in 10% Syria 2.08 Bachar Al Assad staying in power 6% 2.17 A civil war in Syria 6% 1.94 Q6. Please choose from the list the 3 statements that you consider dangerous on your future (circle in the column 1) and rank them from 1 to 3, where “1 = most dangerous” and “3 = least dangerous”, in terms of danger on your future (write in column 2)? Christians in Lebanon Agree with… Interested in Land sales present a danger on Christians 94% 4% 2% 94% 6% Christians have a bright future in Lebanon 52% 34% 13% 94% 6% The Lebanese Christians lost their power in Lebanon 61% 27% 11% 90% 10% Christians are in danger in Lebanon 66% 26% 8% 89% 11% N = 2000 Lebanon should not interfere in what is happening in 82% 13% 5% 80% 20% Syria Lebanese Christians are better off today than in 2004 39% 51% 10% 79% 21% Christians should get closer to all communities 75% 12% 13% 78% 22% Lebanese Christians should call for the change of the 62% 18% 19% 75% 25% Ta’ef agreement Salafists are more dangerous than Hezbollah on 58% 22% 19% 69% 31% Christians Lebanese Christians should protect as much as 56% 33% 11% 64% 36% possible Syrian Christians Hezbollah is more dangerous than Salafists on 34% 46% 20% 62% 38% Christians Lebanese Christians should work to have a state of 19% 76% 5% 61% 39% their own Hezbollah should be allowed to set its own telecom 15% 74% 61% 39% network 11% Christians and Druze should unite to protect each 47% 30% 23% 55% 45% other Hezbollah is to Shiites what Salafists are to Sunnites 39% 36% 25% 47% 53% Christians should get closer to Shiites than to Sunnites 17% 57% 26% 42% 58% Yes No I am not sure Yes No Q8a. I am going to read to you some statements regarding the Christians in Lebanon. Please tell me, as a Christian, if you “agree” or “do not agree” with each of these statements? Q8b. I am going to read to you again the same statements regarding the Christians in Lebanon. Please tell me, as a Christian, if you are “interested” or “not interested” in each of these statements? Christians Existence in Lebanon Christians Existence in Lebanon is Being Threatened? N = 2000 Significantly more in Significantly more in Zgharta, Baabda & Aley No Jbeil, Kesrwan & Metn 34% Yes 66% Reasons why NOT Reasons why YES N = 679 N = 1321 The immigration of Christians 38% Christianity emerged from this region The dramatic decrease in the 45% 32% and no one can remove us Christian population in Lebanon The continuous struggle among 20% Christian political leaders The increased power of Hezbollah in 20% Christians are the core founders of Lebanon 37% The increased power of Salafists in Lebanon 15% Lebanon The absence of a prominent leader 12% to defend the Christians They tried in 1975 and failed because The presence of illegitimate armed 14% 12% we resisted and we can do it again forces Salafists and Ikhwan taking over in 8% the neighboring countries The Muslim majority in the 8% neighboring countries The alliance between the Shiite and The increasing growth of the Muslim 7% 8% Christians will protect us population The Ta'ef agreement diminished the 7% role of Christians in Lebanon All other sects are armed except the 5% Christians The poor security situation 4% Q9a. As a Lebanese Christian, do you feel that your existence in Lebanon is being threatened? Q9b. Why YES? Q9c. Why NOT? Feelings Towards … 99% 1% Independence 1% 1% Freedom 98% 1% Democracy 96% 3% 1% LOVE N = 2000 Resistance 70% 24% 6% 1% Federalism 24% 36% 19% 21% Sectarianism 10% 42% 48% 1% Integrism (Oussoulia) 2% 30% 65% 4% Wilayat el Fakih 2% 35% 54% 9% SCARE Muslim Brotherhood 2% 39% 57% 3% Integralism (Salafia) 30% 67% 2% I love it I don’t care It scares me Don’t know the meaning Q13. On a scale where 1 = “love it”, 2 = “I don’t care”, and 3” It scares me”, can you please tell me how you feel regarding the following terms. Political Forces Assessment Government Performance
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