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Commentaries Commentaries Can Lebanon Be Saved? Only if Citizens Reinvent Their Society and Avoid a New Civil War Joseph A. Kéchichian Ugly sectarianism returned to Lebanon in early June after the wounding of dozens of protesters who were demanding basic rights, meaningful political and economic reforms, and full-scale accountability in a country where successive leaders had failed to tackle any problem, no matter how trivial. For at least three decades, if not longer, Lebanese politicians routinely vandalized the land, tolerated the rise of a militia that threatened citizens, and demanded that those who were not satisfied emigrate on a more or less permanent basis. The future was bleak, with few prospects for meaningful political or socioeconomic reform. What was the message that Hizballah and Amal, the two leading Shi‘ah parties, wished to telegraph to the rest of Lebanon’s population after the June 6, 2020, protests? Were the Shi‘ah marchers, who flew Hizballah and Amal Movement flags and chanted “Shi‘ah, Shi‘ah, Shi‘ah” in what was a cry of defiance, anxious to topple the constitution? Why were security forces, whose riot units fired teargas at Martyrs Square in downtown Beirut and in Ayn al-Rimanih, a troubled section of the capital city where the 1975–1990 war had started, selective in their responses to confront demonstrators? Was Lebanon on the verge of a new civil war, and were there peaceful alternatives to either reinventing Lebanese society or, according to a scenario that was not far-fetched, were Sunni Muslims and Christians being invited to emigrate at their earliest opportunity, as various social media outlets invited them to? A New Civil War? Lebanon’s current socioeconomic ordeals, which arose from a combination of poor representation, corruption, and economic stagnation, started long before the October 17, 2019, uprisings that shook the Can Lebanon Be Saved? Commentaries Only if Citizens Reinvent Their Society and Avoid a New Civil War 1 ruling establishment. At the time, activists called on ordinary citizens to take to the streets and express their disapproval of what was described by leading commentators as the emasculation of an entire nation, an effort that only served to bring down the Sa‘ad Hariri government. Winter and the confinement associated with the Covid-19 Coronavirus discouraged many from remaining in the streets, though the June 6, 2020, rallies were supposed to rekindle the opposition’s agenda and, perhaps, complete the mission that started after October 2019. What the Lebanese demanded then—early parliamentary elections, disassociation from regional conflicts, an end to corruption, and full-scale accountability— confronted fresh refusals from entrenched politicians. Whereas citizens wished to see a genuinely motivated government that could usher in solid reforms, Beirut cherished its farm-like behavior. For every call on the establishment—both secular as well as religious—to act conscientiously and with responsibility, politicians and clerics continued to pretend that the country was their private property, which they could rule with impunity. Even if most Lebanese were preoccupied with economic woes amid a major health crisis, government officials seemed to have used the period between October 17, 2019, and June 6, 2020, to better prepare themselves, with the ultimate goal of crushing future uprisings. On June 6, protesters were faced by Hizballah and its ally, the Amal Movement, both of which were on the defensive because of a real fear that their iron grip on the state was endangered. Naturally, confrontations occurred, some of which resulted in armed clashes, and while the latter died down, what actually occurred on the ground threatened a renewal of the 1975 civil war. This conflict had been left in abeyance despite the 1990 Ta’if Accords, which necessitated Gargantuan efforts under the expert guidance of the late Saudi minister of foreign affairs, Prince Saud al-Faysal. No longer simply interested in a change of government after having given Prime Minister Hassan Diab a hundred-day opportunity to address some of the grave concerns that Beirut faced, protesters were increasingly demanding a total break with the previous system, since most Lebanese have lost trust in parliament, the presidency, the military, and even the judiciary. Today, the chief petition is for early parliamentary elections followed by an economic rescue plan, given the serious challenges being experienced by the overwhelming majority. Equally important was the exigency that the judiciary become independent, a request that was probably impossible to accomplish given how cleverly the executive and legislative bodies entangled their interests with the men and women who served within the third branch. This knot guaranteed that there would be bias—which was just what the establishment wanted. Of course, other claims were expressed too, including the need to restore stolen funds, to arrest and put corrupt politicians on trial, and to adopt a neutral foreign policy that could shield Lebanon from regional entanglements, but all these were impossible as they necessitated internal consensus, which did not exist. In a land that lacked political accountability and where not a single politician was arrested for any mischief in eons, issuing such stipulations was infantile, even though they satisfied incensed protesters. Still, Hizballah saw in the ultimatums that angry and desperate marchers tossed at the establishment a veiled threat to remove its coveted weapons, allegedly to deprive it of its competitive edge over other parties. That was why its members pledged that no living creature could take away the group’s Can Lebanon Be Saved? 2 Only if Citizens Reinvent Their Society and Avoid a New Civil War Commentaries arms now, not in one hundred years, and not even if Israel no longer existed, thereby refuting the very justification for the mercenaries to keep their lethal hardware. Militiamen carrying their weapons roamed the streets on Saturday. June 6, in front of units of Internal Security Forces (ISF) and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), to show their determination and send clear messages to one and all. Although unarmed, antagonistic factions—chiefly Lebanese Forces group in Ayn al-Rimmanih, a Christian area adjacent to the Hizballah stronghold of Shiyyah—took to the streets and denounced Hasan Nasrallah, the stealthy secretary-general who appears so frequently on television that one cannot help but conclude that he is the real ruler of Lebanon. Notwithstanding various pretexts that the Lebanese coalesced around “mutual coexistence” (al ‘aysh al- mushtarak), Hizballah militiamen chanted “Shi‘ah, Shi‘ah, Shi‘ah” as they rushed ISF and LAF units, in what most Lebanese perceived to be little more than a sectarian display precisely intended to provoke partisan responses on the other side. To be sure, the ISF and LAF units kept the hordes in check, but the gravity of the situation did not escape politicians who scrambled to retain control, even though the effort may only have postponed an inevitable renewal of the civil war. Of course, Lebanon seldom failed to mobilize warriors on all sides, recruiting men and women who were anxious to fight proxy wars that outside backers were more than happy to finance and supply, but activists who wished to reinvent the system of government did not desire such an outcome. Except for die-hard Hizballah militiamen, few believed that Lebanon’s problems could be resolved in a new war, though many were equally resolute in their goal to end Hizballah’s hegemony since the country was literally on its knees. Remarkably, concerns over the militia’s bold displays on June 6 terrified both the Speaker, Nabih Berri, and Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), who met a day later to discuss various options. Jumblatt received former Prime Minister Sa‘ad Hariri on June 7 as well, after he and three previous premiers (Najib Miqati, Fouad Siniora, and Tammam Salam) held an emergency meeting, where they presumably weighed their future decisions. President Michel Aoun, a paragon of laissez-faire politics even though his 2006 memorandum of understanding with Hizballah blinded him to ongoing developments, expressed his unease and asked all parties to refrain from mutual provocations. Regrettably, ISF and LAF leaders too proved their inability to lead, notwithstanding the security organizations’ distinctive abilities to unify the country during the past few years. To be sure, the army was respected by a vast majority of the Lebanese, despite the fact that a large segment of the population was aghast that its leadership was no longer an impartial force. Citizens lost their trust in the LAF after its commander, General Joseph Aoun, declared on May 21, 2020, that Lebanon was duty-bound to recuperate its Israeli-occupied territories, the Shib‘ah farms, the Kfarshubah Hills, and the northern parts of the village of Ghajar. Joseph Aoun called on the LAF to confront the Israeli enemy’s repeated violations of Lebanese sovereignty, which was eminently fair, and he used Hizballah’s “people- army-resistance” triptych, which was rejected by at least half the Lebanese and that a former army commander and head of state, General Michel Sulaiman, had declared null and void in May 2014. At the time, Michel Aoun replied to the man who had preceded him as president, “This is wrong because without people’s support there is no resistance and without the army, resisting becomes difficult.” However, once again, this denigrated the role of the state that Michel Aoun presumably sought to lead Can Lebanon Be Saved? Commentaries Only if Citizens Reinvent Their Society and Avoid a New Civil War 3 and Joseph Aoun had sworn to defend. After he became president, Michel Aoun continued to denigrate the state, but he was not the only person embarked on such an endeavor, as the entire establishment helped itself to the till.
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