SAIS EUROPE JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Political Leadership in and the Jumblatt Phenomenon: Tipping the Scales of Lebanese Politics Sebastian Gerlach

For observers and scholars of contemporary Lebanese politics, an understanding of Lebanon’s complex political dynamics is hardly possible without a thorough analysis of the role of , the leader of the country’s community. Notwithstanding his sect’s marginal size, Jumblatt has for almost four decades greatly determined the course of domestic developments. Particularly between 2000 and 2013, the Druze leader developed into a local kingmaker through his repeated switch in affiliations between Lebanon’s pro- and anti-Syrian coalitions. This study argues that Jumblatt’s political behavior during this important period in recent Lebanese history was driven by his determination to ensure the political survival of his Druze minority community. Moreover, it highlights that Jumblatt’s ongoing command over the community, which appears to be impressive given his frequent political realignments, stems from his position as the dominating, traditional Druze za’im and because the minority community recognized his political maneuvering as the best mean to provide the Druze with relevance in Lebanon’s political arena.

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Introduction who failed to preserve their follower- ship after altering their political ori- For observers and scholars of con- 2 temporary Lebanese politics, a thor- entation. In this respect, it is even ough understanding of the country’s more puzzling that Jumblatt was able complex political dynamics is hardly to maintain the support of his Druze possible without analyzing the role of community, known for its nega- Walid Jumblatt, the leader of Leba- tive attitudes towards the prominent non’s Druze community. Indeed, Jum- Shi’ite- March-8 member , blatt has, despite the marginal size when reconciling with the pro-Syrian of his sect, for almost four decades forces in 2009 and enabling the estab- played a pivotal role in the political lishment of a pro-Syrian government arena of Lebanon. Widely considered in 2011. the kingmaker in Lebanese politics,1 Yet academia has so far paid little Jumblatt particularly influenced the attention to the Druze za’im (lead- course of domestic politics between er) and his maneuvering in Leba- 2000 and 2013 by repeatedly switch- nese politics. While some scholars ing affiliations between the opposing have published narrative accounts of pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian coalitions Jumblatt’s personal background and in Lebanon. More precisely, Jum- environment,3 analytical work on his blatt went from a being a close ally of political actions is rare and perspec- the Syrian regime during the 1990s tives on his leadership patterns are to the figurehead of the anti-Syrian practically non-existent.4 This pa- March-14 movement following the per offers a contribution to both the of late Prime Minister studies of Walid Jumblatt and broader Rafik Hariri in February 2005. There- contemporary Lebanese politics. Ex- after, in 2009, he unexpectedly recon- amining the greater period from 2000 ciled with and enabled the until 2013, and particularly Jumblatt’s formation of a pro-Syrian government reconciliation with the pro-Syrian in 2011. In 2013, he changed camps camp in 2009, it seeks to understand yet again and ever since has been a vo- why Jumblatt repeatedly switched cal critic of the Assad regime and its affiliations between the opposing allies in Lebanon. pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian coalitions. Considering the pro-Syrian and Moreover, it aims to identify how the anti-Syrian camps’ fundamental dif- Druze chieftain was able to maintain ferences in outlook regarding the fu- political legitimacy among his Druze ture of Lebanon, it stands out that followers while doing so. the Druze sect, Jumblatt’s sole power The argument of this analysis is base, obediently followed his political twofold. First, it is contended that U-turns. This may seem surprising, Walid Jumblatt’s decisions to change because Lebanon’s history abounds political camps were informed by his with political and communal leaders determination to ensure the political

85 SAIS EUROPE JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS survival of his Druze minority com- blatt’s leadership style during the pe- munity. Second, the Druze followed riod of 2000 until 2013. Lastly, it will Jumblatt both due to his command conclude with a prognosis concerning over the community as the domi- Jumblatt’s possible future political nating, traditional Druze za’im and maneuvering, particularly in terms of because they recognized his political adapting to changing conditions in maneuvering as the best mean to pro- neighboring . vide the minority community with relevance in Lebanon’s political arena. A Divided Nation: Lebanon’s Con- temporary History and Politics This analysis has two central im- plications that are important for the Modern Lebanon and its con- studies of Lebanese politics. As a troversial sectarian political system contribution to understanding Walid stem from the reorganization of the Jumblatt and his leadership, it helps Middle East after World War I. As to comprehend the unparalleled role part of the French Mandate for Syr- the Druze za’im has played in Leb- ia and the Lebanon, the Lebanese anon’s political arena for almost four nation came into being as an artifi- decades. Accordingly, the analysis of cial political entity carved out of the this paper may also help predict future Levantine region. Eager to apply di- vide-and-rule politics in order to fa- developments in Lebanese politics, 6 with particular reference to the Druze cilitate control over its dominion, the community. Moreover, following up French mandate conceived Lebanon on the observation of Marvan Ro- as a multi-sectarian nation and im- wayheb, that “there are few good an- plemented a confessional political and alytical studies on individual political bureaucratic system designed to give 5 each of Lebanon’s sects a proportional leaders in Lebanon,” this analysis is 7 a contribution to understanding lead- share of influence in the new state. ership in Lebanese politics in general. However, in a bid to favor its longtime Hence, it adds to the comprehension regional protégés, France ensured dis- of the political culture of a country proportionate Christian control over whose politics are largely shaped by the state at the expense of all other individual political figures. confessions. In so doing, French pol- icies not only institutionalized segre- This paper proceeds in four main gation between Lebanon’s sects and parts. It will begin by briefly sketching established a political structure that defining characteristics of Lebanon’s was inherently divisive, but also cre- history and politics. Next, it will con- ated a highly uneven power balance duct a synopsis on the Druze sect in which marginalized major communi- Lebanon until the ties within the nascent state.8 and provide an overview on Walid Jumblatt’s early years as Druze za’im. The flawed sectarian system in- Then, the paper will analyze Jum- duced critical tensions among the

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Lebanese and eventually plunged the cal system,11 the Lebanese were not country into a vicious civil war in the able to truly determine their own fate 1970s and 1980s. After gaining inde- following the war. Rather, Syrian oc- pendence in 1943, the Lebanese po- cupation turned the country into a litical establishment agreed on main- de-facto protectorate. Masterminding taining the French-imposed sectarian Lebanon’s domestic politics, Damas- state.9 However, domestic and region- cus began to brutally suppress any al developments of the 1950s and opposition to its rule but also allowed 1960s, including a growing Muslim handpicked allies, most importantly population and the influx of Palestin- the Shi’ite parties Amal and Hezbol- ians into Lebanon, put an increasing lah, Sunni leader Rafik Hariri, and strain on the confessional system and Druze Walid Jumblatt, to extend their weakened the Lebanese state. As a re- power bases and profit from the re- sult, mounting sectarian tensions es- construction of Lebanon.12 calated and led to the outbreak of a 15 However, in 2005, Syria was year-long civil war in 1975. While this forced to withdraw from Lebanon. In conflict was, from a domestic perspec- the early 2000s, domestic resistance tive, predominantly characterized by to Syrian influence gained momen- Christian-Muslim competition over tum as the new Syrian ruler, Bashar control of the state, it was also marked al-Assad, began to alienate Rafik by Lebanon’s emergence as a primary Hariri and Walid Jumblatt. At the décor for regional power politics. In same time, mostly due to U.S. foreign particular, the country’s rival neigh- policy changes, international pressure boring states of and Syria faced on Damascus to terminate control off against each other in the Lebanese over Lebanese politics intensified. arena and supporting opposing Leba- In February 2005, tensions escalat- nese factions intervened heavily in the ed when then-Prime Minister Rafik conflict. Over the course of the war, Hariri was assassinated in a bombing the Israel-supported Christian war- allegedly orchestrated by the Syrian ring parties were increasingly put on regime. Consequentially, following the defensive whilst Syria and its local massive popular demonstrations, Syr- allies, first and foremost the Lebanese ia was pressured to withdraw from Shi’ites, gradually gained the upper Lebanon.13 hand and finally took hold of Leba- non in 1990.10 Despite this development, Leba- non was not yet able to escape the clout Lebanon thus came under Syri- of its powerful neighbor. Against the an tutelage during the 1990s. While backdrop of the Syrian question, Leb- the resolution of the civil war saw the anese society and politics split into implementation of an adjusted sec- two opposing camps: the pro-Syrian, tarian power-sharing formula aimed Shi’a-controlled March-8 coalition at creating a more balanced politi- and the anti-Syrian March-14 alli-

87 SAIS EUROPE JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS ance, led by the Sunni Future Move- and regional competition between ment and Walid Jumblatt.14 As ten- and Iran have continued sions between the two blocs increased, to re-shuffle the cards in Lebanon. In the domestic power balance tipped in 2013, the March-8 government col- favor of the pro-Syrian elements in lapsed and was replaced by another the late 2000s. Though the March-14 national unity government that stayed movement won the national elections in power until December 2016. Today, of 2005 and dominated the govern- Lebanon suffers first and foremost ment, it proved incapable of imple- from sectarian strife between Sunnis menting the political changes neces- and Shi’ites whereby the impacts of sary to distance Lebanon from Syrian the latest political developments re- interference. Especially Hezbollah, main to be seen.17 with its strong military wing, contin- ued to act as a state-within-a-state. The Druze of Lebanon and Kamal Attempts to diminish the influence Jumblatt of the Shi’ite party eventually result- The faced a diffi- ed in a ‘mini civil war’ in May 2008, cult integration into the newly created when Hezbollah occupied and Lebanon after World War I. In gen- induced the collapse of the March-14 eral, the Druze are an ethnoreligious government.15 minority in the Middle East which primarily lives in contemporary Is- Following the 2008 Beirut clashes, 18 the March-14 project collapsed. Since rael, Syria, and Lebanon. Residents shifts in the international political of since the Middle landscape had removed pressure on Ages, the Druze community of mod- Syria to stop interfering in Lebanese ern Lebanon had traditionally been the affairs, the anti-Syrian forces were dominant force in the poorly accessi- marginalized. This setback became ble mountainous region. However, in evident with the formation of a na- the 19th century, increasing clan rival- tional unity government in July 2008. ries among the Druze and a mounting In fact, the construction of this gov- conflict with Mount Lebanon’s grow- ernment accorded official veto power ing Maronite community led to a de- over Lebanese politics to the March-8 cline in Druze power. Most impor- camp. Moreover, in July 2009, Walid tantly, the French-backed Christian Jumblatt’s surprise defection from victory in the Maronite-Druze civil the March-14 alliance dealt a critical war of 1860 resulted in the collapse of blow to the anti-Syrian movement. the formerly dominant Druze feudal The defeat of March-14 was made -fi system and paved the way for Chris- tian domination over Mount Leba- nal when the Druze chieftain enabled 19 the formation of a March-8 govern- non. As a result, after the creation of ment in 2011.16 modern Lebanon in 1920, the Druze were politically marginalized, and the Since then, the newly implemented sectarian system

88 VOLUME 20 allowed the former lords of Mount and soon contained Jumblatt. Facing Lebanon only minimal political influ- military defeat and both interna- ence.20 tional and domestic isolation, Kamal Nevertheless, during the first de- was eventually assassinated in March 1977 and the Druze revival abruptly cades following Lebanon’s indepen- 24 dence, the Druze were able to regain stopped. political prestige under the leadership The Lebanese Civil War, the of . An Arab national- Ascent of Walid Jumblatt, and ist and stout supporter of the Palestin- the Druze-Syrian Alliance ian cause, Kamal Jumblatt criticized the overwhelmingly pro-Western Born in 1949 as Kamal Jumblatt’s outlook of the Maronite-Christian only son, Walid Jumblatt belongs to elites and disdained the flawed sectar- a prominent Druze dynasty. Origi- ian system. Thus, as the founder of the nally hailing from the Aleppo region officially secular – yet mostly Druze – in northern Syria, the Jumblatt-clan Progressive Socialist Party (PSP),21 he emigrated to Mount Lebanon in the gradually emerged as the most signif- 17th century and began to play an icant Lebanese opposition leader to active role in communal politics only the ruling Maronite establishment.22 shortly thereafter. During the in- ner-Druze conflict for supremacy of The beginning of the Lebanese the 18th and early 19th century, the civil war marked both the heyday Jumblatts emerged together with the and end of Kamal Jumblatt’s power. rival Yazbaki-clan at the forefront of By the 1970s, Jumblatt had not only Druze political life and became an become the dominating figure of the influential force in Mount Lebanon. Lebanese Druze, marginalizing other 23 Although the general decline of the clans, but he had also built an im- Druze community after 1860 also di- pressive power base that comprised minished the Jumblatt’s importance leftist-Christian, Lebanese-Mus- in modern Lebanon, Kamal Jumblatt lim, and Palestinian elements. After helped keep the dynasty at the fore- the outbreak of civil strife in 1975, front of domestic politics. Interesting- which initially pitted Jumblatt’s left- ly, during his youth in the 1960s and ist, pan-Arab coalition against the 1970s, Walid was not interested in Maronite-Christian front, the chief- participating in his father’s activism. tain quickly gained the upper hand. Educated at the American Universi- Yet, while Damascus had previously ty of Beirut (AUB), Walid refrained supported Jumblatt to counterbal- from any political involvement. Rath- ance the pro-Western , his er, he worked as a journalist at the fa- growing dominance posed a threat to mous Lebanon leftist daily An-Nahar Syria’s own political agenda. Hence, in and was known for being a playboy 1976, Syria intervened in Lebanon on who frequently broke with Druze behalf of the Christian establishment tradition, for example by marrying a

89 SAIS EUROPE JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS non-Druze woman.25 long-term collusion with Maronite 28 Nevertheless, following his father’s elites. Moreover, the Mountain War assassination in 1977, Walid Jumblatt had elevated Jumblatt’s PSP as the became the primary chieftain of the main defender of the Druze and en- shrined the party as the primary polit- Lebanese Druze community and was 29 forced to navigate the Lebanese Druze ical voice of the community. In this through the turmoil of the civil war. respect, due to the de-facto disappear- The prominence of the Jumblatt-clan ance of Lebanese state authority over and Kamal Jumblatt’s standing among the Druze regions during the civil the Druze provided Walid with initial war, Jumblatt began to use the PSP to legitimacy in the community.26 How- oversee the fiefdom’s administration ever, his position became more com- and established a sophisticated, feudal plicated as the young za’im faced in- patronage network which, from then on, would serve as the foundation of creasing sectarian conflict during the 30 1980s. When Israel invaded Lebanon his communal power. in 1982, allied Christian-Maronite Jumblatt further secured his politi- militias moved into traditionally cal role in the Lebanese arena and the Druze-held territories south of Bei- well-being of his Druze community rut and intended to expel the Druze by forging a strategic alliance with from their ancestral homeland. In the Syrian regime. Already in 1977, response to this threat to the Druze shortly after the assassination of his community’s very existence, Jumblatt father, Jumblatt decided to reconcile launched an all-out campaign against with the Syrian regime. Although the Christian militias following Isra- Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was el’s sudden withdrawal from Lebanon alleged to have ordered the assassina- in 1983. During this conflict, the so- tion of Kamal Jumblatt, Walid visited called Mountain War, lasting from Damascus and mended fences with 1983 until 1984, Jumblatt’s forces the autocrat. Acknowledging that the drove the Christians out of the Druze survival of the Druze was only pos- heartland and the young chieftain sible by acquiring a powerful foreign gained a decisive victory.27 sponsor, Jumblatt allied himself with The outcome of the Mountain War the Syrian regime. Over the course of not only preserved the Druze but also the Lebanese civil war, this relation- contributed crucially to Jumblatt’s ship between Jumblatt and the Syrian communal standing, making him the regime deepened. Most importantly, uncontested leader of the Druze mi- Damascus provided significant logis- nority. Firstly, Jumblatt’s authority tic support to the Druze chieftain, enabling him to further establish his went unquestioned as the credibility 31 of the rival Arslan-clan, which had fiefdom in the Chouf and Aley. become the dominating family of the The importance of this alliance Yazbaki, was undermined given their continued even after 1990. Syria’s

90 VOLUME 20 control over the Lebanese political ed in 1989. However, power shifts in system enabled Jumblatt to fortify Syria during the mid-1990s changed his control of the Druze community. this modus operandi. Eager to sys- Benefiting from gerrymandering of tematically eliminate opposition to electoral districts and receiving access his succession, Bashar al-Assad, son to state resources in the form of im- and heir apparent to Syrian President portant cabinet positions,32 Jumblatt Hafez al-Assad, started out on a pro- strengthened his patronage network. cess of purging the upper echelons In turn, his network helped him keep of the Syrian regime from possible the community united under his lead- threats. In addition, Bashar tight- ership. For instance, to prevent the ened control over Lebanon out of fear Arslan-clan from regaining influence, that the close ties between Lebanon’s Jumblatt co-opted a numerous Yazba- pro-Syrian clients, in particular Rafik ki activists and offered them positions Hariri and Walid Jumblatt, and major in his various organizations.33 Among figures of the old Syrian elite would these individuals were Marwan Ha- pose a danger to him. Finally, in 1998, madeh and Gaza Aridi who, on be- he arranged the election of his protégé half of the PSP, held important gov- Emile Lahoud as president of Leba- ernment posts throughout the last 25 non and sidelined Hariri and Jumblatt years and remain some of Jumblatt’s politically, excluding them from the closest advisors.34 Having carved out newly formed government.35 an important place for both himself Jumblatt responded to these dras- and his community, Jumblatt thus tic changes by turning against Syr- emerged from the civil war as the ia in a strategic manner. Alarmed by Druze’s uncontested communal leader. his waning influence and afraid that Walid Jumblatt leaves the Syrian the Assad regime would orchestrate Sphere of Influence his defeat in the parliamentary elec- tions of 2000, Jumblatt began to po- Walid Jumblatt’s honeymoon sition himself as an outspoken critic with Syria cooled down considerably of Syria’s interference in Lebanon. during the late 1990s. Following its He formed alliances with the mostly total occupation of Lebanon in 1990, Christian opposition to Syria in a bid Damascus had organically pursued a for votes from Christian voters in Aley policy of mutual coexistence with its and the Chouf.36 In August 2000, this Lebanese allies, granting them consid- shift paid off when the Druze lead- erable leeway with regards to domes- er and his new allies won a landslide tic politics. This approach had given victory alongside Rafik Hariri in the Jumblatt and the Druze community parliamentary elections. Thereafter, significant political influence, despite with Hariri being reinstated as prime the confirmation of the Druze’s mar- minister, Jumblatt was allotted an im- ginal status in the adjusted sectarian portant role in the new government.37 power-sharing formula implement-

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Following this success, Jumblatt More precisely, Jumblatt main- remained a critic of Syria and was re- tained authority primarily because he warded for his stances with great do- was able to rely on the above-described mestic popularity. Unlike Hariri, who patronage system that he had crafted pursued reconciliation with the new during and after the civil war. For in- Syrian leadership, Jumblatt further stance, in 2000, Jumblatt’s main rival, distanced himself from his former pa- Syria-supportive Talal Arslan, only tron and called for fundamental po- got elected into parliament “thanks litical change in Lebanon. As a result, to Jumblatt’s not placing a Druze Jumblatt’s standing in Damascus de- challenger in his path.”41 Likewise, clined drastically. The Syrian regime knowing that a strong Lebanese state pursued a strategy designed to under- would have come at the expense of his mine Jumblatt’s standing, declaring dominance over the Druze, Jumblatt him a persona non grata and courting had even after 1990 opposed gov- Druze rivals of Jumblatt.38 Howev- ernment authority in the Chouf and er, these attempts proved unsuccess- Aley.42 Therefore, having had success- ful. Instead of turning against him, fully marginalized opposition within both Jumblatt’s Druze and his newly his community and monopolized ad- gained Christian followers expressed ministrative authority over the Druze massive support for him. In late 2000, throughout the 1990s, Jumblatt could thousands of Druze, as well as many alter his political stances towards Christians, held a massive rally at Syria without fearing substantial re- the Jumblatts’ ancestral home despite percussions arising within the Druze warnings from Syria.39 Moreover, community. prominent Druze religious figures Moreover, it can be inferred that expressed their support for Jumblatt, Jumblatt’s previous successful pro- declaring that the “sheikhs and mem- tection of the Druze created a strong bers of the Druze community are very sense of followership which was im- upset and angry about what Jumblatt 40 mune to outside interference. Indeed, has been subjected to.” Jumblatt’s decision to establish him- Considering Syria’s grip on Leb- self as a critic of the Syrian role in anon, it appears impressive that Jum- Lebanon reflected his previous efforts blatt maintained his domestic stand- to safeguard the Druze community. ing after having renounced ties with Against the backdrop of Lebanon’s his former patron. Indeed, the Assad highly sectarian state, Jumblatt’s deci- regime’s inability to sideline the Druze sion to join sides with the Christian za’im can be attributed to Jumblatt’s opposition coincided with the Druze well-established feudal power base political reality in Lebanon. As Mi- in the Druze community and to the chael Young notes, “after 1992 Jum- Druze’s trust in the political capacities blatt revived a time-honored belief of their leader. that his community’s future was inex-

92 VOLUME 20 orably tied to that of the Maronites.”43 for the anti-Syrian project and the In an increasingly Sunni-Shi’a dom- electoral victory of the newly formed inated Lebanon, Jumblatt knew that March-14 coalition in the 2005 par- the small Druze population could only liamentary election,47 Jumblatt at- remain a political factor if it renewed tempted to position himself as a true its relations with the sidelined Chris- national leader and engineer sustain- tians and thus entered their struggle able change in Lebanon. In particu- against Syrian domination.44 Hence, lar, he began to drastically lash out at acknowledging Jumblatt’s previous Hezbollah, accusing the organization strategic successes, the Druze were of aiding Syrian interference and try- given a strong incentive to stand be- ing to take Lebanon hostage: hind their leader despite his break “Hezbollah’s ideology is the big- with Damascus. gest threat to Lebanon’s future and Walid Jumblatt at the Forefront peaceful coexistence and democracy… of the Hezbollah has a plan and this plan is to bring the country under its con- Reaffirmed in his position, Jum- trol. It had built strong institutions, blatt continued to step up his crit- a military arsenal, and a network icism of Syria’s inference in Leba- of communications [that are] much non in the mid-2000s. He started to better than the ones of the Lebanese openly condemn the political role of state.” 48 Syria’s proxy Hezbollah. Moreover, Jumblatt continuously denounced He further declared: the Syria-backed policies of Presi- “Hezbollah is a tool in the hands of dent Emile Lahoud and his political Iran and Syria… Its weapons are a entourage. When the Assad regime big threat to Lebanon’s internal sta- forced the Lebanese parliament to bility and should be brought under extend Lahoud’s presidential term for the control of the Lebanese state.” 49 another three years in 2004, Jumblatt In fact, Jumblatt understood that a and Hariri undertook more tangible new Lebanon marked by true nation- steps against Syria. Encouraged by 45 al coexistence and ensuring the safety wide-ranging international support, of the Druze minority could only be they formed a broad anti-Syrian coa- achieved by removing Syria’s influ- lition and openly called for the total ence on the country and undermining withdrawal of Syria’s military and in- 46 the superior position of Syria’s allies, telligence units. first and foremost Hezbollah. Ever Following the assassination of since the creation of the Shi’a mili- Rafik Hariri in February 2005, Jum- tia, Jumblatt had feared its staunchly blatt emerged as the primary leader Islamist agenda, which posed a real of the anti-Syrian opposition. Em- threat to the Druze community. The boldened by the international support relationship between the Druze and

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Hezbollah had thereby been “charac- security forces aligned with Saad terized by total political dissonance, Harri’s Sunni , and an absolute conflict of interests be- the Chouf and Aley District, battling tween those who aim at preserving Druze fighters belonging to Jum- the status quo of a pluralistic society blatt.53 [the Druze] and those seeking, from Jumblatt’s authority among the the point of view of the former, its ul- 50 Druze appeared to have been ambiv- timate dissolution [Hezbollah].” alent during his time as spearhead of While Jumblatt was the head of the anti-Syrian coalition. On the one the March-14 movement in 2006 hand, Jumblatt scored considerable and 2007, the situation had become victories in the municipal elections of even more precarious for the Druze. 2004 and the parliamentary election Leaked US cables reveal that Jumblatt of 2005 while the results of his Druze was not only concerned that Hezbol- rivals were rather mediocre.54 This can lah intended to become a permanent be interpreted as a clear sign of sup- state-within-a-state. He also increas- port for Jumblatt’s political shift, as ingly feared Shi’ite population growth the Druze, as aforementioned, consid- and Hezbollah’s massive efforts to ered his new approach beneficial for purchase land in traditionally Druze the community’s long-term well-be- and Christians areas in the mountain ing. On the other hand, Jumblatt was regions southeast of Beirut (primarily eager to receive continued financial the Chouf ).51 More precisely, he was support from the international Arab afraid that Hezbollah intended “to sponsors of the March-14 movement, cut the traditional Druze territory in most importantly Saudi Arabia, in half and install a Shia population loy- order to maintain his feudal patron- al to Hezbollah.”52 Hence, the Druze age network and outspend his Druze chieftain was determined to reduce rivals. For instance, US cables reveal Hezbollah’s power, and, in 2008, ten- Jumblatt’s criticism of sions between Jumblatt and the Shi’a for not supplying him with the same militia escalated. As Hezbollah and amounts Rafik Hariri had used to,55 its March-8 allies had brought the and state that Jumblatt almost ran out March-14-dominated government to of cash in mid-2006.56 Thus, it seems a standstill and disputes between both that Jumblatt’s patronage network camps over the successor of Emile was challenged during this period and Lahoud further paralyzed the country, that his feudal authority was at least Jumblatt publicly revealed clandestine to some extent under pressure. information on Hezbollah’s commu- Nevertheless, given Hezbollah’s nication networks and urged the Leb- expansionist agenda, it can be argued anese government to dismantle these that Jumblatt’s fierce anti-Hezbollah activities. In response, Hezbollah in- stances generally matched Druze pub- vaded both Beirut, defeating private lic opinion and that the Druze thus

94 VOLUME 20 firmly supported theirza’im . When Hezbollah-led March-8 camp had the Shi’a militia entered Aley and the won.59 Commenting on his decision Chouf in May 2008, the Druze rallied to prevent his militiamen from going behind Jumblatt and fervently battled after defeated Hezbollah fighters, he the intruders. Even fighters belonging remarked: to Talal Arslan, who had joined the “I am avoiding war… because I Hezbollah-led March-8 camp and don’t want the Druze to be ‘cleansed’ continued to be an ally to Syria, joined from the Chouf. I don’t care if I lose the combat on behalf of Jumblatt and 57 my personal prestige in the process… fought against Hezbollah. Likewise, I’m a politician. Setbacks happen. the emergence of the radical Druze We must accept it and move on. They group Dai Ammar, which received at- [Hezbollah and its March-8 allies] tention during the 2008 clashes due have humiliated us, but what can we to its grim resistance towards Hez- do now?” 60 bollah, highlights the Druze disdain of Hezbollah. Vowing to protect the The March-14 defeat was indeed Druze people and homeland at any serious. The Doha agreement of May cost, the group’s standpoints were far 2008, a meeting involving all major more radical than Jumblatt’s policy.58 Lebanese factions aimed at dispersing Therefore, it can be concluded that tensions and creating a new political the Druze were ready to follow their modus vivendi, underlined the defeat communal chieftain and remained of the anti-Syrian project and implied loyal throughout the mid-2000s, even that “a new political geography had as conflict shook the community. been created in Lebanon in which the Shiite community controls access Walid Jumblatt tipping the Scales to political power in Lebanon and no government can rule without Shiite However, in the aftermath of the 61 2008 conflict, Jumblatt recognized approval.” Moreover, the departure that the weakness of the March-14 of the hawkish Bush administration project could seriously endanger the and the coming to power of Barack Druze community. The ‘mini civil war’ Obama, who promoted a rapproche- of 2008 had not only revealed the in- ment with Damascus, combined with ability of the anti-Syrian movement to attempts by Saudi Arabia to improve bring about real change in Lebanon, ties with Bashar al-Assad showed Jumblatt that international support but had also demonstrated the contin- 62 uous strength of the pro-Syrian camp. for his endeavors was crumbling. Recognizing the defeat of March-14 Therefore, in a strategic attempt and particularly the Druze’s power- to protect the Druze, Jumblatt decid- lessness, Jumblatt, in discussions with ed to abandon his staunch anti-Syr- U.S. diplomats, accused Hezbollah ian orientation. Aware of the col- of trying to remove the Druze from lapse of international support for the the Chouf, yet acknowledged that the March-14 project and of an imminent

95 SAIS EUROPE JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS rapprochement between Saudi Arabia enthusiastically this time. In a closed- and Syria, which would have forced door meeting with several important Saad Hariri to alter his stances to- Druze sheikhs in June 2008, Jumblatt wards Damascus, Jumblatt wanted to struggled to win the religious author- avoid Druze isolation at any cost.63 He ities for his policy of reconciliation.69 knew that the Druze could not bear a In addition, Jumblatt’s support for the lasting conflict with the Shi’ites and formation of a March-8-led govern- their Syrian patron. ment “left his community at a loss Rather, Jumblatt reconciled with for words and many of its members the pro-Syrian forces in Lebanon. torn between conflicting sentiments” After he had realized that it was im- whereby “Druze in the Chouf Moun- tains were up in arms [over Jumblatt’s possible to break Hezbollah’s grip on 70 Lebanon, he decided that it was bet- stances]. Considering the commu- ter for the sake of Druze survival to nity’s general suspicion against Hez- side with the winning party.64 Having bollah’s practices and the clashes of officially remained committed to the May 2008, these attitudes are not sur- movement until June 2009, in order prising. to manipulate the alliance to secure Yet Jumblatt had to face neither victory in the parliamentary elections serious criticism nor Druze oppo- of the same year,65 Jumblatt finally sition to his approach towards Syria declared his departure from the an- and March-8. Rather, the community ti-Syrian collation in August 2009. stood behind their za’im and “many of Entirely shifting his rhetoric, he re- Jumblatt’s followers said they under- marked, that “protecting the Druze stand his tactic.”71 will be realized by means of the broad Clearly, Jumblatt’s well-estab- Arab horizon… Their protection lies lished feudal standing made it impos- in Arabism and in Syria – without 66 sible for anyone to seriously challenge which they will be trampled.” his authority. Since 1983, Jumblatt Accordingly, throughout 2009 and had been the uncontested commu- 2010, Jumblatt worked relentlessly nal leader of the Druze and, over the on reconciliation with the pro-Syrian decades, his authority had essentially forces in Lebanon, first and foremost marginalized any other voices in the Hezbollah, and the Syrian regime.67 community.72 Besides, the only real In 2011, Jumblatt finally formed a existing opposition to Jumblatt, the tactical alliance with the pro-Syrian Arslan-clan, was already a Hezbollah camp. Contributing to the breakdown ally and in fact coordinated Jumblatt’s of Saad Hariri’s national unity gov- reconciliation with the pro-Syrian ernment in January, he enabled the camp.73 Thus, he enjoyed substantial formation of a March-8 government room for maneuvering with regards to in June of the same year.68 Druze communal politics and made The Druze followed Jumblatt un- use of this freedom when switch-

96 VOLUME 20 ing sides after 2009. Nevertheless, it vation: “I have these 200,000 Druse I would be too simple to just ascribe the have to look out for.”75 The apparent support to Jumblatt’s feudal sway. ‘weather vane,’ Jumblatt essentially Rather, the Druze leader’s overall never changed his fundamental polit- success at safeguarding the commu- ical principle of protecting the Druze nity and providing it with political at all costs, a behavior rewarded by his relevance constituted the main rea- people with absolute followership. son behind his status. In the sectar- The latest episode of Jumblatt’s ian power-sharing system of modern performance was detectable after the Lebanon, the numerically inferior outbreak of the Syrian civil war, when Druze have been allotted only min- Jumblatt turned anew against Syria. imal powers. Being given eight par- Once again, he criticized the Assad liamentary seats and no guaranteed regime and condemned Hezbollah prominent position in the state or the for intervening in the conflict against bureaucracy, the community is for- Lebanese interests and committing mally deprived of any political clout. war crimes.76 In 2014, Jumblatt and However, Jumblatt’s acumen had Saudi Arabia engineered the forma- constantly placed the Druze at the tion of Tamman Salam’s national uni- center of Lebanese politics, allowing ty government. In doing so, Jumblatt the community to play a role that once again occupied a political role greatly exceeded their formal powers. that was larger than the Druze’s for- Considering that Jumblatt tipped the mal role in Lebanese politics.77 As of scales between the March-14 move- today, Jumblatt is still a critic of Da- ment and the March-8 camp after his mascus, but he has been keen to grant defection from the anti-Syrian camp, himself considerable political flexibly his reconciliation with the pro-Syri- within Lebanon’s domestic political an forces implied that the Druze once arena.78 again exerted disproportional political influence. Conclusion and Outlook Thus, Jumblatt has succeeded at In 1977, Walid Jumblatt succeed- deeply enshrining his role among the ed his late father, Kamal Jumblatt, as Druze, who depend on his skills in the primary za’im of the Lebanese order to compensate for their formal Druze. Today, almost 40 years later, political insignificance. Indeed, as Ab- Walid continues to be the uncontest- bas Halabi notes, “only the presence ed leader of his community. Over the of Walid Jumblatt is compensating last four decades, he has established for this general weakness through the a firm position within in the Druze political and social mobilization that community through his feudal pa- he generates.”74 Jumblatt himself rec- tronage network. Moreover, during ognizes this pattern and replied once this time, Jumblatt has continuous- when asked about his political moti- ly won over his Druze followers and

97 SAIS EUROPE JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS has created an approach to domestic on a za’im who stands out among leadership which, despite its seem- Lebanon’s leaders, this analysis has ingly unpredictable flip-flopping, has also underlined the impacts of indi- always been guided by a steady will to vidual political acumen. safeguard his community. Therefore, this paper concludes Based on the results of this analy- with an appeal to Lebanon’s political sis, it can be predicted that Jumblatt’s class to create a more capable Leba- determination to protect his people nese state. Considering the country’s will continue to determine his pol- manifold challenges and its recur- icies in the future. Thus, considering ring political stalemates, Lebanon is the current course of the Syrian civil in dire need of stronger institutional war, it is very likely that the Jumblatt structures that move political power za’im would shift his outlook again if away from sectarian chieftains and the Assad regime was to reemerge as enable political practices which truly the dominant political player in the serve the public interest. Levant. This time, however, the path to reconciliation would be cleared by Sebastian Gerlach is currently a first-year Walid Jumblatt’s first son, Taymour, MA candidate at Johns Hopkins School who will run for parliament in the of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), general elections of 2017 instead of concentrating in Middle East Studies. Having his father.79 After forty years at the studied and worked in and Lebanon, forefront of Lebanese politics, Walid he is particularly interested in the Levant and seems ready to gradually retire and Lebanese domestic as well as communal politics. let his offspring continue his legacy.80 Hence, the prospects for future Druze Bibliography Abdul-Hussain, Hussain. “Lebanon de- politics appear to be set, and Tay- serves proportional representation in mour’s marriage with the daughter elections.” Now Lebanon, September 6, of a prominent Shi’ite family81 can be 2016. Accessed January 8, 2017. https:// interpreted as a sign to which political now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentary- analysis/567068-lebanon-deserves-pro- side the Jumblatts’ will mostly likely portional-representation-in-elections. lean in the near future. Aljazeera. “Lebanese Government Col- lapses.” Aljazeera.com, January 13, 2011. This study has also exemplified Accessed December 9, 2016. http:// the importance of leadership in Leb- www.aljazeera.com/news/middlee- anon and has therefore highlighted ast/2011/01/2011112151356430829.html the importance of studying Lebanese Al-Majalla. “Profile: Walid Jumblatt.” Al-Ma- jalla, May 5, 2009. Accessed January 7, political leaders for understanding 2017. http://eng.majalla.com/2009/05/ the country’s politics. Thus, consider- article554201/walid-jumblatt. ing that studies on Lebanese political Andoni, Lamis. “Walid Jumblatt: King- leadership are rare, it calls on aca- maker.” Aljazeera.com, January 22, 2011. Accessed December 9, 2016. http:// demia to conduct further research on www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opin- the topic. Moreover, having shed light ion/2011/01/2011122114332223683.html.

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ber 9, 2016. http://www.thenational.ae/ cal perspective on Walid Jumblatt and his opinion/comment/walid-jumblatt-hun- political strategies. See Marwan G. Ro- kers-down-in-survival-mode#full. wayheb, “Walid Jumblat and Political Alli- Zaarour, Khodr. “Jumblatt, Walid (1949-).” ances: The Politics of Adaptation,”Middle In Biographical Encyclopaedia of the East Critique 20, no. 1 (2011): 47-66. Modern Middle East and North Af- 5 Rowayheb, “Walid Jumblat rica, edited by Michael R. Fischbach, and Political Alliances,” 49. vol. 1, 395-398. Detroit: Gale, 2008. 6 Ayse Tekdal Fildis, “The Troubles in Syria: Zeineddine, Maher. “Jumblatt pledges to Spawned by French Divide and Rule,” Middle fight ‘demagogy and populism’.”The East Policy 18, no. 4 (2011): 132-133. Daily Star, June 14, 2005. Accessed De- 7 Lebanon has 18 recognized sects, including cember 9, 2016. http://www.dailystar. various Christian and Muslim denominations. com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2005/ The census of 1932, the only official census Jun-14/5225-jumblatt-pledges-to- ever conducted in Lebanon, showed a slight fight-demagogy-and-populism.ash. Christian majority of 51% (mostly Maronites and Greek Orthodox) over a Muslim mi- NOTES nority of 49% (mostly Sunnis and Shi’ites). Today, unofficial figures estimate the Christian 1 Lamis Andoni, “Walid Jumblatt: King- share of the population to be around 40% maker,” Aljazeera.com, January 22, 2011, while Muslims account for the remaining accessed December 9, 2016, http:// 60%. Lebanon’s Druze, who are considered www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opin- Muslim by law, have ever since the creation ion/2011/01/2011122114332223683.html. of the Lebanese nation been a minority, 2 A striking, recent example for this trend the accounting for no more than 5 to 6% of the case of Saad Hariri, leader of the Sunni Future country’s total resident citizens. See CIA, Movement, current prime minister, and son The World Factbook Lebanon, Washington, of the late Rafik Hariri. After having taken a DC: Central Intelligence Agency, continually more moderate stance towards factions of the updated, https://www.cia.gov/library/publi- March-8 coalition and nominated a Maronite cations/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html. March 8-politician for the post of president in 8 William Harris, Lebanon: A Histo- 2015, Saad Hariri had to experience significant ry 600-2011 (Oxford: Oxford University losses during the 2016 municipal elections, Press, 2015), 186-190; Fawwaz Traboulsi, when parts of the Future Movement split away A History of Modern Lebanon, 2nd ed. and ran on a separate, competing platform (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 88-90. against him. See Michael, Young, “After Trip- oli,” Now Lebanon, June 2, 2016, accessed De- 9 In 1943, Lebanon’s political elite adopted cember 9, 2016, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/ the so-called National Pact, an unwritten en/commentaryanalysis/567057-after-tripoli. agreement that clearly defined independent Lebanon as a multi-confessional state. The 3 See for example Gary C. Gambill and general framework of the National Pact, Daniel Nassif, “Walid Jumblatt,” Middle determining that the Lebanese President East Intelligence Bulletin 3, no. 5 (2001), must always be a Maronite Christian, the accessed December 9, 2016, https://www. Prime Minister always a Sunni Muslim, meforum.org/meib/articles/0105_ld1.htm; and the Speaker of Parliament always a Sami Moubayed, “Syria Loses its Former Shia Muslim constitutes the foundation of Ally in Lebanon, Druze Leader Walid Lebanese politics still today. See Traboulsi, Jumblatt,” Washington Report on Middle East A History of Modern Lebanon, 110-112. Affairs 20, no. 1 (2001): 35-36, accessed December 9, 2016, http://www.wrmea. 10 Samir Makdisi and Richard Sadaka, org/2001-january-february/2001-janu- The Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990 (Bei- ary-february-table-of-contents.html. rut: American University of Beirut Institute of Financial Economics, 2003), 7-40. 4 The scholar Marwan Rowayheb, who published an article on Jumblatt in 2011, 11 In 1989, the Lebanese elites agreed on stresses that his work is the first analyti- so-called Taef-Agreement, which modified the confessional distribution of powers and gave

101 SAIS EUROPE JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS the Lebanese Muslim communities politi- 2016, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Leb- cal weight, but yet reaffirmed the inherent anon-News/2016/Oct-31/378876-presiden- sectarian nature of the Lebanese state. The tial-election-will-shuffle-political-deck.ashx. Taef-Agreement shifted powers away from 18 Emerging in Egypt around the year 1000, the Christian presidency and strengthened the Druze doctrine arouse out of as the Sunni Prime Minister as well as the well as pre-Islamic religious and philosophical Shi’a Speaker of Parliament. Furthermore, trends. From the outset, the believers of the Taef introduced a 5-5 ratio of parliament Druze religion became victims of discrimi- members between Christians and Muslims, nation. Hence, to flee persecution, the Druze abandoning the 6:5 in favor of Christians settled in the following centuries primarily stipulated by the National Pact. See Makdisi in the mountainous regions of the Levant, and Sadaka, The Lebanese Civil War, 35-40. forming homogenous communities that ever 12 Harris, Lebanon: A Histo- since have been characterized by a strong ry 600-2011, 258-269. seclusiveness. Moreover, the Druze have since 13 Nicholas Blanford, Killing Mr Leb- early days rested their survival on the inter- anon: The Assassination of Rafik Hari- nal cohesion of the community and utmost ri and its Impact on the Middle East solidary among its members. See Mordechai (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 40-70. Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A 14 After 2005, Lebanon also emerged as History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 2nd a pronounced area of regional competition ed. (Jefferson NC: McFarland, 2002), 94-100. between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with the 19 Harris, Lebanon: A History 600-2011, former backing particularly the Lebanese 69-103; Abbas Halabi, The Druze: A Sunnis led by Saad Hariri’s Future Move- New Cultural and Historical Apprecia- ment and the later backing the Lebanese tion (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2015), Kin- Shi’ites led by Hezbollah. See Harris, Leb- dle Edition, 1000-1114, 3598-3713. anon: A History 600-2011, 269-276. 20 Up until the mid-19th century, the Druze 15 Blanford, Killing Mr Lebanon, 174-211. had constituted the majority of inhabitants in 16 Paul Salem, “Defection Shakes Leb- Mount Lebanon, and even after the Chris- anon’s March 14 Majority,” Diwan by tians superseded them, the Druze contin- Carnegie Middle East Center, August 6, ued to be the dominant minority in their 2009, accessed December 9, 2016, http:// homeland. However, following the creation carnegie-mec.org/2009/08/06/defec- of and the incorporation tion-shakes-lebanon-s-march-14-ma- of mostly Muslim areas into the new entity, jority-pub-23474; Aljazeera, “Lebanese the Druze segment of Lebanon’s popula- Government Collapses,” Aljazeera.com, tions dwindled significantly and fell behind January 13, 2011, accessed December 9, the Maronite, Sunni, Greek-Orthodox, and 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/mid- Shia share. See Rania Maktabi, “The Leb- dleeast/2011/01/2011112151356430829. anese census of 1932 revisited. Who are html; Harris, Lebanon: A His- the Lebanese?,” British Journal of Middle tory 600-2011, 269-276. Eastern Studies 26, no. 2 (1999): 219-241. 17 As of today, Lebanon is marked by yet 21 The PSP was founded as a secular, another reshuffling of domestic alliances that socialist party and attracted considerable has brought an end to the post-2005 bipolar- followership among leftist Christians and ity. While sectarian tensions, inner division, Shi’a Muslims. Nevertheless, Kamal Jum- and infighting remain, the clear division of the blatt also conceived it to create a political political scene into March-8 and March-14 basis for the Druze and cunningly used the has ceased to exist. Nevertheless, the election party as a tool for dominating his communi- of Hezbollah ally as president ty. Accordingly, it is important to note that in October 2016 seems to indicate that the Kamal Jumblatt’s control over the PSP was Iran-backed Shi’ites have strengthened their tantamount to having control over most of position. See Nazih Osserian, “Presidential the Lebanese Druze. See Yusri Hazran, The election will shuffle political deck,”The Daily Druze Community and the Lebanese State: Star, October 31, 2016, accessed December 9, Between Confrontation and Reconcilia-

102 VOLUME 20 tion (London: Routledge, 2014), 57-58. drawal (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 90-91. 22 Gambill and Nassif, “Walid Jumblatt”; 33 Judith P. Harik, “”Shaykh al-’Aql” Hazran, The Druze Community, 160-207. and the Druze of Mount Lebanon: Con- 23 The Lebanese weekly al-Sayyad esti- flict and Accommodation,”Middle East- mated in the mid-1970s that around 75% ern Studies 30, no. 3 (1994): 477. of the Lebanese Druze supported Jumblatt. 34 Harik, “”Shaykh al-’Aql” and the See Hazran, The Druze Community, 169. Druze of Mount Lebanon,” 478; Roula 24 Farid el-Khazen, “Kamal Jumblatt, the Ibrahim, “Walid Jumblatt and His Two Uncrowned Druze Prince of the Left,” Middle Right Hands,” Al-Akhbar, September 23, Eastern Studies 24, no. 2 (1988): 178-185; Har- 2012, accessed December 9, 2016, http:// ris, Lebanon: A History 600-2011, 147-239; english.al-akhbar.com/node/12542. Halabi, The Druze, 1166-128, 3021-3209. 35 Gambill and Nassif, “Walid Jum- 25 Gambill and Nassif, “Walid Jum- blatt;” Moubayed, “Syria Loses its blatt”; Khodr Zaarour, “Jumblatt, Walid Former Ally in Lebanon,” 35.; (1949-),” in Biographical Encyclopedia Bashar al-Assad sought to control Leb- of the Modern Middle East and North anon through Emile Lahoud and the Africa, ed Michael R. Fischbach, vol. Lebanese security and intelligence ser- 1 (Detroit: Gale, 2008), 395-396. vices, which were granted extensive polit- 26 Following feudal customs, Walid Jumblatt ical influence after Lahoud’s election. See succeeded Kamal Jumblatt as za’im and party Gambill and Nassif, “Walid Jumblatt.” leader of the PSP because he was the latter’s 36 Jumblatt allied with influential Ma- first and only son. See Nazih Richani, Dilem- ronite politicians, including Dory Chamoun mas of Democracy and Poltical Parties in Sec- and Amin Gemayel. See Moubayed, “Syria tarian Societies: The Case of the PSP in Leb- Loses its Former Ally in Lebanon,” 35. anon (London: MacMillan Press, 1998), 63. 37 Halabi, The Druze, 3382-3400. 27 Gambill and Nassif, “Walid Jum- 38 Gambill and Nassif, “Walid Jumblatt.” blatt”; Halabi, The Druze, 3260-3275. 39 Sabine Darrous and Hisham Ghait, 28 After Lebanese independence, the “Thousands flock to Chouf to offer Jumblatt Arslan-clan had aligned itself with the support,” The Daily Star, November 13, 2000, Maronite political establishment. See accessed December 9, 2016, http://www. Zaarour, “Jumblatt, Walid,” 395. dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2000/ 29 For instance, during the mid-1980s the Nov-13/30010-thousands-flock-to- 250,000-people strong Lebanese Druze chouf-to-offer-jumblatt-support.ashx. community had around 30,000 militiamen 40 Ibid. most of which were members of the PSP 41 Michael Young, “Walid Jumblatt: Leba- and thus followers of Walid Jumblatt. See non’s anachronism,” The Daily Star, October Richani, Dilemmas of Democracy, 92-95. 28, 2000, accessed December 9, 2016, http:// 30 See Judith P. Harik, “Change and www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Com- Continuity among the Lebanese Druze mentary/2000/Oct-28/98151-walid-jum- Community: The Civil Administration of blatt-lebanons-anachronism.ashx. the Mountains, 1983-90,” Middle East- 42 Ibid. ern Studies 29, no. 3 (1993): 377-398. 43 Ibid. 31 Gambill and Nassif, “Walid Jum- blatt.”; Zaarour, “Jumblatt, Walid,” 396. 44 As aforementioned, Jumblatt depended on the Christian votes in the Aley District and 32 Most notably, Jumblatt was granted the Chouf; particularly in the latter district, the control over the well-endowed Ministry of Christian proportion of the voting population the Displaced, which oversaw the recon- (roughly 30%) is considerable. However, more struction of the regions of Aley and Chouf. importantly, Jumblatt realized that the Druze Jumblatt used the ministry’s fund to main- minority could only continue to play a role in tain his patronage-system. See Abbas Assi, Lebanese politics if the Christians continued Democracy in Lebanon: Political Parties and to be counterweight to Muslim predomi- the Struggle for Power Since Syrian With- nance. See for example Al-Majalla, “Profile:

103 SAIS EUROPE JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Walid Jumblatt,” Al-Majalla, May 5, 2009, “Changing of the guard? Wrapping up Leb- accessed January 7, 2017, http://eng.majalla. anon’s municipal elections, all eyes are now com/2009/05/article554201/walid-jumblatt. on 2005,” Public Sector 24 (2004): 4, accessed 45 Towards the mid-2000s, Syria came December 9, 2016, http://www.localiban.org/ under increasing pressure. Especially the Bush IMG/pdf/Municipal_and_Ikhtariah_leba- Administration, which had just launched nese_elect ions_2004.pdf; Maher Zeineddine, its War on Terror and hoped to bring about “Jumblatt pledges to fight ‘demagogy and comprehensive regime change in the Middle populism’,” The Daily Star, June 14, 2005, East, rebuked Syria for its involvement in accessed December 9, 2016, http://www. Lebanon and backed the Lebanese oppo- dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2005/ sition. Moreover, in September 2004, the Jun-14/5225-jumblatt-pledges-to- United Nations Security Council adopted fight-demagogy-and-populism.ash. Resolution 1559, which called for free and fair 55 U.S. Embassy Beirut, “Lebanon: Jum- presidential elections and a withdrawal of all blatt Wants Hariri To Open His Wallet,” remaining foreign forces from Lebanese soil. August 21, 2006, WikiLeaks, WikiLeaks See Blanford, Killing Mr Lebanon, 71-100. Cable: 06BEIRUT2705_a, accessed De- 46 Harris, Lebanon: A Histo- cember 9, 2016, https://wikileaks.org/ ry 600-2011, 268-270. plusd/cables/06BEIRUT2705_a.html. 47 In the general election of May 2005, 56 U.S. Embassy Beirut, “Lebanon: Jum- the March-14 movement, composed of blatt Sees Hizballah As Threat to Druze.” Walid Jumblatt’s PSP, the Sunni Future 57 Now Lebanon, “The Druze reckon- Movement, and several smaller Chris- ing,” Now Lebanon, October 30, 2008, tian parties as well as independent figures, accessed December 9, 2016, https:// could garner 69 parliamentary seats. now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentary- 48 Walid Jumblatt, Weekly Statement to analysis/the_druze_reckoning_. Al Anba’, July 25, 2007, quoted in Marwan 58 Samar Kadi, “Pious defenders of G. Rowayheb, “Walid Jumblat and Politi- Druze land, but not extremists,” The Dai- cal Alliances: The Politics of Adaptation,” ly Star, October 28, 2014, accessed De- Middle East Critique 20, no. 1 (2011): 60. cember 9, 2016, http://www.dailystar. 49 Walid Jumblatt, Weekly Statement to Al com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/ Anba’, October 16, 2007, quoted in Marwan Oct-28/275575-pious-defenders-of- G. Rowayheb, “Walid Jumblat and Politi- druze-land-but-not-extremists.ashx. cal Alliances: The Politics of Adaptation,” 59 U.S. Embassy Beirut, “Lebanon: Walid Middle East Critique 20, no. 1 (2011): 60. Jumblatt Wants Hariri To Compromise 50 Hazran, The Druze Communi- with Hizballah And Move Forward,” ty and the Lebanese State, 281. May 13, 2008, WikiLeaks, WikiLeaks 51 U.S. Embassy Beirut, “MGLE01: Jumblatt Cable: 08BEIRUT677_a, accessed De- Believes Hizballah Intends Permanent State- cember 9, 2016, https://wikileaks.org/ Within-A-State,” May 19, 2006, WikiLeaks, plusd/cables/08BEIRUT677_a.html. WikiLeaks Cable: 06BEIRUT1575_a, 60 Ibid. accessed December 9, 2016, https://wikileaks. 61 Hazran, The Druze Communi- org/plusd/cables/06BEIRUT1575_a.html. ty and the Lebanese State, 280. 52 U.S. Embassy Beirut, “Lebanon: 62 Rowayheb, “Walid Jumblat and Jumblatt Sees Hizballah As Threat to Political Alliances,” 61-62. Druze; Tribunal Is Indispensable,” Jan- 63 Young, The Ghosts of Mar- uary 11, 2007, WikiLeaks, WikiLeaks tyrs Square, 232-234. Cable: 07BEIRUT60_a, accessed De- 64 Salem, “Defection Shakes Leb- cember 9, 2016, https://wikileaks.org/ anon’s March 14 Majority.” plusd/cables/07BEIRUT60_a.html. 65 Assi, Democracy in Lebanon, 134. 53 Rowayheb, “Walid Jumblat and Political Alliances,” 61. 66 Walid Jumblatt, Interview with Al-Sa- fir, August 7, 2009, quoted in MEMRI, 54 Halabi, The Druze, 3502; iMonthly, “Lebanese Druze Leader Walid Jum-

104 VOLUME 20 blatt: The Slogans of the March 14 Forces ber 9, 2016, http://www.thenational.ae/ Are Worn Out,” MEMRI Special Dis- opinion/comment/walid-jumblatt-hun- patch, No. 2650, November 16, 2009. kers-down-in-survival-mode#full. 67 Rowayheb, “Walid Jumblat and 79 Interview with the director of the Political Alliances,” 62-64 Beirut office of an international -po 68 Ibid. litical think, November 22, 2016. 69 Walid Jumblatt with Druze Sheiks, 80 The Daily Star, “Taymour Walid Jumblatt Transcript of Meeting with Druze Sheiks will succeed his father in the 2017 elections,” published in Al-Akhbar, May 28, 2009, The Daily Star, March 05, 2017, accessed April quoted in MEMRI, “Walid Jumblatt 9, 2017, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/ in Closed-Door Meeting with Druze Lebanon-News/2017/Mar-05/396159-tay- Sheiks: ‘We Have No Choice But to Co- mour-walid-jumblatt-will-succeed-his-father- exist with the Shi’ites’,” MEMRI Spe- in-the-2017-elections.ashx; The circumstance cial Dispatch, No. 2383, June 5, 2009. that the transition of power has proceeded very 70 Now Lebanon, “Jumblatt’s latest flip flop smoothly so far is thereby another indicator for baffles Druze,”Now Lebanon, January 28, the Jumblatts’ strong authority over the Druze 2011, accessed December 9, 2016, https:// community. Information obtained from inter- now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/ view with the director of the Beirut office of jumblatts_latest_flip_flop_baffles_druze. an international political, November 22, 2016. 71 Ibid. 81 Hazran, The Druze Communi- ty and the Lebanese State, 281. 72 Interview with the director of the Bei- rut office of an international political think, Beirut, November 22, 2016. The interviewee, who works closely with the PSP and Jumblatt, Title Page Photo by: Sebastian Gerlach confirmed that Jumblatt remains unchal- lenged in his community and continues to rely on a sophisticated patronage network and loyal vassals. Furthermore, he confirmed that the role of Jumblatt’s rivals, first and foremost Talal Arslan, is rather marginal. 73 Rowayheb, “Walid Jumblat and Political Alliances,” 62. 74 Halabi, The Druze, 3412. 75 U.S. Embassy Beirut, “MGLE01: Scene- setter For Visit Of Druse Leader Jumblatt,” March 2, 2006, WikiLeaks, WikiLeaks Cable: 06BEIRUT613_a, accessed De- cember 9, 2016, https://wikileaks.org/ plusd/cables/06BEIRUT613_a.html. 76 Associated Press, “Hizbollah interven- tion in Syria was moral ‘mistake’: Jumblatt,” The National, June 8, 2014, accessed De- cember 9, 2016, http://www.thenational. ae/world/middle-east/hizbollah-interven- tion-in-syria-was-moral-mistake-jumblatt,. 77 Hiyam Kossayfi, “Lebanon: Tammam Salam’s Path to Prime Minister,” Al-Akhbar. com, April 5, 2013, accessed December 9, 2016, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/15448. 78 Michael Young, “Walid Jumblatt hun- kers down in survival mode, “ The National, September 21, 2016, accessed Decem-

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