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1983-12-16 Cable Re Rumsfeld Mission

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1983-12-16 Cable Re Rumsfeld Mission sisO Department of State INCOMING 01 OF 06 1609102 0784 SS 02 6 14 GE 01 JERUSA 04265 81 OF 06 160910Z 0784 SS02614 PAGE 01 JERUSA 04265 16/ 09 33 Z RECONVENING THE GENEVA RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE. JUMDLATT ANSWERED THAT THE GROUP WAS SUPPOSED NEO ED-Bl SS-9l S-02 D-01 P-02 NEA-Ol 1 X-01 FAIR-Ol 1H11 A2 WGP TO MEET AGAIN. THEY NEED TO FIX A NEW NATIONAL PACT TO TAPE INTO ACCOUNT THE NEW DEMOGRAPHIC ERCENT ACTION SS-BO BALANCE. THE DRUZE REPRESENT ONLY SEVEN OF THE POPULATION BUT THE SHII'A REPRESENT AT AS TO WHY IT IS INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-SO SSO-SO /026 w LEAST ONE-THIRD OF THE PEOPLE. E 000171 1609272 /11 IMPOSSIBLE TO RECONVENE RIGHT NOW, HE SAID THAT X o 1608532 DEC 83 WITHOUT A SOLID CEASEF IRE, WHY GO TO GENEVA TO FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM TALA? RUMSFELD SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS THE SYRIANS ci TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7202 TELLING THEM NOT TO GO. INFO JCS WASI1DC IMIIEDL ATE AMEMBASSY AMMAN IIIMEDIATE 5. JUMDLATT RESPONDED THAT IT IS NOT THE SYRIANS, s AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE BUT A DECISION BY NSF MEMBERS. MOREOVER, IT IS AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE TOO EARLY TO DISCUSS A NEW CABINET. A CEASEF IRE AIIEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE NEEDS TO BE FIXED, CONSOLIDATED, AND THEN ALL AIIEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE THE ISSUES CAN BE DISCUSSED IN GENEVA, INCLUDING USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. IT CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED, AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE FROZEN, OR ABROGATED--IT IS THE PROBLEM. IN E AYIEMBASSY PARIS IIIMEDIATE RESPONSE TO JUPIBLATT'S QUERY ABOUT THE U.S. POSITION, AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE RUMSFELD REPLIED THAT THE SYRIANS ARE USING THE X AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE AGREEMENT AS A PRETEXT TO STAY IN LEBANON, JUMBLATT WHITEHOUSE WASHOC IMMEDIATE ARGUED THAT THE AGREEMENT INFRINGES ON LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. IT PROVIDES FOR MIXED COMMISSIONS, cl R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 JERUSALEM 04265 ISRAELI SURVEILLANCE, MILITIA FORCES AND A ROLE s FOR SA'AD HADDAD. AS HE HAD EXPLAINED IN AMMAN E Xl IS ON OCTOBER 22, TEICHER COUNTERED JUMBLAIT'S ASSERTIONS BY DETAILING THOSE SECTIONS OF THE PlAY 17 MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECHT EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENT WHICH DEALT WITH SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SOUTH ANO THE ROLE OF SA' AD HADDAD. JCS PASS TO EUCOM AND CINCUSNAVEUR; BEIRUT FOR RUMSFELD STINER ADDED THAT THE ELEMENTS OF THE HADDAD FORCES YRTY TO DE INCLUDED IN THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE MUST MEET NORMAL ENTRY STANDARDS AND BE APPROVED BY THE .0. 12356: DECL:OADR LAF. ON THAT BASIS, HE DOUBTED MORE THAN 500 TAGS: PREL, MIL I,MOPS, IS, US, LE,XE, SP SUBJECT: RUMSFELD MISSION: DECEMBER 14 MEETING WITH cl VALID JUMBLATT s ET ENTIRE TEXT. SUMMARY: RUPISFEID MET WITH JUMBLATT IN AMMAN TO DISCUSS URGENCY OF DIALOGUE (ESPECIALLY DIRECT 4&':/i a4ü TALAS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL) LEADING TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION (GENEVAI II, THE DISADVANTAGES OF E BEPENDENCY ON THE SYRIANS, U.S. POLITICAL-MILITARY POLICY IN LEBANON, AN END TO THE VIOLENCE, AND THE X OPENING OF THE AIRPORT. JUMBLATT RESPONDED IN FAMILIAR BUT LOW-HEY FASHION. HE ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN POSITIONING U.S. CEASEF IRE OBSERVERS INSIDE cl ALAY/SHUF AND AGREED TO MEET WITH GEMAYEL IN s AMMAN IF GEMAYEL WISHES. ENO SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR RUPISFELD, CHARGE DJEREJ IAN, BG STINER, HOWARD TEICHER AND TOM MILLER MET WITH WALID JUMBLATT FOR ONE AND A HALF HOURS AFTERNOON OF DECEMBER 14. RUMSFELO BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY CONGRATULATING JUNBLATT ON HIS COOPERATION IN HELPING TO RESOLVE THE REFUGEE SITUATION AT DAY AL-QAMAR, NOTING THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN (WHO HAD SPECIFICALLY RAISED THIS SUBJECT DURING GEMAYEL'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON) WOULD BE DELIGHTED. JUMBLATT STATED THAT lIE HOPED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT EMBARRASS HIM, ESPECIALLY WHILE MOVING THE 'F OUT OF THE AREA. TURNING TO THE (QL IM EL KHARRLID, JMBLATT SAID THE SITUATION WAS BAD, PEOPLE THERE E VERY POOR AND A NEW FRONT HAD OPENED WITH THE VALANGE AND LF. HE OPINED THAT THE SITUATION IN THE MOUNTAINS IS BAD EVERYWHERE. RUMSFELD ASKED ABOUT JUMBLATT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ALERT COPY r ocssw' siso Department of State INCOMING ,'AGE 01 JERUSA 04265 02 0F 06 1609121 0809 SSO2A1I PAGE 01 JERUSA 04265 02 OF 06l60912Z 0009 SS02617 16/09341 THEIR SOLDIERS. CLEARLY, TERRORISM HAS A NFO ED-Bl SS-01 S-22D-Bi P-02 NEA-Ol SSN-01 X-21FAIR-01 HOME IN IRAN, SYRIA, LIBYA AND THE SOVIET UNION." /011 A2 WGP JUMBLAIT SAID ITIS IMPORTANT TO DEFINE TERRORISM BEFORE WE TALK ABOUT IT. RUMSFELD AGREED THAT THAT ACTION SS-OB WAS V FAIR COMMENT BUT CONTINUED THAT TH(MULTI- NATIONAL FORCE IS HERE TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PRDCE.SS, INFO OCT-00 COPY-Bi VOS-00 SSO-00 /026 W AS IS THE SIXTH FLEET. THE U.S."WANTS IO WORK WITH E 000227 1609 32Z /11 YOU AND THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON POLITICALLY, NOT X O 160853! DEC 83 THROUGH GUNF IRE. BUT HE SHOULD Fil AMCONSIJL JERuSALEM UNDERSTAND THAT THE U.S.KNOWS WHO IS DOING WHAT ON THE D TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7203 BATTLEFIELD. OUR FIRST CHOICE IS NOT TO POUND INFO JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE BACK, BUT THERE SHOULD BE NO AMBIGUITY. PRESIDENT AIIEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE REAGAN WILL RESPOND FULLY AND VIGOROUSLY. I CANNOT AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE DICTATE WHAT LEBANON OUGHT TO DO. THAT IS FOR AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE THE LEBANESE TO DECIDE AND FOR THE REST DF THE WORLD AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE TO HELP; BUT PEOPLE MUST TALK TO EACH OTHER." AMEIIBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE JUNBLATT STATED THAT HEIS READY TO TALK, BUT USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE QUESTIONED WHETHER GEMAYELIS READY TO RECOGNIZE AND AMEMBASSH LONDON IMMEDIATE ACCEPT THE NEED FOR REDISTRIBUTION OF E AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE POWER, WEALTH AND A NEW CONSTITUTION. AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE LEBANON IS SIMPLY NOT A NATION EVEN THOUGH THERE X AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE ARE PEOPLE WHO ARE ATTRACTED TO THE IDEALS OF NASSER AND PAN-ARABISM. RUMSFELD COUNTERED, "WHY NOT GO 13 WIIITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE IN AND MAKE A DEAL WITH GEMAYEL?" JUMBLATT SAID THAT R E T SECTION 02 OF 06 JERUSALEM 04265 HE IS READY, AND THAT IS WHY HE WENT TO GENEVA. s EVERYBODY TALKED, NOT ONLY KUADDAM. IT WAS AGREED E XD S IN GENEVA THAT THE TREATY SHOULD BE SET ASIDE, BUT GEMAYEL DECIDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE WOULD BE I'HALANGIST. RUMSFELD COUNTERED BY SAYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST BE REPRESENTATIVE. JCS PASS TO EUCOM AND CINCUSNAVEUR; BEIRUT FOR RUMSFELD HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE LAF WOULD BE REPRESENTATIVE ARTY IF THE DRUZE WOULD GO BACK TO RESTORE ITS MULTI-- CONFESSIONAL BALANCE. JUMBLATT SAID THAT THE .0. 12356: DECL: OVDR ARMY IS NOT MULTI-CONFESSIONAL AT THE TOP. HE TAGS: PREL, MILI, MOPS,IS, US,LE, XF,SV INDICATED THAT TANNOUS HAS POLITICAL AMBITIONS. D SUBJECT: RUP1SFELD MISSION: DECEMBER 14 MEETING WITH OF THE TOTAL WOULD QUALIFY. THEY WILL BE INTEGRATED INTO A LAF BRIGADE RECRUITED FROM THE AREA. ELDERLY AND LESS PHYSICALLY FIT PEOPLE CAN SERVE IN THE ANSAR'S OF THEIR RESPECTIVE VILLAGESIF THEY CHOOSE TO DO SO. 6. RUMSFELD TURNED TO THE POLITICAL-MILITARY E SITUATION IN LEBANON. HE SAID HE WAS STRUCK BY WHAT ALL THE SHI l'A AND SUNNI LEADERS TOLD HIM. X MEANWHILE, THE ECONOMY IS DETERIORATING, SCHOOLS ARE CLOSED, AND THE AIRPORT IS NOT OPEN. RUMSFELD NOTED HIS RECOGNITION OF THE PROBLEM OF JUMBLATT ANO THE DRUZE,INDICATING THAT AMERICANS ARE s SENSITIVE TO DRUZE NEEDS--BUT, AS HE HAD TOLD NABI BARRI, WHY DONT YOU SIT DOWN AND TALK? STOP ARGUING ABOUT 20 YEARS WORTH OF PRETEXT AND LEGALITIES WHILE YOUR COUNTRY S BURNING. THAT IS A DUMBAND DAMAGING THING TO DO. AMIN GEMAYEL HAS GOOD FEELINGS FOR YOU, ANO PEOPLE MUST TALK. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT AMIN WANTS TO CUT A DEAL; NOT JUST OVER THE CABINET, BUT REGARDING POLITICAL REFORMS AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS AS WELL. WHETHER THERE IS 8YRIAN PRESSURE OR NITITIS HARMFUL FOR THE LEBANESE NOT TO BE TALKING TO ONE ANOTHER." 1. RUNSFELD CONTINUED THAT LEBANON IS STRONGER THAN PEOPLE GIVE IT CREDIT FOR, BUT THAT THE 'EBANESE PEOPLE WILL WALK AWAY FROM THEIR LEADERS THEY DO NOT SERVE THEM WELL. "THE SYRIANS AREN'T EN FEET TALL," RUMSFELD SAID, "THEY HAVE PROBLEMS IDO. ASSAD IS SICK, ANDROPDV IS SICK, THEY HAVE LOST FOUR WARS, THEY ARE HAPPY TO FIGHT TO THE LAST DROP OF DRUZE BLOOD, BUT THEY AREN'T SACRIFICING ALERT COPY SRE-T II ILIILI IIjiIiI ti DECLASSFF Department of State INCOMING 0818 SS 02 6 19 CAGE BI JERUSA 0426503 0F 06 1609142 081H SS02619 PAGE 01 JERUSA 04265 03 OF 06 1609142 16/09462 CAN GUARANTEE THE CEASEF IRE? "NO," RUMSFELD SAID. NFO ED-Bl SS-Bl S-02D-01 P-02 NEA-01 55K-01 X-01 FAIR-B! JUMBLATT SAID, "LOOK, JUST KEEP THE INFRINGEMENTS ON THE CONFRONTATION LINE. DON'T SHELL VILLAGES -- Ç /211 A2 WGP OR TME DRUZE WILL SHELL BACK.' HE ASKER FOR OBSERVERS ACTION SS-BO ON HIS SIDE SO THAT BOTH SIDES' VIOLATION WOULD BE SEEN. HE EXPLAINED THAT AMERICAN MARINES ARE WITH THE EINFO OCT-00 COPY-Ol ADS-20 SSO-OB /026 W LAF AND THE DRUZE ARE OBLIGED TO ANSWER WHEN THE 000264 1609352 /1! LAF FIRES AT THE DRUZE. "I DON'T WANT TO KILL Xo 160853Z DEC 83 MARINES OR HAVE THE SIXTH FLEET ON MY BACK." FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM D TO SECSIATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7204 9. STINER THEN DESCRIBED HOW ESCALATION USUALLY INFO JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE OCCURS, STARTING WITH SNIPER FIRE AND LEADING TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE FULL-SCALE SHELLING.
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