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ETANA Hezbollah + Druze.Indd DIVIDE AND CONQUER THE GROWING HEZBOLLAH THREAT TO THE DRUZE A COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE AND ETANA SYRIA OCTOBER 2019 POLICY PAPER 2019-20 CONTENTS * 3 SUMMARY * 4 KEY POINTS * 6 INTRODUCTION * 6 SYRIA * 8 LEBANON * 10 GOLAN HEIGHTS * 13 CONCLUSION Cover photo: Druze men in the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights look out © The Middle East Institute across the southwestern Syrian province of Quneitra, visible across the border on July 7, 2018. (Photo by JALAA MAREY/AFP/Getty Images) The Middle East Institute Contents photos: Hezbollah fighters carry flags as they parade in a southern suburb of Beirut to mark al-Quds Day on May 31, 2019. (Photo by 1763 N Street NW ANWAR AMRO/AFP/Getty Images) Washington, D.C. 20036 SUMMARY Deep political, familial, and religious ties have allowed Druze communities across the Levant to remain largely unified against external threats, but eight years of vio- lence in Syria and a coordinated campaign by the re- gime and its allies now threaten to destabilize regional Druze politics and erode the sect’s political and military power. An Iranian-backed campaign by Hezbollah to incite inter-Druze violence in Lebanon has curtailed this unity, laying the groundwork for Hezbollah to expand into Syria’s Suwayda province with impunity. Hezbollah’s push to create inter-sect strife has extend- ed from Beirut to the occupied Golan Heights to Su- wayda, placing the region’s Druze in a greatly weakened position. This risk is particularly pronounced in Suwayda province, where attempts by Hezbollah and the regime to change the military and political reality on the ground have led to a major shift in power dynamics there, with Hezbollah now affiliated with 60% of armed groups in the province. This paper studies various Hezbollah, Iranian, and Syrian regime attempts to escalate against the Druze politi- cal establishment in Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, and the repercussions of these moves across the region. Methodology: ETANA maintains extensive networks of sources across Syria and within Syria’s neighboring countries which it uses to gather and cross-verify information. Data gathered is analyzed by civil, political, and military experts to understand relations and conditions and recog- nize trends. Maps produced are visual representations of verified data. KEY POINTS • HEZBOLLAH’S POWER IN SUWAYDA: Approximately 60% of all armed groups in Suwayda province are affiliated with Hezbollah, and it continues to work to recruit or co-opt partners there. • IRAN’S ANTI-DRUZE STRATEGY: The Iranian-backed militia group has launched a two-pronged strategy against its enemies within the Druze sect across Lebanon and Syria. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is sowing division between traditional allies and working to dismantle the largest Druze political bloc there, while in Syria it is recruiting a militia of Bedouins and pushing organized crime to promote insta- bility in Suwayda province. • HEZBOLLAH DIVIDES DRUZE IN LEBANON: Hezbollah is leveraging its political allies within the Druze political establishment in Leba- non to isolate and weaken Walid Jumblatt, currently the most prom- inent Hezbollah and Syrian regime critic among the country’s Druze. Hezbollah grants perks and privileges to Jumblatt’s main rivals, Talal Arslan and Wiam Wahhab. • INTER-DRUZE VIOLENCE IN LEBANON: Clashes have erupted be- tween pro- and anti-Jumblatt forces in Lebanon, leading to several deaths. Hezbollah is working to inflame these inter-Druze tensions, which could result in widespread political violence in the Lebanese mountains. • OCCUPIED GOLAN HEIGHTS: Hezbollah is leveraging its allies in the Golan Heights to further drive wedges between Jumblatt and Druze communities. Hezbollah’s push there comes at a tense and unique time: Hezbollah and the regime have clashed with Israeli forces at the Lebanese-Israeli border in recent weeks, and the controversial passage of a Jewish nationality law in Israel has seen relations be- tween the Druze and Tel Aviv sour since the beginning of the year. INTRODUCTION SYRIA The Druze of the Levant region are In Syria, the Druze of Suwayda province connected by tribal, familial, and have enjoyed more than half a decade religious ties that have existed for of relative autonomy, with the regime centuries. Despite the borders and largely taking a hands-off approach political challenges that make even visits to local administration and security. to other Druze populations in the region The void has been filled by a series difficult, political figures from Lebanon, of powerful local Druze political and Israel, Jordan, and Syria have shared a military forces, who wield a great deal certain degree of connectedness. Druze of influence in the province. In recent leadership from each country confers years, Druze community militias have about major issues, and the Druze of established checkpoints and enacted Suwayda, Israel, and Lebanon have community policing, and have also maintained close political ties. These clashed with both the regime and ISIS ties, however, are now challenged by when either group has made incursions rising Hezbollah and Assad regime into the province. In June, Druze militia influence in the region as both seek to forces even drove regime security consolidate power and control in their personnel out of the provincial capital home countries. for several hours. Hezbollah, Iran, and the Syrian regime Today, the regime seeks to consolidate interact with the Druze political its power and authority across the establishment holistically, escalating entire country. With the surrender of against Druze figures and entities in opposition forces in south-west Syria to Lebanon and Syria in an attempt to the regime in July 2018, Damascus and tip the balance of power further in its security apparatus have increasingly their favor. Hezbollah and its allies set their sights on Suwayda province and understand the interconnectedness of the prominent decision makers there. the Druze political establishment across Recent months have seen an increase the region, and seek to weaken these in tension between Suwayda and ties as they push their own local projects Damascus, along with multiple clashes to monopolize the political and military between Druze militias and pro-regime landscape. forces. The most recent major incident came in June, when Druze militia forces attacked the headquarters of regime Air Force Intelligence and drove out regime security personnel from the city for more than 16 hours after an 6 assassination attempt on a local leader. A key tenet of Hezbollah’s current A number of prominent Druze military strategy in Suwayda is to draw on the leaders in the province have been power and influence of local Bedouin killed or faced assassination attempts, tribes, launching a massive campaign including Sheikhs of Dignity commander to recruit fighters from this community Wissam Eid, who was gunned down in into militias under its command. While a Hezbollah-sponsored attack on May 3. it has previously recruited Bedouins to bolster its smuggling and other criminal HEZBOLLAH’S LOCAL AFFILIATES operations along the Syrian-Jordanian border, its current drive to recruit from The regime, its security forces, and local Bedouin populations is much Hezbollah have also worked to co-opt wider in scope and in ambition. These and recruit criminal gangs into their Hezbollah-backed Bedouin militias have spheres of influence — essentially been recruited in Lajat, eastern Daraa promoting state-sponsored organized province, and al-Asfar, as well as from crime in Suwayda in the form of illicit within Suwayda province, especially its arms and drug smuggling. Recent eastern desert region. months have also seen these regime- or Hezbollah-backed gangs engage While the stated goal of these newly in targeted kidnappings and vehicle recruited fighters is to provide local theft, with profits from these operations security and protection from ISIS cells, adding a new stream of revenue to numerous regime and Hezbollah officials expand these criminal activities. on the ground have specifically noted countering Druze militias in Suwayda Hezbollah — and by extension Iran — has is their primary focus. Hezbollah is established a wide network of political, exploiting sectarian and class tensions military, and cultural relationships inflamed after thousands of Sunni in Druze areas of Syria as part of a Bedouins from Suwayda fled their areas concerted effort to seize control of to take refuge in eastern Daraa province decision making in Syria and Lebanon. following the onset of major fighting The group has also mobilized its allies in 2012. Hezbollah offers an enticing within the Lebanese Druze political package to potential Bedouin recruits: a sphere (Talal Arslan and Wiam Wahhab) respectable salary, increased influence, to strengthen and entrench its influence and political control in the southwest, as in Druze areas of Syria. As a result, 60% well as the promise of reclaiming one’s of all local armed groups and security homeland after years of exile. forces in Suwayda province are now affiliated with Hezbollah. HEZBOLLAH’S POWER IN SUWAYDA: Approximately 60% of all armed groups in Suwayda province are affiliated with Hezbollah, and it continues to work to recruit or co-opt partners there. 7 An electoral banner featuring Taymoor Jumblatt (R) and his father Walid Jumblatt (L) of Lebanon’s Progressive Socialist Party hanging in the street in Beirut. (Photo by JOSEPH EID/AFP/Getty Images) The formation of these Bedouin militias watch from a distance as the Druze comes amid a Hezbollah and regime militias that protected the region’s semi- withdrawal from numerous positions autonomy drown in sectarian violence. across the south-west, namely Lajat, eastern Daraa, and eastern Suwayda. LEBANON Though this withdrawal lines up with Lebanon’s confessional system limits former opposition demands in Daraa the government positions available and Quneitra for regime intelligence to members of the Druze sect, yet the forces and Iranian-backed militias to Druze political establishment wields vacate the settlement areas, it signals significant sway in the country.
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