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Update Indonesia THE EMBASSY OF REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA BANGKOK Update Indonesia www.kemlu.go.id/bangkok ISSUE : January – March 2011 Update Indonesia 2 16 December 2010 – H.E. Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, attended an official dinner hosted by His Excellency Kasit Piromya, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, on the occasion of the 3rd Asia-Middle East Dialogue (AMED III). The dinner was held at The Royal Thai Navy Convention Hall in Bangkok last night. THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA BANGKOK Update Indonesia 3 KEDUTAAN BESAR REPUBLC INDONESIA THE EMBASSY OF REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA BANGKOK BANGKOK Update Indonesia Honorary Advisor H.E.Mr.Mohammad Hatta Deputy Honorary Advisor M.Primanto Hendrasmoro Coordinator Bob Felix Tobing The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia Secretary 600‐602 Petchburi Road Suargana Pringganu Phyathai, Rajchatewee, Bangkok 10400 Thailand Editorial Staff Phone: (+662) 252 3135‐40 Suargana Pringganu Fax: (+662) 255 1267 www.kemlu.go.id/bangkok Namon Patisang E‐mail : [email protected] Andri Basapaskana Design Namon Patisang THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA BANGKOK Update Indonesia 4 CONTENTS ISSUE : January – March 2011 5 FOCUS : ASEAN 2011 8 Multibiliteral : AMEN III Page 5 ASEAN 2011 12 ECONOMIC : Economic in 2011 14 EDUCATION : International education 16 TOURISM : Wonderful Indonesia 18 CULTURE : IMLEK Page 8 : AMED III Thailand 2010 20 TAKE A TOUR : Lake Toba 22 SECRET RECIPE : Obama’s favorite 25 BAHASA INDONESIA Page 12 : Economic Forecast Page 16 : Tourism 2011 THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA BANGKOK Update Indonesia 5 FOCUS A new direction for ASEAN under Indonesian 'leadership' The Nation -Today the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) is recognised as one of the most successful regional groupings in the world after the European Union (EU). Asean members have never engaged in interstate wars against each other since the Association's inception. For many people this is palpable evidence that Asean has become a winning peacekeeping organisation. Asean may be seen as an important stage for global powers, but it is not yet a powerful actor that can influence global policies. The Asean Regional Forum (ARF), Asean Plus Three (APT) and the East Asian Summit (EAS) forums are most likely to be used as platforms for the major powers to discuss issues of mutual concern. But this month we are hearing a new tone from Asean, led by this year's chair, Indonesia, which aims to alter this equation. But is Indonesia powerful enough to bring institutional change to this equation? Indonesia is the biggest country and economy in Southeast Asia. At the international level, Indonesia is the regional representative at the G-20. It is the largest Muslim country in the world, and a US partner against terrorism. A study by John Hawksworth at PricewaterhouseCoopers, an accounting and financial advisory firm, suggests that Indonesia will become one of most significant emerging seven economies, or the E-7, composed of Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey. The E-7 is expected to take over the economic power of the G-7 by 2020. THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA BANGKOK Update Indonesia 6 Indonesia has set forth a master plan and new direction for Asean, announced by Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa. The aim is to change Asean from a passive to proactive regional grouping on two levels: by integrating the Asean economic community by 2015; and strengthening Asean's position on global politics. Indonesia has emphasised a two-level relationship: regional and global. This is not new to Asean. But this time is different. Indonesia represents Asean's new desire to develop a more reciprocal relationship with major powers and to gain more leverage and influence on global issues. Asean now wants to be more than just a follower. Recently Indonesia tried to transform the Declaration of Conduct agreed at the ARF into a Code of Conduct in order to solve the territorial conflicts in the South China Sea - or in other words, attempt to manage Chinese power in Southeast Asia. Indonesia has also indicated its interest in engaging in the reconciliation talks on the Korean Peninsula. Recently Asean called off international trade and investment sanctions against Burma. Although the anti- sanctions movement has recently gained more attention from the US government and some international NGOs, Asean has taken the further step of officially opposing the current EU and US trade sanctions against Burma. This action apparently reflects the new confidence of Asean in challenging the western powers. Asean knows that without global participation, the Burmese economy will never liberalise and develop. The prolonged western sanctions policy has become a thorny issue in the creation of the Asean economic community. Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya adds that this new direction will help Asean to accomplish economic integration by 2015. Asean pragmatically cannot demand change in its members' domestic affairs, or create political influence over national governments. Members adhere to the well-known principle of non-interference. On the Burmese issue, Asean has decided to reject the global rhetoric against Burma. In other words, Asean attempts to manage its own environment, which means turning to global politics instead of managing Burma only. Of course, this new direction is in the common interest of every Asean member that wants to liberate the market of 50 million people in Burma. But without a strong rising power like Indonesia, this new direction would be in doubt. The further question to be asked is how Asean will cope with the divergent interests of rising powers like Indonesia and smaller nations in Asean that aren't ready to take a risk in becoming involved in high security- related issues like the Korean Peninsula and South China Sea. So far some members have not supported the Indonesian idea of creating a Code of Conduct to deal with Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. Also, although Asean members are not disinterested in the Korean Peninsula, as Indonesian Foreign Minister Natalegawa says, the question is whether the smaller states have a real interest in engaging in the six-party talks. The benefits of being involved in high security-related issues may not be so clear for small states that have limited military, economic and political leverage. In addition, Indonesia plans to increase military spending from around 1 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) to 1.5 per cent of GDP by 2014. The expansion of Indonesian leadership together with the rise in military budgets may be very sensitive to the balance of power in Asean and could ignite fears of a self-proclaimed regional leader. In fact Asean has never endorsed the creation of a de facto regional "leader" like Germany in the EU and the US in Nato. To lead Asean, which has long enhanced the value of diversity not convergence, is thus not an easy job. Indonesia needs to demonstrate its power to develop Asean internally, represent Asean as a powerful organisation at the international level, and at the same time assure other Asean members that Indonesia's increasing power in the region and beyond is cooperative and reciprocal, not competitive and unilateral. THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA BANGKOK Update Indonesia 7 Indonesia’s Vision as the 2011 ASEAN’s Chair As of January 1, 2011 until the end of the year, Indonesia took on the mantle of ASEAN’s Chair. President Yudhoyono of Indonesia officially announced Indonesia’s Chairmanship at the Closing Ceremony of the 17th ASEAN Summit in Hanoi, Vietnam (30/10/2010). On that occasion, the Indonesian President also delivered the vision and mission to be carried out during Indonesia’s tenure as the next ASEAN’s Chair. In 2011, Indonesia is determined to bring once again concrete and useful contributions through ‘ASEAN Beyond 2015’ initiatives. While maintaining the continuity of the process to establish the ASEAN Community 2015, Indonesia will also push its vision forward to go beyond ASEAN Community. The ASEAN Community will be the foci in the development of regional architecture. It will take on the form of a regional order with the emphasis on ‘dynamic equilibrium’ as reflected in the latest East Asia Summit (EAS) with the strategic inclusion of the United States and the Russian Federation into the fold. Throughout 2011, Indonesia will continue its effort to create a People-Oriented and People-Centered ASEAN. All the results and benefits obtained by ASEAN must be perceived as real by the ASEAN community at large. The above statement was quoted from the press release issued last night (4/1/2011) by the Directorate of Politics and ASEAN Security. During its tenure, Indonesia will host the 18th ASEAN Summit, the 19th ASEAN Summit and EAS and a series of meetings, including the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) Council, ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Council, ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Council, ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ (AMM) Meeting, ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting, ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting and ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crimes. The theme of Indonesia’s Chair is ‘ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations’. This particular theme is selected to support the success of ASEAN Community 2015. The establishment of ASEAN Community in 2015 will create a bigger responsibility for ASEAN. The Association will be required to boost its collective contribution in managing various global issues and challenges. This will act as positive contribution to the global community of nations. The basic shape of the logo during Indonesia’s term as ASEAN Chair is a gunungan wayang (a triangular shape) which represents the three pillars of ASEAN Community with the hope that it will encourage a mutually beneficial cooperation.
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