Thailand's Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia Under the Abhisit Vejjajiva Administration, 2008-2011

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Thailand’s Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia under the Abhisit Vejjajiva Government (2008-2011): Continuity or Change?

Jutamanee Samakkeenit

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Social Sciences Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences The University of New South Wales August 2014

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES Thesis/Dissertation Sheet

Surname or Family name: Samakkeenit

First name: Jutamanee Other name/s:

Abbreviation for degree as given in the University calendar: PhD

School: School of Social Sciences Faculty: Arts and Social Sciences

Title: Thailand’s Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia under the Abhisit Vejjajiva Government (2008-2011): Continuity or Change?

Abstract

This thesis is an analysis of Thailand’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011). It examines Thai foreign policy towards Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar in the context of political transition in Thailand. It seeks to answer the following research questions: Were there any aspects of the Abhisit administration’s foreign policy that differed significantly from that of his predecessors? What were the major factors, both domestic and external, that impacted on Abhisit’s foreign policy decision-making? In answering these two questions, this thesis uses neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework to analyse Abhisit’s foreign policy. This thesis comprises three case studies: the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple, Abhisit’s Malaysia policy in relation to the separatist insurgency in southern Thailand, and Abhisit’s policy towards democratisation in Myanmar.

Through the analysis of the three case studies, this thesis concludes that throughout the Abhisit administration, despite rhetorical differences, continuity was the hallmark of Thailand’s relationships with neighbouring countries. Furthermore, this thesis argues that Abhisit’s foreign policy was largely influenced by domestic political considerations, rather than external factors. In other words, although external or international pressures were significant, they were not the primary determinants of Abhisit’s foreign policy. Specifically, a prolonged confrontation between the pro- and anti-Thaksin forces, the persistence of the Thai military’s influence on politics, the continued separatist violence in southern Thailand, and Thai economic interests in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar were the major factors influencing Abhisit’s foreign policy decision-making. In terms of external factors, the competing nationalisms in the region, the political circumstances in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar, and the inherent weakness of ASEAN cohesion were the primary factors influencing relations between Thailand and its neighbouring countries.

Declaration relating to disposition of project thesis/dissertation

I hereby grant to the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all property rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

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Acknowledgements

The completion of this thesis would have been impossible without assistance from the following people. First, I am most grateful to my supervisor, Andrew Tan, who has given me so much of his time and support in every way possible to ensure that the thesis is completed. For me, it is an honour and privilege to be supervised by him. Next, I would also like to thank my co-supervisor, Andrea Benvenuti, for his insightful comments and kind support along the way. Great thanks to Chris Walkers, Paul Jones, and Rogelia Pe- Pua for their suggestions during my annual review meetings. I am also grateful to staff members of the UNSW Learning Centre, notably Sue Starfield, Jamie Roberts, Bronwen Phillips, and Linda Burnett, for their academic support. Thank you also to my PhD friends, especially Finance Dechsakulthorn, Rabia Ali, Siriwimon Na Chiangmai, Somruedee Khongput, Suna Kyun, Rattana Yawiloeng, and Veronica Yang, for their friendship and counsel.

In Thailand, I am thankful to Naresuan University for providing me a scholarship. Without its financial support, I would not be able to come to study in Australia. I should also thank Napisa Waitoolkiat and Pitch Pongsawat for giving me suggestions on my proposal. I also thank my friends at Christ’s Vision Church in Phitsanulok for their prayers. In Sydney, I am thankful to John and Lisa Rhodes as well as my friends at Hope Sydney Church. I am also grateful to Onanong Nopkhun and Pisupa Yuwanond for their generosity in allowing me to stay with them.

My deepest gratitude goes to my parents for their love and encouragement. I am especially indebted to my mother for her love that gives me strength to continue doing my thesis. Thank you also to my sister and my brother-in-law, Joe and Todd, and my brother, Jack, for their unwavering support in all my endeavours. Also, I am so blessed to have my mother-in-law taking a very good care of my son. Thanks to my little boy, Joseph, for letting mommy to come to study in Sydney. I also thank my best friend in the world, my husband, Chumpol Sripraparkorn, for his love and understanding, which guided me through the difficult periods. Most importantly, I thank him for always believing in me.

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Last but not least, I thank God who led me to this point and will lead me in the future. Thank God for his unconditional love, blessings, hope, and spiritual guidance. All things are possible through him.

Abstract

Table of Contents

Originality statement……………………………………………………………………… i Copyright statement………………………………………………………………………. ii Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………………… iii Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………… v Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………. vi List of Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………… viii

Chapter 1 Introduction……………………………………………………...... 1 1.1 Research Overview…………………………………………………………………… 1 1.2 Background of Thai Domestic Politics and Its Impact on Abhisit’s Foreign Policy…………………………………………………………………………...... 1 1.3 Research Questions…………………………………………………………………… 5 1.4 Neoclassical Realism…………………………………………………………………. 6 1.5 Sources…………………………………………………………………………...... 6 1.6 Thesis Structure………………………………………………………………………. 7

Chapter 2 Theoretical Frameworks for Foreign Policy Analysis………...... 10 2.1 Mainstream Theories of International Relations……………………………………… 10 2.2 Neoclassical Realism: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues……...... 19 2.3 Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy………………………………………………….. 21

Chapter 3 Thailand’s Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era.... 40 3.1 Thailand’s Foreign Policy during the Cold War……………………………………… 41 3.2 Thailand’s Foreign Policy under General Chatchai Choonhavan…………………….. 49 3.3 Thailand’s Foreign Policy under the Chuan Leekpai Administrations……………….. 54 3.4 Thailand’s Foreign Policy under the Thaksin Shinawatra Regime…………………… 63

Chapter 4 Domestic Political Constraints and Abhisit’s Cambodia Policy…... 74 4.1 Historical Background of Thailand-Cambodia Relations…………………………….. 75 4.2 Thailand’s Cambodia Policy during the Post-Cold War Period……………………… 80 4.3 Thailand’s Cambodia Policy under the Abhisit Vejjajiva Administration…………… 97 4.4 Thailand’s Cambodia Policy in the Post-Abhisit Era………………………...... 119

Chapter 5 Thailand’s Southern Conflict and Abhisit’s Malaysia Policy…….. 122 5.1 Background of Thailand’s Southern Conflict………………………………………… 123 5.2 Return of Violence during the Thaksin Era…………………………………………... 127 5.3 Post-Coup Policy Changes after 2006………………………...... …………….. 132 5.4 The Southern Policy under the Abhisit Administration………………………...... 138 5.5 Malaysia’s Role in the Unrest in Southern Thailand………………………...... 145

Chapter 6 Abhisit’s Myanmar Dilemma: Moving Forward Towards Democracy?………………………...... 167 6.1 Historical Background of Thailand-Myanmar Relations………………………...... 168 6.2 Thailand-Myanmar Relations in the Post-Cold War Era………………………...... 172 6.3 A Golden Age of Relations between Thailand and Myanmar………………………... 182 6.4 Abhisit’s Dilemma: Human Rights and Democracy, or Economic Interests? ……….. 187

Chapter 7 Conclusion………………………...... …………………………...... 206 7.1 Neoclassical Realism and Abhisit’s Foreign Policy………………………………….. 207 7.2 Thailand’s Foreign Policy after the End of the Cold War………………………...... 208 7.3 Thailand’s Foreign Policy under Abhisit: Continuity or Change? …………………… 209 7.4 Implications of this Study and Suggestions for Further Research……………………. 214

Bibliography 214 Appendix A Ethics Approval 241 Appendix B List of interviewees 242

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List of Abbreviations

ACD Asian Co-operation Dialogue ACMECS Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Co-operation Strategy AEC Asset Examination Committee AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area AMM ASEAN Ministerial Meeting APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ASC ASEAN Security Community ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting BIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation BRN-C Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinates BSPP Burma Socialist Programme Party CPM Civil-Police-Military joint headquarters DPICM Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions EGAT Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand GBC Thai-Cambodian General Border Committee GDP Gross Domestic Product GMC Greater Mekong Co-operation GMIP Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani ICJ International Court of Justice IMF International Monetary Fund IMT-GT Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle JBC Thai-Cambodian Joint Boundary Commission KNU Karen National Union MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs NACC National Anti-Corruption Commission NESDB National Economic and Social Development Board NLD National League for Democracy NPKC National Peace Keeping Council NRC National Reconciliation Commission

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NSC National Security Council OIC Organisation of the Islamic Conference PAD People’s Alliance for Democracy PAS Islamic Party of Malaysia PMCC Pattani Malay Consultative Congress PPP People Power Party PTP Pheu Thai Party PULO Patani United Liberated Organization QEC Quadrangle Economic Co-operation RKK Runda Kumputlan Kecil SBPAC Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre SBPPC Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command SEANWFZ Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council TOT Telephone Organisation of Thailand TRT Thai Rak Thai Party UDD United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNSC United Nations Security Council UPPC United Patani People Council WTO World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research overview

This thesis is an analysis of Thai foreign policy under Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011). It examines relations between Thailand and its three neighbouring countries – Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar – in the context of the Thai domestic political crisis. It seeks to answer the following questions: Were there any aspects of the Abhisit administration’s foreign policy that differed significantly from those of his predecessors? What were the major factors, both domestic and external, that influenced Abhisit’s foreign policy decision-making? Neoclassical realism will be used as a theoretical framework to answer the two research questions of this thesis, which will clarify the nature of Thailand’s relationships with its neighbours and help in explaining the important factors that impacted on Abhisit’s foreign policy decisions. This thesis comprises three case studies: the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple, Abhisit’s Malaysia policy towards insurgency in southern Thailand, and Abhisit’s policy towards democratisation in Myanmar. In relation to these case studies, this thesis considers four key domestic political components as the primary determinants of the Abhisit administration’s foreign policy, namely interest groups, bureaucratic politics, public opinion, and leaders’ orientations. It also examines the influence of external factors that have affected relations with Thailand, particularly the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the regional context and the domestic political situations in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar.

1.2 Background of Thai domestic politics and its impact on Abhisit’s foreign policy

In the past decade, Thailand has experienced political deadlock and protest campaigns, with little sign of these being diminished. After billionaire businessman Thaksin Shinawatra became prime minister in 2001, Thailand’s political context has changed radically. Thaksin’s populist policies received overwhelming support from the rural poor, particularly those in northern and northeastern Thailand. Many urban working-class

people also supported Thaksin. However, the popularity of Thaksin and his government subsequently drew criticism from his opponents, concentrated in Bangkok. After Thaksin’s victory in the 2005 general election, he and his allies faced a range of accusations of corruption and human rights abuses in his government. In early 2006, the anti-Thaksin Yellow Shirts started massive protests in Bangkok to oppose the Thaksin government and defend the monarchy, which they believed was challenged by Thaksin’s rise.1 Thaksin was eventually ousted by a military coup in September 2006, but many voters still supported him. The pro-Thaksin parties have won decisive victories in every general election since his ouster. The political turmoil that began even before the 2006 coup has continued through the struggle for power between a populist government and the royalist establishment.

Military coups are generally perceived as a common occurrence in Thailand. Since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932, Thailand has witnessed nineteen military coups, occurring approximately once every four years. However, the 2006 coup was far more than a simple case of military seizure of power. Rather, it reflected a class struggle between populist forces led by Thaksin supporters and the Bangkok elite, including the military, the bureaucracy, and the palace. The 2006 coup severely impacted democratic political development and triggered a protracted political crisis in Thailand. Between 2006 and 2011, Thailand was led by six different prime ministers.2 The People’s Power Party (PPP), a rebranded version of Thaksin’s party, won a landslide victory in the first post-coup election in 2007, which brought Thaksin ally Samak Sundaravej to power as prime minister. However, after serving in office for eight months, Samak was ousted by the Constitutional Court on the controversial charge of his accepting payment for hosting a television cooking show. Thaksin’s brother-in-law Somchai Wongsawat then became the new prime minister succeeding Samak. This was followed by months of protests in Bangkok led by the Yellow Shirts, which involved the seizure of Bangkok’s two airports. The Constitutional Court again intervened in the conflict by dissolving the PPP and banning Somchai and his key allies from office for five years over allegations of vote-

1 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Thaksin, the Military, and Thailand’s Protracted Political Crisis,” in The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and Leadership, ed. Marcus Mietzner (New York: Routledge, 2012), 52. 2 Michael J. Montesano, “Four Thai Pathologies, Late 2009,” in Legitimacy Crisis in Thailand, ed. Marc Askew (Chiang Mai: King Prajadhipok’s Institute, 2010), 273.

buying.3 This paved the way for Abhisit Vejjajiva, the leader of the opposition Democrat Party, to assume power.

Abhisit was elected by parliament as the new prime minister, and formed a new coalition government in December 2008. He became premier when the economy was weak and society was divided. More importantly, he was Thailand’s third prime minister within a year and the first from the anti-Thaksin camp. He faced calls for his resignation from his first day as prime minister, followed by massive anti-government protests, led by the pro- Thaksin Red Shirts. Throughout his short term in office (December 2008-August 2011), he had to deal with social and political tensions, especially those that resulted from the political turmoil and a power struggle within the ruling elite. The Abhisit coalition government was supported by factions of the military, the bureaucrats, the palace, and the wealthy upper class and middle class in Bangkok, but it was strongly opposed by the Red Shirts because it was perceived as a political proxy for the military and conservative elite. His coalition government also faced a crisis of legitimacy. The Red Shirts claimed that Abhisit’s Democrat Party came to power illegitimately as it did not represent a majority of voters. During the last twenty years, the Democrat Party had never won a majority of the vote or held a majority of seats in the parliament. The Red Shirts also believed that Abhisit successfully formed a new coalition government because of backroom deals shaped with the help of the military.4

The intense political pressure from the Red Shirts was seen as the most critical problem challenging the Abhisit administration. It impacted negatively on the government’s ability to run the country efficiently. A series of anti-government demonstrations and the political uncertainty in Bangkok paralysed the economy, with huge losses in business and tourism. From March to May 2010, the Red Shirt protesters occupied parts of central Bangkok, calling for a fresh election. This protest was eventually quelled by a military crackdown that resulted in more than 90 deaths.5 The Abhisit government’s popularity

3 Duncan McCargo, “Thailand: State of Anxiety,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2008, ed. Daljit Singh and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 340-341; Paul Chambers, “Thailand on the Brink: Resurgent Military, Eroded Democracy,” Asian Survey 50, no. 5 (2010): 842-843. 4 Kitti Prasirtsuk, “Thailand in 2009: Colored by Turbulence,” Asian Survey 50, no. 1 (2010): 204. 5 Michael K. Connors, “Thailand’s Emergency State: Struggles and Transformations,” in Southeast Asia Affairs 2011, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), 287.

declined sharply after the military crackdown. To reduce the risk of another Red Shirt protest and ease the ongoing political conflict, Abhisit and his allies announced a roadmap for national reconciliation to promote national unity and restore Thailand’s image overseas. Towards the end of his term in office, Abhisit focused his administration’s efforts on implementing its “populist policies” to gain more popularity to win the next election. 6 However, these attempts could not relieve the political pressure on his government. Abhisit finally dissolved the House of Representatives and called a general election in July 2011. Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra and the Pheu Thai Party (PTP) won a spectacular victory in the general election, gaining 265 of the 500 seats in parliament. Abhisit’s Democrat Party won only 159 seats. Yingluck then became the first female prime minister of Thailand.7

During the post-2006 coup period, the political conflict in Thailand has led to much debate among academics as well as politicians. Many scholars have attempted to explain the prolonged political deadlock, and to suggest appropriate solutions. However, little research has been carried out to examine the impact of Thai domestic politics on its foreign policy. In fact, after the 2006 coup, Thailand’s foreign policy and its relations with neighbouring countries were influenced greatly by domestic political considerations. Due to the continued political impasse and economic upheaval, post-Thaksin administrations were preoccupied with power struggles between the pro- and anti- Thaksin camps and street protests. Thai foreign policy became a political tool used by political elites in Bangkok to enhance their political legitimacy. For example, after the Abhisit administration came to office, tensions between Thailand and Cambodia further deteriorated when a long-standing dispute over the Preah Vihear temple led to military skirmishes, resulting in more than two dozen deaths, many injuries, and the displacement of tens of thousands of people. Pavin Chachavalpongpun argues that Thailand’s domestic politics was a primary source of renewed tension between the two countries. Specifically, in an attempt to stay in power, the Abhisit administration adopted a hard-line stance vis- à-vis Cambodia, which in turn served to enhance its legitimacy and bowed to pressure

6 Chairat Charoensin-o-larn, “Thailand in 2009: Unusual Politics Becomes Usual,” in Southeast Asia Affairs 2010, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 305-306. 7 Kevin Hewison, “Avoiding Conflict: Thailand after the Red Shirt Uprising,” Political Insight 3, no. 3 (2012): 31.

from the military as well as the Yellow Shirts.8 Thitinan Pongsudhirak points out that Abhisit’s Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya “was drawn from the inner sanctum of the anti- Thaksin moverment”, that is, from the Yellow Shirts.9 As a result, after assuming office, Kasit was expected to exercise his power to support the Yellow Shirts’ nationalist agenda against Cambodia.

1.3 Research questions

This thesis is an analysis of Thailand’s foreign policy under the Abhisit administration (2008-2011). It focuses on relations between Thailand and its three neighbouring countries – Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar – in the context of the Thai domestic political crisis. It aims to examine the impact of domestic politics on contemporary Thailand’s foreign policy. Specifically, it seeks to answer the following questions:

1. What were the main characteristics of Thai foreign policy under Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva? Were there any aspects of Abhisit’s foreign policy that differed fundamentally from those of his predecessors? 2. What were the major factors, both internal and external, that influenced and shaped the Abhisit administration’s foreign policy towards Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar?

To answer these research questions, neoclassical realism is chosen as the theoretical framework of this thesis. This thesis will advance the field of Thailand’s foreign policy analysis and provide a better understanding of key factors underlying the Abhisit administration’s foreign policy towards the neighbouring countries during the period of political transition in Thailand.

8 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Diplomacy under Siege: Thailand’s Political Crisis and the Impact on Foreign Policy,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 3 (2009): 460. 9 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Battle between Continuity and Change:Thailand’s Topsy-Turvy Foreign Policy Directions,” Global Asia 4, no. 3 (2009): 36.

1.4 Neoclassical realism

This thesis applies a neoclassical realist approach to examine Thailand’s foreign policy. It seeks to fill the gap in literature on the impact of domestic political factors and external forces on Thai foreign policy decision-making. According to Gideon Rose, neoclassical realism is an international relations theory that combines the strengths of classical realism and neorealism. It has been considered the third generation of realism. Neoclassical realists focus not only on the pressures of international structure, but also a variety of domestic factors, such as regime type, political leaders’ perceptions, public opinion, and domestic interest groups, to help explain a state’s foreign policy decision-making.10 Accordingly, this thesis focuses on four major domestic factors: interest groups, bureaucratic politics, public opinion, and leaders’ orientations. In term of external factors, this thesis examines the role of ASEAN as well as the domestic political circumstances in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar, and the impact of these factors on relations between Thailand and its neighbouring countries.

1.5 Sources

The data and information for this thesis are derived from public sources as well as personal interviews conducted by the author with some key figures involved in Thailand’s foreign policy decision-making.

The primary sources for this thesis consist of: (1) speeches, statements, official government announcements; (2) interviews on television and radio shows; (3) transcripts of talks given at seminars, workshops, panels, public lectures, national, and international conferences; (4) official documents of the United States Embassy in Bangkok and the Consulate in Chiang Mai, obtained from the WikiLeaks website; (5) economic and political statistics such as public opinion polls, economic growth, and government financial statements.

10 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 147. See Chapter 2 for an overview of the concepts of neoclassical realism.

Primary information is also drawn from the author’s interviews with key political figures involved in foreign policy decision-making, such as former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, former Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya, Democrat Party spokesman Chavanond Intarakomalyasut, who was also secretary to former Foreign Minister Kasit, Abhisit’s government spokesman Panitan Wattanayagorn, and Deputy Leader of the Democrat Party Apirak Kosayodhin, who was an advisor to former Prime Minister Abhisit. In-depth interviews have also been conducted with prominent scholars in the field.

The secondary source material for this thesis includes: (1) Thai and English language newspaper articles; (2) academic books, journal articles, research papers, and PhD dissertations; (3) other related information from electronic sources where appropriate.

1.6 Thesis structure

Chapter 2 introduces the conceptual framework of this thesis. It begins by reviewing the literature relating to mainstream international relations (IR) theories and foreign policy analysis (FPA). It focuses on neoclassical realism, the main framework of this thesis, which emphasises the importance of both domestic and external factors in an attempt to draw out which aspects of foreign policy outcomes can be explained by which factors. Although realism has been the dominant paradigm in the studies of Thai foreign policy, this chapter argues that the analysis of Thai foreign policy under the Abhisit administration could be better understood by using the neoclassical realist approach. The second chapter concludes with the analysis of the major domestic and external factors influencing the Abhisit administration’s foreign policy.

Chapter 3 aims to understand the background of Thailand’s foreign policy from the end of the Cold War period to the end of the regime of Thaksin Shinawatra. It focuses on relations between Thailand and its neighbouring countries, ASEAN, and major powers. It also examines important factors that influenced Thai foreign policy of the four preceding government administrations, namely the Prem Tinsulanond administration (1977-1988), the Chatchai Choonhavan administration (1988-1991), the Chuan Leekpai administrations (1992-1995; 1997-2001), and the Thaksin Shinawatra administration

(2001-2006). Without an understanding of the historical background of Thai politics and the involvement of the military, it is impossible to understand the Abhisit administration’s foreign policy decision-making. This chapter therefore also discusses the origins of the contemporary political crisis in Thailand, which led to the 2006 coup and the emergence of the pro- and anti-Thaksin movements, specifically the power struggle between the Bangkok-based elite aligned to the military and the Thaksin supporters.

Chapter 4 examines relations between Thailand and Cambodia, with a particular focus on the conflict over the disputed area surrounding the Preah Vihear temple. It begins by providing a brief historical background of the Thai-Cambodian relationship. Then, it examines the major factors that impacted on Abhisit’s Cambodia policy. This chapter argues that the competing nationalisms of the two countries, the weakness of the Abhisit administration’s political position, and the ineffectiveness of ASEAN in managing regional conflict were the primary determinants of the Abhisit administration’s foreign policy towards Cambodia. Furthermore, the Yellow Shirts and the military played a significant role in the Abhisit administration’s hard-line stance against Cambodia.

Chapter 5 looks at Abhisit’s Malaysia policy in relation to the Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. It begins by analysing the historical background of the insurgency in southern Thailand, including addressing the root causes of conflict, especially the assimilationist policies of the past and the failure of the Thai state to respond to the needs of ethnic Malay-Muslims. This chapter also provides a discussion on the return of violence during the Thaksin administration. It argues that the current insurgency in southern Thailand cannot be explained by looking only at historical and religious differences, and social and economic marginalization issues. Along with these factors, the Thaksin administration’s mishandling of the Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents was one of the major factors of renewed conflict. This chapter then assesses how the Abhisit administration responded to the southern conflict and examines important factors that influenced Abhisit’s decision to allow Malaysia to be involved in the peace process.

Chapter 6 focuses on Thailand’s Myanmar policy during the Abhisit administration. It begins by investigating the historical background of the relationship between Thailand and Myanmar. This discussion is followed by the analysis of the domestic and external

pressures that impacted on the Abhisit administration’s foreign policy towards political transition in Myanmar, and of whether Abhisit’s Myanmar policy differed from those of previous administrations. This chapter argues that despite rhetorical differences, continuity was the hallmark of the Abhisit administration’s relationship with Myanmar. Specifically, as security and economic interests were very important, the policy of engagement as well as the avoidance of sanctions or any diplomatic pressure against the Burmese junta appeared to be only the option for the Abhisit government.

Chapter 7 summarises the key findings and implications of this thesis. Through the analysis of the three case studies, the main findings are that the Abhisit administration’s foreign policy towards Cambodia, Myanmar, and Malaysia revealed more elements of continuity rather than change, and that domestic political pressures were the primary determinants of Abhisit’s foreign policy decisions. This final chapter elaborates on how these general findings provide a better understanding of contemporary Thai foreign policy, and presents avenues for future research.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THAILAND’S FOREIGN POLICY

An abundance of literature exists on theories of international relations (IR) and the study of foreign policy analysis (FPA). Many IR scholars have endeavoured to better understand and explain the nature of the relations between states. They also have attempted to explain the origins and the causes of conflict and war as well as the possibility of international cooperation and the role of international institutions. This chapter reviews classical and contemporary theories of IR, with an emphasis on factors influencing continuity and change in a state’s foreign policy. Although there are many models that offer varying explanations of FPA, this thesis adopts neoclassical realism as a conceptual framework for the analysis of Abhisit’s foreign policy. A neoclassical realist approach focuses on the influence of both domestic and external factors on a state’s foreign policy decision-making. In term of domestic variables, neoclassical realists adopt a state-centric perspective and focus on the features of a state as units of analysis. More broadly, they argue that domestic factors, particularly domestic political considerations, have an impact on how a state responds to the constraints and opportunities of the international system.1 This chapter concludes with the analysis of the impact of domestic political factors and external forces influencing Abhisit’s foreign policy decision-making.

2.1 Mainstream theories of international relations

This section reviews the key tenets of the major theories of IR: realism, liberalism, and constructivism, and their differing explanations about factors influencing a state’s foreign policy.

2.1.1 Realism

Realism has been recognised as the most powerful theoretical explanation of international relations. The earliest accounts of realist theory can be traced back to Thucydides during

1 Kenneth N. Waltz, “International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 54- 57; Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton M. Sapin, “Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics,” in Foreign Policy Decision-Making, ed. Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton M. Sapin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 21-30.

the Peloponnesian War, around 430-400 BC. Realist theory can be divided into two groups: classical realism and neo-realism. For classical realists, human nature is sinful and selfish and these characteristics have an influence on a state’s behaviour.2 They argue that every state is preoccupied with the idea of a power struggle to ensure its own survival in the anarchic international system, and self-interest is an underlying explanation of a state’s action. Classical realist Thucydides stated that “the strong do as they please, the weak suffer as they must”.3 Hans J. Morgenthau, the key thinker of classical realism, points out that a state’s action is motivated by “material power” and “interests”. In the realm of power politics, a state seeks to gain more power, which is necessary to achieve its interests. States may form coalitions to fight against common threats, but will leave or dissolve them when a more advantageous opportunity arises.4 According to the “harmony of national interests” axiom, E.H. Carr argues that the international institutions, principles, or norms are, in fact, “the unconscious reflections of national policy” based on each state’s individual interpretation within the context of its own national interests.5

Beyond the classical realist emphasis on “power and interests”, Hedley Bull has proposed the concept of “anarchical society”, arguing that there is no existing higher level of authority over sovereign states. He argues that a number of historical examples illustrate that the concepts of “common interests”, rules, and institutions of international society have never been considered essential constituents in international politics.6 In addition, for classical realists, given the uncertainty in international politics, a state attempts to enhance its own security by means of threatening actions directed at its opponents. In other words, when a state increases its weapons or military expenditure, this may in turn unintentionally threaten its neighbouring countries. This situation causes the so-called

2 Ronen P. Palan and Brook M. Blair, “On the Idealist Origins of the Realist Theory of International Relations,” Review of International Studies 19, no. 4 (1993): 385-399. The original text of the thoughts of Thucydides can be found in Rex Warner, The Peloponnesian War (London, Penguin Classic, 1954). For more contemporary literature on realism, see, for example: Robert O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International Organization 40, no. 1 (1986): 1-27; Waltz, “International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy,” 54-57; Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 42-63. 3 David Carment and Patrick James, “Ethnic Conflict at the International Level: An Appraisal of Theories and Evidence,” in Wars in the Midst of Peace: The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict, ed. David Carment and Patrick James (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 253-254. 4 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 485-507. 5 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1946), 103, 146-152. 6 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 25,49.

“security dilemma”, leading to an increase in tension and a net loss of security for the whole.7

While classical realists claim that human nature is the root cause of state action, for neo- realists, states are the dominant actors in international politics and the structure of the international system is a primary determinant of state action.8 According to Kenneth Waltz’s idea of the “third image”, states are unitary and rational actors. Due to conditions of international anarchy, all states seek to survive and have to protect themselves by increasing and using their power, and the relationship among states is thus marked by fear, suspicion, hostility, and insecurities.9 As each state has different levels of power and capability, it therefore has different interests and makes different foreign policy decisions.10 More importantly, due to the uncertainty over the actions of other states, all states must be prepared to fight for their survival.11 This helps explain a state’s actions. Neither classical realists nor neo-realists consider domestic politics to be a significant influence on a state’s foreign policy. They do not consider a state’s domestic political considerations, such as a state’s political system and the perspectives of key political figures, to have much influence on a state’s foreign policy. Some neo-realists argue that while states may have different political systems, they will behave similarly as long as they find themselves in comparable conditions in the international system.12

Neo-realism has been challenged by other theories focusing on the influence of domestic factors on a state’s foreign policy.13 Based on the rational-choice model, Robert Gilpin’s study on the rise and fall of empires explains the linkage between domestic and

7 John Herz originated the idea of the “security dilemma”, and it has since been developed by Robert Jervis. See John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 9; Robert Jervis, “Realism in the Study of World Politics,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 971-975; Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” 43-44. 8 Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action,” International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (1989): 459-461. 9 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theories of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 65-66. 10 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History XVIII, no. 4 (1988): 616; Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no. 2 (1993): 45; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997): 913. 11 David A. Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 1-24. 12 Waltz, Theories of International Politics, 98-99. 13 The details of other theories that challenge neo-realism will be discussed in the section of domestic political explanations.

international factors and their influence on state action. 14 He points out that “when environmental conditions seem to make it profitable and domestic incentives are sufficiently strong, ambitious states seek to create empires and unite the international system by force”.15 Gilpin argues that states, as rational actors, pursue foreign policy based on cost-benefit calculations. They will attempt to change the existing international system if the expected benefits of so doing exceed the costs.16 According to the model of complex interdependence, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane have argued that domestic societal actors, such as policy makers, interest groups, and business leaders, play a pivotal role in influencing a state’s foreign policy decisions.17 Based on the democratic peace theory, a state’s political system directly impacts its behaviour. Specifically, scholars of democratic peace theory argue that democratic countries are more likely to be at peace with one another, compared to those in non-democratic or semi-democratic regime.18

Realism has been the dominant theory explaining Thailand’s foreign policy. It generally assumes that international factors shape Thai foreign policy. During the period of the Cold War, relations between Thailand and other countries were preoccupied with the concept of balance of power. To assure Thailand’s survival and security, Thai political leaders applied approaches based on flexibility and adaptability. Since the end of the Cold War, realism has been accepted among Thai political elites and used to explain relations between Thailand and major powers such as the United States and China. While the tenets of realism and neo-realism can be used to analyse a state’s foreign policy, neither provides complete explanations or a set of general propositions that would enable scholars to understand the influence of domestic politics in the realm of FPA.

14 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 87. 15 Ibid., 145. 16 Ibid., 6-7. 17 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (1998): 81-85; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, (New York: Longman, 2011), 3-10. 18 Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,” American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 629-630; William J. Dixon, “Democracy and Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict” American Political Science Review 88, no. 1 (1994): 14-15; Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” in Debating the Democratic Peace, ed. Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996): 23-25; Bruce Russett, “The Fact of Democratic Peace,” in Debating the Democratic Peace, ed. Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996): 116-118.

2.1.2 Liberalism

Liberalism is considered as the antithesis of realism. While realists understand international politics through the lens of power and interests, liberalism focuses on the causes of conflict and cooperation in international relations. Although both liberals and realists acknowledge states as the central units of analysis and agree that anarchy is a fundamental condition of the international system, liberals are more optimistic than realists about the opportunity for cooperation between states.19 Over the centuries, the tenets of liberalism have been interpreted in diverse way. 20 The early literature of liberalism, such as John Locke’s Two Treaties of Government (1690), Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1795), and Jeremy Bentham’s Plan for Universal and Perpetual Peace (1927), offers only a broad concept about human freedom and the importance of international trade and international law as a means to promote peace, prosperity, and justice. Generally, liberals believe that peace and security are attainable, but states need to search for a means to prevent or minimise the consequences of the security dilemma between states. Liberals focus on the role of international organisations and international law in the prevention of conflicts between states. 21 As Stephen Walt notes, liberals attempt to find instruments that “states can use to achieve shared interests, highlight the powerful economic forces with which states and societies must now contend, and help us understand why states may differ in their basic preferences”.22 In general, the ideas of liberalism can be categorised into three main groups, namely liberal internationalism, liberal idealism, and liberal institutionalism. These three groups share a belief that cooperation in international politics is possible and achievable, but they offer different explanations of how international cooperation can be initiated and maintained.23

19 See Timothy Dunne, “Liberalism,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 164- 171. 20 Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151-1156; Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate? Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), 7; Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 107-108. 21 Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, 9-13. 22 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy 110, (Spring, 1998): 34-46. 23 Oliver Daddow, “Liberalism,” in International Relations Theory, ed. Oliver Daddow (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2009), 69-80.

The first group is liberal internationalism, which argues that a state’s foreign policy must be established based on the principles of human freedom and dignity. This argument is derived from the works of Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham. The ideas of individual liberty, free trade, prosperity, and interdependence have been identified as principal determinants of sustainable peace and security.24 Scholars of liberal internationalism argue that the “political liberalism” and “internationalism” must be implemented together. The essence of political liberalism is “the protection of individual freedom, the reduction of state power, and the conviction that power is legitimate only if it is based on consent and respects basic freedoms”. 25 Internationalism represents any activities in international affairs that are designed to enhance cooperation among states, particularly through the vehicle of international organisations. In sum, liberal internationalism believes that states should pursue foreign policies that are meant to advance the principles of liberty and the rights of man, and states should promote these principles through international institutions.26

Furthermore, liberal internationalism argues that the pattern of relationships among democratic states is more peaceful than the ones in autocratic states. This argument is given by advocates of the liberal democratic peace theory, which has its origins in Kant’s seminal essay entitled “Perpetual Peace”. Kant’s idea was accepted by many democratic governments after the collapse of communism in the 1990s. Michael Doyle makes a similar argument, asserting that liberal democratic states, particularly those that are committed to the defence of human rights at home, are more likely to be able to resolve conflicts with other democratic states through non-military means, such as bargaining and negotiation. 27 Bruce Russett agrees with this argument, suggesting that democracy, economic interdependence, and membership in international organisations are optimal solutions for preventing conflicts and promoting sustainable peace. Because of these three mechanisms, Russett claims, the cost of conflict would be higher than that of a peaceful solution. 28 The democratic peace theory was widely debated when United States

24 Dunne, “Liberalism,” 164-170. 25 Stanley Hoffmann, “The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism,” Foreign Policy 98, (Spring, 1995): 160. 26 Eugene R. Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990), 25. 27 Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” 1156. 28 Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993): 11-14; Bruce Russett, “Can a Democratic Peace Be Built?,” International Interactions 18, no. 3 (1993): 278.

President Bill Clinton explicitly predicated his foreign policy on this theory and again with regard to United States President George W. Bush’s foreign policy after the 9/11 attack.29 However, democratic peace theory has been criticised by many realist scholars. Christopher Layne claims that democratic peace theorists cannot provide sufficient statistical evidence to support their arguments. 30 According to Sebastian Rosato, “democracy does not cause peace”, and the degree of democracy in a country does not reflect the characteristics of its foreign policy. More importantly, Rosato points out that there have been wars between democratic countries.31

The second group is liberal idealism, which believes in the goodness of human nature and that people are able to cooperate and compromise with one another through socialisation and education. Scholars of liberal idealism argue that war can be prevented by improving international law and strengthening international organisations and institutions as instruments for promoting peace. The idea was widely accepted during United States President Woodrow Wilson’s term in office (1913-1921). He suggested that a state’s behaviour can be constrained by the existing norms and rules of international institutions. Some supporters of liberal idealism have argued further that the roles of civil society organisations, such as research institutions, environmental agencies, health groups, and human rights groups, are crucial in promoting peace, and that international organisations would also be strengthened by promoting the participation of civil society groups.32

The last group is liberal institutionalism, which has directly challenged the concept of realism. While realists argue that a state’s self-interest is determined by the anarchical nature of the international system, liberal institutionalists basically believe that states, particularly the powerful ones, frequently commit themselves to the same rules. They claim that if governments or political elites can foresee the benefits of cooperation,

29 Timothy J. Lynch, “Liberalism and Neoliberalism,” in New Directions in United States Foreign Policy, ed. Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller, and Mark Ledwidge (New York: Routledge, 2009), 48-61. 30 Manfred G. Schmidt, “Political Performance and Types of Democracy: Findings from Comparative Studies,” European Journal of Political Research 41, (2002): 147-163. 31 Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” The American Political Science Review 97, no. 4 (2003): 585-602. 32 Mary Kaldor, “The Idea of Global Civil Society,” International Affairs 79, no. 3 (2003): 583-593; Richard Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics,” World Politics 55, no. 4 (2003): 579-606.

facilitated by international institutions, they will attach themselves to such institutions.33 Since the end of the Second World War, regional and international organisations have expanded in number and scope. The concept of “complex interdependence” has been widely discussed among scholars of liberal institutionalism.34 Moreover, after the end of the Cold War, globalisation has made the world more complex and interconnected culturally, politically, and economically, many problems that states are facing cannot be solved by individual action, but rather require international cooperation. Following the formation of ASEAN in 1967, liberal internationalism has been immensely influential among political leaders of Southeast Asian countries. Over the decades, ASEAN has become a common instrument to ensure peace and stability in the region.35

2.1.3 Constructivism

Constructivism emerged in the early 1990s, as a challenge both to realism and to liberalism.36 It focuses on human consciousness and its place in international affairs, arguing that social dimensions, such as ideas, norms, and beliefs, impact on a state’s behaviour. 37 Constructivists hold that all human beings construct their own belief systems, which directly shape their identities and behaviours. They also argue that a state’s foreign policy or its rational cost-benefit calculation is not only influenced by material factors such as population, technology, economics, and military strength, but also by the beliefs, identities, and norms that a state evolves in. Contemporary studies by prominent scholars such as Martha Finnemore, Kathrin Sikkink, and Alexander Wendt have demonstrated that the interaction between states influences the way these states define their interests and foreign policy objectives.38 Constructivists claim that a state’s

33 Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 41-42. 34 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 226-254. 35 Jorn Dosch, “ASEAN’s Reluctant Liberal Turn and the Thorny Road to Democracy Promotion,” The Pacific Review 21, no. 4 (2008): 531-538; Evelyn Goh, “Institutions and the Great Power Bargain in East Asia: ASEAN’s Limited ‘Brokerage’ Role,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 11, no. 3 (2011): 373-374. 36 Risse Thomas, “Social Constructivism and European Integration,” in European Integration Theory, ed. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), 159-176. 37 Ralph Pettman, “Constructivism,” in World Affairs: an Analytical Overview (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2010), 169. 38 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization, 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917; Alexander Wendt, “The State as Person in International Theory,” Review of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2004): 289-316.

foreign policy is always changing, depending on its relations with other states. In this regard, Wendt has proposed two main arguments; first, that the “structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces”, and second, that the “identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature”. In other words, Wendt believes that a state’s foreign policy is determined by its identities, which can be changed and transformed by the process of state interaction.39

Prominent scholars such as Amitav Acharya, Muthiah Alagappa, Mark Beeson, and Alice Ba have adopted constructivism as a framework for the study of regional integration in Southeast Asia, particularly the development of ASEAN as a regional institution. For example, Acharya points out that the long-standing ASEAN norms of non-interference and consensus largely contribute to the substantive progress of ASEAN integration.40 Alagappa points out that “the idea of nation on the basis of which the state is constructed” or an “imagined community” is rooted in domestic problems and occasionally in interstate conflicts. He argues that a state’s behaviour including its identities and interests can be changed through the process of socialisation in international institutions.41 Like other IR theories, the shortcoming of constructivism is about its concept of identity transformation, which is difficult to measure or prove. Many constructivists have been criticised for failing to give a clear definition of a state’s identity and having a lack of empirical studies analysing the way a state’s identity could possibly be formed and changed.42

In sum, the three major theories in IR, namely realism, liberalism, and constructivism, have all been adopted by many scholars in the field to enhance the understanding of the influence of external factors on Thailand’s foreign policy. However, external factors are only one dimension that can be used to explain a state’s behaviour. The following section

39 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-10. 40 Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter?: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), 29. 41 Muthiah Alagappa, “Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework for Analysis,” Review of International Studies 21, (1995): 359-387; Muthiah Alagappa, “Regional Institutions, the UN and International Security: A Framework for Analysis,” Third World Quarterly 18, no. 3 (1997): 427. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1992), 6. 42 Ian Hurd, “Constructivism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Duncan Snidal and Christian Reus-Smit, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 305-308.

focuses on the impact of domestic factors on foreign policy decision-making, especially the influence of domestic political pressures on Thailand’s foreign policy options.

2.2 Neoclassical realism: conceptual and theoretical issues

Neoclassical realism is adopted as the theoretical framework for this thesis because it represents the best option for the analysis of the influence of domestic and external factors on Abhisit’s foreign policy decision-making. Like classical realism and neo-realism, neoclassical realism is “state-centric”, and considers the anarchical nature of international politics, the struggle for power among states, and the need for state survival as the dominant determinants of a state’s foreign policy. However, a neoclassical realist explanation goes further, arguing that to gain an understanding of factors determining a state’s foreign policy, one must examine not only external factors, but also domestic factors within a state. Neoclassical realists examine the influence of domestic factors, such as its regime type, political leaders’ perspectives, public opinion, interest groups, and economic conditions, to help explain a state’s foreign policy decision-making.

The term neoclassical realism was coined by Gideon Rose in 1998:

It [Neoclassical realism] explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables…Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy [are] driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systematic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.43

Neoclassical realism has been considered the third generation of realism. In recent years, it has increasingly been adopted by scholars of FPA because it provides a practical and more balanced explanation of process, causes, and effects of a particular foreign policy decision. By combining the strengths of both classical realism and neorealism, neoclassical realists focus on a state and its agencies found in classical realism without

43 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 146. Rose has referred to Thomas Christensen, Aaron Friedberg, Randall Schweller, William Wohlforth, and Fareed Zakaria as prominent neoclassical realists.

sacrificing neorealism’s idea of the international political system. Adrian Hyde-Price concludes that “neoclassical realism offers a way of combining the richness of the classical realist tradition with the theoretical rigour of Waltzian neorealism”. 44 For neoclassical realists, a state’s foreign policy is influenced by the anarchic structure of the international system it occupies, and also by domestic-level variables or the “black box” of the state. In other words, neoclassical realists have held some views on a state’s foreign policy that differed from those of classical realism and neorealism, arguing that a state’s responses to external challenges and opportunities also depend on domestic factors.

Robert Putnam’s “two-level game theory” provides a framework for understanding the interaction of domestic politics and foreign policy, one influencing the other. In Putnam’s model, a state may have a range of foreign policy choices, which are determined by the international political system, but political leaders are likely to pursue a policy that primarily responds to domestic pressures. For example, states may face similar international pressures, but they inevitably have different foreign policies depending on their differing domestic conditions.45 In term of domestic factors, neoclassical realists focus on a state’s domestic political structure, particularly regime type, political leaders’ perspectives, and state-society relations, to explain how a state manages and reacts to external pressures and opportunities.46

While realism has been the dominant theory in IR and is also used in much of the mainstream academic literature on FPA, neoclassical realist arguments are rare in the literature, particularly in the case of Thailand’s foreign policy, possibly because neoclassical realism has only recently emerged, in the 1990s. This thesis demonstrates that neoclassical realism is a useful theoretical framework for analysing Thailand’s foreign policy during the Abhisit administration. This theory provides a rich explanation of the influence of both domestic factors and international pressures as an important

44 Adrian Hyde-Price, “Realism: A Dissident Voice in the Study of the CSDP,” in The Routledge Handbook of European Security, ed. Sven Biscop and Richard G. Whitman (New York: Routledge, 2013), 27. 45 For more discussion of this issue as well as the impact of domestic politics on a state’s foreign policy, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Domestic Politics and International Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 46, (2002): 1-6; Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick, The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2012), 1-19. 46 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 151-152.

component for FPA. More importantly, this thesis argues that the Abhisit administration’s foreign policy was strongly influenced by domestic factors, rather than external factors. Specifically, for much of the Abhisit government’s term in office, Thailand’s foreign policy towards its neighbouring countries was primarily driven by domestic political pressures, rather than external pressures.

2.3 Domestic sources of foreign policy

Many scholars have attempted to examine the influence of domestic factors on a state’s foreign policy. Although their explanations of the impact of domestic factors on change and continuity in foreign policy may differ from one another, they have all made similar arguments that domestic factors vary from state to state and from government to government, and that foreign policy decisions are usually made by political leaders.47 As a result, domestic politics is considered as one of the primary factors influencing a state’s foreign policy. Placing domestic political factors at the centre of analysis of foreign policy, many neoclassical realists focus on the role of governing parties in foreign policy- making and the perspectives of political elites. They argue that political leaders’ outlooks and their responses to both external opportunities and constraints are influenced by domestic political pressures. In a democratic country, a government depends on public support to remain in power. Therefore, they have to take public opinion into consideration when making foreign policy decisions, and pursue a foreign policy that is in turn expected to strengthen their domestic political position.

Thailand has been a constitutional monarchy under a parliamentary democracy system since 1932. However, Thai politics over the past eighty years has been preoccupied with problems of political instability, military coups, and a struggle for power between the military and civilian elites. After the 1947 coup, Thailand was ruled mostly by military- led governments for nearly half a century. Consequently, much Thai foreign policy was in the hands of the military during this period, particularly those who occupied top positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was responsible for areas that were not of primary concern to the military such as economic

47 James D. Fearon, “Domestic Policies, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 1, no. 1 (1998): 289-313.

cooperation and trade. During the Cold War years, like many other countries in the region, Thailand struggled to preserve their sovereignty and to prevent military intervention by major powers. During this period, Thailand pursued a policy of confrontation and hostility, rather than cooperation and friendship, towards its neighbouring countries. However, the changing security environment in the region in the post-Cold War era altered relations between Thailand and its neighbours. Economic, rather than political, considerations appeared to have a considerable impact on Thailand’s regional foreign policy. Moreover, the period since the 1992 coup, despite the persistence of the military’s political involvement, has seen the emergence of Thailand’s middle class, which has become the dominant political force in contemporary Thai politics. As a result, Thailand’s foreign policy agenda has been influenced by various stakeholders, such as academics, think tanks, the media, and business groups, and expanded from security and military- oriented issues into various other fields, particularly economic cooperation.

This thesis focuses on the primacy of domestic political variables influencing Abhisit’s foreign policy. It examines four factors, including interest groups, bureaucratic politics, public opinion, and leaders’ orientations. These domestic political factors will be considered in answering the following questions:

1. Did domestic political factors affect and shape Thailand’s foreign policy towards its neighbouring countries during the Abhisit government?

2. If there was an interrelationship between domestic factors and Thai foreign policy, how did Thai political leaders’ perceptions affect Thai foreign policy? Moreover, how much power did the Abhisit government have in making foreign policy decisions?

3. Were there any political opposition groups or interest groups that were especially strong and affected foreign policy-making? If so, did these groups play a major role in shaping the final decisions and how did they push their agendas?

In the following section, all these domestic political factors are discussed through an analysis of relevant literature. Each variable is analysed individually and used to interpret events requiring explanation.

2.3.1 The influence of interest groups on foreign policy

In any democratic political system, interest groups are crucial political actors because differing opinions and conflicting interests are a natural part of society. Interest groups (also called advocacy groups, pressure groups, or lobbyists) are defined as stakeholders who share common interests in the outcome of a particular political issue and attempt to influence a government to make decisions favourable to their interests. 48 Extensive research has focused on conditions in which interest groups play a role in the formation of foreign policy. Jack Snyder argues that no matter what political system or regime type it has, a state’s foreign policy is mainly a reflection of the domestic political debates and pressures. Interest groups are often considered one of the key actors heavily involved in political debates and policy decision-making. 49 Much like Snyder, Helen Milner maintains that foreign policy is often influenced and directed by domestic political considerations, which are mainly shaped by various interest groups within the state. She argues that interest groups are able to influence foreign policy because they are perceived by policy makers as “sources of information”.50 In many circumstances, the executive and legislative actors may have differing preferences over foreign policy. Therefore, they always seek the opinions of powerful interest groups in society before making a final decision to ensure that they develop a policy that responds to public demand.51

Since there are many interest groups in society, they are forced to compete with each other in order to influence policies to their own advantage. These different interest groups sometimes form a coalition to strengthen their bargaining power to achieve greater benefits or influence over a particular matter. However, the goals of each interest group may not coincide with national interests as a whole. As a result, a state’s foreign policy does not absolutely reflect its national interests, but rather it is a result of bargaining and compromise among interest groups. 52 While there is an abundance of definitions of

48 John J. Schrems, Understanding Principles of Politics and the State (Maryland: University Press of America, 2007), 148-151. 49 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), 54. 50 Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 246-248. 51 Ibid. 52 Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005): 107-123.

interest groups, this thesis focuses only on interest groups that can bring the views of their constituents to the attention of foreign policy decision-makers. 53 Thailand’s foreign policy is generally in the hands of elite groups, including military and civilian leaders and bureaucrats.54 Only a few interest groups have power and are allowed to be involved in foreign policy decision-making. During the Abhisit government, influential business and political groups were the two major interest groups that were able to involve themselves. They put pressure on government in many different ways, such as by lobbying ministers or members of the executive branch, making campaign contributions, or defining issues and moulding public opinion.

Business groups

Business groups play an important role in foreign policy decision-making, especially that which relates to economic and trade policy. They support governmental decisions if they benefit them, and have the power to lobby politicians or regulators to change policies that do not protect their interests. In Thai political culture, the relationship between politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen has been referred to as “money politics”.55 Accordingly, the phenomenon of big business owners running for election to high office is common in Thai politics. The ability of big business owners to be elected to positions of power often corresponds to their financial contributions to their political parties. Once taking office, they often use their political power to influence policy decisions that will advance their interests or, in many cases, to support firms which belong to their families.56 In the past, many big business groups in Thailand emerged from small private companies that were founded by Chinese immigrants, who were uneducated and had a low political profile.57 Other large business groups were owned by the Crown Property Bureau or members of

53 Paul D'Anieri, “The State, Society, and Foreign Policy,” in International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs (Boston, M.A.: Wadsworth, 2010), 133. 54 Duncan McCargo, “Thailand,” in Countries at the Crossroads: A Survey of Democratic Governance, ed. Sanja Kelly, Christopher Walker, and Jake Dizard (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2008), 685. 55 Anek Laothamatas, “Business and Politics in Thailand: New Patterns of Influence,” Asian Survey 28, no. 4 (1988): 452-455. 56 Pramuan Bunkanwanicha and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, Big Business Owners and Politics: Investigating the Economic Incentives of Holding Top Office (Tokyo: Center for Economic Institutions, 2006), 1-3. 57 Natenapha Wailerdsak, “Business Groups in Thailand,” in The Oxford Handbook of Business Groups, ed. James R. Lincoln, Takashi Hikino, and Asli M. Colpan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 237- 266.

the Thai royal family. After the fall of the military regime in 1973 and the country’s boost in socio-economic development in the 1980s, large business groups, especially Chinese groups, have become powerful and involved in politics both directly and indirectly.58 Many business owners have held high positions in the government, political parties, or the legislature. A number of former Thai Prime Ministers, such as Banharn Silpa-archa (1996-1996), Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006), Samak Sundaravej (June-November 2008), and Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-present), are from ethnic Chinese business families.

The relationship between business groups and the Abhisit government was clear. Many big business groups that had suffered under Thaksin, along with most middle-class people in Bangkok, supported Abhisit’s Democrat Party. However, the majority of voters, including business owners, in northern and northeastern Thailand strongly supported the pro-Thaksin Pheu Thai Party.59 This thesis focuses on large business groups in Thailand and their influence on Abhisit’s foreign policy towards the region. For example, after Abhisit led Thailand into conflict with Cambodia, the Thai-Cambodian border in the areas of Sa Kaeo, Sisaket, Surin, Trad, and Chanthaburi provinces was closed. Business owners in those areas suffered from a decline in trading and group tour cancellations. Therefore, they strongly opposed Abhisit’s hard-line stance vis-à-vis Cambodia. Due largely to pressure from these businesses, the Abhisit administration was forced to refrain from taking any action that might escalate tensions and instead endeavour to restore relations with Cambodia.60

Domestic political oppositions (the Red Shirts versus the Yellow Shirts)

Domestic political oppositions play a significant role in monitoring government foreign policy. According to Joe Hagan, political oppositions refer to those “who challenge the position and/or policies of the ruling groups and coalition”.61 They are not simply parties

58 Laothamatas, “Business and Politics in Thailand: New Patterns of Influence,” 451. 59 Charles Keyes, “The Color of Politics: Thailand’s Deep Crisis of Authority,” in Bangkok, May 2010: Perspectives on a Divided Thailand, ed. Michael J. Montesano, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, and Aekapol Chongvilaivan (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 177. 60 Daniel Schearf, “Thai-Cambodia Fighting Slows Border Trade, Traffic,” VOA News, 9 February 2011, http://www.voanews.com/content/134804.html (accessed 9 July 2014) 61 Joe D. Hagan, “Opposition, Ruling Strategies, and the Domestic Road to War: Political Explanations of Foreign Policy and the Great Powers since 1815,” in Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis: Theories and

or groups that oppose or criticise policies of the ruling government, but movements that are strong enough to threaten government stability. The power of opposition groups depends on their capabilities and resources, as well as on the government’s popularity at the time. For example, when a domestic opposition group has grown in numbers and become sufficiently well organised to coordinate nationwide mass protests, they have considerable power to challenge the government. In addition, if the government’s ruling party is fragmented and disoriented, a strong opposition would be possible.62

In Thai politics, political oppositions are multi-faceted and often include political parties, organised activist groups, academics, and the media. Since the 2006 coup, the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts have been considered the two major political movements. They have held rallies and occupied Bangkok’s airports, Parliament House, state offices, and parts of Bangkok and major provinces in Thailand. The Red Shirts, officially known as “the United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship” (UDD), began as supporters of Thaksin and his populist policies, later including those who opposed the military coup. The Yellow Shirts, known as “People’s Alliance for Democracy” (PAD), present themselves as the anti-Thaksin movement and the defenders of the monarchy.63 The emergence of these two groups has been interpreted in various ways. Some scholars claim that this is a class war between the rich and middle class in Bangkok, and the poor in the northern and northeastern parts of Thailand. Others have seen the conflict as the old versus the new elites, or those who are conservative and closely connected to the military and monarchy, and those who no longer tolerate the military’s involvement in politics.64

The emergence of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts is closely linked with the ousting of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin’s party won landslide victories in the 2001 and 2005 elections, but its success did not last. Unlike previous Thai prime ministers, Thaksin’s popularity and his populist policies, which targeted the rural poor,

Methods, ed. Margaret G. Hermann and Bengt Sundelius (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2004), 12. 62 Joe D. Hagan, “Domestic Political Regime Change and Foreign Policy Restructuring: A Framework for Comparative Analysis,” in Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Government Respond to Global Change, ed. Jerel A. Rosati, Joe D. Hagan, and Martin W. Sampson II (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 135. 63 Duncan McCargo, “Thai Politics as Reality TV,” The Journal of Asian Studies 68, no. 1 (2009): 7-12. 64 Tim Forsyth, “Thailand’s Red Shirt Protests: Popular Movement or Dangerous Street Theatre?,” Social Movement Studies 9, no. 4 (2010): 462-467.

were seen as a threat to the power of the conservative forces, including the Thai military and monarchy, and the Democrat Party.65 During his second term in office, Thaksin and his government were accused of corruption, abuse of power, disrespecting the monarchy, and even seeking to turn Thailand into a republic state. These allegations caused Thaksin to lose support and popularity among urban professionals and middle-class groups. In February 2006, the Yellow Shirts organised high-profile anti-Thaksin protests, including the occupation of parts of Bangkok. In September 2006, after months of anti-Thaksin protests, the military staged a coup, ousting Thaksin whilst he attended a United Nations summit in New York. 66 In December 2008, with the help of the military, Abhisit’s Democrat Party came to power. This led to the emergence of the Red Shirts, calling for Abhisit’s resignation and fresh elections. The military crackdown on the Red Shirt demonstrations in April and May 2010 resulted in at least 90 deaths and many thousands of injuries.67

Both the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts had a strong influence on Abhisit’s foreign policy. For example, the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple, which erupted in 2008, demonstrated the linkage of domestic politics and foreign policy. The military and the Abhisit government saw the close personal relationships between Thaksin and Cambodia leader Hun Sen, as well as Hun Sen’s support of the Red Shirt movement, as a threat to national stability. Meanwhile, the Yellow Shirts instigated a nationalist campaign, claiming that the Preah Vihear temple and surroundings rightfully belong to Thailand, and considering Cambodia to be Thailand’s enemy. Pavin Chachavalpongpun asserts that the Thailand-Cambodia dispute over the Preah Vihear temple was connected to Thai nationalism and domestic politics, and that it also showed that the Yellow Shirts played a role in Abhisit’s foreign policy decision-making.68 In April 2009, the Red Shirts invaded the ASEAN summit in Pattaya, forcing Asian regional leaders to be airlifted to safety. The cancellation of the summit was seen as a major

65 Duncan McCargo, “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,” The Pacific Review 18, no. 4 (2005): 499-503. 66 Chairat Charoensin-o-larn, “Military Coup and Democracy in Thailand,” in Divided over Thaksin: Thailand’s Coup and Problematic Transition, ed. John Funston (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2009), 49-54. 67 Michael K. Connors, “Thailand’s Emergency State: Struggles and Transformations,” in Southeast Asia Affairs 2011, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), 287. 68 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Temple of Doom: Hysteria About the Preah Vihear Temple in the Thai Nationalist Discourse,” in Legitimacy Crisis in Thailand, ed. Marc Askew (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2010), 107.

embarrassment for both Thailand and ASEAN. A year later, Abhisit cancelled his scheduled attendance at the 2010 ASEAN summit in Hanoi, which is normally seen as a “must” on the diplomatic calendar, after the Red Shirts stormed Parliament.

2.3.2 Bureaucratic politics

Bureaucratic politics is often referred to the organisational process model of foreign policy decision-making, in which all the decisions are made by a small group of political elites.69 In other words, a state’s foreign policy is an outcome of bureaucratic bargaining among high-ranking bureaucrats and political leaders. Theoretically, a political system consists of a collection of political actors. Their policy preferences may differ and may also change with circumstances, due largely to their different positions in the government. Moreover, political leaders will usually support a policy that directly benefits their own group’s interests.70 The bureaucratic politics argument, therefore, posits a power struggle among political elites who are pursuing their own agendas in foreign policy. Based on this argument, a state’s foreign policy is the result of a political game, in which individual players occupy different positions and these positions define their goals, interests, and priorities, as well as their obligations and limitations. In this game model, individuals fight for power over others by forming coalition groups or excluding specific actors from the decision-making process; as Graham Allison has stated: “Where you stand depends on where you sit”.71 Specifically, a foreign policy decision is the product of political competition, negotiation, and compromise among political elites. Jerel Rosati supports

69 For more discussion of bureaucratic politics, see Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics 24, (1972): 40-79; Robert J. Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique,” Policy Sciences 4, no. 4 (1973): 467-490; Leon V. Sigal, “Bureaucratic Politics & Tactical Use of Committees: The Interim Committee & the Decision Todrop the Atomic Bomb,” Polity 10, no. 3 (1978): 326-331; Steve Smith, “Allison and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review of the Bureaucratic Politics Model of Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 9, no. 1 (1980): 21-40; Jonathan Bendor and Terry M. Moe, “An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics,” The American Political Science Review 79, no. 3 (1985): 755-774; Gregory J. Kasza, “Bureaucratic Politics in Radical Military Regimes,” The American Political Science Review 81, no. 3 (1987): 851-855; Daniel W. Drezner, “Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy,” American Journal of Political Science 44, no. 4 (2000): 733-749; Eben J. Christensen and Steven B. Redd, “Bureaucrats Versus the Ballot Box in Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Experimental Analysis of the Bureaucratic Politics Model and the Poliheuristic Theory,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 1 (2004): 69-90; Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 1-11. 70 Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” 40-47. 71 Graham T. Allision and Philip D. Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (New York: Addision Wesley Longman Inc., 1999), 176.

this argument by claiming that the foreign policy decision group is consisted of numerous individuals and organisations, and each has various differences in goals and objectives. That is, according to Rosati, no preponderant individual or single group in the executive branch unilaterally controls a state’s foreign policy. As such, a state leader (prime minister, president, or foreign minister) is only one among a multiplicity of “chiefs” in the decision-making process.72 Therefore, “no one individual alone has the ability to routinely determine the position of the government on a class of foreign policy issues”.73 Any decision is the result of the “pulling and hauling” among the various groups in a governmental body.74

The term “bureaucratic polity” was coined by Fred Riggs in his influential work on the Thai political system. Since the absolute monarchy was replaced by the first constitution in 1932, Thailand has been ruled either by military-run governments or weak civilian-led governments in which the military has a strong and direct influence. In Thai politics, political power is typically in the hands of the military and civil administration, rather than of political parties operating under parliamentary rules.75 Many Thai prime ministers and other ministers were active or retired senior military officers or civilian bureaucrats. As a result, Thailand’s governing elites are generally senior military commanders, prominent members of parliament, some members of the royal family, and some particularly powerful businessmen. Anek Laothamatas notes that:

…the Thai bureaucratic polity operated among docile, politically inert social groups or classes, leaving decision-making authority in the hands of a small elite of bureaucrats. Autonomous, organized political activities of nonbureaucratic groups – student, worker, peasant, business – were minimal and affected the policy of the state mainly in an informal, particularistic, and often clientelistic manner.76

72 Jerel A. Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective,” World Politics 33, no. 2 (1981): 234-253. 73 Margaret G. Hermann, Charles F. Hermann, and Joe D. Hagan, “How Decisions Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior,” in New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, ed. Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, and James N. Rosenau (Boston, M.A.: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 315. 74 Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective,” 238. 75 John L.S. Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics (New York: Cornell University Press, 1981), 119. 76 Laothamatas, “Business and Politics in Thailand: New Patterns of Influence,” 451.

Bureaucratic politics is useful for explaining Thailand’s foreign policy decision-making in particular. Although the progress of political and economic reforms in Thailand has provided opportunities for various stakeholders to get involved in policy decision-making in general, this remains less true for foreign policy. During the Abhisit administration, the prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, political advisors, the military, and the monarchy all played important roles in foreign policy decision-making, and the following sections will explore these roles in more detail.

The Prime Minister

In the Thai political system, the prime minister serves as the chief executive, the chief legislator, and the chief diplomat. As the leader of the government, the prime minister can appoint any ministers. His role in the conduct of foreign relations is important, given that he represents the country in its dealings with other countries and serves as chief spokesperson in the international community. 77 The power of the prime minister is subject to a number of factors, which may vary over time. Generally, it depends on the prime minister’s ability to build a strong political network as well as a strong support base.78 Furthermore, prime ministers with the support of the military have often been much more powerful than those without such support.79 Historically, most Thai prime ministers were not able to hold office for the full term of four years, due to the instability and high fragmentation of the Thai party system, the military’s interference in politics, coups, and mass demonstrations. For instance, from 2001 to 2011, Thailand was led by six different prime ministers.80 In the case of Abhisit, his power as the prime minister depended on the support of the palace, the military and its allied partners, and the middle

77 John Funston, “Thai Foreign Policy from Sarit to Seni: Adaptation During the Second Indochina War” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 1989), 94; Paitoon Mahapannaporn, “The Making of Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Vietnam: The Era of Reconciliation and Regionalism” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 2000), 24-27. 78 David Oldfield, “The Restructuring of Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Laos, 1988-1991” (PhD diss., Northern Illinois University, 1998), 126-129. 79 Andreas Ufen, Political Party and Party System Institutionalisation in Southeast Asia:A Comparison of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2007), 17-21. 80 Satoru Mikami and Takashi Inoguchi, “Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Thailand, 2003-2007: Perceived Quality of Governance and Its Consequences on Political Beliefs,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8, no. 3 (2008): 282-284.

and upper class in Bangkok.81 More importantly, Abhisit and the Democrat Party came to power through a parliamentary vote, not a popular vote. As a result, throughout his premiership, he faced a major crisis of legitimacy that left him struggling to remain in office, and his government was hampered by opposition forces, led by the Red Shirts.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

The MFA is formally responsible for formulating and implementing all matters related to Thailand’s foreign policy. The ministry has been seen as an elitist organisation as most officials are from privileged backgrounds or influential families, and are educated at the best universities in Thailand and the world.82 Although the MFA is the main institution for foreign-policy formulation, the degree of its involvement in foreign policy decision- making has varied and depends on the regime in power. 83 Unlike military-led governments, most elected civilian governments have allowed the MFA to function to its full potential. The MFA during the era of Thaksin regime (2001-2006) is a case in point. Thaksin’s foreign policy was controversial and different from those of previous governments. His principal foreign policy goal was to transform Thailand’s position from a middle power to becoming a leading country in Southeast Asia. The MFA during this time played a significant role in foreign policy decision-making.84 During the Abhisit administration, however, the MFA’s role was overshadowed by the military. One of the major objectives in foreign policy at this time was to suppress Thaksin’s political movement abroad. Moreover, Abhisit appointed Kasit Piromya, a former leader of the Yellow Shirts, as foreign minister. Since coming to office, Kasit attempted to bring Thaksin back to Thailand for trial, which was publicised as a response to concerns raised by the Yellow Shirts and the military. In addition, due to pressure from the Yellow Shirts, Kasit adopted a hard-line stance against Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, after Thaksin was appointed as a special economic advisor to the Hun Sen government. The ultra-nationalist campaign against Cambodia led by the Yellow Shirts, combined with

81 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “The Necessity of Enemies in Thailand’s Troubled Politics,” Asian Survey 51, no. 6 (2011): 1019-1021. 82 Funston, “Thai Foreign Policy from Sarit to Seni: Adaptation During the Second Indochina War,” 108. 83 Salinee Srivardhana, “Responses to a Major Foreign Policy Change: The Case of Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards the Conclusion of the Third Indochina Conflicts During the Government of Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-1991)” (PhD diss., University of London, 2003), 44. 84 Pongphisoot Busbarat, “Embracing Proaction: The Role of Self-Perception in Thailand’s Post Cold War Foreign Policy” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 2009), 7-8.

Kasit’s strong personal animosity against Hun Sen, exacerbated existing tensions at the border, which eventually led to military clashes between the two countries.85

Political advisors

Political advisors are considered as one of the most important groups in bureaucratic politics. They always work alongside politicians and government officials, guiding them to frame important decisions. Even if political advisors are not fully responsible for the government’s policy decision, their recommendations have a direct influence on the government’s policy agenda.86 Abhisit appointed five advisors to assist him in running his government, but none of them was officially responsible for foreign policy. Panitan Wattanayagorn, who was appointed as a deputy secretary-general of political affairs and the government spokesman, was viewed as one of the key advisors behind the Abhisit government’s foreign policy, due largely to his academic background in security.87

The military

The military has long been a major political actor in Thai politics. Coups are the common mechanism used by the military to seize political power. Following a coup, the military has maintained its power by appointing a military-bureaucratic parliament, which has often provoked popular uprisings that forced the military-installed government out of power and restored liberal democracy. Most of the coups in Thailand have been declared to protect the country and the monarchy from corrupt politicians, or from political chaos and violence.88 Jorn Dosch’s 2004 study of the role of the military in politics and foreign policy decision-making in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia shows that the military’s influence in politics has declined, while civilian governments have become

85 International Crisis Group, “Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict,” Asia Report No. 215, 6 December 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east- asia/thailand/215%20Waging%20Peace%20--%20ASEAN%20and%20the%20Thai- Cambodian%20Border%20Conflict.pdf (accessed 10 July 2014). 86 Christensen and Redd, “Bureaucrats versus the Ballot Box in Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Experimental Analysis of the Bureaucratic Politics Model and the Poliheuristic Theory,” 69-73. 87 Panitan Watttanayagorn, “Thailand: The Elite’s Shifting Conceptions of Security,” in Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 443. 88 Borvorn Praprutidee, “The Military and Modernization in Thailand, 1960-1984” (PhD diss., Miami University, 1987), 20.

more powerful.89 This is, however, not necessarily the case, as Thailand’s military coups in 2006 and 2014 respectively have undermined this claim.

The 2006 coup, despite being termed a “Good Coup”, is clearly a backward step on Thailand’s path to democracy.90 The military has claimed that 80 per cent of people supported the coup and saw it as a means to restore government on its rightful path towards democracy.91 In an interview with Thai newspaper, The Nation, the coup leader, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, insisted that the takeover was for the good of the people and nation:

I would like to say two things about the military coup. First, I received calls for the coup from many people. Second, soldiers are obliged to protect national security, safeguard the nation, and uphold loyalty to the monarchy. The military cannot tolerate any leaders who lack or have limited loyalty to the King.92

Undoubtedly, the monarchy played a pivotal role in this event’s success and also had a major influence on this mindset. Since the 2006 coup, Samuel Huntington’s concept of “military professionalism” has been widely discussed in Thai society. 93 Critics have begun to question whether the military’s interventions in politics lead to democracy or cause political instability and hamper democratisation. A coalition of anti-coup groups has called on the military to reform its role in politics and return to its main duty of protecting the nation from external threats, allowing civilians to lead the country. During the Abhisit government, the military exercised influence over political leaders, and dominated foreign policy decision-making, thereby playing a role in defining major issues related to national security and stability. The relationship between the military and civilian bureaucrats was close. The military was in control of making major foreign policy

89 Jorn Dosch, “Southeast Asia and Globalization: Implications for International Relations,” in Thai Politics: Global and Local Perspectives, ed. Michael H. Nelson (Bangkok: King Prajadhipok’s Insitute, 2004), 131. 90 Kevin Hewison, “Thailand after the “Good” Coup,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 14, no. 1 (2007): 237; Michael K. Connors and Kevin Hewison, “Introduction: Thailand and the “Good Coup”,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, no. 1 (2008): 3-4. 91 Giles Ji Ungpakorn, “There Were Democratic Alternatives to the Staging of a Military Takeover,” The Nation, 26 September 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/homeThere-were-democratic-alternatives- to-the-staging--30014636.html (accessed 10 July 2014). 92 “Exclusive Interview: Kingdom ‘Would Not Have Survived without Coup’,” The Nation, 26 October 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/10/26/politics/politics_30017169.php (accessed 10 July 2014). 93 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 1968), 221.

decisions, with the assistance of civilian technocrats. In the 2007 Constitution, the military does not control use-of-force decision-making, but its input has significant weight when it proposes to use force.

The monarchy

The ideology of Thai national identity is based on the “holy trinity” of nation, religion, and king (Chat, Satsana, Phra Mahakasat in Thai). 94 The current king, Bhumibol Adulyadej, is revered as the most powerful and important king in Thailand’s history. He has been on the throne since 1946 and is currently the world’s longest-serving head of state. Since the revolution of 1932, Thailand has regarded itself as a liberal democracy: the monarchy is no longer involved in politics. As a constitutional monarch, the role of the king is theoretically “above politics”.95 However, many scholars such as Duncan McCargo, Kevin Hewison, Michael K. Connors, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, and Thongchai Winichakul argue that the king has played a significant role in influencing Thai politics, both directly and indirectly. Historically, King Bhumibol has been involved in governmental affairs, numerous political conflicts, coup attempts, and has supported the military’s involvement in politics.96 Moreover, the bond between the palace, military, and political institutions has remained firmly rooted in the Thai political system.97 While the military needs the king’s support to maintain its political influence, the king also needs the military to protect the constitutional monarchy. The reciprocal relationship between the king and the military is reflected in the political events of 1976, 1991, and 2006.98

94 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Thailand since the Coup,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 19 (2008): 140. 95 Michael K. Connors, Democracy and National Identity in Thailand (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007), 130-135; Thongchai Winichakul, “Toppling Democracy,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, no. 1 (2008): 15. 96 For further discussion of the Thai monarchy, see McCargo, “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,” 499-503; Kasian Tejapira, “Toppling Thaksin,” New Left Review 39 (May-June, 2006): 17- 20; Michael K. Connors, “When the Walls Come Crumbling Down: The Monarchy and Thai-Style Democracy,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 41, no. 4 (2011): 658-669; Thongchai Winichakul, “The Monarchy and Anti-Monarchy: Two Elephants in the Room of Thai Politics and the State of Denial,” in “Good Coup” Gone Bad: Thailand’s Political Developments since Thaksin’s Downfall, edited by Pavin Chachavalpongpun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014), 79-108. 97 Connors, “When the Walls Come Crumbling Down: The Monarchy and Thai-Style Democracy,” 661. 98 Michael K. Connors, “Thailand – Four Elections and a Coup,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 62, no. 4 (2008): 491-493.

The success of any coup in Thailand depends on support from the monarchy, which is perceived as symbol of legitimacy in Thai politics.99

In a democratic country, people are supposed to have freedom of expression. However, any public debates on the Thai monarchy are strictly prohibited in Thailand. Even if the role and the actions of the monarchy are politically significant, people are not allowed to speak or criticise the actions of any members of the royal family. As a result, many Thai people still believe that the king is not involved in any political issues and remains above politics.100 Moreover, due to the respect in which the king is held by the people, his opinion and suggestions have a strong influence on the public’s view of politics, including the prime minister, ministers, as well as both the pro-and anti-government protest camps.

2.3.3 Public opinion

In a democratic system, public opinion is an important input into the process of foreign policy decision-making.101 Many scholars have attempted to understand the impact of public opinion on foreign policy.102 James Fearon develops the concept of “domestic audience costs”, in which governments could quickly lose public support if they publicly threaten other countries and subsequently back down. Fearon assumes that such costs or negative consequences would arise because the domestic audience is concerned with whether their leadership is successful in international relations. Moreover, he argues, a domestic audience is likely to view backing down as a sign of government incompetence.103 In this regard, political leaders in democratic systems are accountable to their domestic publics.104 As Fearon notes, “In democratic countries, foreign policy

99 McCargo, “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,” 506-509; Kevin Hewison, “A Book, the King and the 2006 Coup,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, no. 1 (2008): 196-198. 100 David Streckfuss, Truth on Trial in Thailand: Dafamation, Treason, and Lese-Majeste (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2011), 3-9. 101 Ole R. Holsti, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Where Do We Go from Here?,” in Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), 298-299. 102 Jerome S. Bruner, “Public Opinion and America’s Foreign Policy,” American Sociological Review 9, no. 1 (1944): 50-56; Ole R. Holsti, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond- Lippmann Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates,” International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 4 (1992): 439-466; Stuart N. Soroka, “Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy,” The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 8, no. 1 (2003): 27-48. 103 James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 577-579. 104 Kenneth A. Schultz, “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises,” American Political Science Review 92 (1998): 829-832; Alastair Smith, “International Crises and Domestic Politics,” American Political Science Review 92, (1998): 623-624.

decision is made by an agent on behalf of principals (voters) who have the power to sanction the agent electorally or though the workings of public opinion”.105

In contrast to Fearon’s argument, Richard Sobel’s study on the impact of public opinion on the United States’ intervention in the Vietnam War claims that although each American administration during this period was aware of and sensitive to public opinion, it was actually responsive to public opinion only when its pre-existing policy was in line with public preferences. In other words, although public opinion polls may influence their views, policy-makers are more likely to respond to only public opinion that supports government preferences.106 Building on the work of Sobel, Peter Furia and Bethany Barratt examine the cases of twelve countries to shed light on the influence of public opinion on a government’s decision to participate in the Iraq War. They conclude that public opinion does not have a strong influence on government decision-making. However, the linkages between public opinion and government action are complicated, involving other factors such as the preferences of individual political leaders, and the degree of intensity of the public’s concerns about government action.107 Peter Trumbore identifies three major factors influencing the impact of public opinion on government decisions. First, timing is important: public opinion has the greatest impact on government decision during the period before the policy is finally determined by ministers. Second, if a policy is a high-intensity issue, involving a wide range of political actors, public opinion will be more likely to affect the government’s stance on the issue. Third, if the public has direct power to ratify a government decision, the potential for public opinion to directly impact on the government’s decision will be more apparent.108

Studies of public opinion as a source of the legitimacy of government policies are widely discussed. Alexander Todorov and Anesu Mandisodza argue that elite misperceptions of public opinion are important as they relate to the attitudes and behaviours, as well as the

105 Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” 581. 106 Richard Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy since Vietnam: Constraining the Colossus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 9-26. 107 Peter A. Furia and Bethany Barrett, “Introduction,” in Public Opinion and International Intervention: Lessons from the Iraq War, ed. Richard Sobel, Peter A. Furia, and Bethany Barrett (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2012), 23-29. 108 Peter F. Trumbore, “Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two- Level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process,” International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 3 (1998): 545- 565.

decisions of individual policy-makers. They found that there might be wide differences between “actual” and “perceived” public preferences, and policy-makers seem to react to the “misperceived” public opinion, rather than the “actual” public opinion. Consequently, public opinion is not always reliable and does not necessary reflect the authentic will of the people. 109 Moreover, Ole Holsti points out that “generation, gender, education, occupation, region, and race” give people differing ideologies and preferences.110 By examining these factors, scholars will understand more about the causes of changes in public opinion. In Thailand, the two major polling organisations are Assumption University’s ABAC poll and Suan Dusit Rajabhat University’s Suan Dusit poll. The results of opinion polls from these two agencies are usually aired in the media, and Thai political leaders are often called to respond to the survey results.

2.3.4 The leaders’ orientations

Political leaders’ individual preferences and behaviours are highly significant in foreign policy decision-making.111 According to neoclassical realists, political leaders are the primary actors in the policy-making process. They argue that political leaders are rational actors, who make decisions based on a strategic calculation of costs and benefits. In this sense, as different decisions have different impacts, political leaders are generally expected to define a state’s domestic and external constraints and opportunities, and accordingly make the foreign policy decisions that are best for the country. Therefore, a state’s foreign policy preferences may vary in accordance with the orientations of political leaders. In other words, a state’s foreign policy reflects the values and beliefs of political elites. Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan argue that “Leaders’ orientations arise out

109 Alexander Todorov and Anesu N. Mandisodza, “Public Opinion on Foreign Policy: The Multilateral Public That Perceives Itself as Unilateral,” Public Opinion Quarterly 68, no. 3 (2004): 323-348. 110 Holsti, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Where Do We Go from Here?,” 163-165. 111 For more discussion of leaders’ orientations, see Margaret G. Hermann, “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1 (1980): 7-46; Karen A. Rasler, William R. Thompson, and Kathleen M. Chester, “Foreign Policy Makers, Personality Attributes, and Interviews: A Note on Reliability Problems,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1 (1980): 47-66; Alex Mintz, “How Do Leaders Make Decisions?: A Poliheuristic Perspective,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 1 (2004): 3-13; Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, “Belief System as Causal Mechanisms in World Politics: An Overview of Operational Code Analysis,” in Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis, ed. Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006): 3-22; Stephen G. Walker, “Foreign Policy Analysis and Behavioral Internatinal Relations,” in Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations, ed. Stephen G. Walker, Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer (New York: Routledge, 2011): 3-20.

of their experiences, goals, beliefs about the world, and sensitivity to political context”.112 They also suggest that political leaders make decisions based on their beliefs, perceptions, interpretations, and judgments about what is possible and most likely to benefit their own political supporters or strengthen their own political positions. Moreover, political leaders’ responses to international pressures can be ranged from “doves” to “hawks”, involved to isolationist, unilateral to multilateral, regional to global, and pragmatist to radical.113

Many studies of leaders’ orientations revolve around the rationality of leaders’ decisions and the way in which individual rationality influences foreign policy decision-making. Joshua Goldstein and Jon Pevehouse noted that “Every international event is the result, intended or unintended, of decisions made by individuals”.114 Robert Jervis examines the psychology of leaders, arguing that political leaders’ perceptions and misperceptions are often formed by their experiences. Furthermore, political leaders’ misperceptions commonly emanate from cognitive bias, inadequate information, and stressful conditions. 115 Such perceptions frame the government’s policy priorities, including specific foreign policy actions. In sum, Jervis argues that political leaders’ attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs impact their actions and decisions. When they believe in something, they are likely to perceive all other relevant information based on their existing perceptions and experiences. As a result, by knowing a particular leader’s perspectives, one may predict how that leader will define the situation and consequently how he or she will respond to it. This thesis therefore examines the attitudes of Thai foreign policy-makers and how they the policy. In the case of the Abhisit government, this thesis focuses on the perspectives of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya, and military leaders.

112 Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan, “International Decision Making: Leadership Matters,” Foreign Policy, 110 (Spring, 1998): 124. 113 Ibid., 126. 114 Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, “Foreign Policy,” in International Relations (New York: Longman, 2012), 129. 115 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 28-31.

Conclusion

The literature on FPA can be categorised into two major groups. The first group comprises that which adopts mainstream IR theories, including realism, liberalism, and constructivism, to examine the relations between states and the impact of international structure on a state’s foreign policy. The other group, neoclassical realism, includes those scholars who examine both domestic and external variables to analyse a state’s foreign policy. Neoclassical realists focus on domestic factors, particularly domestic politics, and how domestic politics influence a state’s foreign policy. Moreover, they also argue that leaders’ beliefs about the international system and their concern with domestic political survival are the key determinants of foreign policy. This thesis focuses on the primacy of domestic political variables influencing Abhisit’s foreign policy. It examines four major factors, including interest groups, bureaucratic politics, public opinion, and leaders’ orientations, and how these factors influenced the Abhisit administration’s foreign policy decision-making.

CHAPTER 3

THAILAND’S FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE POST- COLD WAR ERA

Thailand’s foreign policy during the tensions of the Cold War was responsive to external forces, rather than to domestic politics. In the view of the Thai government, the most dangerous threat was the communist expansion in Indochina. From the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, Thailand allied itself with the United States in fighting against the communist threat in the region. However, after the withdrawal of American bases from Thailand in 1975, followed by the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia (1978-1989), Thailand turned to China for military assistance and also played a more active role in regional cooperation. The changing security environment in the region in the post-Cold War era, particularly the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989, altered relations between Thailand and neighbouring countries. Economic, rather than political, considerations appeared to have a considerable impact on Thai foreign policy towards the region. The decline of the military’s political influence after the 1992 coup, combined with socio-economic transformation, has considerably changed Thai society. The middle class that emerged as a result of the policies of economic liberalisation introduced in the late 1980s has become the dominant political force in Thailand. Thailand’s foreign policy agenda has also expanded from security and military-oriented issues into various other fields, particularly economic cooperation, with the objective of promoting Thailand as a regional economic centre.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background of Thailand’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia from the Cold War period to the regime of Thaksin Shinawatra. This chapter examines the major factors, both domestic and international, that Thailand faced in this period. It begins with an overall assessment of the evolution of Thai foreign policy in the region during the Cold War. It will then analyse Thai foreign policy of the three specific government administrations during the two decades after the end of the Cold War, namely the Chatchai Choonhavan government (1988-1991), the Chuan Leekpai administrations (1992-1995; 1997-2001), and the Thaksin Shinawatra regime (2001- 2006). This chapter also discusses Thailand’s political crisis following the 2006 coup.

3.1 Thailand’s foreign policy during the Cold War

Since the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in 1932, political instability, military coups, and a struggle for power between the military and civilian elites have long dominated the scene in Thai politics. During the half-century after a coup in 1947, Thailand was ruled mostly by military-led governments. Consequently, Thai foreign policy was largely influenced by the interests of the military, particularly those who occupied top positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy.1 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was virtually excluded from the decision-making process regarding security issues and was in charge of areas that were not of primary concern to the leaders of the military, such as economic cooperation and trade.2 During the Second World War years, like many other countries in the region, Thailand had struggled to preserve their sovereignty. To prevent military intervention by major powers, Thailand had pursued a policy of confrontation and hostility, rather than cooperation and friendship, towards its neighbouring countries.

1 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, “Thailand: A Stable Semidemocracy,” in Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 323-324; Paul Chambers, “Thailand on the Brink: Resurgent Military, Eroded Democracy,” Asian Survey 50, no. 5 (2010): 839-840; Aurel Croissant, “Civilian Control over the Military in East Asia,” EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No. 31, September 2011, http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng_report/201111151042365.pdf (accessed 10 July 2014), 16. 2 Daniel Mark Fineman, “The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947-1958” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1993), 6-8; Raschada Jiwalai, “Thai Foreign Policy Toward Laos, 1975-1990” (PhD diss., University of Hawaii, 1994), 61.

With the advent of the Cold War years, the political situation in Southeast Asia changed dramatically. Due to the expansion of communism in Indochina, particularly the victory of the Soviet-backed North Vietnamese over the South Vietnamese and the United States, the region became the site of proxy war battles, which climaxed in the Vietnam War. To prevent the expansion of communist regimes, the so-called “domino theory” was used by the United States to legitimise its action in the fight against communist influence during the Vietnam War.3 The United States saw the region as being threatened by communist intervention. If communist forces in Vietnam were victorious, the result would subsequently turn Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia into communist states, like falling dominoes. The Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was established in 1954 as part of the United States’ policy of containment directed against the Soviet Union and China. During that time, Thailand was concerned with the possibility of a Chinese or Vietnamese invasion. The method of “bamboo diplomacy” or bending with the strong wind” was used to maintain Thailand’s political independence.4

For over twenty years from 1950 to 1975, Thailand became a close ally with the United States, as a bulwark against the communist threat. The essence of Thailand’s foreign policy was heavily influenced by the United States’ involvement in the region. Bangkok, as a treaty ally of Washington, sent troops to fight alongside American armed forces in the Vietnam War, and also allowed the United States to use Thailand as a mainstay of resistance against the advancing communist threat in Indochina. There were eight major American military bases and many more minor installations in Thailand.5 Around three- quarters of the bomb tonnage dropped on Laos and North Vietnam was flown from these bases.6 In return, Thailand received hundreds of millions of dollars of military assistance every year from the United States as compensation for its anti-communism efforts.7

3 Danny Unger, “From Domino to Dominant: Thailand’s Security Policies in the Twenty-First Century,” in East Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order, ed. Robert S. Ross (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 234. 4 Arne Kislenko, “Bending with the Wind: The Continuity and Flexibility of Thai Foreign Policy,” International Journal 57, no. 4 (2002): 538; Pongphisoot Busbarat, “Embracing Proaction: The Role of Self-Perception in Thailand’s Post Cold War Foreign Policy” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 2009), 5; Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 63-65. 5 Benedict Anderson and Ruchira C. Mendiones, In the Mirror: Literature and Politics in Siam in the American Era (Bangkok: Duang Kamol, 1985), 23.

When Thailand was under military-led governments from the 1950s to the 1960s, an anti- communist campaign became a political tool for the military to legitimise its grip on power.8 More importantly, although during that time Thailand was ruled by a military dictatorship, the United States did not oppose the Thai military’s involvement in politics. Despite regarding itself as the leader of the democratic world, the United States worked closely with the Thai military, whether a civilian or military regime ruled Thailand. The legitimacy of Thai political leaders and the way they came to power (coup, dynasty, or election) were not the United States’ concern. 9 In other words, the United States cooperated with Thai military leaders as long as they supported American interests.10 As Daniel Fineman has argued:

Thailand was never important to the Americans in itself. Rather, it mattered only insofar that it could advance U.S. policy in the region as a whole. When facing the dilemma of whether to encourage good government in Thailand or promote American interests, the Americans’ decision came easily. They chose the latter. And Thailand suffered for it.11

It could be noted that during the Cold War period, the military in Thailand was at the height of its powers, partly due to continued support from the United States.

During the Cold War era, relations between Thailand and the United States led to socio- economic and even cultural changes in Thai society, which Benedict Anderson has called the “American Era” of Thai history.12 A substantial amount of financial aid that Thailand received from the United States brought drastic changes to the country and was important

6 Charles Hirschman, Samuel Preston, and Vu Loi Manh, “Vietnamese Casualties During the American War: A New Estimate,”Population and Development Review 21, no. 4 (1995): 790-791; World and Its Peoples: Eastern and Southern Asia (New York: Marshall Cavendish Corporation, 2008), 676. 7 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, A History of Thailand (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 144-147. 8 Surin Maisrikrod, “Thailand’s Policy Dilemmas Towards Indochina,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 14, no. 3 (1992): 290. 9 Surachai Sirikrai, “Thai-American Relations in the Laotian Crisis of 1960-1962” (PhD diss., State University of New York at Binghamton, 1980), 41; Phongpaichit and Baker, A History of Thailand, 144- 147; Byungkuk Soh, “United States Response to the 1973 Democratic Uprising in Thailand,” International Area Studies Review 12, no. 3 (2009): 219-220. 10 Fineman, “The United States and Military Government in Thailand,” 5-6. 11 Ibid., 500. 12 Benedict Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 9, no. 3 (1977): 15-20; Anderson and Mendiones, In the Mirror: Literature and Politics in Siam in the American Era, 19.

in shaping the modern Thai nation. 13 These changes were evident as early as the ultranationalist regime of Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram (1948-1957). After a 1947 coup, Phibun came back to power for a second term, with his mission of turning Thailand into “the Great Thai Empire”, which was designed as a means to legitimise his authoritarian rule.14 Phibun’s government cooperated with the United States, not only for military protection against communism, but also for financial support. Between 1951 and 1957, Bangkok received about US$500 million in military and economic aid from Washington or around 26 per cent of the central government budget. The military aid from the United States was almost 2.5 times of Thailand’s annual defence budget.15 Many new social and economic development projects such as the construction of roads and highways, the more widespread introduction of electricity supply, and the vast expansion of market-based agriculture were funded by the United States. On the other hand, Bangkok was changed dramatically, as it became a market for sexual services for American soldiers in the region, thus leading to many social problems.16

In the early 1970s, Thailand began to espouse a more neutral foreign policy. Due to United States President Richard Nixon’s rapprochement with China, the American withdrawal from Indochina, and the Vietnamese influence over Laos and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Thailand was forced to adjust its foreign policy to the new political reality in the region.17 Moreover, with the overthrow of the military regime by the student uprising in 1973, the centre of political power in Thailand shifted from fifteen years of military rule to civilian rule. The military stayed out of politics for a brief period, and the civilians began to assume power. After the 1975 general election, Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj came to power. During the Kukrit government (1975-1976), the MFA resumed its role in foreign policy decision-making and its recommendation of a more independent

13 Kislenko, “Bending with the Wind: The Continuity and Flexibility of Thai Foreign Policy,” 541; Ja Ian Chong, “Imposing States: External Intervention and the Politics of State Formation” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2008), 412; Janit Feangfu, “(Ir)resistibly Modern: The Construction of Modern Thai Identities in Thai Literature during the Cold War Era, 1958 -1976” (PhD diss., University of London, 2011), 41-42. 14 Feangfu, “(Ir)resistibly Modern,” 31. 15 Chong, “Imposing States,” 437. 16 Feangfu, “(Ir)resistibly Modern,” 33. 17 John Funston, “Thai Foreign Policy from Sarit to Seni: Adaptation During the Second Indochina War” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 1989), 179-180; Jiwalai, “Thai Foreign Policy Toward Laos, 1975-1990,” 63; Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead, “A Revisionist History of Thai-US Relations,” Asian Review 16, (2003): 62-63.

policy towards the United States was thus brought into effect.18 Thailand successfully established diplomatic relations with China and improved relations with Indochina.19 The most controversial foreign policy issue between the Kukrit government and the military was the withdrawal of American troops, including the removal of all intelligence facilities from Thailand.20 The military strongly disagreed with Kukrit’s initiative, arguing that the presence of American troops was crucial to protect Thailand from any possible North Vietnamese aggression. However, the military decided to maintain a low profile as public opinion appeared to support the withdrawal of American troops.21

Kukrit had lost his parliamentary seat in the 1976 general election and was succeeded as prime minister by Seni Pramoj, his elder brother and political rival. The political riot on 6 October 1976, however, provided an opportunity for the military to stage a coup against Seni’s new government, which ended the democratic transition that had been in progress since 1973.22 King Bhumibol endorsed the coup, which led to the appointment of Tanin Kraivixien by the coup leaders to head a government. However, after only a year in power, Tanin was toppled by the coup in 1977, due to a conflict between Tanin and factions of the military. With support from the monarchy, the military again seized power and ruled for the next decade. The military also took control of foreign policy decision- making.23 A new policy of confrontation of the three Indochina countries was adopted, replacing the previous policy of rapprochement by civilian governments. 24 Raschada Jiwalai has argued that “the military could no longer tolerate a political system in which civilian governments played a significant role in both domestic and foreign policy”.25 Niyom Rathamarit has noted that, while “the political parties in 1974-1976 were stronger than before and had gained significant strength…they were still no match for the

18 David Oldfield, “The Restructuring of Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Laos, 1988-1991” (PhD diss., Northern Illinois University, 1998), 136. 19 M.L. Bhansoon Ladavalya, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy under Kukrit Pramoj: A Study in Decision- Making” (PhD diss., Northern Illinois University, 1980), 2-4. 20 Ibid., 173. 21 ibid., 179-180; Jiwalai, “Thai Foreign Policy Toward Laos, 1975-1990,” 68. 22 Surachart Bamrungsuk, “From Dominance to Power Sharing: The Military and Politics in Thailand, 1973-1992” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1999), 12-13. 23 Oldfield, “The Restructuring of Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Laos,” 136. 24 John Funston, “The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Thailand: Some Preliminary Observations,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 9, no. 3 (1987): 237. 25 Jiwalai, “Thai Foreign Policy Toward Laos,” 73.

military”.26 Many scholars have pointed out that King Bhumibol seemed to be convinced by the military elites that the two coups, in 1976 and 1977, were necessary for the security of the country, as the elected political leaders could not solve the domestic political conflicts and were too weak to counter the communist regimes in Indochina.27

After the 1977 coup, Thailand entered the period of what has been called “semidemocracy”, led by General Kriangsak Chamanand (1977-1980) and General Prem Tinsulanond (1980-1988). The popular support for the monarchy gave legitimacy to the military-led governments. Although the military controlled the executive branch, other stakeholders, such as business groups, technocrats, and academics, gradually developed their strength and became more important political actors of the military regime.28 The Thai political system appeared more democratic and more open to people’s participation than that of previous military regimes. For this reason, many scholars have chosen to use the term “semi-democracy” or “half-leaf democracy”, rather than an autocracy, to describe Thai politics during this time.29

During the Prem government, multi-party politics was allowed and the lower house was elected by the people. In addition, Prem allowed civilian politicians to play a role in his administration. His cabinet was comprised of senior generals and bureaucrats controlling key ministries such as Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Interior, and businessmen and technocrats controlling the lower house and the remaining ministries. Prem’s formation of a cabinet that consisted of technocrats, particularly technical experts in economic matters, eased public concerns over the ability of the military-led government to deal with economic problems, and also enhanced the government’s legitimacy.30 Moreover, Prem’s ability to compromise interests among rival military factions and among political parties

26 Niyom Rathamarit, “Military Governments in Thailand: Their Policies toward Political Parties, 1977- 83” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1984), 111. 27 William Bradley, David Morell, David Szanton, and Stephen Young, “Thailand: Domino by Default? The 1976 Coup and Implications for United States Policy,” Southeast Asia Paper Series No. 46 (Ohio: Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1978), 21; Jiwalai, “Thai Foreign Policy Toward Laos, 1975-1990,” 73. 28 Natenapha Wailerdsak, “Business Groups in Thailand,” in The Oxford Handbook of Business Groups, ed. James R. Lincoln, Takashi Hikino, and Asli M. Colpan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 242- 243. 29 See Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, “Introduction: What Makes for Democracy?,” in Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 7-8. 30 Surin Maisrikrod, “The Making of Thai Democracy,” in Democratization in Southeast and East Asia, ed. Anek Laothamatas (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), 157.

in his coalition government contributed to his political survival. However, throughout his term in office, Prem faced military coups in 1981 and 1985, both of which failed. With the support of the monarchy, the symbol and source of bureaucratic legitimacy, Prem survived the abortive coup attempts to oust him.31 As Jeremy Plotnick has noted:

During his tenure in office, Prem was perceived to be a fair and honest, if somewhat dull, leader who had the interests of the nation at heart. Perhaps his most important asset was that he was acceptable to most major groups and had the strong support of the Royal Family.32

Prem’s loyalty to the monarchy was beyond doubt and the strong support from the Palace made it impossible for his political opponents to defeat him.33

During the 1980s, Vietnam’s presence in Cambodia and its hegemonic ambition to dominate all of Indochina was the most serious threat to Thailand.34 During this period, Thailand, under the Prem administration, allied itself with ASEAN, the United States, and China to counter Vietnam’s hegemony over Cambodia and prevent any Vietnamese incursion.35 Due to the decline in American influence in Southeast Asia after the end of the Vietnam War, Thailand turned to China to seek alternative resources for its defence needs against Vietnam. Thailand’s China policy shifted from one of friendship to a stronger partnership.36 China not only gave military assistance to strengthen the ability of Thai security forces, but also vowed to use force against Vietnam to protect Thailand.37 With military assistance from both the United States and China, Thailand secretly

31 Clark D. Neher, “Thailand in 1987: Semi-Successful Semi-Democracy,” Asian Survey 28, no. 2 (1968): 201; Surachai Sirikrai, “General Prem Survives on a Conservative Line,” Asian Survey 22, no. 11 (1982): 1094. 32 Jeremy Plotnick, “A Case Study: The Translation of Threat Perception into Arms Procurement Policy. Thailand’s Reaction to the Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia” (PhD diss., Northern Illinois University, 1994), 183-187. 33 Sirikrai, “General Prem Survives on a Conservative Line,” 1093-1094. 34 Paitoon Mahapannaporn, “The Making of Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Vietnam: The Era of Reconciliation and Regionalism” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 2000), 80-81. 35 Julaporn Euarukskul, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Vietnam, 1978-1991” (PhD diss., Auatralian National University, 1994), 229; Monsak Jangariyawong, “Thailand in Southeast Asia: A Study of Foreign Policy 1945-1991” (PhD diss., Monash University, 2003), 184-186. 36 Euarukskul, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Vietnam, 1978-1991,” 81-84; Panidone Pachimsawat, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy toward the People’s Republic of China in the Post-Cold War Era” (MA thesis, Boston College, 1999), 14; Chulacheeb Chinwanno, “Rising China and Thailand’s Policy of Strategic Engagement,” in The Rise of China: Responses from Southeast Asia and Japan, NIDS Joint Research Series No.4 (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2009), 92. 37 Euarukskul, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Vietnam, 1978-1991,” 151; Xiaoming Zhang, “China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment,” The China Quarterly 184, (2005): 868.

provided logistical support to the Khmer resistance forces as a means of opposing the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.38

During the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1980s, Prem’s Indochina policy was under the control of the MFA, led by Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Savetsila. 39 Thanks to his early career years in the military service and his special connections with military leaders, Siddhi successfully worked with the military and the National Security Council (NSC). While the military played a role in border security and refugee issues, the MFA was in charge of Thai diplomacy on the Cambodian conflict.40 It should be noted that during the Prem era, although a group of businessmen and technocrats played a more prominent role in the cabinet, Prem’s foreign policy was controlled by a group of bureaucratic elites. Other political bodies, including the legislative branch and political parties, did not play a role in foreign policy decision- making. According to Chai-Anan Samudavanija:

The issue of Indo-China conflicts and its implications have not received much attention from political parties. In Parliament, there has been no serious effort among the MPs or parliamentary committees to study the issue. It seems that politicians take it for granted that the military and the government have so far handled the problem effectively.41

In his eight years in office, Prem was forced to reshuffle his cabinet three times. However, Siddhi was never removed from the cabinet, making him arguably the most powerful foreign minister Thailand ever had. Due largely to Siddhi’s competence, Thailand was successful in maintaining good relations with both China and the United States.42 Facing

38 Thongchai Winichakul, “Kampucha: Mayaphap Kap Manutsayatham (Cambodia: Myth and Humanitarianism),” Warasan Thammasat 14, no. 2 (1985): 55; Maisrikrod, “Thailand’s Policy Dilemmas Towards Indochina,” 295; Euarukskul, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Vietnam, 1978-1991,” 228; Puangthong Rungswasdisab, “Thailand’s Response to the Cambodian Genocide,” in Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives, Program Monograph Series No. 1, ed. Susan E. Cook (New Haven, C.T.: Yale MacMillan Center, 2004), 88, 92. 39 Jiwalai, “Thai Foreign Policy Toward Laos, 1975-1990,” 89; Rungswasdisab, “Thailand’s Response to the Cambodian Genocide,” 90. 40 Jangariyawong, “Thailand in Southeast Asia: A Study of Foreign Policy 1945-1991,” 181. 41 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, “Implications of a Prolonged Conflict on Internal Thai Polities,” in Confrontation or Coexistence: The Future of ASEAN-Vietnam Relations, ed. William S. Turley (Bangkok: Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1985), 84. 42 Sirikrai, “General Prem Survives on a Conservative Line,” 1101.

growing demands for an elected prime minister, Prem resigned in 1988, allowing General Chatchai Choonhavan and the Chat Thai Party to come to power.

3.2 Thailand’s foreign policy under General Chatchai Choonhavan (1988-the 1991 coup)

General Chatchai Choonhavan was Thailand’s first democratically elected prime minister after twelve years of military rule. The way Chatchai entered to politics was different from most previous military leaders, who seized power by staging coups. In 1975, he and his associates in the military allied with a group of local businessmen and formed the Chat Thai Party. Chatchai’s Chat Thai Party won a landslide victory in the 1998 general election. Despite its popular election, the Chatchai government was perceived as a group of business-based politicians and was widely known as the “buffet cabinet”, viewed by many as a corrupt administration. After only two and a half years in office, Chatchai was removed by the army in a coup in 1991 on the grounds of “rampant corruption”.43

Thailand’s regional policy towards the region changed dramatically after Chatchai came into office. He had proposed to increase trade and investment relations with all neighbouring countries, claiming that it was a way of bringing peace to Indochina.44 His policy of “turning Indochina from a battlefield to a market place” became one of the most important conceptual breakthroughs in Thailand’s foreign policy. Chatchai’s Indochina policy was radically different from that of earlier Thai administrators. In contrast to the policy of alliance with China against Vietnam, which was the main strategy of the Prem government, Chatchai pursued a more reconciliatory policy towards both Hanoi and Phnom Penh.45 As a result of Chatchai’s policy of reconciliation, Thailand had great success in developing relations with its communist neighbours. Moreover, the result of

43 Maisrikrod, “The Making of Thai Democracy,” 159; Ruth Thomas McVey, Money & Power in Provincial Thailand (Denmark: NIAS Publishing, 2000), 226. 44 Salinee Srivardhana, “Responses to a Major Foreign Policy Change,” 34. 45 Euarukskul, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Vietnam, 1978-1991,” 230; Oldfield, “The Restructuring of Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Laos, 1988-1991” 1-2, 163; Srivardhana, “Responses to a Major Foreign Policy Change,” 48, 75.

the economic success during this period also led to the emergence of the middle class, who later became the main actors in Thai politics.46

Thailand decided to normalise its relations with Indochina due to a series of changes that occurred in Southeast Asia during the mid-1980s. The political changes in the region began when Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev introduced policies of internal “reconstruction” and “openness”, which coincided with Vietnam’s economic reform, the so-called “Doi Moi”, in 1986.47 The Soviet Union’s economic concerns led to the era of détente among the power blocs and the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations in 1989. Due to the demise of the Soviet Union, combined with a military clash with China during a short border war in the northern part of Vietnam, international sanctions, and its domestic economic difficulties, Vietnam was forced to withdraw its troops from Cambodia in 1989 and return to the international community.48 During these events, Thai foreign policy was in the hands of Chatchai and his advisors, not the foreign minister or military leaders.49 Chatchai and his allies insisted that common prosperity was the best and effective mechanism to bring peace to the region and that a military-oriented foreign policy could no longer adequately serve the long-term interests of the country. They also claimed that peace in the region could be more easily reached through economic cooperation with Indochina. Chatchai abandoned his predecessors’ hard-line policy towards Indochina and instead immediately initiated a new policy of “turning Indochina from a battlefield to a market place”, despite disagreement from factions of the military.50

46 Richard F. Doner, The Politics of Uneven Development: Thailand’s Economic Growth in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 109-110. 47 Nguyen Vu Tung, “Vietnam-ASEAN Cooperation after the Cold War” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2004), 179-180. 48 Beck Lee, “Vietnam’s Foreign Policy Reorientation” (PhD diss., Boston University, 2011), 140-142. 49 Jiwalai, “Thai Foreign Policy Toward Laos, 1975-1990,” 103-104. 50 Euarukskul, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Vietnam, 1978-1991,” 232; Srivardhana, “Responses to a Major Foreign Policy Change,” 7.

Chatchai’s Indochina policy led to problems in domestic politics as well as Thailand’s relations with other countries. The new policy generated conflicts among political elites: between the foreign minister and some military leaders, and Chatchai and his advisory team. While the military under General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh strongly supported Chatchai’s initiative, Foreign Minister Siddhi disagreed with a policy of engagement with Hanoi and Phnom Penh. Siddhi insisted that Thailand had to follow the ASEAN agreement of punishing Vietnam for its intervention in Cambodia and promoting economic expansion with Indochina should come after a political settlement in Cambodia was reached. With the support of the military, Chatchai and his advisors ignored Siddhi’s position.51 In 1989, the Chatchai government invited Hun Sen, whom some accused of being a Vietnamese puppet, to visit Thailand as an independent leader of the Phnom Penh government. Thailand’s initiative to invite Hun Sen to Bangkok, without first clearing the matter with ASEAN countries, China, and the United States, created enormous controversy and widespread opposition, particularly in the other ASEAN countries.52

All other ASEAN members disapproved of Hun Sen’s official visit and were confused over Thailand’s intentions towards Indochina. Due to the way the policy suddenly emerged without any discussion among ASEAN countries, Thailand was blamed for violating ASEAN’s traditional commitment to consensus. Indonesia, in particular, was very dissatisfied with Thailand’s sudden policy change, claiming that it impacted on regional stability.53 For Indonesia, Thailand’s decision could seriously damage ASEAN’s credibility and tear ASEAN apart. Moreover, concerns were raised that Chatchai’s engagement policy with Indochina could ease the pressure being applied to Vietnam to make concessions at the negotiating table over Cambodia’s political future. In other words, Chatchai’s recognition of Hun Sen and his policy of engaging with the Hanoi government had an enormous impact on the Cambodian peace agreement. In this regard, Thailand was expected to consult and seek agreement from other ASEAN countries

51 Euarukskul, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Vietnam, 1978-1991,” 185, 210; Jiwalai, “Thai Foreign Policy Toward Laos, 1975-1990,” 107; Srivardhana, “Responses to a Major Foreign Policy Change,” 178. 52 Maisrikrod, “Thailand’s Policy Dilemmas Towards Indochina,” 296. 53 Leszek Buszynski, “New Aspirations and Old Constraints in Thailand’s Foreign Policy,” Asian Survey 29, no. 11 (1989): 1069-1070.

before making any major decision.54 As former Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja has commented:

ASEAN cohesion and political solidarity, slowly built up over a decade since the end of 1978, was dealt a rude blow by Thailand’s turn-around on the Kampuchean question in 1988…Prime Minister Chatichai’s [sic] actions since then have seriously undermined ASEAN credibility.55

After Hun Sen’s visit to Thailand, Siddhi resigned from the cabinet. Chatchai continued to pursue a policy of economic cooperation with Indochina. He appointed former Commerce Minister Subin Pinkayan as his new foreign minister.56

During his premiership, Chatchai was confident that a military coup was not possible as his government received popular support for its ability to promote economic growth as well as work successfully with the military. 57 However, after General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh resigned as army chief in order to join the government as deputy prime minister and defence minister, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, who succeeded him, began to criticise the Chatchai government for corruption. Seeing themselves as “guardians of a moral political order”, the military, led by Suchinda, staged a coup in 1991. Suchinda claimed that he had to save the country from its corrupt politicians.58 However, the anti- coup demonstrations started a few weeks after Suchinda’s appointment as prime minister. The people’s uprising against the 1991 coup, also known as “the Black May Massacre”, has become one of the most important events in Thai political history, because it signalled that Thai people would no longer tolerate a military regime.59 Most of the protesters were middle class and professional people. The demonstrations demanded Suchinda’s resignation and a constitutional amendment requiring that the prime minister must be an elected member of parliament. The demonstrations were the largest witnessed in Thailand

54 Srivardhana, “Responses to a Major Foreign Policy Change,” 179. 55 Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, “Some Thoughts on ASEAN Security Co-Operation: An Indonesian Perspective,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 12, no. 3 (1990): 166. 56 Jangariyawong, “Thailand in Southeast Asia: A Study of Foreign Policy 1945-1991,” 233-234. 57 Bamrungsuk, “From Dominance to Power Sharing: The Military and Politics in Thailand, 1973-1992,” 27. 58 Scott Christensen, “Thailand after the Coup,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 3 (1991): 95; Zoltan Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012), 192-193. 59 Ake Tangsupvattana, “Political De-Development, Corruption and Governance in Thailand,” in Limits of Good Governance in Developing Countries, ed. Hirotsune Kimura (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 2011), 76.

since the student uprising in 1973, with an estimated half a million people participating. In May 1992, instead of giving in to the demand, Suchinda ordered to use force to disperse anti-government protests in Bangkok, which resulted in more than a hundred deaths.60 Finally, King Bhumibol summoned both sides to his palace and Suchinda stepped down, which led to former diplomat Anand Panyarachun becoming an interim prime minister. Anand organised elections and also removed three top military leaders who had been responsible for the crackdown.61

Thailand’s foreign policy after the 1991 coup was marked by adjustments to the new circumstances of the post-Cold War era. Due to the disappearance of the communist threat and the emerging multipolar system, economic considerations preoccupied Thai foreign policy decision makers.62 Thailand’s Indochina policy focused on economic cooperation as a means to bring peace and stability to the region.63 The successful establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, which was proposed by the Anand Panyarachun government (1991-1992), enabled Thailand to regain its international credibility by demonstrating its willingness and commitment to promoting deeper regional integration.64 Thailand’s relations with Laos and Vietnam gradually improved, as for the first time Thailand provided financial aid to support its neighbouring countries.65

60 Suchit Bunbongkarn, “Thailand in 1992: In Search of a Democratic Order,” Asian Survey 33, no. 2 (1993): 220. 61 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Kings, Country and Constitutions: Thailand’s Political Development, 1932- 2000 (New York: Routledge, 2003), 64. 62 Kusuma Snitwongse, “Thailand in 1993: Politics of Survival,” Asian Survey 34, no. 2 (1994): 151. 63 Maisrikrod, “Thailand’s Policy Dilemmas Towards Indochina,” 297; Jorn Dosch, “The Impact of Democratization on the Making of Foreign Policy in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 25, no. 5 (2006): 51. 64 Jangariyawong, “Thailand in Southeast Asia: A Study of Foreign Policy 1945-1991,” 238. 65 Mahapannaporn, “The Making of Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Vietnam,” 164.

3.3 Thailand’s foreign policy under the Chuan Leekpai administrations (1992-1995; 1997-2001)

3.3.1 Chuan’s first term (1992-1995)

Over six months, in the aftermath of the unsuccessful military intervention in 1992, Thailand had two elections, three prime ministers, four governments, and massive middle-class demonstrations against the military regime, ending with a deadly military crackdown on civilians.66 The 1992 Black May uprising shifted Thai politics into another transitional period. The period following anti-military government protests in 1992 saw a decline in military influence in Thai politics. The fall of the military junta showed that while political power was largely in the hands of the military and civilian elites, some level of citizen participation in the political system had emerged. The institutions of civil society, such as NGOs, the press, and trade unions, became watchdogs in monitoring the government’s accountability.67 Political legitimacy was perceived as the most necessary feature for political elites to gain the support of the people and thus maintain power.68 Although political elites had some degree of autonomy in decision-making, they were nevertheless constrained to some extent by the need to respond to domestic interest groups.69 Moreover, as the military always claimed that its objective in seizing power was to save the country from corrupt politicians, political elites were required to prove that they were able to serve the country in order to prevent the military’s intervention in politics. As Suchit Bunbongkarn has argued:

The civilian government must improve its efficiency, accountability, and stability. The Thai political experience suggests that the fragility of democratic governments encourages military intervention. To change the military mind-set into a more democratic one, the civilian democratic government must prove itself strong and responsible.70

66 Surin Maisrikrod, “Thailand 1992: Repression and Return of Democracy,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 1993, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), 327. 67 See Duncan McCargo, “Elite Governance: Business, Bureaucrats and the Military,” in Governance in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Richard Maidment, David Goldblatt, and Jeremy Mitchell (London: Routledge, 1998), 127. 70 Suchit Bunbongkarn, “The Military and Democracy in Thailand,” in The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific, ed. Viberto Selochan (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2004), 58.

After the 1992 general election, Chuan Leekpai became the prime minister of a five-party coalition government. He was considered the first prime minister to have come to power without either an aristocratic or military background. However, Duncan McCargo has argued that Chuan’s Democrat Party successfully formed the coalition government because of the support of the monarchy.71 The events of May 1992 and the new civilian- elected government were seen as evidence of a decline of the military’s influence in politics. However, many scholars have wondered if democracy in Thailand would in fact continue to exist for long.72 The concern was that the military, with its long history of political intervention, would not allow itself to be excluded from politics.73

Shortly after assuming office, Chuan emphasised the two major difficulties that his government had to deal with in order to establish a stable democracy. The first concern was the military’s structural reform. The second concern was the growing division between the rich and poor. Chuan’s policies were largely influenced by these considerations.74 Chuan started forming new civil-military relations, in which the civilian government, not the military, controlled political decisions. The military was severely downsized and more controlled by the government. Defence policy and, in particular, the military budget were controlled by a civilian authority.75 For example, the annual student intake into Chulachomklao Military Academy was decreased from 500 to 200 and the

69 Helen E. S. Nesadurai, “Attempting Developmental Regionalism through AFTA: The Domestic Sources of Regional Governance,” Third World Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2003): 239. 70 Suchit Bunbongkarn, “The Military and Democracy in Thailand,” in The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific, ed. Viberto Selochan (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2004), 58. 71 Kyoung Kyo Seo, “Military Involvement in Politics and the Prospects for Democracy: Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea in Comparative Perspective” (PhD diss., Southern Illinios University at Carbobdale, 1993), 231; Duncan McCargo, “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,” The Pacific Review 18, no. 4 (2005): 508. 72 Bunbongkarn, “Thailand in 1992: In Search of a Democratic Order,” 218; Anek Laothamatas, “A Tale of Two Democracies: Conflicting Perceptions of Elections and Democracy in Thailand,” in The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, ed. Robert H. Taylor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 201- 202; Michael Leifer, “Can Democracy Last in Thailand?,” in Michael Leifer: Selected Works on Southeast Asia, ed. Kin Wah Chin and Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 689-690. 73 Harold Crouch, “Civil-Military Relations in Southeast Asia,” in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives, ed. Larry Diamond et al. (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 230. 74 Seo, “Military Involvement in Politics and the Prospects for Democracy,” 231. 75 See Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia’s New Democracies,” Journal of East Asian Studies 9, (2009): 197; Paul Chambers, “Trouble in Thailand: Failed Civilian Control Amidst Fruitless Demilitarization,” in Demilitarising the State: the South and Southeast Asian Experience, ed. Rajesh Basrur and Kartik Bommakanti (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2012), 59-60.

curriculum in military academies was revised. The announcement of military promotion was reduced to once a year from twice a year.76 Moreover, the cabinet also rejected the navy’s request in 1994 to purchase two submarines, which would have cost US$640 million, claiming that there was no external threat to the country for the next five years.77 Furthermore, Chuan maintained a complete separation of military and civilian spheres to prevent the military from intervening in politics. This intention was clearly demonstrated when the number of former military officers, who were appointed as senators, was reduced from 152 (out of 260) in 1992 to only 48 in 1996.78

Thailand’s foreign policy in the aftermath of the 1992 Black May massacre

With the decline of the military’s political power, foreign policy was handed over to relevant ministries and agencies such as the MFA, the NSC, and the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB).79 The main focus of foreign policy moved from a military-oriented perspective to a new direction, the “economic-driven foreign policy”, as it was known, with particular attention given to the Greater Mekong Co- operation (GMC) scheme and the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation (QEC) initiative.80 The new policy was popularised during the earlier governments of Chatchai and Anand and enhanced under the Chuan government.81 It aimed to promote Thailand as a regional economic, financial, and transport centre, linking mainland Southeast Asia to other regions. The policy was expected to lead to a boost in the Thai economy, a decrease in the poverty rate, and the closing of the gap between the urban rich and the rural poor in Thailand.82

76 Buszynski, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy: Management of a Regional Vision,” 724. 77 Suchit Bunbongkarn, “Thailand in 1995: The More Things Change, the More They Remain the Same,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 1996, ed. Daljit Singh and Liak Teng Kiat (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), 365. 78 Croissant and Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia’s New Democracies,” 197. 79 John Funston, “Thai Foreign Policy: Seeking Influence,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 1998, ed. Derek da Cunha and John Funston (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), 295-296. 80 Buszynski, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy: Management of a Regional Vision,” 723. 81 Pongphisoot Busbarat, “A Review of Thailand’s Foreign Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia: Exploring an Ideational Approach,” European Journal of East Asian Studies, (2012): 136. 82 Surin Maisrikrod, “Thailand’s Two General Elections in 1992: Democracy Sustained,” Research Notes and Discussions Papers vol. 75 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), 59; Funston, “Thai Foreign Policy: Seeking Influence,” 295.

Despite the success of economic cooperation with Indochina, Thailand had a serious problem with Myanmar over a disputed area, known as “Hill 491”. 83 The conflict occurred when the hill was occupied by the Burmese Karen ethnic group to launch attacks against Burmese troops. The Burmese government sent troops to attack the Karen rebels and finally retook the hill.84 The presence of Burmese troops along the border after this was a major concern for Thailand. However, the Chuan government and the military had different ways of solving the problem. While the government refused to use military action to pressure the Burmese junta to withdraw their troops from the hill, the Thai military and the opposition accused the government of indecisiveness. Finally, all groups adopted a unanimous position after King Bhumibol stepped in calling for a peaceful negotiation to resolve disputes. He also suggested that if the government could not reach agreement with Myanmar over the ownership of the hill, the two countries should cooperate to develop the land, which would benefit both sides. Following the king’s advice, Thai government officials were sent to Yangon for negotiations. The outcome of the talks was positive as Myanmar promised to withdraw its forces from the disputed area.85

During his time as prime minister, Chuan was criticised for making slow progress in solving economic and political problems, due to the political rivalries among the coalition partners and the working style of Chuan himself, who relied heavily on the bureaucracy.86 Moreover, many of Chuan’s cabinet members were accused of profiting from a land reform scheme that was originally intended to benefit poor landless farmers. In response to the corruption allegations, Chuan dissolved the House of Representatives and the general election was held in July 1995.87 Chuan’s Democrat Party lost and has never again won a majority of seats in parliament in the two decades since. Following the downfall of the Democrat Party, Thailand was led by the governments of Banharn Silpa-archa (1995-1996) and former Army Chief Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (1996-1997). During their

83 Leszek Buszynski, “Thailand and Myanmar: The Perils of ‘Constructive Engagement’,” The Pacific Review 11, no. 2 (1998): 299. 84 Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Thai-Burma Relations,” in Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on multilateral and bilateral responses (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001), 124. 85 Maisrikrod, “Thailand 1992: Repression and Return of Democracy,” 347. 86 ibid., 338-339; Clark Neher, “Democratization in Thailand,” Asian Affairs 21, no. 4 (1995): 208. 87 Bunbongkarn, “Thailand in 1995: The More Things Change, the More They Remain the Same,” 358; Suchit Bunbongkarn, “Thailand’s November 1996 Election and Its Impact on Democratic Consolidation,” Democratization 4, no. 2 (1997): 155.

short terms in office, the two governments had similar problems with ministerial corruption. They were also blamed for leading Thailand into the 1997 financial crisis.88 It has been revealed that the crisis was caused by the government’s lack of transparency and accountability, corruption, and mismanagement.89

Despite the 1997 financial crisis, relations between Thailand and neighbouring countries improved significantly during the Banharn and Chavalit governments. Particularly, trade and economic relations between Thailand and Myanmar improved considerably during the Chavalit government. Chavalit claimed that his background in the military helped him understand the way to deal with Myanmar’s military leaders.90 He used what he termed “military-to-military diplomacy” to connect with senior leaders of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).91 Moreover, he refrained from comment about human rights abuse in Myanmar and focused only on business issues. Chavalit and his ministers visited Yangon several times, arguing that the informal talks between Thai and Burmese leaders were crucial for business negotiations. Consequently, they were accused of using personal connections with Burmese leaders to advance their business interests. Companies owned by Chavalit’s family, cabinet members, military leaders, and local power brokers reportedly benefited from concessions given by Myanmar. 92 The economic crisis prompted the resignation of the Chavalit government in 1997, following the financial crisis that damaged the Thai economy for a decade.

Although 1997 was a year of economic crisis, it was also the year that Thailand introduced a new constitution, known as the “People’s Constitution”, reflecting the degree of public participation involved in its drafting process. New constitutional articles were also designed for a more participatory form of democracy.93 Due to the 1997 financial crisis, the public grew increasingly dissatisfied with government corruption. They viewed the crisis as having been caused by “cronyism, nepotism, and corruption in the financial

88 Leif Roderick Rosenberger, “Southeast Asia’s Currency Crisis: A Diagnosis and Prescription,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 19, no. 3 (1997): 228-233. 89 Amara Pongsapich, “Politics of Civil Society,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, ed. Daljit Singh and John Funston (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), 332. 90 Funston, “Thai Foreign Policy: Seeking Influence,” 296. 91 Ibid., 301. 92 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “A Study of Thai Nationhood and Its Implications on Thai-Burmese Relations, 1988-2000” (PhD diss., University of London, 2002), 133-136. 93 Suchitra Punyaratabandhu, “Thailand in 1997: Financial Crisis and Constitutional Reform,” Asian Survey 38, no. 2 (1998): 165.

sector” and by the government’s mismanagement of financial institutions.94 As a result, there emerged a much greater interest in political participation. Discussions of the concepts of good governance and civil society participation also received wide public attention in Thai society. McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand have summarised the people’s attitude towards the government at this time as follows:

Public dissatisfaction with the quality of Thai politicians and of the political system had produced growing demands for reform in the wake of May 1992…Political parties were much criticised as factionalised alliances of interest groups, divorced from the concerns of the electorate. Practice such as candidate-buying (encouraging electable politicians to switch parties by using financial inducements), vote-buying and the corruption of government officials made the electoral process wide open to manipulation and abuse.95

The 1997 Constitution was perceived as a landmark in democratic political reform. It was expected that anti-corruption measures in the new constitution would lead to a more accountable and stable government. The new constitution also aimed to reduce the notorious vote-buying and other inappropriate measures that plagued Thai elections and helped to produce many corrupt governments.96 James Klein has argued that during the first sixty years of Thailand’s constitutional history, “there were no serious attempts to reform the political process and its associated problems of inefficiency and corruption”.97 Moreover, the 1997 Constitution was the first attempt in Thai history to grant people “the right to resist peacefully any act committed for the acquisition of the power to rule the country by a means which is not in accordance with the modes provided in this constitution”.98 In other words, it was the first time that the Thai constitution protected an individual right to resist to military coups and direct military interference in politics.

94 Suchit Bunbongkarn, “Thailand’s Successful Reforms,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 4 (1999): 64. 95 Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005), 127. 96 Prudhisan Jumbala, “Thailand: Constitutional Reform Amidst Economic Crisis,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 1998, ed. Derek da Cunha and John Funston (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), 273-274; Punyaratabandhu, “Thailand in 1997: Financial Crisis and Constitutional Reform,” 165- 166; Duncan Mccargo, “Security, Development and Political Participation in Thailand: Alternative Currencies of Legitimacy,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 1 (2002): 63-64. 97 James R. Klein, “The Constiution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997: A Blueprint for Participatory Democracy,” (San Francisco, C.A.: Asia Foundation, 1998): 9. 98 Jumbala, “Thailand: Constitutional Reform Amidst Economic Crisis,” 274.

Although the right to resist coups was a considerable controversy during the drafting process, a compromise was eventually reached.

3.3.2 Chuan’s second term (1997-2001)

Chuan’s Democrat-led coalition government came to power for the second time in 1997, with a campaign of promoting democracy and human rights and bringing the country’s economic recovery. The 1997 financial crisis seriously affected Thailand, worsening its economic, social, and political problems. Once the foreign reserves were depleted and the Thai currency went into free fall, Thailand’s economic competitiveness was dramatically reduced. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate went from positive to alarmingly negative, from -1.7 per cent in 1997 to -10.2 per cent in 1998.99 Within a year, Thailand was transformed from an East Asian miracle to an economic failed state.100 The Chuan government decided to receive a bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and had to comply with the IMF’s conditions, including many measures to restructure and reform the financial sector. 101 Consequently, the government had to restrain budget expenditure, close insolvent financial institutions, and privatise state companies, such as the Telephone Organisation of Thailand (TOT) and the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT). As a result of following those measures, the Chuan government was accused of “selling out” the country to foreigners.102

It soon appeared that the IMF’s recommendation of a fiscal tightening was partly misguided as the Thai economy was decelerating rapidly.103 In addition, the social impact of the economic crisis and of the measures adopted under IMF pressure resulted in high rates of poverty, crime, unemployment, and education dropouts. During the three years in office, Chuan and his Democrat Party were accused of making Thailand the “good

99 Wayne M. Morrison, “Thailand-U.S.Economic Relations: An Overview,” 28 March 2003, CRS Report for Congress No. RS21478, http://www.usasean.org/Thailand/thailand-RS21478.pdf (accessed 10 December 2012), 3. 100 Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, “The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis,” NBER Working Paper No. 6680 (Cambridge, M.A.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998), 2. 101 Kevin Hewison, “A Book, the King and the 2006 coup,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, no. 1 (2008): 201. 102 “Chuan on Top,” The Economist, 25 December 1999, http://www.economist.com/node/270944 (accessed 18 January 2013); Kevin Hewison, “Thailand’s Capitalism: The Impact of the Economic Crisis,” UNEAC Asia Paper No.1 (Armidale, NSW: University of New England, 1999), 39-42. 103 Takatoshi Ito, “Asian Currency Crisis and the International Monetary Fund, 10 Years Later: Overview,” Asian Economic Policy Review 2, no. 1 (2007): 25-26.

boy” of the IMF and not appreciating the hardship imposed on Thai people.104 Moreover, the Chuan administration was criticised for its “bureaucratic inﬂexibility and high-minded disdain”, and several ministers were accused of corruption and of mishandling the response to the economic crisis. The failure of the IMF and the Chuan government to revive the economy and protect domestic interests resulted in a political backlash against the Democrat Party.105

Thailand’s foreign policy during the 1997 financial crisis

The 1997 economic crisis and political circumstances at the time put Chuan in a difficult position. The political and economic instability resulted in a decline in Thailand’s bargaining power, particularly in dealing with the ASEAN countries. The government’s effort to position Thailand as a regional hub for financial and economic activities was hampered due to the economic hardship. Overall, the Chuan government’s approach to foreign policy was focused on economic rather than political concerns. Thailand at that time needed foreign credits for trade and foreign investment to alleviate the difficulties of economic reform and privatisation. For this purpose, Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan joined other ministers in addressing these issues in international forums, such as IMF, ASEAN, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).106

A great deal of effort was focused on strengthening economic cooperation with major powers, especially with Thailand’s major trade partners such as Japan, China, and the United States. 107 While Japan and China actively provided economic support and financial aid to help Thailand’s economic recovery, the United States’ reaction bitterly disappointed the Thai government. The Bill Clinton administration not only failed to offer any bilateral bailouts to Thailand and Indonesia, but also suppressed the IMF in making heavy-handed demands for reform, imposing its one-size-fits-all measures on the

104 Nicola Bullard, Walden Bello, and Kamal Mallhotra, “Taming the Tigers: The Imf and the Asian Crisis,” Third World Quarterly 19, no. 3 (1998): 528-529. 105 McCargo and Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, 1. 106 Funston, “Thai Foreign Policy: Seeking Influence,” 304. 107 Naruemon Thabchumpon, “Thailand: A Year of Diminishing Expectations,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, ed. Daljit Singh and John Funston (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), 322.

region.108 The IMF’s macroeconomic programme resulted in an economic recession and brought little economic relief.109 As a result, the IMF’s policies were widely criticised for damaging Asian economies and generated the spread of anti-Americanism in Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries.110 Tensions between Washington and Bangkok were further aggravated after the United States blocked a Thai candidate, Supachai Panitchpakdi, from heading the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It has been argued that relations between Thailand and the United States deteriorated due partly to the Chavalit government’s pro-Myanmar stance.111

Myanmar was perhaps one of the most problematic foreign policy issues for the Chuan government. Several problems in Myanmar, such as ethnic civil wars, drug trafficking, and human rights violations, had intensified and ASEAN seemed unable to deal with these problems. Consequently, Thailand decided to adopt a tougher stance towards Myanmar.112 With its ambition to gain international recognition and political legitimacy at home, the Chuan administration proclaimed that Thailand would give priority to democracy and human rights in its relations with the Burmese junta.113 In 1998, Thailand proposed the controversial concept of “flexible engagement”, as a way for ASEAN to put pressure on the Burmese regime. The idea suggested that ASEAN’s policy of non- interference in other members’ affairs should be replaced by flexible engagement, which would allow ASEAN countries to discuss the domestic policies of any ASEAN countries when they had cross-border implications. 114 All the ASEAN countries, except the Philippines, rejected Thailand’s proposal, claiming that its concept remained ambiguous and its primary purpose challenged the traditional norms of non-interference in internal

108 Diane K. Mauzy and Brian L. Job, “U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited Re-Engagement after Years of Benign Neglect,” Asian Survey 47, no. 4 (2007): 625. 109 Suchitra Punyaratabandhu, “Thailand in 1998: A False Sense of Recovery,” Asian Survey 39, no. 1 (1999): 81; Ito, “Asian Currency Crisis and the International Monetary Fund,” 30. 110 Mauzy and Job, “U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited Re-Engagement after Years of Benign Neglect,” 625-626. 111 Paul Chambers, “U.S.-Thai Relations after 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 3 (2004):462-463. 112 Chachavalpongpun, “A Study of Thai Nationhood and Its Implications on Thai-Burmese Relations, 1988-2000”, 139-140. 113 Ibid., 24, 61. 114 Jürgen Haacke, “Understanding the ASEAN Way: Origins and Development of a Diplomatic and Security Culture” (PhD diss., University of London, 2000), 236; Kusuma Snitwongse, “Thai Foreign Policy in the Global Age: Principle or Profit?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 23, no. 2 (2001): 197.

affairs of ASEAN members.115 The policy met with little success as it was never endorsed and generated more tensions between Thailand and Myanmar.116

3.4 Thailand’s foreign policy under the Thaksin Shinawatra regime (2001-2006)

The downfall of Chuan and his Democrat Party paved the way for the rise of billionaire telecommunications tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party in 2001. Thaksin’s TRT Party won a landslide victory in the 2001 general election, with 248 of the 500 seats in the House of Representatives. The TRT Party became the first political party in Thailand’s history to hold the majority of seats in the parliament. The rise of Thaksin and his popularity derived from his populist economic policies, with which he had campaigned against Chuan’s Democrat Party during the economic crisis.117 As the economic crisis deepened and lengthened after Thailand’s time under the direction of the IMF, the Chuan government was seen as ineffectual and incapable of resolving the problems that the country faced. While the Chuan government suffered a continuous decline in its popular support, Thaksin’s TRT Party seized the resulting opportunity to come to power.

It is noteworthy that the economic crisis of 1997 paved the way to Thaksin and his allies to enter politics. Though the crisis affected many businesses, Thaksin’s Shin Corporation, the largest telecommunications business in Thailand, suffered only a slight loss in profits. Thanks to Thaksin, who was then deputy prime minister, Shin Corporation survived the crisis well. Before the Thai currency was floated in July 1997, Shin Corporation bought millions of US dollars and later gained the profit from exchange rate changes.118 In 1998, Thaksin assembled a group of major domestic capitalists, who had also survived the crisis, and founded the TRT Party. They positioned themselves as modernisers who wanted to

115 N. Ganesan, “Thai-Myanmar-ASEAN Relations: The Politics of Face and Grace,” Asian Affairs 33, no. 3 (2006): 139. 116 Haacke, “Understanding the ASEAN Way,” 250. 117 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, “Business Populism in Thailand,” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 2 (2005): 61; Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, “Thaksin’s Populism,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, no. 1 (2007): 64. 118 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2004), 97; Kitti Prasirtsuk, “From Political Reform and Economic Crisis to Coup d'état: The Twists and Turns of Thai Political Economy, 1997-2006,” Asian Survey 47, no. 6 (2007): 884.

bring economic reforms and cleaner politics.119 Their populist campaigns were innovative and captured public attention. The new political party with new ideas simply seemed the best alternative at the time of national crisis.120 Thaksin’s populist policies won him huge grassroots support, particularly among the rural poor in northern and northeastern Thailand, but upset many middle-class and wealthy voters, especially those living in Bangkok. For the middle and upper classes, Thaksin’s policies were a new form of vote- buying by corrupt politicians and would ultimately cause long-term economic damage.121

During his first term, Thaksin launched what became known as the “Thaksinomics” policies, which focused on increasing the purchasing power of the rural poor, income redistribution, and government subsidies for the working classes. Among other initiatives, Thaksinomics included debt relief for farmers, village development funds, a rural small and medium enterprise development programme, and a new health programme which brought coverage to all Thais for 30-baht per visit.122 In late 2004 and 2005, Thailand’s economic growth decelerated, due to rising inflation and increased fuel prices. The economy was also plagued by consumer debt and trade deficits partly because of Thaksin’s populist policies. Moreover, the controversial sale of Shin Corporation, a company owned by Thaksin’s family, to Singapore’s Temasek Holdings ignited an outcry, particularly among the middle-class professional and educational elites in Bangkok. When the company was sold, Thaksin’s family allegedly avoided paying more than US$1.9 billion in taxes.123

Thaksin’s TRT Party won a second landslide victory in the 2005 general election, with nearly 19 million votes or 70 per cent of the votes, which translated into a majority of 377 of the 500 seats in parliament. Thaksin became the first Thai prime minister to complete the full term in office and be re-elected for the second term. However, the second Thaksin

119 Kevin Hewison, “Thailand’s Conservative Democratization,” in East Asia’s New Democracies, ed. Yun-han Chu and Siu-lun Wong (New York: Routledge, 2010), 123-124. 120 Phongpaichit and Baker, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand, 98. 121 N. Ganesan, “Thaksin and the Politics of Domestic and Regional Consolidation in Thailand,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 1 (2004): 30; Kane Seth, “Thailand’s Political Crisis: Which Color Is Conservative?,” SAIS Review 30, no. 1 (2010): 106. 122 Robert Looney, “Thaksinomics: A New Asian Paradigm?,” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 29, no. 1 (2004): 72-76; Patarapong Intarakumnerd, “Thaksin’s Legacy: Thaksinomics and Its Impact on Thailand’s National Innovation System and Industrial Upgrading,” International Journal of Institutions and Economies 3, no. 1 (2011): 32-33. 123 Phongpaichit and Baker, “Thaksin’s Populism,” 77-79.

administration faced growing opposition, led by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) or the Yellow Shirts, who accused Thaksin of corruption, abuse of power, disrespecting the monarchy, and even seeking to turn Thailand to a republic state.124 In March 2006, the PAD began street protests in Bangkok and occupied parts of Bangkok for over three months, trying to bring down the government. Eventually, after fifteen years of maintaining a low profile, the military staged a coup in September 2006 and toppled the Thaksin government. The coup was backed by the old power elites in the military and palace. The coup also led to the emergence of the anti-coup movement, the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), or the Red Shirts, who called for the resignation of the military government and fresh elections to be held. The leaders of the Red Shirts were politicians in the TRT Party and activists. Many of the Red Shirt supporters were from the urban and rural poor.125 This support has transferred to the Pheu Thai Party (PTP), led by Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra.

During six years in office, Thaksin and the TRT Party brought major changes to Thai politics, including Thai foreign policy. In terms of Thai politics, Thaksin intended to eliminate three major problems. First, he claimed that many politicians were corrupt as they won elections through massive vote-buying and looked for ways to recoup their money plus profits through corruption. Second, he pointed out that the Thai bureaucracy was ineffective: “too powerful, too torpid, and too ignorant of the business world”. In other words, the bureaucracy was blamed for a lack of will and capacity to help the country develop and cope with a globalised world. Third, he blamed the old group of politicians and bureaucrats for their inability to respond to the 1997 financial crisis, claiming they did not understand the world.126 In attempting to deal with what he called “dirty politics”, Thaksin proposed “new thinking, new ways, for all Thais”, using his clean and uncorrupted image, combined with his successful experience in business, to call for bureaucratic reform. His initiative aimed to empower and decentralise local

124 Oliver Pye and Wolfram Schaffar, “The 2006 Anti-Thaksin Movement in Thailand: An Analysis,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, no. 1 (2008): 38-41. 125 See McCargo, “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,” 499; Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Thaksin’s Political Zenith and Nadir,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2006, ed. Daljit Singh and Lorraine C. Salazar (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 148-150; Giles Ji Ungpakorn, “Class Struggle between the Coloured T-Shirts in Thailand,” Journal of Asia Pacific Studies 1, no. 1 (2009): 85; Kevin Hewison, “Thaksin Shinawatra and the Reshaping of Thai Politics,” Contemporary Politics 16, no. 2 (2010): 127; Michael H. Nelson, “Thailand’s Legitimacy Conflict between the Red Shirt Protesters and the Abhisit Government: Aspects of a Complex Political Struggle,” Security and Peace 1, (2011): 14. 126 Phongpaichit and Baker, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand, 172.

governments. The idea of a “CEO-diplomat” and “CEO-governor” was raised, supported by the claim that the methods of business were superior to the practice of bureaucracy.127 Thaksin’s leadership style and his populist policies captured the hearts and minds of the poor. However, his opposition portrayed Thaksin as a “chao pho” or power broker, who used his influence to act above and beyond the law.128 More importantly, Thaksin’s growing power challenged the old power arrangements, or a coalition of military and civilian elites, and was a major cause of his downfall in 2006.

Thaksin Shinawatra’s economics-driven foreign policy

Thaksin’s foreign policy is interesting in many respects and displays some differences to those of previous governments. The economic and political circumstances at the time put Thaksin in a strong political position. When Thaksin came to power, he pursued seemingly unorthodox but effective and pragmatic foreign policies. Influenced by the ideas and leadership style of former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed and former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Thaksin crafted himself as a new star of Asian leaders, who had his own original ideas and was not limited by Western ideologies.129 He criticised the previous Chuan government for its foreign policy that focused on human rights and democracy, rather than economic development. In contrast to the Chuan administration’s policy, the principles of human rights and democracy were not mentioned in the Thaksin government’s policy statement. Thaksin’s Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai declared that his foreign policy would not be “ideology driven” but “business driven”. 130 This rhetoric, however, gave the wrong message to the West, especially the United States, that Thailand wanted to pursue economic interests while ignoring human rights and democratic principles. Thaksin was quick to clarify his government’s stance on this issue, claiming that he intended to follow the previous government’s pro-democracy effort.131

127 Martin Painter, “Thaksinisation or Managerialism?: Reforming the Thai Bureaucracy,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 36, no. 1 (2006): 37-39. 128 Michael K. Connors and Kevin Hewison, “Introduction: Thailand and the Good Coup,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, no. 1 (2008): 5. 129 Duncan McCargo, Media and Politics in Pacific Asia (London: Routledge, 2003), 144. 130 Snitwongse, “Thai Foreign Policy in the Global Age: Principle or Profit?,” 209. 131 Marwaan Macan, “Thaksin’s Visit to Measure Ties with U.S.,” The Irrawaddy, 23 May 2003,

Economic interests were clearly the primary underlying motivation of Thaksin’s foreign policy. In his inaugural address to Parliament, Thaksin introduced the policies of “proactive economic diplomacy”, and “forward engagement”.132 These policies aimed to increase cooperation between ASEAN, East Asia, and South Asia. To achieve this objective, the government created and renewed Thailand’s bilateral and regional initiatives, including various free trade agreements, the Asian Co-operation Dialogue (ACD), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co- operation (BIMSTEC), and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Co- operation Strategy (ACMECS). However, Thaksin’s initiatives on regional economic cooperation were perceived as problematic, unrealistic, and designed merely to promote his leadership at the expense of achieving real significant outcomes.133

Thaksin’s foreign policy also focused on strengthening economic cooperation with all neighbouring countries. As the Thai economy grew constantly, Thaksin used this opportunity to expand economic and trade cooperation with Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, in order to access their abundant raw materials as well as to expand markets for Thai products. The Thaksin government approached these countries with funds for investment in infrastructure, such as roads, railways, and telecommunications, which in turn would facilitate trade in the region. Thaksin also sought to promote Thailand’s status as a newly emerging donor country, insisting that Thailand was no longer in a “begging- bowl position”.134 He claimed that Thailand had reached the status of a developed country and was ready to provide financial assistance for its neighbouring countries, with the aim of improving economic prosperity for the region.135 Thaksin voiced disagreement with the economic sanctions imposed by Western countries against Myanmar. He argued that confrontation with the Burmese junta would not bring changes in Myanmar. Unsurprisingly, Myanmar’s ruling junta was very satisfied with Thaksin’s stance, and trade, investment and economic cooperation between Thailand and Myanmar expanded rapidly. In 2005, Thailand emerged as Myanmar’s top trading partner. The trade between

132 Chambers, “U.S.-Thai Relations after 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?,” 463; Busbarat, “Embracing Proaction: The Role of Self-Perception in Thailand’s Post Cold War Foreign Policy”, 210. 133 Alex M. Mutebi, “Thailand in 2003: Riding High Again,” Asian Survey 44, no. 1 (2004): 85; Chachavalpongpun, Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy, 268. 134 Chaiyakorn Kiatpongsan, The EU-Thailand Relations: Tracing the Patterns of New Bilateralism (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 151. 135 Chachavalpongpun, Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy, 163.

the two countries reached US$2.5 billion, an increase of 27.2 per cent from the previous year. Moreover, Thaksin was the first foreign leader to visit Naypyidaw, the new capital city of Myanmar.136

While Thailand’s dealings with Myanmar were generally positive, its relations with Cambodia were perhaps the most problematic issue for the Thaksin government. After assuming office, the Thaksin government initially tried to improve relations with Cambodia through economic assistance. In 2003, Thailand became one of the major countries providing technical and financial assistance to Cambodia. 137 In addition, Thaksin claimed that his friendship with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen would cultivate trust and confidence between the two countries. However, relations between Thailand and Cambodia were strained by historical disputes and territorial issues, particularly regarding the ownership of disputed area surrounding the Preah Vihear temple.138 The border conflict over this site remained unresolved due largely to both Cambodian and Thai politicians, who each attempted to elicit a sense of nationalism in their electorates and used it to enhance their political legitimacy.139

An incident in 2003, in which the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh was burnt down by Cambodian nationalists, demonstrated the enduring feeling of hatred and resentment among people of both countries.140 The anti-Thai riots occurred in response to rumours published in a Cambodian newspaper that had been circulating for months, alleging that famous Thai actress Suvanan Kongying said that “she would only ever accept an invitation to perform in Cambodia if the famous Angkor Wat [temple] was returned to Thailand and she looked down on Cambodians by saying that if she was reincarnated, she would rather be a dog than be a Cambodian national”.141 This feeling of hatred towards

136 Ibid., 167-168. 137 Thailand International Development Cooperation Agency (TICA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand, Thailand International Cooperation Programme: Report 2003-2004 (Bangkok: Thailand International Development Cooperation Agency, 2005), 64, 78. 138 L. P. Singh, “The Thai-Cambodian Temple Dispute,” Asian Survey 2, no. 8 (1962): 23; David P. Chandler, “The Tragedy of Cambodian History,” Pacific Affairs 52, no. 3 (1979): 418. 139 Alexander Hinton, “Khmerness and the Thai ‘Other’: Violence, Discourse and Symbolism in the 2003 Anti-Thai Riots in Cambodia,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 37, no. 3 (2006): 454. 140 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Thais and Cambodians Must Learn to Be Good Neighbours,” The Nation, 19 August 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/Thais-and-Cambodians-must-learn-to-be-good- neighbo-30080868.html (accessed 18 January 2013). 141 See Serhat Ünaldi, Reconstructing Angkor: Images of the Past and Their Impact on Thai-Cambodian Relations (Berlin: Humboldt-University, 2008), 6.

Thais became more intensified when Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen made a televised speech attacking the Thai actress and proclaiming that she was “worth less than a blade of grass at Angkor Wat” and that “TV channels in Cambodia must reduce or stop showing Thai movies”.142 His nationalistic remarks were on the front page of Cambodian newspapers, which broadened the controversy about the Thai actress’s statement. Suvanan’s public denial of the rumour appeared to be true as the editor of the Cambodian newspaper that published the original story admitted that it had been based on hearsay and never verified.143

The rumours led to the anti-Thai riots in Phnom Penh mentioned above. The Thai embassy and Thai businesses, including Cambodian Shinawatra (or Camshin), a telecommunications company owned by Thaksin’s family at the time, were attacked. In the hours after the riots, the Thai military was immediately prepared to launch an attack on Cambodia. However, King Bhumibol asked the Thai side to stay calm, thus defusing the situation.144 In the aftermath of the riots, both the Thai and Cambodian governments sought to prevent any possible conflicts in the future by establishing a Thai-Cambodia Joint Commission for the Promotion of Cultural Cooperation (later renamed the Thailand- Cambodia Cultural Association) in 2004. The objective of the Joint Commission was to promote mutual respect for each other’s history and culture, mutual recognition of shared history and heritage, and a shared identity as fellow members of ASEAN. However, due to a lack of political will, funding, and coordination, the Thailand-Cambodia Cultural Association has been inactive since the first year of its creation.145

The 2006 coup and aftermath

One of the recurring motifs of Thai politics is its unpredictability and the rapid pace with which drastic changes take place. In September 2006, the military staged a coup to remove Thaksin from power. The 2006 coup was called a “bloodless coup” or a “good

142 Hinton, “Khmerness and the Thai ‘Other’,” 446. 143 Ibid., 448. 144 “Can the Dispute between Thailand and Cambodia Be Resolved? ,” BBC News, 3 Febuary 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/2709843.stm (accessed 18 January 2013). 145 Yajai Bunnag, “An Evaluation of ASEAN’s Progress in Regional Community Building: Implications of Thailand’s Bilateral Relations and the Extent of Civil Society Participation in Regionalism” (PhD diss., University of London, 2012), 117-118.

coup” and was supported by the elite and middle class in Bangkok. According to coup leaders, Thaksin was alleged of various wrongdoings, including corruption, abusing power, conflicts of interests, lèse-majesté, violation of human rights, and using inappropriate populist policies to gain votes, especially among the rural poor. Moreover, critics point out that Thaksin’s dramatic electoral rise raised concerns among some sections of Thailand’s elite that the power of the monarchy was being challenged.146 However, the 2006 coup caused immediate resentment among the pro-Thaksin and anti- coup groups. Among those who opposed the coup was Nuamthong Phaiwan, a taxi driver, who protested against the coup by ramming his taxi into a military tank and then committing suicide by hanging himself in front of the Thai Rath newspaper’s headquarters. The letters found near the body state that Nuamthong chose to take his life as a form of protest against the 2006 coup and to challenge the statement made by Colonel Akara Thiprot implying that “nobody would hurt themselves for political ideology”. (Akara later apologised for his comments and offered condolences to Nuamthong’s family).147 The death of Nuamthong has become one of the symbolic representations of the anti-military dictatorship movement, particularly for the Red Shirts.

The 2006 coup plunged Thailand deeper into political turmoil. Some of the consequences of the coup were political conflicts between the pro-Thaksin forces and the conservative forces, the rise of Abhisit and the Democrat Party, and a serious crisis of political legitimacy faced by the military and conservative elites, including the monarchy. The pro- Thaksin People Power Party (PPP) won the 2007 general election, the first election after the military coup. However, the Bangkok elite could not accept the results. The military also appeared unwilling to allow the democratically-elected government to take power. They remained deeply opposed to Thaksin’s allies playing a political role in Thailand. For years, with the support from the military, the anti-Thaksin movements, led by the PAD, maintained their positions of power through street protests. Due to the continued political impasse and economic upheaval, post-Thaksin administrations have been generally preoccupied with the power struggle and conflicts between the pro- and anti-

146 Ukrist Pathmanand, “A Different Coup d'état?,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, no. 1 (2007): 133- 136. 147 “Government Responses to the Taxi Driver Suicide,” asiancorrespondent 3 November 2006, http://asiancorrespondent.com/20084/government-responses-to-the-taxi-driver-suicide/ (accessed 19 April 2013).

Thaksin camps. As a result, the overall Thai foreign policy during the post-coup period has been influenced greatly by domestic political considerations, rather than pressures from the international community. Moreover, Thai foreign policy has been used as a political tool by a group of political elites in Bangkok to enhance their political legitimacy.148

The continuation of the prolonged political crisis in Bangkok in the post-2006 coup paved the way for the military to once again intervene in politics. On 22 May 2014, the army, claiming it had to restore stability, seized power by staging a coup. Much of the Thai press embraced the notion that the coup was necessary for the country to move forward. Much of the state’s apparatus, including the judicial branch and the key institutions of the parliament, reportedly saw the military coup as a part of a solution, rather than a threat to the domestic democratic process. However, reformist forces and pro-government supporters have called for a fresh general election and a return to civilian rule. Many analysts have warned that public resistance to the military’s power could grow and tear Thai society apart. They also believe that the political confrontations between the anti- Thaksin Yellow Shirts and the pro-Thaksin Red Shirts, urban and rural, rich and poor, have become protracted and intractable. This conflict is likely to remain deadlocked.149

Conclusion

This chapter has presented a historical background of Thailand’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia from the Cold War period to the era of Thaksin Shinawatra. It has attempted to shed light on how and why Thailand developed and produced such variant foreign policies during that period and in order to understand Abhisit’s foreign policy (as discussed in the following chapters). During the 1950s and 1960s, when Thailand was under a military regime, its foreign policy, therefore, was largely influenced by the military. All other relevant political institutions such as the MFA, the Parliament, political parties, and the press were controlled by the military. Thus, much of Thailand’s foreign policy during this time period reflected the aims and interests of the military elite, and

148 Pathmanand, “A Different Coup d'état?,” 136-139. 149 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Leaning on Thailand’s Junta,” The New York Times, 30 June 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/opinion/leaning-on-thailands-junta.html?_r=0 (accessed 28 August 2014).

ignored the interests of the public. During the Cold War period, Thailand was a strong ally of the United States in the fight against communist influence in Southeast Asia. Thai military leaders also made use of financial assistance from the United States to strengthen their political legitimacy in order to stay in power. Following the military crackdown against student-led protesters in October 1973, the military suffered a severe legitimacy crisis and decided to keep a low profile in politics, allowing civilian governments to take control. Thereafter, Thailand’s foreign policy was controlled primarily by the prime minister, the cabinet, and the parliament. However, the military did not allow civilian governments to hold power for long and again staged a coup in 1977. During the 1980s, although Thailand was ruled by military-led governments, technocrats, bureaucrats, and business elites played a more significant role in government decision-making. However, Thailand’s foreign policy was controlled by the MFA with the support of the military. Due to a decline in American influence in the region after the Vietnam War, Thailand focused on its relations with China and ASEAN, with the objective of forcing Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia.

After the end of the Cold War, and the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989, Thailand attempted to improve relations with all neighbouring countries by expanding economic cooperation. The landmark policy of “turning Indochina from a battlefield to a market place” was introduced by the Chatchai Choonhavan government (1988-1991). The policy was expected to bring about peace to the region through economic cooperation. However, Chatchai’s policy was opposed by the foreign minister and conservative factions of the military, who saw Vietnam as a threat to Thailand and denied any change in their anti-Vietnamese policy. Due to allegations of corruption, Chatchai’s elected government was overthrown by a coup in 1991.

Following the 1992 Black May Massacre, the fall of the military regime paved the way to the rise of the Chuan Leekpai governments (1992-1995; 1997-2001). The rapid socio- economic changes and the 1997 Constitution led to the emergence of new political forces. As a result, Chuan’s foreign policy was influenced by various stakeholders such as academics, think tanks, the media, and business groups. The essence of Chuan’s foreign policy was to promote not only economic cooperation, but also democracy and human rights, particularly in Myanmar. The proposed policy of flexible engagement was an

attempt of the Chuan government to make ASEAN more efficient by increasing the pressure on the Myanmar junta to democratise the country. Relations between Thailand and Myanmar deteriorated after the policy of flexible engagement was introduced. The failure of the IMF and the Chuan government to revive the economy paved the way for Thaksin Shinawatra and his TRT Party to come to power.

During the Thaksin regime (2001-2006), Thailand’s foreign policy was mainly driven by economic interests, with the ultimate goal of leading Thailand to become a major power in Asia. Relations between Thailand and neighbouring countries improved significantly, especially in economic terms. However, Thaksin was criticised by the opposition for lacking legitimacy, partly due to a series of government concessions received from, particularly, Myanmar and Cambodia, which directly benefited his family-owned businesses. More importantly, his popularity was seen as a threat to the military and conservative forces, which finally staged a coup in 2006.

CHAPTER 4

DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS AND ABHISIT’S CAMBODIA POLICY

Over the sixty years, since Thailand and Cambodia established diplomatic relations in 1950, the relationship between the two countries has improved significantly. However, the conflict over the Preah Vihear temple remains. According to Thai historian Charnvit Kasetsiri, the dynamic and vastly complex relationship between Thailand and Cambodia can be characterised as one of “love-hate”;1 while people in both countries have benefited from the solid trade partnership, historical and political tensions, particularly over the Preah Vihear temple, have strained the relationship.2 This chapter examines tensions between Thailand and Cambodia during the period of the Democrat Party-led government of Abhisit Vejjajiva. It focuses on the prolonged conflict between the two countries over the disputed territory surrounding the Preah Vihear temple. The chapter begins by analysing the historical background of the Thai-Cambodian relationship. It then analyses the reasons behind Thailand’s hard-line stance towards Cambodia during the Abhisit administration. This chapter concludes that the major factors that influenced Abhisit’s Cambodia policy were the weakness of Abhisit’s political position and his unpopular Democrat Party, competing nationalisms of Thailand and Cambodia, and the ineffectiveness of ASEAN in managing regional conflict and security issues.

4.1 Historical background of Thailand-Cambodia relations

The impact of historical conflict on perceptions of “victors” and “victims” in Thai and Cambodian political memory

The history of Thai-Cambodian relations is marked by wars and conflicts. Following the decline of the Khmer Empire during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Kampuchea (or Cambodia), the weaker of the two, was invaded by Siam (or Thailand).3 As a result, the perception of “victimisation” by Siam is deeply embedded in the history of Cambodia,

1 Similar to the popular catchphrase of “Cold in Politics” vs. “Hot in Economics” in Sino-Japanese relations. 2 Charnvit Kasetsiri, “Thailand-Cambodia: A Love-Hate Relationship,” Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia 3(2003). http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/issue2/article_242.html (accessed 9 January 2013). 3 Peter Church, A Short History of South-East Asia (Singapore: John Wiley & Son, 2009), 10.

from the Siamese occupation of Angkor Wat4 in the fifteenth century and further Siamese incursions into Khmer territory in the subsequent period. 5 Contemporary historians regard the period between seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the darkest age of Cambodian history when Kampuchea became a “weak vassal” of Siam and Vietnam and was also devastated by civil wars, famine, and internal strife.6 By the mid-nineteenth century Cambodia had almost become a “failed” state, following approximately a century of French colonial rule.7 Kavi Chongkittavorn sums up Cambodia’s attitude to Thailand: “[For] Cambodians, Thais are villains who invaded their country and destroyed the Angkor civilisation. They are also arrogant and often look down on their neighbours”.8

“Preah Ko Preah Keo”, a well-known legend in the history of Cambodia, is an example that reveals Cambodia’s collective memory of Siamese aggression. It narrates how Preah Ko and Preah Keo, the symbols of, respectively, peace and prosperity, were stolen from Cambodia by Siam. The legend of Preah Ko Preah Keo, which can be found in children’s books, films, and paintings, has been influential within Cambodian society. The story of Preah Ko Preah Keo has various versions, but in most versions Siam or the Siamese were generally portrayed as “threatening, invasive, provocative, and war-addicted and want[ing] to get control of Cambodian territory and all its resources”.9 Some Cambodians believe that the absence of Preah Ko and Preah Keo is a cause of today’s poverty and many other social problems.10

Cambodia became an independent kingdom in 1953 when colonialism was on the wane. As a new nation after a long period of intervention by neighbouring countries and France, Cambodia has been extremely sensitive to the issue of its sovereignty and territory. From the Second World War to the 1980s, Thailand was seen as a serious threat to Cambodia.

4 Angkor Wat is a symbol of Khmer glory and empire. 5 L. P. Singh, “The Thai-Cambodian Temple Dispute,” Asian Survey 2, no. 8 (1962): 23; David P. Chandler, “The Tragedy of Cambodian History,” Pacific Affairs 52, no. 3 (1979): 418. 6 Puangthong Rungswasdisab, “War and Trade: Siamese Interventions in Cambodia, 1767-1851” (PhD diss., University of Wollongong, 1995), 1; John Tully, A Short History of Cambodia from Empire to Survival (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2006), 71-72. 7 David Chandler, A History of Cambodia (Colorado: Westview Press, 2008), 5. 8 Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Historical Baggage a Burden on Thai-Cambodian Relations,” The Nation, 1 July 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/Historical-baggage-a-burden-on-thai-cambodian-rela- 30076956.html (accessed 20 March 2013). 9 Kimly Ngoun, “The Legend of Preah Ko Preah Keo and Its Influence on the Cambodian People’s Perception of the Thais” (MA thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 2006), 169. 10 Ibid., 1-2.

Throughout this period, Thailand collaborated with third countries, especially the United Sates, as well as regional powers such as Japan and China, in opposing the three Indochinese countries. For Thailand, its diplomatic tactic, so-called “bending with the wind” (or flexible response to change and adaptation in order to survive), was applied to preserve its own independent status.11 In contrast, for Cambodia, Thailand’s collaboration with external powers was perceived not only as a measure to maintain its national independence from communism in Indochina, but also to achieve its own expansionist and hegemonic designs. During that time, the Cambodian government saw itself as a victim of the Thai expansionists, and united closely with Laos and Vietnam against Thailand and other external powers.12

For many years, relations between Thailand and Cambodia have been strained due to the boundary dispute, particularly the ownership of the Preah Vihear temple. The roots of the conflict can be traced back to European colonial rule during the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.13 In 1904, Siam and French Indochina agreed to form a joint commission to demarcate their border. In 1907, French topographical officers drew up a map, which depicted the temple in Cambodian territory. In 1908, Siam received a series of maps indicating the new delineation of the border with French Indochina, but did not challenge its accuracy.14 Moreover, a French map was even accepted as the official map of Siam during King Vajiravudh’s reign (1910-1925).15 The border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia erupted again after the withdrawal of French troops from Cambodia in 1954. Taking the advantage of the political instability in Cambodia during that time, Thai troops immediately occupied the temple. Cambodia protested against Thailand’s invasion and officially cut diplomatic ties with Thailand. In 1962, the International Court of Justice (ICJ, also known as the World Court) finally ruled that,

11 Khien Theeravit, “Thai-Kampuchean Relations: Problems and Prospects,” Asian Survey 22, no. 6 (1982): 561; Paitoon Mahapannaporn, “The Making of Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Vietnam: The Era of Reconciliation and Regionalism” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 2000), 80-82; Arne Kislenko, “Bending with the Wind: The Continuity and Flexibility of Thai Foreign Policy,” International Journal 57, no. 4 (2002): 537; Monsak Jangariyawong, “Thailand in Southeast Asia: A Study of Foreign Policy 1945-1991” (PhD diss., Monash University, 2003), 181-183. 12 Hourn Kim Kao, “Cambodia’s Foreign Policy and ” (PhD diss., University of Hawii, 2001), 46. 13 Lee Yong Leng, “The Razor’s Edge: Bounderies and Boundary Disputes in Southeast Asia,” Research Notes and Discussion Papers No.15 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1980), 28. 14 Brian Taylor Summer, “Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice,” Duke Law Journal 53, no. 6 (2004): 1795-1797. 15 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 129.

according to the 1907 Franco-Siamese treaty, the temple belonged to Cambodia and ordered Thai troops to leave the temple and its vicinity.16 The court explained that the Siamese government had implicitly accepted the maps provided by France. Moreover, French officials had exercised various acts of sovereignty over the temple for many years, while the Siamese government had failed to protest the matter and had never demonstrated any acts of sovereignty over the site.17

Over the years, the ICJ’s decision was never fully accepted by many Thais. They criticised the ICJ as a tool employed by powerful countries to dominate weaker counties. Thailand’s military-led government at the time believed that the World Court’s President Bohdan Winiarski of Poland used the court to allow communism to infiltrate Thailand through its border with Cambodia.18 In response, the government stopped issuing visas to Poles, boycotted Polish imports, and ordered members of Polish trade organisations to leave the country.19 By denying the finality of the ICJ decision, Thailand conveyed the impression that the verdict was unfair and illegitimate, insisting that it only lost the temple to Cambodia because it was less powerful than France.20 The loss of the Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia became a sensitive issue for the Thai public and aroused strong feelings of antagonism towards Cambodia. The Thai government and media portrayed Cambodia as a major enemy of Thailand. Then Prime Minister Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat urged the Thai people to remember that the temple was stolen by “the enemy who lacked dignity and legitimacy with its abhorrent tactics”.21 Meanwhile, the Thai public asked the government to disregard the court ruling. As noted by Manu Walyapechra, “the Thais still considered the temple to be Thai, not Cambodian”.22 Sarit was reportedly ready to decline the handover of the temple. However, King Bhumipol

16 Theeravit, “Thai-Kampuchean Relations: Problems and Prospects,” 567; Manich Jumsai, History of Thailand and Cambodia (Bangkok: Chalermnit, 2001), 269-281. 17 Monticha Pakdeekong, “Who Owns the Preah Vihear Temple?: A Thai Position,” Journal of East Asia and International Law 2, no. 1 (2009): 230. 18 Shane Strate, “The Lost Territories: The Role of Trauma and Humiliation in the Formation of National Consciousness in Thailand” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2009), 239. 19 Ibid., 245. 20 Patrick Tuck, The French Wolf and the Siamese Lamb: The French Threat to Siamese Independence, 1858-1907 (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1995), 136-137. 21 Cited in Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Temple of Doom: Hysteria About the Preah Vihear Temple in the Thai Nationalist Discourse,” in Legitimacy Crisis in Thailand, ed. Marc Askew (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2010), 87. 22 Manu Walyapechra, Regional Security for Southeast Asia: A Political, Geographic Assessment (Bangkok: Thai Watana Panich, 1975), 115.

Adulyadej commanded the Sarit government to comply with the court’s ruling, claiming that retaining Thailand’s position as a member of the United Nations was important.23 It should be noted that the collective memory of the Preah Vihear conflict among Thais focuses only on the discourse of national humiliation and loss due to the influence of Western imperialism, but ignores Cambodian identity and the history of Siamese invasions of Cambodia.24

Relations between Thailand and Cambodia improved dramatically under elected Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj (1975-1976). The Kukrit government offered the Khmer Rouge regime both recognition and full diplomatic relations, following the official visit of Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ieng Sary to Thailand in 1975. Kukrit’s policy of accommodation with all communist countries became possible due to changes in domestic and international politics. A decline of the Thai military’s influence in politics after a student uprising in 1973 allowed a civilian government to take control over foreign policy.25 In terms of external factors, the withdrawal of United States forces from the region in the late 1960s, combined with the spread of communism in Indochina in 1975, led to Kukrit deciding to distance Thailand from the United States as well as from an ideological anti-communist stance, and instead pursue a more cooperative relationship with its neighbours. 26 However, some factions in the military strongly disagreed with Kukrit. They were concerned that Kukrit’s policy of rapprochement with Indochina would harm relations with the United States. More importantly, they were concerned that the United States might no longer provide financial and military support to Thailand.27

23 Strate, “The Lost Territories,” 241. 24 As Cambodia has a history of genocide and civil war, for Cambodian people, the Preah Vihear temple is a “symbol of struggle for a nation”. Thailand (or Siam, as it was known at the time) is described by Cambodian nationalists as a bogeyman who invaded and destroyed the once mighty Khmer empires. See Chachavalpongpun, “Temple of Doom: Hysteria About the Preah Vihear Temple in the Thai Nationalist Discourse,” 86. 25 Theeravit, “Thai-Kampuchean Relations: Problems and Prospects,” 566. 26 John Funston, “Thai Foreign Policy from Sarit to Seni: Adaptation During the Second Indochina War” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 1989), 318. 27 M.L. Bhansoon Ladavalya, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy under Kukrit Pramoj: A Study in Decision- Making” (PhD diss., Northern Illinois University 1980), 173-174; Michael Haas, Cambodia, Pol Pot, and the United States: The Faustian Pact (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 19-20.

The relationship between Thailand and the Khmer Rouge during the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia (1979-1987)

A series of conflicts between the civilian and military wings of the Thai government eventually led to a military coup in 1977, followed by the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia in 1979. All of these changes negatively impacted relations between Thailand and Cambodia. Thailand at that time was led by the military-dominated regime of General Prem Tinsulanond (1980-1988). For most of Prem’s term in office, the Vietnamese dominance in Indochina and armed conflicts along the Thai-Cambodian border were seen as major threats to Thailand. To secure itself from a possible incursion by Vietnamese forces, Thailand adopted a policy of confrontation against the neighbouring communist countries, and aligned with the United States and later with China to deal with conflicts in the region. Moreover, Thailand supported the Khmer Rouge army and other resistance groups to fight against the Vietnamese-installed government in Cambodia, and also applied diplomatic pressure on Vietnam by forming a coalition with the United States, China, and ASEAN to deny formal recognition of the Vietnamese-backed government. 28 In response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kampuchea (Cambodia) published a booklet in 1983 titled “Thai Policy vis-à-vis Kampuchea”, criticising Thailand’s and its allies’ support of the Khmer Rouge. The purpose of the booklet was to convince the Cambodian people of Thailand’s hegemonic aspirations over Cambodia.29 In essence, Thai foreign policy towards Cambodia during the Cold War years was largely preoccupied with security issues and relations between the two countries were subsequently tainted by hostility and mutual suspicion.

It is noteworthy that during the Prem era, the budgetary allocation for the military was increased dramatically. The Prem administration allocated approximately 20 per cent of the total national budget to defence, claiming concern over the Vietnamese ambition to

28 Serm Vongchant, “The Impact of the Kampuchean Crisis on ’s Unity: The Role of Thailand’s Security Interest (1978-1985)” (PhD diss., Claremont Graduate School, 1986), 176-177; Raschada Jiwalai, “Thai Foreign Policy Toward Laos, 1975-1990” (PhD diss., University of Hawaii, 1994), 83-84; Jeremy Plotnick, “A Case Study: The Translation of Threat Perception into Arms Procurement Policy. Thailand’s Reaction to the Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia” (PhD diss., Northern Illinois University, 1994), 183- 185. 29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of Kampuchea, Thai Policy vis-à-vis Kampuchea (Kampuchea: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of Kampuchea, 1983), 3-5.

dominate Indochina as well as the prevention of the communist expansion in the region.30 Moreover, while the government’s budget allocation to other activities was intensively scrutinised by other branches of government, the military budget was exempted. According to Suchit Bunbongkarn and Sukhumbhand Paribatra, the ongoing tensions in Indochina paved the way for the Thai military to maintain its influence in politics. Thai foreign policy and all other major policy decisions regarding national security issues were in the hands of the military.31 Overall, Prem’s foreign policy was thus the outcome of a “state-centric process” that provided very little political space for other groups such as academics, business people, and media to play a role. In addition, throughout the Prem era, as Thai foreign policy was preoccupied with defence and security concerns, particularly the ideological struggle between democracy and communism, the government’s plans for economic cooperation with its neighbouring countries were almost completely sidelined.32

4.2 Thailand’s Cambodia policy during the post-Cold War period

During the late 1980s, relations between Thailand and its neighbouring countries moved from hostility to friendship due to changes in both domestic and external factors. After years of economic crisis and continued war in Cambodia, the Vietnamese government adopted the policy of “Doi Moi” (or renovation) in 1986, which transformed Vietnam’s economic system from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. The new economic policy also reformed Vietnamese foreign policy to focus on cooperation instead of confrontation, since stability was required for economic development to proceed.33 In Thailand, General Chatchai Choonhavan and his Chat Thai Party won a victory in the 1988 general election and Chatchai became prime minister. Thailand’s new government abandoned its predecessors’ hard-line policy against Indochina and immediately initiated the policy, outlined in Chapter 3 of this thesis, of “turning Indochina from a battlefield to a market place”. Chatchai, with his business-oriented approach, argued that bringing

30 Theeravit, “Thai-Kampuchean Relations: Problems and Prospects,” 571. 31 Suchit Bunbongkarn and Sukhumbhand Paribatra, “Thai Politics and Foreign Policy in the 1980s,” in ASEAN in Regional and Global Context, ed. Karl D. Jackson, Sukhumbhand Paribatra, and J. Soedjati Djiwandono (Berkeley, C.A.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986), 71. 32 Theeravit, “Thai-Kampuchean Relations: Problems and Prospects,” 573. 33 Cam Tu Dang, “Vietnam in ASEAN Community Building” (PhD diss., University of New South Wales, 2011), 171-172; Beck Lee, “Vietnam’s Foreign Policy Reorientation” (PhD diss., Boston University, 2011), 135-136.

peace to Cambodia was more likely to happen through an expansion of economic relations with Indochina. His government’s efforts in achieving a peace settlement in Cambodia, therefore, focused on persuasion, instead of coercion. Specifically, the Chatchai government was focused not on forcing Vietnam to leave Cambodia, but on encouraging all Cambodian factions to agree to a political settlement.34

Shortly after assuming office, Chatchai invited Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, the leader of the Vietnamese-backed government, to pay an official visit to Bangkok. However, the Chatchai government’s recognition of the Hun Sen government was strongly criticised by other ASEAN members. Thailand, a key member of ASEAN, did not consult or inform other ASEAN countries in advance about the policy, which had significantly affected ASEAN’s diplomatic position. Due to a lack of active involvement by ASEAN and other major powers, Chatchai’s policy contributed little to the peace process in Cambodia. His policy of an open Indochinese market – as a means of integrating Indochina into the community of Southeast Asian states – also did not receive active support from ASEAN and regional partners. Although his policy of rapprochement with Indochina did not gain much international recognition, it gained wide support from both the regime in Phnom Penh and the Thai public, particularly Thai business groups. Because of the Chatchai government’s growth-focused economic policy, Thailand’s economy expanded rapidly during that time, which resulted in Thai businesses searching for more raw materials and natural resources and new export markets to sustain their growth. As a consequence, Chatchai’s policy of supporting access to natural resources and markets in Indochinese countries gained considerable support from Thai businesses.35 However, there was little incentive for Thai businesses to invest in Cambodia due to its poor infrastructure and lack of skilled labour after years of civil war. Although, during the years of Chatchai’s term, neither trade nor investment between Thailand and Cambodia expanded as much as had been anticipated, Chatchai’s policy of engagement

34 Salinee Srivardhana, “Responses to a Major Foreign Policy Change: The Case of Thailand’s Foreign Policy towards the Conclusion of the Third Indochina Conflicts during the Government of Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-1991)” (PhD diss., University of London, 2003), 75. 35 Ibid., 179-181.

with Cambodia at least provided a good start for many Thai businesses, which expanded into Cambodia after the Cambodian general election in 1993.36

Thailand’s ambition to become the dominant power in Southeast Asia and its foreign policy towards Cambodia in the post-Cold War era

The end of the Cold War brought about significant changes in regional circumstances. These changes started with the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989, following the United Nations-sponsored elections in Cambodia in 1993, and the expansion of ASEAN membership during the late 1990s. In the absence of major regional conflicts, most Southeast Asian countries, including Thailand, were less worried about the prospect of conflict over territory. Instead, they were more focused on increasing economic cooperation and strengthening economic competitiveness in order to face the challenges of globalisation and increased regional interdependence. Moreover, due to Thailand’s economic growth in the late 1980s and the decline of the influence of the Thai military in politics after the unpopular coup in 1992, other social groups such as academics, the urban middle class, and business people gradually increased their roles in politics, including their ability to influence the government’s foreign policy. As a result of the increased influence of these groups in Thai politics, Thailand was transformed and its foreign policy was subsequently changed.

During the Cold War years, Thailand’s foreign policy under the military-dominated regime had been narrowly defined to protect national sovereignty. In contrast, in the post- Cold War era, the concept of economic competitiveness became an important element of Thailand’s development strategy and strongly influenced the nation’s foreign policy. Thailand’s new foreign policy, what has been called “economic-driven foreign policy”, was initiated to promote international economic cooperation and integration. The new policy aimed to sustain Thailand’s economic growth and help reduce poverty. 37 To achieve these policy goals, Thailand actively participated in promoting regional

36 Leszek Buszynski, “New Aspirations and Old Constraints in Thailand’s Foreign Policy,” Asian Survey 29, no. 11 (1989): 1059-1061. 37 Panitan Watttanayagorn, “Thailand: The Elite’s Shifting Conceptions of Security,” in Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 443; Michael K. Connors, “Goodbye to the Security State: Thailand and Ideological Change,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 33, no. 4 (2003): 434-435.

integration and cooperation.38 At regional and sub-regional levels, Thailand was focused on relations with ASEAN and its neighbouring countries for the purpose of economic development and the sharing of natural resources.

From the Chuan Leekpai to Thaksin Shinawatra administrations (1992-2006), Thailand sought to strengthen its position as a leader among Southeast Asian countries. Thai political leaders perceived that Thailand was in a better position in terms of geopolitical and economic considerations compared with its surrounding countries, and believed that it should therefore become a leader of the region. This idea initially emerged during the Chatchai administration, but was further advanced by the Thaksin government.39 Thaksin and his advisory group initiated many projects attempting to boost Thailand’s international recognition both within Southeast Asia and beyond. These projects included various free trade agreements and regional economic cooperation initiatives such as the Asian Co-operation Dialogue (ACD), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC), and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya- Mekong Economic Co-operation Strategy (ACMECS).40

Relations between Thailand and Cambodia improved significantly in the post-Cold War era. Thailand’s Cambodia policy is focused on promoting economic cooperation, facilitating trade, and reducing transboundary threats. Cambodia is a source of cheap labour and raw materials for Thai industries and an important export market for Thai goods. In addition, Thailand and Cambodia share a border of approximately 800 kilometres, with six border-trade posts. In recent years, the bilateral trade, particularly border trade, has increased dramatically, except between 2008 and 2009 when Abhisit took an aggressive position against Cambodia. In 2012, Thailand was Cambodia’s second largest import market (after China), which accounted for 14.1 per cent of total import expenditure. Thai exports to Cambodia in that year were worth about 12 times more than Cambodia’s exports to Thailand, and at a value of US$4.15 billion, had increased 43 per

38Kusuma Snitwongse, “Thai Foreign Policy in the Global Age: Principle or Profit?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 23, no. 2 (2001): 193-195; Pongphisoot Busbarat, “A Review of Thailand’s Foreign Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia: Exploring an Ideational Approach,” European Journal of East Asian Studies 11, no. 1 (2012): 137-138. 39 Pongphisoot Busbarat, “Embracing Proaction: The Role of Self-Perception in Thailand’s Post Cold War Foreign Policy” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 2009), 4-5, 125. 40 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Mainland Southeast Asia, ASEAN and the Major Powers,” in East Asian Regional Order, ed. Jun Tsunekawa (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2007), 102-103.

cent from 2011. The value of Cambodia’s exports to Thailand in 2012 was only US$260 million, but had increased by 70 per cent on the previous year. The Thailand-Cambodia border trade amounted to about US$2.7 billion, which is approximately 65 per cent of the total value of bilateral trade. Apart from trade, the two countries have benefitted from other areas of economic cooperation such as investment and tourism.41

Thailand’s Cambodia policy under Thaksin

Relations between Thailand and Cambodia, particularly in the economic sphere, were mostly positive during Thaksin’s term in office (2001-2006). Due to the personal friendship between Thaksin and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, Cambodia received particular attention from Thaksin even before he came to office. Their friendship can be traced back to 1998, the year of economic crisis in Thailand, when Thaksin’s telecommunications company Cambodia Shinawatra (CamShin) signed a deal with the Cambodian government.42 The Thai media has speculated that Thaksin also had other business interests in Cambodia such as the entertainment complex in Koh Kong, and oil and gas exploration deals.43 The importance that Thaksin accorded Hun Sen became after Thaksin became prime minister. For example, he paid eight official and private visits to Cambodia during his term in office.44 In 2001, the two governments reached an agreement to establish an industrial zone along the border between Thailand and Cambodia in which Thai labour-intensive industries can employ inexpensive Cambodian labour and use raw materials imported from Cambodia.45 During the Thaksin era, bilateral trade between

41 See Department of Export Promotion, Ministry of Commerce, Thailand, “Foreign Trade Statistics of Thailand,” December 2012, http://www.ops3.moc.go.th/infor/MenuComTH/trade_sum/report.asp (accessed 13 April 2013). 42 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2004), 211; Don Pathan, “The Telecoms Tycoon : Dealings over Two Decades,” The Nation, 23 October 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/10/23/politics/politics_30115069.php (accessed 17 April 2013); Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 171. 43 “Gold Rush Follows Thaksin,” Bangkok Post, 14 September 2008 ; Supalak Ganjanakhundee, “Thaksin’s Cambodia Visit Complicates Task for Govt,” The Nation, 18 August 2011 http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Thaksins-Cambodia-visit-complicates-task-for-govt- 30163057.html (accessed 18 April 2013). In April 2013, former Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama gave an interview to a Thai television program, Wake Up Thailand, insisting that former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra does not have business connections to oil and gas exploration in Cambodia. See, Noppadon Pattama, “Wake Up Thailand: Coffee with Noppadon,” 22 April 2013, http://shows.voicetv.co.th/wakeup-thailand/68154.html (accessed 29 April 2013). 44 Chachavalpongpun, Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy, 170. 45 “Thai-Cambodian Industrial Zone Planned,” Asia Times, 27 July 2000, http://www.atimes.com/se- asia/BG27Ae03.html (accessed 16 April 2013).

Thailand and Cambodia increased dramatically from US$450 million in 2001 to US$1.2 billion in 2006.46

Thai businesspeople and many lower-income people who live along the border benefited considerably from trade and investment with Cambodia. However, they were also demonstrably the ones most affected by the conflict between the two countries. In recent years, Thai business groups have increasingly played a role in Thailand’s Cambodia policy. When conflict has arisen and the government has decided to close the border, they have always come out strongly against hard-line policy, calling instead for diplomatic talks to resolve the dispute. The influence of business groups on Thailand’s Cambodia policy was clearly evident when, in 2003, the Royal Thai Embassy in Phnom Penh was burnt down and Thai-owned businesses, including Thaksin’s company, Camshin, were destroyed by the anti-Thai protests. The Thaksin administration responded immediately by downgrading diplomatic relations, closing the border, and evicting thousands of Cambodian traders, beggars, and labourers. Yet as result of complaints from Thai border traders, Thailand quickly normalised relations with Cambodia. The border was reopened after being closed for only 10 days.47

However, the conflict remained unsolved. Although Thailand reopened its border crossings for Cambodians, it continued to forbid Thai people from entering Cambodia.48 This ban directly affected Cambodian businesses, as it prevented Thais from crossing the border to gamble at casinos or buy Cambodian goods. Hun Sen was upset by this situation. In response, Cambodia closed its borders to pressure Thailand to open the borders to both sides. Hun Sen claimed that the Thai border policy destroyed Cambodia’s pride and made Cambodians seem like beggars, asserted that “We have used all measures possible [to compensate Thailand for its damages]. We did what Thailand told us to do and we bowed our head to the ground and I think that was enough”.49 He added, “Our nation needs

46 Department of Export Promotion, Ministry of Commerce, Thailand, “Foreign Trade Statistics of Thailand,” December 2007, http://www.ops3.moc.go.th/infor/MenuComTH/trade_sum/report.asp (accessed 13 April 2013). 47 John Aglionby, “Thais cut links with Cambodia after riots,” The Guardian, 31 January 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jan/31/cambodia (accessed 16 April 2013). 48 “Thailand to reopen border with Cambodia,” VOA news, 6 Febuary 2003, http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-a-2003-02-06-13-thailand/393104.html (accessed 16 April 2013). 49 “Border Politics: Cambodia shuts its border with Thailand, protesting against unequal ties,” The Straits Times, 7 March 2003, http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Issue/straitstimes20030307.aspx (accessed 16 April 2013).

dignity. As a sovereign state, we cannot kneel to anyone”.50 Cambodia also threatened to stop trading with Thailand and to turn trade to other ASEAN countries. Cambodia’s reactions raised concerns among Thai businesses in Cambodia. They thus called upon Bangkok to normalise relations with Phnom Penh. Finally, both borders were reopened after being closed for two weeks.51

The extent of anti-Thai sentiments in Cambodia demonstrates a strong distrust and even fear of Thailand’s growing influence in Cambodia, which is already evident in the Cambodian way of life. Thai goods and television programmes, particularly Thai soap operas, are popular in Cambodia. However, many Cambodian nationalists fear that Thai culture will destroy or replace Cambodian culture. Cambodian perceptions of Thailand are related to Cambodia’s history and its cultural past of being victimised by Thailand. Kao Kim Hourn, executive director of the Phnom Penh-based Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, has explained that Cambodian society is apprehensive of a “Thailandization of Cambodia”. He argued that “[the 2003 anti-Thai riots] should not simply be seen as an event triggered only by a rumour. It is the result of a longer process of the past ten years of Cambodians feeling they are losing out to Thailand.”52 This demonstrates that a sense of nationhood or national identity is a major factor influencing Thai-Cambodian relations.

The aftermath of the 2006 coup: the role of new political actors, internal pressures, and the conflict over the Preah Vihear temple

Since the absolute monarchy was replaced by the first constitution in 1932, Thailand has witnessed nineteen military coups, nineteen constitutions, and twenty-seven general elections. 53 Likhit Dhiravegin proposed what he termed the “vicious circle of Thai politics” as a concept explaining the nation’s democratisation process. The vicious circle

50 “Hun Sen lashes out at Bangkok,” Bangkok Post, 7 March 2003, http://www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 16 April 2013). 51 Alexander Hinton, “Khmerness and the Thai ‘Other’: Violence, Discourse and Symbolism in the 2003 Anti-Thai Riots in Cambodia,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 37, no. 3 (2006): 451. 52 Marwaan Macan-Markar, “Cambodia: Identity Crisis Surfaces after Riots,” Asia Times, 28 Febuary 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EB28Ae01.html (accessed 17 April 2013). 53 See Pornsakol Panikabutara Coorey, “The Evolution of the Rule of Law in Thailand: The Thai Constitutions,” UNSW Faculty of Law Research Series No.45 (Sydney: University of New South Wales, 2008), 2. The 2014 coup that unseated the popularly elected Yingluck Shinawatra government was the latest coup in Thailand.

starts with a military coup followed by the promulgation of a new or revised constitution. Then, elections are held and a civilian-led government is formed. Later, a political crisis develops and paves the way for the military to stage the next coup.54 Over the past eighty- two years, military coups have been a common occurrence in Thailand. They were used by the military as a means to form such a circle.

Thailand’s 2006 military coup that unseated Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was a clear example of the vicious circle.55 However, the coup itself was different from previous coups. It not only reflected the persistence of the conflict between civilian and military authorities, but also illustrated a class struggle between populist forces led by Thaksin supporters and the Bangkok elite, including the military, the bureaucracy, and the palace. In the interim, the military continued its stranglehold on power. The military-supported 2007 constitution was drafted under the influence of the palace.56 The draft constitution passed referendum in August 2007 with 14 million votes or 57.81 per cent, while 10 million or 42.19 per cent voted to reject the draft, and half a million ballots were voided. The results of the votes clearly reflected the strong influence and popularity of Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party. Suchit Bunbongkarn explains that

those who voted against the new constitution in the countryside still supported Thaksin and perhaps wanted him to come back…[For the pro-Thaksin supporters], he [Thaksin] was the only leader who really helped the poor despite his corruption while others, who were also corrupt, never made efforts to help them.57

54 Likhit Dhiravegin, Demi-Democracy: The Evolution of the Thai Political System (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1992), 147. 55 For further discussion about the 2006 coup and civil-military relations in Thailand, see Kevin Hewison, “Thailand after the “Good” Coup,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 14, no. 1 (2007): 242-243; Chairat Charoensin-o-larn, “Military Coup and Democracy in Thailand,” in Divided over Thaksin: Thailand’s Coup and Problematic Transition, ed. John Funston (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2009), 49-58; Paul Chambers, “In the Shadow of the Soldier’s Boot: Assessing Civil-Military Relations in Thailand,” in Legitimacy Crisis in Thailand, ed. Marc Askew (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2010); Paul Chambers, “Thailand on the Brink: Resurgent Military, Eroded Democracy,” Asian Survey 50, no. 5 (2010): 845- 854; Kevin Hewison and Kengkij Kitirianglarp, “Thai-Style Democracy: The Royalist Struggle for Thailand’s Politics,” in Saying the Unsayable:Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand, ed. Søren Ivarsson and Lotte Isager (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010), 180-186. 56 Hewison, “Thailand after the “Good” Coup,” 244. 57 Suchit Bunbongkan, “Thailand’s 2007 Constitution and Re-Emerging Democracy: Will Political Polarization Continue?,” in Divided over Thaksin: Thailand’s Coup and Problematic Transition, ed. John Funston (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2009), 90.

Ultimately, all attempts to eliminate the influence of Thaksin were in vain, as the People’s Power Party (PPP), a rebranded version of the TRT Party, won a landslide victory in the 2007 general election. The result of the election was seen as a humiliation for the army, particularly the coup-makers. Samak Sundaravej, who called himself a stand-in for Thaksin, was then elected prime minister. After the election, the military restrained from interfering in the Samak administration due to the growing anti-coup sentiment. However, the military secretly united with the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), known as the Yellow Shirts, against the Samak government.58

The Thaksin supporters expected that the main goals of the new government would be to amend the 2007 constitution and bring Thaksin back to Thailand.59 One of these goals was achieved, as Thaksin returned to Bangkok in February 2008. He was arrested at the airport on the corruption charge, but immediately granted bail. Thaksin’s return stirred more political tensions because it led his supporters to move rapidly on constitutional amendments, which could allow Thaksin to return to politics. While the government continued to push to amend the constitution, campaigns demanding Samak resign from the premiership gathered pace. The PAD began street demonstrations in order to pressure the new government to dissolve the parliament.60 During the PAD’s 193-day rally against the government, Army Commander-in-Chief Anupong Paojinda called for the government to dissolve Parliament and call new elections. He insisted that a military coup would not resolve the deepening political turmoil in Thailand, but that giving people an opportunity to vote again would end the political crisis. 61 However, Anupong later received strong criticism for his role in that crisis: after the pro-Thaksin Red Shirts blocked streets in Bangkok in May 2010, Anupong was appointed as head of the Emergency Operations Command to end the protests. The military crackdown resulted in

58 Chambers, “Thailand on the Brink: Resurgent Military, Eroded Democracy,” 856. 59 James Ockey, “Thailand in 2008: Democracy and Street Politics,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2009, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 319. 60 Federico Ferrara, Thailand Unhinged: The Death of Thai-Style Democracy (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2010), 65. 61 Quoted in Ian MacKinnon and Angela Balakrishnan, “Thai military chief calls for dissolution of parliament and new elections,” The Guardian, 26 November 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/26/thailand (accessed 1 May 2013).

at least 90 officially confirmed deaths, most of them unarmed civilians, with thousands of people injured.62

The Preah Vihear temple conflict: competing claims

Thailand’s foreign policy under the Samak administration was essentially the same as that of the Thaksin government (2001-2006). Samak appointed Thaksin’s former lawyer Noppadon Pattama as his foreign minister.63 Samak and Noppadon restored Thaksin’s commerce-centric foreign policy, which aimed to identify new markets for Thai exports. However, the belief that Noppadon was appointed foreign minister to protect Thaksin’s interests, not the public’s, began in his first days in the position when Thaksin, who had been living in self-imposed exile since the coup, was given back his diplomatic passport, after the military-backed government had revoked it. Noppadon claimed that it was the foreign ministry’s decision, not his, to restore the diplomatic passport. 64 He also announced that Thaksin would definitely return to Thailand. The re-issue of Thaksin’s passport significantly affected Noppadon’s credibility due to the growing belief that he used his position to benefit Thaksin’s interests.65

During the seven months of Samak’s term in office, Thailand’s Cambodia policy was focused on supporting of Cambodia’s listing of the Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage Site of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In 1962, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had ruled that the Preah Vihear temple belonged to Cambodia, but ownership of the 4.6-square kilometre area surrounding the temple remained unsettled. In 2007, tension over the disputed territory erupted when Cambodia announced its intention to apply for the inscription of the Preah Vihear temple in the UNESCO World Heritage Site list. Thailand, under the interim government of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont (October 2006-January 2008),

62 Michael K. Connors, “Thailand’s Emergency State: Struggles and Transformations,” in Southeast Asia Affairs 2011, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), 287. 63 After Noppadon resigned as foreign minister in 2008, he returned to his position as Thaksin’s personal lawyer. See Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Diplomacy under Siege: Thailand’s Political Crisis and the Impact on Foreign Policy,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 3 (2009): 455. 64 “Thaksin diplomatic pass returned,” BBC News, 25 February 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/7262767.stm (accessed 25 April 2013). 65 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “The Necessity of Enemies in Thailand’s Troubled Politics,” Asian Survey 51, no. 6 (2011): 1026.

protested Cambodia’s application to UNESCO, which included a map that implied Cambodian ownership of disputed territory. However, Cambodia continued its plan to list the temple as a World Heritage Site, despite Thailand’s disagreement.66

Samak made his first foreign visit as prime minister to Cambodia in March 2008. After negotiations, Cambodia finally removed the disputed area from its application and resubmitted its bid. In May, Noppadon signed a joint communiqué with Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Sok An, supporting Cambodia’s application. For the Samak government, the listing of Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage Site was expected to solve common border problems and promote areas that could attract tourists and boost the economy of the impoverished border towns near the temple. 67 However, the communiqué signed by Noppadon became a contentious topic in Thai political debate. The ultra-nationalist PAD, allied with the Democrat Party, used the Preah Vihear issue to mobilise society against the Samak administration. 68 They accused Thaksin and his affiliates of being traitors, claiming that Noppadon endorsed Cambodia’s UNESCO bid in exchange for Thaksin receiving business concessions for a casino complex on Cambodia’s Koh Kong island.69 The PAD’s claim eroded people’s confidence in the Samak government. Approximately 2,500 members of the PAD staged a mass protest in front of the Foreign Ministry in response to Noppadon’s signing the joint communiqué, likening his actions to treason.70

The Democrat Party joined with the PAD in an attempt to topple the Samak regime. They depicted themselves as the defenders of Thailand, declaring their intention to protect Thai territory from Cambodia. In June 2008, the opposition leader, Abhisit Vejjajiva, filed a no-confidence motion against Samak and Noppadon in the parliament for their

66 Bangkok Pundit, “Noppadol, Abhisit, Surayud, and the Politics of Preah Vihear,” asiancorrespondent, 5 July 2008, http://asiancorrespondent.com/18778/noppadol-abhisit-surayud-and-the-politics-of-preah- vihear/ (accessed 12 July 2013). 67 Kavi Chongkittavorn, “An autopsy of the Thai-Cambodian information war,” The Nation 27 October 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/10/27/opinion/opinion_30086865.php (accessed 11 July 2013); Carlyle A. Thayer, “Cambodia: The Cambodian People’s Party Consolidates Power,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2009, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 92. 68 Nattaya Chetchotiros, “PAD-allied group predicts Govt will bend to its will over Cambodia dispute,” Bangkok Post, 20 January 2011, http://bangkokpost.newspaperdirect.com/epaper/viewer.aspx (accessed 23 May 2013). 69 Ockey, “Thailand in 2008: Democracy and Street Politics,” 320. 70 “PAD rally at MFA against Preah Vihear Temple map,” The Nation, 23 June 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/06/18/politics/politics_30075851.php (accessed 27 April 2013); Kitti Prasirtsuk, “Thailand in 2008: Crises Continued,” Asian Survey 49, no. 1 (2009): 177.

mishandling of the Preah Vihear issue. They were accused of violating Section 190 of the constitution in failing to seek parliamentary consent prior to signing the joint communiqué.71 Moreover, Abhisit raised the issue of “national betrayal”, claiming that the joint communiqué would have negative effects on Thailand’s sovereignty and territory, and that it was signed in exchange for Thaksin’s personal benefit.72 He called on “all members of Parliament who are Thai” to vote against Samak and Noppadon.73 Noppadon rejected the allegation that the joint communiqué with Cambodia would disturb the land around the temple. He insisted that, in fact, the joint communiqué protected the disputed area from being unilaterally claimed by Cambodia. Furthermore, the joint communiqué signed by Noppadon was not the government’s decision alone, but was agreed to by other Thai authorities, specifically the cabinet, military, and top bureaucracy in the Foreign Ministry. UNESCO also clarified that the temple’s registration as a World Heritage Site was completely unrelated to the boundaries.74

UNESCO officially gave the temple World Heritage status in July 2008. Its decision stirred up strong nationalist feelings within Thailand. Anti-government groups, including senators, the opposition Democrat Party, and nationalist academics rallied around the belief that Thailand lost 4.6 square kilometres to Cambodia due to the joint communiqué signed by Noppadon. They strongly opposed Cambodia’s listing of it as a World Heritage Site and blamed the Samak government for allowing Cambodia to have the temple registered.75 Meanwhile, the tension along the border was exacerbated when three Thai nationalists, including a Buddhist monk, protested the listing by illegally crossing into Cambodia to plant a Thai flag on the temple grounds. They were arrested by Cambodian soldiers, prompting Thailand to send several dozen Thai soldiers to cross the border. Two

71 Supalak Ganjanakhundee, “Preah Vihear controversy a hot topic in no-confidence,” The Nation, 25 June 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/06/25/politics/politics_30076442.php (accessed 15 July 2013). 72 Piyanart Srivalo and Nerisa Nerykhiew, “PPP makes concessions to allies,” The Nation, 28 June 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/06/28/politics/politics_30076755.php (accessed 9 July 2013); Suthichai Yoon, “Samak will win the vote but not the confidence,” The Nation, 26 June 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Samak-will-win-the-vote-but-not-the-confidence- 30076515.html (accessed 29 July 2013). 73 Yossawadee Hongthong, “Abhisit urges MPs to vote with ‘a Thai conscience’,” The Nation, 24 June 2008, http://nationmultimedia.com/2008/06/24/politics/politics_30076323.php (accessed 27 April 2013). 74 “I can beat Preah Vihear charges: Noppadon,” The Nation, 1 October 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/10/01/politics/politics_30113487.php (accessed 26 April 2013). 75 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Embedding Embittered History: Unending Conflicts in Thai-Cambodian Relations,” Asian Affairs 42, no. 1 (2012): 90.

Thai soldiers were injured in a landmine blast, one of whom lost his leg. Cambodia closed the temple for security reasons. Both countries deployed troops and heavy weapons to the disputed border around Preah Vihear.76

During the debate in the upper house, Samak strongly criticised the PAD and other anti- government groups for disregarding the actual history of the Preah Vihear issue, in which the temple has belonged to Cambodia. He asked senators, “Have not you noticed that the flag that has been flying over Preah Vihear for the past 46 years is Cambodia’s?” He expressed regret that the public had been misled and felt hatred towards Cambodia because of the PAD’s propaganda.77 Samak decided to hold talks after the July 2008 general election in Cambodia, hoping that Cambodia’s stance on the issue might soften. However, talks between the two governments failed to ease the tension. In October, Thai and Cambodian troops exchanged fire, resulting in the deaths of three Cambodian soldiers and one Thai soldier. Cambodia asked Singapore, as ASEAN’s chair, to form a regional “inter-ministerial group” to help find a peaceful solution.78

During the PAD rallies against Cambodia, many Thai academics criticised PAD leaders for confusing the public about the Preah Vihear issue. They encouraged Thai society to look for mutual benefit, rather than conflict, and argued that Thailand could benefit from Preah Vihear’s World Heritage listing. Thai security analyst Surachart Bamrungsuk asked the Thai nationalists, who did not accept the decision of the World Heritage Committee, to answer the world community on how Thailand would “coexist with others”.79 Thai historian Charnvit Kasetsiri urged the public to be aware of false information used to fan nationalism. He reprimanded the nationalists for their distorted facts and half-truths about the Preah Vihear dispute. While scholars, such as Charnvit, tried to inform the public

76 “Thailand Cambodian Clashes: Timeline,” The Telegraph, 7 Febuary 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/cambodia/8308298/Thailand-Cambodian-clashes- timeline.html (accessed 16 July 2013). 77 “Samak Counters with Attack on Senator,” The Nation, 24 June 2008, http://nationmultimedia.com/2008/06/24/politics/politics_30076326.php (accessed 29 July 2013). 78 “Cambodia Seeks Regional Intervention to Resolve Military Standoff with Thailand,” The Jakarta Post, 22 July 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/07/22/cambodia-seeks-regional- intervention-resolve-military-standoff-with-thailand.html (accessed 16 July 2013). 79 Subhatra Bhumiprabhas, “Temple could draw millions of tourists,” The Nation, 17 July 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/07/17/politics/politics_30078302.php (accessed 8 May 2013).

about the benefit of cooperation with Cambodia, the PAD accused him and his fellow academics of turning traitors and receiving money from Thaksin for their research.80

The accusation over the joint communiqué resulted in Noppadon’s resignation, ending his five months in office. Noppadon claimed that he resigned to ensure peace and political stability in the country and accused the opposition and the Yellow Shirts of fanning nationalism and anti-Cambodia sentiment for political gain. He maintained that he had done nothing wrong and had followed all the rules, adding:

As the dust clears, I am confident, the truth would [sic] appear, as rationale [sic] comes to replace sentiment, time would [sic] prove what the foreign ministry and I did was the right thing and that we protected territory and national interest…I did not betray the nation, I did not hurt the country.81

Samak appointed Tej Bunnag as new foreign minister. Tej was considered to be close to King Bhumibol and his acceptance of the position was seen as a sign of royal approval of the Samak administration. However, he resigned after 39 days in office, claiming that his family could not tolerate the intense pressure from the PAD.82

To the PAD, Noppadon’s resignation proved the Samak government’s guilt in failing to protect Thailand’s sovereignty. This made PAD leaders feel more confident in their righteousness and decide to take a step further to against Samak. They called not only for new elections, but also for major changes to Thai democracy. For example, the PAD suggested that 70 per cent of members of the parliament should be appointed rather than elected.83 For the Thai-Cambodian dispute, PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul proposed a “what-to-do” list to the government, including: close all 40 Thai-Cambodian checkpoints, inform Thai investors in Cambodia and Thai people doing business along the border to

80 Puangthong Pawakapan, State and Uncivil Society in Thailand at the Temple of Preah Vihear (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013), 65. 81 Supalak Ganjanakhundee, “FM Noppadon resigns,” The Nation, 22 August 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/07/10/politics/politics_30077778.php (accessed 25 April 2013). 82 “Setting records in the Foreign Ministry,” The Nation, 30 September 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Setting-records-in-the-Foreign-Ministry-30084683.html (accessed 3 May 2013); “Thai foreign minister hands in resignation,” ABC News, 4 September 2008 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-09-03/thai-foreign-minister-hands-in-resignation/498570 (accessed 3 May 2013). 83 Shawn W Crispin, “What Sondhi really wants for Thailand,” Asia Times, 9 September 2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JI09Ae01.html (accessed 28 July 2013).

be prepared for possible clashes, ban all flights from Bangkok to Phanom Penh, and build a naval base at Koh Kut, near the Cambodia’s border, for stationing battleships.84

In April 2013, the case concerning the disputed area of 4.6 square kilometres around Preah Vihear was again back to the ICJ. Noppadon declared his innocence at charges of selling out his nation. He thanked Virachai Plasai, the Thai ambassador to the Netherlands and leader of the Thai delegation to the world court, for confirming that the joint communiqué did not surrender Thailand’s rights over the 4.6 square kilometres area to Cambodia.85 He asked the Democrat Party to stop politicising the issue because it put Thailand at a disadvantage in territory claims.86 Recently, Noppadon referred to what happened during the time he served as foreign minister as follows:

Nationalism in Thai society is a major obstacle in Thailand’s foreign policy towards neighbouring countries. We [Thai people] always look down on our neighbours…we think that we are better than others…Thailand’s foreign policy should aim to assist our neighbouring countries to develop together with Thailand, the so-called “prosper-thy-neighbour” policy. Nationalism is good but not too much…I am not hyper-nationalistic like you [referring to the Thai nationalists].87

Noppadon’s resignation demonstrated that the role of non-state actors, particularly the PAD, was crucial in Thai politics. The PAD movement had been able to seriously challenge the government’s authority.88 For example, Thaksin’s relationship and business deals with Hun Sen were closely scrutinised by the PAD and Thai media, especially after speculation that the joint communiqué was signed in exchange for the approval of Thaksin’s business ventures. The controversy over the joint communiqué lingered even after the dissolution of the Samak government. In 2009, the military-influenced National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) filed charges against Samak and Noppadon under

84 “Sondhi Limthongkul’s solution to the Preah Vihear dispute,” Prachatai, 2 August 2008, http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/732 (accessed 28 July 2013). 85 “Cambodia-Backed Map was ‘never endorsed’,” The Nation, 19 April 2013 http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Cambodia-backed-map-was-never-endorsed-30204302.html (accessed 25 April 2013). 86 “Noppadon: Ready for Preah Vihear Communique Case,” Bangkok Post, 28 April 2013 http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/347362/noppadon-ready-for-preah-vihear-communique-case (accessed 29 April 2013). 87 Noppadon Pattama, “Wake Up Thailand: Coffee with Noppadon,” 22 April 2013, http://shows.voicetv.co.th/wakeup-thailand/68154.html (accessed 29 April 2013). Author’s translation. 88 Pawakapan, State and Uncivil Society in Thailand at the Temple of Preah Vihear, 3-5.

Article 157 of the Criminal Code for abuse of authority during the UNESCO-listing process of Preah Vihear temple.89 In April 2013, the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Persons Holding Political Positions accepted Noppadon’s case for consideration.90

The shift in power

Samak was ousted as premier in September 2008, after the Constitution Court ruled that his appearance on a popular television cooking show constituted a conflict of interest. Thaksin’s brother-in-law Somchai Wongsawat was elected by parliament as the new prime minister, despite threats from the PAD vowing to force him from power. Throughout Somchai’s 77-day term in office (18 September 2008-2 December 2008), his administration was under intense pressure, not only from the PAD but also from the military. The political turmoil arose in the early days of the new government. PAD-led demonstrators stormed Parliament to prevent Somchai from presenting his government’s policy statement. Many, including the new prime minister, had to escape by climbing over the fence evade the demonstrators. The violence led to the deaths of two protesters, for which the police and government was blamed. Popular sentiment began to turn against the government. Interestingly, Queen Sirikit and Princess Chulabhorn attended the funeral of one of the protesters. The queen told the victim’s father that his daughter was “a good woman since she had helped the nation and preserved the monarchy”.91 Army Commander-in-Chief Anupong Paochinda, several of the king’s advisers, and Opposition Leader Abhisit Vejjajiva also attended the funeral, however, no senior police were present. The PAD took the queen’s and military’s actions as a sign of their backing the street movement. Therefore, they remained ensconced at the Government House and continued to hold rallies.92

89 Chachavalpongpun, “Diplomacy under Siege: Thailand’s Political Crisis and the Impact on Foreign Policy,” 457. 90 “Ex-FM Defends Communique: NACC Takes Legal Action on Temple Listing Signing,” Bangkok Post, 27 April 2013, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/347235/ex-fm-defends-communique (accessed 1 May 2013). 91 Chalathip Thirasoonthrakul, “Thai Queen Weighs in with Anti-Govt Protesters,” Reuters, 13 October 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/13/us-thailand-protest-idUSTRE49C56K20081013 (accessed 3 July 2013). 92 Ockey, “Thailand in 2008: Democracy and Street Politics,” 325; Kevin Hewison, “Thailand’s Conservative Democratization,” in East Asia’s New Democracies, ed. Yun-han Chu and Siu-lun Wong (New York: Routledge, 2010), 136.

Following the clashes between the PAD and police at Parliament, Anupong and all commanders of other armed forces appeared on television, urging Somchai to take responsibility for the violent dispersal of anti-government demonstrators by resigning. The Nation newspaper commented that Anupong’s remark was a “coup on TV”. However, Somchai maintained that Anupong had simply given advice and resisted calls to quit.93 The PAD was determined to provoke a confrontation, and did this by seizing Bangkok’s two airports. The military was called upon to intervene and clear the protesters from the airports, but it refused to act on requests for assistance in managing demonstrations and also ignored the use of weapons by the PAD. Furthermore, Army Commander-in-Chief Anupong threatened the government that the military would stage a coup if he were removed from his position. He repeatedly urged Somchai to resign and call snap elections to resolve the political deadlock. Somchai resisted this pressure, stating, “My position is not important, but democratic values are…I reassure the people that this government, which is legitimate and came from elections, will keep functioning to the end. These protesters...have destroyed democracy with mob rule”. 94

Public support for the PAD declined significantly due to the economic damage caused by the seizure of the airports. However, the PAD insisted that closing the airports was a reasonable measure and a “price worth paying” against what it viewed as a corrupt government and to protect the monarchy. 95 While PAD leaders claimed that their unpopular actions were for the sake of the monarchy, the palace remained silent. In December 2008, the Constitutional Court again intervened to end the impasse. The court disbanded the ruling PPP party and two smaller parties in the Somchai-led coalition government on electoral fraud charges and disqualified Somchai and senior executive members of the three parties from politics for five years. Somchai thus became the first Thai prime minister who never entered the Government House during his term. The PAD

93 “Coup via TV?,” The Nation, 17 October 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/10/17/politics/politics_30086236.php (accessed 3 July 2013). 94 Ian MacKinnon and Paul Lewis, “Thai PM snubs call to quit to end airport siege,” The Guardian, 27 November 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/27/thai-thailand-airport-siege-protest (accessed 4 July 2013). 95 Pravit Rojanaphruk, “Is Sondhi’s PAD now a brainwashed political cult?,” The Nation, 5 December 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/12/05/politics/politics_30090273.php (accessed 8 July 2013); Hewison, “Thailand’s Conservative Democratization,” 128-129.

claimed victory but threatened that it would shut down the airports again, if the new government was not to its liking.96

The Pheu Thai Party (PTP), a third-generation pro-Thaksin party, was established to shelter non-executive party members, and chose former Police Chief Pracha Promnok as its candidate for the premiership. In response, the military helped to install the civilian government of Abhisit Vejjajiva in order to restore its presence in politics.97 Anupong negotiated with former Thaksin ally Newin Chidchob,98 and persuaded his group to shift its support to the Democrat Party.99 This paved the way for Abhisit Vejjajiva, the leader of the opposition Democrat Party, to assume power. Abhisit was elected by parliament as the country’s third prime minister in four months, and formed a new coalition government in December 2008. The rise of Abhisit and the Democrat Party clearly showed the persistence of the military’s influence in Thai politics.100

4.3 Thailand’s Cambodia policy under the Abhisit Vejjajiva administration

Neoclassical realism and Abhisit’s Cambodia policy

According to neoclassical realists, a state’s foreign policy is best explained by examining the influence of domestic and external factors. Like classical realists, neoclassical realists argue that a state’s position in the international structure and its relative power have a significant impact on its foreign policy. For example, weak states in terms of its

96 Ockey, “Thailand in 2008: Democracy and Street Politics,” 327. 97 Thanong Khanthong, “Masters of the Game,” The Nation, 29 December 2008, http://nationmultimedia.com/2008/12/29/headlines/headlines_30092044.php (accessed 10 July 2013); Jim Glassman, “Thailand in the Era of the Cold War and Rama IX,” Human Geography 2, no. 1 (2009): 38. 98 Newin Chidchob was the head of a political bloc that had been part of the PPP ruling coalition. 99 Wassana Nanuam, “From the Barracks: Govt Hopefuls Rendezvous with Anupong,” Bangkok Post, 11 December 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com/111208_News/11Dec2008_news18.php (accessed 9 July 2013); Ferrara, Thailand Unhinged: The Death of Thai-Style Democracy, 87; Hewison, “Thailand’s Conservative Democratization,” 132; Paul Chambers, “A Brief History of Military Influence in Thailand,” in Knights of the Realm: Thailand’s Military and Police, Then and Now, ed. Paul Chambers (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2013), 317. 100 Chambers, “Thailand on the Brink: Resurgent Military, Eroded Democracy,” 842; Chairat Charoensin- o-larn, “Thailand in 2009: Unusual Politics Becomes Usual,” in Southeast Asia Affairs 2010, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 303; Hewison and Kitirianglarp, “Thai- Style Democracy: The Royalist Struggle for Thailand’s Politics,” 470; Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Thaksin, the Military, and Thailand’s Protracted Political Crisis,” in The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and Leadership, ed. Marcus Mietzner (New York: Routledge, 2012), 57.

population, geography, military or economic power, are not able to threaten powerful states. However, for neoclassical realists, it is too simplistic to say that a state’s foreign policy is primary driven by its position in international system. Any effects exerted on the international system have to come from domestic factors, what neoclassical realists term the “intervening factors”. 101 In short, neoclassical realism focuses on a state’s relative power on the one hand and its domestic-level variables, or the “black box” of the state, on the other, as the primary determinants of foreign policy.

Abhisit’s Cambodia policy can best be explained by applying the concept of neoclassical realism. Domestic political considerations during the Abhisit years, the role of ASEAN in regional affairs, and the political circumstances in Cambodia all had a profound impact on Thailand’s Cambodia policy. Specifically, Abhisit’s Cambodia policy was influenced by domestic political considerations, the weakness of ASEAN’s conflict-resolution mechanisms, and Cambodia’s political situation under the Hun Sen regime.102 The border skirmishes around the Preah Vihear temple during the Abhisit administration were primarily the result of conflicting historical claims that were not settled by the 1962 ICJ decision. Moreover, the domestic political turmoil in Thailand and Abhisit’s support of nationalistic policies exacerbated existing tensions. Meanwhile, ASEAN, which was expected to play a role as mediator between its two members, was less successful in facilitating a definite reconciliation. The border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia also challenged ASEAN’s credibility as a peace-loving organisation and jeopardised ASEAN’s plan to become a regional community by 2015.

Abhisit’s quest for political legitimacy

In his early days in office, Abhisit was supported by the military and its allies. 103 However, throughout his years in power, the new military-backed prime minister was under considerable political pressure as Thaksin’s popularity among the rural masses remained strong. Shortly after Abhisit took office in December 2008, the anti-military

101 For further discussion of neoclassical realism, see Chapter 2 of the thesis. Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 145. 102 Zoe Daniel, “Int’l Court of Justice to rule on Preah Vihear ownership,” ABC News, 14 April 2013 http://www.abc.net.au/correspondents/content/2013/s3736374.htm (accessed 25 April 2013). 103 Michael H. Nelson, “Thailand’s Legitimacy Conflict between the Red Shirt Protesters and the Abhisit Government: Aspects of a Complex Political Struggle,” Security and Peace 1, (2011): 16.

United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), known as the Red Shirts, began staging massive demonstrations, demanding the government dissolve the parliament and call new elections.104 The Red Shirts had emerged in the wake of the 2006 coup, and was now enraged with the new political arrangement. The Red Shirt movement was composed of groups of people at the grassroots level from the north and northeast, the urban lower classes from Bangkok, and academics. 105 While the PAD supporters wore yellow, showing their support to the king, the UDD wore red, representing the class struggle for equality.106 As Thitinan Pongsudhirak observed, Thailand’s political turmoil was the confrontation between the traditional establishment and the challengers. The former was represented by the “holy trinity” of monarchy, military, and bureaucracy; the latter were led by the Thaksin camp and the anti-coup camps, including new business groups, technocrats, and academics.107

For the Red Shirts, the Abhisit government was undemocratic and illegitimate as it did not represent a majority of voters. They also perceived the government as a political proxy for the military and conservative elite. 108 Even among academics, the controversy whether the Abhisit government was legally constituted was widely discussed. The Democrat Party has not won a majority vote at the national level in the last twenty years. In contrast, Thaksin’s political parties have won the last three general elections (2001, 2005, and 2007). As a result, during its term in office, the government not only had to appease the Red Shirts, but also needed to please its own political allies, including the military and the Yellow Shirts. In attempting to compromise and please all sides, the

104 James Stent, “Thoughts on Thailand’s Turmoil,” in Bangkok, May 2010: Perspectives on a Divided Thailand, ed. Michael J. Montesano, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, and Aekapol Chongvilaivan (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 32-33. 105 Tim Forsyth, “Thailand’s Red Shirt Protests: Popular Movement or Dangerous Street Theatre?,” Social Movement Studies 9, no. 4 (2010): 465-467; Claudio Sopranzetti, Red Journeys: Inside the Thai Red-Shirt Movement (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2012), 84-85. 106 Giles Ji Ungpakorn, “Class Struggle between the Coloured T-Shirts in Thailand,” Journal of Asia Pacific Studies 1, no. 1 (2009): 76. 107 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Thailand since the Coup,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 4 (2008): 140; Prasirtsuk, “Thailand in 2008: Crises Continued,” 178. 108 Hewison and Kitirianglarp, “‘Thai-Style Democracy’: The Royalist Struggle for Thailand’s Politics,” 195-196; Michael K. Connors, “When the Walls Come Crumbling Down: The Monarchy and Thai-Style Democracy,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 41, no. 4 (2011): 662.

government was criticised for its indecisiveness and an unclear political stance towards the political crisis.109

Abhisit’s foreign policy, like those of his predecessors, placed priority on developing relations with neighbouring countries and ASEAN member countries, with the ambition of placing Thailand in a leading position in the region.110 However, the intense political pressure from the Red Shirts impacted negatively on the government’s capability to run the country efficiently.111 For example, in April 2009, the Red Shirts stormed the venue of the East Asia Summit, forcing the government to cancel the meeting, where regional leaders, the United Nations Secretary-General, and the President of the World Bank had planned to discuss the global recession and North Korea’s missile test.112 The China- ASEAN trade and investment agreement also could not be ratified. Abhisit was forced to declare a state of emergency. Foreign leaders, such as the Chinese and Japanese prime ministers, were evacuated from the venue by helicopters.113 A British journalist regarded the cancellation of the summit as a “humiliating setback” for Abhisit.114 Following the incident, Abhisit’s scheduled visit to Cambodia after the summit was also cancelled. A year later, Abhisit had to skip the 2010 ASEAN summit in Hanoi, normally considered an essential item on the diplomatic calendar, after the Red Shirts stormed Parliament. The cancellation of the summit and other foreign trips sent a signal to the international community regarding the severity of the political crisis in Thai society. The mass protests caused enormous damage to Thailand’s reputation as an investment and tourist destination. Several countries issued travel warnings to their citizens to cancel non- essential trips to Thailand.115 Moreover, due to its absence at the Hanoi meeting, Thailand

109 Jenny Percival, “Thai Opposition Leader Becomes PM,” The Guardian 15 December 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/15/thailand-prime-minister (accessed 7 May 2013). 110 Chavanond Intarakomalyasut, interview by author, Bangkok, 18 June 2013. 111 Abhisit Vejjajiva, interview by author, Bangkok, 21 June 2013. 112 The East Asia Summit consists of the 10 members of , along with China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand. 113 “Thais storm summit venue,” The Telegraph, 12 April 2009, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090412/jsp/foreign/story_10810167.jsp (accessed 6 May 2013). 114 Peter Beaumont, “Protesters storm Asian leaders’ summit in Thailand,” The Guardian, 11 April 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/11/thailand-economics (accessed 6 May 2013). 115 “PM skips ASEAN summit in Hanoi,” The Nation, 9 April 2010, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/04/09/politics/PM-skips--Summit-in-Hanoi- 30126759.html (accessed 8 May 2013).

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not only lost its opportunity to influence the summit’s outcome, but was also perceived as an inactive player in regional affairs.116

Nationalism as a means to enhance political support

Nationalism is a powerful political weapon that can be used by both politicians and social movements to manipulate public opinion and to guide the presentation of policies in a way that will enhance their legitimacy and acceptance by the public. As Muthiah Alagappa pointed out, when a legitimacy crisis occurs and the government loses its credibility, politicians tend to sway public attention from domestic problems to external rivalries by fuelling the flame of nationalism. In other words, nationalism is often used as a means to unify popular opinion and justify a governmental policy, which in turn serves to enhance domestic legitimacy of the government and to protect the regime from being questioned by the public.117 The influence of nationalism has long been a significant political force in Thai-Cambodian relations. The border tension between Thailand and Cambodia is an example of the negative impact of nationalism on Thailand’s foreign policy. The dispute over the land surrounding Preah Vihear was used by Thai political leaders to stir up a sense of nationalism in an attempt to legitimise their political position.118

The crisis in Thai-Cambodian relations (2008-2011), on the surface, may be seen as the result of historical tensions between the two countries. However, many analysts argue that the escalation of conflict with Cambodia in the period from 2008 to 2011 was mainly rooted in Thai domestic politics and that nationalism was used to damage the government’s credibility. In other words, in contrast to the past when nationalism was used against Cambodia, nationalism in the Thai-Cambodian conflict during the Abhisit’s term was instead “used as a weapon in Thailand’s domestic political battle”.119 For many

116 Ann Marie Murphy, “Thai Foreign Policy in Crisis from Partner to Problem,” in Bangkok, May 2010: Perspectives on a Divided Thailand, ed. Michael J. Montesano, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, and Aekapol Chongvilaivan (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 201. 117 Muthiah Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 49. 118 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations (Lanham: University Press of America, 2005), 4. 119 Wagener, “Lessons from Preah Vihear: Thailand, Cambodia, and the Nature of Low-Intensity Border Conflicts,” 44; Murphy, “Thai Foreign Policy in Crisis from Partner to Problem,” 200.

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Thais, the loss of Preah Vihear temple is often perceived as a “symbol of national humiliation”.120 As Shane Strate observed, “[the conflict over] the Preah Vihear temple was not just a struggle for land, it was a contest for the sacred honour of Thailand”.121 According to Thongchai Winichakul, “The nature of modern boundaries between Thailand and its neighbours is like a time bomb…Thais have been taught their territories were lost…The idea of loss is a powerful tool used to whip up nationalism, especially in domestic politics”. He concludes that Abhisit’s rhetoric on the lost territories was employed to discredit the Samak government.122

UNESCO’s decision to list Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage Site in 2008 should not have affected Thai-Cambodian relations. The joint communiqué signed by Noppadon clearly indicated that only the temple, which belongs to Cambodia, was to be nominated, that the 4.6-square-kilometre dispute area was to be excluded, and that a management plan would be developed by both sides.123 However, the recent Thai-Cambodian conflict demonstrated how nationalism has been used by Bangkok’s elite in order to gain power. The Preah Vihear issue, which was used to stir up a nationalist movement during the post- Second World War period, was again revived in contemporary Thai politics. The leaders of anti-Thaksin factions, particularly the PAD, the Democrat Party, and the military, exploited the Preah Vihear issue by misleading the public to think that the joint communiqué paved the way for Cambodia to strengthen its claim over disputed territories. According to an International Crisis group report, Thailand’s domestic politics has thus spilled over into its policy towards Cambodia. Puangthong Pawakapan observes that “Abhisit was ready to sacrifice the relationship with Cambodia for his own domestic gain”. 124 In other words, a hard-line stance against Cambodia was also seen as an opportunity for the Abhisit government to strengthen its influence in politics.

120 Shane Strate, “A Pile of Stones? Preah Vihear as a Thai Symbol of National Humiliation,” South East Asia Research 21, no. 1 (2013): 41. 121 Strate, “The Lost Territories,” 228. 122 Thongchai Winichakul, “Preah Vihear Can Be ‘Time Bomb’,” The Nation, 30 June 2008, http://nationmultimedia.com/2008/06/30/politics/politics_30076876.php (accessed 15 May 2013). 123 Martin Wagener, “Lessons from Preah Vihear: Thailand, Cambodia, and the Nature of Low-Intensity Border Conflicts,” Current Southeast Asian Affairs 3, (2011): 32. 124 International Crisis Group, “Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict,” Asia Report No. 215, 6 December 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east- asia/thailand/215%20Waging%20Peace%20--%20ASEAN%20and%20the%20Thai- Cambodian%20Border%20Conflict.pdf (accessed 30 July 2014).

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Kasit’s new position and his new political stance

Abhisit appointed Kasit Piromya, an experienced ambassador and a known anti-Thaksin advocate, as Thailand’s new foreign minister. When the Democrat Party was in opposition, Kasit was the shadow deputy prime minister. Meanwhile, he was a PAD supporter and a regular speaker at the PAD’s protests. He accused the Samak administration of supporting Cambodia’s listing of Preah Vihear Temple as a World Heritage Site. He also made critical comments regarding the relationship between Thaksin and Hun Sen, calling Hun Sen a “kon-ba” or mentally imbalanced person, and a “gui” or gangster.125 Because of these comments, the public was concerned that Abhisit’s appointment of Kasit as foreign minister could be perceived as a hostile gesture towards Cambodia.126 Abhisit insisted that Kasit was qualified for the position due to his long diplomatic experience.127 However, critics pointed out that the appointment of Kasit was clear evidence of the Democrat Party’s involvement with the Yellow Shirts, and seen as a reward for the Yellow Shirts’ support.128

During the first months of the Abhisit administration, the atmosphere of Thai-Cambodian relations was positive. Hun Sen was the first world leader to send congratulations to Abhisit. His support for the new Thai government paved the way for an exchange of high- level official visits and meetings, starting from Kasit’s visit to Cambodia in January 2009. The agenda was to seek a solution to the Preah Vihear conflict, which had been ignited by the PAD and the Democrat Party to overthrow the Samak government. As a new foreign minister, Kasit apparently switched his tough approach towards Cambodia, announcing that “a return to Thai ownership of the Preah Vihear temple was not an option [and] Thailand [had to] maintain cooperation with Cambodia over the historic and controversial Hindu temple”. Moreover, during the visit, he attempted to extend friendship to Hun Sen after Cambodian media alleged that he said he intended to “use Hun Sen’s blood to wash his feet” during the PAD protest in November 2008. This reported speech refers to an historical myth about conflict between Thailand and

125 Chachavalpongpun, “Temple of Doom: Hysteria About the Preah Vihear Temple in the Thai Nationalist Discourse,” 104. 126 “Many feel Kasit should resign : Poll,” The Nation, 9 July 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/07/09/politics/politics_30106932.php (accessed 10 May 2013). 127 Abhisit Vejjajiva, interview by author, Bangkok, 21 June 2013. 128 Wagener, “Lessons from Preah Vihear,” 44.

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Cambodia during the King Naresuan’s reign in Ayutthaya (1590-1605). It was believed that King Naresuan ordered the beheading of Phraya Lovek, a ruler of the Khmer kingdom, and used Phraya Lovek’s blood to wash his feet.129 Kasit claimed that his previously provocative stance over the Preah Vihear issue would not impact relations with Cambodia as he was familiar with Cambodian leaders after they worked together on the Paris Accord on Peace in Cambodia in 1989.130 The outcome of Kasit’s trip to Phnom Penh was positive. Both sides agreed to resolve the ongoing border dispute “quickly through peaceful means”. 131 According to a senior Thai foreign ministry officer, Cambodian leaders appeared to focus on cooperation and discounted Kasit’s rhetorical attack on Hun Sen.132

During Thai Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwon’s visit to Cambodia in February 2009, the two governments indicated their intention to withdraw remaining troops from the disputed area, create a border committee to determine the border demarcation, and jointly develop the disputed area for tourism.133 However, the tensions between the two countries flared again in April 2009 when Hun Sen claimed that Kasit had insulted him by calling him a “gangster”. Kasit apologised, explaining that the word he used meant “a person who is a lion-hearted, courageous, and magnanimous gentleman”.134 On the day that Kasit’s letter of apology was sent to Hun Sen, Cambodian and Thai troops exchanged gunfire, resulting in the deaths of two Cambodian and two Thai soldiers.135 Following the clash, the Thai military took control of Thailand’s response to Cambodia. In May, Army Commander-in-Chief General Anupong Paochinda visited the Cambodian border near the Preah Vihear temple, as a guest of Cambodian Deputy Commander-in-Chief General Chea Dara. Anupong was the first Thai military leader to visit the frontline after the

129 Chachavalpongpun, “The Necessity of Enemies in Thailand’s Troubled Politics,” 1033. 130 Kasit Piromya, interview by author, Bangkok, 29 October 2012. 131 “Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Reveals Outcome of Official Visit to Cambodia,” Bangkok Post, 27 January 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 3 August 2013). 132 WikiLeaks cable, “Thai-Cambodian Border Dispute: Thai FM Kasit’s Visit to Cambodia Produces Optimistic Statements,” 27 January 2009, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BANGKOK209_a.html (accessed 3 August 2013). 133 “Thailand, Cambodia Reach Temple Agreement,” Xinhua, 8 Febuary 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/08/content_10782013.htm (accessed 3 August 2013). 134 “Nak Leng Means Lion-Hearted Gentleman: Hun Sen Told,” The Nation, 3 April 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/04/03/politics/politics_30099579.php (accessed 2 August 2013). 135 “Clashes on Thai-Cambodian Border,” BBC News, 3 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/7980535.stm (accessed 2 August 2013).

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border clash first erupted in 2008. Both sides agreed that the numbers of troops deployed at the border should be reduced.136

Abhisit’s opposition to Preah Vihear’s inscription as a World Heritage Site

Abhisit visited Cambodia to discuss border issues in June 2009, after his earlier scheduled trip had been cancelled due to the Red Shirt protest. Thailand returned artefacts to Cambodia as a goodwill gesture. However, the outcome of his one-day visit to Cambodia fell below expectations. The discussion of the border issues did not reach any resolution. After his visit to Phnom Penh, the border tension escalated when Abhisit announced that Thailand would ask the World Heritage Committee to review its decision to register Cambodia’s listing of Preah Vihear temple. He also blamed UNESCO’s decision for worsening the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia.137 Tellingly, Abhisit’s objection to the temple’s status occurred after the poll showed that his government’s popularity was down.138 Cambodia was clearly upset with Thailand’s decision. As a result, Thai Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban was assigned to meet with Hun Sen to explain the Thai position. Suthep claimed that he wanted to confirm with Hun Sen that his government had problems with UNESCO, not with Cambodia.139 However, for Hun Sen, Thailand’s problem was with Cambodia. He refused to discuss the registration of the Preah Vihear temple, and wanted only to discuss the withdrawal of Thai troops from the disputed area.140 While UNESCO did not respond to Thailand’s appeal, Cambodians celebrated the first anniversary of Preah Vihear temple’s listing as a World Heritage Site. As the outcome of Suthep’s talks with Phnom Penh leaders was unproductive, Abhisit asked the military to negotiate with Cambodian leaders. Thai Supreme Commander General Songkitti Jaggabatra therefore visited Phnom Penh in August 2009. After

136 Wassana Nanuam, “Anupong, Hun Sen Stress Need for Peace,” Bangkok Post, 23 May 2009 http://bangkokpost.newspaperdirect.com/epaper/viewer.aspx (accessed 1 August 2013). 137 Claudette Werden, “Thailand takes temple row to UNESCO,” ABC News, 22 June 2009, http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2009-06-22/thailand-takes-temple-row-to-unesco/157072 (accessed 8 August 2013). 138 “Govt Need Not Be Disheartened by Opinion Poll Results,” The Nation, 30 June 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/06/30/opinion/opinion_30106355.php (accessed 8 August 2013). 139 Kittipong Soonprasert, “Thai Deputy PM to Visit Cambodia as Temple Row Flares,” Reuters, 23 June 2009, http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/06/23/idINIndia-40537220090623 (accessed 13 August 2013). 140 Supalak Ganjanakhundee, “Suthep Unlikely to Achieve Border Breakthrough with Hun Sen,” The Nation, 26 June 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/06/26/headlines/headlines_30106073.php (accessed 6 August 2013).

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intensive talks, Songkitti announced: “I would like to clarify again that there will be no more problems between Thailand and Cambodia. The border will not be the cause of any further disputes”.141

PAD leaders were frustrated because the government and military used diplomatic means of resolving the border disputes with Cambodia. In September 2009, hundreds of PAD supporters rallied near the Preah Vihear temple, demanding that Thai troops occupy the 4.6 square-kilometre disputed area. However, several dozen villagers, living near the disputed territory, opposed the PAD rally, vowing that they did not want any problems with Cambodia. Clashes between the PAD supporters and local villagers erupted near the border, resulting in many injuries on both sides.142 Hun Sen ordered Cambodian troops to shoot anyone crossing into the temple area. Democrat Party deputy spokesman Boonyod Sukthinthai asked PAD leaders to soften their stance on the Preah Vihear issue, stating that, “It looks like Thais are fighting Thais and becoming the laughing stock for Cambodians”.143 Abhisit claimed that Hun Sen’s remarks were designed for his own domestic benefit, insisting that the situation at the border was normal and that his government would find a solution through the Thailand-Cambodia Joint Boundary Committee (JBC).144

Hun Sen’s support for Thaksin

In November 2009, the relationship between the two governments worsened after Hun Sen appointed Thaksin as both his personal adviser and an economic adviser to the Cambodian government, and even regarded him as a national asset.145 When Thaksin flew to Phnom Penh to deliver a lecture to Cambodian officials, Thailand sent an official letter asking Cambodia to extradite Thaksin. However, Hun Sen refused, insisting that Thaksin was a victim of political persecution and had been unfairly judged by the Thai judicial

141 “Peace at Preah Vihear: Army,” The Phnom Penh Post, 25 August 2009, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/peace-preah-vihear-army (accessed 1 August 2013). 142 Bangkok Pundit, “PAD Protest at Srisaket,” asiancorrespondent, 21 September 2009, http://asiancorrespondent.com/17747/pad-protest-at-srisaket/ (accessed 6 August 2013). 143 “PAD vows to uphold Thai sovereignty over disputed area,” The Nation, 21 September 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/09/21/politics/politics_30112661.php (accessed 6 August 2013). 144 “PM Abhisit: Thai-Cambodian Border Situation ‘Normal’,” MCOT, 2 October 2009, http://www.mcot.net/news/view.php?id=12093 (accessed 8 August 2013). 145 “Thai Envoy Recalled from Cambodia,” BBC News, 5 November 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8343703.stm (accessed 30 April 2013).

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system.146 His remarks were strongly criticised by the Abhisit government as interference in Thai internal affairs, an attempt to worsen Thailand’s political polarisation, and disparaging of the Thai judicial system.147 Abhisit also immediately recalled the Thai ambassador from Cambodia in protest at Hun Sen’s statements. 148 Furthermore, Thailand’s assistance to Cambodia and several investment projects were frozen. 149 Interestingly, after Abhisit decided to downgrade diplomatic ties with Cambodia, his popularity increased significantly. According to a public poll conducted by Assumption University, the ABAC Poll, public support for Abhisit increased three-fold, from 23.3 per cent in September to 68.8 per cent in November 2009.150

During the ASEAN summit in Thailand in 2009, a war of words between the Thai and Cambodian leaders erupted. Hun Sen accused Abhisit and his government of lacking political legitimacy, claiming that without the 2006 coup, Abhisit would never have become prime minister.151 He likened Thaksin to Aung San Suu Kyi as both were victims of military coups. However, he labeled Abhisit’s government as Cambodia’s enemy, just as Kasit and the PAD earlier called Hun Sen Thailand’s enemy. According to Hun Sen:

I am not the enemy of the Thai people…But the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, these two people look down on Cambodia. Cambodia will have no happiness as long as this group is in power in Thailand…We may be poor, but we would rather shed our blood than let you look down on us.152

Hun Sen also showed his support for the Red Shirts: “This is just moral support from me. As one million Thai people of the red shirt group support Thaksin, why cannot I, as a friend from afar, support Thaksin?” Hun Sen’s remarks satisfied the Pheu Thai Party and

146 Shawn W. Crispin, “Plots Seen in Thaksin’s Cambodia Gambit,” Asia Times, 12 November 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KK12Ae01.html (accessed 7 August 2013). 147 “Thaksin Shinawatra and Hun Sen: A New Way to Annoy a Neighbour,” The Economist, 12 November 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/14857229 (accessed 11 April 2013). 148 “Thailand, Cambodia Pull Envoys in Thaksin Row,” Bangkok Post, 5 November 2009, http://bangkokpost.newspaperdirect.com/epaper/viewer.aspx (accessed 2 August 2013). 149 Martin Petty, “Thai Crisis Deepens as Thaksin Finds Cambodian Base,” Reuters, 12 November 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/12/us-thailand-cambodia-idUSTRE5AB2I920091112 (accessed 9 August 2013). 150 “PM’s Popularity Soars 3 Times for Downgrading Ties,” The Nation, 6 November 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/11/06/politics/politics_30116022.php (accessed 11 July 2013). 151 Veera Prateepchaikul, “Does Hun Sen Want to Play in Our Political Sandbox?,” Bangkok Post, 26 October 2009, http://bangkokpost.newspaperdirect.com/epaper/viewer.aspx (accessed 10 May 2013). 152 Seth Mydans, “Cambodian Monarch Pardons Thai Held as Spy,” The New York Times, 11 December 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/12/world/asia/12cambo.html?_r=0 (accessed 10 May 2013).

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the Red Shirts, but incensed the PAD and many non-partisan Thais who perceived him as an outsider interfering in Thai politics. In Bangkok, a thousand PAD protesters staged a demonstration against Hun Sen’s appointment of Thaksin.153

Due to Hun Sen’s support for Thaksin, mistrust and conspiracy fears between the two governments spread. Siwarak Chotipong, a Thai engineer working at the airport in Phnom Penh, was arrested on the charge of stealing Thaksin’s flight schedule for the Thai embassy in Cambodia. 154 Kasit denied allegations that his government assigned an embassy officer to acquire Thaksin’s information, blaming Thaksin as the root of Siwarak’s troubles.155 Siwarak was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for spying. However, he received a Royal pardon from Cambodian King Norodom Sihamoni a month later. Hun Sen’s spokesman claimed that Siwarak was freed because of intervention from Thaksin and the opposition Pheu Thai Party. In January 2010, Thai and Cambodian troops exchanged gunfire at the contested border near the temple, leaving two Thai soldiers injured. However, the military leaders of both sides claimed that the clash was caused by a misunderstanding.156

The PAD’s stance against the Abhisit government

Due to anti-government protests led by the Red Shirts in Bangkok in April-May 2010, the temple and border issues were not a major focus of the government. However, tensions reignited in July when about a thousand PAD supporters held rallies at UNESCO’s Bangkok office and Government House, opposing Cambodia’s unilateral management plan for tourism development for the Preah Vihear temple. The plan was expected to be submitted during a World Heritage Committee meeting the following week. The PAD called on the government to boycott attending the meeting and take a hard-line stance against Cambodia. PAD leader Chamlong Srimuang criticised the

153 “Hun Sen, Abhisit Start Summit War of Words,” Bangkok Post, 24 October 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com/epaper/ (accessed 8 August 2013). 154 “Kamrob to Explain Role in Arrest of Sivarak,” The Nation, 15 December 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/12/15/national/national_30118565.php (accessed 10 May 2013). 155 Supalak Ganjanakhundee, “I didn’t pressure Kamrob: Kasit,” The Nation, 17 December 2009 2009 http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/12/17/politics/politics_30118689.php (accessed 9 August 2013). 156 “Misunderstanding Leads to Thai-Cambodian Border Clash: Thai, Cambodian Armies,” Xinhua, 25 January 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-01/25/c_13149268.htm (accessed 9 August 2013).

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government for its weak response to Cambodia’s plan, threatening to unseat Abhisit if his government failed to protect Thailand’s sovereignty and pride.157 Nationalism, and in particular territorial issues, had always been a key part of the PAD’s political platform, but was now used by the PAD against Abhisit’s Democrat Party-led government, its former ally.

Due to the intense pressure from the PAD, two days before the World Heritage Committee’s meeting took place, Thai Minister of Natural Resources and Environment Suwit Khunkitti met with UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova to oppose Cambodia’s temple management plan. The Thai government demanded that Cambodia’s plan should not be approved until the disputed area was settled by the two countries. It announced its intention to resign membership of the World Heritage Committee if the plan was approved. As a result of Thailand’s blockage, the World Heritage Committee decided to postpone its decision on Cambodia’s plan for another year. Meanwhile, Abhisit continued with the plan to jointly list the Preah Vihear temple with Cambodia. In his words, “all problems could be settled if Cambodia allowed Thailand to propose the Preah Vihear jointly as a World Heritage Site”.158 He claimed that a joint listing of the site and its adjacent compound was the “best and smoothest path to take” to end conflict. In response, Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hor Namhong argued that Thailand’s demand for joint listing of temple was “out of date” and only “Abhisit’s dream”.159 Abhisit’s pursuit of a joint World Heritage listing of Preah Vihear temple and his government’s objection to Cambodia’s Preah Vihear management plan were seen to contradict his rhetoric that his government wanted to solve the Preah Vihear issue in a peaceful manner.160

157 “Abhisit Meets PAD Leaders over Preah Vihear,” asiancorrespondent, 28 July 2010, http://asiancorrespondent.com/38112/abhisit-meets-pad-leaders-over-preah-vihear/ (accessed 10 May 2013). 158 “UNESCO Delays Decision on Management to Bahrain Meeting,” The Nation, 30 July 2010, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/07/30/national/Unesco-delays-decision-on-management- to-Bahrain-me-30134867.html (accessed 12 August 2013). 159 “Cambodia says Thai demands for joint listing of temple is out of date,” Xinhua, 7 August 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-08/07/c_13434115.htm (accessed 13 August 2013). 160 Puangthong Pawakapan, “Abhisit’s View Is an Obstacle to Final Border Settlement,” The Nation, 15 February 2011, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/others/Abhisits-view-is-an-obstacle-to-final-border- settl-30148661.html (accessed 13 August 2013).

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Abhisit’s objection to the multilateral approach to resolving territorial disputes

When attempts to negotiate through bilateral talks failed, Cambodia called for a multilateral approach to solving disputes with Thailand. In August 2010, Hun Sen sent a letter to the presidents of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council, referring to Abhisit’s remarks to the PAD that Thailand was prepared to use force over the dispute. He also asked United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon to act as coordinator, claiming that bilateral mechanisms did not work anymore.161 Meanwhile, Cambodia also called on ASEAN countries to mediate the Thai-Cambodian dispute. Vietnam, as the current ASEAN chair, asked Thailand to consider ASEAN’s assistance to resolve the conflict. In contrast to Cambodia’s position, Thailand rejected any intervention from ASEAN or any third party, arguing consistently that the conflict had to be solved through bilateral talks. Due to Thailand’s opposition, Vietnam decided to stop taking any further action on the matter.162 The International Crisis Group consequently criticised ASEAN for its failure to do more to ensure that the situation at the Thai- Cambodian border would not lead to an armed conflict, asserting that many opportunities for preventive diplomacy were missed because ASEAN considered the Thai-Cambodian border conflict to be a “minor incident”.163 In fact, during Abhisit’s term in office, clashes between Thai and Cambodian troops erupted six times, causing dozens of deaths and injuries.164

Thailand resumed the normalisation of diplomatic relations with Cambodia in August 2010 after Thaksin resigned from his dual positions as personal adviser to Hun Sen and economic adviser to Cambodia’s government. After nine months in which diplomatic ties were suspended, Abhisit met Hun Sen in September on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. However, neither side made any breakthrough over the border conflict. Abhisit argued that although conflicts at the border remained, bilateral trade had

161 “Hun Sen Will Seek UN Chief Mediation in Border Row,” The Nation, 13 August 2010, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/08/13/politics/Hun-Sen-will-seek-UN-chief-mediation-in- border-row-30135768.html (accessed 10 August 2013). 162 Government Public Relations Department, Office of the Prime Minister, Thailand, “Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya Sends Clarification Letters to ASEAN Concerning Thai-Cambodian Problems,” 20 August 2010, http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_news.php?id=5211&a=2 (accessed 10 August 2013). 163 International Crisis Group, “Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict,” 15. 164 “Troops from Thailand, Cambodia in Border Clash,” The Jakarta Post, 22 April 2011, http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/04/22/troops-thailand-cambodia-border-clash.html (accessed 28 July 2013).

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increased.165 ASEAN and the United Nations nevertheless remained concerned over the ongoing confrontation between the two ASEAN countries. United Nations Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon called on the Thai and Cambodian prime ministers, together with ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, to meet again on the sidelines of the Asia- Europe Meeting in October. After a brief 15-minute talk, the two leaders agreed only to reopen negotiations on formalising bilateral relations. In late October, the two leaders met for the third time at the ASEAN summit in Hanoi. However, the main topic of discussion was not the border dispute, but the Thai media report that Red Shirt leaders wanted on terrorism charges were in Cambodia. Interestingly, it was Hun Sen who raised the issue. He denied allegations that Cambodia had provided weapons training to Red Shirt activists and allowed them to hide out in Cambodia.166 Clearly, Hun Sen, who earlier had publicly thrown his support behind the Red Shirt demonstrators, now wanted to distance himself from any involvement in Thai domestic politics. Later that year, during the celebration of the 60th anniversary of established diplomatic relations between Thailand and Cambodia, which was held in Cambodia in December, Hun Sen vowed to work closely with the Abhisit government to prevent border conflicts. As a goodwill gesture, Cambodia released three Thai villagers who had been arrested in August and sentenced for spying on Cambodia.167 His softened stance against Thailand could perhaps be explained by the fact that Cambodia was scheduled to be ASEAN chair in 2012, and thus did not want conflict with Thailand to jeopardise its position.168

The military’s opposition to the PAD’s move

In October 2010, Abhisit promoted General Prayuth Chan-ocha to army commander-in- chief. Before assuming the post, Prayuth was the commander in charge of dispersing the

165 “Abhisit, Hun Sen Meet in New York, Seek Closer Bilateral Ties,” The Nation, 26 September 2010, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/09/26/national/Abhisit-Hun-Sen-meet-in-New-York-seek- closer-bilat-30138751.html (accessed 18 August 2013). 166 “Hun Sen Meets Abhisit in Hanoi,” The Phnom Penh Post, 31 October 2010, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/hun-sen-meets-abhisit-hanoi (accessed 19 August 2013). 167 “Hun Sen Says Bilateral Ties Improving, Thaksin Matter ‘Is in the Past’,” Bangkok Post, 22 December 2010 2010, www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 19 August 2013). 168 Rodolfo C. Severino, “Cambodia’s ASEAN Chairmanship in 2012,” East Asia Forum, 20 February 2012, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/02/20/cambodia-s--chairmanship-in-2012/ (accessed 19 August 2013).

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Red Shirt protesters in Bangkok in April-May 2010. 169 It was speculated that his promotion was speculated as a reward for this role in the dispersal of the protests.170 Although Prayuth was seen as hawkish and an ultra-royalist, he disagreed with the PAD’s stance over the Preah Vihear issue. He argued that “unsettled border disputes should not be raised unnecessarily because doing so would only make people become emotional”.171 When the PAD mocked the army as cowardly and shameful because it rejected PAD’s repeated calls to attack Cambodia, Prayuth replied sarcastically, asking the PAD to come to the border and fight. 172 In December, Prayuth and top military leaders visited Cambodia to meet with Hun Sen to discuss the border issue. The meeting was a positive step towards further negotiations. Prayuth promised Hun Sen that the Thai government “would not allow any group to use Thai territory to mistreat Cambodia”. The two parties agreed to seek peaceful negotiations to prevent disputes that might erupt in the future, but did not mention the withdrawal of their troops from contested borders.173

Prayuth’s remarks to Hun Sen appeared to contradict Abhisit’s move. In late December 2010, Panich Vikitsreth, a member of parliament of the ruling Democrat Party and the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, along with six PAD members, was caught at the Cambodian border and charged with illegal entry.174 Abhisit admitted to the cabinet that he had sent Panich to check out the disputed border area but did not know exactly where he would go.175 Later, five of them, including Panich, were released after a Cambodian court suspended their jail terms for trespass. However, PAD activist Veera Somkwamkid and his assistant Ratree Pipatanapaiboon were charged with spying. Veera was given

169 “Thai Article Reviews Military Career Background of New Army Chief Gen Prayut,” Bangkok Post, 5 October 2010, www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 18 August 2013). 170 Paul Chambers, “The Challenges for Thailand’s Arch-Royalist Military,” New Mandala, 9 June 2010, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2010/06/09/the-challenges-for-thailand%E2%80%99s-arch- royalist-military/ (accessed 19 August 2013). 171 Saksith Saiyasombut, “Thailand: General Prayuth’s Wish List for 2011,” asiancorrespondent, 29 December 2010, http://asiancorrespondent.com/44912/general-prayuths-wish-list-for-2011/ (accessed 19 August 2013). 172 Bangkok Pundit, “Thai Army Chief on Skirmishes at Thai-Cambodian Border,” asiancorrespondent, 5 February 2011, http://asiancorrespondent.com/47753/thai-army-chief-on-skirmishes-on-the-thai- cambodian-border/ (accessed 19 August 2013). 173 “Thai Army Chief Visits Cambodia to Seek Better Relationship between Two Countries,” Xinhua, 20 December 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-12/20/c_13657267.htm (accessed 19 August 2013). 174 “Thai MP Arrested by Cambodian Authorities,” asiancorrespondent, 3 January 2011, http://asiancorrespondent.com/45184/thai-mp-arrested-by-cambodian-authorities/ (accessed 10 May 2013). 175 “PM Unaware of Panich’s Trespassing,” Bangkok Post, 4 January 2011, www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/.../pm-unaware-of-panich-trespassing (accessed 10 May 2013).

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eight years, while Ratree was sentenced six years in prison.176 Following this incident, Abhisit faced more pressure from PAD protests. PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul announced a radical proposal towards resolving the Thai-Cambodian conflict. He called on the government to use military force against Cambodia before conducting any negotiations. He urged the military to seize Cambodian territory, including Battambang, Siem Reap, Angkor Wat and Koh Kong, so that Thailand could barter them for the Preah Vihear temple.177 The PAD’s unrealistic demands complicated the issue and intensified the conflict with Cambodia.

The conflict spreads

The confrontation at the border escalated into violent clashes from 4-7 February 2011. Interestingly, on the morning of the first day of the clashes, Hor Namhong and Kasit Piromya held a meeting in Siem Reap, 150 kilometres from Preah Vihear. In the afternoon, Kasit was visiting a PAD member at a jail, when the military confrontation broke out.178 In contrast to the earlier clashes, Thailand was condemned for using cluster munitions during the battle. The weapons had been banned since the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions came into force in 2010 and became binding international law. While the Thai government denied the allegation, several humanitarian organisations found evidence that cluster bombs were used by the Thai army.179 Cambodia sent a letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), requesting an emergency meeting. It also asked United Nations forces to create a buffer zone in the vicinity of Preah Vihear to stop Thailand’s aggression. Abhisit countered Hun Sen’s letter by asserting that the clashes were well-planned in advance by Cambodia to internationalise

176 After serving sentences in Cambodia’s prison for two years, Ratree was released in February 2013 due to Prime Minister Yingluck’s talks with Hun Sen. Veera was released in July 2014. “Cambodia Finds Two Thai Nationalists Guilty of Spying,” BBC News, 1 February 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12338147 (accessed 10 May 2013); “Yingluck Thanks Hun Sen for Ratree Release,” Bangkok Post, 5 February 2013, www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/334259/pm-thanks-cambodia-for-pardon (accessed 12 August 2013). 177 “Sondhi Urges Thai Military to Seize Angkor Wat in Exchange for Preah Vihear,” Prachatai, 9 February 2011, http://www.prachatai3.info/english/node/2298 (accessed 25 July 2013). 178 “Temple Trouble,” The Economist, 10 February 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18119225 (accessed 24 July 2013). 179 Guy De Launey, “Thailand ‘Admits Cluster Bombs Used against Cambodia’,” BBC News, 6 April 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12983127 (accessed 14 August 2013); Bangkok Pundit, “Thailand Admits Using Cluster Bombs against Cambodia,” asiancorrespondent, 6 April 2011, http://asiancorrespondent.com/51950/thailand-admits-using-cluster-bombs-against-cambodia/ (accessed 14 August 2013).

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the issue.180 He also urged UNESCO help defuse the border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia by delisting the Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage Site and scrapping Cambodia’s development plan for the temple.181

The UNSC agreed with Cambodia’s request and called the two countries, along with Indonesia, the current ASEAN chair, to meet in New York in February 2011. The Council urged both sides to exercise maximum restraint, establish a permanent ceasefire, and resolve the conflict through dialogue. However, Cambodia’s request for the dispatch of a United Nations observer mission to the Thai-Cambodian border was not met. The UNSC returned the issue to ASEAN to facilitate future talks. ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan claimed that the meeting represented “an evolution of ASEAN’s effort to resolve bilateral disputes amongst its member states” and also reflected the international community’s trust in ASEAN’s ability to resolve the dispute. He expected that the Thai- Cambodia conflict would become a case study for future ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms. 182 However, these diplomatic attempts appeared fruitless as border skirmishes erupted a day after the meeting.183 Cambodia continued to insist on ASEAN’s intervention, but Thailand refused to bring any third party to the table, reiterating that the conflict must be solved bilaterally.184 Thailand’s objection to ASEAN’s involvement was blamed for seriously damaging ASEAN’s integrity and credibility. Likewise, ASEAN was criticised for its inability to deal effectively with intra-ASEAN conflict.

During the armed clashes, thousands of PAD protesters held a rally in Bangkok, demanding Abhisit resign in order to pave the way for an independent prime minister to head the country. The PAD criticised Abhisit for lacking leadership skills and moral integrity. They claimed that Abhisit had failed to protect Thailand’s territory due to his

180 Bangkok Pundit, “Thailand: Cambodian Attacks Were Pre-Meditated,” asiancorrespondent, 10 February 2011, http://asiancorrespondent.com/48141/thailand-cambodian-attacks-were-pre-meditated/ (accessed 14 August 2013). 181 Aekarach Sattaburuth and Prasit Tangprasert, “PM Urges UNESCO to End Chaos,” Bangkok Post, 11 February 2011, http://www.bangkokpost.com/lite/topstories/220930/pm-urges-unesco-to-end-chaos. (accessed 10 May 2013). 182 “ Chair Invited to UNSC Meeting on Cambodian-Thai Border Dispute,” The Nation, 10 February 2011, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/-chair-invited-to-UNSC-meeting-on-Cambodian-T- 30148404.html (accessed 16 August 2013). 183 Wassana Nanuam, “Border Conflict Rages On,” Bangkok Post, 17 February 2011, www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 16 August 2013). 184 Supalak Ganjanakhundee, “UN Should Get Cambodia to Hold Bilateral Talks: Abhisit,” The Nation, 14 February 2011, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/02/14/national/UN-should-get-Cambodia-to- hold-bilateral-talks-Abh-30148631.html (accessed 14 August 2013).

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government’s refusal to follow its hard-line stance against Cambodia. Moreover, they accused the Abhisit administration of corruption, causing economic problems and an increased cost of living. Many scholars disagreed with the PAD’s demand, and doubted whether Abhisit’s resignation could end the border conflict with Cambodia.185 Abhisit insisted that his government and the PAD shared the same stance on the Preah Vihear temple issue and did not understand why the group called him to resign.186 Meanwhile, the PAD also blamed Hun Sen for the border clashes. PAD leader Sondhi speculated that the clashes were Hun Sen’s attempts to set up a political environment for his son, Hun Manet, to gain political credentials.187 Hun Manet, a possible successor of Hun Sen, was reported to have commanded troops during the battle.188 Some critics suggested that conflict with Thailand served as an opportunity for Hun Manet to exercise his power and leadership. According to Eurasia Group analyst Roberto Herrera-Lim, the clashes were used by Hun Sen’s government to divert the Cambodian people’s attention from domestic troubles. Herrera-Lim claims that as long as the Cambodian military losses were not heavy, Cambodians still wanted to see Hun Sen take a tough stance against Thailand.189

ASEAN’s intervention

After the completion of ASEAN’s membership expansion, when Cambodia became its tenth member state in 1999, ASEAN was seen as a key actor in maintaining stable interstate relations within the association. Although ASEAN defined itself as an organisation of “peace-loving nations”, claiming responsibility for maintaining the region’s stability and security, it had never managed to resolve any of its intra-group conflicts.190 As such, the Thai-Cambodian conflict from 2008 to 2011, particularly over the Preah Vihear issue, was a challenging task for ASEAN’s conflict resolution mechanism. When Thai and

185 “PAD Seeks to Pave Way for National Gvt under Non-MP Prime Minister,” Bangkok Post, 7 February 2011, www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 15 August 2013). 186 Abhisit Vejjajiva, interview by author, Bangkok, 21 June 2013. 187 “Hun Sen’s Eldest Son a Key Man in Border Fighting,” The Nation, 8 February 2011, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/02/08/national/Hun-Sens-eldest-son-a-key-man-in-border- fighting-30148203.html (accessed 14 August 2013). 188 Sebastian Strangio, “Hun Sen’s War Calculations,” Asia Times, 3 May 2011, http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/ME03Ae01.html 189 Martin Petty, “Analysis: Cambodian PM Reaps Gains from Thai Border Battles,” Reuters, 4 March 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/04/us-cambodia-thailand-idUSTRE7430QL20110504 (accessed 15 August 2013). 190 Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary-General (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 400.

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Cambodian troops clashed in October 2008, ASEAN was called on to mediate disputes. The incident occurred shortly after the ASEAN Charter was ratified. Evidently, the charter’s principle of the non-use of force could not prevent the two members from attacking each other. According to Rizal Sukma, the clashes were seen as a “slap in a face” to ASEAN. It was clearly a setback for ASEAN, which had ambitions to become an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) by 2015.191 For Amitav Acharya, the clashes between the two members were seen as “the most serious threat to ASEAN’s intra-mutual peace”.192 However, he believed that the ASEAN spirit would restrain the two sides from escalating the issue further.193Amitav’s view was too optimistic. Only four months after the ASEAN Charter came into force, the Thai-Cambodian border dispute erupted into violence in April 2009, and further escalated in January 2010, and February-April 2011. The armed clashes resulted in several deaths and numerous injuries. Although the Thai- Cambodian conflict is one of many ongoing border disputes in Southeast Asia, the clashes are considered the worst conflict since ASEAN’s formation.

During the Thai-Cambodian clashes in 2011, Indonesia, the current chair of ASEAN, played a significant role in mediating the conflict. Within a few days of the clashes escalating in February, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa flew to Thailand and Cambodia for talks. Then, Indonesia held an informal ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting to discuss the resolution. It was the first time that the ASEAN chair had performed this duty. However, only five of the ten ASEAN foreign ministers participated in the meeting.194 The other five ASEAN members sent only deputies or senior officials. Foreign Minister Natalegawa later noted that some ASEAN members seemed uncomfortable with the meeting’s agenda. They were concerned that ASEAN’s intervention in the conflict might violate the non-intervention principle and it could set a standard or norm that would apply to them in the future.195 Because of these concerns, neither Myanmar, nor Laos, nor Brunei made comments or suggestions regarding the

191 Rizal Sukma, “Thai-Cambodia Row a Slap in the Face of ASEAN Charter,” The Jakarta Post, 21 October 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/10/21/insight-thaicambodia-row-a-slap-face-- charter.html (accessed 4 May 2013). 192 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (New York: Routledge, 2009), 155. 193 Amitav Acharya, “Democracy or Death? Will Democratisation Bring Greater Regional Instability to East Asia?,” The Pacific Review 23, no. 3 (2010): 349. 194 The meeting was attended by the foreign ministers of Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, and Singapore. 195 International Crisis Group, “Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict,” 21.

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Thai-Cambodian conflict. Due to Indonesia’s leadership, both sides agreed to avoid further armed clashes and to hold further talks with Indonesian participation. Moreover, Thailand softened its stance, allowing Indonesian observers to monitor the border.196 Indonesia proposed to host the Joint Boundary Committee (JBC) on demarcation and the General Border Committee (GBC) in March. Both sides accepted Indonesia’s offer and agreed to attend the next two meetings.197 The outcome of the informal ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting illustrated that Thailand and Cambodia realised the importance of ASEAN’s cohesiveness. Importantly, Thailand did not use the non-interference doctrine to reject Indonesia’s involvement. Kasit announced that Thailand should not embarrass ASEAN and must “respect and honour the role and involvement of Indonesia”. 198 Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo later revealed that in the beginning of the meeting Kasit appeared unwilling to accept Indonesian observers. However, after facing pressure from other ASEAN members, he eventually relented.199

While the Abhisit government accepted Indonesia’s proposal to alleviate the border tension, the military leaders refused to attend the GBC meeting, co-chaired by the Thai and Cambodian defence ministers. Army Chief Prayuth Chan-ocha insisted that any talks must not take place in a third country. 200 Furthermore, he objected to Indonesian observers entering the disputed area, claiming that the problem could not be solved by their presence. He also claimed that if the observers did appear, he would have to “keep them on the outside”.201 Clearly, the government and the army had conflicting positions on ASEAN’s involvement in the issue. However, the military’s refusal to accept ASEAN’s proposals revealed the fact that the army was not only the key foreign policy

196 Brian Padden, “ Mediates in Cambodia, Thailand Conflict,” VOA news, 22 February 2011, http://www.voanews.com/content/-mediates-in-cambodia-and-thailand-conflict-116644324/135398.html (accessed 15 August 2013). 197 Suthichai Yoon, “Abhisit and Hun Sen Must Take Blame for Undermining ,” The Nation, 5 May 2011, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Abhisit-and-Hun-Sen-must-take-blame-for-underminin- 30154599.html (accessed 15 August 2013). 198 Mustaqim Adamrah, “Thai-Cambodian Border Clash an ‘Embarrassment for ’,” The Jakarta Post, 2 May 2011, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/05/02/thai-cambodian-border-clash- %E2%80%98embarrassment-%E2%80%99.html (accessed 19 August 2013). 199 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, “Remarks by FM George Yeo in Parliament,” 3 March 2011, http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/pr/2011/201103/press_20110303_01.html (accessed 15 August 2013). 200 Wassana Nanuam, “No to GBC Meeting in Indonesia,” Bangkok Post, 22 March 2011, www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 15 August 2013). 201 Wassana Nanuam, “Thai Army Chief: Indonesian Observers ‘Not Needed’,” Bangkok Post, 24 March 2011, www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 21 August 2013).

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decision-maker regarding the conflict with Cambodia, but also the real power behind the civilian regime of Abhisit.202

The most recent round of fighting between Thailand and Cambodia occurred in April- May 2011. Both sides again blamed each other for initiating the violence. In this clash, the Thai military took a tougher stance towards Cambodia. According to the Cluster Munitions Coalition’s report, Thailand used cluster munitions during the clash. The Thai government denied the allegation, but admitted using Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM), which were identified as a type of cluster munition.203 The international community expressed deep concern over the clash, in which 18 were killed and nearly 50,000 civilians fled their homes. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed “grave concern” and called on the two neighbours to resolve the issue through “serious dialogue”. United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged Indonesia to exercise its role as chair of ASEAN to work with both countries for an immediate end to the hostilities. 204

Cambodia blamed the renewed fighting on the Thai government’s reluctance to accept the entrance of Indonesian observers into border area. On the Thai side, Defence Minister General Prawit Wongsuwon accused Cambodia of trying to internationalise the issue by launching a new round of attacks. Again, the Thai military rejected third party involvement, insisting that the problem must be solved only through the existing bilateral mechanism.205 Abhisit now fully supported the army’s action, claiming that Thailand must not “fall into Cambodia’s trap” of internationalising the dispute.206 Following the clashes, Indonesian Foreign Minister Natalegawa planned to visit Cambodia and Thailand

202 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Thai-Cambodian Conflict: The Failure of ’s Dispute Settlement Mechanisms,” Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 1, no. 1 (2013): 75. 203 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand, “Press Release: Thailand refutes CMCs claim on its use of cluster bombs,” 8 April 2011, http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/media-center/1926/27035-Press-Release:- Thailand-refutes-CMC%E2%80%99s-claim-on-its.html (accessed 15 August 2013). 204 “Thailand and Cambodia Border Clashes Escalate,” The Guardian 26 April 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/26/thailand-cambodia-border-clashes-escalate (accessed 21 August 2013). 205 “Bilateral Talks Best Way to Resolve Conflict,” The Nation, 24 April 2011, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/04/24/national/Bilateral-talks-best-way-to-resolve-conflict- 30153803.html (accessed 24 July 2013); “Prayuth: Army Will Follow Govt Orders,” Bangkok Post, 25 April 2011, www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 15 August 2013). 206 “Clashes Persist Along Thai-Cambodian Border,” CNN, 24 April 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/04/24/thailand.cambodia.clashes/index.html (accessed 24 July 2013).

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to convince both sides to sign an agreement to allow the Indonesian observers to enter the disputed areas. However, Indonesia cancelled the trip without explanation. Cambodia claimed that the cancellation was due to Thailand’s disagreement with the deployment of the Indonesian observers to disputed border areas.207 Meanwhile, the Thai military was suspected of fostering the clashes with Cambodia to delay an election that many believed the opposition Pheu Thai Party would win. As Chris Baker argues, the motivations behind the military’s hard-line stance against Cambodia were “prestige and money”. He claims that due to the conflict with Cambodia, the military budget increased and the election was postponed.208 Following the clashes during the first months of 2011, Cambodia asked the ICJ to interpret a 1962 verdict to settle the border dispute and also requested the Court issue a provisional order to force Thai troops back to barracks.209 While the case was under consideration by the Court, Abhisit announced the dissolution of the parliament and called for an election in July 2011.

4.4 Thailand’s Cambodia policy in the post-Abhisit era

Thaksin’s younger sister Yingluck Shinawatra and the Pheu Thai Party (PTP) won a landslide victory in Thailand’s 2011 general election, and Yingluck became Thailand’s first female prime minister. She was seen as a stand-in for Thaksin, who proclaimed that his sister was his “clone”.210 Moreover, “Thaksin thinks, Pheu Thai acts”, the party’s slogan, clearly demonstrated that Thaksin’s shadow loomed large over the Yingluck administration. However, many saw Yingluck as a “fresh face” and expected her to be the key to unlocking the political crisis that had worsened since the 2006 coup. As a political newcomer, she sent soothing messages to Thai people, particularly those who

207 “Indonesian FM Cancels Visits to Cambodia, Thailand,” Xinhua, 25 April 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-04/25/c_13844575.htm (accessed 24 July 2013). 208 Tim Johnston, “Thai-Cambodia Border Clashes Spread,” Financial Times, 26 April 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/070c83f2-6fe8-11e0-8591-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2ZwOyObGU (accessed 24 July 2013). 209 Ron Corben, “Cambodia Seeks Court Ruling on Dispute with Thailand,” VOA news, 28 April 2011, http://m.voanews.com/a/167387.html (accessed 28 August 2013). 210 “Thaksin ‘Clone’ to Be First Female Thai PM,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 July 2011, http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/thaksin-clone-to-be-first-female-thai-pm-20110704- 1gxna.html (accessed 16 May 2013).

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were against her brother, urging for unity, reconciliation and justice, in an attempt not to rile the powerful forces of the military and conservative elites ranged against her.211

The situation along the border between Thailand and Cambodia greatly improved when Yingluck entered office. The Yingluck government took immediate steps to restore relations with Cambodia.212 In September 2011, a “football diplomacy” match was held in Phnom Penh’s Olympic Stadium between high ranking Cambodian officials, led by Prime Minister Hun Sen, and a group of Red Shirt leaders, led by former Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat. Thaksin also flew to Cambodia to meet Hun Sen and Red Shirt leaders. After the 90-minute friendly football match, Hun Sen announced that “the nightmare era” between the two countries was over.213 Former Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya returned to the public arena to fight against the Cambodian government, claiming that Hun Sen had interfered in Thai politics by giving Red Shirt leaders, charged with staging riots in Bangkok in May 2010, refuge in Cambodia. However, Kasit’s remarks did not attract much attention from the public or the mass media, mainly due to the absence of military support. In December 2011, Thai Defence Minister General Yuthasak Sasiprapha met Cambodian General Tea Banh in Phnom Penh. Both sides agreed to withdraw their troops from the disputed border area near the Preah Vihear temple. The troop withdrawal was supervised by joint observers from Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia in its capacity as the ASEAN chair.214

Conclusion

Relations between Thailand and Cambodia during the Abhisit government can be described as akin to a roller coaster ride. Thailand’s domestic politics were seen as a primary source of the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple. The Abhisit administration’s Cambodia policy was largely influenced by the

211 Ian MacKinnon, “Sister of exiled Thai leader on course to win divisive election,” The Telegraph, 2 July 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/thailand/8612676/Sister-of-exiled-Thai- leader-on-course-to-win-divisive-election.html (accessed 16 May 2013). 212 Wagener, “Lessons from Preah Vihear: Thailand, Cambodia, and the Nature of Low-Intensity Border Conflicts,” 43. 213 Pisei Hin, “Friendly football fixture Unites Nations,” The Phnom Penh Post, 29 September 2011, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/sport/friendly-football-fixture-unites-nations (accessed 28 August 2013). 214 “Thailand and Cambodia reach deal on temple border,” BBC News, 21 December 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16294309 (accessed 16 May 2013).

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pressure from the Yellow Shirts and the military, who tried to strengthen their political influence by adopting a hard-line stance against Cambodia. Nationalism was used by the Abhisit government as a means to justify its hard-line approach towards Cambodia, which in turn served to protect the government from being questioned by the public. In order to appease the Yellow Shirts and the army, the government stood firm on the bilateral process and refused all other options suggested by the international community. Thailand’s refusal of ASEAN’s involvement in the conflict seriously damaged its reputation as a key ASEAN member, as its actions appeared to endanger ASEAN’s unity. However, during the clashes between Thailand and Cambodia in 2011, Indonesia played a significant role in mediating the conflict and was successful in convincing the two sides to enter to talks. While it could be argued that this is the first time that ASEAN played a role in resolving a dispute among its members, the initiative came chiefly from Indonesia, there being no consensus regarding ASEAN’s role in intervening in such conflicts.

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CHAPTER 5

THAILAND’S SOUTHERN CONFLICT AND ABHISIT’S MALAYSIA POLICY

The Malay-Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand has a long history. The underlying causes of conflict relate to the political, economic, and social developments of the region. It can be traced back to the late eighteenth century when an independent sultanate known as the Patani Kingdom was incorporated into Siam, though it was officially recognised by Britain under the Anglo-Siamese Treaty in 1909. The process of assimilation designed to extend the Siamese government’s influence and authority was carried out over several decades. Numerous policies were implemented in an attempt to assimilate the Malay- Muslim group into the Thai Buddhist nation. These policies made local people feel alienated and repressed. The Malay Muslims perceived themselves as being second-class citizens.1 Since then, the region has emerged as the site of one of the country’s most significant political struggles, that is, between native Malay-Muslims and the central ruling apparatus in Bangkok. The increasing dissatisfaction with Thai authority has led to a series of episodes of violent resistance.

This chapter examines the insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces and its impact on the relations between Thailand and Malaysia during the period of the Democrat Party-led government of Abhisit Vejjajiva. First, it begins by analysing the historical background of the Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand. Second, it examines the major factors, both internal and external, that influenced Abhisit’s decision to allow Malaysia to be involved in Thailand’s southern crisis. The chapter concludes that the Abhisit government took a more conciliatory approach towards the insurgents. Abhisit’s “politics-led-military” approach, focusing on reconciliation, justice, and economic development, was adopted to end the conflict. Despite some disagreement among the Thai ruling authorities on the peace negotiation with the insurgents, the government viewed the peace talks as one of the essential means of the solution. Both the government and the military saw Malaysia playing an effective role in bringing insurgent leaders to the negotiating table. However, the peace process was stalled in 2010 due to the political

1 Neil J. Melvin, “Conflict in Southern Thailand: Islamism, Violence and the State in the Patani Insurgency,” SIPRI Policy Paper No.20 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007): 1-9.

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tensions in Bangkok and the government’s lack of political will and dedication. Although a security force of more than 60,000 was stationed in the area and a massive budget allocation was spent on development projects, Abhisit’s government failed to suppress the insurgency. The overall level of violence in the South did not significantly abate during Abhisit’s tenure.

5.1 Background of Thailand’s southern conflict

Thailand is a country with a Buddhist-majority. According to the 2011 census, more than 90 per cent of the population of 64 million are Buddhists.2 However, the Thai constitution does not mention that Buddhism is the official religion of Thailand. Religious liberty is a right for Thai citizens. The government believes that religious freedom could prevent conflict between Buddhists and non-Buddhists within Thai society. In addition, such a stance promotes Thailand’s status as a peaceful and harmonious multicultural society. The Thai-Muslim population is the largest religious minority group in Thailand, with 4.6 per cent of Thailand’s total population. 80 per cent of the Thai-Muslim population are located in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand, known as the “Deep South”. The majority of the population in these provinces – about 78.2 per cent – are Muslims and ethnic Malays.3 Though the local Malay-Muslim population is a minority group in the predominantly Buddhist Thai state, they are a majority in the region. They share a common identity, culture, and history, and frequently perceive themselves as victims of the Thai state’s heavy-handed integration and counter-insurgency policies.4

The Malay-Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand can be traced back to the eighteenth century when an independent sultanate known as the Patani Kingdom was annexed by Siam and subsequently divided into seven administrative provinces. The annexation was officially recognised by Britain in 1909 under the Anglo-Siamese Treaty demarcating the

2 National Statistical Office, Thailand, “Statistical Yearbook, Thailand (2013),” http://service.nso.go.th/nso/nsopublish/pubs/syb_54/SYB_54_T.pdf (accessed 19 September 2013). 3 Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Panyasak Sobhonvasu, “Unpacking Thailand’s Southern Conflict: The Poverty of Structural Explanations,” Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 1 (2006): 102. 4 Aurel Croissant, “Unrest in South Thailand: Contours, Causes, and Consequences since 2001,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 1 (2005): 22; Thomas Parks, “The Last Holdout of an Integrated State: A Century of Resistance to State Penetration in Southern Thailand,” in Autonomy and Armed Separatism in South and Southeast Asia, ed. Michelle Ann Miller (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 237.

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boundary between Siam and British Malaya. During the first half of the twentieth century, the regime was under the nationalistic policies of the military-led governments. The policy of assimilation was applied to the Malay-Muslims with an expectation that they had to accept and adjust to a dominant society, if they wanted the same rights and privileges as other Buddhist Thais. Steps were taken to achieve this result. The separatist movements first became apparent under the ultra-nationalist government of Field Marshall Phibun Songkhram (1938-1944 and 1948-1957).5 The two Phibun governments issued a series of national conventions in an attempt to eliminate “backward Islamic customs and dialects”.6 Western culture and habits were introduced into the region, without consideration of the unique Malay-Muslim culture. The Thai minorities were forced to adapt to Thai norms and assimilate into the dominant Thai culture. For example, the Malay-Muslims were not allowed to wear traditional dress in public and were required to wear only Western-style clothing, with those not abiding by the rules being fined. The speaking of the Malay language was forbidden in government offices, and Muslims who worked in the government service were forced to change their Malay-Arabic names to Thai names. The Malay-Muslims saw these rules as a direct threat to their traditional cultural identities.7

In 1947, Haji Sulong, a local Malay-Muslim nationalist, established the Pattani People’s Movement (PPM), calling for self-rule, culture and language rights, and the implementation of Islamic law. The government rejected their demands and arrested Haji Sulong and several other religious leaders on treason charges. Riots erupted all over Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala. The Dusung Nyor rebellion of 1948 was the most serious uprising in the history of the independence movements in the region, resulting in 400 dead and up to 6,000 refugees fleeing to Malaysia.8 In 1952, Haji Sulong and his son were

5 S. P. Harish, “Ethnic or Religious Cleavage? Investigating the Nature of the Conflict in Southern Thailand,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, no. 1 (2006): 52-53. 6 Peter Chalk and others, The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment (Santa Monica, C.A.: Rand Corporation, 2009), 6. 7 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002), 90; Marte Nilsen, “Negotiating Thainess: Religious and National Identities in Thailand’s Southern Conflict” (PhD diss., Lund University, 2012), 55. 8 Thanet Aphornsuvan, “Origins of Malay Muslim ‘Separatism’ in Southern Thailand,” in Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula, ed. Michael J. Montesano and Patrick Jory (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008), 94-96; James Ockey, “Elections and Political Integration in the Lower South of Thailand,” in Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on a

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released from prison and then mysteriously disappeared. No one was convicted for their disappearance, however, it was commonly believed that they were kidnapped by the police. Since then, trust and confidence in the Thai state have eroded and the political struggle for autonomy and sovereignty by the Malay-Muslims has escalated.9

The 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of several separatist movements in southern Thailand. The ideologies and operational methods of these groups differed, but they shared the common goal of establishing an independent Pattani. The assimilationist policies of the military-led governments further deepened feelings of resentment, distrust, and anger within the Malay-Muslims towards the government and strengthened the resistance of the insurgents to the central forces.10 Moreover, due to assistance from Muslim groups in Malaysia, the separatist movements in southern Thailand became more entrenched. After the Islamist opposition Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) emerged in the first Malaysian elections in 1959, Islam became one of the key issues in Malaysian politics.11 PAS leaders often publicly criticised the Thai government’s policy towards the insurgency and called for southern Thailand independence, autonomy, or merging with Malaysia. However, the ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) government rarely criticised the PAS’s position due to concerns with its popularity in the north.12 The Malaysian government was also reluctant to arrest or take action against Thai insurgents sheltering in northern Malaysia, particularly in Kelantan state. Moreover, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman announced in an UMNO meeting in 1961 that it would allow Thai Muslims who fled oppression to settle in Malaysia. As a result, relations between Thailand and Malaysia deteriorated. Malaysia was accused of being a safe haven

Plural Peninsula, ed. Michael J. Montesano and Patrick Jory (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008), 133-136. 9 Zachary Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 15. 10 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 129-130. 11 Swee-Hock Saw, “Population Trends and Patterns in Multiracial Malaysia,” in Malaysia: Recent Trends and Challenges, ed. Swee-Hock Saw and K. Kesavapany (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 24. 12 The popularity and influence of the PAS was mostly confined to the northern Malaysian provinces that share a border with Thailand. See, for example, David Carment, Patrick James, and Zeynep Taydas, Who Intervenes?: Ethnic Conflict and Interstate Crisis (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2006), 121; Jonathan Ross-Harrington, “Separatist Insurgency in Southern Thailand: An Approach to Peacemaking,” in Stopping Wars and Making Peace: Studies in International Intervention, ed. Kristen Eichensehr and W. Michael Reisman (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 182; John Funston, “Malaysia and Thailand’s Southern Conflict: Reconciling Security and Ethnicity,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no.2 (2010): 236.

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for the militant movements to launch attacks on Thai authority. From the perspective of Thai leaders in Bangkok, the insurgents were strengthened and the Muslim aspiration to separatism grew because of the support from Muslim groups in Malaysia.13

Conflicts in the region decreased considerably under the new government of General Prem Tinsulanond (1980-1988). In contrast to preceding military governments, the assimilation policies were dropped and a new strategy was launched with the aim of winning the hearts and minds of the local populace. For example, a huge budget was allocated for education and economic development in the area. An amnesty was offered to former insurgents. Public participation in local governance was encouraged by the government. Some Muslim politicians from the region were appointed to ministerial portfolios. In addition, new administrative agencies, known as the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and the Civil-Police-Military joint headquarters (CPM 43), were established to promote negotiations.14 As a result, the government gained support from many Malay-Muslim elites, who received political privileges and development funds. New security and governance arrangements also paved the way for the army to control the South.15 Thailand’s relations with Malaysia were improved considerably during the Prem administration. In 1987, a Joint Commission, headed by foreign ministers of both counties, was set up to discuss issues of mutual concern. Improved cooperation between the Thai and Malaysian governments contributed to the decline of insurgency in the area.16

However, the peaceful period ended in the late 1990s, when several insurgent groups formed an alliance, known as the National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate (Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate, BRN-Coordinate), and conducted a series of attacks against security positions. The government’s failure to maintain peace in the region was

13 N. Ganesan, “Thailand’s Relations with Malaysia and Myanmar in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 2, no. 1 (2001): 135-136; Carment, James, and Taydas, Who Intervenes?: Ethnic Conflict and Interstate Crisis, 116-117; Funston, “Malaysia and Thailand’s Southern Conflict,” 239; Christopher M. Joll, “Religion and Conflict in Southern Thailand: Beyond Rounding up the Usual Suspects,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no.2 (2010): 267. 14 Duncan McCargo, “Southern Thailand: The Trouble with Autonomy,” in Autonomy and Armed Separatism in South and Southeast Asia, ed. Michelle Ann Miller (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 220. 15 Srisompob Jitpiromrsi and Duncan McCargo, “A Ministry for the South: New Governance Proposals for Thailand’s Southern Region,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 3 (2008): 404. 16 Funston, “Malaysia and Thailand’s Southern Conflict,” 240.

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due largely to the political instability in Bangkok. During the 1990s, Thailand saw a series of unstable civilian governments and military coups. As a result, the government’s primary focus was on the political situation in Bangkok, rather than the conflict in the Deep South. Without political will, the economic conditions and quality of life of the Malay-Muslims were not improved. The southernmost provinces remained the least economically developed and one of the most isolated and poorest areas of Thailand. Moreover, a weak judiciary, corruption, brutality, and human rights violations committed by the police and military, provoked fear, suspicion, and hostility and strengthened the cause of the insurgents.17

5.2 Return of violence during the Thaksin era

The current insurgency in southern Thailand erupted under the government of Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006). The conflict cannot be explained by looking only at historical and religious differences, and social and economic marginalisation issues. Apart from these factors, many experts saw Thaksin’s and the Thai authorities’ mishandling of the crisis as a cause of renewed conflict.18 A hard-line approach against the insurgents, the dissolution of the two conflict-management bodies, and the human rights abuses committed in the region during the “war on drugs” led to the rapid expansion of the insurgent campaign in southern Thailand.19

In December 2001, police posts in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat provinces were attacked, killing five police officers. The violence continued during 2002, including several major raids on police stations and the bombing of the Yala train station. In early 2003, the government launched a “war on drugs”, which involved the killing of over 2,800 suspected drug traffickers in the first three months of the campaign. Malay-Muslim insurgents, whom the government accused of being drug dealers and users, were also

17 Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya, and Sabrina Chua, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005), 12. 18 See, for example, Croissant, “Unrest in South Thailand,” 33-34; Duncan McCargo, “Thaksin and the Resurgence of Violence in the Thai South: Network Monarchy Strikes Back?,” Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 1 (2006): 53-54. 19 For more information, see Amnesty International, “If You Want Peace, Work for Justice,” 4 January 2006, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA39/001/2006/en/03b05929-d46f-11dd-8743- d305bea2b2c7/asa390012006en.pdf (accessed 30 July 2014).

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arrested and some killed.20 In January 2004, around sixty separatist militants set fire to twenty-one schools and raided the 4th Army Engineers Battalion camp in Narathiwat, where around 400 arms were stolen. Thaksin was upset with the army and set a seven- day deadline for local authorities to arrest the perpetrators. Five suspects were arrested ten days after the attack, confessing that they had been hired by the BRN and GMIP leaders for 8,000 baht or US$250 each. However, it was later revealed that confessions had been extorted by torture.21 In March, the suspects’ lawyer, Somchai Neelaphaijit, disappeared in Bangkok. A few days before his disappearance, he accused the police of torturing suspects in custody in an effort to extract confessions. Five policemen were arrested in connection with the case, but all were freed due to lack of evidence. 22 Somchai’s disappearance and the indiscriminate arrest of Muslims for alleged terrorist links fuelled distrust and resentment against the Thai authority among the locals.

During the 1970s and 1980s insurgent activities were carried out by organised groups. The largest and most effective insurgent group was the Patani United Liberated Organization (PULO), whose goal was to create an independent Islamic state. In contrast, the current insurgents are comprised of many groups with many functions.23 Their goals are unclear but range from resistance to the authority to demands for autonomy. The current insurgent groups are “loosely structured”, decentralised, non-hierarchical, and lack a coherent strategy. In other words, attacks are organised by a “network without a core”.24 Despite ambiguity over coordination amongst insurgent groups, the insurgents have conducted operations with a higher degree of violence and complexity than those in the past. The BRN-Coordinate has been recognised as the backbone of the new generation of separatist militants, but other groups such as the PULO, the Pattani Islamic Mujahidin

20 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2004), 236. 21 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” Asia Report No. 98, 18 May 2005, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east- asia/thailand/098_southern_thailand_insurgency_not_jihad.pdf (accessed 30 July 2014). 22 Tyrell Haberkorn, “Southern Thailand: Marginalization, Injustice and the Failure to Govern,” in Diminishing Conflict in Asia and the Pacific, ed. Edward Aspinall, Robin Jeffrey, and Anthony J. Regan (New York: Routledge, 2013), 195. 23 For more information on Thailand’s insurgent groups, see Aurel Croissant, “Muslim Insurgency, Political Violence, and Democracy in Thailand,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, (2007): 5; Marc Askew and Sascha Helbardt, “Becoming Patani Warriors: Individuals and the Insurgent Collective in Southern Thailand,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 35, no. 11 (2012): 782-783. 24 Duncan Mccargo, “Mapping National Anxieties: Thailand’s Southern Conflict,” RUSI Journal 154, no. 3 (2009): 55.

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Group (Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani, GMIP), and the Runda Kumputlan Kecil (RKK or small patrol unit) also play role.25

Thaksin paid little attention to the southern Thailand insurgency during his first years in office. His policy was mainly focused on economic development. When the violence in the southern provinces escalated in 2001, the government had little idea who was behind the attacks. Thaksin first asserted that the violence had been carried out by “criminal gangs” and drug dealers. High ranking officers and military leaders also denied any suggestion that separatist groups were active.26 A military official stated in an interview: “Please do not refer to them as insurgents. They are bandits. Just like the ones we fought during the Communist days.”27 However, after the army camp raid in 2004, Thaksin realised that the conflict was more complicated than he had expected. He finally admitted: “The assailants are not ordinary bandits, they are professional and well-trained”. In response, he sent an additional 3,000 troops to the region.28

Since then the situation has worsened dramatically, particularly since the human rights abuse and mismanagement of the Krue Se mosque and Tak Bai incidents of 2004, where nearly 200 Muslims were killed. In April, around 200 insurgents attacked eleven police and military posts, where five security forces and 107 Muslim militants were killed. During this incident, thirty-two suspected assailants were shot dead by soldiers inside the historic Krue Se mosque in Pattani province. Most of the dead were young Muslim men, who fought police armed with knives and machetes. While Thaksin regarded the military’s operations as a victory, local and international human rights advocates, including within the United Nations, condemned the army’s use of force, calling for an investigation. Thaksin demanded that foreign countries and international organisations stop interfering in internal affairs, but later appointed an independent fact-finding

25 Duncan McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand (New York: Cornell University Press, 2008), 171, 173. 26 McCargo, “Thaksin and the Resurgence of Violence in the Thai South: Network Monarchy Strikes Back?,” 48. 27 Prashanth Parameswaran, “Rethinking Counterinsurgency Learning: Ideational Shifts and the Case of Southern Thailand,” The Monitor 13, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 56. 28 “Southern Violence: Pattani Hit, Martial Law Declared,” The Nation, 6 January 2004, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2004/01/06/headlines/SOUTHERN-VIOLENCE-Pattani-hit- martial-law-declared-91430.html (accessed 29 November 2013).

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commission to investigate.29 In the report, the incident was described as having been caused by the “disproportionate use of force by security forces”; neither the military nor the government however has faced any criminal prosecution for the incident.30

The government’s misunderstanding and mishandling of the problem claimed further lives. In October 2004, police fired on a crowd of demonstrators in Narathiwat’s Tak Bai district, leaving seven people dead. After 1,300 protesters were arrested, seventy-eight protesters were found dead due to suffocation in the military trucks where they had been bound and stacked on top of each other during transportation.31 Thaksin blamed the “lower ranking military officers” for mistakes and ordered an independent investigation, where once again no one was prosecuted or given any other disciplinary measures.32 The Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents have become “one of the worst blunders ever committed by the military in the restive Deep South”, sparking massive opposition by locals and human rights advocates. 33 However, many people in other parts of Thailand still supported the military’s disproportionate use of force. According to Chaiwat Satha- Anand, a scholar of non-violent resistance, the military’s use of violence against local Muslim demonstrators was widely supported by the Thai-Buddhist ethnic majority.34 This has fuelled anti-Buddhist sentiment against Muslims and extended the gap between the Malay Muslims and the non-Muslims in the region.35

Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) won its second landslide victory in the 2005 general election, gaining 377 of the 500 seats in parliament. However, his party won only 1 of 54

29 “Southern Unrest: Thaksin Tells the World to Back Off,” The Nation, 2 May 2004, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/headlines/SOUTHERN-UNREST-Thaksin-tells-the-world-to-back-of- 98087.html (accessed 3 December 2013). 30 “Thai Mosque Killings Criticised,” BBC News, 28 July 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/3932323.stm (accessed 20 September 2013). 31 Kate McGeown, “Takbai Legacy Lingers in Thai South,” BBC News, 27 February 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4742976.stm (accessed 20 September 2013). 32 International Crisis Group, “Thailand: The Evolving Conflict in the South,” Asia Report No. 241, 11 December 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/241-thailand-the- evolving-conflict-in-the-south.pdf (accessed 30 July 2014). 33 Veera Prateepchaikul, “Eight Years after Tak Bai, and No Closer to Peace,” Bangkok Post, 25 October 2012, http://www.bangkokpost.com/lite/topstories/318214/tak-bai-anniversary (accessed 4 November 2013). 34 Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Fostering ‘Authoritarian Democracy’: The Effect of Violent Solutions in Southern Thailand,” in Empire and Neoliberalism in Asia, ed. Vedi R. Hadiz (New York: Routledge, 2006), 178. 35 Michael K. Jerryson, Buddhist Fury: Religion and Violence in Southern Thailand (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 12.

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seats from the South, losing 52 seats to the opposition Democrat Party. Following the election, Thaksin realised that his militarised approach not only failed to contain the violence, but also resulted in a wave of opposition against his government. He therefore set about finding a more balanced approach by introducing several policies and initiatives on the southern conflict. The cabinet moved 12,000 troops to an economic-development unit and allocated 8.8 billion baht or US$225.6 million for the new division.36 In March 2005, Thaksin established the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) and appointed former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun as the chairman. The NRC was responsible for investigating the causes of the conflict and for making recommendations for conflict resolution. Anand was an outspoken critic of Thaksin’s southern policy. However, it is believed that both the establishment of the NRC and Anand’s appointment came from the palace.37

Within the first year, the NRC released a report including recommendations such as the need to end martial law, strengthening the rule of law, compensation to the victims of violence, and allowing Pattani-Malay (Yawi) as a second official language in the region. However, both the government and President of the Privy Council General Prem Tinsulanond rejected calls for official recognition of the Malay dialect. Prem warned: “We cannot accept that [proposal] as we are Thai. The country is Thai and the language is Thai. So we have to make efforts to learn Thai and [everyone should have a uniform] command with the rest of the Kingdom”. 38 The NRC proposals were not fully implemented by the Thaksin administration, despite promises that they would adopt many of the NRC’s suggestions. Anand blamed the government for “having no clear national agenda, except for its own survival”. 39 Thaksin faced more pressure when Privy

36 “Govt to Set up New Development Force in Deep South,” The Nation, 16 February 2005, 37 Duncan McCargo, “Thaksin and the Resurgence of Violence in the Thai South,” in Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence, ed. Duncan McCargo (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007), 62-63; Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand, 188. 38 “Prem Disagrees with Proposed Use of Malay as Official Language,” The Nation, 25 June 2006, http://nationmultimedia.com/2006/06/25/headlines/headlines_30007268.php (accessed 9 December 2013). 39 “Anand Slams PM,” The Nation, 29 July 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/homeAnand-slams- PM-30009178.html (accessed 9 December 2013).

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Councillor General Surayud Chulanont, former army commander and supreme commander, conveyed concerns from the palace over the government’s southern policy.40

Throughout 2006, the violence in the Deep South showed no sign of abating. Bombings and attacks on security officials, teachers, and Buddhists continued. In June, after about fifty bombs exploded in the three southernmost provinces, Thaksin appointed Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratglin as the leader responsible for security policy in the South. However, soon after Sonthi took position, the tension between the government and the military was evident. Sonthi actively supported the NRC, the agency Thaksin had ignored, and often criticised the government’s failure to win over the hearts and minds of the Malay-Muslims.41 In July, Thaksin attempted to replace Sonthi, but was unsuccessful due to disagreements among senior military officers. Following a series of explosions at twenty-two bank branches in Yala province in August, Sonthi then raised the idea of opening talks with the southern insurgents, his proposal however remaining ignored in official security circles.42

5.3 Post-coup policy changes after 2006

After fifteen years of civilian rule, the military led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin ousted Thaksin in a coup in 2006. The failure to solve the crisis in the Deep South was one of the major reasons cited by the military for overthrowing the Thaksin regime. Between January 2004 and mid-2006, the increase in insurgent attacks had resulted in over 1,300 dead.43 The military claimed that the escalation of deadly violence in the southern provinces was a result of Thaksin’s mishandling of the insurgency. Immediately after taking power, the junta announced its intention to make changes in the government’s policy in the South. It promised to alleviate the problem by reversing counter-insurgency measures taken by Thaksin. Policies of reform and reconciliation between the state and

40 McCargo, “Thaksin and the Resurgence of Violence in the Thai South: Network Monarchy Strikes Back?,” 61. 41 “Force Alone Won’t Win the Battle against Insurgents,” The Nation, 4 July 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/south2years/july0506.php (accessed 10 December 2013). 42 “Deep South: Army Wants Peace Talks but Unsure Who With,” Bangkok Post, 19 September 2006, http://www.bangkokpost.com/News/19Sep2006_news02.php (accessed 14 December 2013); Michael J. Montesano, “Political Contests in the Advent of Bangkok’s 19 September Putsch,” in Divided over Thaksin: Thailand’s Coup and Problematic Transition, ed. John Funston (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2009), 19. 43 Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand, 54.

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insurgency groups were introduced. The strategy of winning hearts and minds through dialogue and development projects was considered key to successful counter-insurgency. The coup raised expectations that the military would bring an improvement to the deteriorating situation in the area.44

The military, with the support of the monarchy, appointed retired General Surayud Chulanont as the interim prime minister (October 2006-January 2008). The coup leader General Sonthi was appointed as deputy prime minister in charge of national security. The opportunity for peace in the South was heightened during the tenure of the new military-installed government. Sonthi was a Muslim and on record as supporting increased emphasis on a peaceful settlement of the conflict by means of talks with the rebel groups. Many anticipated that the military-installed government would display greater understanding towards the insurgents and could offer a better approach to improving the deteriorating situation. 45 In contrast to Thaksin, Surayud appeared to comprehend the gravity of the separatist insurgency in the South. He made a conciliatory statement, insisting that political and military leaders were committed to resolving the conflict through non-military means. He also declared that the government was ready to open a dialogue with the militants.46 Most notably, Surayud made a public apology to an assembly of Malay Muslims for the deaths of at least 85 people during the Tak Bai incident in 2004. In his speech, Surayud accepted that “what happened in the past was mostly the fault of the state”. 47 Besides, he admitted that the strife in the southern provinces was “primarily rooted in [the region’s] lack of justice”.48 It was the first time that the central authority had taken responsibility for its actions.

In addition, the new government re-established SBPAC and CPM 43, which Thaksin had dissolved, to coordinate counterinsurgency operations and introduce conciliatory solutions. The SBPAC’s responsibility was to enhance consultation with Malay Muslims

44 Ibid., 81. 45 Rohan Gunaratna and Arabinda Acharya, The Terrorist Threat from Thailand: Jihad or Quest for Justice? (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013), 2. 46 Donald E. Weatherbee, “Southeast Asia in 2006: Deja Vu All over Again,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2007, ed. Daljit Singh and Lorraine C. Salazar (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 17; Chalk and others, The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment, 120. 47 “Surayud Apologises for Govt’s Abuses in South,” The Nation, 3 November 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/11/03/headlines/headlines_30017938.php (accessed 25 September 2013). 48 Cited in Chalk and others, The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment, 115.

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and investigate corruption and complaints about abusive officials. The CPM was in charge of coordinating operations among the military, police, and intelligence agencies. The two agencies were established by the Prem Tinsulanond administration in 1981, but dissolved by Thaksin in 2002. Critics point out that Thaksin perceived them to be dominated by the Democrat Party and had close ties with Prem.49 To replace the SBPAC, Thaksin had established a new institution, the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command (SBPPC), and appointed his ally Chidchai Vanasatidya to lead a new administration. However, the SBPPC’s head office was based in Bangkok and its top- down approach had failed to achieve a resolution to the conflict. Surayud thus announced a revival of the previous SBPPC and other related agencies to continue on with their previous work.50

Relations between Thailand and Malaysia entered a new phase after Surayud visited Kuala Lumpur in October 2006. The insurgency issue had adversely affected relations between the two countries during the Thaksin era. Thaksin accused Malaysia of harbouring militants and consistently objected to any negotiations with insurgent representatives.51 In contrast to Thaksin, Surayud assured that his government wanted to hold peace talks with the insurgent leaders and work more closely with Malaysia.52 He also asked Malaysia to help improve understanding of the situation in the South with other Muslim countries.53 In February 2007, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi met Surayud in Bangkok to confirm cooperation in resolving the southern conflict. The two leaders insisted on the continuation of the dialogue with the insurgents, with Malaysia offering to mediate. However, Surayud admitted that it was unclear which rebel groups would be included, telling the press: “we have agreed that there should be talks if

49 McCargo, “Thaksin and the Resurgence of Violence in the Thai South: Network Monarchy Strikes Back?,” 49-50; Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand, 44. 50 S. P. Harish and Joseph Chinyong Liow, “The Coup and the Conflict in Southern Thailand,” Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 19, no. 1 (2007): 166-167. 51 Ukrist Pathmanand, “Thaksin’s Achilles’ Heel: The Failure of Hawkish Approaches in the Thai South,” in Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence, ed. Duncan McCargo (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007), 71. 52 “Surayud Seeks Peaceful Solution to Muslim Insurgency,” The Nation, 18 October 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/Surayud-seeks-peaceful-solution-to-Muslim-insurgen- 30016531.html (accessed 19 November 2013). 53 Michael J. Montesano, “Thailand: A Reckoning with History Begins,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2007, ed. Daljit Singh and Lorraine C. Salazar (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 327.

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Malaysia can help Thailand figure out which groups we should hold talks with”.54 The leaders also discussed the contentious issue of dual-nationality for the estimated 50,000 to 100,000 people who claim it.55 The Thai authority claimed that many insurgents held both Thai and Malaysian citizenship enabling them to flee across the border to Malaysia as a safe haven when needed. The two leaders agreed to improve security along their borders to control insurgent activities.56

The most noteworthy incident was the anti-government protest at the Pattani Central Mosque in 2007. It occurred on the third anniversary of the Krue Se crackdown. More than 3,000 local Muslims, including women and children, staged demonstrations, blaming security officials for assaulting innocent people and demanding a troop withdrawal from the region.57 Surayud asked security officers to refrain from using force to disperse protesters. Moreover, during the five-day protest, local authorities provided food, water, and facilities for protesters. However, protesters denied offers due to a fear that the food and water might be poisoned. After hours of negotiations, the protests ended after authorities agreed to set up a 50-member committee to investigate incidents of violence in the region.58 Surayud’s decision to use political means was successful in resolving the situation.

Despite some positive signals, including Surayud’s apology to the Muslim community for abuse and mistreatment by authorities, the dialogue with insurgent groups, and a reorganisation of governance structures, 2007 saw the highest number of casualties since the violence erupted in 2004.59 Moreover, criticism was raised about post-coup military expenditure, which increased by 33.8 per cent in 2007 and 24.3 per cent in 2008.60 The

54 “Thailand to Rope in Malaysia for Talks with Militants,” The Straits Times, 17 February 2007, http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Issue/straitstimes20070217-1.aspx (accessed 17 December 2013). 55 Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand, 223. 56 “In Need of Help to Douse the Flames,” The Economist 15 February 2007, http://www.economist.com/node/8706170 (accessed 3 September 2013). 57 “Protest at Mosque in Pattani Still Continues,” Prachatai, 4 June 2007, http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/14 (accessed 19 November 2013). 58 Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, “If You Use Nonviolence, I Will Respond with Nonviolence: The 2007 Pattani Protest in Southern Thailand,” in Conflict Transformation: Essays on Methods of Nonviolence, ed. Rhea A. DuMont, Tom H. Hastings, and Emiko Noma (North Carolina: McFarland, 2013), 60. 59 Benjamin Zawacki, “Politically Inconvenient, Legally Correct: A Non-International Armed Conflict in Southern Thailand,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law, (2012): 16. 60 Chairat Charoensin-o-larn, “Military Coup and Democracy in Thailand,” in Divided over Thaksin: Thailand’s Coup and Problematic Transition, ed. John Funston (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2009), 71.

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military claimed that the massive growth of the defence budget was aimed at countering the insurgency. Critics, however, believed that the corruption which was widespread in the South actually worsened. The huge budgets for the South since 2004 have become the so-called “industry of insecurity”, from which many officials and politicians tried to benefit.61 Due to time constraints, as elections came closer, Surayud’s government was unable to produce tangible results in settling unresolved conflicts in the region. Moreover, social policies such as education, employment, and justice system reform were not fully implemented.62

In the 2007 general election, the pro-Thaksin People’s Power Party (PPP) won and formed the six-party coalition government. However, due to anti-government demonstrations in Bangkok and tensions within the coalition government, problems in the South did not receive serious attention from the Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat governments (January-September and September-December 2008). The ruling elites struggled to maintain their hold on power, while the public was more concerned with political conflict in Bangkok and economic problems such as increased fuel prices. As a result, the military was completely in charge of the southern policy. The government also claimed that the southern insurgency was a security problem which should be left to the military. In fact, critics point out that the two pro-Thaksin prime ministers wanted to keep good relations with the army.63 After taking control of southern policy, the military claimed its success in bringing more stability to the southern provinces, as the number of casualties dropped modestly in 2008 and 2009.64 In fact, the military was unable to make significant progress in dampening down the levels of violence as armed attacks increased after 2009. 65 Moreover, the counter-insurgency

61 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Moving Towards Political Solutions,” Asia Report No. 181, 8 December 2009, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east- asia/thailand/181%20Southern%20Thailand%20Moving%20towards%20Political%20Solutions.pdf (accessed 30 July 2014). 62 Ian Storey, “Southern Discomfort: Separatist Conflict in the Kingdom of Thailand,” Asian Affairs 35, no.1 (2008): 45-46. 63 International Crisis Group, “Thailand: Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency,” Asia Brief No. 80, 28 August 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east- asia/thailand/b80_thailand___political_turmoil_and_the_southern_insurgency.pdf (accessed 30 July 2014). 64 Pakorn Puengnetr, “3,380 Killed in Nine Years of Violence,” The Nation 4 January 2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/3380-killed-in-nine-years-of-violence-30197241.html (accessed 19 November 2013). 65 Sunai Phasuk, “Justice Is Key to Success for South Dialogue,” Bangkok Post, 8 March 2013, http://m.bangkokpost.com/opinion/339358 (accessed 4 November 2013).

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campaigns involved serious human rights violations, such as extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and torture. Abuse of ethnic-Malay Muslims by security forces consequently provoked a new generation of insurgents.66

During the Somchai administration, peace talks were renewed in September 2007 in Indonesia. The so-called “Bogor talks” involved representatives of the Pattani Malay Consultative Congress (PMCC), which claimed to be the coordinator of the network of insurgent groups, Thai military officers, and Indonesian Vice-President Jusuf Kalla, who served as a mediator in the discussion. 67 Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono also met both negotiation teams. After the meeting, Indonesia announced that the talks achieved some progress as both sides agreed to exercise restraint to avoid an escalation of tensions.68 However, violence in fact intensified in the wake of the talks. Critics point out that the Borgor gathering was nothing less than a diplomatic disaster. The Thai government was suspicious of Jakarta’s intentions and displeased when the Indonesian government claimed that it was considered “an experienced mediator and the largest country in ASEAN”. In the view of the Thai government, Indonesia had tried to claim credit for holding talks as a means of reaffirming its leadership position within ASEAN. 69 As a result, Thailand’s foreign ministry and army chief denied their involvement in negotiations. 70 Army Commander-in-Chief Anupong Paojinda announced that the government was not involved in the talks and had never asked the Indonesian government to act as a mediator. According to Foreign Ministry spokesman Tharit Charungvat: “We did not send any representatives to Indonesia…Our position is that the situation in the South is an internal conflict and we will not set up any talks with the militants”.71 Bangkok’s negative reaction to Indonesia clearly showed that the Thai

66 See Amnesty International, “Thailand: Torture in the Southern Counter-Insurgency,” 13 January 2009, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA39/001/2009/en (accessed 27 September 2013). 67 “President SBY welcomes Thai Muslim delegates,” The Jakarta Post, 22 September 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/09/22/president-sby-welcomes-thai-muslim-delegates.html (accessed 2 October 2013). 68 Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., “President Receives South Thailand Delegation to Bogor Peace Talks,” 22 September 2008, http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/news/2008/09/news126.htm (accessed 2 October 2013). 69 Wassana Nanuam, “No Talks with Rebels,” Bangkok Post, 2 October 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com/021008_News/02Oct2008_news17.php (accessed 13 December 2013). 70 “Kalla Insists Thai Peace Talks Received Valid Authorization,” The Jakarta Post, 27 September 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/09/27/kalla-insists-thai-peace-talks-received-039valid- authorization039.html (accessed 6 December 2013). 71Bangkok Pundit, “We Have Peace?,” asiancorrespondent, 22 September 2008, http://asiancorrespondent.com/19187/we-have-peace/ (accessed 2 October 2013).

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government was not serious about the Bogor meeting, but was more concerned with its image. Moreover, the Thai military was also concerned about the idea of “special autonomy”, which Jakarta used as a political instrument in solving its long-running conflict with Aceh. For years, the Thai military strongly opposed granting greater autonomy to the southern provinces. Since then, Thailand has denied Indonesia’s offer to host future talks, as it aims to prevent the spread of ideas of implementing autonomy.

5.4 The southern policy under the Abhisit administration

After twenty years in opposition and now in the ruling government, there were high expectations that the Abhisit-led Democrat government might be able to resolve the insurgency problem. The South has traditionally been the stronghold of the Democrat Party. When in opposition, Democrat politicians severely criticised Thaksin and his allies for mishandling the insurgency, claiming that they failed to comprehend the root causes of the conflict and the “southern Thai political culture”. 72 Democrat leaders always expressed confidence in their ability to make better decisions. Moreover, many perceived the Democrat Party to be less abusive than other parties, due to its strong record on human rights and deep ties to the South.73 In the first month in office, Abhisit made his first visit to the South to reaffirm that resolving the situation there was his government’s top priority. He also promised to find a political solution, focusing on “justice and opportunities”, as a key to peace and stability in the area.74

Within two months after assuming office, newly appointed Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya announced that the government was confident of ending insurgent violence by 2010, claiming that 60,000 security forces in the region would succeed in controlling the situation.75 Hopes, particularly of those in southern Thailand, were high that the new government would fulfil its promises. However, four months later, as the conflict was

72 Marc Askew, Performing Political Identity: The Democrat Party in Southern Thailand (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2008), 57. 73 Duncan McCargo, Mapping National Anxieties: Thailand’s Southern Conflict (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2012), 6. 74 Zachary Abuza, The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011), 4. 75 “Running out of Ideas in the South,” The Nation, 4 February 2010, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/south2years/feb0410.php (accessed 18 December 2013).

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more complicated than Kasit initially thought, the government’s deadline was changed.76 Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban, who was responsible for security affairs, later admitted that the southern problem was getting worse as well as more difficult to resolve. He announced that the government would end the insurgency within three years.77 At the end of Abhisit’s term, the deadline was not met, as the overall level of violence in the Deep South was not substantially reduced.

Since the 2006 coup, the government in Bangkok has been through periods of instability and turmoil. Following the 2007 general election, Thailand had three prime ministers within a year. In December 2008, Abhisit and his Democrat Party came to power with the support of the military, after the Somchai administration was removed by a controversial judgement of the Constitutional Court. After taking office, the new government under Abhisit was continually confronted by pro-Thaksin Red Shirt demonstrators, who brought the government to a standstill. Although Abhisit’s government had strong support from the military, the palace, and the anti-Thaksin Yellow Shirts, its legitimacy was rejected by the Red Shirts. The government thus faced a political crisis in Bangkok, where the Red Shirts staged massive protests in 2009 and 2010. At the same time, the government also struggled with the 2009 global economic crisis and the conflict with Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple. As a result, the government paid little attention to the South. While many hoped that former Democrat foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan might help the government end the ongoing conflict, he did not in fact play any role in solving the insurgency problem. As the Secretary-General of ASEAN at the time, he was preoccupied with the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple.78

Throughout Abhisit’s term in office, the southern conflict showed no signs of abating, claiming nearly 1,500 lives between 2009 and 2011.79 The attack at Al-Furqan Mosque

76 Don Pathan, “A Long Way to Go before Peace Is Possible in the South,” The Nation, 24 July 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/south2years/jul2409.php (accessed 19 December 2013). 77 Government Public Relations Department, Office of the Prime Minister, Thailand, “Justice and Opportunities: Key Strategies to Stop Unrest in the Deep South,” 18 June 2009, http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_news.php?id=4264&a=2 (accessed 18 December 2013). 78 IPS Asia-Pacific, Thailand, “Q&A: It will take time before ASEAN is a complete community,” 6 March 2013, http://www.aseannews.net/qa-it-will-take-time-before--is-a-complete-community/ (accessed 19 December 2013). 79 Bangkok Pundit, “56 Deaths and 547 Injuries in Thailand’s Deep South in March, What Is Next?: Part 1,” asiancorrespondent, 8 April 2012, http://asiancorrespondent.com/79824/56-deaths-and-547-injuries- in-thailands-deep-south-in-march-what-is-next-part-1/ (accessed 16 December 2013).

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in 2009, leaving 11 people dead, including the Imam, was the worst violence seen in southern Thailand since 2004. Security forces were suspected of being involved in the killings. However, without an investigation, Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban and Army Commander-in-Chief Anupong Paojinda were quick to deny the accusation.80 The failed investigation into this incident further deepened the mistrust between the Thai authority and the Malay Muslims in the region. While the government claimed that justice reform was one of the crucial mechanisms in resolving the conflict, it failed to make any progress in prosecuting security officers believed to be responsible for serious human rights violations, particularly in the Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents. Moreover, the number of reported cases of torture, disappearance, and human rights violations by the authorities remained high.81 According to the International Crisis Group’s report, as of August 2009, there had been 6,758 security-related cases in the region. Due to poor investigations and insufficient evidence, very few of these cases ever went to court. 82 However, some progress on justice reform was made in March 2009, when the cabinet approved the Justice Ministry’s five-year strategic plan, which aimed to improve the justice system in the southern provinces.

“Politics Leading the Military” approach

Since Thaksin was ousted in a coup in 2006, the Thai government has been subject to frequent changes or been overthrown completely. As a result, the government’s response to the southern conflict, regarding both security and development, has in general been dominated by the military. After assuming power in 2008, Abhisit made an attempt to bring back civilian supremacy in overseeing the Deep South. He thus announced what he termed “politics-led-military” approach to deal with the unrest, with an attempt to reduce the army’s influence and to pursue a less confrontational approach.83 Meanwhile, he moved ahead with the establishment of the “Southern Cabinet”, aimed at increasing coordination among ministers to oversee relevant budget and policy issues for the restive

80 Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Prosecute Rights Violators in the South,” 1 December 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/12/01/thailand-prosecute-rights-violators-south (accessed 17 December 2013). 81 Amnesty International, “Thailand: Torture in the Southern Counter-Insurgency,” 13 January 2009, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA39/001/2009/en (accessed 27 September 2013). 82 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Moving Towards Political Solutions,” 15. 83 Marc Askew, “Insurgency and the Market for Violence in Southern Thailand,” Asian Survey 50, no. 6 (2010): 1122.

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region. In this regard, Deputy Leader of the Democrat Party Kraisak Choonhavan stated: “The government has a plan – it calls itself the Southern Cabinet in which in theory the military will be part of a civilian rule in the South”.84 A reduction of the military presence was also one of the government’s primary aims, as outlined by Abhisit: “I have said very clearly that I would measure the success of the government’s policy by our ability to reduce troops’ presence in the three provinces, and also actually eventually lifting the state of emergency in those provinces as well”.85 The military’s presence in the South increased significantly after the January 2004 attack. About forty percent of the army was stationed in the southernmost provinces with 3.1 million people.86

Abhisit’s plan also focused on several significant measures such as judicial reforms, economic development projects, the rearrangement of the security agencies, and negotiations with insurgents.87 Overall, these initiatives were not new or innovative. Similar policies had been implemented previously to some degree by preceding governments. In fact, without the military’s consent, Abhisit did not appear to have the courage to make a decision on sensitive issues such as peace talks with the insurgents, prosecution of past human rights abuses by security forces, and local election of the governors of the three southernmost provinces. Moreover, the government made little headway in convincing the military to give up the lead role in the Deep South. For example, Kasit Piromya offered the idea of establishing a minister with special responsibility for the region, similar to Britain’s Minister for Northern Ireland. He believed that a new ministry would replace the ineffective SBPAC, the central problem- solving mechanism for the Deep South, which was dominated by the military. Army Commander-in-Chief Anupong Paochinda immediately opposed Kasit’s plan. As Anupong was the one who put the Democrat-led coalition government together, Kasit’s idea was discarded.88 Clearly, the so-called “politics-led military” approach that aimed to

84 “Thailand Explores Greater Autonomy for Largely Muslim Provinces,” VOA News, 2 November 2009, http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2009-03-18-voa36-68772077/410818.html (accessed 19 December 2013). 85 Council on Foreign Relations, “A Conversation with Abhisit Vejjajiva, Prime Minister, Thailand,” 24 September 2010, http://www.cfr.org/thailand/conversation-abhisit-vejjajiva-prime-minister- thailand/p23035 (accessed 20 December 2013). 86 Brian McCartan, “Abduction Case Puts Thailand on Trial,” Asia Times, 14 March 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KC14Ae01.html (accessed 8 February 2014). 87 International Crisis Group, “Thailand: The Evolving Conflict in the South,” 9. 88 Don Pathan, “FM Kasit Seeks Lower Profile for Military in South,” The Nation, 20 January 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/FM-Kasit-seeks-lower-profile-for-military-in-south- 30093639.html (accessed 12 November 2013).

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reduce the military’s preeminent role in the Deep South was difficult to implement, since the government depended on the army for its existence. Even though Abhisit wished to adopt a conciliatory approach to the South, he owed his allegiance to the military figures who played a strong role in his government. In fact, Abhisit’s first three months in office saw the deployment of an additional 4,000 troops to the region.89 Overall, throughout Abhisit’s term in office, the military continued to dominate counterinsurgency efforts and policies for the South.

The government’s efforts to ensure greater civilian control over the military were revealed when Abhisit reorganised the SBPAC in 2010. The SBPAC’s duties were to monitor the work of civilian government agencies and to coordinate with security forces in southern Thailand. It was also seen as a key institution to build trust between the state and Malay Muslims. However, for years, the organisation had been plagued by a top-down approach and dominated by the military. The new SBPAC was headed by a secretary-general, who was appointed by and responsible to the prime minister. The agency was granted more authority and resources, with a separate budget.90 In 2009, the government approved 63.1 billion baht or US$1.85 billion for a security and development programme for the region between 2009 and 2012. The increased budget came under criticism because the new SBPAC was considered by many as a part of the Democrat Party’s machine to maintain its popularity in the region. Although funding for the regional development projects, which were managed by the SBPAC, was increased significantly during this period, critics point out that prevailing rampant corruption led to local communities rarely receiving the benefits of those projects.91 Moreover, most of the government’s initiatives, such as economic development and vocational training programmes, failed to yield any perceptible results. The opposition criticised the government’s initiatives as being irrelevant to the core causes of the conflict as local people still felt alienated, suffered from injustice, and did not trust the government.92

89 Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Duncan McCargo, “The Southern Thai Conflict Six Years On: Insurgency, Not Just Crime,” Comtemporary Southeast Asia 32, no. 2 (2010): 173. 90 Matt Wheeler, “People’s Patron or Patronizing the People?: The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre in Perspective,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no. 2 (2010): 224. 91 Gerard B. McDermott, “Barriers toward Peace in Southern Thailand,” Peace Review 25, no.1 (2013): 121. 92 Kittipong Thavevong, “PM Defends South Policy but Admits More Needs to Be Done,” The Nation 18 March 2011, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011-30151174.html (accessed 21 December 2013).

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Despite Abhisit’s talk of following civilian-led principles, in practice, the South remained largely the preserve of military interests. The military showed no desire to minimise its role in the southern provinces. Since the 2006 coup, the military’s annual budget has been increased substantially. From 2007 to 2009, it increased by about 100 per cent. 93 Consequently, the military budget for southern security operations, which was used by the military-controlled agencies, was also increased. 94 From 2004 to 2008, the total budget allocated to security and development activities in southern Thailand was over US$2.2 billion. Under the Abhisit government, the budget for the restive South was increased nearly 20 per cent from US$766 million in 2008 to US$918 million in 2009.95 The government’s increased military expenditure was seen as a means of avoiding confrontation with the army. The military budget was cut slightly in 2010 due to the global economic downturn and the flood disaster in many provinces.

While the military claimed that a significantly increased budget could win the hearts and minds of the Muslim Malays and could bring peace and stability to the region, the failure to suppress the insurgency raised concerns about the military’s commitment to resolving the conflict and related expenditure. Some observers are suspicious that what has been called “industry of insecurity”, which cost the government over US$5.5 billion in the previous decade (2004-2013), might in fact represent the military’s real incentive to maintain its dominant role in the southern conflict. This also explains why the military was upset when the government cut its budget in 2010.96 Despite soaring military budgets since 2006, increased budgets for development in the south and for the more than 60,000 security forces deployed in the area, the insurgency remains unresolved. Some critics even argue that the enormous budget might be motivation for the military to “sustain rather than end the conflict”. 97 Similarly, some academics argue that the decade of conflict has seen military forces have been and will continue to be used as a major strategy of the Thai state against the insurgency, with the strong likelihood that this strategy will

93 Chairat Charoensin-o-larn, “Thailand in 2009: Unusual Politics Becomes Usual,” in Southeast Asia Affairs 2010, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 324. 94 Paul Chambers, “Trouble in Thailand: Failed Civilian Control Amidst Fruitless Demilitarization,” in Demilitarising the State: the South and Southeast Asian Experience, ed. Rajesh Basrur and Kartik Bommakanti (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2012), 71. 95 McCargo, Mapping National Anxieties: Thailand’s Southern Conflict, 9. 96 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Moving Towards Political Solutions,” 6-7. 97 “A Bid to Buy Thai Muslim Hearts and Minds,” Asia Times, 5 August 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KH05Ae01.html (accessed 18 December 2013).

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continue. However, it is undeniable that the long tradition of military influence in the southern conflict has failed to produce regional stability and has continued to hinder the promotion of reconciliation, justice, and peace in the region.98

During his tenure, while Abhisit repeatedly claimed that the violence in the South had decreased, the situation on the ground had in fact changed very little. Statistics from the Deep South Watch and the International Crisis Group show that the number of incidents did not change significantly, and has even increased in recent years.99 Violence and casualties dropped sharply in 2008. However, overall, the number of incidents increased after 2008 and remained at a constant level. In addition, the number of casualties declined between 2008 and 2009, but then increased again between 2010 and 2011. 100 The deployment of enormous resources did not reduce the violence and the insurgency did not subside. Due to prolonged anti-government protests in Bangkok and the conflict with Cambodia, the insurgency was a low priority for the government. Throughout 2010, the government was confronted by the Red Shirt protests in Bangkok, which peaked in May, leaving more than 90 people dead. When the violence in the South was more severe during that period, the government paid little attention to the problem. In his 31 months in office, Abhisit made only four 1-day visits to the South, a mere 1.5-hour flight from Bangkok.101 As a result, the military continued to dominate the southern policy, and its high-handed approach towards the insurgents therefore continued. Despite many promises and policy initiatives, none was translated into any visible change on the ground. The underlying causes of the conflicts such as the long-standing injustice, human rights abuses, poor governance, and social and economic grievances were not taken into account.102

98 Srisompob Jitpiromrsi, “Thailand’s Security Section and the Southern Insurgency,” in Knights of the Realm: Thailand’s Military and Police, Then and Now, ed. Paul Chambers (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2013), 565, 572. 99 “Weapons and Ammunition Found in Searches by Officials in Far South,” The Nation, 27 February 2011, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Weapons-and-ammunition-found-in-searches-by-offici- 30149643.html (accessed 17 December 2013). 100 Pakorn Puengnetr, “3,380 killed in nine years of violence,” The Nation, 4 January 2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/3380-killed-in-nine-years-of-violence-30197241.html (accessed 19 November 2013). 101 Abuza, The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand, 17. 102 McCargo, Mapping National Anxieties: Thailand’s Southern Conflict, 159.

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5.5 Malaysia’s role in the unrest in southern Thailand

The ongoing separatist insurgency in southern Thailand has a considerable impact on relations between Thailand and Malaysia. Malaysia’s involvement in Thailand’s southern conflict is as complex as it is important. Malaysia has vested security and economic interests in the region. Moreover, the relationship between the ethnic Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand and northern Malaysia is very close. They share not only a geographical border, but also a common historical and socio-economic background, culture, religion, and language. As a result, Malaysia’s reaction to the southern Thai insurgency has been a mixture of sympathy for Thai Muslims among people in the northern part of Malaysia, domestic political and security concerns, and diplomatic caution. During the Thaksin government, the Thai-Malaysian relations were tense and full of disputes, particularly those involving insurgency groups. After the Tak Bai and Krue Se incidents, as the number of insurgent attacks increased dramatically, the Thai authorities accused Malaysia of being sympathetic to the insurgents. Thaksin asserted in a nationally broadcast interview that the Thai insurgents held anti-government meetings in northern Malaysia’s Kelantan State. He not only accused Malaysia of being a safe haven for the militants, but also claimed that many bomb components and much of their funding came from or through Malaysia. In fact, there was no evidence that the Malaysian government supported the Thai militants. Malaysia denied accusations that they had supported the insurgents and also offered to help resolve the conflict.103 However, Thai military leaders continued to blame local political leaders in northern Malaysia for supporting the separatists, financially and morally, to fight the Thai authority. They also severely criticised the Malaysian government for not fully cooperating on efforts against the insurgency.104

In Malaysia, both the Thai government’s mishandling of the southern insurgency and the way Thai Muslims were abused by the authorities presented sensitive subjects for Muslims in the Malay-majority states of Northern Malaysia, which have traditionally been the stronghold of the Islamic opposition party, PAS. After the Tak Bai and Krue Se

103 Vaudine England, “Malays Reject Accusations They Aid Thai Separatists,” The New York Times, 6 May 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/05/world/asia/05iht-malaysia.html?_r=0 (accessed 11 February 2014). 104 Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand, 221.

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tragedies, PAS leaders and supporters held a rally in front of the Royal Thai Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, calling for boycotts against Thai products. Furthermore, the fundamentalist PAS party raised funds to donate to Thai Muslims whose family members were killed in military operations.105 Popular opinion forced the Malaysian government to establish a higher priority for the protection of Muslim rights in Thailand. Responding to Thaksin’s provocative diplomacy, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmed Badawi personally expressed concerns about Bangkok’s inability to guarantee the safety of Muslim people. The Malaysian parliament condemned Thaksin’s hawkish policy towards insurgency.106 The deterioration in relations between the two countries reached its most tense point when 131 Thai Muslim refugees fled across the border to Malaysia in 2005, to avoid the military crackdown on the insurgency.107 Thaksin asked Malaysia to return them, claiming that they were militants in disguise. Due to pressure from its Muslim population, Badawi’s government rejected Thaksin’s request to return the asylum seekers and invited representatives from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to interview them.108 Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar commented that it was the Thai government’s responsibility to inspire trust among its Muslim people, to enable them to live safely in Thailand, and to not have to come to Malaysia. 109 Thaksin responded by condemning Malaysia for interfering in Thailand’s internal affairs and trying to exploit the issue for its own political purposes.110

Thaksin’s suspicion of Malaysian complicity in the insurgency put the Malaysian government in an awkward position. For Malaysia, violence in southern Thailand clearly had spillover effects on its border security, so that it had a vested interest in seeing

105 Anil Netto, “Malaysia Rages over Muslim Killings,” Asia Times 30 October 2004, http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FJ30Ae02.html (accessed 14 February 2014). 106 John Funston, “Malaysia and Thailand’s Southern Conflict: Reconciling Security and Ethnicity,” 243. 107 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand,” in A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia, ed. Andrew T.H. Tan (Glos: Edward Elgar Press, 2007), 274-275. 108 Peter Hourdequin, “Malaysia’s 2005-2006 Refugee Stand-Off with Thailand: A Security Culture Analysis,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8, no. 2 (2008): 184; N. Ganesan, “Thailand- Malaysia Bilateral Relations,” in International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism, ed. N. Ganesan and Ramses Amer (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 152. 109 “Malaysia Risks Row with Thailand,” BBC News, 2 September 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/4208094.stm (accessed 13 November 2013); John Funston, Southern Thailand: The Dynamics of Conflict (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 22. 110 Baradan Kuppusamy, “Thai, Malaysian War of Words Heats Up,” Asia Times, 13 October 2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GJ13Ae01.html (accessed 13 November 2013).

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stability return to the area. However, due to domestic pressures to intervene in the conflict and the regional commitment to non-interference in Thailand’s internal affairs, Kuala Lumpur thus attempted to play a balancing act between the two. On the one hand, Kuala Lumpur criticised Thaksin’s heavy-handed policy towards the insurgency for inflaming the situation and also refrained from arresting or returning the insurgents to the Thai government. On the other, Malaysia tried to maintain good relations with Thailand. It repeatedly denied supporting the insurgency and offered to assist Thai authorities in bringing peace to the region. More importantly, Malaysian leaders played a constructive role in peace talks between the Thai government and insurgents. During the period of Thaksin’s hostility to Malaysia, the flood of reports of Malaysian complicity in the insurgency at times led to tensions between Thai and Malaysian military officers on the ground. The situation along the border was tense as the armies of both sides deployed additional troops. Malaysia decided to compromise by withdrawing the insurgency issue from the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005. It was rumoured that Thaksin threatened to downgrade the Thai diplomatic delegation if the issue appeared on the agenda.111 In 2004, Thaksin threatened a walkout if the Tak Bai massacre was raised in the ASEAN summit in Laos. Thaksin’s action was strongly criticised by Malaysia and Indonesia, who accused him of undermining ASEAN’s cohesiveness.112

Relations between Thailand and Malaysia continued to improve after Abhisit took office in 2008. Abhisit’s conciliatory approach to the Malay-Muslim communities was welcomed by the Malaysian government.113 Moreover, former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who was asked to help in the peace talks, had good working relations with former Thai Prime Ministers Prem Tinsulanond and Chuan Leekpai, who had close ties with Abhisit.114 As a result, Abhisit seemed to have a positive opinion of Malaysia’s role in southern conflict. In Malaysia, after the 2008 general election, Prime Minister Badawi came under intense pressure from opposition parties and opponents in his party. He was forced to resign in March 2009. Najib Razak, who became the new prime minister

111 Nick Cumming-Bruce, “News Analysis: Thailand and Malaysia Bristling,” The New York Times, 27 October 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/27/world/asia/27iht-thai.html?_r=0 (accessed 8 December 2013). 112 “Thaksin to Leave If ASEAN Discusses Muslim Deaths,” The Straits Times, 26 November 2004, http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/sub/asia/story/0,5562,287054,00.html (accessed 8 December 2013). 113 Ganesan, “Thailand-Malaysia Bilateral Relations,” 159. 114 Khadijah MD. Khalid, “Malaysia’s Foreign Policy under Najib: A Comparison with Mahathir,” Asian Survey 51, no.3 (2011): 445.

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in April 2009, continued to maintain good relations with Thailand. The relationship between the two countries was strengthened by Najib’s state visit to Narathiwat province in December 2009. Najib was the first Malaysian leader to visit after the insurgency began in 2004. During his visit, he expressed concerns over the continued violence and offered support for the Thai government to resolve the conflict. 115 Abhisit reaffirmed his government’s commitment to a peaceful and reconciliatory approach to the insurgency. Both leaders chose to visit religious schools to signal their recognition of Islamic faith and identity. Malaysia offered to help in establishing curricula for religious schools. For years, the Thai military believed that Islamic schools, Islamic teachers, and violent incidents were associated. Radical Islamic teachers were accused of recruiting, indoctrinating, and training the militants in the Islamic schools. When Abhisit adopted the politics-led-military principle in dealing with the insurgency, he announced that education was a “key weapon” in the fight against Muslim separatism. He promised to promote Islamic education and opportunities for professional employment for local Muslims.116

For Thailand, Najib’s visit to the South was significant because it reaffirmed Malaysia’s acceptance of Thai sovereignty over the region. It was also a signal of the Malaysian government’s call for the insurgents to reconcile with the Thai authority, rather than to incorporate with Malaysia.117 Clearly, Najib wanted to end the existing mutual distrust, as he asserted: “Malaysia’s stand is to be a partner who will respect that this is domestic, and the message is clear that the people of Thailand must be loyal to the country, Constitution, and King”. At the end of the meeting, the two leaders initiated a number of joint projects to develop Thailand’s southern region. For example, the need to increase bilateral trade and investment, the training programme for Thai Islamic teachers in Islamic teachings in Malaysia, and a solution to the dual citizenship problem.118 Many

115 Jayaratnam Saravanamuttu, Malaysia’s Foreign Policy, The First Fifty Years: Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 324. 116 “Thailand’s Restive South and Malaysia: The Trouble in Between,” The Economist, 10 December 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/15065869 (accessed 31 October 2013). 117 Bangkok Pundit, “Why Is the Malaysian Pm Visiting the Deep South?,” asiancorrespondent, 13 December 2009, http://asiancorrespondent.com/26278/why-is-the-malaysian-pm-visiting-the-deep-south/ (accessed 12 September 2013). 118 Mergawati Zulfakar, “Malaysia Will Respect Thailand’s Wishes but Will Help If Asked To,” The Star, 9 December 2009, www.thestar.com.my/Story/?file=%2F2009%2F12%2F9%2Fnation%2F5267463&sec=nation (accessed 28 February 2014).

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hoped that Najib’s visit would give a boost to peace process efforts. For over a year, the Abhisit government had failed to fulfil its promise to suppress the insurgency. A joint visit to the South showed that Abhisit was at least attempting to solve the problem.

In August 2010, during the 50th Thai-Malaysian General Border Committee (GBC) meeting in Bangkok, the two governments signed a new agreement to strengthen border cooperation, including joint military exercises. Under the new agreement, the two sides agreed on using e-border passes to control illegal crossings, particularly by insurgents and drug traffickers. 119 After the violence erupted in 2004, Thailand had identified dual citizenship as a major factor contributing to the insurgent’s ability to evade capture. Malaysia was also accused of failing to prevent insurgents crossing the border. With increased security cooperation along the border, the Thai government expected that the insurgents would find it difficult to seek refuge in northern Malaysia. The Malaysian government would also be able to take action against those who provided material and ideological support to Thailand’s insurgency groups.

During the Abhisit government, like its predecessors, there were feelings of ambivalence regarding Malaysia’s involvement in Thailand’s southern insurgency. Although Abhisit did not accuse the Malaysian government of direct complicity, some Thai officials remained suspicious over Malaysia’s intention in Thailand’s conflict. To understand Abhisit’s Malaysia policy, the following discussion focuses on Malaysia’s role in Thailand’s southern conflict and Abhisit’s efforts to promote cooperation with Malaysia, which can be categorised into three main areas: supporting Malaysia’s role in facilitating talks between the Thai authorities and insurgents, seeking support from the Malaysian authorities in preventing the idea of independence, and promoting economic cooperation as a way to resolve the conflict in the long-term.

Dialogue

Since the onset of the separatist violence in 2004, top military figures and members of successive Thai governments have been involved in various forms of dialogue with

119 “New Thai-Malaysian Border Accord,” Bangkok Post, 5 August 2010, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/security/189609/thai-malaysian-border-cooperations (accessed 19 December 2013).

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insurgents. Malaysia, which is believed to have connections with insurgent groups, has been asked to facilitate some of these dialogues. The first acknowledged dialogue meeting took place under the auspices of former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad. In October 2005, during the conflict between the Thaksin and Badawi governments over the 131 Thai Muslims seeking refuge in Malaysia, Mahathir visited Thailand to meet with NRC chair Anand Panyarachun to discuss initiating a dialogue with the rebel groups. Thaksin and his defence and interior ministers made clear their opposition to the talks, but lacked the courage to challenge Anand, who was backed by the palace.120 Mahathir told a Malaysian newspaper, The Star: “The king agreed with Anand’s suggestion that I be involved in the peace initiative for southern Thailand”.121 Subsequently, with the secret support of the palace and the military, the peace talks between the Thai government and separatists, known as “the Langkawi Process”, were held on Langkawi Island in Malaysia in November 2005 and February 2006. The meetings were chaired by Mahathir Mohamad and Shazryl Eskay Abdullah, Honorary Consul at the Royal Thai Consulate in Langkawi. Participants included the old-guard leadership of separatist groups such as PULO, BRN, and GMIP, senior Thai officials from the military and the National Security Council, Malaysian security officials, and NGOs.122

The outcome of the Langkawi peace talks was a list of recommendations, known as “Joint Peace and Development Plan for Southern Thailand”, which was submitted to the Thaksin government, but never implemented. The recommendations stressed the need for reconciliation and the need to recognise Malay-Muslim identity. In addition, leaders of separatist movements were asked to accept Thai territorial integrity in exchange for amnesty and increased government funds for economic development.123 However, these

120 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup,” Asia Report No. 129, 15 March 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east- asia/thailand/129_southern_thailand___the_impact_of_the_coup_web.pdf (accessed 30 July 2014). 121 “Dr M: Ball’s in Thai court,” The Star, 7 October 2006, http://www.thestar.com.my/Story/?file=%2F2006%2F10%2F7%2Fnation%2F15662213&sec=nation (accessed 10 December 2013). 122 Participants from the Thai state included Armed Forces Security Centre Chief Lt-General Vaipot Srinuan and National Security Council Chief General Winai Pathiyakul. Participants from the exiled groups included Mohammed Bin Abdul Rahman, President of Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP); Razi Bin Hassan, Vice President of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO); Abdulah Bin Ismail, President of Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Congress (BRN); Abdullah Bin Idris, Vice President of BRN, and Wan Kadir Che Man, former president of the now-defunct BERSATU. For more information, see Patani Forum, Negotiating a Peaceful Coexistence between the Malays of Patani and the Thai State, (Patani: Patani Forum, 2012), 76. 123 Chalk and others, The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment, 120.

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recommendations were not put into effect, due to several constraints hindering progress. Firstly, Thaksin neither accepted Mahathir’s initiative nor the existence of the talks.124 From his perspective, Malaysia was not a neutral broker, but instead a supporter of the insurgents. Thaksin was aiming for stronger cooperation with Malaysia, especially intelligence sharing, in order to eliminate the insurgents. 125 Secondly, several representatives of the insurgency pointed out that the agenda and recommendations from the talks were dominated by Malaysia, and did not reflect the real interests of the insurgents. Moreover, BRN-Coordinate, which was believed to be responsible for most of the violence in the restive region, boycotted the meeting.126 Thirdly, in view of the fact that separatist leaders who participated in the talks were from the previous generation and that leadership among the insurgent groups was unclear, the Thai military doubted whether these leaders still had influence over their members.127

After the 2006 coup, Surayud’s interim administration immediately dropped Thaksin’s strong-arm tactics, and resorted to dialogue and reconciliation. The peace process was greatly enhanced by Surayud’s efforts to reach out to the international community and exiled separatist leaders. As his days in office were numbered and there was a possibility that the incoming government might not follow his initiatives or might adopt a different approach, Surayud decided to meet with the insurgents. However, high-ranking foreign ministry officials disagreed with his decision, claiming that it could be a move to legitimise the insurgency. Despite criticisms, Surayud, whom many believed was supported by the king, tried to pursue dialogue. With the help of a European NGO, he met with senior representatives of BRN and PULO in Bahrain in December 2006. It is noteworthy that this was the first time that a Thai head of government had met with insurgent leaders to negotiate for peace.128 Despite the absence of concrete results, the meeting was perceived as a huge success that would pave the way for future talks.

124 Funston, “Malaysia and Thailand’s Southern Conflict: Reconciling Security and Ethnicity,” 247. 125 Jason Johnson, “Malaysian Role Voxes Thai Conflict,” Asia Times, 21 September 2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NI21Ae01.html (accessed 11 December 2013). 126 Bangkok Pundit, “Wan Kadir Che Man,” asiancorrespondent, 21 February 2007, http://asiancorrespondent.com/20152/wan-kadir-che-man/ (accessed 26 September 2013). 127 Joseph Chinyong Liow and Don Pathan, Confronting Ghosts: Thailand’s Shapeless Southern Insurgency (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2010), 86. 128 Anthony Davis, “Thai Peace Talks Come to Light,” Asian Times, 6 April 2011, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MD06Ae01.html (accessed 15 February 2014).

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Relations between Thailand and Malaysia improved remarkably during Surayud’s tenure. Surayud paid several visits to Malaysia, encouraging Malaysia’s involvement in the peace process as a means of pressuring Thai Muslim separatist groups to participate.129 Several talks between Thai officials and separatist leaders were held in Malaysia and chaired by Malaysian senior politicians and officials.130 The recommendations from the Langkawi talks, which were ignored by Thaksin, were reconsidered and some were adopted.131 However, Thai-Malaysian cooperation in counter-insurgency was limited by the domestic political concerns of both countries. In Malaysia, the PAS’s criticisms over Thailand’s aggressive approach towards the insurgency and its stance on behalf of the Muslim insurgents attracted considerable support among northern voters. Consequently, the UMNO-led government’s cooperation with Thailand raised concerns that UMNO risked losing support to PAS. In Thailand, Bangkok’s efforts regarding peace talks were negligible after Surayud’s tenure ended. Thaksin’s two proxy governments under Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat were preoccupied with political struggles, particularly with the anti-Thaksin protests. Moreover, in the 2007 general election, the pro-Thaksin PPP won only a single seat in the twelve southern provinces. Without local and military support, and in view of the political instability in Bangkok, peace talks were halted. The search for solutions for the southern conflict also slipped further down the government’s list of priorities.132

During the Abhisit government, while some reconciliation initiatives were revived, peace talks did not make concrete progress. After a year in office, Abhisit did not show any interest in promoting a policy of dialogue. Critics pointed out that it was because Abhisit could not afford to give the South priority over the political instability in Bangkok. Moreover, his relations with his biggest ally, the military, could be easily jeopardised if the government made any decision without the military’s consent. 133 In contrast to

129 Bernama, “Surayud to Visit Malaysia Three Times Next Month,” The Straits Times, 13 July 2007, http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Issue/straitstimes20070713-1.aspx (accessed 21 February 2014). 130 Piyanart Srivalo, “Violence in South Will Ease, Says Boonrawd,” The Nation, 9 January 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/Violence-in-South-will-ease-says-Boonrawd-30023644.html (accessed 1 October 2013). 131 Tim Huxley, “Southeast Asia in 2007: Domestic Concerns, Delicate Bilateral Relations, and Patchy Regionalism,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2008, ed. Daljit Singh and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 23. 132 Patani Forum, Negotiating a Peaceful Coexistence between the Malays of Patani and the Thai State, 85. 133 Jitpiromsri and McCargo, “The Southern Thai Conflict Six Years On: Insurgency, Not Just Crime,” 171.

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Surayud, Abhisit consistently refused to formalise peace talks or negotiate with the insurgents, arguing: “Why should their [the insurgents’] voices be louder than the ones who are not practising violence?” 134 Army Commander-in-Chief General Anupong Paochinda was also opposed to a dialogue approach, fearing that it would mean an official recognition of the insurgency groups, and a consequent legitimisation of their demands and goals. He argued: “It is impossible for the military to enter talks with any separatist group as it would violate the country’s Constitution. Any talks with those who commit criminal crimes against the people are out of question as it is also against [Thailand’s] criminal laws”.135 While the government and military expressed discomfort with the term “negotiation”, a group of academics proposed the use of the term “peace dialogue”, which referred to “a less structured approach and concept”.136 The government seemed to accept the term “dialogue” or “talks”, which were perceived to be less threatening. Instead of negotiation with the insurgents, Abhisit claimed that his government wanted to expand the base of participation in a dialogue by inviting civil societies and leaders of communities, both Buddhists and Muslims, as a way to strengthen the legitimacy and acceptance of the process.137 However, a move towards dialogue was obstructed by the shootings at the Al-Furqan Mosque in 2009. Due to the government’s inability to investigate the case, local leaders were concerned over their safety and questioned the government’s sincerity for around the dialogue process.138

While Abhisit maintained a firm non-negotiative stance with the insurgents, some talks were carried out in secret. During mid-2010, a government delegation led by the National Security Council (NSC) continued talks with Kasturi Mahkota’s PULO faction, which

134 “Malaysia Willing to Help Down South, but Will Not Interfere,” The Nation, 12 December 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/12/12/opinion/opinion_30118377.php (accessed 12 November 2013). 135 “Thai Army Chief Rules out Talks with Insurgents in Restive South,” MCOT, 14 June 2009, http://enews.mcot.net/view.php?id=10365 (accessed 17 February 2014). 136 Don Pathan, “Conflict Management and Resolution in Asia: The Role of Civil Societies in Thailand’s Deep South,” Occasional Paper No. 18 (San Francisco, C.A.: Asia Foundation, 2012): 6. 137 Tim Johnstston, “Thai PM Will Not Negotiate with Insurgents,” Financial Times, 14 June 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d1cd08cc-58d5-11de-80b3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2tYdumFJQ (accessed 17 February 2014); Patani Forum, Negotiating a Peaceful Coexistence between the Malays of Patani and the Thai State, 98. 138 Don Pathan, “Can the Old Guard Get Peace Talks Going in the South?,” The Nation, 6 April 2011, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2011/04/06/opinion/Can-the-old-guard-get-peace-talks-going- in-the-Sou-30152592.html (accessed 19 February 2014).

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Surayud had contacted in late 2007.139 The talks were aimed at persuading the old-guard leaders to act as brokers between the government and a new generation of militants. The so-called “Geneva Process” resulted in a four-week unilateral ceasefire announced by PULO representatives in three districts of Narathiwat.140 However, the shooting incidents in the area continued during that period. The government tried to save face by refusing to recognise the ceasefire announcement. The military officials on the ground claimed that the attacks were carried out by insurgents from other groups, with the aim of discrediting PULO.141 Critics pointed out that, beside a lack of mutual trust and confidence between the government and the insurgents, conflicts and disunity among the insurgent groups gravely hampered the talks’ progress.142 Some insurgent leaders blamed the government for failures in negotiations. They argued that the Thai authorities brought little to the negotiating table. The Thai side offered only a policy review and more money for the region, but refused to negotiate on amnesties, pardons, or autonomy. In other words, it was unclear what the Thai state could offer and what the insurgents could realistically hope to gain in negotiations.143 In addition, the talks led by the NSC upset the military because the latter felt that they were bypassed by the government. The military claimed that the PULO faction, with whom the council held talks, was not responsible for the violence, and did not seem to have command-and-control over local militant cells. PULO was influential in the 1970s-80s, but had a negligible role in the warfare campaign over the past decade. Meanwhile, BRN-Coordinate, which was believed to be the largest separatist network, repeatedly refused to surface publicly or come to the table to take part in a formal peace process.144

139 “History of Peace Talks to Resolve Southern Unrest Problem,” ISRA News, 18 May 2013, http://www.isranews.org/%E0%B8%82%E0%B9%88%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%A7/4-politic/21302- pmove210513.html?pop=1&tmpl=component&print=1 (accessed 17 February 2014). 140 Don Pathan, “Southern Militants Have Scant Desire to Negotiate,” The Nation, 19 January 2010, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/south2years/jan1910.php (accessed 20 February 2014). 141 Patani Forum, Negotiating a Peaceful Coexistence between the Malays of Patani and the Thai State, 100. 142 “It’s Time to Talk Face-to-Face with Southern Rebels,” The Nation, 16 July 2010, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/Tt-s-time-to-talk-face-to-face-with-southern-rebel- 30133870.html (accessed 13 February 2014). 143 Zachary Abuza, “The Upcoming Peace Talks in Southern Thailand’s Insurgency,” CTC Sentinel 6, no. 3 (2013): 20. 144 Jason Johnson, “Thaksin as Peacemaker in South Thailand,” Asia Times, 14 August 2013, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-01-140813.html (accessed 20 February 2014).

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While relations between the two countries improved significantly after Najib’s visit to southern Thailand in 2009, Malaysia’s efforts to facilitate dialogue between the Thai authorities and insurgents were stalled. Although Malaysia expressed its intention to hold peace talks, it did not receive any positive signals from the Thai authorities.145 Within Thai security circles, opinions about Malaysia’s role in the peace talks differed. It was unclear whether Malaysia’s role was that of a “facilitator”, a “mediator”, or an “interferer”. 146 Some officials were optimistic, stating that Malaysia had played a constructive role in the peace dialogue, and that counterinsurgency policy could not succeed without Malaysia’s involvement. They were also concerned that the longer the Thai government waited, the harder it would be to put the dialogue back on track. Some hardliners, however, particularly those in the military, had contrasting views. They stressed consistently that the southern conflict was a domestic affair, and were suspicious of Malaysia’s efforts to get involved in the issue, one which could present a threat to Thai national security. Thus, Najib stressed during his visit to Thailand that the role Malaysia played in assisting Thailand to resolve the conflict would be “at the invitation of the Thai government”. He also reaffirmed that Malaysia would not attempt to interfere in Thailand’s internal affairs.147

In late 2010, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) held two meetings with exiled insurgent leaders in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. Participants included representatives from PULO, BRN, and several small groups. BRN-Coordinate also sent a low ranking representative to observe, but not participate. The main discussion in the meetings focused on establishing a political front, the so-called “United Patani People Council (UPPC)” that would give legitimacy to the separatists when negotiating with the Thai state.148 After the dialogue process began in 2005, these self-proclaimed insurgent leaders did not have consensus for a common position, as each insurgent group had its

145 “Malaysia Willing to Help Down South, but Will Not Interfere,” The Nation, 12 December 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/12/12/opinion/opinion_30118377.php (accessed 12 November 2013). 146 Liow and Pathan, Confronting Ghosts: Thailand’s Shapeless Southern Insurgency, 78. 147 Mazwin Nik Anis, “Najib, Abhisit to Visit Southern Thai Schools to Help Ease Tensions,” The Star, 8 December 2009, http://www.thestar.com.my/story.aspx?file=%2F2009%2F6%2F8%2Fnation%2F20090608184324&sec= nation (accessed 21 December 2013). 148 “Govt Cool on OIC Moves to Bring Peace to Far South,” The Nation, 2 November 2010, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Govt-cool-on-OIC-moves-to-bring-peace-to-far-South- 30141313.html (accessed 15 February 2014).

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own objectives. Instead of searching for a common ground that might bring solutions to all groups, they competed with each other to gain the much-needed legitimacy from the state. As a result, the OIC urged the insurgent representatives to combine their efforts to set up the UPPC and vowed to facilitate talks with the Thai authority. However, when the proposal to establish the UPPC was released in public, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya refused to accept the OIC’s role as a mediator, arguing that his government was able to hold talks with the insurgents, without the need for a “middleman”. He blamed the insurgents for trying to use the OIC to internationalise the conflict.149

After the Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents, Thailand worked hard to prevent the southern conflict from becoming an international issue. Thaksin’s government at the time was very worried that the OIC would issue an official condemnation of cases of human rights abuse in the South, and that it would consider the southern insurgency as a “religious conflict”. The military was also concerned that insurgent leaders wanted to use the OIC to enhance their negotiating power and even called for international intervention into the conflict.150 Thanks to the Malaysian government, and its presidency of the OIC that year, the OIC’s report indicated that the situation in Thailand was “not a religious conflict”, but was an internal affair. However, Thailand’s relations with the OIC became strained after Malaysia’s presidency ended. The situation in southern Thailand was discussed during the OIC summit in 2006. A joint communique was issued, describing Thailand’s southern conflict as “a matter of serious concern”. 151 Relations with the OIC improved significantly after Surayud adopted a more conciliatory tone towards the insurgents. When OIC Secretary-General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu visited Thailand in 2007, he announced that Thailand had a “constructive and compromising” attitude towards the insurgency. More importantly, he urged the Thai Muslims to be “good citizens and respect the law”.152

149 Don Pathan, “OIC to Take up Issue of Militancy in South,” The Nation, 1 November 2010, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/OIC-to-take-up-issue-of-militancy-in-South-30141266.html (accessed 13 February 2014). 150 Michael Vatikiotis, “Resolving Internal Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Domestic Challenges and Regional Perspectives,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, no.1 (2006): 40; Abuza, The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics, 27. 151 Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand, 232. 152 Ibid., 233.

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When Abhisit took power, his commitment to resolve the conflict through peaceful means, like those of Surayud, was welcomed by the OIC. However, the attack at Al- Furqan Mosque in May 2009 raised the OIC’s concerns over Thailand’s southern Muslim community. Without any official explanation from the Thai government, the OIC issued a statement condemning the attack, demanding that the Thai government undertake an inquiry into the incident.153 While Thai authorities denied that security forces were behind the attack, they were unable to find any culprits. In August 2009, the OIC sent its forty- two representatives to visit southern border provinces and meet high-ranking officials from the military and relevant agencies. Kasit accompanied the delegates on their visit, trying to convince them that the government made good progress in improving the situation.154 Before the OIC meeting was held in 2010, Kasit worked hard to convince OIC Secretary-General Emomali Rahmon not to put the southern insurgency on the agenda. He repeatedly insisted that the southern problem was an internal affair, preventing outsiders from intervening. However, as Thailand was an observer state of the OIC, Kasit was asked to explain the situation in southern Thailand to the OIC foreign ministers meeting in Tajikistan. He had success in preventing the OIC from considering Thailand’s situation a religious conflict.155

Autonomy

Governance reform is considered as one of the essential factors in bringing peace to the region. It has already proven successful in several countries having similar experiences such as Aceh in Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. For years, academics and experts in the field have called for the government to work towards a “political solution” to end the crisis. They suggest that setting up a special administrative structure in the Deep South could help the government better manage and oversee security and justice agencies. It is also a way to promote and

153 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, “OIC Secretary General Condemns Killing of Muslim Worshippers at Mosque in Southern Thailand,” 9 June 2009, http://www.oic- oci.org/oicv2/topic/?t_id=2454&ref=1068&lan=en&x_key=Thailand (accessed 17 February). 154 Government Public Relations Department, Office of the Prime Minister, Thailand, “Foreign Minister Led OIC Envoys to Visit Yala,” 10 August 2009, http://202.47.224.92/en/news.php?id=255208100059 (accessed 13 February 2014). 155 Royal Thai Embassy, Singapore, “Remarks by H.E. Mr. Kasit Piromya Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, at the Conference on “the Role of ASEAN Masjid in Sustainable Human Development,” 3 February 2011, http://www.thaiembassy.sg/announcements/remarks-by-he-mr-kasit-piromya-minister-of- foreign-affairs-of-thailand-at-the-conferen (accessed 16 February 2014).

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protect minority rights. 156 However, the desire of the government to undertake any governance reforms appears minimal. Proposals for local autonomy, special governance structures, elections for southern governors, and other forms of self-rule have been ignored by authorities. Indeed, the term “autonomy” has been a taboo subject in Thai society.157 The governing conservative elites, particularly the army, strongly oppose any move to grant more autonomy to the locals in the South. They voice concerns that granting enhanced political power or greater administrative autonomy would provide a step towards outright independence. As a result, proposals for autonomy appear to be “more alarming than consoling”.158 However, as demands for a political solution are mounting, political and military leaders claim that they agree with more decentralised governance, yet insist that stability and security in the region have to be established first.159

The Abhisit government’s stance concerning governance reform in the three southernmost provinces was unclear and inconsistent. 160 While the government’s “politics-led-military” approach opened up opportunities for the public to discuss solutions to end the insurgency, Thai political structure, in general, continued to disapprove of differences of opinion from the bottom-up. As a result, recommendations from academics and experts, that a special administrative structure should be established, were largely neglected by authorities.161 At the beginning of his term, Abhisit seemed to support ideas of decentralisation and a new form of political administration in the southernmost provinces. Despite concerns about its sensitivity, Abhisit announced that his government was willing to discuss a special form of governance or a local assembly. However, he argued that simply changing the form of governance would not solve the

156 Brian Beary, “Separatist Movements: Should Nations Have a Right to Self-Determination?,” in Issues in Peace and Conflict Studies: Selections from CQ Researcher, ed. CQ Researcher (California: SAGE Publications, 2010), 34-35. 157 Jitpiromrsi and McCargo, “A Ministry for the South: New Governance Proposals for Thailand’s Southern Region,” 407. 158 Duncan McCargo, “Autonomy for Southern Thailand: Thinking the Unthinkable?,” Pacific Affairs 83, no. 2 (2010): 262. 159 Brian McCartan and Shawn W. Crispin, “Southern Test for New Thai Leader,” Asia Times, 24 December 2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JL24Ae02.html (accessed 16 September 2013). 160 Bangkok Pundit, “Abhisit Was for Autonomy before He Was against It,” asiancorrespondent, 8 November 2009, http://asiancorrespondent.com/24351/abhisit-was-for-autonomy-before-he-was-against- it/ (accessed 19 February 2014). 161 Parks, “The Last Holdout of an Integrated State: A Century of Resistance to State Penetration in Southern Thailand,” 251.

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whole problem, and that the most important issue was improving the relationship between the ruled and the rulers.162 However, the new Army Commander-in-Chief Prayuth Chan- ocha strongly disagreed with concepts of autonomy: “No matter what, the three provinces cannot be separated or given even self-rule because that would be against the constitution”.163 Due to the military’s disagreement with ideas of decentralisation, Abhisit thus contradicted his previous stance that the government supported governance reform in the South. He claimed that the government had no plan to establish a new administrative structure or allow local people to elect their governors.164

Abhisit’s inconsistent stance on a political solution to the southern conflict reflected the weakness of his position because he was unable to take a tough stand with the military. While the government seemed to recognise that promoting greater autonomy was needed, it made little headway in policy formation and implementation, partly because it was beholden to the military, which had a leading role in handling the insurgency. Critics point out that it would be “political suicide” for Abhisit and his government to make any decision that might be seen as promoting autonomy.165 According to Sunai Phasuk of Human Rights Watch (HRW): “It is a very awkward situation where the prime minister cannot command the armed forces…Abhisit is trying to do all the right things but nobody is answering to him and he cannot make them”.166 With its weak democratic mandate, the government was unlikely to be able to persuade the Bangkok elites to let southerners govern themselves. It would prompt an immediate backlash from Thai nationalists. Without strong support from the public, Abhisit’s government thus refrained from promoting any moves in regard to autonomy that might resolve and reconcile Malay- Muslim grievances.

Following several talks between the Thai government and rebel groups, Malaysian leaders such as Mahathir Mohamad and Najib Razak voiced support for political solutions

162 “Thai PM Backs Autonomy for Troubled South,” Bangkok Post, 28 October 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/158319/thai-pm-backs-autonomy-for-troubled-south (accessed 8 November 2013). 163 Abuza, The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand, 21. 164 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Moving Towards Political Solutions,” 17-18. 165 Ibid. 166 Claire Truscott, “Broken Promises Feed Thai Insurgency,” The Telegraph, 7 December 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/6751836/Broken-promises-feed-Thai-insurgency.html (accessed 17 February 2014).

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such as dialogue and decentralisation to resolve the problem of legitimacy. From the Malaysian point of view, sovereignty was nonnegotiable, but greater autonomy for Thailand’s southern provinces was a crucial solution to end the conflict. However, as the notion of autonomy was sensitive and controversial among the Thai public, Malaysia refrained from making any comments, thus avoiding criticism over Malaysia’s interference in Thailand’s internal affairs. 167 Malaysia’s suggestion that the Thai government should grant some form of autonomy was not new. Following the Langkawi Process, former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed made a similar recommendation, which was not welcomed by Thaksin’s government. He emphasised that autonomy was one of the solutions to the unrest in the Deep South and compared the plight of the Thai Malay-Muslim minority to that of the Palestinians. Malaysia’s opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim also supported autonomy as a way to reconcile and overcome differences, but advised southerners against demanding independence.168

Najib’s visit in 2009 came amid increased discussion of the need for a political solution that included some form of self-rule in the South. Asked his view about special autonomy as a peace deal, Najib seemed very cautious, insisting that Malaysia as a partner wanted to help Thailand, but would not interfere. He emphasised that independence demanded by separatist groups was not viable, but Thailand should offer a certain degree of autonomy to people in the predominantly Muslim region. As Najib argued:

Autonomy is quite sensitive to some people in Thailand…If the Thais are more comfortable with decentralisation, so be it. This is a Thai domestic issue and we must respect that…we will be cooperating with the Thai government based on how they want to play it, how they want to move forward.169

Najib’s comments reflected Malaysia’s interest in the solution to the problem; at the same time, he also emphasised his respect for Thailand’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the ASEAN non-intervention principle. Clearly, Malaysia was willing to help

167 Don Pathan, “Malaysia Must Speak Carefully on Thailand’s Fractious South,” The Nation, 27 October 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/10/27/opinion/opinion_30115272.php (accessed 7 November 2013). 168 Achara Ashayagachat, “Thailand, Malaysia and the Southern Insurgency,” Bangkok Post, 9 February 2007, www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 16 February 2014). 169 “Malaysia Willing to Help Down South, but Will Not Interfere,” The Nation, 12 December 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/12/12/opinion/opinion_30118377.php (accessed 12 November 2013).

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Thailand resolve the conflict, but refrained from taking a leading role. Abhisit adopted Najib’s suggestion, stating in a more conciliatory tone that the Thai government supported decentralisation in the South (though not autonomy), including measures to allow the southerners the right to elect their leaders at provincial and district levels.

However, efforts to address the need for a political solution to unrest in the South were not priorities of the Abhisit government, due largely to the political instability in Bangkok. The first two years of Abhisit’s term were fraught with power struggles. The overall political situation in Thailand in 2010 was focused on street protests in Bangkok. The massive protests in Bangkok overshadowed the conflict in the South, with Abhisit arguing that “the Red Shirt protests were a major concern for the government”.170 In May 2010, Kasit met Najib in Malaysia, where discussion focused on the anti-government protests in Bangkok. Kasit thanked the Malaysian government for having adopted an impartial position with regard to the protests. As Abhisit’s government was paralysed by the prolonged protests, the peace process and cooperation to resolve the conflict in the South became less of a priority and were not discussed.171 Moreover, while both Red Shirt and Yellow Shirt protesters called for many policy changes, they showed little concern over the plight of Malay Muslims. The lack of government and public concern over the unrest in the South intensified grievances among the Malay-Muslim people in the region, and dampened the prospect of achieving a long-term solution to the insurgency.

Economic cooperation

The three southernmost provinces are recognised as one of the poorest areas in Thailand, with high numbers of unemployed. Due to poverty, unemployment, and lack of educational opportunities, many young Muslim men are driven to join the insurgency movement. According to the Thai government’s National Economic and Social Development Board, as of 2002, nearly one-third of the population in the three southernmost provinces live below the poverty line.172 People in the three southernmost

170 Abhisit Vejjajiva, interview by author, Bangkok, 21 June 2013. 171 Office of the Prime Minister, Malaysia, “Thai Foreign Minister Briefs PM on Bangkok Protests,” 4 May 2010, http://www.pmo.gov.my/?menu=newslist&news_id=2795&page=1731&news_cat=13 (accessed 21 December 2013). 172 Supara Janchitfah, “Southern Muslims Plead for Understanding,” Bangkok Post, 30 September 2001, www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 25 February 2014); Gunaratna and Acharya, The Terrorist Threat from Thailand: Jihad or Quest for Justice?, 24.

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provinces are poorer than those in the rest of the South, and those in northern Malaysia. In 2002, the household income per capita for Narathiwat, the poorest province in the South, was 7,603 baht or US$198 in contrast to 28,239 baht or US$735 for Bangkok.173 Moreover, in the past decade, schools and teachers, perceived as symbols of the Thai authority, have been targeted for attack by the insurgents, thus keeping schools closed for months on end, with the result that the education system is steadily deteriorating.174

Undeniably, social and economic grievances have been described as one of the root causes of insurgency. Abhisit, like other predecessors, paid serious attention to economic measures as a crucial component of counterinsurgency. However, several recent articles debunk this explanation, arguing that economic development or poverty reduction alone simply could not end the insurgency in southern Thailand. Even leading experts convincingly argue that poverty is only a minor cause of the problem. Instead, feelings of injustice and discrimination appear to be a major force behind separatist movements.175 It is noteworthy that many provinces in the north and northeast of Thailand are poorer and less developed than the three southern provinces. In fact, inequality and the gap between the rich and the poor are persistent problems in Thai society. As a result, poverty alleviation alone might not be able to solve the insurgency problem, which is largely the result of a sense of injustice and discrimination among local Malay Muslims. On one hand, the majority of the Muslim community demand development and opportunities for equality in education, employment, and human capital development. Better education would help local Malay Muslims be able to profit from the economic development and progress of their area. On the other, as a small minority within a Buddhist majority, they also want to be recognised, respected, and treated fairly. For example, besides work in the agricultural and fishing industries, alternative sources of employment in the region are very limited. Few Malay Muslims work in professional or local government positions, including the local police. These positions are invariably filled by non-southerners, who

173 Peter Warr, “Thailand’s Paradoxical Recovery,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2005, ed. Kin Wah Chin and Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 399. 174 Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Protect Students, Teachers, Schools in South,” 21 September 2010, http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/09/21/thailand-protect-students-teachers-schools-south (accessed 2 March 2014). 175 See, for example, Jitpiromsri and Sobhonvasu, “Unpacking Thailand’s Southern Conflict: The Poverty of Structural Explanations,” 103; Abuza, The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand, 21; Gunaratna and Acharya, The Terrorist Threat from Thailand: Jihad or Quest for Justice?, 24.

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have little knowledge or understanding of Muslim culture, thus adding to the resentment.176

During the Abhisit government, a number of job-creation and socio-economic development programmes were introduced, with expectations that improving living conditions for local communities would prevent the insurgency’s expansion and even defeat it in the long run. Moreover, these initiatives would alleviate the sense of relative deprivation that undermined the legitimacy of the Thai authority. 177 Massive development expenditures were allocated to the region. Many initiatives were launched such as promoting large-scale palm oil plantations, developing southern Thai posts, and establishing a halal food processing plant. Overall, these projects, however, made little progress as the situation discouraged many potential investors.178 Most industries in the region suffered as a result of almost daily violence. According to SBPAC’s report, during 2002 to 2003 (before the violence erupted), the annual average rate of economic growth in three southernmost provinces was around 6 per cent, which dropped sharply to 1.4 percent during the period 2004 to 2009. However, in 2010, the region’s economic growth rate rose to 2.1 percent, due to the government grants for funding for economic development projects.179 Due to economic hardship, the Malay Muslims fared poorly compared with neighbouring Malaysia.180 As of 2004, nearly 230,000 Thai Muslims or one-fifth of the southern work force moved to work in Malaysia, but about half of them were illegal migrant workers.181 At the end of Abhisit’s term in 2011, the government’s development projects brought about neither social change nor poverty reduction due to poor governance and corruption. Moreover, as Bangkok’s politicians were distracted by perpetual instability on the domestic political front, policies and solutions for the southern

176 Storey, “Southern Discomfort,” 36. 177 “Thai Insurgency: A deadly attack on a mosque in Thailand,” The Economist, 11 June 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/13834203 (accessed 21 February 2014). 178 Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand, 30. 179 Suphitcha Rattana, “9 Years of the Southern Unrest, the Nightmare of Border Economy,” Kom Chad Luek, 15 September 2012, http://www.komchadluek.net/detail/20120915/140061/ (accessed 3 March 2014). 180 Jitpiromsri and Sobhonvasu, “Unpacking Thailand’s Southern Conflict: The Poverty of Structural Explanations,” 103. 181 David Fullbrook, “An Economic Battle, Too,” Asia Times, 18 December 2004 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FL18Ae05.html (accessed 26 February 2014).

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conflict were inconsistent. As a result, along with the lack of opportunities and justice in the region, poverty remained a major challenge and further exacerbated the conflict.

Abhisit’s government saw economic cooperation with Malaysia as the key to boosting the local economy. For Thailand, greater cooperation with the Malaysian authorities would result in greater stability in the area. For Malaysia, Najib sought to increase Malaysian participation in the socio-economic development for the region through the 3Es concept: education, entrepreneurship, and employment. These initiatives aimed to promote free and stable movement of workers, trade, and money, which was crucial for prosperity in the border areas. 182 Undeniably, both Abhisit and Najib acknowledged benefits from economic development in the region, as the outcome of economic cooperation would affect their ability to stay in power. 183 During Abhisit’s visit to Malaysia, the two governments agreed to enhance cooperation, particularly in energy and the halal industry. 184 Abhisit expressed strong support for the Indonesia-Malaysia- Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), a subregional cooperation initiative formed in 1993, aimed to establish a special economic development zone with tax incentives for investment.185 IMT-GT was expected to advance the role of the ethnic Malay minority in economic development. However, critics argued that IMT-GT appeared to portray “the mistaken belief that if politics leads, investment and development will follow”.186 While Malaysia was very active in this initiative, expecting that its benefits could reduce the economic development gap between “the northern triangle” and “the southern triangle”, neither Thailand nor Indonesia invested much political capital, focusing instead only on infrastructure investment that might attract private investors. Moreover, the economic crisis in 1997, conflict in Aceh, and the Muslim separatist problem in southern Thailand impeded cooperation. The onset of separatist violence in 2004 also revealed such initiatives as failed and irrelevant. Although many obstacles hindered the integration

182 Khalid, “Malaysia’s Foreign Policy under Najib,” 446. 183 Ong Kian Ming, “Malaysia in 2010: Resurgent Najib and BN, Stumbling Anwar and PR,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2011, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), 131. 184 Mazwin Nik Anis, “Najib and Abhisit to reach out to Thailand’s restive south,” The Star, 9 June 2009, http://www.thestar.com.my/story/?file=%2f2009%2f6%2f9%2fnation%2f4079105 (accessed 25 February 2014). 185 “ Intensifies Sub-Regional Cooperation,” The Jakarta Post, 2 March 2009, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/03/02/-intensifies-subregional-cooperation.html (accessed 21 February 2014). 186 Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 119-120.

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process, the IMT-GT was revitalised after the first IMT-GT summit meeting in 2005. With support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), an operational framework and action plan for 2007-2011 were adopted during the second summit in 2007.187 In 2012, the IMT-GT adopted its blueprint for cooperation for 2012-2016, which was intended to be a step towards the Asean Economic Community (AEC) by 2015.

Conclusion

The separatist insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces can be traced back to the eighteenth century when the Patani Kingdom was annexed by Siam and the failure of the Thai state since then to respond to the needs of the ethnic Malay-Muslims. More importantly, the conflict represents the political struggle of the Malay-Muslims for their legitimate rights. Separatist sentiments have been fuelled since the early twentieth century by the government’s assimilation policies. Moreover, the region has struggled continuously with economic and social neglect and has suffered under poor governance, maladministration, corruption, and human rights abuses. The current upsurge of violence began after the Thaksin government adopted a hard-line policy towards the insurgents. The Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents in 2004 provoked strong resistance from insurgent groups. Since then, the insurgents have committed atrocities to express their antagonism towards the Thai state.

Since the onset of violence in 2004, relations between Thailand and Malaysia have been predominantly shaped by the situation in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand. During the Thaksin administration, Malaysia was accused of providing a haven for the separatist insurgents and attempting to interfere in Thailand’s domestic affairs. Despite pressure from the ethnic Malays in northern Malaysia to boycott the Thai government, Malaysia used dialogue to resolve the problem and defuse tensions. Moreover, with the help from former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad as well as support from the Thai monarchy, dialogues between the Thai authorities and insurgents were held in late 2005. After the 2006 coup, a turning point in Thai-Malaysian relations occurred when the military-installed Prime Minister Surayud adopted a more reconciliatory approach to the

187 Royal Thai Government Official Site, “PM Attends ASEAN Plus Meetings, +3, IMT-GT,” 29 October 2010, http://www.thaigov.go.th/en/news-room/item/60895-pm-attends--plus-meetings-%203-imt- gt.html?tmpl=component&print=1(accessed 2 March 2014).

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insurgency. Malaysia continued its constructive role in facilitating the peace dialogue between the Thai authorities and insurgents.

Under the Democrat-led Abhisit government, little was done by the government to bring about genuine reconciliation with separatist insurgents, despite public promises to take a softer and more constructive approach. Bureaucratic infighting, lack of political will, and political instability led to inconsistencies in the southern policy. The political solutions to the South were not seriously discussed or considered by the authorities. Any attempts to decentralise or transfer more power to local authorities were perceived as a threat to Bangkok’s bureaucratic elites, particularly the security hardliners, who benefited from their continued influence in the Southern provinces. Despite Abhisit’s “politics leading the military” approach, the South was largely controlled by the military. Although the budget and the number of troops increased, the government and military failed to suppress the insurgency. The southern situation deteriorated sharply in 2010. Despite some suspicion from hardliners within Thai security circles about Malaysia’s role and influence in Thailand’s domestic conflict, Thai political leaders saw Malaysia as a reliable counterpart to help bring about stability in the region. However, without Thailand’s clear direction on counterinsurgency, Malaysia felt powerless to help for fear of being accused of interfering in Thailand’s domestic affairs. As a result, Malaysia could not play a role in the peace talks and took a “wait-and-see” approach towards Thailand’s southern conflict.

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CHAPTER 6

ABHISIT’S MYANMAR DILEMMA: MOVING FORWARD TOWARDS DOMOCRACY?

Since diplomatic relations were established in 1948, bilateral relations between Thailand and Myanmar have remained strained, mainly due to historical tensions and the unstable and unpredictable political conditions in both Yangon and Bangkok. On Thailand’s side, Myanmar policy has always been in the hands of military leaders and their allies in the cabinet. Overall, the policy has been focused on two major issues: border security concerns and business interests, particularly those associated with natural resources and raw materials. 1 Despite Myanmar’s 1988 political crisis, relations between the two countries greatly improved during the Chatchai administration (1988-1991), mainly due to efforts of Thai political elites to access raw materials in Myanmar. However, since Thailand’s 1991 coup, the Thai stance towards political reforms in Myanmar has been inconsistent. During the period of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, tensions between the two governments escalated when Thailand, under the second Chuan administration (1997-2001), adopted a hard-line stance vis-à-vis Myanmar. Chuan’s aggressive posture was seen as a way to prevent his government from being criticised by Western countries. Throughout the late 1990s, controversy over the Thai military’s support of Burmese ethnic minority separatist groups led to a series of armed clashes along the border between the two countries. The period of the Thaksin administration (2001-2006) has often, due to close personal relationships between political elites of the two countries, been called the Golden Era of Thai-Burmese relations. Promoting human rights and democracy in Myanmar was not a priority for Thaksin and his allies. Instead, they focused on the importance of economic relations with Myanmar. However, the controversy surrounding corruption allegations against Thaksin, including a soft loan given by his government to Myanmar, led to a series of anti-government protests in Bangkok, and thereafter to the military coup of September 2006.

1 Maung Aung Myoe, “Neither Friend nor Foe: Myanmar’s Relations with Thailand since 1988 : A View from Yangon,” IDSS Monograph No. 1 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2002), 2; Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Thailand-Myanmar Relations: Old Animosity in a New Bilateral Setting,” in International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism, ed. N. Ganesan and Amer Ramses (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 117-118.

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This chapter examines Thailand’s Myanmar policy during the period of the Democrat Party-led government of Abhisit Vejjajiva. First, it begins by analysing the historical background of Thai-Myanmar relations. Second, it examines the major factors, both internal and external, that influenced the Abhisit government to first adopt a hard-line stance against, and later favour a more engagement-based policy towards, the Burmese regime. When Abhisit came to power, a major economic crisis rocked Thailand, followed by massive anti-government Red Shirt protests throughout his term of office. Abhisit initially advocated for democratic and human rights reforms in Myanmar, which in turn was expected to enhance his international credentials, which had been eroded after the 2006 coup. Moreover, as Thailand chaired ASEAN from mid-2008 to the end of 2009, the Abhisit administration aimed to exploit this opportunity to restore Thailand’s regional position by using ASEAN to put pressure on the Burmese junta to heed the demands of the international community. However, due to political turmoil in Bangkok, the Abhisit government became preoccupied with domestic politics and had little interest in maintaining its commitment on democracy and human rights. More importantly, for Thailand, Myanmar is a crucial source of natural resources, particularly natural gas. As the two economies were so closely linked, it was inevitable that Abhisit would have to maintain a policy of engagement with Myanmar and reject sanctions or any diplomatic pressure against Myanmar’s military regime. This chapter concludes that, overall, Thailand’s Myanmar policy under Abhisit did not change, but rather followed the same course as that set out by previous governments, which aimed to maintain Thailand’s business interests in Myanmar. Moreover, as security and economic benefits were very important, the policy of engagement with Myanmar appeared to be only the option for Abhisit’s government. In other words, despite rhetorical differences, continuity was the hallmark of the Abhisit administration’s relationship with Myanmar. It is likely that in the future this continuity will remain the most salient characteristic of Thai foreign policy towards Myanmar.

6.1 Historical background of Thailand-Myanmar relations

At the height of the Cold War in the late 1940s and 1950s, Thailand adopted a “buffer zone” policy of supporting armed ethnic minority groups against Myanmar’s ruling regime, with the aim of containing communist expansion into Thailand. Consequently,

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the Burmese military rulers was suspicious of asylum seekers fleeing to Thailand for safe haven, claiming that they were being trained at the Thai border for operations in Myanmar.2 However, when the threat of communism was in decline in the late 1980s, combined with the desire of Thai political elites to gain access to natural resources in Myanmar, relations between the two countries improved. In the late 1990s however, when Thailand experienced a financial crisis, it decided to shift its Myanmar policy from engagement to hostility. The Thai government harshly criticised the Burmese junta for human rights abuse as a way of preventing criticism from Western countries. In response to this criticism, the Burmese junta alleged that Thailand had returned to its previous buffer zone policy of supporting armed ethnic groups against the government of Myanmar, although Thai political leaders denied this accusation. Throughout this period, the controversy over Thai involvement in insurgent activities in Myanmar resulted in clashes between the Thai and Burmese troops along the border.3

Historical factors have also influenced relations between Thailand and Myanmar. Many Thais continue to hold on to memories of the Siamese-Burmese wars when the old Siam capital of Ayutthaya was attacked by the Burmese in the seventeenth century. Negative images of Myanmar can be found in history textbooks, films, and novels throughout Thai culture. Furthermore, when the Thai ruling elite faced a legitimacy crisis, they tended to use the popular perception of the Burmese threat as a means to stir up nationalist sentiment, which served to bolster their regimes. After the end of absolute monarchy in 1932, Thailand went through sixty years of military rule before embracing a more democratic system in the 1992 general election. While the military has dominated Thai politics, its political legitimacy has always been questioned. Accordingly, when Thai military governments lose their credibility, the idea of a common enemy has repeatedly been used to distract attention and divert the attention towards a common threat.4 The construction of Myanmar as an enemy has been a method used by Thai military leaders to justify and convince the society that they need the military for protection. In other words, Thai political elites needed to create imaginary enemies as a way to justify their

2 Christopher Roberts, ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 89. 3 Maung Aung Myoe, “Regionalism in Myanmar’s Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future,” ARI Working Paper No. 73 (Singapore: Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2006), 10. 4 Chachavalpongpun, “Thailand-Myanmar Relations: Old Animosity in a New Bilateral Setting,” 120.

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monopolisation of political power and to maintain its control over national security and foreign policy.

This negative popular image of Myanmar can be traced to the nationalist regimes under Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram (1938-1944 and 1948-1957) during the period of the Second World War. Phibun and successive military leaders used nationalism as a propaganda theme to legitimise the military regimes and the policy of accommodation with Japan. They also used the depiction of Myanmar as Thailand’s enemy as a tool to emphasise the need for military protection from the threat of Burmese aggression.5 More importantly, Thailand under Phibun became involved in the civil conflicts in Myanmar by providing support to armed ethnic minority groups against the Burmese junta. For a decade, the Thai government implemented a buffer zone policy with the aim of destabilising the central authority in Yangon. 6 This policy and the support given to Myanmar’s armed ethnic groups not only intensified the anti-Thai sentiment among the political elite in Yangon, but also led to a series of security problems along the border such as an influx of refugees, illegal labour, human trafficking, and drug smuggling. These problems continue to the present day.7

After Myanmar gained independence from British colonial rule in 1948, relations between the two countries improved slightly due to Burmese Prime Minister U Nu’s policy of reconciliation. In 1954, U Nu sought to make peace with Thailand by apologising for past Burmese aggression during pre-colonial times.8 Subsequently, U Nu and Phibun exchanged visits in 1955, and Myanmar apparently made peaceful gestures by waiving all claims on Thailand for damages incurred during the Second World War, and making a donation towards the restoration of temples that were destroyed during the Siamese-Burmese war in 1767. The year 1960 was marked by the visit of the King and

5 Scot Barme, Luang Wichit Wathakan and the Creation of a Thai Identity (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), 51. Judith A. Stowe, Siam Becomes Thailand: A Story of Intrigue (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd., 1991), 229. 6 Martin Smith, “Ethnic Conflicts in Burma,” in A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia, ed. Andrew T.H. Tan (Glos: Edward Elgar Press, 2007), 300, 306. 7 Patrick Meehan, “Drugs, insurgency and state-building in Burma: Why the drugs trade is central to Burma’s changing political order,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 42, no.3 (2011): 382. 8 Richard Butwell, U Nu of Burma (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), 189.

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Queen of Thailand to Myanmar as guests of Myanmar’s General Ne Win.9 However, after U Nu was overthrown in the 1962 coup and supplanted by a government under General Ne Win, relations between Thailand and Myanmar faced new challenges and gradually deteriorated.

The ideological tensions of the Cold War fuelled suspicion and hostility between the two sides. The new military government under General Ne Win (1964-1988) was suspicious of Thailand’s protection of the ethnic minorities sheltering along the border areas. Meanwhile, anti-communist Thai leaders were concerned that Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism”10 could expand into Thailand. As such, high-level contact between the two countries was almost suspended. Ne Win and his Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) led the country into two decades of isolation, which saw Myanmar decline “from a country once regarded as amongst the most fertile and mineral rich in Asia to one of the world’s 10 poorest nations”.11 However, relations between the two countries improved rapidly when Thailand’s new military-led government under General Prem Tinsulanond (1980-1988) took power. In 1982, Prem initiated an “Omni-Directional Policy”, which sought to have good relations with every country in the region, despite political and ideological differences. Thailand’s new policy paved the way for the exchange of state visits in the 1980s. Significantly, Prem announced that his government would no longer support armed ethnic groups against the Burmese authorities. However, critics have suggested that some Thai military officials continued to have secret business dealings, particularly those involving weapon trafficking, with armed ethnic groups that had fought the Burmese military on and off in the border area since independence was declared in 1949. 12 These allegations of the Thai military’s support of separatist guerrillas in Myanmar became a major source of confrontation and served as a crucial factor in increasing mistrust between the two countries.

9 Venika Boonma-Klee, Burma:Thai Foreign Policy under Chatichai Choonhavan’s Government (Bangkok: The Thai Research Fund, 1997), 47; Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Thai-Burma Relations,” in Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on multilateral and bilateral responses (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001), 119. 10 The policy was an admixture of Buddhist, Marxist, and nationalist principles. Helga Turku, Isolationist States in an Interdependent World (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009), 96. 11 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (New York: Zed Books, 1999), 24. 12 Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sungsidh Piriyarangsan, and Nualnoi Treerat, Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja: Thailand’s Illegal Economy and Public Policy (Bangkok: Silkworm Books, 1998), 134-141; Myoe, “Neither Friend nor Foe: Myanmar’s Relations with Thailand since 1988,” 47-48.

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6.2 Thailand-Myanmar relations in the post-Cold War era

In the 1988 general election, General Chatchai Choonhavan became Thailand’s first democratically elected prime minister after twelve years of military regimes. The new civilian government raised hopes that Thai politics would be free from military influence. Chatchai’s right-wing economic policies received support from various groups, particularly business elites and technocrats.13 The government initiated the concept of “Suvannaphume” (Golden Land), which aimed to position Thailand as the future subregional economic hub of mainland Southeast Asia.14 A new foreign policy of what was known as “turning Indochina from a battlefield to a market place” was introduced. The policy aimed to promote Thailand’s economic links with Indochinese countries – Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos – and Myanmar, with the expectation that this could pave the way for Thai businesses to access sources of raw materials from these countries.15

Throughout much of the Cold War period, when fears of communist expansion became the overriding preoccupation for Thai foreign-policy makers, Thailand implemented a buffer zone policy by providing financial and military support to armed ethnic groups in Myanmar, particularly the Shan and the Karen. 16 Thailand’s buffer zone policy had fuelled a deep animosity between Yangon and Bangkok. However, as the threat of communism receded in the late 1980s, Thailand’s buffer zone policy was abandoned under the Chatchai government. Chatchai sought to downplay the role of the buffer zone with the objective of improving trade with Myanmar. His policy of engagement with all countries in the region was welcomed by neighbouring countries, despite concerns from conservative bureaucrats in Bangkok that the policy could deteriorate relations with ASEAN and the United States. Chatchai’s policy at that time was controversial because

13 Yos Santasombat, “The End of Premocracy in Thailand,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 1989, ed. Ng Chee Yuen (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), 323. 14 Leszek Buszynski, “Thailand and Myanmar: The Perils of ‘Constructive Engagement’,” The Pacific Review 11, no. 2 (1998): 292. 15 Jürgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects (New York: Routledge, 2003), 106; Salinee Srivardhana, “Responses to a Major Foreign Policy Change: The Case of Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards the Conclusion of the Third Indochina Conflicts During the Government of Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-1991)” (PhD diss., University of London, 2003), 52. 16 Roberts, ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community, 89.

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Thailand, as part of ASEAN, still officially opposed the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.17

The failure of Ne Win’s socialist policies led to widespread anti-government demonstrations across Myanmar. General Saw Maung staged a coup and formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in September 1988, which was followed by a violent crackdown on protests, leading to the deaths of 1,000 people. Myanmar’s military government was condemned outright by the international community for its human rights abuses. The military junta also nullified the results of a 1990 election, in which Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) had won a landslide victory. The United States and other Western governments began to internationally politicise Myanmar’s human rights issues and focused on Aung San Suu Kyi as the icon of the Burmese democracy movement. Much of the international community outside ASEAN, China, India, Japan, and South Korea adopted sanctions as their primary means of prompting socio-political change in Myanmar.18

The brutal crackdown on the 1988 pro-democracy uprising in Myanmar posed a major dilemma for Thailand regarding its efforts to engage with the Burmese junta. While the international community sought to isolate the dictatorial regime, Thai elites sought to engage Myanmar’s rulers for economic reasons. In the aftermath of the suppression of the 1988 anti-government protests in Yangon, Chatchai initially followed international sentiment that Myanmar’s regime must be sanctioned and isolated. However, given economic interests and security considerations, particularly in assuring access to raw materials and natural resources in Myanmar, Chatchai later changed his stance by adopting a policy of engagement with Myanmar.19 On the one hand, Thailand placed a low priority on democracy and human rights in Myanmar by refraining from issuing a public statement condemning the Burmese government’s actions, on the grounds of its commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

17 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Thailand: the Enigma of Bamboo Diplomacy,” in Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft, ed. B.J.C. McKercher (New York: Routledge, 2012), 206-207. 18 Robert H. Taylor, “Pathways to the Present,” in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, ed. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 23. 19 Helen James, “Resources, Rent-Seeking, and Reform in Thailand and Myanmar,” Asian Survey 50, no. 2 (2010): 443.

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On the other, Chatchai also decided not to return approximately 40,000 refugees to Myanmar on humanitarian grounds and in response to international pressure. 20 Meanwhile, in order to maintain relations with Myanmar, Army Chief Chavalit Yongchaiyudh visited Yangon to show his support for the regime. He was the first high ranking foreign dignitary to visit Myanmar following the 1988 massacres. His trip provoked strong criticism from the West and ASEAN because it was perceived as giving legitimacy to the regime. However, his historic visit brought a fundamental shift in relations between the two countries. Yangon adopted a more economic approach towards Bangkok in exchange for its friendship. Chavalit went back from Myanmar with business agreements as well as numerous concessions for industries such as logging, fisheries, and gemstone mining.21 During this time, Thai military leaders played a key role in business dealings with Yangon. The military elites of the two countries received substantial benefits from this bilateral trading relationship.22 However, overall, the benefits of this economic cooperation were received only by the privileged few, including the military regime and its business partners.23

Due to the success of its economic policies, combined with the political stability of the “quasi-democratic regime” of the Prem Tinsulanond administration, Thailand experienced rapid economic expansion in 1980s. 24 However, Thailand’s economic development contributed to a rapid decrease in natural resources, such as forests, minerals, and fisheries.25 In addition, following the flood disaster of 1988, the Thai government banned logging and revoked all logging concessions, making Thailand dependent on the forests of Myanmar and Cambodia for its timber needs. More urgently,

20 James A. Goldston, Human Rights in Burma (Myanmar) (New York: Human Rights Watch/Asia, 1990), 34. 21 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations (Lanham: University Press of America, 2005), 67. 22 Yajai Bunnag, “An Evaluation of ASEAN’s Progress in Regional Community Building: Implications of Thailand’s Bilateral Relations and the Extent of Civil Society Participation in Regionalism” (PhD diss., University of London, 2012), 80. 23 “It’s a Family Affair,” The Irrawaddy, May 1997, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=610&page=2 (accessed 8 April 2014). 24 Throughout Prem’s term in office, although the military wielded enormous power and influence over Thai politics, the bureaucrats and technocrats were allowed to direct economic policy. See Muthiah Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 327; Suchit Bunbongkarn, “Thailand’s Successful Reforms,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 4 (1999): 55-56. 25 Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of Thailand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 241.

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Thailand was unable to meet its gas and petroleum demands through domestic production. In 1991, Thailand was ranked second fastest in its rate of growth in oil consumption in the world. Up to 60 per cent of Thailand’s energy demands were met by imports at this time. Chatchai’s policy of engagement with Myanmar, aimed at getting access to Myanmar’s rich energy resources and raw materials, was therefore necessary to support Thailand’s economic growth.26 Chatchai’s initiatives for increasing trade with Indochina and Myanmar resulted in Thailand’s rapid economic growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1988, Thailand’s economic growth rate increased to more than 10 per cent for the first time in twenty-two years.27

While Chatchai’s policy of engagement with Myanmar succeeded in promoting economic growth, it also had negative impacts, which are still evident today in Thai society. Firstly, rapid economic development in Bangkok and other urban areas during the 1990s led to the influx of illegal migrant workers from neighbouring Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. In 1992, the Thai government launched its first effort to register migrant workers. Some estimate that, as of 2005, there were approximately 1.7 million Burmese migrant workers in Thailand. Most are employed in agriculture, manufacturing, and service and domestic work.28 Although their wages are lower than the standard wages for Thai workers, they are about ten times higher than in Myanmar.29 In past decades, migrant workers have made huge contributions to the Thai economy, but have little protection from the Thai authorities. Many migrant workers have been at risk of being cheated of their wages, and of living and working under poor and hazardous conditions. They have not been covered with health benefits and have had no assurance of minimum wages. According to a Human Rights Watch report, migrant workers in Thailand face severe human rights abuses “including killings, torture in detention, extortion, and sexual abuse, and labour

26 Marc Innes-Brown and Mark J. Valencia, “Thailand’s Resource Diplomacy in Indochina and Myanmar,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 14, no. 4 (1993): 339; Chongkittavorn, “Thai-Burma Relations,” 118. 27 Srivardhana, “Responses to a Major Foreign Policy Change,” 21. 28 Nicholas Farrelly, “Exploitation and Escape: Journeys across the Burma-Thailand Frontier,” in Labour Migration and Human Trafficking in Southeast Asia: Critical Perspectives, ed. Willem van Schendel, Lenore Lyons, and Michele Ford (New York: Routledge, 2012), 136. 29 Achara Deboonme, “Legal Limbo Leaves Millions of Myanmar Migrants Quaking,” The Nation, 1 March 2014, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Legal-limbo-leaves-millions-of-Myanmar- migrants-qu-30228048.html (accessed 6 April 2014).

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rights abuses such as trafficking, forced labour, and restrictions on organising”.30 For many years, the Thai government has failed to show commitment to solving migrant worker issues. Secondly, Thailand’s economic relationship with Myanmar also led to the emergence of Thailand’s local power brokers or “chao pho”, who later played a key role in national politics and also in Thai-Myanmar relations. As Pavin Chachavapongpun explains:

[They have] not only “wealth” and “power” but also an ability to operate above the law…They move closely with powerful bureaucrats, policemen, politicians, and military figures. They sit in a position of authority in local administration, and sometimes play a key role in parliamentary elections.31

The relationship between military, senior bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and local businessmen in border areas had a substantial influence on Thailand’s Myanmar policy in the following period.32

Chatchai was toppled by a military coup in 1991, led by General Sunthorn Kongsompong and General Suchinda Kraprayoon. The coup leaders accused Chatchai and his cabinet of widespread corruption and abuse of power to justify their economic policies. However, many believed that the origin of the coup was a conflict between the government and the military over weapons purchases and the military’s resentment of civilian interference in its domain. In other words, the coup was seen as a response to an erosion of military influence on the civilian government.33 In any case, the coup did not affect relations between Bangkok and Yangon. Efforts to promote economic ties with Myanmar were continued by Thailand’s new military junta, due to the affinity between the two countries’ senior generals. Sunthorn Kongsompong, then Thailand’s supreme military commander, visited Yangon only one day before the coup. Following the coup, Sunthorn established the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC), an interim administration, with himself as

30 Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Migrant Workers Face Killings, Extortion, Labor Rights Abuses,” 23 February 2010, http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/02/22/thailand-migrant-workers-face-killings-extortion- labor-rights-abuses (accessed 8 April 2014). 31 Quoted in Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations, 72. 32 James Ockey, “The Rise of Local Power in Thailand: Provincial Crime, Elections and the Bureaucracy,” in Money and Power in Provincial Thailand, ed. Ruth McVey (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2000), 65-66. 33 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 354.

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chairman. Myanmar was the second country, after China, to extend de facto recognition to the NPKC.34 Public outrage forced Thailand’s military junta to step down after the military’s violent crackdown on protesters in Bangkok in 1992, known as “the Black May Massacre”. However, Sunthorn and his allies still maintained good relations with the military elite in Yangon.35 In 1999, Sunthorn was again put in the national spotlight when he passed away, leaving over US$30 million to his heirs. Questions arose over his estate, as his monthly salary had been only US$1,000.36

Following the 1992 Black May massacre, Thailand saw the emergence and proliferation of civil society movements as well as their growing political power.37 Moreover, in 1997 Thailand enacted a new constitution that was designed to enhance people’s participation in the political process and also sought to improve the quality of electoral politics. The new constitution established a range of independent institutions to provide checks and balances to the power of the government. It was a significant attempt to undermine what has been called the “money politics” of previous governments. 38 Despite many democratic changes around this time, including the 1997 constitution, Thai politics continued to be dominated by a small group of ruling elites, including politicians, business leaders, bureaucrats, and the military. Thailand’s chronic problems with political corruption and instability also continued. Between 1991 and 2001, Thailand was governed by seven prime ministers,39 due largely to the struggle among ruling elites and the weakness of political parties. Furthermore, despite increasing expectations that the political rivalry would ease, the underlying structural power of the military in Thai

34 “Military Coup in Thailand,” Dawn News Bulletin 2, no. 26 (1991), http://www.burmalibrary.org/KN/Dawn1991-02-V02-N26.pdf (accessed 8 April 2014). 35 Chris Baker, “Pluto-Populism: Thaksin and Popular Politics,” in Thailand Beyond the Crisis, ed. Peter Warr (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 111. 36 Thawilwadee Bureekul and Curtis N. Thomas, Monitoring the Pulse of the Nation: Indicators of Good Governance and Development in Thailand (Nonthaburi: King Prajadhipok’s Institute, 2003), 54; “Perd Tung Ngern “Sarit, Thanom, Big Jod, Big Bung” (Expose the Wealth of Sarit, Thanom, Big Jod, Big Bung),” Prachachat, 3 October 2009, http://www.prachachat.net/news_detail.php?newsid=1254482992 (accessed 9 April 2014). 37 Prudhisan Jumbala, “Thailand: Constitutional Reform Amidst Economic Crisis,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 1998, ed. Derek da Cunha and John Funston (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), 270. 38 Duncan McCargo, “Thailand,” in Countries at the Crossroads: A Survey of Democratic Governance, ed. Sanja Kelly, Christopher Walker, and Jake Dizard (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2008), 573. 39 Suchinda Kraprayoon (April-May 1992), Anand Panyarachun (June-September 1992), Chuan Leekpai (September 1992-May 1995), Banharn Silpa-archa (July 1995-September 1996), Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (November 1996- November 1997), Chuan Leekpai (November 1997-February 2001), and Thaksin Shinawatra (February 2001-September 2006).

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politics has remained unchanged. Any civilian government has to handle its relations with the military with circumspection if it wants to stay in power.40 In other words, a struggle for power between civilian and military factions has been an enduring feature of Thai politics.

Thailand under the Chavalit Yongchaiyudh administration (1996-1997) placed a priority on economic interests over human rights and democratic principles in its relations with Myanmar. Chavalit had a long history of business interests in Myanmar, having been the first high-ranking officer to visit Yangon after the 1988 crackdown to negotiate for logging and fishing rights. The Chavalit administration saw the practice of informal diplomacy as a way to strengthen relations with Myanmar. Personal relations between Chavalit and Burmese generals paved the way for economic and trade cooperation between the two countries. When Chavalit became prime minster, Burmese Foreign Minister U Khin Maung expressed confidence that close relations between the two countries’ leaders would further strengthen economic cooperation. As he explained, “Chavalit is a good friend (of Myanmar) and also a businessman. We want to deal with this kind of people”. 41 Likewise, Chavalit showed his friendship with Burmese counterparts by constantly referring to them as “brothers”. During his year in office, Chavalit and his cabinet members visited Myanmar many times. Chavalit argued that because Myanmar was under a centralised system, it was therefore necessary to use his personal connections to develop relationships with Burmese leaders. Consequently, they were accused of using personal connections to advance their business interests.42 At this time, Myanmar’s ruling authorities also benefited from trading with Thailand, as Myanmar was desperate for foreign investment and infrastructure development due to the economic sanctions imposed by Western governments.

While relations between Bangkok and Yangon improved as high-level leaders maintained relatively close contact with each other, Chavalit faced widespread criticism from human

40 Mark Beeson and Alex J. Bellamy, Securing Southeast Asia: The Politics of Security Sector Reform (New York: Routledge, 2008), 126. 41 Quoted in Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations, 72. 42 John Funston, “Thai Foreign Policy: Seeking Influence,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 1998, ed. Derek da Cunha and John Funston (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), 301; Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “A Study of Thai Nationhood and Its Implications on Thai-Burmese Relations, 1988- 2000” (PhD diss., University of London, 2002), 136.

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rights activists who said that his government’s relations with Myanmar undermined Thailand’s democratisation. They also urged Chavalit to show his commitment to human rights and democracy by taking the practical step of visiting Aung San Suu Kyi during his visits to Myanmar. In response to this criticism, Chavalit appealed to the international community to be patient with the Burmese junta, claiming that they had no intention of holding power indefinitely.43 He also defended his personal connections with Burmese leaders, claiming that he was using them as a means to convince the regime to respond to the concerns of the international community. For example, after meeting with Burmese General Than Shwe, Chavalit said in an interview: “I told him to slowly release some freedoms. People want to see something on human rights and freedoms”.44 In contrast to his remarks, Chavalit promised the Burmese leaders that he would not meet with Aung San Suu Kyi or attempt to act as a mediator between them.45 From this, it is apparent that Chavalit sought to appease his critics by expressing his support for human rights and democracy; yet at the same time, he tried to maintain close relations with Myanmar to advance his own business interests.

During the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Chavalit faced fierce criticism from business leaders and middle class demonstrations for his mishandling of the crisis. Chavalit resigned in November 1997 and was succeeded by opposition leader Chuan Leekpai, who became prime minister for a second time following an earlier stint between 1992 and 1995. During the second Chuan administration (1997-2001), Chuan’s leadership was considered needed for the economic recovery efforts. Thailand’s focus at this time was on prudent economic management and political reforms in order to bring back investor confidence. In contrast to previous administrations, the second Chuan administration saw the rise of civilian government over military influence for the first time. No military officers were included in the new cabinet. More significantly, Chuan appointed himself as defence minister and also appointed Surin Pitsuwan and Sukhumbhand Paribatra, the leading members of the ruling Democrat Party, as foreign minister and deputy foreign minister respectively.46 Consequently, Chuan’s Myanmar

43 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations, 74. 44 “It’s a Family Affair,” The Irrawaddy, May 1997, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=610&page=2 (accessed 8 April 2014). 45 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations, 138. 46 Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005), 132.

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policy was transferred from the hands of the military to the Foreign Ministry. Chuan strongly criticised past governments for using personal connections with the Burmese regime for their own interests. Instead, he adopted a tough policy towards Myanmar by falling into line with international support for Aung San Suu Kyi’s fight for democracy against the Burmese military government.

During his term in office, Chuan followed many Western countries in shunning the Burmese regime for its poor human rights record and failure to hand over power to a democratically elected government. Thailand, at that time, decided to ally with its former partners such as the United States, the European Union, Japan, and China as a way to ensure access to foreign assistance and to regain economic confidence. Chuan’s hard-line stance towards Myanmar’s military junta was an example of his attempts to maintain favourable relations with Western countries. More importantly, the immediate solution adopted by the Chuan administration in response to the 1997 economic crisis was to accept a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Consequently, the country was required to comply with the IMF requirements such as good governance, democratisation, human rights, and rule of law.47 Chuan saw following these international norms as a chance to win back the confidence of foreign investors.48

Relations between Bangkok and Yangon deteriorated after Chuan supported the West’s demonisation of Myanmar as well as its policy of economic sanctions. Bangkok’s tough approach towards Yangon was viewed as a response to pressure from Western governments and international agencies, combined with domestic political concerns. Apart from international pressure, Thailand’s 1997 constitution raised public awareness about the protection of human rights. Chuan believed that by distancing Thailand from Myanmar, it would help promote his government’s democratic credentials to both its domestic supporters and the international community. During his three years in office, Chuan refused to visit Myanmar and suspended all high-ranking visits to express

47 Kavin Hewison, “Neo-Liberalism and Domestic Capital: The Political Outcomes of the Economic Crisis in Thailand,” in East Asia and the Trials of Neo-Liberalism, ed. Kavin Hewison and Richard Robinson (New York: Routledge, 2006), 118. 48 Naruemon Thabchumpon, “Thailand: A Year of Diminishing Expectations,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, ed. Daljit Singh and John Funston (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999) 317.

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displeasure with the Burmese regime.49 The resulting hostility led to a series of diplomatic confrontations and eventually resulted in a number of armed skirmishes between the Thai and Burmese armies.50 In 1999, Burmese dissidents in Thailand staged a siege of the Myanmar embassy in Bangkok, and the next year seized control of a hospital in the Ratchaburi province. Speaking on the Myanmar embassy seizure, then Thai Interior Minister Sanan Kachonprasart declared that the attackers were not terrorists, but rather they were students who sought democracy.51 Myanmar reacted angrily by closing all border checkpoints and terminating Thai fishing concessions without any prior notice.52

Unlike previous governments, the Chuan administration allowed the Foreign Ministry to take a leading role in foreign policy decision-making. Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan was active and vocal about the need for political reform in Myanmar. He was highly critical of ASEAN’s principle of non-intervention, which was seen as a major hindrance to democratisation in Myanmar. The non-intervention norm had been repeatedly used by the Burmese rulers as a defence to protect the regime from pressure from the international community. Previous Thai leaders had also adhered to this principle in order to continue both engaging with Myanmar while preventing criticism from Western countries. During the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 1998, Surin revived Anwar Ibrahim’s concept of “constructive intervention”, which would allow ASEAN members to express views on the domestic issues of other members. His suggestion was designed as an attempt to force ASEAN members to be more active about political reforms in Myanmar. However, the idea was strongly opposed by other ASEAN countries, which preferred to pursue a strict adherence to non-interference. Surin then decided to redefine the concept and announced a new approach labelled “flexible engagement”, which aimed to allow ASEAN members to discuss each other’s domestic issues if these have an impact outside their borders. 53 Surin asserted that engagement would help to eventually transform Myanmar into a thriving democracy. All ASEAN members, except the Philippines,

49 Phillip J. Eldridge, The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2002), 54; Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Thailand Realigns Its Burma Policy,” The Irrawaddy, 18 October 2010, www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=19751 (accessed 16 April 2014). 50 Roberts, ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community, 90. 51 Sanan Kachonprasart returned to power as a deputy prime minister in Abhisit’s Democrat-led coalition government (2008-2011). 52 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations, 77-78. 53 Simon S. C. Tay, “Institution and Processes: Dilemmas and Possibilities,” in Reinventing , ed. Simon S. C. Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao, and Hadi Soesastro (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 253.

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rejected his proposal, claiming that such a policy could jeopardise ASEAN’s cohesion. Moreover, although ASEAN members agreed on supporting the efforts of democratic reform in Myanmar, they preferred to see the process accelerated by the Burmese people, rather than forced by other countries.54 Critics have argued that the proposed policy change caused great concern among ASEAN members that it could become a channel allowing external forces outside of the ASEAN group to interfere in regional affairs.55 Surin’s initiative was also strongly opposed at home in Thailand by local businessmen and some bureaucrats, who feared that the policy could severely hamper economic relations with Myanmar.56

As the Thai economy continued to decline, and with opposition to the IMF’s economic reform programmes widespread, Chuan and his economic team were severely criticised for making little progress in improving economic conditions, particularly at the grassroots level. Chuan’s economic policy was also seen as being designed to help only large financial institutions and to sell the nation off to foreign investors. Moreover, before the end of Chuan’s term in office, several cabinet members were embroiled by corruption scandals. The failure of Chuan’s economic policies paved the way to the rise of the Thaksin era (2001-2006). Billionaire telecommunications tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party won a landslide victory in the 2001 general election, raising hopes that his populist policies would lead to economic recovery.

6.3 A golden age of relations between Thailand and Myanmar

Thailand’s foreign policy under Thaksin, like that of Chuan, was aimed at improving the economy, which was still suffering from the 1997 Asian financial crisis. However, his strategy differed from that of his predecessor. Instead of focusing on relations with the United States and the European Union, Thaksin focused primarily on the necessity of increasing Thailand’s role in regional affairs. He initiated the “Forward Engagement” strategy as part of the government’s goal to transform Thailand’s position from a low-key

54 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects, 177. 55 Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter?: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), 127,132. 56 Lee Jones, , Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 192.

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actor with limited influence to a leading power in mainland Southeast Asia.57 The strategy was intended to increase interaction between ASEAN, East Asia, and South Asia, particularly in the areas of trade and investment, with Thailand acting as a bridge between these three groups. To achieve this objective, Thaksin initiated various bilateral and multilateral agreements such as the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC), and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS). 58 At that time, Thaksin was touted as potential regional leader following in the footsteps of former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.59 Thaksin’s popularity and power reached the point where his opponents began to spread rumours that he planned to destroy the monarchy.60

Relations between Thailand and Myanmar greatly improved under the Thaksin regime; in contrast to the Chuan administration, which adopted a hard-line stance against Yangon, the Thaksin administration saw Myanmar as a business partner, not a threat. Thaksin strongly criticised Chuan’s tough policies for putting the Thai-Myanmar relationship in jeopardy. Thailand under Thaksin saw economic interests as the first priority and dropped all conditions on the improvement of democracy and human rights in Myanmar. Thaksin argued that other countries could not force the process of democratisation, and that it had to be initiated by state leaders. Moreover, he saw personal diplomacy as an important means to engage with Burmese elites. He and his high-ranking officers visited Yangon more often than any predecessor.61 Thaksin’s first overseas visit as prime minister was to Myanmar in June 2001. His visit ended a four-year hiatus in high-level exchanges

57 Pongphisoot Busbarat, “A Review of Thailand’s Foreign Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia: Exploring an Ideational Approach,” European Journal of East Asian Studies 11, no. 1 (2012): 141. 58 Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, “Collective Action Problems and Regional Integration in ,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, no. 1 (2006): 134-135. 59 Pasuk Phongpaichit, “Thailand under Thaksin: Another Malaysia?,” Working Paper No. 109 (Perth: Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, 2004), 2; Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, “Thailand in Trouble,” in Bangkok, May 2010: Perspectives on a Divided Thailand, ed. Michael J Montesano, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, and Aekapol Chongvilaivan (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 223. 60 Chairat Charoensin-o-larn, “Military Coup and Democracy in Thailand,” in Divided over Thaksin: Thailand’s Coup and Problematic Transition, ed. John Funston (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2009), 51. 61 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2004), 213.

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between the two countries. During the visit, diplomatic and trade relations were restored in exchange for anti-narcotics cooperation and border security.62

Thaksin’s pro-Myanmar policy, involving the downgrade in the importance of human rights, was supported by his coalition partners, particularly Defence Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. However, Army Chief Surayud Chulanont disagreed with Thaksin’s policy of engagement with Myanmar, claiming concerns about the Burmese junta’s brutality against Myanmar’s ethnic minorities.63 Surayud was also an outspoken critic of the Burmese regime’s involvement in drug trafficking.64 While the Burmese government denied having involvement in the narcotics business, individuals in authority had been accused of receiving benefit from the narcotics trade. Burmese ethnic minority groups were also believed to be part of this narcotics trade network.65 Thaksin, however, ignored Surayud’s concerns. Surayud’s disagreement with Thaksin’s Myanmar policy reflected the mismatch of interests between the civilian and military elites.66 During the Thaksin era, although several armed clashes occurred between Thai and Burmese troops along the border, diplomatic relations were normalised within a short time, as Thailand placed a greater emphasis on maintaining cordial relations with Myanmar. For example, in 2002, the Burmese forces encroached on Thai territory in pursuit of the insurgents, leading to exchanges of gunfire across the border. Thaksin not only ordered Thai troops to retreat to avoid an escalation of the conflict, but also blamed Thai military leaders for overreacting.67

Thaksin’s soft political approach towards Myanmar was seen to be related to his willingness to do personal business with the Burmese government. In 2003, Thaksin’s family-owned company, Shin Corporation, prompted criticism after it signed a US$12

62 Maung Maung Oo, “Bilateral Talks Bearing Fruit,” The Irrawaddy, 10 January 2002, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=2226 (accessed 9 May 2014). 63 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Thaksin, the Military, and Thailand’s Protracted Political Crisis,” in The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and Leadership, ed. Marcus Mietzner (New York: Routledge, 2012), 53. 64 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations, 103; Aung Zaw, “Gen Surayud Chulanont: Loved and Hated in Burma,” The Irrawaddy, 2 October 2006, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=6376 (accessed 9 May 2014). 65 Lex Rieffel, “The Moment,” in Myanmar/Burma: Inside Challenges, Outside Interests, ed. Lex Rieffel (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 11-12. 66 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Diplomacy under Siege: Thailand’s Political Crisis and the Impact on Foreign Policy,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 3 (2009): 451. 67 Michael K. Connors, “Thailand: The Facts and F(r)ictions of Ruling,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2005, ed. Chin Kin Wah and Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 370.

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million deal with Myanmar’s telecommunications provider, Bagan Cybertech.68 Shin Satellite Plc (SATTEL), a subsidiary of Shin Corporation, had reportedly started business in Myanmar when then-Foreign Minister Thaksin visited there in 1994.69 However, the strongest allegation against Thaksin was a four-billion-baht soft loan given to Myanmar. In 2004, the Export-Import Bank of Thailand was ordered to increase the amount of soft loans given to Myanmar from three to four billion baht. While a three-billion-baht loan was for development of basic infrastructure, including road links with Thailand, the additional loans were granted to Myanmar’s Ministry of Communications to improve telecommunications services, including purchasing telecommunications equipment from Shin Corporation.70 Following the military coup which ousted Thaksin’s government in 2006, Surayud Chulanont was installed as an interim prime minister. The new military- installed government established the Asset Examination Committee (AEC) to investigate allegations of corruption in the Thaksin clan. In 2007, Thaksin faced a series of charges for corruption and abuse of power, including the loans given to Myanmar. The Supreme Court ultimately ordered the seizure of assets belonging to Thaksin and his family valued at 76 billion baht or US$2.2 billion.71

Thaksin’s soft stance on Myanmar was also widely criticised for enabling the survival of the Burmese regime during the period of sanctions. In 2005, Thailand became Myanmar’s top trading partner, with two-way trade at US$2.5 billion, increasing 27.2 per cent from the previous year. The value of Myanmar’s natural gas exports to Thailand increased significantly from US$114.2 million in 2000 to US$1,497.4 million in 2005, which accounted for over 80 per cent of Myanmar’s exports to Thailand in 2005.72 While the ruling elites of the two countries enjoyed benefits from their cooperation, human rights advocates accused the Thaksin government of putting its own economic stability and energy needs ahead of Myanmar’s human rights record. Thaksin countered that the effects

68 Bagan Cybertech was owned by General Khin Nyunt’s son. General Khin Nyunt was Myanmar’s prime minister of from 2003 until 2004. Prior to that, he was a deputy military chief when the military took power in a coup in 1988. 69 Phongpaichit and Baker, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand, 213. 70 Connors, “Thailand: The Facts and F(r)ictions of Ruling,” 370; Chachavalpongpun, “Diplomacy under Siege: Thailand’s Political Crisis and the Impact on Foreign Policy,” 453. 71 Ben Doherty, “Thaksin Shinawatra Stripped of Half His Fortune for Abuse of Power,” The Guardian 27 February 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/26/thaksin-shinawatra (accessed 10 May 2014). 72 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 120.

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of Thailand’s investment in and trade with Myanmar would be conducive overall to economic and political reforms, and by extension to the strengthening of human rights in Myanmar. In response to this criticism, Thaksin introduced the concept of the “Bangkok Process”, in which Thailand would act as a place of discussion between the Burmese government and interested parties. Thaksin saw his close personal relationship with Burmese generals as an opportunity for him to play a mediator role in Myanmar’s internal conflict. Moreover, any success from these efforts could enhance his international reputation.73 Thaksin arranged the first Bangkok Process meeting in December 2003, which brought together representatives from eleven countries74 and the United Nations, to exchange views on Myanmar’s roadmap to democracy. However, the meeting did not bring about any substantial change in Myanmar’s politics. In 2004, Myanmar declined to attend the second meeting, resulting to the end of the Bangkok Process.75

Since the 2006 coup that removed Thaksin from power, his proxies have continued to challenge the military and its allies. The 2007 general election paved the way for the return of pro-Thaksin forces to power. The Thaksin-backed governments of Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat also prioritised economic interests over democracy and human rights concerns. Samak visited Myanmar at least twice during his eight months in office. He announced during his first visit to Naypyidaw (Myanmar’s new capital city from November 2005) that his government opposed the Western sanctions, and wanted to reinforce economic cooperation, particularly in energy sectors. Moreover, he seemingly agreed with the continued house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi: during Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein’s visit to Bangkok, Samak claimed that “it is okay if she is put on the shelf, but others admire her because of it”.76 However, during the post-Thaksin period, Thailand’s relations with Myanmar improved only slightly because Samak and Somchai were preoccupied with domestic political instability and anti-government protests.

73 Ibid., 140-141. 74 The meeting was attended by representatives from Australia, Austria, Italy, Germany, France, Japan, China, India, Singapore, Thailand, and Myanmar. 75 Maung Zarni, “An inside View of Reconciliation,” in Myanmar/Burma: Inside Challenges, Outside Interests, ed. Lex Rieffel (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 66. 76 Chachavalpongpun, “Thailand-Myanmar Relations: Old Animosity in a New Bilateral Setting,” 124.

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Despite political turmoil in Bangkok, 2008 saw positive signs for Thai-Burmese relations. In the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis,77 the Samak government approved an aid fund of US$100,000 and also sent medical and food supplies valued more than US$31.3 million to Myanmar. Moreover, Thailand worked closely with ASEAN to assist in recovery efforts. Due to longstanding tensions with Western countries, the Burmese regime initially was reluctant to allow international relief agencies access to the cyclone devastated region. Interestingly, Cyclone Nargis paved the way for ASEAN to begin to engage constructively with Myanmar. While the Burmese junta was strongly criticised by the international community for impeding the inflow of aid to victims, ASEAN, led by then Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, immediately reached out to help facilitate communication between the international humanitarian community, through the United Nations system, and Myanmar.78 ASEAN’s successful response to the Nargis disaster raised hopes that ASEAN would possibly achieve its community-building efforts by 2015. The disaster occurred at a pivotal time, when the ASEAN Charter entered into force in 2008. The success of the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force represented a real example of positive engagement by ASEAN.79

6.4 Abhisit’s dilemma: human rights and democracy, or economic interests?

Abhisit’s Myanmar policy initially followed the same path as that of the second Chuan administration in the late 1990s, with an emphasis on human rights and democracy rather than economic interests. Traditionally, Thai prime ministers visit the ASEAN countries soon after taking office. However, Myanmar was the last ASEAN country visited by Abhisit; it was almost two years after assuming power before he made a one-day visit to Naypyidaw in October 2010. When Abhisit was the opposition leader, he had been an outspoken advocate for political reform in Myanmar. Speaking to the Indonesian press, he claimed that ASEAN should not consider the situation in Myanmar as a “purely domestic problem” because it could affect the whole association. He also urged Thailand

77 In May 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck in Myanmar, resulting in an estimated 140,000 deaths. It was the worst cyclone to hit Asia since the devastating tsunami in 2004. 78 William Sabandar, “Cyclone Nargis and : A Window for More Meaningful Development Cooperation in Myanmar,” in Ruling Myanmar: From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections, ed. Nick Cheesman, Monique Skidmore, and Trevor Wilson (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), 199. 79 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “ Seeks to ‘Unchain’ the Mind of Burmese Junta,” Bangkok Post, 21 July 2009, www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 26 March 2014); Christopher Roberts, “Changing Myanmar: International Diplomacy and the Futility,” Security Challenges 7, no. 4 (2011): 92.

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and other ASEAN countries to continue to push for democratisation in Myanmar, to show respect for “human rights and key principles upheld by the international community”.80 His view was similar to that of Surin Pitsuwan, a former Thai foreign minister under the Chuan government, who proposed a policy of flexible engagement in 1999. While Surin’s policy had met with criticism and strong objections, it had been seen as a way to pressure Myanmar to make democratic reforms after it became an ASEAN member. Abhisit’s intent to promote human rights issues in Myanmar was evident just days before he took power when he met with a number of exiled Burmese political activists in Bangkok.81 Accordingly, many hoped that Thailand’s new government would be more enthusiastic about the protection of human rights and democratic principles, especially because of its claim of having no personal interest in engaging with Myanmar’s military rulers.

Yet Abhisit’s promise to promote human rights was met with scepticism from his first days in power. In January 2009, Thailand came under considerable criticism from human rights groups for its mishandling of an incident involving Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. The Thai military was alleged to have forcibly pushed some boats of Rohingya asylum seekers out to sea, with some fatal results. Abhisit initially denied the incident happened, but later promised a thorough investigation. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) sent a request to the Thai Foreign Ministry for access to the Rohingyas, some of whom were reportedly detained by the military in southern Thailand. However, the Foreign Ministry claimed that the government had not received any report about the detainees.82 Lacking a clear explanation from the Thai government, further media investigations alleged that some Thai military officials were involved in human rights abuses of Rohingya refugees. However, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya claimed that those reports were inaccurate and urged people not to “believe what

80 “The Leaders: Interview with Abhisit Vejjajiva,” The Leaders, 5 September 2006, http://www.spf.org/the-leaders/library/08.html (accessed 3 April 2014). 81 Wai Moe, “Thailand’s Burma Policy Set to Change under New Premier,” The Irrawaddy, 25 December 2008, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=14846 (accessed 3 April 2014). 82 Human Rights Watch, “Ad Hoc and Inadequate: Thailand’s Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers,” September 2012, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/thailand0912.pdf (accessed 14 May 2014), 76-77.

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the world says about Rohingya”. 83 Consequently, the Abhisit administration was criticised for defending the military, but ignoring the human rights of the refugees.84

6.4.1 Promoting human rights and democratic values

From his first days as prime minister, Abhisit suffered serious legitimacy problems as his government was beholden to the military, and his party had not won a national election in almost two decades. While his predecessor had had democratic legitimacy and a mandate from the people, Abhisit lacked these. Without strong domestic support, the government’s international credibility was diminished. As a result, Abhisit attempted to establish his own legitimacy by giving priority to democratic principles in domestic and foreign policies. The shift in Thailand’s stance towards Myanmar was seen as a way of restoring the Thai government’s international image after the 2006 coup. Abhisit’s ambition of promoting democracy was supposed to serve Thailand well as it held an ASEAN chair from July 2008 to December 2009. Moreover, it was anticipated that ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan would support Abhisit in taking a tougher stance towards the Burmese regime.

When ASEAN accepted Myanmar into the group in 1997, it faced much criticism over its decision, given Myanmar’s poor track-record on human rights. A strategy of constructive engagement has been implemented by ASEAN, which is hoped to change Myanmar gradually, not by force, but by influence. The “constructive” aspect of engagement intends to use dialogue as a means to persuade Myanmar’s elite towards good governance and liberal reform. Meanwhile, ASEAN’s trade and investment linkages with Myanmar are hoped to lead to socio-economic development and the emergence of a democratic middle class. However, ASEAN’s constructive engagement policy towards Myanmar contrasts with the boycotts and sanctions employed by Western countries.85

83 “Don’t Believe What the World Says About Rohingya,” The Nation, 5 February 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/-Don-t-believe-what-the-world-says-about-Rohingya-- 30095035.html (accessed 14 May 2014). 84 Ed Cropley, “Boat People Tragedy Exposes Thai PM’s Debt to Army,” Reuters, 25 January 2009, http://mobile.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE50O0EW20090125?src=RSS-WOR (accessed 14 May 2014). 85 Alain Guilloux, “Myanmar: Analyzing Problems of Transition and Intervention,” Contemporary Politics 16, no. 4 (2010): 388-389; Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, “Democratic Transformation and Regional Institutions: The Case of Myanmar and ,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 32, no. 1 (2013): 37.

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Consequently, a decision over whether to engage or isolate Myanmar has become a dilemma for the international community. For years, ASEAN has been criticised over its ineffectual attempts to influence the ruling junta and its inability to bridge Myanmar with the West, due largely to the lack of an integrated and coherent political strategy. However, for its ASEAN associates, Myanmar’s processes of liberalisation and democratisation have to be indigenously driven, and external pressure has little effect on Myanmar’s political development. 86 ASEAN’s policy of engagement seemed to have been very successful when Myanmar moved towards greater democracy by holding elections in 2010.87

After taking power, Abhisit promised to immediately prioritise human rights and democracy in Myanmar. He insisted that Thailand, as the ASEAN chair, would be involved in a more proactive stance on human rights issues. He indicated that efforts to promote human rights in Myanmar were important to ASEAN’s credibility in the eyes of the international community. Thailand would therefore try to convince ASEAN countries of the necessity of a strong position on human rights to the ASEAN community.88 Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya also declared that his government’s Myanmar policy was not determined by business interests, thus differing from that of the Thaksin and Thaksin- inspired governments. He criticised Thaksin for cooperating with Myanmar, and avoiding responsibility for democracy and human rights. Consequently, an “ethical foreign policy” was announced as Thailand’s new approach towards Myanmar. Kasit stated that the personal business interests of past administration would have no role in Abhisit’s Myanmar policy, promising that “this government will not mix business and politics”.89 Moreover, he vowed to push for the establishment of an ASEAN human rights body, with the aim to “restore Thailand’s international voice”, after the nation’s presence in the global community had been nearly invisible for so long. 90 However, the ASEAN

86 Christopher Roberts, “Myanmar and the Argument for Engagement: A Clash of Contending Moralities?,” East Asia: An International Quarterly 23, no. 2 (2006): 34. 87 Mathew Davies, “The Perils of Incoherence: , Myanmar and the Avoidable Failures of Human Rights Socialisation?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 34, no. 1 (2012): 1; Michael Haas, Asian and Pacific Regional Cooperation: Turning Zones of Conflict into Arenas of Peace (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 132. 88 Wai Moe, “Thailand’s Burma Policy Set to Change under New Premier,” The Irrawaddy, 25 December 2008, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=14846 (accessed 3 April 2014). 89 “Kasit Promises No PAD Influence,” The Nation, 20 December 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/Kasit-promises-no-PAD-influence-30091498.html (accessed 3 April 2014). 90 Kasit Piromya, interview by author, Bangkok, 29 October 2012.

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Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), formed in 2009 when Thailand chaired ASEAN, was criticised for being “toothless”, without any provision on rights protection or sanction of abuses. Abhisit, however, argued that making a start was better than making no progress at all. 91

It is noteworthy that while Abhisit initially promised that his Myanmar’s policy would give priority to democracy and human rights in Myanmar, throughout his term in office, he tried to maintain ASEAN’s long-standing principle of “constructive engagement” in relations with Myanmar. He stressed the need for ASEAN and the West to find common ground. He stated that “the West and ASEAN have a common objective. We want to bring good change in Myanmar”.92 At the ASEAN summit in 2009, Abhisit announced that ASEAN would maintain high-level contacts and exchanges at all levels with Myanmar. In contrast to Western countries, Abhisit disagreed with sanctions on Myanmar. He claimed that both ASEAN and Western countries had “the same goal or opinions”, but ASEAN could not “resort to the same procedure” because of the different conditions, particularly between countries in the region and countries from other regions.93 He also insisted that ASEAN’s policy of engagement with Myanmar as a means of encouraging political change was “more productive than alienation and isolation”. He believed that such coercive measures could not resolve Myanmar’s political problems, but that talks with the Burmese political leaders were the best way to effect political change, improve human rights, and stem drug trafficking.94

Cyclone Nargis in 2008 created opportunities for ASEAN to expand engagements with Naypyidaw. Although the ASEAN’s humanitarian efforts did not lead to political change inside Myanmar, the ruling elite in the Burmese government at least appeared to open up to the world community. In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, Thailand’s role in providing assistance and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid from the international

91 Achara Ashayagachat, “Toothless in Infancy, but the Victory Is in Being Born,” Bangkok Post, 16 July 2009, 1, http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/20303/toothless-in-infancy-but-the-victory-is-in- being-born (accessed 16 April 2011). 92 “ Not in Favour of Sanctions against Myanmar,” The Star, 20 July 2009, http://www.thestar.com.my/story.aspx/?file=%2F2009%2F7%2F20%2Fnation%2F20090720145744 (accessed 2 April 2014). 93 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “The Last Bus to Naypyidaw,” in Myanmar/Burma: Inside Challenges, Outside Interests, ed. Lex Rieffel (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 172. 94 Foster Klug, “Thai PM Says US Moving toward Engaging Burma,” The Irrawaddy, 22 September 2009, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=16839 (accessed 27 May 2014).

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community paved the way for a new beginning in relations between the two countries. Kasit attempted to use this opportunity to talk to the Burmese authorities about political reforms. He initially took a more proactive diplomatic approach to try and engage the Burmese generals. He made his introductory two-day visit to Myanmar in March 2009, meeting with Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein and Foreign Minister Nyan Win to enhance political trust and discuss a wide range of bilateral issues, including cooperation on the suppression of narcotics, road linkage projects, cooperation on energy, the issue of illegal migrant workers, and anti-human trafficking operations. 95 Interestingly, Kasit offered for Thailand to facilitate negotiations between Naypyidaw and the Karen National Union (KNU), one of the few ethnic minority groups that had rejected Myanmar’s new constitution and reconciliation process. His initiative dominated the media headlines, with many questioning whether Thailand was ready to act as a mediator in the talks between the Burmese government and the KNU. Kasit claimed that “Myanmar has asked Thailand to help talk with minority groups to join in the reconciliation process”, and his government would help Myanmar without any hidden agenda.96 However, his initiative did not take place as hoped. Given their concerns about Thailand’s previous buffer zone policy, it was thus unsurprising that the Burmese government would not trust Thailand in this role.

Avoiding a loss of credibility

Despite support from the military, judiciary, and bureaucracy, Abhisit’s popularity and political legitimacy were declining after a few months in office. He faced massive anti- government protests, eventually leading to clashes between the military and Red Shirt protesters in April 2009, leaving two people dead and dozens hurt. The ASEAN and East Asia summits in Pattaya suddenly had to be cancelled for security reasons. The cancellation of the summits was seen as a major humiliation for Abhisit, raising doubts as to whether Thailand could maintain its role as ASEAN chair. While Thailand’s credibility was eroded, Indonesia took the opportunity to propose to host the summit if

95 Bangkok Pundit, “Mr Kasit Goes to Burma,” asiancorrespondent, 21 March 2009, http://asiancorrespondent.com/18453/mr-kasit-goes-to-burma/ (accessed 18 March 2014). 96 Thanida Tansubhapol and Wimol Nukaew, “Kasit Agrees to Push KNU Disarmament,” Bangkok Post, 24 March 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/13874/kasit-agrees-to-push-knu-disarmament (accessed 20 May 2014).

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Thailand was not ready.97 However, then ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan reiterated Thailand’s readiness to host the rescheduled summit. When the situation in Bangkok was more stable, Abhisit started to voice criticism of the political situation in Myanmar. In May 2009, Thailand issued a statement on behalf of ASEAN, voicing a “grave concern” over the Burmese government’s decision to press charges against Aung San Suu Kyi after an American allegedly sneaked into her house. The joint ASEAN statement called for the “immediate release” of Aung San Suu Kyi, after strong criticism from human rights advocates that ASEAN had not put enough pressure on the junta.98 Two days before Thailand issued the statement, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had phoned Kasit Piromya to raise concerns about Aung San Suu Kyi’s detention. Thailand’s statement also reiterated the necessity for the Burmese government to implement reconciliation steps:

With the eyes of the international community on Myanmar at present, the honour and the credibility of the Government of the Union of Myanmar are at stake. Thailand, as the ASEAN chair, reaffirms ASEAN’s readiness to contribute constructively to the national reconciliation process and the peaceful transition to democracy in Myanmar.99

The statement made clear that dialogue encouraging political change was a priority for Thailand and Abhisit’s government was ready to “constructively” take part in the reconciliation and democratisation process in Myanmar. Meanwhile, Abhisit was critical of the sanctions imposed on Myanmar by the United States and the European Union, insisting that Thailand would not enact the same policies. 100 Although a policy of “pragmatic engagement” of the Barack Obama administration appeared to be focused on closer engagement and dialogue with Naypyidaw, the existing sanctions measures

97 “Thai Protests Cancel Asian Summit,” BBC News, 11 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/7994465.stm (accessed 1 March 2014). 98 “Asian Leaders Call for Suu Kyi’s Release,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 May 2009, http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/asian-leaders-call-for-suu-kyis- release/2009/05/19/1242498756289.html (accessed 24 March 2014). 99 “Documents on Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 20, no. 3 (2009): 182; Jürgen Haacke, “The Myanmar Imbroglio and ASEAN: Heading towards the 2010 Elections,” International Affairs 86, no. 1 (2010): 164. 100 Bangkok Pundit, “Abhisit Goes to Burma,” asiancorrespondent, 13 October 2010, http://asiancorrespondent.com/41417/abhisit-goes-to-burma/ (accessed 15 May 2014).

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remained in place.101 Therefore, Abhisit’s Myanmar policy was not substantially different from that of Thaksin. While democratisation in Myanmar was considered important, Thailand did not see economic sanctions as the way to do it.

Relations between Bangkok and Naypyidaw deteriorated as a result of Abhisit’s statement. It sparked strong protests from the Burmese government over Thailand’s attempts to interfere in its domestic affairs. However, following mounting international pressure, Myanmar thus allowed envoys from Thailand, Singapore, and Russia to meet Aung San Suu Kyi in a prison. Myanmar chose the Thai envoy because Thailand was then ASEAN chair, Singapore was the dean of the diplomatic corps in Myanmar, and Russia represented the United Nations Security Council. Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya stated after a meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi that Thailand strongly supported her release. He reaffirmed that Thailand expected to see “all political prisoners released and national reconciliation”. 102 However, pressure from the international community appeared to have no influence on the Burmese government’s decision on Aung San Suu Kyi’s trial. A court found her guilty of breaking the terms of her house arrest. Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced to a further eighteen months of house arrest, which meant that she would not be allowed to take part in Myanmar’s general election in 2010.

Despite continuing political uncertainties both in Thailand and Myanmar, there were efforts by the Thai Foreign Ministry to promote mutual understanding between the two countries through a revised historical memory of the Siamese-Burmese Wars. For decades, distortions of history and nationalism had developed hostile perceptions of each other in both countries.103 The project was to bring Thai and Burmese historians together to address contentious issues in the two countries’ shared histories, with the intention to rewrite history textbooks based on historical facts, rather than nationalist myths or legends. However, due to the lack of collaboration and funding, the revised historical textbooks were not produced.104 Interestingly, while the Foreign Ministry claimed that it

101 Harn Yawnghwe, “United States-Myanmar Relations: On the Threshold of Rapprochement? A Response,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs 32, no. 3 (2010): 432. 102 Supalak Ganjanakhundee, “Aung San Suu Kyi Is Fine, Kasit,” The Nation, 20 May 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/Aung-San-Suu-Kyi-is-fine-Kasit-30103216.html (accessed 23 May 2014). 103 Roberts, ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community, 91. 104 Kasit Piromya, interview by author, Bangkok, 29 October 2012.

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did not have enough support for the historical textbook revisions, the government provided funding of 100 million baht or US$3.12 for the making of the film Legend of King Naresuan 3 and 4.105 This film tells the story of King Naresuan of the ancient Ayutthaya Kingdom, who was taken hostage by the Burmese King Bayinnaung. Because of his military and leadership skills, King Naresuan later liberated Ayutthaya Kingdom from the Burmese. The Burmese kings in this film, like in Thai historical literature, were portrayed as Siam’s enemy. The film was made to celebrate the 72nd birthday of the Queen of Thailand. Abhisit claimed that the film was “meaningful in Thai history and to the Thai people”, as it signified “our gratitude to the land”.106 Obviously, this movie would not contribute to healthy relations between Thailand and Myanmar, but was instead a means for the government to enhance its legitimacy at home.

The Legend of King Naresuan was made in 2003, during the time that Thai society saw the rise of nationalistic sentiments against the IMF and Western foreign lenders. It was reported that the film was the most expensive film made in Thailand at that time, costing over 700 million baht, or around US$19 million to produce.107 In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Thailand’s entry into the IMF’s programme and subsequent privatisation policies as part of IMF conditionality was regarded as a humiliation to the Thai people. Perhaps for this reasons, the theme of “defending Thailand against its foe” became popular in Thai media.108 Many Thai films during this time shared similar story lines about Thai historic heroes and heroines such as Queen Suriyothai, King Naresuan, and Princess Suphankalaya and their sacrifices in the Siamese-Burmese wars during the Ayutthaya period. On the one hand, the stories aimed to send a message that the Thai people would survive any crisis because they have protection from the monarchy and Buddhism. On the other, the negative image of Myanmar was used to boost nationalistic sentiment. The stories reinforced the image of Myanmar as Thailand’s most dangerous enemy and deepened the antagonism between the two nations.

105 “Film Directors Protest Culture Ministry’s 100 Million Baht Grant to King Naresuan Movies,” Prachatai, 29 April 2010, http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/1769 (accessed 13 May 2014). 106 Kong Rithdee, “Patronising Patriotism,” Bangkok Post, 15 August 2009, www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 13 May 2014). 107 Khun Sam, “Thai-Burmese Historical Film Breaks Box Office Records,” The Irrawaddy, 25 January 2007, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=6608 (accessed 7 May 2014). 108 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, “Business Populism in Thailand,” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 2 (2005): 69.

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Thailand’s 2010 political crisis

The political deadlock in Thailand made 2010 a very tough year for Abhisit. In March- May 2010, Red Shirt protesters occupied parts of central of Bangkok, eventually leading to the worst political violence in Thailand in several decades. A military crackdown led to at least 90 deaths and more than 2,000 injuries, and Abhisit cancelled his trip to Hanoi for the ASEAN summit in its aftermath. One of the main discussion topics for the summit was to urge the Burmese junta to hold a general election in November 2010 as scheduled.109 Moreover, ASEAN was expected to use its regional influence to convince Myanmar to implement a so-called “seven-step roadmap to democracy”, which had been first announced by Prime Minister Khin Nyunt in 2003. The meeting was also scheduled to discuss the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners. The absence of Abhisit at the ASEAN summit reflects the impact of domestic politics on Thailand’s international role and reputation.110 Clearly, political instability hampered Thailand’s ability to be a regional leader. More importantly, due to the military crackdown in Bangkok, Abhisit was seemingly not in the position to influence the Burmese regime to respect human rights principles.

ASEAN’s long-held principles of non-intervention and consensus decision-making have been seen by many critics as a political weapon used by both Thai and Burmese leaders to maintain their domestic political positions. Any comments on political issues could be seen as an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of another country. For example, following clashes between the military and Red Shirt protesters in Bangkok in 2010, Aung San Suu Kyi voiced her opinion about Thailand’s political crisis, claiming that it resulted from a constitution that was written under military rule after the 2006 coup. Her comments, which seemed to support the Red Shirts, were strongly criticised by pro- government supporters. 111 A Thai senator denounced Aung San Suu Kyi’s remarks, saying: “I feel very disappointed because Aung San Suu Kyi should understand Thailand

109 “Abhisit’s Dilemma,” The Economist, 8 April 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/15868632 (accessed 1 April 2014). 110 “PM Skips ASEAN Summit in Hanoi,” The Nation, 9 April 2010, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/04/09/politics/PM-skips-Asean-Summit-in-Hanoi- 30126759.html (accessed 1 March 2014). 111 Anusak Konglang, “Thai PM Rejects Compromise Deal to End Protests,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 April 2010, http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/thai-pm-rejects-compromise-deal- to-end-protests-20100424-tk2z.htmls (accessed 18 April 2014).

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better than this. Therefore, I ask for an investigation into Aung San Suu Kyi’s financial situation on whether she has received any money from any person”. 112 Government spokesman Panitan Wattanayagorn argued that Aung San Suu Kyi was perhaps uninformed about Thailand. He asserted: “[Thailand and Myanmar] are not at all similar because we have the democratic system for a long time when many other countries have never been democratic”.113 The Abhisit administration initially declared its appreciation of and full support for Aung San Suu Kyi and her non-violent struggle against the military atrocities. However, as Abhisit was under the influence of the military, his claim of supporting political reforms and human rights improvements in Myanmar was quite unconvincing for Aung San Suu Kyi.

Myanmar’s 2010 election

The year 2010 saw many changes in Myanmar’s political scene. Myanmar held its first general election in twenty years, although the ballot was condemned by Western countries as unfair. Some small opposition parties were allowed to participate, but Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) boycotted the polls because of election laws it said were “unjust”. Subsequently, however, the newly elected government of Thein Sein, a former general and prime minister under the junta, made further positive steps towards political reform. Six days after the election, Aung San Suu Kyi was finally released when her latest house arrest order expired. Most importantly, in May 2011, Thein Sein’s government released several thousand political prisoners. Due to these remarkable developments, the United States and European Union decided to review the economic sanctions imposed on Myanmar.114 Following Myanmar’s 2010 election, the Burmese government attempted to establish diversified relations with other countries, particularly Western governments. It also expressed its readiness to assume the chairmanship of ASEAN for the first time in 2014. In 2006, due to criticism from the international

112 “Focus on Thaksin as Protest Paymaster,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 April 2010, http://www.smh.com.au/world/focus-on-thaksin-as-protest-paymaster-20100416-skgu.html (accessed 14 May 2014). During the anti-government protest in 2010, Red Shirt protesters were accused of receiving money from Thaksin Shinawatra for mobbing. 113 Bangkok Pundit, “Aung San Suu Kyi vs Thai Government Spokesman Update Thai Senator Asks for an Investigation into Suu Kyi,” asiancorrespondent, 26 April 2010, http://asiancorrespondent.com/31504/ann-san-suu-kyi-vs-thai-government-spokesman/ (accessed 18 April 2014). 114 Lee Jones, “Explaining Myanmar’s Regime Transition: The Periphery Is Central,” Democratization, (2014): 2.

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community, Myanmar was forced to renounce the role of ASEAN’s rotating chair. However, after Myanmar’s democratic reform in 2011, ASEAN leaders finally approved Myanmar to take the chair in 2014, which would provide the regime with international credibility. Many also hoped that Myanmar, as the ASEAN chair, would work closer with other ASEAN countries, while demonstrating improvements on human rights and progress on democratic transition.115

Abhisit saw political changes in Myanmar as a “positive sign”, but was still concerned by Myanmar’s political instability.116 More importantly, Thailand was concerned by the accusation that Myanmar was planning to build a nuclear programme with the assistance of North Korea. Claims of a secret nuclear weapons agreement between Myanmar and North Korea raised international concern after it was revealed in secret United States cables released by Wikileaks. The United States also expressed concern about defence relations between Myanmar and North Korea that appeared to have developed over the past decade. However, Myanmar repeatedly rejected these allegations. A nuclear weapons programme would violate the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) and dramatically threaten regional security among ASEAN countries. For Thailand, Myanmar’s nuclear ambitions would certainly change the relationship between the two countries. Despite the international community’s concerns, Abhisit dismissed such claims, insisting that “Myanmar confirmed in an ASEAN-United States summit that it wanted to see ASEAN as a nuclear-free region”. He also asserted that there was no direct evidence of Myanmar’s intention to possess nuclear weapons.117

Towards the end of Abhisit’s term in office, his government gave priority to economic and political considerations at home, rather than concerns over its relationship with Myanmar or any other country. As the general election drew near and the Democrat Party saw a decline in its popularity, Abhisit paid much greater attention to policies that could help his party win back control of the House. His main campaign promise was to boost the economy, which was in recession at the time. While Abhisit was preoccupied with the

115 Roberts, “Changing Myanmar: International Diplomacy and the Futility,” 108. 116 Yoko Nishikawa, “Interview -Thai PM Lauds Suu Kyi Release, Future Unclear,” Reuters, 14 November 2010, http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/11/14/idINIndia-52897820101114 (accessed 24 March 2014). 117 “Burma Not Nuclear, Says Abhisit,” Bangkok Post, 12 December 2010, www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 25 March 2014).

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election campaign, Kasit Piromya and the Foreign Ministry took the lead in dealing with Myanmar. In January 2011, Kasit met Aung San Suu Kyi to discuss Thailand’s Myanmar policy. He reaffirmed that his government supported democratisation and national reconciliation and would not support or shelter any armed ethnic group against the Burmese government. He expressed his support for a plan to end economic sanctions on Myanmar. During the trip, Kasit also met with regime officials in Naypyidaw. However, Abhisit was criticised for not personally meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, while world leaders such as United States President Barack Obama, British Prime Minister David Cameron, and United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Myanmar to meet with her. In February 2012, Abhisit, as the leader of the opposition, eventually met with Aung San Suu Kyi. He claimed that the meeting had been arranged since his term as prime minister. His visit came after new Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra visited Myanmar in December 2011. Interestingly, Yingluck was the first foreign leader to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi after her release from house arrest. In May 2012, Aung San Suu Kyi also chose to visit Thailand as her first foreign trip in twenty-four years.118

6.4.2 Economic and energy interests

Soon after taking power, the Abhisit administration faced three major challenges: the global economic crisis, the Red Shirt demonstrations, and the conflict with Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple. In 2010, the Abhisit government lost support following the crackdown in Bangkok, and was also unable to deal with separatist violence in the predominantly Muslim southern provinces. Indeed, during a time of political disorder when Abhisit and the Democrat Party were losing support, the military seemed to be the biggest beneficiary as its budget almost doubled. Moreover, it became a pivotal factor in the political conflict because any decision the government took was likely to depend on its support. Before the end of his term, Abhisit was also criticised for failing to implement his campaign promises, while raising the price of oil also cut into his government’s popularity.119 Due to domestic constraints, the Abhisit government was caught between political priorities and economic necessity in its dealings with the Burmese regime.

118 “Aung San Suu Kyi Arrives in Thailand,” Bangkok Post, 30 May 2012, http://www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 24 May 2014). 119 Chairat Charoensin-o-larn, “Thailand in 2009: Unusual Politics Becomes Usual,” in Southeast Asia Affairs 2010, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 309.

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Abhisit initially put pressure on the Burmese government to adopt democratic reforms, which in turn could enhance his international image. However, he later softened his stance and refrained from any moves that might raise tensions between the two countries. Abhisit delayed his visit to Myanmar to reaffirm his commitment to democratic principles. Meanwhile, his government maintained economic ties the Burmese government, and attempted to create a more favourable environment for the trade and investment that Thailand needed for its economic recovery.

Myanmar has been an important economic partner of Thailand’s in terms of trade, investment, and labour, as well as natural resources. Thailand’s economy and energy needs have been dependent on Myanmar’s gas supply. Without Myanmar’s cooperation, Thailand would face power blackouts, rising fuel prices, and labour shortage.120 Due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, combined with ongoing political unrest, Thailand has been struggling to emerge from two decades of economic malaise. Investments into as well as exports to Myanmar are important for Thailand. In 2011, the bilateral trade between Myanmar and Thailand reached US$4.886 billion, an increase of 12.96 per cent from the previous year. Of the total amount, Myanmar’s exports to Thailand amounted US$2.813 billion, while its imports from Thailand stood at about US$2.072 billion.121 Between 2004 and 2011, Thailand had been Myanmar’s largest export destination and the third largest source of imports. Most importantly, Thailand’s main import item from Myanmar is natural gas, which accounted for 90 per cent of the total import value. Between 2006 and 2011, Myanmar earned more than US$2 billion per year from the sale of natural gas to Thailand.122

Thailand has been importing gas from Myanmar since 1988 during the Chatchai Choonhavan administration. 123 In past decades, Thailand’s rapidly increasing consumption of energy and raw materials has motivated much of Thailand’s investment

120 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Myanmar and Thailand in a Mainland Great Game,” East Asia Forum, 14 July 2013, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/07/14/myanmar-and-thailand-in-a-mainland-great-game/ (accessed 10 March 2014). 121 “Thai Entrepreneurs to Promote Bilateral Trade with Myanmar,” Xinhua, 20 March 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/business/2013-03/20/c_132248458.htm (accessed 6 April 2014). 122 Department of International Trade Promotion, Ministry of Commerce, Thailand, “Handbook of Trade and Investment in Myanmar,” (Bangkok: Ministry of Commerce, 2011), 40. 123 Jon Fernquest, “Thailand-Burma Energy Relationship,” Bangkok Post, 27 February 2012, http://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/learning-from-news/281869/thailand-burma-energy-relationship (accessed 16 May 2014).

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in Myanmar, particularly after Myanmar discovered a large natural gas reserve in the Bay of Bengal in the mid-1990s. As of 2013, Thailand’s state-controlled oil company, PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Limited (PTTEP), was the biggest foreign investor in exploring and importing natural gas from Myanmar, with a share of US$44.2 billion, or 42.5 per cent in the energy sector.124 In 2008-2009, Myanmar exported about 80 per cent of its natural gas supplies to Thailand.125 Currently, 70 per cent of Thailand’s electricity generation comes from natural gas and approximately one third of Thailand’s natural gas demand is imported from Myanmar with most of that coming from the Yadana and Yetagun gas fields.126 Thailand’s interest in energy is, therefore, another factor that underpins the Thai approach towards Myanmar.

As the economic ties between Thailand and Myanmar are crucial to both sides, the Abhisit government could not afford to undermine them by implementing sanctions or exerting excessive diplomatic pressure. Abhisit had been critical of human rights practices in Myanmar, but he disagreed with the isolation and sanctions imposed by Western countries. He argued:

We do not think sanctions have worked and we do not think sanctions will work…We think that engagement, frustrating at times as it can be, offers the most realistic approach…There is a difference in the way we see things…We do not have the luxury of distance.127

Like Thaksin, Abhisit therefore maintained a policy of engagement with Myanmar, claiming that Thai investment in Myanmar benefited not only Thai investors, but also helped Myanmar people. He saw economic development in Myanmar as a way of improving quality of life for Myanmar’s citizens and promoting democratic

124 “PTTEP Invests Big in Myanmar,” The Nation, 28 February 2014, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/business/PTTEP-invests-big-in-Myanmar-30227956.html (accessed 26 May 2014). 125 Roberts, “Changing Myanmar: International Diplomacy and the Futility,” 78. 126 “Myanmar Seeks to Cut Gas Exports to Thailand to Meet Own Needs,” Reuters, 4 October 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/04/myanmar-thailand-gas-idUSL3E8L24ZM20121004 (accessed 16 May 2014). 127 Bangkok Pundit, “Abhisit Goes to Burma,” asiancorrespondent, 13 October 2010, http://asiancorrespondent.com/41417/abhisit-goes-to-burma/ (accessed 15 May 2014).

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transformation, as well as generating regional benefits. In short, Abhisit’s policy towards Myanmar was, in substance, no different from Thaksin.

In August 2010, Myanmar’s military regime showed its commitment to democratic reform by announcing the country’s first election in twenty years to be held in November 2010. Abhisit decided to use this opportunity to visit Naypyidaw, one month before the election. During his one-day visit, Abhisit, along with high ranking military officers and civilian leaders,128 met with Burmese Prime Minister General Thein Sein to discuss enhancing bilateral relations and cooperation in such areas as tackling drug trafficking, boosting trade and investment, promoting the tourism sector, and building a deep-sea port in the Burmese city of Dawei. One the one hand, Abhisit’s visit to Myanmar carried significant symbolism of Thailand having responded positively to Myanmar’s democratic transition. On the other, his visit was also viewed critically by some human rights groups, which saw the trip as focusing only on business objectives without explicitly considering human rights issues such as the release of political prisoners and international concerns about free and fair elections.129

Following Abhisit’s visit to Naypyidaw, a deal for the Dawei mega-project was signed between Italian-Thai Development Public Company Limited (ITD), Thailand’s largest construction conglomerate, and the Myanmar authority, five days before the general election in Myanmar.130 Despite concerns over environmental impacts and human rights violations, the deal would lead to the construction of a deep-sea port and highway linking Dawei with the central Thai city of Kanchanaburi. The construction of the port would create a shortcut between Indochina and Europe that would reduce shipping times for exporters. Foreign companies building plants in the region could save time and shipping costs by bypassing the long journey through the Strait of Malacca, a several-thousand- kilometre detour. The area around Dawei would become Myanmar’s first special

128 Members of the Thai delegation included Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya, Army Commander-in-Chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha, National Security Council Secretray-General Thawil Pliensri, Secretary- General of the Office for National Economic Arkok Termpittayaphaisit, and Social Development Board and Deputy Government Spokesman Marut Massayawanit. 129 Bangkok Pundit, “Abhisit Goes to Burma,” asiancorrespondent, 13 October 2010, http://asiancorrespondent.com/41417/abhisit-goes-to-burma/ (accessed 15 May 2014). 130 Su Myat Sandy, “Thai PM’s Myanmar Visit Further Strengthens Bilateral Friendly Cooperation,” Xinhua, 5 October 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-10/05/c_131175792.htm (accessed 6 April 2014).

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economic zone. The project, valued at approximately US$12 billion, could provide jobs on an unprecedented scale. It is estimated that the entire project could be worth over US$58 billion, making it Myanmar’s largest single investment project.131 Moreover, the project is important to Thailand’s ability to meet its energy needs in the future. A new coal-fired power plant in Dawei would supply electricity with a 3,000-megawatt capacity to Thailand.132

Thailand, with aspirations of becoming a regional transportation hub, appeared to have the most to gain from the Dawei deep-sea port. The project has received support from the highest level of both the Thai and Burmese governments. Remarkably, all Thai governments, before and after the 2006 coup, have supported it, which is unusual in Thailand’s fractured political landscape. An agreement on the Dawei project began in 2008 under the Samak administration, and the Abhisit administration supported the investment to implement it. In addition, the Dawei project highlighted the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions and trade embargo imposed by the United States and European governments on Myanmar, as Thailand and other Asian countries, particularly China and India, have been eager to invest in Myanmar. Thailand was Myanmar’s top investor as of mid-2010 with over US$10.3 billion in projects.133 In February 2011, China reportedly became Myanmar’s largest foreign investor, surpassing Thailand. However, after the recent political and economic reforms in 2010, Myanmar’s new government has made many changes to the laws and policies governing foreign investment. These changes show that Myanmar is very keen to attract new foreign investment. There is particular enthusiasm for Western companies, which tend to have higher standards. One reason is probably that Myanmar wants new sources of investment as a means of reducing its economic dependence on China. Moreover, increasing inflows of foreign investment is

131 Saksith Saiyasombut, “Dawei: Thai-Backed Mega Project in Burma Hits a Snag,” asiancorrespondent, 11 January 2012, http://asiancorrespondent.com/73474/dawei-thai-backed-mega-project-in-burma-hits-a- snag/ (accessed 6 April 2014). 132 “Myanmar Dam Progress Urged,” Bangkok Post, 9 October 2013, www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 24 May 2014). 133 Clifford McCoy, “Myanmar Forges New Trade Highway,” Asia Times, 30 November 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LK30Ae01.html (accessed 15 May 2014).

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an important strategy for ensuring that Myanmar’s ruling elite would have chance to win the next general election in 2015.134

Conclusion

This chapter has examined Abhisit’s Myanmar policy, focusing on domestic and international circumstances that have remained consistent over time and that limited Thailand’s policy choices with the Burmese regime. During the Cold War, relations between the two countries became extremely difficult when Thailand adopted a buffer zone policy of supporting Myanmar’s armed ethnic minority groups against the Burmese military junta. However, Thailand’s relations with Myanmar improved after Chatchai Choonhavan came into power in 1988, mainly due to the desire of Thai elites to access natural resources in Myanmar. During the post-Cold War period, tensions between Bangkok and Yangon were at their highest level for years when Chuan Leekpai was in power. At that time, Thailand faced the 1997 Asian financial crisis and consequently needed Western assistance to recover from years of economic hardship. Chuan’s hard- line stance against the Burmese government to pressure it to enact democratic changes was seen as a way to prevent his government from being criticised by Western countries. Throughout the late 1990s, the mistrust and controversy over the Thai military’s support of armed ethnic groups in Myanmar resulted in armed clashes between the Thai and Burmese troops along the border. Relations between Thailand and Myanmar improved significantly under the Thaksin regime. Promoting human rights and democracy in Myanmar was not a priority for the Thai authorities during this time. Instead, they were more concerned about economic interests. However, corruption charges against Thaksin, including his government’s soft loan given to Myanmar, paved the way for the military coup in 2006. Apart from political and security constraints, historical factors have had a substantial influence over Thai-Myanmar relations. This chapter has also demonstrated how a negative image of Myanmar has been constructed by Thai elites. The depiction of Myanmar as Thailand’s enemy has been repeatedly used by Thai political leaders as a

134 Jared Bissinger, “Foreign Investment in Myanmar: A Resource Boom but a Development Bust?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 34, no. 1 (2012): 23.

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way to enhance their political legitimacy and to convince the society that they need military protection.

During the Abhisit era, both the Thai and Burmese governments were more preoccupied with political survival at home than with international affairs and relations between the two countries. When Abhisit came in power, he strongly criticised the policies of the Thaksin administration, which pursued engagement with Myanmar. Abhisit’s Myanmar policy initially followed the same lines as that of the Chuan government in the 1990s. Abhisit advocated for political change in Myanmar, which in turn was expected to enhance his political legitimacy and support. However, due to domestic constraints, the Abhisit government was caught between political priorities and economic necessity in its dealing with the Burmese regime. As Abhisit was preoccupied with anti-government Red Shirt protests, he had little interest in maintaining his commitment on democracy and human rights. More importantly, Myanmar has been Thailand’s crucial source of natural resources, particularly natural gas. Economic ties with Myanmar were important for Thailand’s economic recovery. Like its predecessor, the Abhisit government maintained a policy of engagement with Myanmar and rejected sanctions or any diplomatic pressure against Myanmar’s military regime. Abhisit’s policy of engagement with the Burmese authorities reaffirmed that Thailand’s fundamental interests in Myanmar remained the same as before. First, Thailand supported a democratic change in Myanmar through a dialogue with representatives of the Burmese leadership, not through sanctions. Second, Thailand needed Myanmar’s natural resources, which served mainly to sustain its economic growth. This continuity was the hallmark of Abhisit’s Myanmar policy.

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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This thesis is a study of Thailand’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia during the period of the Abhisit Vejjajiva administration (2008-2011). It examines relations between Thailand and its three contiguous neighbours (Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar) and has sought to answer the following questions: Were there any aspects of Abhisit’s foreign policy that differed from those of previous governments? What were the major forces and factors, both internal and external, which influenced and shaped Abhisit’s foreign policy decision- making? This thesis uses neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework to answer these two questions. It examines a number of domestic and external variables that affected Abhisit’s foreign policy towards Thailand’s neighbouring countries. This thesis contains three case studies. The first case study focuses on tensions between Thailand and Cambodia, particularly over the disputed area surrounding the Preah Vihear temple. The second case study examined Abhisit’s Malaysia policy in relation to the ongoing separatist insurgency in southern Thailand. The third case study looks at Abhisit’s policy with Myanmar, with an aim to prioritise human rights and democratic principles, as well as to advance economic interests.

Through analysis of the three case studies, this thesis concludes that although there were both continuity and change in Abhisit’s foreign policy, continuity appears more prominent than change. Furthermore, this thesis has shown that Abhisit’s foreign policy was largely influenced by domestic politics, rather than external factors. External influences were also significant, but overall they were not the major causes of changes in Abhisit’s foreign policy. In other words, Abhisit’s foreign policy was determined not so much by a fear of external threats, but by concerns over domestic political instability. Specifically, a prolonged confrontation between the pro- and anti-Thaksin forces, the persistence of the Thai military’s influence on politics, the continued separatist violence in southern Thailand, and Thai economic interests in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar were the primary determinants of the Abhisit administration’s foreign policy. This thesis has also demonstrated that the ongoing territorial and historical disputes in the region, political situations in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar, and the role of ASEAN in

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regional affairs were the critical external factors that have affected relations between Thailand and its neighbouring countries. More importantly, as a result of continued political turbulence after the 2006 coup, Thailand became unable to sustain its leading role in the region and had insufficient influence to pursue its interests.

7.1 Neoclassical Realism and Abhisit’s Foreign Policy

Chapter two reviewed the literature relating to international relations (IR) theories and the study of foreign policy analysis (FPA). Although there are many models that offer varying explanations of FPA, this thesis chose neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework for the analysis of Thailand’s foreign policy because it explains the influence of both domestic and external factors on a state’s foreign policy decision-making. Chapter two, accordingly, focused on a neoclassical realist approach and, in particular, discussed how it can be used to explain the Abhisit administration’s foreign policy with respect to relations with Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar. As discussed in Chapter two, neoclassical realism adopts a state-centric perspective, which, like classical realism, sees both domestic political considerations and external factors as being involved in influencing a state’s foreign policy. In terms of domestic factors, governments in democratic countries depend on public support to stay in power. As a result, they have to take public opinion into consideration when making decisions, especially when elections are approaching. Moreover, when a government faces a crisis of legitimacy, it has to pursue a policy that is expected to strengthen its domestic political position.

During the Abhisit administration, relations between Thailand and its neighbouring countries were influenced by domestic politics and economic interests, rather than by external pressures. Abhisit’s policies towards Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar were largely controlled by the political elite in Bangkok, particularly the military and its allies. Moreover, these policies were used as a political weapon to target the government’s domestic opponents, which in turn was expected to enhance the government’s legitimacy and consolidate its support base. Although domestic considerations were most important in shaping Abhisit’s foreign policy decision-making, external factors also had an influence on relations between Thailand and its neighbouring countries. Pressures from the international community, particularly ASEAN, the United Nations, and other non-

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governmental organisations undoubtedly forced Thailand to resume talks with Cambodia, cooperate with the Malaysian government to address the insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South, and initially to take a more hard-line stance towards Myanmar.

7.2 Thailand’s foreign policy after the end of the Cold War

Chapter three investigated the historical background of Thailand’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia from the period of the Cold War to the regime of Thaksin Shinawatra. Since the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in 1932, Thailand has been described as a bureaucratic state in which foreign policy is the product of specific configurations of government agencies and military elites. After the 1947 coup, Thailand was ruled mostly by a military regime. Consequently, Thai foreign policy during the Cold War years was controlled by a small group of military elites. Moreover, in many cases, civilian leaders who challenged the military were often removed by coups. As such, most civilian leaders tried to avoid conflict by engaging and cooperating with, rather than confronting, the military. Like foreign policies in other countries in the region, from 1950 to 1975, Thai foreign policy was responsive to pressure from external threats, rather than to domestic politics. Because of great concern over the threat of communist expansion, Thailand pursued a policy of confrontation and hostility towards its neighbouring countries. Thailand became a close ally with the United States in preventing the expansion of communism in Indochina. As a result, Thai foreign policy during this period was heavily influenced by the United States’ involvement in the region. Thailand not only received military protection from the United States, but also substantial military and economic aid, which contributed to the Thai military’s success in maintaining its grip on power.

As a result of the changing security environment in the region, particularly the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989, relations between Thailand and its neighbouring countries improved significantly. In the post-Cold War era, economic considerations, rather than political or security considerations, have had a considerable impact on Thai foreign policy towards the region. Since the Chatchai Choonhavan administration (1988-1991), Thailand has developed strong relations with its neighbouring countries, particularly through economic cooperation. Myanmar and

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Cambodia have been a source of raw materials, cheap labour, and markets for Thailand. Thailand has strengthened relations with Malaysia with an emphasis on economic cooperation and resolving the insurgency that has spread fear across southern Thailand for over a decade. However, Thailand has been riven by political unrest and periodic protests since the 2006 coup that ousted Thaksin Shinawatra administration. All successive governments have been preoccupied with domestic political survival and the opportunities for realignment of political power. Due to domestic political instability after Thaksin’s departure, Thailand’s foreign policy towards neighbouring countries is inconsistent and also reflects the ongoing power struggles between civilian and military authorities. Due to an increase of the military’s influence in politics since 2006, overall, Thai foreign policy, particularly in terms of security concerns, is thus currently controlled by the military.

7.3 Thailand’s foreign policy under Abhisit: continuity or change?

Comparing the three case studies strongly suggests that Thailand’s foreign policy under Abhisit embraced continuity rather than flux and change. In other words, the Abhisit administration’s foreign policy was largely a continuation of its predecessors’, despite rhetorical differences. In each case, due largely to the political unrest in Bangkok, combined with economic considerations, Abhisit’s foreign policy aimed to strengthen his government’s domestic political position. In addition, throughout Abhisit’s term in office, the military retained its influential position in foreign policy decision-making.

7.3.1 Domestic political constraints and Abhisit’s Cambodia policy

In Chapter four, the thesis examined relations between Thailand and Cambodia, particularly a century-long dispute over the ownership of the Preah Vihear temple and the surrounding area. The conflict has its origins back in European colonial rule during the late 1800s and early 1900s. In 1962, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that, according to the 1907 Franco-Siamese treaty, the temple belonged to Cambodia and ordered Thai troops to leave the temple and its vicinity. However, over the years, the ICJ’s decision has never been fully accepted by many Thai people. The loss of the Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia has become a sensitive issue for the Thai public and has aroused strong feelings of antagonism towards Cambodia. The conflict over the Preah

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Vihear temple is thus not purely an attempt to seize land. Rather, it is also the product of distrust stemming from historical baggage. Moreover, competing nationalisms have for many years been a source of tension and resentment between the two countries. Nationalism has served as a powerful political weapon that can be used by political leaders and social movement to manipulate public opinion and to guide the presentation of policies in a way that will enhance their legitimacy and acceptance by the public. Accordingly, when a government faces questions of legitimacy or loses its credibility, it tends to divert public attention from domestic problems to external rivalries by fuelling the flame of nationalism. In other words, nationalism is often used as a means to justify a government policy, which in turn serves to protect the government from being questioned by the public.

The crisis in Thai-Cambodian relations (2008-2011) may, on the surface, be seen as a result of historical and territorial disputes. However, many analysts argue that the escalation of conflict with Cambodia was mainly rooted in contemporary Thai domestic politics and that nationalism was used by the Yellow Shirts to damage government’s credibility. That is, Thailand’s domestic politics were a primary source of the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple. In July 2008, when the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) officially gave World Heritage status for the Preah Vihear temple, intense feelings of nationalism were aroused in Thailand. The pro-Thaksin Samak Sundaravej government (January- September 2008) was accused of abuse of power and violating the Constitution by signing the controversial joint communiqué with Cambodia which, it was claimed, would have negative effects on Thailand’s sovereignty and territory. Following months of protests by the anti-Thaksin Yellow Shirts, including the seizure of Bangkok’s two airports, the Constitutional Court forced two Thaksin-linked prime ministers from office in succession.

With the help of the military and its allies, Abhisit and his Democrat Party came to power in December 2008. However, the political crisis deepened when the Red Shirts began protesting against the new government from the first day it came into office. In an attempt to stay in power, the Abhisit administration adopted a hard-line policy towards Cambodia, which in return served to enhance its legitimacy and bowed to pressure from the Yellow

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Shirts in particular, as well as popular sentiment in Thai society. During Abhisit’s term in office, clashes between Thai and Cambodian armed forces erupted six times, leading to at least dozens of deaths and injuries, and thousands of people displaced during the fighting. The Abhisit government claimed that its actions were meant to protect national pride and prestige. By late 2009, public support for Abhisit increased significantly due to his aggressive stance against the regime of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen.

When the conflict between the two countries intensified in 2011, Cambodia went back to the ICJ, and the Court accordingly created a demilitarised zone around the temple. ASEAN offered to intervene by holding talks with both sides, in an attempt to mediate the conflict. However, Thailand repeatedly opposed ASEAN’s involvement and kept insisting on resolving the conflict only through bilateral negotiations. This seriously damaged Thailand’s reputation as a key ASEAN member, as its actions raised concerns that the dispute could ultimately endanger ASEAN’s unity. After Abhisit left office in August 2011, relations between Thailand and Cambodia improved significantly. In November 2013, the ICJ ruled that the temple and the area immediately surrounding it were Cambodia’s territory. Though Thai and Cambodian troops have remained stationed in the area, the ruling so far has been greeted peacefully.

7.3.2 Thailand’s Southern Conflict and Abhisit’s Malaysia policy

Chapter five looked at relations between Thailand and Malaysia, which have been complicated by an ethnic separatist insurgency in Thailand’s majority-Muslim southern provinces. The Malay-Muslim separatist movement in southern Thailand is motivated by several factors. The roots of the conflict can be traced back to the eighteenth century when the Patani Kingdom was annexed into Siam, though it was officially recognised by Britain in 1909 under the terms of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty, and the failure of the Thai state since then to respond to the needs of the ethnic Malay-Muslims. The rise of the ultra- nationalist government of Field Marshall Phibun Songkram in 1938 and the implementation of his policies designed to assimilate the Malay-Muslim group into the Thai Buddhist nation led to the confrontation between the central ruling apparatus in Bangkok and the Malay Muslims. More broadly, the conflict represents the political struggle of the Malay-Muslims for their legitimate rights. Moreover, the region has

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struggled continuously with economic and social neglect and has suffered under poor governance, maladministration, corruption, and human rights abuses. A new wave of violence began when the Thaksin administration (2001-2006) adopted a hard-line policy towards the insurgents. The tragic Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents in 2004 provoked strong resistance from insurgent groups. The Malaysian public, particularly in northern Malaysia, has grown angry at the perceived targeting of Malay-Muslims in Thailand by Thai authorities. Since the onset of violence in 2004, the insurgents have committed atrocities to express their antagonism towards the Thai state. Thailand and Malaysia have cooperated on efforts to seek talks with various separatist groups in the South. However, most separatist leaders have been reluctant to commit themselves to the peace process without preconditions.

After twenty years in opposition and now in government, there were high expectations that Abhisit’s Democrat Party might be able to resolve the separatist insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South, since the South has traditionally been the stronghold of the Democrat Party. When in opposition, Democrat leaders always expressed confidence in their ability to make better decisions in handling of the southern unrest. However, although a security force of more than 60,000 was stationed in the area and a massive budget allocation was spent on development projects, the Abhisit government failed to suppress the separatist insurgency. The overall level of violence in the South did not significantly abate during Abhisit’s tenure. Instead, the southern situation deteriorated sharply in 2010. Moreover, most of the government’s initiatives such as economic development and vocational training programmes failed to yield any perceptible results. In addition, little was done by the Abhisit administration to bring about genuine reconciliation with the insurgents, despite public promises to take a softer and more constructive approach.

Bureaucratic infighting, lack of political will, and general political instability led to inconsistencies in the southern policy. Despite Abhisit’s “politics leading the military” approach, the military continued to dominate counterinsurgency efforts and policies in the South. Moreover, the budget for southern security operations, which was used by military-controlled agencies, was substantially increased, particularly after the 2006 coup. The government’s increased military expenditure was seen as a means of avoiding a

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political confrontation with the army. As the military showed no desire to minimise its role in the southern provinces, some academics argue that the enormous budget might be motivation for the military to maintain its control over policies of the South. Political solutions for the South were not seriously discussed or considered by the authorities. Any attempts to decentralise or transfer more power to local authorities were perceived as a threat to Bangkok’s bureaucratic elites, particularly the security hardliners, who benefited from their continued influence in the southern provinces. Despite some suspicion from hardliners within Thai security circles about Malaysia’s role and influence in Thailand’s domestic conflict, Thai political leaders saw Malaysia as a reliable partner in helping to bring about stability in the region. However, without Thailand’s clear direction on counterinsurgency, Malaysia was powerless to help for fear of being accused of interfering in Thailand’s domestic affairs. As a result, Malaysia could not play a role in the peace talks and took a “wait-and-see” approach towards Thailand’s southern conflict.

7.3.3 Abhisit’s Myanmar Dilemma: A Balance between Democracy and Human Rights, and Economic Interests

Chapter six focused on the Abhisit administration’s Myanmar policy, with an emphasis on the question of whether it gave priority to human rights and democratic principles, or to economic interests. This chapter argued that overall, Abhisit’s Myanmar policy did not change, but rather appeared to follow the same course as that set out by previous governments, which aimed to engage with the Burmese regime in order to secure and expand Thailand’s economic interests in Myanmar. When Abhisit and the Democrat Party came to power, they initially advocated for democratic reforms and human rights in Myanmar. They thus adopted a hard-line stance towards the Burmese regime, and also cooperated with ASEAN in mobilising international pressure on Myanmar to follow the roadmap to democracy and release the Burmese pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. The Abhisit government’s pro-democracy foreign policy, in turn, was expected to enhance the international credentials that had been eroded by the 2006 coup. In addition, Thailand chaired ASEAN from mid-2008 to the end of 2009. The Abhisit government sought to use this opportunity to restore its regional role by using ASEAN to put pressure on Myanmar authorities to heed the demands of the international community. However, during its term in office, the Abhisit government became preoccupied with its

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domestic power struggle and had little interest in maintaining its commitment on democracy and human rights. Furthermore, Thailand faced a major economic crisis in 2010, followed by massive anti-government Red Shirt protests that paralysed the Abhisit government for years. More importantly, despite differences on political and human rights issues, shared economic and security interests have long provided the basis for Thai-Myanmar cooperation. Since the late 1980s, Myanmar has been a crucial source of natural resources, particularly natural gas, for Thailand. As security and economic benefits were deemed very important, the policy of engagement, including the avoidance of sanctions or any diplomatic pressure against the Burmese junta, appeared to be only the option for the Abhisit administration. In other words, despite rhetorical differences, continuity was the hallmark of the Abhisit administration’s relationships with Myanmar.

7.4 Implications of this study and suggestions for further research

Through the analysis of the case studies presented in Chapter 4 to 6, the general findings of this thesis are as follows. First, they have suggested that Thailand’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia under the Abhisit administration revealed more elements of continuity than change. Second, they have provided a more comprehensive explanation of the impact of domestic and external factors on continuities and changes in Thailand’s foreign policy. This thesis has examined a number of factors that influenced Abhisit’s foreign policy decision-making towards Cambodia, Myanmar, and Malaysia in the context of the Thai political crisis. It has argued that during the Abhisit administration, relations between Thailand and its neighbouring countries were influenced by domestic political considerations and economic interests, rather than pressures from external factors. In other words, external factors such as ASEAN, the United Nations, and the domestic political situations in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Malaysia were important, but the domestic political pressures were the primary determinants of Abhisit’s foreign policy. Specifically, the persistence of the military’s involvement in Thai politics, a prolonged and protracted power struggle between the pro- and anti-Thaksin factions within the country’s ruling class, the current wave of violence in southern Thailand, and Thai economic interests in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar had a strong impact on Abhisit’s foreign policy decision-making. Externally, the competing nationalisms in the region, the political circumstances in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar, and the

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inherent weakness of ASEAN cohesion were the primary external factors influencing relations between Thailand and its neighbouring countries.

An area that is perhaps worthy of further investigation is the question of continuity and change in Thailand’s foreign policy towards major powers, particularly the United States, China, and Japan, during the post-Cold War era. It would be interesting to see how neoclassical realism can be applied to explain the dilemmas that Thailand, as a weaker country, faces when conducting its relations with much more powerful countries outside the region. This would mean examining the impact of Thai domestic politics, particularly the influence of the military and its allies, on Thai foreign policy towards the major powers.

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ABC News www.abc.net.au/news/ Asia Times www.atimes.com/ asiancorrespondent asiancorrespondent.com/ Bangkok Post www.bangkokpost.com/ BBC News www.bbc.com/news/ Financial Times www.ft.com/ Irrawaddy www.irrawaddy.org/ ISRA News www.isranews.org/ Kom Chad Luek www.komchadluek.net/ MCOT www.mcot.net/news/enews Prachatai www.prachatai.com/ Reuters www.reuters.com/ The Economist www.economist.com/ The Guardian www.theguardian.com/au The Jakarta Post www.thejakartapost.com/ The Nation www.nationmultimedia.com/ The New York Times www.nytimes.com/ The Phnom Penh Post www.phnompenhpost.com/ The Star www.thestar.com.my/News/ The Straits Times www.straitstimes.com/ The Sydney Morning Herald www.smh.com.au/ The Telegraph www.telegraph.co.uk/ VOA News www.voanews.com/ Xinhua www.xinhuanet.com/english/

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Appendix I: Ethics Approval

Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel B Arts, Humanities & Law

Date: 21.09.12

Investigators: Jutamanee Samakkeenit

Supervisors: Associate Professor Andrew Tan

School: School of Social Sciences

Re: Thailand's Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia under the Abhisit Vejjajiva Administration, 2008-2011

Reference Number: 12 069

The Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel B for the Arts, Humanities & Law is satisfied that this project is of minimal ethical impact and meets the requirements as set out in the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research*. Having taken into account the advice of the Panel, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research) has approved the project to proceed.

Your Head of School/Unit/Centre will be informed of this decision.

This approval is valid for 12 months from the date stated above.

Yours sincerely

Associate Professor Anne Cossins Panel Convenor Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel B

Cc: Christopher Walker Head of School School of Social Sciences

* http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/

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Appendix II: List of Interviewees

All interviews were conducted between June 2012 and June 2013 in Bangkok and Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand.

1. Abhisit Vejjajiva, Thailand’s prime minister between 21 June 2013 Bangkok 2008 and 2011, currently leader of the Democrat Party. 2. Apirak Kosayodhin, advisor to Prime Minister Abhisit 14 June 2013 Bangkok Vejjajiva between 2008 and 2011, currently deputy leader of the Democrat Party. 3. Chavanond Intarakomalyasut, secretary to former 18 June 2013 Bangkok Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya between 2008 and 2011, currently Democrat Party spokesman. 4. Kasit Piromya, Thailand’s foreign minister between 29 October 2012 Bangkok 2008 and 2011. 5. Napisa Waitoolkiat, lecturer at Institute of Southeast 20 June 2012 Bangkok Asian Affairs, Chiang Mai University. 6. Panitan Wattanayagorn, spokesman for the Abhisit 24 October 2012 Bangkok government, currently Associate Professor of political science at Chulalongkorn University 7. Pavin Chachavapongpun, Associate Professor of 22 January 2013 Ubon political science at Kyoto University. Ratchathani 8. Pitch Pongsawat, Assistant Professor of political science 31 October 2012 Bangkok at Chulalongkorn University.

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