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Southeast Asia from the Corner of 18Th & K Streets Southeast Asia Program Southeast Asia from the Corner of 18th & K Streets Volume I | Issue No. 25 | August 10, 2010 Should the United States Combine the Missions of U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN and Special Envoy for Burma? Inside This Issue ernest bower the week that was Ernest Z. Bower is the senior adviser and director of the Southeast • United States and Vietnam Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies engage in nuclear talks in Washington, D.C. • MCC approves $434 million to Philippines August 10, 2010 • Kurt Campbell’s Australia-NZ- U.S. Trilateral meeting The White House has not yet released a name for its choice as U.S. the week ahead ambassador to ASEAN. Before it does, it might consider combining that mission with the position of U.S. Special Envoy for Burma. • Philippine secretaries of finance and trade advance President Aquino visit • Indonesia’s 65th Independence Day The administration has stepped up its focus on Southeast Asia with both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert • Australia will elect members of the Gates having visited the region last month with related missions to set 43rd Parliament of Australia the table for the United States’ entrance into the East Asian Summit (EAS) and for investing in strengthening bilateral ties with friendly countries around the region. To effectively drive an enduring and effective Asian regional security and trade architecture, the United States has determined, correctly, that it must have a strong partnership with ASEAN. Further, it recognizes that if ASEAN is to be at the core of such structures, it needs to develop stronger institutions and capabilities. A highly professional and proactive U.S. ambassador to ASEAN must be in place to advocate for consistent focus, bandwidth, and resources in this context. The White House has indicated that the next U.S. ambassador to ASEAN, (succeeding Mr. Scot Marciel, former ambassador and deputy assistant secretary of state for Southeast Asia, who has been confirmed by the Senate as the next U.S. ambassador to Indonesia) will be located in Jakarta where the ASEAN Secretariat is based. The United States was the first country to indicate it would name an ambassador to ASEAN and the first to signal that the ambassador would be based in Jakarta, but the Japanese have moved ahead and, while the Obama administration 1800 k street nw, washington dc 20006 | t. 202.775.3211 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org Southeast Asia from the Corner of 18th & K Streets August 10, 2010 | 2 Should the United States Combine the Missions of U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN and Special Envoy for Burma? (continued) considers its options, have named Mr. Takio Yamada the first ambassador to ASEAN to reside in Jakarta. ASEAN Secretary General Dr. Surin Pitsuwan received Mr. Yamada’s credentials in Jakarta on July 27, 2010. A U.S. ambassador to ASEAN will need to be a highly skilled diplomat, combining credibility and commitment with diplomacy to avoid stepping on the toes of his or her counterparts serving as heads of mission in the ASEAN countries. It will not be easy to cover the territory in the region as well as visit U.S. agencies inside the Beltway regularly to advocate for support and the resources that will be needed to support a new level of U.S. engagement in key regional forums. Another position that the United States is being pressured to fill is a U.S. Special Envoy for Burma. This position was mandated by the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act, which was signed into law by President George W. Bush on July 29, 2008. The act was approved in a bipartisan vote and supported by then-senator Barack Obama. The law includes three doctrines: (1) impose new financial sanctions and travel restrictions on the leaders of the junta and their associates; (2) tighten “The Pros. By combining the the economic sanctions imposed in 2003 by outlawing the importation of Burmese gems to the United States; and (3) create a new position positions of ambassador to of U.S. “special representative and policy coordinator” for Burma. ASEAN and special envoy The question is whether the positions should be consolidated. for Burma, a senior-level diplomat will be forward- The Pros. By combining the positions of ambassador to ASEAN and special envoy for Burma, a senior-level diplomat will be forward-deployed deployed in the region and in the region and in a position to sustain high-level representation in a position to sustain in ASEAN while maintaining focus on one of the most intractable issues hindering real ASEAN integration—the politically cloistered and high-level representation in authoritarian Burmese regime. A dual-hatted diplomat could ensure the ASEAN while maintaining centrality of the Burma issue at key meetings while seeking regional support for results-oriented solutions to the problems presented by focus on one of the most Burma’s unwillingness to open its political system and take steps away from its current record of human rights abuses, repression, and possible intractable issues hindering exploration of options for developing nuclear weapons. In addition, it is real ASEAN integration— likely that by combining the missions, both positions could be filled soon. the politically cloistered and authoritarian Burmese regime.” 1800 k street nw, washington dc 20006 | t. 202.775.3211 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org Southeast Asia from the Corner of 18th & K Streets August 10, 2010 | 3 Should the United States Combine the Missions of U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN and Special Envoy for Burma? (continued) The Cons. On the other hand, by giving the new U.S. ambassador to “The Cons. On the other ASEAN the Burma job, the United States may put itself back into a policy box that the Obama administration stepped out of early on—namely, by hand, by giving the new asserting a new engagement strategy for Burma, the Americans got back U.S. ambassador to to the table with ASEAN. No longer did Burma keep the United States from pursuing its regional national interests, from trade and investment ASEAN the Burma job, to security concerns. In return, the administration made a pact to live up the United States may put to its commitment to sustain a very high-level focus on Burma, seeking resolution to unacceptable conditions thrust on the Burmese people by itself back into a policy the military government. Unfortunately, Burma has shut down energetic initiatives spearheaded by Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell. box that the Obama Rules for elections have provided little if any new political space, dates administration stepped for elections remain a mystery, and the Burmese government has provided no cooperation to the United States on important issues such out of early on—namely, as nuclear proliferation, refugees, and human rights abuses of minority by asserting a new groups. Given the commitment of advocacy groups working on Burma as well the urgent need for progress, a dual-portfolio ambassador may find engagement strategy for that the ASEAN agenda could be overtaken by his or her Burma mandate. Burma, the Americans In conclusion, while the idea of combining the job of U.S. ambassador got back to the to ASEAN with that of special envoy for Burma offers a certain table with ASEAN.” bureaucratic efficiency, pursing this option would undercut the ability of even the most experienced diplomat to deliver on each portfolio. The United States should not combine these two important positions, but it should move forward with all speed on nominating qualified candidates for both roles and seeking their confirmation in the U.S. Senate at the earliest possible date. happy birthday—asean turns 43 Forty-three years ago on August 8 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bangkok, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created as the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand signed the ASEAN Declaration. At the time, the regional grouping was formed to bind a young and increasingly powerful Indonesia into a pact with its neighbors, encouraging it to enter onto the regional and world stage as a source of economic growth and diplomacy, pursuing its interests peacefully. The other objective was to staunch the feared spread of communism from Vietnam into other newly independent nations in the region. The more things change, the more they stay the same. 1800 k street nw, washington dc 20006 | t. 202.775.3211 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org Southeast Asia from the Corner of 18th & K Streets August 10, 2010 | 4 Should the United States Combine the Missions of U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN and Special Envoy for Burma? (continued) ASEAN has come a long way. And now, as a 10-country grouping comprising nearly 650 million people and a $1.4 trillion gross domestic product, ASEAN finds itself at the center of a an effort to create a new regional architecture designed in part to encourage two regional giants—China and India—to step onto the regional and global stage peacefully, contributing to growth and stability. Will ASEAN be able to replicate its success? Only time will tell. On the night of August 7, Vietnamese prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung addressed a packed house of diplomats, including ASEAN Secretary General Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, in the elegant Hanoi Opera House to mark ASEAN’s forty-third birthday. Here was the leader of Communist Vietnam, and arguably one of ASEAN’s most forward- leaning proponents, espousing the grouping’s achievements after four decades of change. The very fact of the event is testament to ASEAN’s subtle but very real achievements.
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