Korn Chatikavanij

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Nov.20 – Nov.22, 2015 Montreux – Switzerland Korn Chatikavanij Former Finance Minister, Kingdom of Thailand EDUCATION OXFORD UNIVERSITY, St. John’s College Oxford, UK Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) 1982 – 1985 WINCHESTER COLLEGE Winchester, UK 1978 – 1982 OLD MALTHOUSE SCHOOL Dorset, UK 1975 – 1978 SATIT SRINAKARINWIROT DEMONSTRATION SCHOOL Bangkok, Thailand 1974 – 1975 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Democrat Party Thailand Chairman of Thailand Democrat Party Policy Unit Dec 2013 – Present House of Representatives Thailand Member of Parliament, Party-list member Aug 2011 – Dec 2013 Democrat Party Thailand Executive Committee Member and Deputy Leader Feb 2005 – Nov 2013 Ministry of Finance Thailand Finance Minister Dec 2008 – Aug 2011 House of Representatives Thailand Member of Parliament, Bangkok Constituency 2 Dec 2007 – May 2010 House Committee on Finance and Banking Thailand Deputy Chairperson Feb 2005 – Feb 2006 House of Representatives Thailand Member of Parliament, Bangkok Constituency 7 Feb 2005 – Feb 2006 JP Morgan Securities (Thailand) Limited Bangkok, Thailand President 2000 – 2004 JF Thanakom Securities Limited Bangkok, Thailand President & Co-Founder 1988 – 1999 www.worldpolicyconference.com Nov.20 – Nov.22, 2015 Montreux – Switzerland SG Warburg London, UK 1985 – 1988 AWARDS − “Global Finance Minister of the Year 2010” and − “Asia-Pacific Finance Minister of the Year 2010” both are awarded by The Banker (an affiliated publication of the Financial Times) FORMER POSITIONS − Stock Exchange of Thailand; Committee − Jardine Fleming International Holding Limited Thailand; Board Member − Association of Securities Companies; Committee − Ayudhya Jardine CMG Life Assurance Public Company Limited; Committee − Thai Insurance Public Company Limited; Committee − Thai Gypsum Public Company Limited; Committee − Special Olympic Organising Committee Thailand; Committee DECORATIONS − 2011 – Knight Grand Cordon (Special Class) of the Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant. − 2010 – Knight Grand Cordon (Special Class) of the Most Noble Order of the Crown of Thailand − 2009 – Knight Grand Cross (First Class) of the Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant. − 2008 – Knight Grand Cross (First Class) of the Most Noble Order of the Crown of Thailand − 2005 – Knight Commander (Second Class) of the Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant. www.worldpolicyconference.com .

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