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The Power of Political Movement and the Collapse of Democracy in Thailand

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The Power of Political Movement and the Collapse of Democracy in Thailand THE POWER OF POLITICAL MOVEMENT AND THE COLLAPSE OF DEMOCRACY IN THAILAND by VIPAPAT (AIM) SINPENG A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Political Science) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) December 2013 ©Vipapat (Aim) Sinpeng, 2013 i ABSTRACT Why are some opposition movements pro-democracy while others are not? What explains an anti-democratic movement in a democracy? Examining how democratic institutions give rise to a popular anti-democratic movement is the key task this research accomplishes. To answer this question, my dissertation exploits variation across Thailand in terms of the extent to which a popular movement contributes to a collapse of democracy. Based on a within-case comparison of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) Movement, I develop a novel theory called "institutional blockage." It argues that a mobilized society can turn against democracy when their voices are not given appropriate space to channel their grievances within the realms of formal and informal institutions. When people feel blocked from access to power, they rebel against the system by appealing to nondemocratic institutions to regain their power, which then triggers a regime collapse. The argument reveals a paradox that people will support democracy as long as the regime does not marginalize them. The dissertation makes three key contributions. First, the middle class and civil society can act as a force against democracy. The PAD's support base is drawn largely from NGOs and the urban middle class, both of which are often seen as bulwarks for democracy. My research outlines a concrete process in which these two forces turn again democracy, thus surmounting a theoretical and empirical challenge that has confronted previous scholarship. Second, a weakly institutionalized party system, under certain conditions, can contribute to regime survival. New democracies with fluid, patronage-based, non-programmatic party systems constrain political elites from subverting the system. Third, democratic consolidation, particularly concentration of executive power, can threaten the viability of democracy. The theory on institutional blockage and the process of anti-democratic mobilization can shed light on similar movements in Egypt, Venezuela and the Philippines. ii PREFACE This dissertation is an original intellectual product of the author, Aim Sinpeng. The fieldwork reported in chapters 4-7 was covered by UBC Ethics Certificate number H11-00466 of May 19, 2011. A list of publications arising from the work conducted for this dissertation is provided below. "State Repression in Cyberspace: The Case of Thailand." Asian Politics and Policy. Vol. 5. No. 3. (2013): 421-440. Fieldwork drawn from chapter 7. "From the Streets to the Ballot Box: The July 2011 Elections and the Rise of Social Movements in Thailand" with Erik Martinez Kuhonta. Contemporary Southeast Asia. Vol 34, No 3 (December, 2012): 389-415. Lead author. Fieldwork drawn from chapters 5-7. "Party-Movement Coalition in Thailand's Political Conflict (2005-2011)" In Liamputtong, Pranee (Ed.). Contemporary Socio-Cultural and Political Perspectives in Thailand. The Netherlands: Springer (2013). Fieldwark drawn from chapters 6-7. "From Assembly to Streets: Contentious Politics in Thailand (1991-2010)" (2012). Rian Thai: International Journal of Thai Studies. Vol 4/2011. Fieldwork drawn from chapters 5-7. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................ ii Preface ......................................................................................................................................................... iii Table of contents………………………………………………………………………………….……... iv List of tables.............................................................................................................................................. viii List of figures .............................................................................................................................................. ix List of abbreviations ................................................................................................................................... x Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................... xii Dedication .................................................................................................................................................. xv 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1 Anti-democratic mobilization ............................................................................................................ 3 Overview of institutional blockage theory ........................................................................................ 5 Overview of the state of literature ..................................................................................................... 9 Economic crisis/Wars ........................................................................................................................ 9 Intra-elite competition ..................................................................................................................... 10 Weak political institutions ............................................................................................................... 10 Class conflict ................................................................................................................................... 11 Political leadership .......................................................................................................................... 12 The case of Thailand ....................................................................................................................... 13 Theory of institutional blockage ...................................................................................................... 18 Methodology.................................................................................................................................... 18 Outline of the thesis ......................................................................................................................... 20 2. Anti-democratic mobilization and the breakdown of democracy .................................................... 23 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 23 What is anti-democratic mobilization? ............................................................................................ 29 Typology of opposition movements ................................................................................................ 31 Existing explanations ....................................................................................................................... 33 Comparative literature ..................................................................................................................... 34 Case-specific literature .................................................................................................................... 37 Observable implications .................................................................................................................. 38 Flaws of existing explanations ........................................................................................................ 40 Explaining anti-democratic mobilization ........................................................................................ 46 Stage 1: Institutional blockage ........................................................................................................ 49 iv Stage 2: Alliance formation ............................................................................................................. 50 Stage 3: Anti-democratization ......................................................................................................... 50 Stage 4: Alliance with nondemocratic institutions .......................................................................... 51 Mobilizational capacity ................................................................................................................... 51 Institutional blockage in Thailand ................................................................................................... 54 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 61 3. Crises, coups and constitutions ............................................................................................................ 62 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 62 Background...................................................................................................................................... 63 The Black May Uprising ................................................................................................................. 67 The 1991 coup d'état .......................................................................................................................
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