The Politics of Central Banking in Thailand, 1942-1997 Supanai
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Unpopular Guardian The Politics of Central Banking in Thailand, 1942-1997 by Supanai Sookmark A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science Carleton University © 2009 by Supanai Sookmark All Rights Reserved Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 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The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation. reproduced without the author's permission. In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne Privacy Act some supporting sur la protection de la vie privee, forms may have been removed quelques formulaires secondaires from this thesis. ont ete enleves de cette these. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. i*I Canada Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Abstract For students of Thai political economy, the financial crisis of 1997 brought the Bank of Thailand (BOT) under the spotlight. The Bank's failure to prevent the crisis damaged its longstanding reputation as the country's staunch defender of financial stability. While many studies rightly point to the decline in the BOT's autonomy, reflected in the political interference with the Bank's financial supervisory role, as a major contributing factor to the crisis, some important questions remain around why the BOT decided to liberalize the financial system in the late 1980s and why it insisted upon pursuing a fixed exchange rate regime? This thesis explains the path toward financial liberalization and crisis and the constraints on the Bank's policy choices during this period from a historical institutionalist perspective by focusing on the evolution of Thailand's monetary and financial policy and its connection with the BOT's relative autonomy. To begin, the thesis examines the origin of the Bank's commitment to monetary conservatism and international credibility and the formation of its behavioral autonomy from the 1940s to the 1960s to explain the BOT's leading role in monetary and financial management, despite its weak legal status. The institutionalization of the Bank within the context of authoritarianism and the Cold War is key to the making of this relative independence from the government, financial sector, and international financial community. As the BOT emerged as a leading monetary authority by the 1970s, it was able to push for various policy preferences guided by a conservative tradition and the desire to maintain international credibility. At times, the difficulty in balancing between domestic and ii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. external obligations and demands arose to complicate the Bank's policy decisions. The move toward financial liberalization and the persistent pursuit of a fixed exchange regime will be explained based on this background together with other contributing domestic and external factors. Apart from insight into Thailand's experience with financial liberalization and crisis, this thesis offers understanding of the Thai state's autonomy in monetary and financial policy from the interference of societal and external actors. That this autonomy eroded in the 1990s due to democratization and financial liberalization reflected the challenges to state power posed by political reform and global economic integration. Other contributions include the thesis's application of Selznick's institutionalism to the understanding of central bank 'de facto' independence, as well as a theoretical bridging among the three strands of new institutionalism in their understanding of preferences and actions. iii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Acknowledgements I became interested in international finance and the influence of the international financial system on developing countries when I began my doctoral program at Carleton University. The financial crisis of 1997, which originated in my home country, Thailand, triggered much curiosity regarding the danger of global financial integration and the role of national governments in managing an open financial system. Professors Jeremy Paltiel and Michael Dolan, in their capacity as advisor and thesis proposal supervisor respectively, helped me hone these interests into a dissertation project and kindly committed themselves to be on my dissertation committee, along with Professor Laura Macdonald. During this enriching journey, I am indebted to the three members of my committee and another faculty member for their guidance. As supervisor, Professor Paltiel offered countless rounds of stimulating discussion, professional wisdom, and continuous support. His insights were influential in my theoretical framework, research design and analysis. Throughout the process, I am thankful for his prompt attention, accessibility, and the fact that he always had the answers to my questions and problems. Apart from her constant encouragement, Professor Macdonald's detailed and critical feedback to all my drafts made the thesis more substantively sound and organizationally coherent. Professor Dolan's expertise on the financial crisis helped improve Chapter 6 and its connection to the whole work. Professor Randal Germain, who was not on the committee but read the entire manuscript, helped refine the thesis by offering perceptive iv Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. comments on international financial and theoretical issues. My thanks also go to Professor Paltiel and Professor Macdonald for their editorial comments and corrections. While conducting research, many individuals offered valuable advice and assistance. At the Bank of Thailand (BOT), I am grateful to Khun Somlak Hiranburana and Dr. Pichit Patrawimolpon for their generosity in helping me get in touch with other BOT officials for my interviews. While maintaining their anonymity, I thank all my interviewees at the BOT for their time and information, which enabled me to understand better the Thai financial system and the role of the BOT. My appreciation also goes to the BOT's library staff who provided exceptional assistance throughout my library use at the institution. Outside the BOT, I offer many thanks to a number of financial advisors, bank executives, and politicians, who also wanted to remain anonymous, for their professional insights on financial liberalization and crisis and a glance into the real world of money and politics. This project would not have been completed without the plethora of help and encouragement of friends and family. Ann-Marie Field was always at the end of the line to give advice, support, and big cheer-ups. I cannot ask for a truer friend. Rob Judge offered his assistance in proof-reading my final draft despite his busy schedule. Putriga Amphaipan set up a meeting with her relative who is involved in Thai politics. P'Orm, Theerakun Niyom, introduced me to Khun Somlak at the BOT and recommended a number of potential interviewees from the financial sector. My former boss, Saroj Chavanaviraj, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also helped arrange an interview with an important BOT figure. During research at Cornell University, my landlady, Jan Evans- v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Tiller, offered great company and a home away from home. I also thank Professor Marvin Rogers for being a source of inspiration throughout these years. Finally, I would not have done it without the love and support from my family. My parents' passion for learning led me to pursue this project, while their perennial understanding and encouragement kept me at it until the end. I dedicate this work to them. Both of my little sisters' company and assistance during my research in Thailand made this project