•Œto Close for the Guns!•Š 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade in The
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Canadian Military History Volume 12 Issue 2 Article 2 2003 “To Close for the Guns!” 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Battle for Rhine Bridgehead Lee A. Windsor University of New Brunswick, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Recommended Citation Windsor, Lee A. "“To Close for the Guns!” 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Battle for Rhine Bridgehead." Canadian Military History 12, 2 (2003) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Windsor: 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Battle for Rhine Bridgehead "Too Close for the Guns!" 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Battle for the Rhine Bridgehead Lee A. Windsor ie spring of 1945 was the "sweetest of all not consist of weary old men and young boys, Tseasons" for Dutch and Canadian but the latest, albeit last, crop of keen Nazi participants in the Second World War. That April, replacements prepared to die for their Fiihrer. First Canadian Army lifted the yoke of Nazi oppression once and for all from the people of The North Nova action at Bienen on 25 the Netherlands. It was a month of rapid March was the climax of 9 Canadian Infantry advances from the Rhine to the North Sea Brigade's role in Second British Army's punctuated by sometimes bitter "mopping up" Operation Plunder. Nine Brigade was attached battles to clear isolated German garrisons from to XXX British Corps during its assault crossing towns like Zutphen and Groningen. Despite of the Rhine in support of the larger main landing suffering casualties until the last days of the war, near Wesel. It was the dramatic crossing at Wesel, many Canadian soldiers remember that spring preceded as it was by airborne and commando of liberation fondly. landings and followed by a climactic dash into the heart of Germany, that drew historians' In those first days of spring, however, the attention. Military historians' fascination with North Nova Scotia Highlanders experienced one rapid manouevre and sweeping advances of their most savage battles of the war. It left 68 obscures the fact that it was XXX Corps, and its of them wounded and 44 dead after a single day attached Canadian brigade, that carried out the of battle in the town of Bienen, Germany. These most difficult and important task of Operation losses represented 30 per cent of the unit's Plunder. fighting strength and would be considered devastating at any time during the war, but German Forces opposing XXX Corps especially so given the end was in sight. German consisted of the only cohesive army left on the losses numbered over 200 dead, a similar western front, General Alfred Schlemm's First number of prisoners, many of whom were Parachute Army. Schlemm's frontline divisions wounded, and an unknown number of recovered were rested, reinforced, well dug-in, backed by casualties. Most wounds on both sides were 150 pieces of artillery, and a powerful reserve inflicted by bullets and grenades.1 in the form of XLVII Panzer Corps. This corps, consisting of the veteran 116th Panzer and 15th The outcome of this battle contradicts the Panzer-Grenadier Divisions, was the last popular belief, initiated by American Lieutenant- operational-level manouevre formation left on General George S. Patton Jr., that the German the German order of battle in the west. army on the east bank of the Rhine was beaten.2 It also provides an example of vicious close- These forces could not stop Plunder. quarter fighting, challenging the widely-held view Nevertheless, they were strong enough to impede that Anglo-Canadian citizen soldiers preferred a breakout and delay plans to encircle the Ruhr, to stick close to cover and let their overwhelming capture Berlin and end the war as soon as the artillery and air power do the killing.3 The spring flooding abated.4 Field-Marshal Canadians also discovered that their enemy did Montgomery was acutely aware that the division © Canadian Military History, Volume 12, Numbers 1& 2, Winter/Spring 2003, pp.5-28. Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2003 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 2 of post-war Europe between the Soviet Union most, between Rees and Emmerich. There the and the Western Allies would be decided by the corps was to plow into the bulk of First positions of their armies on the day the war Parachute Army, force the commitment of XLVII ended. He could also not help but be aware that Panzer Corps and destroy it in a battle of every day the war dragged on, more Allied annihilation. Such action would allow the main soldiers, concentration camp inmates, and portion of Second Army to drive on Berlin European civilians would perish. Montgomery unimpeded. therefore deemed it essential that General Schlemm's forces not be allowed to delay the Destroying XLVII Corps meant prolonged 5 breakout to Berlin. periods of intense fighting between forces similar in size and combat power. It also meant While ostensibly ordered to "advance" on the considerable bloodshed and little to show for it flank of the main assault, the real mission of in terms of ground gained. However, once the XXX Corps and its attached Canadians was to process was complete, especially after 9 cross the Rhine where the Germans expected it Canadian Brigade broke the back of the last https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol12/iss2/2 2 Windsor: 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Battle for Rhine Bridgehead German formations around Bienen, advances Stacey's paragraphs about Bienen reflect his into Holland and the German interior came judgement of the Canadian Army's performance swiftly.6 evident throughout The Victory Campaign.8 Stacey implies Canadian infantry alone were Because it took time and cost lives, fighting incapable of overcoming prepared defences in the north end of the bridgehead is downplayed manned by more skilful German troops. It was, in accounts of Plunder. Instead, the rapid, low- in Stacey's view, only when Canadian infantry cost advance further south caught the eyes of advanced as part of a massive mechanical historians seeking to measure success by miles juggernaut, and behind a curtain of artillery that travelled. Indeed, some Rhine crossing they could move at all. More recently, Timothy commentators suggest that XXX Corps' sluggish Harrison Place suggested that slow Anglo- advance along the northern flank resulted from Canadian progress throughout the war resulted poor motivation among leading infantry units. from a fundamental lack of tactical training and For example, Canada's official army historian, knowledge among junior infantry and armour C.P. Stacey, wrote that despite having plenty of leaders. This shortcoming was, he argues, artillery support as well as help from heavy overcome by relying on artillery to win battles.9 mortars and medium machine guns, the North Nova Scotia Highlanders got hopelessly "pinned The story told by surviving veterans and the down" in front of Bienen. records of units in 9 Brigade paints a very different picture of the battle for Bienen. According to Stacey it was only after XXX Contrary to the orthodox interpretation that Corps' famous commander, Brian Horrocks, Allied armies in the Second World War possessed visited the North Nova command post that the decisive material and numerical superiority over unit was inspired to get moving again. Even then, German forces, Canadian units fighting in they needed help from Wasp flame-throwers, Bienen had no such advantage.10 In fact, the full- tanks and further artillery concentrations. Yet, strength, well-equipped and motivated German with all that support, the North Novas still only units defending the town outnumbered their gained a foothold at the edge of town. A second attackers, and in addition possessed all the Canadian battalion was needed to clear the advantages inherent in defending a fortified objective and move past it.7 village with flanks secured by water obstacles. 51st Division Signals detachment south of Speldrop, 24 March 1945. Rees can be seen burning in the background. In the foreground lies a 154 Brigade Highlander killed earlier that day. 9 Brigade relieved the exhausted Scotsmen later that evening. The flat, featureless topography of the Bienen-Speldrop area is most evident. Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2003 3 Canadian Military History, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 2 From this village, and others like it in 9 Brigade's to Berlin. Second Army's riverborne assault area, the enemy commanded the surrounding would be delivered by XXX British Corps on the flat, featureless terrain with fire. Despite these left in the Rees area, and XII British Corps on odds Canadian infantrymen fought their way into the right, west of Wesel. In front of XII Corps town, killed large numbers of Germans and took two airborne divisions would drop on the high many more prisoner. By doing so, 9 Brigade ground commanding the approaches to the river. contributed significantly to the goal of breaking Behind them stood the rested and refitted troops XLVII Corps' capacity to conduct mobile of British VIII Corps which would rapidly pour operations. into the bridgehead once it was secure. It was planned that XII and VIII Corps would break out Capturing real estate was of secondary together and not stop until they reached the front importance in the Allied strategy and doctrine steps of the Reich's Chancellery in Berlin. for defeating Germany. Indeed, the reason German units finally yielded ground in the Rees The orders given to XXX Corps' were to area was because they suffered crippling losses.