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The Fog of War: Large-Scale Smoke Screening Operations of First C Canadian Military History Volume 8 | Issue 1 Article 5 1-24-2012 The ogF of War: Large-Scale Smoke Screening Operations of First Canadian Army in Northwest Europe James C. Bond Canadian War Museum Recommended Citation Bond, James C. (1999) "The oF g of War: Large-Scale Smoke Screening Operations of First Canadian Army in Northwest Europe," Canadian Military History: Vol. 8: Iss. 1, Article 5. Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol8/iss1/5 This Canadian War Museum is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Bond: The Fog of War: Large-Scale Smoke Screening Operations of First C The Fog of War Large-Scale Smoke Screening Operations of First Canadian Army in Northwest Europe 1944-1945 James C. Bond moke screens have been employed in in smoke generators, commonly known Ssea and land warfare for many as "smoke pots." The best known centuries for a variety of purposes. They examples of these was the British No.24 have been used to conceal troop Smoke Generator, weighing about 40 movements, to deceive the enemy as to pounds and burning (emitting smoke) for combat strengths, points of attack, and 12 to 15 minutes, and the U.S. Army M4 preparations for offensive operations. floating smoke pot, similar to the No.24 During the Second World War all armies in weight and smoke production made use of smoke screens in their characteristics, but fitted with a flotation operations to a greater or lesser extent. Canada chamber. was no exception and was considered to be extremely innovative in the use of smoke The second was oil smoke. Three different equipment in ways for which it was not designed. kinds of oil smoke generators have been used in The First Canadian Army first employed large­ modern warfare. An effective smoke can be scale non-artillery-projected smoke screens produced by injecting oil into the hot exhaust of during the campaign in Northwest Europe. For a vehicle, the oil condensing in the air to form a the first time, at least in the history of Canadian smoke cloud. Some naval vessels could produce operations, units of trained specialists worked this type of screen, which became known as a to lay down smoke screens in the field. "Destroyer Screen." The British developed an oil smoke generator which partially burned and Background partially vapourized oil. This generator, called the Haslar after the experimental station where it was ilitary smoke screens are basically clouds developed, weighed about one ton and was of particles which are effective in absorbing, M mounted on either a trailer or a truck. Its role reflecting and/ or refracting light rays. In North­ was to screen ports and factories from Luftwaffe West Europe the Canadians used two different observation and attack. It produced a fairly materials to produce major smoke screens. effective smoke cloud in the anti-aircraft role for The first was zinc chloride. Zinc or zinc oxide which it was designed, although it covered nearby reacts with chlorinated hydrocarbons, such as buildings and gardens with a sooty layer of oil. It carbon tetrachloride or hexachlorethane, to was neither soldier-proof nor rugged enough for produce a zinc chloride vapour which condenses field use. The United States Chemical Corps in the air to create an effective white smoke. There developed and produced by contract to Standard were, and still are, a number of different Oil a generator which produced superheated oil, formulations, all of which were known as "HC" combined it with steam and sprayed it into the smokes (for HydroCarbon). In addition to being air. This generator, known as the "Esso," was employed in a variety of artillery shells, mortar mounted on a four-wheellow-bed trailer as a self­ bombs, and hand grenades, HC was employed contained unit, holding fog oil, fuel oil and water ©Canadian Military History, Volume 8, Number l, Winter 1999, pp.4l-58. 41 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1999 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 5 for about two hours' operation. The output was prior to the despatch of 1st Canadian Infantry variable. The Esso was standard in the U.S. Army Division to the Mediterranean in 1943. In the Chemical Corps Smoke Companies and was planning for the invasion of Europe Canada was issued to British Pioneer Corps Smoke not seen as having any responsibility for the Companies serving outside the United Kingdom. provision of "Theatre" troops, or units directly The Esso was supplemented in the last few under Theatre Headquarters command. Smoke months of the war by the "Beslar," a miniaturized troops were included in the order of battle of both version which could be carried by two men. the British and US Army Groups with the assigned task of screening beachheads and the The Canadian army's first real experience build-up of men and stores from German air with large-scale tactical smoke screens was the attack. Britain, the United States, and Canada assault on Dieppe on 19 August 1942. In this all had staff and technical staff officers trained operation, known as "Jubilee," the RAF close in chemical warfare defence at the various support included "smoke-laying aircraft to formation headquarters. The US Army had a neutralize enemy defences both as pre-arranged "Chemical Officer" in the rank of colonel at each and as requested by the Military Force division and in a correspondingly higher rank at Commander." Three squadrons were allocated the corps and army level. These officers' to this task and in the actual operation supplied responsibilities included all aspects of chemical support to the Royal Regiment of Canada landing warfare such as flame, protective measures at Puys and the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry against chemical attack, analysis of captured and Essex Scottish landings on the beach directly enemy ammunition, as well as planning and in front of the town of Dieppe. 1 Although the air execution of major smoke screens. The British support was of some value, the inflexibility of had a "Chemical Warfare Technical Officer" at timing of the support substantially reduced its each corps headquarters, usually in the rank of effectiveness. Some aircraft did attempt to screen captain. If staff trained, he was called a "Technical the evacuation of casualties from the beach, but Staff Officer." The British had no such officers at with only limited success. The experience the divisional level, and only a small staff at reduced the confidence of the army in aerial Second British Army Headquarters. smoke support, a feeling which persisted throughout the campaign in Northwest Europe. At First Canadian Army Headquarters, Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. (Reg) Sawyer was the To put the large-scale tactical smoke screens GS01 (CW), ie. the grade one staff officer, used within First Canadian Army in Northwest responsible for chemical warfare and smoke. Europe into perspective, it is necessary to look Sawyer had a staff of eleven all ranks, including at the position of the Canadian Army in Britain chemists, flame equipment and tactics instructors, as well as officers trained in the tactics, chemistry and the micro meteorology of smoke screening. In addition, there was a mobile Chemical Warfare Laboratory based at Army Headquarters. With the exception of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, the Canadian and British divisions did not have Technical Officers, and this exception was as a result of the insistence of Major-General G. Kitching, the divisional commander. I held the position of Technical Staff Officer (Chemical Warfare) at Headquarters, II Canadian Corps, and, commencing in March 1945 was assisted by a Technical Officer. I was fortunate in that I had completed the Canadian War Staff Captain Jim Bond and Major Stewart Bastow. MC during operations in the Rhineland. February 1945. http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol8/iss1/5 2 Bond: The Fog of War: Large-Scale Smoke Screening Operations of First C Course in Kingston in 1943 and that, combined units, including the Royal Canadian Dragoons with a B.A. and an M.A. in Chemistry, apparently were trained in the use of the No.24 British qualified me for the slightly better paid job of Smoke Generators, but no successful operational "Technical Staff Officer," rather than a straight use was recorded. In fact the only reference to "Technical Officer." I don't think that my duties generator smoke in the Dragoons' history is to or responsibilities were ever spelled out in black their lack of success. 3 In Italy the smoke and white, but it was generally understood that resources were more limited than in Northwest anything within the Corps that had to do with Europe and of these some were retained in the chemical defence training and equipment, port areas as protection against enemy air attack. flamethrower training, equipment and tactics, and smoke screening, other than that produced The Canadian contribution to the D-Day by the artillery or infantry, was, at least initially, landing in Normandy was 3rd Infantry Division to be referred to me. This was pretty heady stuff supported by 2nd Armoured Brigade. In for a captain and it was quite humorous, and a addition, under command of 6th Airborne bit embarrassing, when the American 82nd and Division, 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion 101stAirborne Divisions came under command landed on D-Day on the extreme left flank of the of our Corps, and the two Divisional Chemical Allied operation. By 11 July II Canadian Corps Officers, both colonels. reported to the "Canadian was operational and assumed command of these Corps Chemical Officer." Several years after the formations, together with a normal complement war, when I was posted as liaison officer to the of corps troops.
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