Masterthesis IEHEI Pax Europea for the Balkans
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INSTITUT EUROPEEN DES HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALES (I.E.H.E.I.) MA European and International Studies Pax Europea for the Balkans? The role of values and political conditionality in the EU’s policy by Alexander Kleibrink Directeurs de recherche: Dr. Matthias Waechter Ragnar Leunig Année Universitaire 2005/2006 Contents Prologue iii Introduction 1 1. Norms of a civilian power 6 1.1. THE POWER -IDENTITY NEXUS 8 1.2. “C OLLECTIVE MEMORY ” AND BASIC VALUES 13 1.3. NORMS AND INTEREST 21 1.4. METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 28 2. Value promotion: political conditionality 31 2.1. THE CONDITIONALITY TOOL 34 2.2. OBJECTIVES 44 3. Case studies 49 3.1. COOPERATION WITH THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL 50 3.1.1. Croatia 52 3.1.2. Serbia 59 3.2. LIFE AND DEATH OF SERBIA -MONTENEGRO 70 3.2.1. Forging a union 73 3.2.2. ‘Solania’ revisited 77 Conclusion - Community trap reloaded 88 Epilogue 96 Bibliography 97 Annex 115 TABLES AND GRAPHS 115 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 122 Prologue Prologue Europe has to choose between Balkanisation and Helvetisation. (Karl Jaspers) 1 Balkanisation as opposed to Helvetisation , bellicose jingoism versus integrative plurality, the classical Westphalian concept of nation-state against shared power in a federal system. Where other than in the Balkans can these antagonisms be better observed? The space stretching from the western shores of the Adriatic Sea to the Balkan mountains has not only been the stage for the outbreak of WWI, but it was also an example of failing states at the threshold of the 21 st century. Both times the (Western) European powers failed to prevent bloodshed, a double burden weighing heavily on Europe’s collective memory. On 09 May 1950, six European countries decided to go the path of Helvetisation and hence committed themselves to the values of reconciliation and cooperation, thus creating a ‘domesticated’ civilian Pax Europea . Nineteen other countries have joined the founding states since then. The attraction of the European integration model has achieved considerable changes in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe and it has proven the potential of civilian power. The EU on the other hand has used this positive perception from the outside to promote its own values of substantive democracy, market economy and rule of law, based on a highly technocrat acquis communitaire. After having failed to prevent the atrocities of the civil wars in the 1990’s, the European family of states has committed itself to open the Community also to the countries of the so-called ‘Western Balkans’ and give them a membership perspective. The positive incentives are ideational and economic: the Balkans could leave behind their bloody past and finally join the Common Market, including additional aid and allocations from cohesion funds. On the other side, the EU has a considerable influence through political conditionality to enforce 1 Heinrich Schneider, “The dimensions of the historical and cultural core of a European identity”, in: Thomas Jansen (ed.), Reflections on European Identity (Brussels: 1999), European Commission Working Paper, p. 12. iii Prologue compliance, either by persuasion, suspension of talks or positive incentives. In some cases Brussels tries to convince the (potential) candidates, in others it openly menaces to suspend negotiations. The aspect of awarding compliance is a third alternative not as often made use of. The question of knowing if societal changes can be imposed from the outside is often answered with ‘no’ by many transformation scholars. Still, the EU has so far has had an undeniably great impact on the transition in the region. It remains to see whether the Union strives for expansion and a Pax Europea on the whole sub-continent, or if the Union seeks to peacefully promote the crucial values of reconciliation and cooperation in the Balkans in order to integrate them one day into its structures. But will Europe succeed in the stabilisation and pacification? Can the EU apply its own set of norms – values it cherishes since the end of WWII – on others? Has the “hour of Europe” 2 finally come through the promotion of its democracy paradigm? Seemingly, Brussels can lead the Balkans to Helvetisation only if it sticks to a coherent and credible approach and if it maintains the ultimate perspective of EU membership. In the end, the question of Helvetisation and Balkanisation is one of great importance for both sides. Today, Karl Jaspers’ words can be interpreted even broader. Only if united can Europe stand the global and regional challenges and only as a Helvetised entity can the Balkans enter a period of peace, stability and relative prosperity. During the course of writing this thesis I received substantial support from various people. Matthias Waechter helped me organise and structure my sometimes chaotic ideas and thoughts and pushed me to find a logical matrix for the thesis. My second supervisor, Ragnar Leunig, listened to my various propositions with great patience and astonished me with his broad general knowledge. The interviews with Fernando Gentilini and Dušan Relji ć provided me with further information on the topic itself, the former with genuine insight of a practitioner of the Council’s Policy Unit and the latter with his regional expertise and valuable 2 Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jacques Poos was overhasty when in July 1991 he stated that the European crisis-management facing the break-up of former Yugoslavia would symbolise that Europe’s hour had come, quoted in: Knud Erik Jorgensen, “Theorising the European Union’s foreign policy”, in: Ben Tonra/ Thomas Christiansen (eds.), Rethinking European Union foreign policy (Manchester: 2004), p. 12. iv Prologue research experience. All these people have added important elements to this thesis and without their contributions the shape and the content of this dissertation would not be the same. Last, but as always surely not least, I have to finally also thank my parents and my family who have supported my studies like a duck takes to water. v Introduction Introduction If there is ever another war in Europe, it will come out of some damned silly thing in the Balkans. (Otto von Bismarck, end of 19 th century)3 The Balkans, more than any other region in the world, are an EU responsibility. […] we cannot afford to fail. (Javier Solana, 2005)4 Though Bismarck’s statement might at first sight seem an appropriate and direct account of the Balkans’ contemporary history, it evokes improper connotations. The permanently claimed Europeanisation of the Balkans neglects the fact that a regional process of bridging east and west had already begun in the nineteenth century when the Ottoman Empire retreated gradually. The old widely accepted notion of the Balkan peoples as “tribes that squabble for futile reasons” is a myth and oversimplification of the historical development to which Western Europe greatly contributed its part. 5 One the main reason for armed conflicts in the region is the “fog of history” which was so many times misused in entire Europe since the creation of the modern nation-state in the 19 th century. 6 Destructive par excellence , it led to the catastrophes of the 1990’s. It is still a collective memory that dominates politics and societies in the region, dating back to the lost battle on the Kosovo Polje in 1389 or only more than ten years to the liberation and actual independence of Croatia. These different periods are still present in today’s consciousness. For the member states of the EU, collective memory has been a leading guideline since 1945, a constructive interpretation of the past and a turn to values such as reconciliation and peaceful cooperation. In retrospective, this internal Pax Europea was based on four elements. First, the strong leadership with an 3 Quoted in: Tony Judt, Postwar (London: 2005), p. 665. 4 Javier Solana, speech on “Europe’s International Role” (Bratislava: 09 November 2005). 5 Ismail Kadare, “The Balkans: Truths and Untruths”, in: Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (ed.), The southern Balkans – Perspectives from the region , ISS Chaillot Paper 46 (Paris: April 2001) p. 6. 6 Ibid . 1 Introduction emancipatory idea, best exemplified by Konrad Adenauer as the crucial figure for building partnerships between former enemies and regaining a regional and international role for Germany. Second, the elites in the founding countries of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were both driven by interest (security/economic) and norms (reconciliation and dialogue). Third, the positive economic performance enhanced public trust in the integration project and thus guaranteed the citizens’ support for the elitist approach to integration. Finally, a common enemy, the USSR, forged a community willing to resist the influence of totalitarianism. Many contemporary politicians have made allusions to the Balkans as being the next pacification project, similar to the experiences of the post-WWII era. Can such historic comparison, often per se dangerously simplified, stand more detailed examination? This thesis will try to analyse in how far norms – meaning “a standard of appropriate behavio[u]r for actors with a given identity”7 – are the guiding principles of the EU foreign policy since 1999. To depict in details the Yugoslavian wars in the 1990’s and the NATO-bombing in 1999 is beyond the scope of this thesis. 8 The aim of this dissertation is rather to analyse of the EU’s role after the ethno-political armed conflicts in the 1990’s and how the EU supports the post-war development and the stabilisation process in the Balkans.9 A successful and sustainable pacification of former Yugoslavia is crucial for Europe’s credibility as an international actor. That is why High Representative 7 Martha Finnemore/ Kathryn Sikking, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, International Organization , 52 (Autumn 1998) 4, p.