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“Negotiation as a means of Peace and Conflict Resolution The exemplar case of Morocco”

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Lecture by H.E Mohamed MAEL-AININ Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco

The Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies The University of Sydney

Thursday 15 March, 2012

Dear Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Mr Jake Lynch Professors and students of the University of Sydney, Moroccan Nationals, Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Before I start my presentation, I would like to express my gratitude to the Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Dr. Jake LYNCH and to the Council Member, Mr. Abe Quadan who, since our first meeting has made all his best to make this event true.

Indeed when I learnt that The Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPACS) promotes interdisciplinary research and teaching on the causes of conflict and the conditions that affect conflict resolution and peace, Research projects and other activities focus on the resolution of conflict with a view to attaining just societies, and, aims to facilitate dialogue between individuals, groups or communities who are concerned with conditions of positive peace, whether in interpersonal relationships, community relations, within organisations and nations, or with reference to international relations, I found in it a specialized academic institution that deals with an issue so dear to myself “Negotiation as a means to peaceful settlements of conflicts". Indeed, this is the very essence of any successful diplomacy”.

You are all aware that in all the conflicts that humanity has known, the resolution of most of them were found in peaceful negotiations. The conflicts that have turned to the use of force, and unfortunately sometimes to bloodshed must reinforce our belief that the most appropriate means for resolution of any dispute lies in the use of pacific and honest negotiation.

Indeed, whether a conflict has economic, administrative or political character, between two or more States, between a State and a non-state entity, the solution of this conflict cannot avoid negotiation at any stage of the conflict.

The obligation to pacific settlement of conflicts between States has been defined by the Conferences of the Hague in 1899 and 1907 , by the pact of the League of Nations, by the Charter of the United Nations, by the declaration of 24 October 1970 relating to the principles of International Law pertaining to the

friendly relations and cooperation between States, and the Declaration of Manila 1982 on the pacific settlement of International conflicts.

All these international regulations are complimentary.

For this reason I cite only some articles from the Chapter V of the UN Charter titled “Pacific Settlement of Dispute” which state :

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council. 2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

The United Nations Charter and all the Conventions cited above constitute a road map for all moral or physical persons who are interested in finding solutions to conflicts in various situations.

But what about those situations in history that predate the adoption of these conventions or the existence of the United Nations itself.

It is of paramount importance in this context to ask how independent and sovereign States in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, or even before, used to solve conflicts they confronted.

It is exactly to illustrate such a situation that I chose the case of my country Morocco, in a view to showing how an independent and sovereign State solved his conflicts at that time.

Indeed, Morocco has been an independent State for more than 1222 years. He broke from the Abbaside Arab rule since 789. He was the only Arab State to avoid the Ottoman Rule.

Morocco has always played an active role in the story of modern nations. The oldest recorded commercial treaty dated back to the 13th century with Venice. The Andalusia Moorish period remains a landmark in human history of art, science, philosophy and diplomacy.

Morocco as well has a long story of alliance and rivalry with Modern European powers due to its strategic location at the crossroad of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, Africa and Europe

In one of the first general history of Morocco in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Australian historian C.R. Pennell states in his book Morocco since 1830: “At the end of the twentieth century, Morocco is the only major country in the Arab speaking world whose dynastic system of rule substantially predates colonialism.” (C.R. Pennell, Morocco since 1830: A History).

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In this presentation I will try to shed light on the major events that shaped the modern history of Morocco. In the same historical vein, the focus will be on negotiation as a peaceful means used by the Millennium Moroccan

Independent State to solve its international issues and conflicts caused by the repeated attempts of colonialism to undermine its sovereignty.

At the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, the European powers were in a mad rush to colonize Africa and Asia, and to maintain their presence in the Americas whose peoples were beginning to gain independence. Morocco, as an independent State, managed to keep itself from becoming politically involved in the European conflicts of the time, even so those conflicts had direct consequences on its economic life.

But the continued pressure from several states all settlers on the central government of Morocco, and the use of military threat and especially economic and diplomatic pressure led the Monarchs to successive negotiations whose primary purpose was to safeguard national sovereignty.

European political interest in the Moroccan State was aroused. Spain, Great Britain and France, Morocco’s traditional partners, were joined by newcomers. In order to safeguard the interest of its fast expanding navy, the Kingdom of Naples re-established relations with Morocco in 1834. Belgium installed a Consul General in Tangiers and signed a trade agreement in 1839Other States established diplomatic relations with Morocco recognising him as a sovereign State.

The Kingdom of Sweden and Norway dispatched a mission to the country in 1837. Russia likewise displayed interest in Moroccan Affairs, while the United States concluded a treaty of peace and friendship with the Government of Morocco on 17 September 1836. It is fitting here to recall that Morocco is the first country to have recognized the independence of the United States of America in 1776. President Obama reiterated this in his speech in Cairo in 2009.

In 1843 the King Mulay Abderrahman, in support of the Algerian leader Emir Abdelkader, who took refuge in Morocco, lost the Battle of Isly against the French army. It was the first conflict Morocco was engaged in with a European power since the sixteenth century.

Consequently, the Franco Moroccan boundary treaty of Lalla Maghnia was signed in Tangier on 10 September 1845 to delimit theborder between Morocco and what France considered as “French Algeria”.

In November 1859, the Spanish navy landed to the east of Ceuta and at Ouad Martil, the port of Tetouan. On 6 February 1860 Spanish troops tried to occupy Tetouan.

The Treaty of Madrid was signed (1861) conceding to Spanish traders the same commercial privileges as the treaty with Britain had done in 1856.

The strong personality of the monarch Mulay Hassan I, as great negotiator, led the major European nations and the United States to decide at the Madrid Conference In 1880 to preserve the territorial integrity of Morocco and to maintain equal trade opportunities for all.

Until the end of the century, the King Mulay Hassan I (1873-1894) adopted a strategy of avoiding direct military involvement with the French along the Algerian border and the Spanish colonies, Ceuta and Melilia, seeking a diplomatic solution as the only alternative to a dispute.

All these States that signed with Morocco accords respecting his sovereignty were aware of the fact that the Moroccan Monarchy system of the time based his national integrity on the oath of allegiance given by the tribes leaders to the sovereign. In this system, each tribe possessed large prerogatives of autonomy over her territory which constituted a part and parcel of the Moroccan nation.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Coming to the 20 the century, from 1900 onwards, Morocco became the focal point of European powers rivalry and a coveted strategic territory for the colonial powers. A series of diplomatic accords between 1900 and 1904 removed Italy, Spain and Great Britain as opponents of the French designs in Morocco.

France and Spain were the most interested in the country. France from, occupied Algeria, had a long land border with Morocco and all the south coast of the Iberian peninsula is close to the Moroccan northern coast, Spanish Canary Islands in front of Moroccan Western Sahara.

As for the British, they were strongly opposed to any change in Morocco’s status and so was Germany. The issue aligned the leading European nations against one another and led to a new balance of forces emerging on Africa to change the history of its people, as stated by Edmund Burke in his “Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco”.

The King had invited the powers interested in Morocco to a conference to discuss the reforms which the State of Morocco requested. That conference had met at Algeciras on 14 January 1906.

The General act of Algeciras, framed conjointly by the representatives of the King of Morocco and by the representations of the following powers: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, the US, France, Great Britain, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Russia and Sweden, reiterated the “sovereignty and independence of his Majesty the Sultan (King of Morocco), the integrity of his state and economic freedom”.

Having blocked threats and attempts of its occupation by the great powers of the time, and bringing them to sign an agreement that respects its sovereignty and territorial integrity, entered Morocco in the register of great negotiators in History.

Through negotiations, which lasted from January to April 1906, Morocco succeeded to change the colonial ambitions into a balance of power in the region. Pennell talks about the conference by stating that: “On 7 April the final Act of Algeciras was agreed by the eleven European delegations, the US delegation and the Moroccan. The 123 articles were supposed to ensure order, peace and prosperity in Morocco, and to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sultans (the Kings) dominions; no European country would predominate”. ( Pennell :Morocco since 1830, p132).

However, the colonial appetites of the two neighbouring Morocco, France and Spain, have not dimmed. They used the subterfuge of indebtedness of the kingdom with their banks to impose a dual protectorate agreement (1912), which recognizes the continued authority of Moroccan political system on any internal activity, giving the protectorate authorities the rights of international trade and a priority in all international relations.

For the reasons stated above, though weak economically and financially, Morocco remained a sovereign State negotiating all the treaties and conventions relating to its integrity and independence. It is noteworthy to say that Morocco, in legal terms, has not been under direct colonisation. On the contrary, it was under the regime of protectorate, keeping its legitimate institutions, governing itself in its own fashion under the control of European powers. (Pierre Parent, The truth about Morocco, p16)

By Treaty of Fez signed on March 1912, Morocco was put under protectorate regime and thus was divided into six zones of influence to weaken the resistance: French protectorate in the Middle, Tangier submitted to international jurisdiction, Spanish administration in the North, Spanish Sahara in the South (divided in three parts: Ifni, Tarfaya and Sakia el-Hamra - Rio de Oro), the seventh part , made of the two cities Sebta and Melilia, was colonised before the Act of protectorate and remains the last territory under colonisation in Africa.

Just after the protectorate, the Moroccans from all provinces understood that France and Spain began to have much more similar practices of colonialism than those practices assigned by the protectorate agreements. The Ulema, scholars of the Moroccan Western Sahara, of Marrakech and of Souss led by my uncle Sheikh Ahmed El Hiba, coming from the Western Sahara, stated that these agreements were signed under pressure and are therefore null and void. Therefore, they declared Jihad, as a way of resistance, immediately in 1912.

In 1921, the Rif region was burning under the leadeship of Abdelkrim El Khattabi. In other cities political parties advocating independence began to organize themselves in different forms in response to the presentation of the Manifesto of Independence 11 January, 1944 in total accord with HM the late King Mohammed V.

The pressure that was exerted on the King and the people led to the deportation and exile of the King as well as all the princes and princesses on 20 August, 1953, and repression of all nationalists. Allal El Fassi, leader of the party who presented the Manifesto of January 11 was to be exiled in Cairo after nine years of exile in Gabon.

The King Mohammed V, who refused the continuation of the protectorate in collaboration with the heads of the national movement, achieved, after tough negotiations, the independence of the six parts listed above each at a given date.

- The first peaceful negotiation led to the signing of the independence of Morocco from the French protectorate on 18 November 1955.

- The second peaceful negotiation with Spain led to the recovery of the provinces under Spanish protectorate in the north April 1956.

- The third peaceful negotiation concerned the city of Tangier which was under the protectorate of thirteen countries with consulates. Tangier was recuperated in October1956.

- The fourth peaceful negotiation covered all the Western Sahara, that Spain was preparing to cede to Morocco as a whole, but, under pressure from France, who did not want that Morocco has borders with Mauritania where some tribes recognized the oath of allegiance to the Kings of Morocco, Spain has given up the northern part of Western Sahara; namely the area of Tarfaya in 1958 (Angra de Sintra Treaty).

In this regard, King Mohammed V did his best to recover the rest of the west Saharan territories. In a show of defiance to the French-Spanish colonizers he paid a visit to the southern part of the country to deliver a rousing speech at M’Hamid El Ghizlane on 25 February 1958 in which he promised, I quote ‘to continue to do everything in our power to recover our Sahara and all that which, by historical evidence, and by the will of its inhabitants, belongs as of right to our Kingdom’. End of quote.

Since then, diplomatic campaigns launched at different international forums were conducted by Morocco claiming full integral territory.

In June 1962 Morocco addressed an official request to the United Nations’ Decolonisation Committee to call on Spain to enter into pacific negotiations with Rabat over the rest of the Saharan territories and the enclave of Sidi Ifni.

In a Resolution adopted on October 16, 1965 the UN Decolonisation Committee called on Madrid to take the necessary measures to apply the UN 1960 Declaration on the occupied territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara (Western Sahara) in a time that Morocco was the only party claiming this territory of Western Sahara (see GA Resolution 2072, 16 December 1965).

In June 1966, Morocco proposed to the Decolonisation Committee to call on Spain to conduct a referendum to allow the inhabitants of the Sahara territories to exercise their right to self-determination. The Moroccan proposal was meant to re-integrate the Western Sahara, on the basis of the UN Resolution 1541, stipulating that a colonised territory recovers its independence by reintegrating to an independent State of which it was a part before colonisation, either through negotiations or by free expression of the will of the inhabitants.

I must recall that the United Nations Resolution 1514 was recent at that time. Many colonised territories recovered their independence without having recourse to referendum including the recuperation by Morocco of the four abovementioned parts. The fifth part which is Sidi Ifni had to follow the same course.

In fact, a more forceful GA resolution N 2229 was adopted on December 20, 1966 which: “requests the administering power to take immediately the necessary steps to accelerate the decolonisation of Ifni and to determine with the Government of Morocco, bearing in mind the aspirations of the indigenous population, procedures, for the transfer of power in accordance with provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 XV.

By the Summer of 1967, the Franco Government decided to enter into negotiations with Morocco over Ifni, a territory that was ceded back to Morocco on 29 July 1969. The accord was not contested neither by Algeria, nor by the OAU or at the UN. Yet, the Western Sahara and Sidi Ifni were one single issue within international organisations. Only two parties were negotiating about these territories namely; Morocco and Spain.

By splitting this issue into two parts Western Sahara on one part and Sidi Ifni on the other part, the Spanish colonizer was trying to make his occupation of parts of the Moroccan territory last as long as possible known today as Western Sahara and was named by International Organisations “the Spanish Sahara”.

New data of international politics have been added on the mechanisms of the United Nations due to the Cold War. Records are no longer treated as historical rights, but rather based on belonging to the "Eastern bloc" or "Western bloc". Morocco was facing the entire block under the influence of the USSR.

To weaken Morocco who was judged as an enemy of this bloc, they tried to prevent him from any possibility to recover back his Western Sahara. It is in this context that the Polisario Front was formally created in 1973.

Spain announced on 20 August 1974 the intention to hold a referendum in the Western Sahara early in 1975. King Hassan II, retaliated the same day by stating in a press conference that “Morocco prefers direct diplomatic negotiations and peaceful means”.

On 30 September 1974, Morocco called upon the UN General Assembly to refer the Saharan issue to the International Court of Justice. Subsequently, a GA resolution was adopted on 13 December1974 referring the case to the ICJ to give an advisory opinion.

The question the ICJ had to answer was one and only one:

"Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakia El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?"

What Were the Legal Ties of This Territory with the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian Entity?"

By this Advisory opinion, the ICJ recognised the existence of legal ties of allegiance (Bay’a) between the Moroccan Kings and tribes of Western Sahara. Those being the same bonds I referred to as the traditional links in the independent Moroccan State since its creation In 789.

On the basis of the ICJ consultative opinion confirming ‘historic links between the Moroccan Kings and the inhabitants of the Western Sahara’, King Hassan II, (you can refer to professor Pennell states p339), declared on 16 October on national television that the court had acknowledged traditional links and these validated the claim to sovereignty. He called on the Moroccan people to liberate the Sahara peacefully by marching across the border; the Spanish army would never fire on an unarmed procession. That was the peaceful Green March.

The Security Council asked Spain to negotiate with Morocco. In the sixth negotiations, Morocco recuperated from Spain his territory, the sixth one before Ceuta and Melilia.

The countries of the bloc linked to the USSR, provided the polisario, created and based in Algeria, by all military, financial and human support. This has transformed the issue from a case of colonial struggle between Morocco and Spain into a fight of armed separatists supported at the international arena by the neighbouring State that host it.

Since then, and because of the cold war, the question of Sahara took a new turning point.

However , Morocco remained faithful to its politics based on the peaceful negotiation to solve his conflicts. And at the same time legitimately defending his territories from the armed aggression from the “polisario”.

To safeguard the future, Morocco has never tried to retaliate against his aggressors who used to attack him during 15 years from the neighbouring territory Algeria.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

King Hassan II, in response to the UN Secretary General’s appeal for a “search of a peaceful solution to the problem” and in response to Head of friendly States offered in June 1981 in the OAU Summit an immediate unilateral cease fire on condition that territories under his responsibility were not attacked. He also proposed the organisation of a referendum under the auspices of the OAU.

Once the OAU declared incapable to hold the referendum and due to its recognition of a fictive entity in the disputed territory in 1984 without the organisation of referendum, the file was transmitted to the UN in 1985 which created in 19 April 1991 the MINURSO.

The United Nations Secretary General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, presented a peace plan on 11 August 1988 that was accepted by all concerned parties on 30 August 1988 and subsequently a Settlement Plan was endorsed by the Security Council in June 1990 and the following year the UN brokered a cease—fire implementation on 6 September 1991.

The Settlement Plan comprised a transitional period, the repatriation of refugees, the exchange of prisoners of war and the setting up of an international peace-keeping force, MINURSO, to monitor the ceasefire and the planning and the organisation of a referendum on the basis of the establishment of lists of the eligible voters corresponding to the 5 criteria among which the Spanish census was only one.

Erik Jensen, who served as head of the Unite Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) from 1994 to 1998, states in his book “Western Sahara, Anatomy of a Stalemate, that “in September, King Hassan addressed the United Nation General Assembly saying: “Morocco tells you that it wishes a referendum. Morocco tells you that it is prepared to hold this referendum as of tomorrow if you want. Morocco is ready to grant all the conditions necessary for all observers wherever they may come from so that there can be a cease-fire and so that a just, fair and true consultation may follow. Finally, Morocco is solemnly committed to the results of the referendum” (end quote) p33.

The Polisario, says Erik Jensen, “never budged from its focus on an electorate based on the 1974 census” made by the Spanish colonizer power” p59. Morocco insisted to include all Sahrawi who moved to northern provinces of Morocco to flee Spanish domination. Erik Jensen exposes this argument as follows: “Te fact that many Sahrawis, including several of the Polisario leaders outside Western Sahara at the time of the census, mainly in Morocco, reinforced the argument: these were people who moved readily in and out of the territory to be with fellow tribesmen, to escape foreign domination, for education, commerce, and other reasons, and had been especially prone to do so during the years of Spanish colonialism. Many had even fought with the Moroccan Army of Liberation.” End quote (p60).

The complexity of the identification process and the deliberate will of polisario to exclude many Sahrawi tribes from the process as well as the “fundamental divergences” between the parties led the General Secretary and the Security Council to conclude in the SG report S/2000/131 of 17 February 2000, paragraph 32 that “the implementation of the Plan, including the start of the transitional period, has been impeded by fundamental differences between the parties over the interpretation of its main provisions.

In view to these practical developments, in 2000, the UN Secretary General and his Personal Envoy, James Baker, concluded that the Settlement Plan could not be implemented and James Baker “ reiterated that there were many ways to achieve self-determination” (refer to UN Security Council Report/565/23 May 2003. Para.33.

On such basis, Morocco participated in 2000 in good will to many consultations convened by Baker in London and Berlin asking for a compromise on a third way based on a negotiated political solution to the conflict of Western Sahara.Against the principle of self determination, Algeria submitted on 2 November 2001 a proposal for the partition of the territory as well as the Sahrawi population.Baker’s second peace plan was presented in January 2003 and includes the options of independence, autonomy or full integration with Morocco.

Ladied and Gentlemen:

Once the UN Security Council realised in 2003 the Algerian-backed polisario was unable to accept the UN criteria on the eligibility of voters in a UN- sponsored referendum, the priority shifted to a “negotiated and mutually acceptable political solution”.

A turning point came about through a frank speech before the UN Security Council by Peter Van Walsum, the United Nations Secretary General’s special envoy and mediator in talks on Western Sahara from July 2005 to January 2006. In his assessment of the situation on the ground, he told the UN Security Council that “an independent Western Sahara was not a realistic proposition”.

In a spirit of realism and good will, HM Mohammed VI, the King of Morocco, came up on 2007 with a very precise plan granting the Sahraoui population a wider autonomy status in the framework of the Moroccan Sovereignty , that is now the only serious proposal on the negotiating table.

This proposal has been well received and supported by the International Community. It has broken the deadlock and created a new dynamic within the Security Council that qualifies it as “serious and credible”. UN reports have since underlined the importance of “realism and the spirit of

14 compromise”, two core virtues of the Moroccan Autonomy Initiative, and called for intense and substantial negotiations on its basis.

Instead of concluding my presentation by an assessment that may be judged subjective, permit me to quote two international and independent experts; namely: Mr. Javier Tajadura Tejada, Constitutional Law Professor from the University of Bilbao- Spain, and Mr. Benoit Pelletier, Professor at the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Law- Canada during the Round Table of Geneva, 17 March 2011, on the margins of the 16th Session of the Human Rights Council:

1) Mr. Javier Tajadura says: “The Moroccan proposal doesn’t grant autonomy as such, but contains a proposal open to negotiation with the other party to the dispute. The proposal is not a closed project but a starting point, a basic text open to negotiation. As stated in article 8 it is the draft “autonomy statute which shall be submitted to the population concerned for a referendum”.

2) As for Mr. Benoit Pelletier, he states that: “The various provisions of this Initiative, and particularly articles 1,2,3,7,9,10 and, 11, clearly attest to Morocco’s willingness to find a final, or at least a long term solution to this more than thirty years old conflict. Morocco indeed openly acknowledges the stalemate on the issue of the Western Sahara and is committed to doing its utmost to reach a mutually acceptable political solution and to put an end to the separation and exile of the Sahrawi. It also acknowledges that it is important to find a consensus-based and fair solution to end the impasse”.

All what has been said shows clearly how much the Kingdom of Morocco is committed to the peaceful settlement of all the conflicts pertaining to its sovereignty through negotiation. And that is the reason why I consider Morocco as an exemplar case in this matter.

Thank you

Mohamed MAEL-AININ Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco

Document:

Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region, presented to the United Nations on 11 April 2007

References:

Ali Bahaijoub, Western Sahara Conflict (Historical, Regional and International Dimensions), North South Books, London, 2010.

Edmund Burke, Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: pre-colonial protest and resistance, 1860-1912, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1976.

Erik Jensen, Western Sahara, Anatomy of a Stalemate, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2005.

E.D.Morel, Morocco in Diplomacy, Smith Elder, London 1912.

Pierre Parent, The Truth about Morocco, Flushing, New York 1953.

C.R. Pennell, Morocco since 1830: A History, New York University Press, New York, 2000.

Round Table of Geneva, Democracy and the Human Rights dimension in the Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region, Geneva, March 17th, 2011.