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Reform Or Revolution? : the Aquino Government and Prospects for the Philippines

Reform Or Revolution? : the Aquino Government and Prospects for the Philippines

EAST-WEST CENTER SPECIAL REPORT

Reform or Revolution?

The Aquino Government and Prospects for the

A Gateway in Between and America

KEITH B. RICHBURG

Reform or Revolution?

The Aquino Government and Prospects for the Philippines

September 1991

THE EAST-WEST CENTER Jt HONOLULU, HAWAII Contents

The Aquino Legacy: What Happened? 3

The Communist Party 9

The Rise of the Coup Factor 11

Roots of Unrest 13

The Military's Factions 16

Washington and : Friends Forever? 19

Conclusion: Towards 1992 24

Notes 26

This Special Report is one of a series produced by the staff and visiting fellows of the Special Projects unit of the East-West Center. The series focuses on timely, critical issues concerning the , Asia, and the Pacific and is intended for a wide audience of those who make or influence policy decisions throughout the region.

This paper may be quoted in full or in part without further permission. Please credit the author and the East-West Center. The Center would be grateful for cop• ies of articles, speeches, or other references to this paper.

Please address comments or inquiries to: Special Projects, East-West Center, 1777 East-West Road, Honolulu, Hawaii, 96848.

Telephone: 808-944-7602. Fax: 808-944-7670. Summary

THE STEAMING VOLCANO of Mt. Pinatubo million for America's continued use only of and its devastating after-effects have emerged as Subic Bay Naval Station. a sad but compelling metaphor for the disaster- Coping with this disaster could well define the prone Philippines under the administration of remaining months of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. President Corazon C. Aquino. Finding jobs for the unemployed, housing for From the high hopes of the "" refugees, and money to replace lost revenues will revolt in 1986, the country has lurched from be the standard by which many will crisis to crisis, seeing its modest gains in reviving judge the Aquino government. the economy and rebuilding political institu• tions repeatedly battered and set back by right- After five and one-half years in office, Mrs. wing coup attempts, leftwing , Aquino's record does not offer much encourage• secessionist movements, government incompe• ment. Her government's failure to respond ade• tence, corruption, and a raft of natural disasters. quately to growing demands for change over the The result has been a government that has been last five years has emboldened forces on the reactive and often paralyzed by events beyond political extremes advocating more revolution• its control. ary action.

Mt. Pinatubo's eruption has come as the Philip• On the left, the Communist Party of the Philip• pines began to recover after the and pines shows signs of stagnation. But as long as the fall in world oil prices. Now, the 15 percent the government flounders on promises of re• unemployment rate is likely to worsen, and the form, the radical left will remain a threat. On the government may be forced to revise, again, its right, military mutineers who have styled them• projected growth in gross national product, selves "reformists" have attempted to co-opt the which was but 0.2 percent in early 1991. banner of progress, and will likely remain a source of instability. Perhaps most important for the economy, the volcano has forced the United States to abandon Also unsettled is the future of the Philippines' its sprawling . The continuing relationship with its former colonial master, the volcano threat has made the base inoperable; the United States. Mrs. Aquino has failed to articu• fine ash renders computer instruments unusable late a clear and coherent policy and to build a and is a hazard to jet engines. Manila has been consensus over issues such as the U.S. military forced to accept an agreement for just $203 presence. KEITH B. RICHBURG was the Journalist-in-Residence at the East-West Center from September 1990 to September 1991. For four years before that, he was the bureau chief for The Washington Post and was based in Manila. From there, he traveled extensively in the Philippines and other countries that are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and in the nations of Indochina. Mr. Richburg was earlier a national staff reporter for the Post in Washington and a metropolitan reporter in Maryland and the District of Columbia. He earned a B.A. in political science in 1980 from the University of Michigan, where he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa and a Harry S Truman Scholar. He was awarded an M.Sc. in government by the London School of Economics in 1984. Reform or Revolution?

ayor Romeo Corpuz of San Marcelino, a farming town two hours' drive north of Manila, sat in The Aquino Mthe ruins of his municipal building. He seemed at times close to tears as he tried to summarize the damage to his town since the catastrophic June 15 eruption of Mt. Government Pinatubo, the long-dormant volcano nearby. Only about half of the town's 37,000 inhabitants remained, and for them there was no work and only the food provided by and relief agencies. Ninety percent of the town's houses had collapsed under the weight of the volcanic ash. And at noontime—a full three weeks after that major eruption— Prospects the volcano was still spewing out ash each day, turning the midday sky as black as midnight.

for the "There is no peace of mind for the people in this town," the mayor said, explaining how the volcano could remain active for years to come. "They cannot go on with the Philippines rehabilitation work. They cannot rebuild their houses because they are afraid. There is nothing."1

San Marcelino, in province on island, KEITH B. RICHBURG was perhaps the town hardest hit by the unexpected eruption. Overall, across the volcano-affected provinces, Philippine officials estimate that some 650,000 people have lost their livelihoods, 27,000 hectares of farmland have been wiped out, and more than a half-million head of cattle and poultry perished.2 In addition, continuing mudslides—caused by monsoon rains releasing volcanic debris from the mountain slopes—have displaced tens of thousands of villagers, many of whom have streamed into Manila. Their presence has Abbreviations added pressure on a capital already suffering from inadequate housing and high unemploy• AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines. ment. CARP Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, Aquino's land reform law. The steaming volcano, with all its devastating after-effects, has emerged as a sad but compel• CPP Communist Party of the Philip• pines. ling metaphor for the disaster-prone Philippines under the administration of Pres• GMA-7 A Manila television and radio sta• ident Corazon C. Aquino. From the high tion seized by rebel troops in 1987. hopes of the "People Power" revolt in 1986, NBI National Bureau of Investigation, the country has lurched from crisis to crisis, Manila's equivalent of the FBI. seeing its modest gains in reviving the econ• NDF National Democratic Front, the um• omy and rebuilding political institutions re• brella group for leftist organiza• peatedly battered and set back by rightwing tions. coup attempts, leftwing terrorism, secessionist NPA New People's Army, the communist movements, government incompetence, cor• military wing. ruption, and a raft of natural disasters. The PAF . result has been a government that is at best reactive, and at worst, paralyzed by events RAM Reform the Armed Forces Move• ment. beyond its control. SFP Soldiers of the Filipino People, the Marcos loyalist faction. Filipinos have grown accustomed to picking up the pieces following disasters—including a YOU Young Officers Union. bloody coup attempt in 1989, a massive earth• quake on Luzon in 1990, and a devastating typhoon later that year that largely wrecked the once-prosperous central island of . In addition, and perhaps most important for But unlike those upheavals, the volcano's ef• the long-term economic picture, the volcano fects linger, creating what John McBeth of the has forced the United States to abandon its Far Eastern Economic Review has termed the sprawling Clark Air Base in nearby . "economic strangulation" of the struggling The continuing volcano threat has made the country.3 base virtually inoperable; the fine ash—some• thing the consistency of baby powder—rend• The latest disaster has also come as the Philip• ers finely calibrated computer instruments pines was beginning to see signs of recovery unusable and is a hazard to jet engines. Clark after the end of the Gulf War and the fall in had figured into the Philippines' request for world oil prices. Now, because of the volcano, $830 million in annual U.S. assistance. In the the country's 15 percent unemployment rate aftermath of the volcano, Manila has been is likely to worsen, and the government may forced to accept an agreement for only $203 be forced to revise, again, its projected figure million for America's continued use only of for growth in gross national product, which Subic Bay Naval Station in Olongapo.5 Clark's was a scant 0.2 percent for the first three impact on the economy of surrounding Ange• months of 1991.4 les City is formidable; the base employs 42,000 workers directly and indirectly.

2 Reform or Revolution? Coping with this disaster could well define the remaining months of Corazon C. Aquino's The Aquino Legacy: presidency. As San Marcelino Mayor Corpuz put it, "I know we can recover if the national What Happened? leadership will help us." Finding jobs for the unemployed, housing for the refugees, and It was an uncharacteristically humble, some• money to replace the lost revenues will be the what chastened who made standard by which many Filipinos ultimately the long journey in July from Malacanang judge the success or failure of the Aquino Palace to the old Marcos-era parliament build• government in its pledge to speak for the poor ing in to address the assembled and the dispossessed. members of the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives. In many ways, the very fact So far, after five-and-a-half years in office, Mrs. that these bodies were meeting at all was a Aquino's record does not offer much encour• testament to Mrs. Aquino's early success in agement. restoring the formal structures of after two decades of decay. But what she had The Aquino government's failure to respond to say in this, her final state-of-the-union ad• adequately to growing demands for change dress, seemed to speak more to her failures over the last five years has emboldened forces than to her successes. on the political extremes advocating more revolutionary—and violent—action. "God knows, we have made mistakes," Mrs. Aquino said. "I hope that history will judge me On the left, the Communist Party of the Phil• ... favorably ... because, as God as my wit• ippines (CPP) is showing signs of stagnation, ness, I honestly did the best I could."6 as the movement is dogged by a more efficient counterinsurgency campaign and an erosion The contrast to past Aquino speeches was of its ideological base. But as long as the gov• stark. Typically, in her addresses to Congress ernment flounders on its promises of reform, or in speaking to the press, Mrs. Aquino pre• the radical left will remain a long-term threat. ferred to extoll her successes while railing in strident language against all critics. In one On the opposite side, military mutineers who address, she chided the unshaven military mu• have styled themselves "reformists" have also tineers by taunting, "Some people don't like attempted to co-opt the banner of progressive the way I dress. Well, I don't like the way they change and will likely remain a source of in• look. I am in power and they are out." Mrs. stability not only for Aquino but whoever Aquino's admission of "mistakes" seems to succeeds her. Also unsettled is the future mirror the general sense of the country—the course of the Philippines' relationship with its sense of disappointment, disillusionment, former colonial power, the United States, as frustration and even despair. A reporter who Mrs. Aquino has failed to articulate a clear and lived in Manila for four years during Mrs. coherent policy and build a national consen• Aquino's rule, and has returned there twice sus over such divisive issues as the U.S. mili• since, found by 1991 the public mood of dis• tary presence. content palpable. Almost everyone, including some of the president's staunch early support• ers, spoke about having been let down and were waiting to see what new presidential elections might bring in 1992, since Mrs.

Prospects for the Philippines 3 Aquino has repeatedly said she will not be a • Mrs. Aquino's personal failings as a politi• candidate for reelection. cian and leader;

• The vociferousness of her opponents who This disillusion stands in sharp contrast to the never gave her sufficient "running room," heady days of great expectations following the or what Americans might call the presiden• dramatic "People Power" revolt of February, tial "honeymoon"; 1986, that ousted the corrupt dictatorship of Ferdinand E. Marcos and brought Cory • And, finally, the nature of the events of 1986 Aquino to power. The coalition of middle-class that, in retrospect, appear to have been Filipinos, the poor, the business community, more of a "restoration" than the "revolu• and the democratic left forces that combined tion" they have been popularly called. to stage the 1986 revolt were all filled with high hopes that the new government could ease the country's economic slide, restore the On one level, Mrs. Aquino's failings make for integrity of governmental institutions, and a classic case of the theory of heightened ex• usher in a new era of popular democracy. pectations. That is, popular demands follow• ing the fall of Marcos were too high to have It would even seem fair to say that the Philip• been satisfied by any president, much less one pine revolution served as a global model for with no political experience like Corazon peaceful transitions from authoritarian rule to Aquino, a housewife and widow of a popular democracy from Eastern Europe to Burma.7 opposition leader. Mrs. Aquino herself appears Mrs. Aquino became Time magazine's Woman to accept this explanation for the shortcom• of the Year for 1986 and was nominated for ings of her government. In one interview, in the . October, 1989, just before a sixth bloody coup attempt to oust her, Mrs. Aquino told me: Within months, however, the hopes of Febru• "People were just expecting miracles because ary started to fade. The Philippines no longer of the seemingly easy transition from dictator• was noted for its "People Power" revolt, but for ship to democracy.... When I was running its constant attempted coups and military mu• for president, I did not promise many things. tinies. The government came to be character• In fact, at that time, I think we were all just ized by incompetence, inefficiency, and concerned that this country be brought back 9 bickering among senior cabinet officials and to democracy." between the executive and legislative branches. Official, high-level corruption again In one sense, Mrs. Aquino was correct. A re• became prevalent, forcing Aquino's longtime view of her campaign speeches found few backers in the Catholic Church to issue a pas• specific promises and only vague references to toral letter condemning the practice. Aquino improving the lives of Filipinos and curbing herself acknowledged in 1989 what many Fil• abuses of human rights. Yet during her cam• ipinos had already been saying. "Corruption," paign various groups whose support she she conceded, "is again a way of public life."8 needed began grafting on programs and poli• cies they assumed she would support if What happened? The answers are several. elected. And while Aquino may have made few They include: promises during her campaign, she did appear to raise expectations for sweeping reform once • Systemic flaws that no Philippine president she was in office. For example, she unveiled a can easily correct; land-reform plan that she pledged would be

4 Reform or Revolution? "comprehensive" and contribute to "the up• no longer controlled from the presidential lifting of the Filipino masses." She said land palace. But she soon found that her legislative reform would be the centerpiece of her admin• proposals became bottled up in Congress as istration. various factions and entrenched interests as• serted their power. The press became a con• But the law was gutted by the landlord-domi• stant, harping critic. And Mrs. Aquino found nated Congress, while Mrs. Aquino stood by many of her rulings and decrees reversed by passively refusing to get in• the court system she helped volved in the debate. Then to unshackle. its implementation was stalled by bureaucratic inef• For example, following the ficiency, the oppositionist bloody December, 1989, tactics of big landowners, coup attempt, Mrs. Aquino and finally by corruption tried to project an image of scandals.10 So far, few land toughness with the plotters titles have been distributed by ordering the jailing of to poor farmers. the lone opposition sena• tor, , on It should be noted that Mrs. charges that he aided the Aquino's early efforts at re• failed mutiny. But days form were often frustrated later, the Philippine Su• by her political adversar• preme Court ordered Enrile ies—the opposition politi• freed and the charges cians and, in the violent against him thrown out be• extreme, the military muti• cause, technically, the neers who were intent on overthrowing her. charge lodged—rebellion complexed with Much of her early time in office was spent murder—did not exist under Philippine law. fending off various contenders to the throne, The land-reform debacle offers another exam• including her defense minister; her vice-pres• ple of how the president found her efforts ident; ex-President Marcos and his , thwarted by the very Congress she was respon• Imelda, who were underwriting a destabiliza- sible for recreating. When Aquino introduced tion campaign from Honolulu; Communist land-reform legislation, she left the key details insurgents; and a restless military. Mrs. Aquino for Congress to decide, only to find the entire also appears needlessly to have antagonized program gutted by a legislature dominated by many local political bosses by her decision to landlords—including her brother, Rep. Jose dismiss summarily all local government of• ("Peping") , who led the anti-land ficeholders—all the mayors and governors reform bloc in the House of Representatives. and councilmen throughout the 73 prov• inces^—and replace them with handpicked Many of those obstacles could have been over• "officers-in-charge" loyal to her. come had Mrs. Aquino proven more adept in the use of her executive powers, and thus the In many ways, Mrs. Aquino became a victim president herself must be at least partly of her initial success. She did restore constitu• blamed for her failings. She was hampered by tional democracy to the Philippines, includ• the lack of a political party or "machine" to ing a vociferously free press, a fiercely inde• oversee enactment of her policies, and she pendent bicameral legislature, and a judiciary failed to marshall her vast reservoir of popular

Prospects for the Philippines 5 support, the "People Power" that propelled had called for major reforms during the her to office. election, it became apparent that her gov• ernment was not prepared to take quick Much of the reason for this failing has to do action on controversial Issues such as land reform.11 with Mrs. Aquino's often-stated aversion to the use of presidential powers in a dictatorial fashion. Her aversion is understandable, since Aquino readily acknowledged her distaste for she campaigned for—and won—election as a what she considered excessive use of executive candidate opposed to the authoritarian powers and even the appearance of acting in of Marcos. Once elected, she refused to involve a dictatorial fashion. In my interview with her herself in what she saw as the prerogative of in October, 1989, she expressed frustration the legislative branch, and in the year-long over the difficulty of trying to satisfy demands

What is happening now is that people would

like to have the benefits of a dictatorship

at the same time living under a democracy. **

period before the new Congress was estab• for quick action within the constraints im• lished in 1987, she refused to exercise the vast posed by a democratic form of government. decree-making executive powers granted to She also blamed the Filipino people for not her under the interim (the so- understanding or appreciating that democ• called Freedom Constitution of 1986-87) that racy is by nature a slow-moving process. was hastily drawn up to replace the old Marcos constitution. "What is happening now is that people would like to have the benefits of a dictatorship at the Analyzing the early months of the Aquino same time living under a democracy," she told presidency, political scientist and Philippine- me. "When they refer to me as being weak and watcher David G. Timberman, writing in a ineffective, they would like to see the forceful- journal called Southeast Asian Af• ness of a dictator. But they are not willing to fairs, observed: give up their freedoms either, in exchange for the rapid decisions of a dictator."12 The Aquino government... often seemed paralyzed by indecision and internal dis• agreements—even though the "Freedom The problem with Mrs. Aquino's philosophy Constitution" gave it powers equal to or of restraint is that the quick exercise of execu• greater than those possessed by Marcos tive powers may be precisely what her strug• Progress on key socio-economic issues was gling country needs. Experiences in the more frustratingly slow... . And although Aquino prosperous countries of East Asia appear to

6 Reform or Revolution? have demonstrated the advantages of a kind tion. The problem is true of many newly inde• of liberal authoritarianism when it is directed pendent Asian countries, where the effort at towards the goal of national economic devel• "nation building" is a continuing process and opment. This has been the case for the mili• popular identification with the larger interests tary-bureaucratic regimes of , of the nation is still relatively weak. But the , and and for the strong• Philippines has the additional problem of hav• man, single-party states like Singapore, all of ing a relatively weak "state," meaning central which have seen impressive economic government. Kerkvliet pointed out that gov• growth, relative political stability, and na• ernment expenditures in the Philippines are tional development over the last decade.13 quite low and shrinking as a percentage of GNP—only 11 percent in 1986, for example, A case could also be made that a stronger hand compared with 22 percent in and 26 at the center in dealing firmly with military percent in Thailand and Indonesia. mutineers in the early days might have been sufficient to stave off subsequent coup at• 2. The close relationship with the United tempts. The commission empaneled to inves• States constrains independent action. tigate the causes of the December, 1989, revolt Kerkvliet noted two instances, the problem of said in its initial report: debt repayment and land reform, in which the dominant position of the United States in the While there is understandably a reluctance Philippine economy has limited the govern• by President Aquino to exercise power in a ment's freedom of movement. On the prob• manner that might be compared with for• lem of the debt, there was a strong sentiment mer President Marcos, a democracy in a among the Philippine political elite for some crisis of transition calls for a firmer and more direct hand at the helm.14 kind of selective moratorium on repayment, particularly on questionable loans obtained The Aquino government's modest efforts at by the discredited Marcos regime, until the reform have also been constrained by systemic new government could sort out its own eco• flaws in the Philippine body politic. Indeed, nomic priorities. But fears of U.S. retaliation, these flaws run so deep that it would probably among other reasons, prompted the govern• be fair to say that any Philippine president— ment to adopt a policy of repaying bad or even one more disposed to the use of executive questionable loans while asking for debt relief authority—would have been similarly sty• only as part of overall aid negotiations. mied. Political scientist and Philippine scholar Benedict J. Kerkvliet of the University of Ha• 3. Economic disparities. This is perhaps the waii has identified what he termed five "broad most glaring feature of the Philippines, as even features of the Philippine politics" that have the first-time visitor will notice that Manila is persisted and acted as constraints on the gov• a city of Mercedes limousines and mansions at ernment.15 They are: one extreme and ragged street beggars and sprawling squatter communities at the other. 1. A relatively weak nation-state apparatus. According to Kerkvliet's calculations, the top The Philippine archipelago, comprising more 20 percent of the population had incomes 23 than 6,000 islands and encompassing a myr• times that of the bottom 20 percent. And the iad of ethnic and linguistic groupings, is rela• gap is growing. tively new as a "nation," despite more than three hundred years of Spanish colonization 4. A strong system of patronage. Much in and forty years under American administra• the Philippines (as elsewhere in Asia) is built

Prospects for the Philippines 7 on ties of family, province, linguistic group, and fraternity. The patronage system parallels Philippine and often supplants formal lines of authority. Political Parties

5. A blurred distinction between what is LDP Lakas ng Demokratikong Pillpino public and what is private. This relates to the patronage system and is known in the West as LP Liberal Party corruption. In Philippine terms, it means that PDP Pilipino Democratic Party public monies—for example, funding for a NP provincial highway project—are often distrib• uted as the private reserve of provincial politi• PP Partido Pilipino cians to support family and village kin.

These features of Philippine life have persisted for , and it was perhaps unrealistic to believe than any president operating within the political stage, the political elite that had traditional constraints could have molded an dominated Philippine politics until the entire entirely new and modern nation. Traditional process was hijacked by Marcos and his new patterns were allowed to reassert themselves breed of elite, the so-called crony capitalists. because of the nature of the street and military mutiny of 1986 that led to the ouster The two elections held during Aquino's first of the Marcos dictatorship and the ascension two years—the May, 1987, congressional elec• of Cory Aquino. tions and thejanuary, 1988, local government balloting—were supposed to mark the consol• That changeover has been mistakenly labeled idation of the gains of the 1986 "revolution." a "revolution." Mistakenly, I say, because a The elections were to signal a shift away from revolution, in the classic sense, would have traditional politics ruled by "guns, goons, and uprooted traditional patterns and practices. gold" to what became popularly known as the The old system would have been broken down "new politics" ushered in by Aquino and Peo• in a true revolution, and a new system would ple Power. There were some changes. The con• have been instituted in its place. A true Phil• gressional elections did bring some young, ippine revolution would have brought about previously unknown candidates, who were pervasive political, social, and economic re• backed by Mrs. Aquino, into the House and structuring. Senate, while the subsequent gubernatorial elections on the surface appeared to be a rejec• tion of old-school politics. The average age of Rather than a revolution, the events of Febru• the winning governors was four years less than ary, 1986, might best be called a "restoration." that under their predecessors in the Marcos The term was chosen with care. It refers on one era, while only four of the old-school gover• level to the restoration of past patterns and nors remained (in the total of 73 provinces).16 practices—the traditional pattern of feudalis• ts, patronage-based dynastic politics that per• meated the Philippines until it was disrupted But the changes were far fewer than the initial by two decades of Marcos's authoritarian rule. numbers might suggest. In the first place, ac• But in another sense, "restoration" also refers cording to the private Institute for Popular to the revival of some of the same players on Democracy in Manila (quoted in the Far East-

8 Reform or Revolution? em Economic 'Review), 129 of the 200 elected And both pose serious, long-term threats not congressmen were identified as leaders of old only to the Aquino government but to what• political clans, while 39 were scions of estab• ever government succeeds it in 1992. lished provincial oligarchies. The institute found that 65 percent of the new congressmen had pre-1987 political experience, and only 15 percent were political newcomers.17 The new young governors, as well, appeared to mark a The Communist Party passing of the torch to the next of the same old family dynasties rather than a In the first half of the , the CPP and its shift in political power. military wing, the New People's Army (NPA), were considered the greatest threat to Philip• Thus it would appear that while the Aquino pine stability. The phenomonal growth of the 1986 election and "revolution" are credited insurgency under Marcos—fed, in fact, by the with bringing a new period of political democ• old regime's dictatorial repression—led many racy and reform, what actually occurred could U.S. and foreign analysts to predict an even• be more accurately called a "restoration" of tual communist takeover unless reforms were old-school politics. As the traditional oli• instituted. Fear of the insurgency was one of garchs, family dynasties, and provincial bosses the reasons that key figures in the Reagan reasserted their longtime grip on the country, administration lobbied for a new policy of the chances of true reform—at least through breaking with Marcos and opening ties to the the formal, political and legislative process— democratic opposition and dissident groups in were diminished. The rape of Aquino's land- the military. Washington persuaded Marcos to reform legislation in the landlord-dominated call a surprise, or "snap" presidential election Congress was ample demonstration of how before his constitutional term expired, and the traditional politicians are inherently con• when evidence of widespread fraud surfaced, servative and not so much interested in reform State Department and Pentagon insiders per• as in preserving the status quo, and all of its suaded a reluctant President Reagan to with• inequalities. draw support from the old regime.

So far, only two identifiable nationwide With Mrs. Aquino, and the restoration of dem• groups are advocating broad-based systemic ocratic institutions, the country was seen as change—including breaking the power of the having a greater chance to stem the growth of traditional oligarchs, redistribution of in• the insurgency, which by 1986 boasted a peak come, and "comprehensive" land reform. of some 24,000 guerilla fighters (half of them They are the Communist Party of the Philip• armed). From that peak, however, the commu• pines (CPP) on the left and a loose alliance of nist insurgency has seen a steady decline. A military rebels, including the Reform the combination of factors over the last five years Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and the has led to this diminishing of the Com• Young Officers Union (YOU), on the right. The munists' strength and an erosion of their sup• sincerity of each group in its advocacy of re• port. Among them were: form is highly questionable, although both claim to be speaking for the poor, the rural • The ill-advised decision of the CPP Central masses, and the economically dispossessed. Committee to boycott the 1986 "snap" elec• Both advocate violent, revolutionary change. tion. The Communists thereby missed an

Prospects for the Philippines 9 opportunity to participate in the democratic guerilla activities in the cities, including the process and later to claim a stake in helping killing of Americans. The debate became so Mrs. Aquino succeed to the presidency. intense—and so public—that at one point, the captured head of the New People's Army, A newly invigorated Philippine armed interviewed in prison, warned against the forces, flushed with more American assis• party's shift towards "military adventurism" tance and heightened morale following the and said the party needed to concentrate on 1986 revolt. The Armed Forces of the Phil• the more tedious work of education in the

ippines (AFP) began scoring impressive 19 villages. gains against the insurgents, who in the past had the upper hand in some areas. • A spate of of police officers and local officials in Manila by communist Improvement in the AFP intelligence capa• hit teams called "sparrow units" because the bilities that led to the arrest of several key killers were able to strike their victims CPP Central Committee members. They quickly and flitter away like tiny sparrows. include Saturnino Ocampo and his wife, (The AFP at one point formed its own unit Carolina ("Bobby") Malay—perhaps the to track the sparrows and named it The best-known Central Committee members— Eagles.) The sparrow killings appear to have who were arrested on July 27,1987, and NPA drained the insurgents of much of their chief Romulo Kintanar, who was arrested public sympathy and support. with his wife while being fitted for a pair of eyeglasses at a hospital in early Au• • Recruiting difficulties. The party reportedly gust, 1991. AFP intelligence also led to the had trouble attracting new members from capture of Communist Party computer disk• among its urban bases, the squatter commu• ettes that authorities described as a veritable nities and particularly on college campuses. treasure trove of information on the insur• gents, their internal debates, safehouses, • The growth in some major outlying prov• and international financing. inces, like and parts of Minda• nao, of military-backed vigilante groups. The collapse of communism in Eastern Some groups were linked to small tribal re• Europe and the electoral defeat of the San• ligious sects, like the Tadtad in Davao, dinistas in Nicaragua. The global crisis in whose name means "chop to pieces" be• communism sapped the Philippine insur• cause of their propensity for hacking their gents of their ideological underpinnings. victims up with machetes. Others, like the While the Communists consistently claim• older, established Alsa Masa in , ed that they were building an indigenous included Communist defectors. The Alsa "Philippine model" of socialism based on Masa was responsible for chasing the Com• the country's internal condition, they had munists out of the Agdao district of the city often, in interviews, mentioned Nicaragua that, before 1986, was so heavily Commu• as a potential model.18 nist-infested that it was referred to as "Nicaragdao." The vigilantes were accused Internal schisms within the party over the of using violent methods and abusing wisdom of sticking with the Maoist, rural human rights, and there were various at• strategy of slowly building support in the tempts to bring them under more direct AFP countryside versus a Leninist, urban strat• control. But there is little doubt about their egy that would put more stress on violent effectiveness.20

Reform or Revolution? In short, the Philippine Communists were made it his handmaiden in the administration never able to adopt a coherent strategy for of . Since becoming independent dealing with the Aquino presidency. Aside in 1946, the Philippines had never known a from their admitted blunder of boycotting the period where the military ever came close to "snap" election, the Communists never devel• threatening direct intervention into politics. oped a convincing argument for opposing a It was stunning because the form of military generally popular democratically elected pres• was the mutiny and the attempted ident whom most Filipinos continue to view coup. In the span of just-a few years, the as personally honest and incorruptible. Philippines went from being known as the country of "People Power" to the country with In the first year of the Aquino administration, the most coup attempts in rapid succession. the Communists did show themselves to be somewhat adept at taking advantage of what The number of military coup attempts under the president referred to as the country's new Aquino is generally placed at six, although "democratic space." They participated in some definition is required. Some of the mili• peace talks with the government—and even tary revolts might be best described as just won a ninety-day truce that allowed their that—revolts—or better still, as mutinies, members safe passage in Manila, free from the since it was unclear whether their ultimate threat of arrest, to move above ground and talk objective was to seize power. In other cases, openly with reporters. They continued their such as the so-called God Save The Queen infiltration of labor unions. Communist sym• operation in the fall of 1986, which led to the pathizers were able to use the new govern• ouster from the cabinet of Defense Minister ment's concern for human rights to raise Juan Ponce Enrile, no shots were ever fired. complaints against the military for its counter- insurgency activities in the provinces. But In that episode, the government claimed to after the end of the truce in early 1987, and have learned of the coup in advance and to the collapse of talks aimed at finding a com• have preempted it by sacking Enrile and reas• prehensive peace, the CPP-NPA returned to signing his top security aide, Col. Gregorio the underground and stepped up its "sparrow" "Gringo" Honasan. But Enrile has denied any attacks. The timing seemed to coincide with coup plot ever existed, and questions remain the radical left's general decline and internal as to whether "God Save The Queen" was an disarray. actual coup plan about to be implemented, or more the kind of backroom plotting and in• trigue that occurred every day in the Philip• pines. But whether the coup plot was real or The Rise of the exaggerated by the government, the central question remains; if a coup plot was discov• fcoup Factor ered and preempted, should it still be counted officially as a "coup attempt?" I think not. The rise of military factions as a major—and often violent—catalyst for political change By the standard definition of a "coup," Mrs. has been an unexpected and stunning devel• Aquino has survived only three actual at• opment during the Aquino administration. It tempts to oust her. The first was the bloody was unexpected since the Philippine military August, 1987, revolt where rebels led by had traditionally been apolitical until Marcos Honasan seized the main military headquar-

Prospects for the Philippines 11 ters, , and had to be bombed out. More than 50 people died in that revolt. Philippine Coup Attempts

The second was staged by a motley collection July 6, Takeover of the by of Marcos loyalists in January, 1987, timed to 1986 Marcos loyalists. disrupt the voting for a new Aquino constitu• Nov. 23, "God Save the Queen" alleged tion. Rebels simultaneously attacked several 1986 attempt in which Defense Minis• military camps and a television station around ter Enrile is sacked. Manila, but only the attack on the TV station Jan. 27, Attack on Manila military succeeded. Since only about two hundred 1987 camps and a television station, rebel soldiers ended up occupying the televi• which is often called the "GMA- sion station, GMA-7, the episode has since 7 Coup." been dismissed more as a comic opera coup April 18, Mutiny by Marcos loyalist than a serious military revolt. But that does 1987 troops at , the not dismiss the fact that the event started with country's main army camp, in the attacks on the camps. what is sometimes called the "Black Saturday Coup." It was quickly crushed. By far, the most serious of the real coup at• tempts was the revolt in December, 1989, in August 28, Coup attempt by Honasan. which more than a hundred people died and 1997 the rebel soldiers briefly occupied Manila's October Alleged plot by Marcos to main business and financial district, including 1988 launch a coup before his indict• several five-star hotels with their foreign ment on fraud and racketeering guests held as hostages. This was the most charges by a New York grand jury. was report• serious in that the largest number of officers edly seen in a Hawaii store buy• and soldiers were involved, and the revolt ing hundreds of pairs of combat appeared to attract some support from outly• boots. ing islands, including Cebu,- where rebel December Coup attempt with the loyalists, troops seized the Mactan Air Base and the 1989 RAM, and YOU. Cebu International Airport. It was well-coor• dinated, and, in contrast to other Philippine coup attempts, it was violent. On another, deeper level, however, it appeared With each successive coup attempt, the de• to reflect the "revolutionizing" of the Philip• mands of the rebels broadened, from strictly pine rebel military forces. They have gone military concerns—poor pay, inadequate from wanting to force a change in the military housing, a change in the military hierarchy, hierarchy—which would have amounted to and perceived lack of government support for making the civilian government subservient the anti-insurgency campaign—to a wide- to the wishes of the rebels—to wanting to seize ranging agenda of socio-economic concerns, power and run the country themselves. such as land reform and an end to corruption, family dynasties, and patronage. This seemed After each of the escalating coup attempts, the to reflect, at least in part, a deliberate attempt government focused on the undeniable statis• by the coup plot leaders to attract wider public tic that the vast majority of the armed forces support for their actions by trying to exploit stayed loyal to the constitution, the president, popular grievances against the government. and to the chain-of-command. But that claim

12 Reform or Revolution? ignores, first, that each successive attempt ap• She is not of their culture, and they not of hers. pears to have attracted a larger number and Many of the soldiers openly backed the reelec• broader cross-section of the military, culmi• tion of Marcos, and some were photographed nating in the December, 1989, coup attempt with red-and-blue "Marcos-Tolentino" stick• when some of the generals appointed by Mrs. ers affixed to their rifle butts. Many appear to Aquino were involved. Also, the last coup have been persuaded by Marcos's campaign attempt involved some of the country's youn• scare tactic alleging that Mrs. Aquino's closest gest and best-educated officers—captains and advisors were closet Communists, and that a lieutenants—suggesting that the discontent vote for her was a vote for communism. Mrs. reaches deep into the ranks and was not really Aquino herself inadvertently helped feed that a phenomenon of the martial-law years. belief by three early actions as president that further stoked military suspicions of her Third, that the majority did not openly back government's supposed leftist leanings. the rebels ignores what many reporters learned from talking with pro-government First, she ordered the release of about five soldiers in the camps and on the streets; while hundred persons considered to be political there was disagreement over the rebels' violent prisoners, including top Communists Jose course of action, there was widespread agree• Maria Sison, founder of the Communist Party ment with many of the issues and grievances of the Philippines, and Bernabe Buscayno, they raised. One young lieutenant colonel alias "Kumander (Commander) Dante," head who remained on the government side during of the New People's Army. Some Philippine the coup, but who referred to the plotters as officials reportedly had warned her not to "classmates, friends," told me during the coup include avowed Communists among those re• in December, 1989: "You are talking about leased, because it would risk a rupture between people who are politicized. They are moti• the government and the military. But in those vated. We have a lot of idealistic young people, early days, Mrs. Aquino—at least according to and they think their cause is right. A lot of her public statements—appeared to view Phil• what they are saying is justified." When I ippine communism as mainly an outgrowth asked him which side he would be on if the of the excesses of the Marcos regime. She was rebels staged another coup, he replied; "I will looking for a fresh start, and held out the olive decide later what I will do."21 branch of peace talks with the rebels.22

Second, Mrs. Aquino created a authorized to investigate past and present human rights abuses that had Roots of Unrest allegedly been committed by the military. This was later to become a source of tension be• At the outset, it is fair to say that in general, tween the government and the military. In the many of the soldiers do not like Mrs. Aquino. four years I spent traveling the Philippine And the reverse seems true; from the.outset of provinces and interviewing officers and men her six-year term, she has made known her in the field, the most common complaint was own dislike for, and suspicions of, the military that the troops consider the government to be establishment, which she blames, among one-sided on the human rights issue. other things, for the long incarceration and eventual of her husband, oppo• In their view, the Communist rebels were re• sition leader Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. sponsible for the greatest abuses of human

Prospects for the Philippines 13 rights—ambushes of military convoys, kid• military services. Ramos particularly was fond napping and assassinating village leaders, and of pointing out how the Philippines devoted in a few cases, massacring large numbers of a smaller percentage of the national budget to people during periods of internal party purges. its armed forces than any of the other five But investigating Communist atrocities fell countries in the Association of Southeast outside the charter of the human rights com• Asian Nations, despite the fact that the Philip• mission, which was responsible only for inves• pines was the only country still facing active tigating allegations of abuse by the military. insurgencies on two fronts (the Communists and Moslem secessionists in the South). Com• It should be noted, moreover, that the inter• parative figures on defense spending by the nationally accepted definition of a "human ASEAN states show this complaint to be based rights violation" usually refers to the violation in fart.23 of a person's rights by his government. But the way the average soldier saw it, if a Communist While the three actions by Mrs. Aquino seem killed him and his entire unit, there would be to have stoked the military's distrust of her no government investigation, but if a soldier government, they alone obviously do not ac• shot and killed one Communist, he was liable count for the depth of discontent and perva• to be brought up before the human rights sive politicization that would cause a faction commission to answer for his actions. of the soldiery to take the risky step of rising up in revolt against the established regime. Third, and equally important, Mrs. Aquino That politicization goes back to the early appointed to her government some longtime 1970s and Marcos's declaration of martial law. human rights lawyers and anti-government critics whom military officers and soldiers The conventional analysis of many Philippine considered to be either Communists or Com• military watchers, like political scientist and munist symathizers. There is no evidence that retired Col. Candido Filio, is that the AFP, as any of the advisors they most frequently the administrators of martial law beginning in named had any affiliation with the CPP or its 1972, enjoyed unprecedented powers. Officers front organization, the National Democratic served in the armed forces at the same time Front. But the fact those advisors had been they ran civilian departments and agencies. outspoken in their criticism of military abuses Marcos gave military officers wide influence was enough to raise suspicions in the minds over matters of government policy and pre• of some soldiers. Specifically criticized were served military loyalty by corrupting the pro• executive secretary ; legal aide motion system to ensure that his staunchest (later senator) Rene Saguisag; Arroyo's assis• supporters were in charge of key service posi• tant (and later natural resources secretary) Jun tions.24 Factoran; labor minister Augusto Sanchez; and local governments minister (later senator) The experience of the February, 1986, anti- Aquilino Pimentel. Marcos revolt—when the military for the first time intervened directly to change civilian A final complaint, voiced more by the military presidents and won widespread popular sup• top brass—including staunchly loyal officers port and backing from the Catholic Church— like former Chief of Staff and Defense Secre• was the deciding factor in the military's tary Fidel V. Ramos—is that the Aquino gov• crossover. It changed from a professional insti• ernment did not allocate enough national tution subservient to civilian command to a resources—in other words, money—to the force unto itself that reserved the right to

14 Reform or Revolution? intervene again. It has become something of a truism around the globe that once soldiers Officers Actively Involved in have tasted power, they often find it difficult December 1989 Coup Attempt to return to barracks. This was certainly the case in the Philippines, where the young offi• Brigadier Generals 7 cers who staged the revolt that ousted Marcos decided that they were thus the self-appointed Navy Commodore 1 watchdogs over the new regime they helped to install. Colonels 13

Paradoxically, part of that sense of mission Lieutenant Colonels 45 derives from the rebel soldiers' interpretation Captains 155 of a clause in the 1987 constitution supported by Mrs. Aquino. It declares that civilian rule is First Lieutenants 123 "at all times supreme," but goes on to say: "The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the Second Lieutenants 91 protector of the people and the state." Rebel• lious officers have interpreted that section to Source: Rigberto Tiglao, Ktuleta: The Challenge to Philippine Democracy mean that the role of the military is to "pro• tect" the people from corrupt or incompetent government officials. In essence, they define the "people" and the "state" as distinct and the unrest more like the formation of a broad- separate from government officials and bu• based political movement within the ranks of reaucrats. the AFP. Unlike the Communists, the military movement is not cohesive and lacks a coher• , Rigoberto Tiglao, a respected Filipino journal• ent ideological base. But by virtue of the exist• ist, has offered a different, more complex ex• ing military structure, the movement is planation for the politicization of the armed disciplined and hierarchical and provides a forces. He said the politicization of the AFP ready ground for new recruits from the mili• 25 must be seen as one of two revolutionary tary camps. . political movements that emerged as a re• sponse to martial law. One was the student Electoral results from 1987, and the numbers movement, which became radicalized of active duty officers and reservists involved through infiltration by the Communists. The in the bloody 1989 revolt, provide some mea• other was the military officers now in their 30s sure of the depth of military discontent. and 40s who came of age during martial law; the pivotal event for them was the 1983 assas• The electoral figures are not a precise indica• sination of opposition leader Benigno S. tor, but are nonetheless suggestive. In January, Aquino. 1987, while most Filipinos nationwide were giving a resounding "Yes" vote to the new Tiglao sees the Philippines as essentially a so• constitution supported by Mrs. Aquino, a sur• ciety torn between two competing revolution• vey of the results from polling stations near ary forces, both of which developed during the military camps showed the opposite returns; Marcos years. Unlike the government's expla• the soldiers appeared to be voting no. A similar nation that the coup attempts are the work of result emerged from the elections for a new a clique of power-hungry officers, Tiglao sees Philippine senate in May, 1987. The slate of

Prospects for the Philippines 15 candidates backed by Mrs. Aquino swept 22 Vice-Governor Rolando Abadilla of Ilocos out of 24 seats (with , a popular Norte, who was a colonel in charge of the movie actor, and ousted Defense Minister dictator's Metropolitan District Command Enrile winning the only two opposition seats). (Metrodiscom) and was known as "The Assas• But, again, surveys from polling stations sin" by some critics in Manila for his alleged around military camps showed an opposite role in the disappearance and execution of result. There, the opposition slate—called the Marcos opponents. Others, like Gen. Jose Grand Alliance for Democracy—fared far bet• Zumel and former chief-of-staff , are ter than the Aquino-backed candidates.26 either in hiding or in overseas exile. The loy• alists were largely behind the first two serious The second gauge of the depth of discontent— military mutinies, the takeover of the Manila and what that holds for future instability—is Hotel in July, 1986, and the coup attempt of in the numbers. Some 534 officers were di• January, 1987, that ended up with the take• rectly involved in the December, 1989, coup over of GMA-7 television station. The strength attempt, including 7 brigadier generals, 1 of the loyalist troops, according to the govern• Navy commodore, 13 colonels, 45 lieutenant ment, has always been their access to money, colonels, 155 captains, 123 first lieutenants, through the financial network of Marcos and and 91 second lieutenants. They appear to his cronies abroad. represent a small fraction of the 14,000-mem- ber officer corps until one examines the class The most significant group, the RAM, was and age groupings. The core group of plotters, formed in July, 1982, by a group of reform- the Reform the Armed Forces Movement, were minded young officers. They had become dis• almost all from the graduating classes of 1971, enchanted with Marcos's corruption, the 1972, and 1973. Then there is a ten-year jump misuse of the military promotion system to to the second bloc of plotters, almost all youn• reward personal loyalty, and the perceived de• ger officers from the classes of 1981,1982, and cline in the readiness of the AFP in the face of 1983.27 what was then a growing threat from the rapidly expanding New People's Army.28

The RAM members could be called "martial law babies," since they graduated from the The Military's Factions Philippine Military Academy and took their commissions just as martial law was imposed The military antagonists responsible for the in 1970, 1971, and 1972. They were initially instability fall into three distinct categories; idealistic supporters of Marcos, and they be• the Marcos loyalist faction, the Reform the lieved in his stated vision of a "New Society" Armed Forces Movement, known as RAM, and that would tackle the country's pressing prob• the lesser-known Young Officers Union, or lems of poverty and inequality But as the YOU. dictator's excesses became more and more ap• parent, they gradually broke with him and The Marcos loyalists are the least significant sided with then Defense Minister Juan Ponce since their numbers have dwindled and their Enrile. Many of the RAM core members seeming cause—the return of the dictator— worked on Enrile's staff as his personal security obviously lost its resonance with his death in detail and as his intelligence specialists. Hawaii in 1989. Some of the Marcos loyalist officers have entered civilian politics, like The RAM, with Enrile's support, was planning

16 Reform or Revolution? an anti-Marcos coup for late 1985. But the dictator preempted the plot by calling a Armed Factions "snap" presidential election, meaning an un• Battling in the Philippines scheduled election with only two months no• tice. The election campaign made it clear that The Marcos Loyalists the majority of Filipino voters were backing the opposition candidate, Mrs. Aquino, and The Reform of the that Marcos was trying to win the election Armed Forces Movement through vote-fraud and intimidation. The Young Officers Union Marcos then discovered the coup plot and had The pro-government armed forces Enrile and other conspirators arrested. The "Ramboys," as they were called in the local The New People's Army (Communist) press, used the fraudulent election as a pretext for staging a so-called withdrawal of support The Moro National Liberation Front from the regime, and their ultimate shift to the (MLNF, Moslem secessionist) Aquino camp. The coup plotters, who faced The Moro Islamic Liberation Front arrest under Marcos, suddenly became the he• (M1LF, Moslem secessionist) roes of what became known as the "revolu• tion" of 1986. Because of the widespread media coverage, their names and faces became instantly recognizeable throughout the Phil• present threat kept the government con• ippines—"Gringo" Honasan, "Red" Kapunan, stantly off-balance for most of 1988. "Tito" Legaspi, Felix Turingan, Vic Batac, and Rex Robles. They were the matinee idols of Honasan and his backers struck again in De• Manila, a squad of swashbuckling young offi• cember, 1989, but this coup attempt brought cers with their Uzi submachine guns and to the fore a little-known military clique call• open-necked shirts. They also became a con• ing itself the Young Officers Union. During the tinuing source of instability for the new Aquino 1986 revolt, the YOU members were the mes• government that they had helped to install. sengers and coffee boys for their older RAM colleagues. That experience had served to po• The "Ramboys" made their first overt bid for liticize the young officers. They apparently power in the coup attempt that failed in Au• became disenchanted with the macho person• gust, 1987. Honasan managed to escape by ality cult built up around Honasan and the helicopter from the burning wreck of the AFP RAM, and they distrusted the RAM's links with General Headquarters (GHQ) at Camp Enrile and others they considered "traditional Aguinaldo. For the next several weeks, his politicians" linked to Marcos. celebrity status grew as he moved around giving interviews to the local and for• The YOU members are nationalistic in their eign press, appearing on CBS-TV's "60 min• rhetoric, anti-feudalist in their social policy, utes" program to chat with Diane Sawyer, and and somewhat leftist-sounding in ideology. threatening to strike again at a time and place That is no accident; most of the YOU leaders of his own choosing. Honasan was arrested in say that their first assignments out of the December, 1987, but then made another es• military academy were as field commanders cape three months later on Easter weekend fighting the Communist insurgents in the and quickly resumed his plotting. His ever- hills. They learned from the Communists and

Prospects for the Philippines 17 adapted some of their methods—including Despite the threat posed by the military fac• the cellular organizational structure and the tions from 1986 until the bloodiest coup at• emphasis on mass education. While they tempt at the end of 1989, the likelihood of claim to be stridently anti-Communist, the another coup attempt appears to have receded YOU manifesto, released shortly after the De• somewhat. Visitors to Manila in mid-1991 no• cember, 1989, coup failed, could easily be mis• ticed a sharp reduction in tension and a new taken for a Communist document. The YOU focus on the upcoming 1992 elections as the says it has determined that the social justice next pivotal event for the country. concerns of the Communists are well-placed, and that the way to defeat communism is to The approaching elections seem to be a signif• tackle its root causes, such as poverty, inequal• icant mitigating factor weighing against an• ity, and the corruption and patronage of the other military revolt. But at least four other political system.30 important factors enter into the new equation for stability. The YOU also appears more prone to violence than its RAM mentors. YOU members Capt. First, money appears to be a problem for the and Maj. Abraham Purugganan, coup plotters. A coup attempt on the scale of both decorated scout rangers, emerged as the the December, 1989, affair is a costly venture, group's spokesmen and leaders during the and the rebels may have lost many of their takeover arid seige of the Makati financial traditional financial backers because of that district in December, 1989, when the YOU failure. With elections approaching, the finan• held several five-star hotels and thousands of ciers—including exiled crony businessmen foreign guests as virtual hostages. The YOU is living in the United States and elsewhere also widely suspected to have been behind abroad—would probably rather put money several bombings in Manila that followed the into bankrolling political campaigns. coup, and they have claimed credit for a num• ber of jailbreaks in which detained coup par• Second, logistics now appear to be a more ticipants have been freed. formidable obstacle to staging another coup. Mrs. Aquino's military high command appears Because the agenda of the YOU is so close to to have learned a lesson from the last major that of the Communists, much speculation in revolt and is making sure that key air force and 1990 centered on the possibility of a YOU armored units stay under the command of alliance with the Communist Party of the Phil• officers loyal to the government. ippines and its military wing, the New People's Army. The Communists even made a blatant Third, the creation of a "counter-coup appeal for such an alliance in May, 1990, at the force" would make any new attempt to grab opening of negotiations over the U.S. military power more difficult. The government's own installations in the Philippines. The CPP in a Presidential Security Group (PSG) is better statement urged "all armed political groups" equipped and trained. Splitting off the na• to assist it in "striking militarily against U.S. tional police into an autonomous group has bases and occupation troops."31 Such a mar• created a new power center partly to balance riage of convenience, however, seemed un• off the army and marines. likely from the start, since the YOU members consider themselves staunchly anti-Commu• Finally, the government side—particularly the nist. National Bureau of Investigation, which is the

18 Reform or Revolution? Philippine equivalent of the Federal Bureau of sations of corruption and bureaucratic incom• Investigation in the United States—has petence. Her popularity has fallen to around tracked down some of the core RAM and YOU 58 percent, the lowest of her presidency. She'll leaders and put them behind bars. The new ask for more aid, but the U.S. Congress is in a AFP staff chief and the new Army commander, cantankerous, budget-cutting mood. both veteran officers respected by all the fac• tions, have announced their desire to enter "I think she is still one of the best known and into dialogue with the rebel holdouts and most popular democratic leaders on the world negotiate an end to the instability. Reportedly, stage today," a Western diplomat in Manila contact was made with Honasan in July, 1991, said before her trip. "But obviously after three about a possible return to barracks and an end years there is less romanticism.... There's a to the continuing state of hostility. sour ... mood in Washington. There's a lot more interest in burden-sharing, and the Phil• ippines is always seen as having its hand out."32 Washington and Manila: Relations between the former colony and the Friends Forever? former colonial master have been bittersweet since the Philippines was granted indepen• Two contrasting scenes perhaps best tell the dence from the United States on the Fourth of story of the decline of U.S.-Philippine rela• July, 1946. On one level—the human, person- tions under President Aquino. to-person level—Americans feel very much at home in the Philippines, and Filipinos gener• The first is from September, 1986. The glow ally'enjoy things American from basketball to from the "People Power" events of the preced• fast food to trips to visit family members in ing February is still fresh, and Mrs. Aquino is Los Angeles and Chicago. making her first official visit to Washington as the president of a newly restored democracy. On the governmental level, however, tensions Secretary of State George Shultz gushes as he show. The American side constantly stresses wears a Cory doll affixed to his lapel, and what it believes is best to sustain "the special declares he's "bullish" on the Philippines. relationship" and Filipino officials chafe at President Aquino gets a roaring ovation from what they consider U.S. paternalism, lack of a joint session of Congress and is immediately respect, and self-interest at the expense of rewarded with an extra two hundred million Philippine concerns. They are irritated by dollars in economic aid. She attracts crowds what they see as continued American eco• from New York to . She is the conquer• nomic and cultural domination. ing heroine, the Joan of Arc and the dragon slayer who toppled the evil dictator. Time mag• A political scientist at the East-West Center, azine names her "Woman of the Year." Muthiah Alagappa, who is a Malaysian, ob• i served in the journal Contemporary Southeast The second scene is just three years later, and Asia in 1989: Mrs. Aquino is making her second trip to Washington. She has survived several coup This bilateral relationship has been de• attempts, but restive military factions are still scribed as "patron-client," "love-hate," plotting. Her government is dogged by accu• "neo-colonial," "symbiotic and comple-

Prospects for the Philippines 19 mentary," "unequal/' "special," and so forth. The phrase "special relationship" has U.S. Security Aid to ASEAN Countries been used by both the Philippine and U.S. (in $US million ) governments. The accuracy of these labels notwith• Year Philippines ASEAN Total standing, it is a fact that the relations be• tween these two countries are presently in a state of flux.33 1976 37.0 154.0

1977 36.4 159.1

The main issue on which the relationship 1978 36.5 147.6 most often pivots has been the U.S. military 1979 32.0 108.1 presence in the Philippines and the cor• responding American economic and security 1980 75.7 164.2 assistance to the country. The installations— 1981 75.3 172.5 Clark Air Base, Subic Bay Naval Station, and 1982 51.8 185.3 four smaller support and communications in• stallations^—have long been described as es• 1983 52.0 176.6 sential to the maintenance of U.S. military 1984 51.5 211.1 readiness in the Pacific and crucial to securing 1985 41.9 184.1 vital sea lanes and promoting regional stabil• ity. 1986 102.3 200.4 1987 102.5 167.9 From the Philippine side, the bases issue brings 1988 127.6 180.1 into play emotional questions of national sov• ereignty and national pride, resentment at 1989 127.6 155.6 what is seen as a last vestige of colonial dom• 1990a 202.9 258.4 ination, and a fear that the bases can be used as a pretext to justify American covert inter• Proposal for FY 1990. vention into Philippine domestic affairs. Source: U.S. Department of Defense figures cited in There is also a sense that America is not paying Muthiah Alagappa, "U.S.-ASEAN Security Relations/' nearly what the bases are worth, and Filipino p. 23. officials constantly cite statistics showing that Israel and Egypt, which do not host U.S. bases, falls on deaf ears in Manila, as Filipinos tend receive more aid than the Philippines. to be the most insular and least attached to the region of all the ASEAN countries). By contrast, the American side stresses the economic benefits the Philippines gets from A new agreement, which is now before the the bases—not only in direct assistance, but in Philippine Senate for review, attempts to find the "spin-off" costs of employment and in a middle ground in a compromise made pos• money pumped into the surrounding base sible mainly by the unexpected eruption of the towns. American officials also tend to lecture Mt. Pinatubo volcano that has rendered Clark Filipinos about their security obligations to Air Base inoperative. The new agreement calls the rest of Asia and how the stability of the for the United States to turn over the four region is a benefit in which Manila should be smaller facilities in 1991 and Clark Air Base in * proud to share. (It is an argument that usually 1992 (after some clean-up) and grants a ten-

20 Reform or Revolution? I year lease on the naval base at Subic in ex• • The presence of former President Marcos in change for $203 million in economic and Hawaii until his death in 1989. At one point, security support.34 That amount is far less than when President Reagan placed a call to Mar• the $830 million demanded by the Philip• cos, Filipino politicians and journalists in• pines, and the foreign secretary, Raul S. terpreted the call as a show of support for Manglapus, had maintained that he would the ousted strongman. not budge from that demand even after the volcano damaged both major bases. • The connection between conservative groups in the United States and rightwing Far from settling the matter, the new agree• anti-Aquino politicians in Manila. Filipino ment has fed the same old arguments about journalists, particularly, have been fond of the bases and is imperiling the pact's chances writing how conservative think tanks, like of getting the mandatory two-thirds approval the Heritage Foundation, were the intellec• in the Philippine Senate. Washington is still tual arm of the White House. When such seen as having access to the bases at too low a groups met with opposition leaders like cost. Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, it was in• terpreted in Manila as sending a signal to While the base debate has provided the overall- Aquino. context for the relationship, other factors have • Perceived links between U.S. embassy offi• led to the steady deterioration in ties between cials in Manila and some of the coup plot• Manila and Washington over the last five ters. The U.S. embassy, mostly through its years. military attaches, established contacts with Honasan and the other RAM members when The most crucial factor has been the lingering they were the above-ground opposition to suspicion in Manila that the Reagan and Bush Marcos. They often played golf together at administrations did not fully support the military camps and attended family func• Aquino government. This might sound odd, tions. These close ties that were praised given Washington's help in engineering the when they helped unseat Marcos were later "snap" election of 1986 and then help in criticized as proof that the American em• persuading Marcos to leave the presidential bassy was trying to "play both sides." palace. Washington also increased its aid sub• stantially to Manila after Mrs. Aquino took office, including unlocking frozen military The criticism of these links escalated when it aid, and the White House and State Depart• was revealed that an Air Force colonel had ment have made repeated statements of sup• been inside Villamore Air Base at the time of port to Mrs. Aquino in the face of various the coup attempt in August, 1987, while an• threats. other senior embassy official, Phil Kaplan, who was charge d'affairs at the time, placed a Still, the feeling persists, and has led to the phone call directly to Honasan at the height constant rumors—often voiced openly by of the coup asking him to desist. After members of the Philippine Congress and re• Honasan's escape, unconfirmed and un- ported in the Manila press—that the U.S. Cen• sourced stories routinely circulated through tral Intelligence Agency has been behind the the Philippine media reporting that the fugi• various attempts to oust Mrs. Aquino. This tive muntineer was being protected at Clark suspicion has been fed by: Air Base.

Prospects for the Philippines 21 The direct U.S. intervention in the Philippines set out to forge what he called a new, non- at the height of the coup attempt in December, aligned and independent foreign policy. He 1989, when American F-4s provided air sup• stated in an early speech that his goal was to port for beleaguered Philippine ground troops, "slay the American father-image" and put would seem to have ended all speculation U.S.-Philippine relations on a more equal about which side America was backing. But footing than in the past. He said he wanted to some Philippine politicians and columnists, end the "isolation" of Philippine foreign pol• again showing an uncanny propensity to defy icy, which in the past had closely adhered to logic, began openly speculating that Washing• American strategic interests around the globe. ton had engineered the coup, then used its He expressed interest in having Manila join planes at the last minute to crush it to demon- the non-aligned movement, which was com-

As foreign secretary, Manglapus . . . seemed to

have a habit of irking American officials with policy

statements and quips that seemed more directed at //

his Philippine audience than Americans.1 • • •

strate to Mrs. Aquino her dependence on U.S. plicated by the presence of the U.S. bases on military bases. Philippine soil.

Those suspicions aside, a second factor that led As part of that new policy, Manglapus to some deterioration in the relationship was launched a series of initiatives to show more the appointment in 1987 of Senator Raul S. independence from Washington. First, he Manglapus as foreign secretary and his rapid made a series of overtures to socialist countries emergence as the government's principal about opening or improving relations. In No• voice in foreign policy-making. vember, 1988, he made the first visit by a Philippine official to Hanoi, where he praised Manglapus was a well-known Philippine exile his Vietnamese Communist counterpart, For• in the United States during the martial law eign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, as a fellow years, and that period appears to have affected fighter against colonialism in Asia. his view of the United States. He has spoken of embarrassing treatment he and other dissi• Then in December, Soviet Foreign Minister dents suffered at the hands of American offi• Eduard Shevardnadze made the first visit to cials who at the time were still closely allied the Philippines since the two countries with the Marcos regime. opened diplomatic relations in 1976. In Janu• ary, 1989, Manglapus announced his interest As foreign secretary, Manglapus immediately in opening relations with North Korea. He also

22 Reform or Revolution? organized and hosted what was called a "Con• In a final episode, in February, 1990, Defense ference of Newly Restored " from Secretary Dick Cheney paid a visit to Manila around the world and rankled the United as part of a regular program of bilateral security States by inviting the Sandinista government exchanges. But the visit took on added signif• in Nicaragua as a "newly restored democ• icance when Mrs. Aquino inexplicably said on racy."35 a radio call-in show that she would not see Cheney. Her refusal to see Cheney reflected in Manglapus seemed to have a habit of irking part her personal pique over American press American officials with policy statements and reports about the trips of two other high-level quips that seemed more directed at his Philip• American visitors in the wake of the December pine audience than Americans, who listened coup attempt. Reports of those earlier meet• with a mixture of bemusement and dismay. In ings leaked to the press and reflected unfavor• response to the shooting death of American ably on her. Palace officials later conceded that servicemen by Communist terrorists, Mrs. Aquino's decision not to see Cheney re• Manglapus dismissed the attacks and said it sulted more from a mistake than a deliberately was the price America had to pay as a super• thought-out attempt to rebuke the U.S. de• power.36 In a more recent speech, oddly titled fense chief. "The Philippines; Strategic Corner of the Uni• verse," he calculated that the Philippines was Still, this action was widely interpreted as a a net aid donor to the United States because of "snub" to an American cabinet officer. It the presence of large numbers of Filipino doc• seemed a particularly nasty snub considering tors and nurses working in America. that just two months earlier the United States had scrambled its jets at Clark to assist Mrs. But it was in the negotiations over the U.S. Aquino in crushing the coup attempt. Accord• bases that Manglapus most directly demon• ing to many analysts familiar with the Philip• strated his ability to irk the United States. In pines, the Cheney snub probably did more to the preliminary talks in 1988 over a continu• damage Mrs. Aquino's support in Congress— ation of the existing treaty, then two years where Cheney had been a popular member— later in the opening of talks on a new agree• than any of the other recent points of 37 ment, the foreign secretary surprised, con• tension. founded, and enraged American negotiators with demands for increased compensation. In The new lease governing Subic Bay would addition, Manglapus raised side issues such as appear to give both the United States and the dual, usage of the facilities and Philippine gov• Philippines the opportunity to begin forging ernment control over operations and de• a new relationship that goes beyond slogans manded that Washington disclose whether and sentimentality to one that casts both sides nuclear weapons were stored in the facilities. as equal partners with a shared history and common interests in the region. American members of the bases panel said privately to journalists that they found For the Philippines, the return of Clark and the Manglapus an often-cantankerous negotiator four smaller installations—and the prospect of who was difficult to pin down on details. They the return of Subic itself in another ten years— also expressed frustration that Mrs. Aquino would seem to meet nationalistic concerns chose to stay aloof from the talks, giving her over sovereignty without the massive shock to foreign secretary freer rein to press his own the economy that a complete and immediate fiercely nationalistic agenda. U.S. withdrawal would no doubt precipitate.

Prospects for the Philippines 23 On the American side, a ten-year lease on era politics where elections were decided by Subic and the return to the Philippines of the strongmen buying votes and making alliances other facilities would acknowledge that the with provincial warlords. The election of a end of the has reduced the impera• new, reform-minded candidate without ties to tive for a large American military presence in the traditional politics of the past would mean the Philippines. At the same time, ship repair that the revolt of 1986 was not a one-time and logistics operations would be maintained "fluke," but a major step in the development during a reasonable phase-out period. of Philippine democracy.

Whether the nationalistic-minded Philippine The elections might also allow for a test of the Senate will interpret the pact the same way is theory that a stronger hand at the helm might the key question that remains. It appears stand a better chance of reforming Philippine doubtful at this writing that the treaty can win society and attacking embedded traditions like ratification without serious adjustment. Sen• corruption than an untrained former house• ate acceptance of the pact might assist in re• wife with a reluctance to use executive power. storing a part of Corazon Aquino's legacy, as No Philippine president is likely to succeed she will be remembered as the transitional entirely in restructuring society. But a presi• president who prepared her country for the dent with more committment to reform, and phase-out of American bases and for putting a willingness to exercise power to implement Manila's relations with Washington on a more policies over the opposition of an instransi- even footing. But a rejection that leads to a gent legislature, might well be able to stave off complete American withdrawal—with all the further challenges to democratic authority economic hardships that would bring—might from the self-styled reformists on both the far be seen as one last and tragic error for an left and the far right. administration now known more for its fail• ures than its many successes. Several questions may be determinant. Will elections proceed as scheduled, with voting for president, the 24 Senate seats, all 200 seats in the House of Representatives, and local gov• ernment offices taking place on the exact same Conclusion: Towards 1992 day? Or will the Congress move to schedule separate elections for the various offices? Since Mrs. Aquino has consistently said she Leaving the balloting as scheduled runs the will not be a candidate for president in May, risk of creating widespread confusion, and at 1992, when her six-year-term ends, specula• the extreme, heightening the prospects for tion has already begun on the question of who bloodshed. A confused and bloody election will succeed her. There are no fewer than a might give military adventurists yet another dozen announced or probable candidates excuse to stage a new rebellion before the votes vying for the job, although the field is likely are counted. to be whittled down as the contenders reassess their chances and begin forming alliances. Also relevant is the current plan for a winner- take-all presidential vote, with no run-off. As The elections will be pivotal for the Philip• it stands, a candidate could win the presidency pines. They will determine, first of all, whether with only a plurality of the vote, and with the uprising of February, 1986, indeed marked several candidates competing, the winner a turning point away from old-style, Marcos- could conceivably receive only a third or a

24 Reform or Revolution? military services in his dealings with the pres• Possible Presidential idential palace. It is unclear whether he could Candidates in 1992 improve his image among the ranks if he is elected to the top job and has a freer hand to pursue policies like increasing the budget of General Fidel V. Ramos, former the armed forces. secretary of national defense

Speaker RamonV. Mitra, Jr. The anti-Aquino opposition remains a ques• tion mark. If the opposition is able to unite Senator Aqullino Pimental around a single candidate—either Vice-Presi• dent Laurel, Senator Enrile, or former Marcos Senator Joseph E. Estrada business associate Eduardo Cojuangco—then Senate President Jovita R. Salonga they could mount a formidable and well-fi• nanced race for the presidency. On the other Senator Juan Ponce Erlle side, at least a half-dozen candidates occupy the same political ground as Mrs. Aquino, and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel they will be seeking her endorsement. Many are expected to run regardless of whom the Former Ambassador Eduardo Cojuangco president chooses as her successor. Former Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago Philippine elections have traditionally not been about issues, but personalities. That is Former Secretary Oscar M. Orbos likely to be true in 1992 as well, although the issue of the lease on the Subic Bay Naval Governor Emilo R. Osmena Station could eventually figure into the debate Former Imelda Marcos if the contest becomes a question of compet• ing nationalistic credentials. Almost every opinion poll has shown that a vast majority of Filipinos favor a continued American military quarter of the votes cast. In that event, a new presence, and some of the anti-base politi• president without a clear majority would have cians^—running for president or even for Sen• to face serious questions of legitimacy. Such ate seats—might have to account for their questions might provide another pretext for position to the voters in 1992. military rebels to attempt to overturn the vote through extra-constitutional means. Although much has been made of former first lady Imelda Marcos, her political support in• Will a new president be able to rein in all the side the Philippines is considered negligible. factions of the restive military? A former mil• She has no independent political base and is itary man like Ramos, who resigned from the widely disliked in the on North• cabinet in July, 1991, to run for president, ern Luzon, which was her husband's political would seem to have the best chance. But it was bastion. Many people there blame Imelda's during Ramos's tenure as chief of staff and notorious extravagance for the downfall of later as defense secretary that the various mu• President Marcos. tinies, revolts, and coup attempts took place. The rebels have consistently criticized Ramos Finally there is the role of the Catholic for failing to stand up for the interests of the Church, a prominent political force in the

Prospects for the Philippines 25 overwhelmingly Catholic Philippines. America, the BBC, and from the newsweekly Church support for Mrs. Aquino in 1986 was magazines, Time and Newsweek. pivotal, and similar backing for a perceived 8. Richburg, "Aquino Concedes Many Still Mired "reform candidate" in 1992 might provide the in Misery," Washington Post, July 25, 1998. needed edge in a close election. 9. Richburg, "People Power Euphoria Begins to Wear Off for Aquino," Washington Post, Oct. 26, In conclusion, the 1992 elections might an• 1989. swer the question of whether the Philippines 10. I covered the land reform debate from can move peacefully towards reform of its Aquino's first announcement of her "compre• social and economic system, or whether the hensive" plan in a press conference at violent revolution advocated by the extremes Malacanang Palace on July 23, 1987, until the will find more currency. At the outset of the final approval of the bill by Congress on June campaign, the picture is confusing. The issues 8,1988. My stories appeared in the Washington are largely being ignored, the declared and Post. likely candidates come mainly from the old 11. David G. Timberman, "Unfinished Revolu• school of politics, and the Philippines appears tion; The Philippines in 1986," in Southeast likely to face a prolonged period of political Asian Affairs, 1987 edition, p. 249, published uncertainty and further instability. by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. 12. "People Power Euphoria ...," Washington Post, Oct. 26, 1989. Notes 13. For more on this question of the link between strong central governments and economic 1. This account is based on my trip to San growth in Asia, see Stephan Haggard, Pathways Marcelino and interview with the mayor on July From The Periphery: The Politics of Growth in 13, 1991. Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990). 2. John McBeth, "Picking Up After Pinatubo," Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 153, no. 30,July 25, 14. From the report of the Investigating commit• 1991, p. 24. tee. 3. Ibid. 15. From a talk by Ben Kerkvliet of the University of Hawaii before a Philippine seminar and 4. Rigoberto Tiglao, "Test of Resolve," Far Eastern workshop on March 16,1991. The statistics on Economic Review, vol. 153, July 25, 1991, p. 24. and the gap between the richest and 5. Details of the agreement are from the Joint poorest were provided by Kerkvliet. Statement on the Bases, July 18,1991, obtained 16. John McBeth, "The Boss System," Far Eastern by fax from the United States Information Ser• Economic Review, vol. 145, no. 37, September vice (USIS), Manila. 14, 1989, and also McBeth, "A Congress of 6. Aquino's July 1991 state-of-the union address Words, Not Acts, " Far Eastern Economic Review, was reported by various news agencies. The sto• vol. 149, no. 28, July 12,1990. ries appeared In the local newspapers, the Hono• lulu Advertiser and the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. 17. McBeth, "A Congress of Words, Not Acts," Far Eastern Economic Review, July 12, 1990. 7. As the Southeast Asia bureau chief for the Wash• ington Post, I was able to travel to South Korea 18. From interview with Communist Party leaders and Burma during periods of student unrest and Saturnino Ocamp and with met student leaders who told me that they were Mrs. Katherine Graham, publisher of the Wash• inspired by the Philippine "People Power" revolt ington Post, in October, 1986. from reports they had heard via the Voice of 19. Much of this internal Communist Party debate

26 Reform or Revolution? was played out In the local press during 1988 of their earlier coup plot during an October, and 1989.1 interviewed Rodolfo Salas, the for• 1986, dinner at the Manila Hotel with Mrs. mer Communist Party chairman, in a cell at Katherine Graham of the Post during her trip in Manila on July 27, 1989. to Manila. I was in attendance. 20. The analysis of the factors that have contrib• 30. John McBeth has an excellent article on the uted to the erosion of the CPP-NPA strength is Young Officer's Movement titled "Who are essentially that of the author, after extensive YOU?" in Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 148, interviews over four years with foreign diplo• no. 23, June 7, 1990. Also, I was able to inter• mats, Philippine military and intelligence offi• view some YOU members during the December cials, and other analysts who have followed the coup attempt, as well as some military officials insurgency movement. familiar with the group. 21. Richburg, "Military Unrest Remains Problem 31. From a 1990 official Communist Party state• for Aquino," Washington Post, Dec. 10, 1989. ment delivered to my office in Manila and to 22. Timberman, "Unfinished Revolution." other local and foreign news agencies during the base negotiations. The document was later 23. From charts on comparative ASEAN defense determined to be authentic. expenditures. One chart Is provided within the text. 32. From my article, "People Power Euphoria," 24. I talked with Candldo Filio in Manila In the Washington Post, Oct. 26, 1989. days during and immediately following the 33. Muthiah Alagappa, "U.S.-ASEAN Security Re• December 1989 coup attempt. He is quoted in lations: Challenges and Prospects," Contempo• Richburg, "Military Unrest Remains Problem rary Southeast Asia, vol. 11, no. 1, June 1989. for Aquino," Washington Post, Dec. 10,1989. 34. From the joint statement on the bases, pro• 25. Rigoberto Tiglao's analysis is contained in the vided by USIS Manila. overview chapter in the book Kudeta: The Chal• 35. Richburg, "Shevardnadze to Pay First Visit to lenge to Philippine Democracy (Manila: Center Manila," Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1988, and for Investigative Journalism, 1990), which pro• "Philippines Seeks to Expand Links to Socialist vides the best chronology of the 1989 coup Countries," Washington Post, Jan. 18, 1989. I attempt and the roots of military unrest in the also traveled to Vietnam in late November, Philippines. 1988, to cover the trip of Foreign Secretary 26. From my own coverage of the election results Manglapus. and the reports of the Commission on Elec• 36. Manglapus, in a meeting with foreign corre• tions (Comelec) In Manila. spondents, said that having citizens killed in 27.. From Kudeta: The Challenge to Philippine De• terrorism overseas was part of the price of being mocracy. a superpower and that Americans should learn 28. The history of the Reform the Armed Forces to "relax and enjoy it." He later offered an Movement is well-known and has been widely apology and clarified his remarks to say that he reported. For more information on the RAM, did not mean to sound insensitive to U.S. see Cecil Arilio's Manila-published book, Break• deaths in the Philippines. away. 37. Richburg, "U.S.-Manila Ties Fall to Low 29. Honasan and Enrile confirmed the existence Point," Washington Post, Feb. 17, 1990.

Prospects for the Philippines 27

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