Appraisal Theory: Old and New Questions Phoebe C
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University of Michigan Law School University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository Articles Faculty Scholarship 2013 Appraisal Theory: Old and New Questions Phoebe C. Ellsworth University of Michigan Law School, [email protected] Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1052 Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles Part of the Law and Psychology Commons Recommended Citation Ellsworth, Phoebe C. "Appraisal Theory: Old and New Questions." Emotion Rev. 5, no. 2 (2013): 125-31. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. EMR5210.1177/1754073912463617Emotion ReviewEllsworth Appraisal Theory: Old and New Questions 4636172013 Emotion Review Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 2013) 125 –131 © The Author(s) 2013 ISSN 1754-0739 DOI: 10.1177/1754073912463617 Appraisal Theory: Old and New Questions er.sagepub.com Phoebe C. Ellsworth Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, USA Abstract I describe my current thinking on two old questions—the causal role of appraisals and the relationship of appraisal theories to basic emotions theories and constructivist theories, and three (sort of) new questions—the completeness of appraisals, the role of language, and the development of automaticity in emotional responses. Keywords appraisal, emotion, emotional development, role of language Appraisal theories of emotion, like all good theories, are negative, and the situation and her past life define the specific informed by a multiplicity of earlier perspectives. Like Darwin emotional experience, is to say next to nothing about what it is (1872) and James (1884), they assume that emotions are adap- that differentiates fear, anger, grief, and disgust—what it is tive (Arnold, 1960; Ellsworth, 2007; Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009), about the situation that matters. Specifying what matters in the motivating appropriate responses to environmental challenges person’s perception of the situation has been a central goal of and opportunities. Like dimensional theories, dating back to appraisal theory, and its most original contribution. Wundt (1874/1902), they see emotional experience as continu- ous, with infinite variations in a multidimensional space, rather than as separate, independent categories or programs. And they Old Questions see emotional experience as an ever-changing process, like a Do Appraisals Cause Emotions? river, rather than a collection of separate pools, or like the weather, rather than like sunlamps and refrigerators. Appraisal I am often asked whether I think that appraisals cause emotions: theorists believe that thought and emotion are largely insepara- yes or no? My writings have been unclear on this point because ble, that emotions arise from the organism’s perceptions—its my thoughts are unclear. The issue of causality in emotion is a appraisals—of environmental changes that are relevant for its vexing one for me, and one that I have generally tried to avoid. well being. Like constructivist theorists (Averill, 1980a; Barrett, There is a fundamental ambiguity to the question because there 2006a; Schachter & Singer, 1962; and cf. Johnson-Laird & are so many different definitions of “cause” and so many differ- Oatley, 2000), they believe that human beings’ appraisals of an ent definitions of “emotion.” Most current theories of emotion, event are influenced by temperament, physiology, culture, cur- including appraisal theories, are multicomponential (Niedenthal, rent goals, and past life experiences, so that similar events can Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2006), with appraisal a significant com- provoke different emotions in different people, or in the same ponent that differentiates emotions. But, as Frijda points out, an person at different times. ingredient, no matter how essential to the emotional experience, What is different about appraisal theories is that they don’t is not the same thing as a cause (Frijda, 1993; Frijda & just say that a person’s emotions are constructions of the mean- Zeelenberg, 2001). He also argues convincingly that what ing of the situation and leave it at that, vague and amorphous. counts as a cause depends on one’s definition of emotion. If They specify the materials that go into this construction, the emotions are defined as categorically distinct states, the defini- constituent elements of emotional experience. These elements tion of cause is quite different than if emotion is defined as an are the appraisals: Novelty, valence, certainty, goal conducive- ever-changing multidimensional process. In the latter case, ness, agency, and control are the ones most commonly pro- because in any emotional state certain appraisals are more sali- posed. To say that a person feels aroused, or aroused and ent and available than others, appraisals can cause emotions, Corresponding author: Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 530 Church Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1043, USA. Email: [email protected] Downloaded from emr.sagepub.com at UNIV OF MICHIGAN on November 8, 2013 126 Emotion Review Vol. 5 No. 2 and emotions can also cause future appraisals (Keltner, lover who presumed him dead. Although there are some univer- Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). The fact sal antecedents of emotion (Ellsworth, 1994c; Frijda, 1994), in that something is an ingredient does not rule out its being a general my situation is not your situation. Temperament, physi- cause. Water, for example, can be the cause of a seed becoming ology, culture, current goals, past life experiences, and the cur- a plant, but water is also an essential component of the plant. rent situation have all been suggested as causes, and a plausible Like most appraisal theorists, I believe that emotional expe- case can be made for any of them. Then the question is whether riences usually, but not always, start with appraisal. This these phenomena influence emotions because they influence assumption sounds as though appraisals precede emotions, and appraisals. I have argued that this is so in the case of culture therefore are in a position to cause them, but that is not what I (Ellsworth, 1994a), and I think that it may be generally true, but think. I think that appraisal changes involve neural and physio- I have not considered all the possible exceptions. logical changes and thus an appraisal change is an emotional Very often the appraisal of valence is simultaneous, or almost change. The first appraisal leading to an emotion or a change in simultaneous (Zajonc, 1980), with the appraisal of novelty, and emotion is usually the perception of novelty. A person may be the “same” stimulus may elicit responses from delight to dis- walking from here to there, with the mind in a sort of emotional gust. The appraisals of different people are different, but so are “default mode” (Raichle & Snyder, 2007), daydreaming and their physiological responses, their expressions, their subjective drifting among internally generated thoughts and images, and experiences, and their action tendencies. These are correlates of then something changes and the person notices. The unfocused appraisals, and may begin simultaneously with the first background state is replaced by focused attention. Sometimes appraisal. It is a continuous process, a recursive process, with all the novel stimulus is easily explained and dismissed as irrele- components influencing and being influenced by the other com- vant, in which case the development of emotion is aborted; ponents. This is why the question of cause is not a question otherwise an emotional experience begins. that makes sense to me, and why I prefer the term “emotional The appraisal of novelty is associated with physiological experience” to the term “emotion.” changes, such as lowered heart rate; expressive and other motor changes, such as widened eyes or a turn of the head, if it is an Appraisals and Basic Emotions external stimulus, or slight tension of the corrugator muscle (a frown), if it is a novel thought or memory; changes in action So novelty may often be the beginning of emotion, but even that tendency, so that ongoing action is suspended and the person is single appraisal can be considered an emotional experience, motivated to concentrate on the new event; and a change in sub- something like simple interest, or alert awareness. With addi- jective experience. The organism’s state is different, physiologi- tional appraisals it may become apprehension, or annoyance, or cally and psychologically, from what it was before. It could be amusement, or terror, but the experience is emotional before it called a state of readiness for emotion or it could be called the corresponds to a recognized emotion label. For the theorists that beginning of emotion (Ellsworth, 1994b; Kagan, 1991), but I Moors (2013) calls “subemotional parts theorists” a person can consider it an emotional experience. Whether one considers it have a multitude of emotional experiences that do not corre- the beginning of emotion or some pre-emotional state is an arbi- spond to the categories proposed by any basic emotion theorists. trary semantic preference, not amenable to empirical test. As Appraisal theorists (Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & further appraisals are made, sometimes almost