Review: Everything You Ever Wanted to Know about Cognitive Appraisal Theory without Being Conscious of It Author(s): Richard A. Shweder Reviewed work(s): Emotion and Adaptation by Richard S. Lazarus Source: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1993), pp. 322-326 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449649 Accessed: 01/03/2010 14:04

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http://www.jstor.org PsychologicalInquiry Copyright1993 by 1993, Vol. 4, No. 4, 322-342 LawrenceErlbaum Associates, Inc.

BOOK REVIEW ESSAYS ON LAZARUS'S EMOTIONANDADAPTATION

Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Cognitive Appraisal Theory Without Being Conscious of It

Richard A. Shweder Committeeon HumanDevelopment Universityof Chicago

Emotion and Adaptation, by RichardS. Lazarus,is Lazarusgrounds his principle by suggesting that "we an intellectual monument.It is an academic shrine to are constructed in such a way that certain appraisal the mind of the psychologist, where visitors may dwell patternsand their core relationalthemes [e.g., the ap- for a while in awe of the magnificence of its scope and praisal that one has transgresseda moral imperative] ennobled its by scholarly integrity. For pilgrims such will lead to certain emotional reactions [e.g., guilt]" as myself, who saunter about in search of deep and (pp. 191, 122) and that,"once the appraisalshave been comprehensive reflections on psychological topics of made,the emotionalresponse is a foregone conclusion, importance,Emotion and Adaptation is an epitome of a consequence of biology." (p. 192) At one point, he the true discipline. The book contains everything you writes, "Once we have appraisedthat our ego-identity ever wanted to know about cognitive appraisaltheory has been enhanced,we are bound to react with pride, without being conscious of it, and much more. From and so on for each core relationaltheme and its emo- Heideggerian "nonreflective understandings" to tion" (p. 359). At another point, he asserts that "ap- Gibsonian "affordances",from Schacterian "arousal praisalis a necessary and sufficient condition"for the processes"to Ekmanesque"affect programs"-almost production of an emotion (p. 171). According to every major concept and distinction in the study of Lazarus,the psychobiological principle "providesfor cognition, emotion, motivation, coping, and develop- universalsin the emotion process of the humanspecies ment worthy of note is noted, and critiqued.Better yet, andprobably applies to otheranimals, too" (p. 191). He Lazaruscomes out on the right side of things most of believes the principle is "evident observationally"(p. the time, or at least I think he does. I came away from 191). the of experience reading this book (or should I say Lazarus'spsychobiological principle, or some prin- encyclopedia) greatly admiringthe author,feeling re- ciple more or less like it, is definitive of all cognitive dedicated to the life of the mind, and eager to quibble. appraisal approaches to the study of the emotions, In this essay, I summarize Lazarus's main message althoughthe principleis not always labeled as such or about the natureof the emotions by examininga single interpretedin precisely the same way by differentthe- proposition,which he refersto as his "psychobiological orists. Ellsworth (in press), for example, writes that, principle." "accordingto appraisaltheories of emotion, emotions Lazarusformulates his psychobiologicalprinciple as consist of patternedprocesses of appraisal of one's follows: relation to the environment ... along with associated physiological responses and action tendencies" and If a personappraises his or her to the relationship that, for example, "if someone has lost something be- environment in a particularway [e.g., as irrevocable loved, and if the loss is seen as due to circumstances loss], then a specific emotion [e.g., sadness] which is then the tied to the appraisalpattern, always follows. A corol- beyond anyone's control, personwill feel sad" lary is that if two individualsmake the same appraisal, (p. 37). Universalizingher formulation,Ellsworth sug- then they will experiencethe same emotion,regardless gests that "the dimensions of appraisal identified in of the actualcircumstances. (p. 191) studiesof Westernersare culturally general, that similar patterns of appraisal will result in similar emotions across cultures"(p. 10). Ellsworth, however, does not Emotion and Adaptation, by Richard S. Lazarus, 1991, New view her principle as evident observationally,at least York:Oxford University Press. not yet. Because of the limited data available on ap- BOOK REVIEWESSAYS praisal processes and emotional functioning in non- the way I feel because my child has died" and "I feel Western cultural traditions, she tentatively advances the way I feel because I was fired from my job." the principleas a hypothesis. I have a somewhatdiffer- Although it is a frequent move among cognitive ent view of the centralprinciple of cognitive appraisal appraisal theorists to analytically detach mental theory, which I discuss after I summarize Lazarus's states from their content, one is left wondering pre- particularapproach. cisely whose style of appraisalhas been privileged in In Emotion and Adaptation, the emotions are ana- the theory and whether the theory has really helped lyzed as a cognitive system. This is because Lazarus us understandthe mental life of the native from the believes that the emotions are ways of apprehending native's point of view. Indeed, one question not ad- states of the world that have significance for personal dressed in the book is whether there is individual or well-being. The emotions are "about"the world. They cross-cultural variation in the abstract versus con- are mental maps about certain kinds of truths.That is crete organization of emotional experiences. Is it what makes them "cognitive."That is why "appraisal" possible that there exists a good deal of individual must be included as a fundamentalfeature of an emo- and cross-cultural variation in how many distinct tional response. emotions have been made available (through pro- Whatis a cognitive appraisal?According to Lazarus, cesses of abstraction and concretization) for a per- it is an evaluationof the significance of what is happen- son to experience? ing in the world for personalwell-being (p. 89). These The abstract core relational themes identified by "significations" or meanings are classified into two Lazarus have a dual ontological status. "Demeaning kinds-harmful to the self (losses or costs) andbenefi- personal insult," for example, is treated as both an cial (gains). It is not entirely clear why Lazaruselects evaluation of external events (which causes anger) to cast his rich analysis in a utilitarianframework of and as a constitutive part of the internal psychologi- cost-benefit analysis,especially given the role of moral cal experience of the emotion as well. In one of the evaluations (e.g., a perceived injustice,not necessarily most fascinating chapters in the book ("Issues of to one's self) in mediatingan emotional response(e.g., Causality"), Lazarus forthrightly and proudly ac- indignation). knowledges that he views his core relational themes The two kinds of meanings (costs and benefits) are (e.g., loss, threat, insult) both as the cause of the then further specified in terms of "core relational emotion and as partof the experience of the emotion, themes" (e.g., irrevocable loss, demeaning offense, the effect (p. 173). Lazarus recognizes that this blur- physical danger, threat, enhancement of ego-iden- ring of the distinction between independent and de- tity). The core relational themes are analyzed as pendent variables, between cause and effect, will abstract schemata, as "irrevocable loss" rather than bother some readers, but he is too sophisticated, as "irrevocable job loss" or "irrevocable loss of a subtle, well-read, and up-to-date to be deterredby the child." Thus, despite his "cognitivism," Lazarus old-fashioned procrustean scruples of a positivist pulls up short of fully defining the emotions by philosophy of science and causality. Nevertheless, reference to their "objects" (loss of a job in contrast Lazarus's formulationis going to leave many readers to loss of a child). He elects to treathis core relational wondering whether a postulated mental appraisal themes categorically, as detachable abstract sche- (which he claims is a causal condition of the emo- mata (e.g., as irrevocable loss) while acknowledging tion) is anything other than a reified redescriptionof that it is possible that "there are as many emotions as a component of the meaning of the emotion. It left there are specific ways there are to be harmed or me wondering whether it is really necessary to reify benefited" (p. 117). meanings (redescribing them as though they were In Lazarus's approach, a cognitive appraisal is an antecedent causal events) in order to acknowledge abstract evaluation of the significance of what is their central role in our mental life. happening in the world for personal well-being, yet Harmfulsignificances (and their specific core rela- none of the significant actual events happening in the tional themes) are then linked by Lazarusto negative world are treated as part of the appraisal. In effect, emotions such as fright-anxiety, guilt-shame, envy- the abstract schemata of appraisal theory (irrevoca- jealousy, disgust, sadness, and anger. Beneficial signi- ble loss, enhanced ego-identity) make it possible for ficances (and their specific core relationalthemes) are Lazarus to treat two mental appraisals as equivalent linked to positive emotions such as happiness-joy, regardless of differences in the identity of the events pride, love, relief, and compassion. they are about. It is assumed that mental processes A "cognitive appraisal"is an evaluation of the ab- do not function concretely and that, in the production stract significance of events in the world for personal of an emotional experience, there is no fundamental well-being. InEmotion andAdaptation, this evaluation qualitative difference between, for example, "I feel process is classified into two kinds of processes: a

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"primaryappraisal" process that evaluates core rela- sense or other, I view myself as a cognitive appraisal tional meanings (e.g., What type of harmsand benefits theorist(see, e.g., Shweder, 1991, 1993, in press; also are involved? Is this an irrevocableloss?) and a "sec- see Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). And I share many as- ondary appraisal"process that evaluates what to do sumptionsand principleswith Lazarus.Nevertheless, I about it (e.g., How can a sense of well-being be re- do not believe that Lazarus'spsychobiological princi- stored?Who is to blame for my emotionalstate?). Thus, ple is evidentobservationally. I do not even believe that each emotion (e.g., anger) is conceptualizedas a pack- it is the kindof formulation(a "hypothesis")that might age deal consisting of a primary appraisal of some one day be supportedor disproved by new evidence particularself-involving state of the world (a demean- from cross-culturalresearch. In my view, cognitive ing offense) and a secondaryappraisal activating some appraisaltheory is not so mucha theoryas a framework particularaction tendency (e.g., the desireto attack)and of concepts for generating interpretationsabout the some coping strategy. Indeed, accordingto Lazarus,it mentallife of others. is the presence of these cognitive appraisalprocesses I am skepticalabout the principle,not because I think that distinguishes emotional feelings (e.g., disgust) it is unimportantor wrong (although,if the principleis from other types of feelings that are non-emotional interpretedas a propositionabout an invariantcausal (e.g., pain, pleasure, distaste) (p. 56). The psychobio- connection between two types of events in the natural logical principleechoes throughoutthe book: "Emotion world-the makingof an appraisalof a particulartype is a result of appraisal"(p. 172). and the havingof an emotionalresponse of a particular Furtherspecifications of the appraisalprocess are type-then I do think the principle is wrong). Nor am offered. For example, to evaluate the significance of I indifferentto the paucity of good ethnographicevi- what is happeningin the world for personalwell-being dence on emotional functioning in different ethnic (primaryappraisal), one must assess the relevance of groupsand cultural traditions (including Western tradi- events for one's goals. According to Lazarus,"if there tions). Emphatically,we need much more evidence of is no goal relevance [to happeningsin the world] there this type. cannot be an emotion" (p. 150). Quite crucially, Rather I am inclined to resist Lazarus's appro- Lazarusdistinguishes his core relationalthemes (e.g., priation of cognitive appraisal theory to a psycho- threat,offense, loss) from such evaluative dimensions biological principle because I believe that the as controllability,pleasantness, and uncertainty,which psychobiological connection he alludes to exists in he views as aspects of knowledge external to the ap- name alone and that the way appraisals and emo- praisal process. He is critical of the failure of other tions are "tied to" or "bound to" one another is a cognitive appraisaltheorists to distinguishknowledge matter of conceptual necessity, not causal neces- from appraisal(pp. 146-147). sity. I think Lazarus is right that it is a "foregone Last, Lazarus is quite clear that cognitive appraisal conclusion" that, for example, loss and sadness are (e.g. the evaluation of an event as a demeaning per- tied to each other, but not as events in the empirical sonal insult) can be either conscious or unconscious, world. They are bound to one another because the deliberate or automatic, fast or slow. Cognitive ap- appraisal condition (loss) is intrinsic to our concept praisal should not be thought of as a sequential con- of what it is like to be sad. We are not biologically scious decision process going on inside the head. constructed in such a way that mental event A (the Lazarus has important things to say about affordan- appraisalof loss) and mental event B (the experience ces and processes of nonreflective evaluation. He of sadness) must go together. It is the idea of sadness does not believe that subjects are necessarily aware that is so constructed. Internalto the idea of sadness of their own cognitive appraisals. He writes: "... if is a connection to loss that we have no choice but to appraisals are assessed by self-report methods, there employ if we are to interpretothers as sad. The link is the danger that what is obtained is superficial, and between the appraisal condition and the emotion is therefore will not lead to successful predictions of part of an a priori conceptual architecture, which is manifest emotions" (p. 167). It is not entirely clear available for us to put to use in our attempts to that appraisals are the kinds of things that can be comprehend others as persons and to arrive at a assessed at all, although they certainly can be attrib- reading of their mental life. Yet, this conceptual uted. Indeed, after reading Emotion and Adaptation, architectureis not the only conceptual architecturein I found myself wanting to ask Lazarus the following town. It may or may not be the conceptual architec- question: Does the assessment by a psychologist that ture that is actually online, giving shape and meaning someone has made an unconscious, rapid, and auto- to the mental life of this or that person or people. matic appraisalof loss amount to anything other than This point can be made most clearly by considering believing that the person is sad? Lazarus'streatment of the relativelycommonplace an- Now for with this my quibble great book. In some thropologicalobservation that, in some cultures (e.g.,

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Tahiti), people respond to loss not with sadness but and the a priori conceptual link between sadness and ratherwith "fatigue, sickness or other kinds of bodily loss. distress" (p. 193). Does this observation lead him to In other words, the psychobiological principle is conclude that his psychobiological principle is not really a hypothesis at all and is certainly not wrong? Of course not. Instead, it is the principle "evident observationally." What is evident ob- itself that provides the constituting framework for servationally is that many, many people respond to making sense of what is going on and for generating apparentloss without evincing sadness, to apparent a series of interpretive possibilities, all of which insult without evincing anger, to apparent"transgres- presuppose a conceptual connection between loss sion of moral norms" without evincing guilt, and to and sadness. apparent goal attainment with direct and explicit One possible interpretationis that, because there is expressions of disappointment and regret, and so an appraisalof loss, the native really is experiencing forth. Yet, what is evident observationally is just sadness but (a) denies it, (b) defends against it, or (c) grist for the interpretivemills of a cognitive appraisal does not have a vocabularyor language for describing theory. The connections and links built into cognitive it. Lazarusfavors (c). appraisaltheory (loss and sadness, transgression and A second possible interpretationis that an appraisal guilt, etc.) are not there as a result of being observed. of loss did not really occur. In the anthropological They arise out of the meanings inherent in our emo- the literature, appraisalof loss is usually a deliberate tional state concepts, meanings presupposed by the self-conscious appraisalmade by the observinganthro- mental state language (the "folk psychology," to use who pologist has witnessed a circumstancehe or she the contemporary philosophical parlance) that we thinks of as loss. Perhaps the native did not appraise use to "mind-read"the subjective states of others. things that way. To avoid misunderstanding,let me make it quite A third is that possible interpretation the native does clear thatI am all for makinguse of cognitive appraisal not to respond loss emotionally, perhaps because of theory to constructinterpretations of what it is like to some psychobiological pathology thathas switchedoff be a Tahitian or to be this or that Tahitian. It is our the causal connection between the appraisaland the scheme of a priori mental state concepts that leads us emotionalexperience. A moreextreme possibility (fan- to wonder aboutwhat it is like to be someone else and ciful to be is sure) that there is an order of beings to constructa plausible and intelligible account about midwaybetween robotsand persons-beings who have the beliefs and processes of consciousness of others. no emotional or mental life but can experience fatigue, Indeed,if we are to comprehendothers as personswith sickness, and bodily distress. a mentallife, we have no other choice but to make use So, the theorist appraisal has three interpretiveop- of some version of cognitive appraisaltheory, at least tions in sense of the native making who respondsto loss to the extent that we interpretothers as having an with fatigue, sickness, or bodily distress.The appraisal emotional life thatwe can understand. theorist can and a name to the identify give type of Yet, as an anthropologicaladvocate of comparative appraisal and mandatedemotional experience that is research on the emotions and as a fan of Lazarus's assumed to be unconsciously, rapidly, and automati- cognitive appraisalapproach, it seems evident to me cally activated, what the despite native says. The ap- thatthere is no conceivableobservation that any anthro- praisaltheorist can claim thatno relevant unconscious, pologist could ever bring back from some faraway rapid,or automatic has been made at appraisal all. Or, place thatwould lead Lazarusto conclude, for example, he or she can thatthe "other" posit is eitherpathological that for some peoples of the world the appraisal of or not a really person. irrevocable loss is causally connected to pride and Notice that a is self-report neither a necessary nor happinessand the appraisalof enhancedego-identity is sufficient datum for the cognitive theorist appraisal as causally connected to sadness and shame. Perhaps he or she tries to weed out these interpretivepossibili- the best I can do is raise a fourth interpretive possi- ties. If the native explicitly denies appraisingthe death bility that, as far as I can remember,Lazarus does not of a child as loss, the appraisal theorist is free to consider. discountthe testimony.If the nativeexplicitly confirms That fourth possibility is that the native does not his or appraising her circumstanceas loss but gives no respondto loss emotionally-not because the emotion evidence of experiencingsadness, the appraisaltheorist (while experienced)is deniedor repressedor inexpress- is free to eitherassume the native is really sad (whether ible, not because of a pathology or because the native or not the native shows it) or to some suspect form of lacks a mentallite, but because the secondaryappraisal pathology. As far as I am able to this judge, entire system is able to reach into the primaryappraisal sys- spectrum of interpretive is possibilities itself made tem and short-circuitthe link between the actual ap- possible our of the of by knowledge meaning sadness praisalof loss and the emotionalized experience of it.

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In otherwords, I would raise the interpretivepossibility to do. Emotion and Adaptation is a fabulous book. So that, with sufficient cultural consciousness about the much the betterfor psychologic. managementof experience and with the right mix of socialization practicesand mental disciplines, the psy- Note chological processes thatcontrol whether the emotions RichardA. Shweder, Committeeon HumanDevel- are brought online at all supersede the processes that of 5730 SouthWoodlawn control how a loss is experienced, given that the emo- opment,University Chicago, IL 60637. tions have been allowed to come online. On this ac- Avenue, Chicago, count, there might well be genuine cross-cultural References differences in the extent to which primaryevaluations Ellsworth,P. (in press). Sense, cultureand sensibility. In H. Markus of, say, loss resultin the "emotionalization"of actually & S. Kitayama(Eds.), Cultureand the emotions. Washington, experience at all (see Shweder, in press). On this ac- DC: AmericanPsychological Association. count, the emotional response is not a foregoneconclu- Mesquita,B., & Frijda,N. H. (1992). Culturalvariations in emotions: sion of biology. We are not bound to react, at least not A review. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 179-204. Shweder, R. A. (1991). Menstrual soul loss and the com- emotionally. pollution, parativestudy of the emotions.In R. A. Shweder(Ed.), Thinking In sum, cognitive appraisaltheory is an invaluable throughcultures: Expeditions in culturalpsychology (pp. 241- tool for constructinginterpretations of what it is like to 268). Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press. be a person. Nevertheless, I do not believe thatits most Shweder,R. A. (1993). The culturalpsychology of the emotions. In M. Lewis & J. Haviland Handbook emotions fundamental are inductions about causal (Eds.), of (pp. principles 417-431). New York:Guilford. connections in the naturalworld. Cognitive appraisal Shweder, R. A. (in press). You're not sick, you're just in love: The theoryis best understoodas a form of what Smedslund interpretiveapproach to the emotions. In P. Ekman& R. David- (1991) called "psychologic," which makes it possible son (Eds.), Fundamentalissues and questions about emotions. New York:Oxford Press. for us to generateinterpretations about the mentalstates University Smedslund,J. (1991). The pseudoempiricalin psychology and the of others and to "mind-read,"if that is what we choose case for psychologic. Psychological Inquiry,2, 325-328.

How Do We Represent Both Emotional Experience and Meaning? Tom Trabassoand Nancy L. Stein Universityof Chicago

In Emotion and Adaptation, a comprehensivetreat- the emotions themselves cause. Emotions are thus de- ment of emotional experience, Richard Lazarus puts fined as part of a dynamic process-sensitive to and emotions where they belong-namely, in the context changing with the environmental circumstances in and dynamics of everyday life. With emotion situated which they occur. in everyday experience, as it unfolds over time, the The dimensions that regulatethe evocation of emo- relationalmeaning among emotions,events, states, and tion are appraisals and interpretationsof perceived actions becomes clearer. Lazarusdoes not view emo- changes in states of well-being. These appraisals in- tions as discrete, isolated units that can be defined volve the evaluationof beliefs, values, andpreferences. exclusively in terms of defenses, expressions, reac- The ways in which environmentalevents or self-gener- tions, or actions. Emotions are intimatelyconnected to ated actions influence, block, or facilitate the mainte- the monitoringof environmentalconditions and to per- nance or attainmentof well-being are at the heart of sonal states of well-being. When changes occur in emotional experience. Thus, emotions have relational perceivedstates of well-being, distinctfeelings or emo- meaningbecause of the transactionsthat are carried out tions arise and are expressed through specific action between the personand the environmentin the context "tendencies"as well as throughfacial and bodily reac- of an event that unfolds over time. tions. Situationsin which emotions arise are appraised Lazarus's model of emotion and adaptationis the and reappraised,and this monitoringleads to the for- resultof a lifetime of work and reflects the influenceof mulation of ways of coping with the problems that his productiveassociation with several collaborators, evoked the emotions, as well as with the problemsthat notably Susan Folkman and James Averill (Lazarus,

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