The End of ETA?

A Multi-Level Analysis of the Basque Terrorist Group’s Decline in the 21st Century

Master Thesis

Katrin Roosens s1339346 August 2017

Crisis & Security Management Institute of Public Administration Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs Leiden University

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker Second Reader: Dr. Jelle van Buuren

Words: 29453 (including in-text references)

Table of Contents List of Tables ...... 3 List of Figures ...... 3 List of Abbreviations ...... 4 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 5 1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT & RESEARCH QUESTION ...... 5 1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY ...... 7 1.3 THESIS STRUCTURE ...... 7 2 WHAT IS TERRORISM? ...... 9 2.1 THE SEARCH FOR A DEFINITION ...... 9 2.2 KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM ...... 12 3 LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 14 3.1 HOW DOES TERRORISM END? ...... 14 3.2 THE DEMISE OF ETA IN THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE ...... 21 4 RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 24 4.1 RESEARCH APPROACH ...... 24 4.2 RESEARCH PURPOSE ...... 24 4.3 RESEARCH STRATEGY ...... 25 4.4 CONCEPTUALIZATION & OPERATIONALIZATION ...... 26 4.5 DATA & DATA COLLECTION METHOD ...... 29 4.6 LIMITATIONS ...... 29 5 THE BASQUE ETA ...... 32 5.1 TERRITORIAL SETTING ...... 32 5.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ...... 33 5.2.1 Early history ...... 33 5.2.2 The emergence of Basque nationalism ...... 34 5.2.3 Francoism and the founding of ETA ...... 36 5.2.4 The transition to democracy and the persistence of violence ...... 37 5.2.5 The 1990s ...... 40 5.2.6 Recent history: The War on Terrorism, the Madrid attacks and the end of violence ...... 41 6 ANALYSIS ...... 45 6.1 THE STRUCTURAL LEVEL ...... 45 6.1.1 International developments ...... 45 6.1.2 National developments ...... 51 6.1.3 Local developments ...... 60 6.2 THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL ...... 66 6.2.1 The Abertzale Left ...... 66 6.2.2 ETA: Modus operandi, leadership/organizational structure & internal conflicts ...... 68 6.2.3 Fundraising capabilities ...... 73 6.2.4 Membership & recruitment capabilities ...... 74 6.3 THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ...... 77 7 CONCLUSION ...... 81 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 85

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List of Tables Table 1. Basque political parties banned in Spain ...... 58

List of Figures Figure 1. Map of the Basque Country ...... 32 Figure 2. Number of ETA attacks and fatalities, 2000-2016 ...... 42 Figure 3. Image of ETA activists among the Basque population, 1978-2007 ...... 61 Figure 4. Basque attitudes towards ETA, 1981-2011 ...... 62

3 List of Abbreviations BAC Basque Autonomous Community CT Counterterrorism EAW European Arrest Warrant EH Euskal Herritarok (Basque Citizens) EH Bildu Euskal Herria Bildu (Basque Country Reunite) ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom) EU European Union FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FLN Algerian National Liberation Front GAL Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups) GTD Global Terrorism Database HB Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity) IRA Irish Republican Army IS Islamic State JITs Joint Investigation Teams KAS Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista (Socialist Nationalist Coordinator) LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MLNV Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Vasco (Basque National Liberation Movement) OL Organic Law PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) PLO Palestine Liberation Organization PNV Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party) PP Partido Popular (Popular Party) PSE-EE Partido Socialista de Euskadi-Euskadiko Ezkerra (Socialist Party of Euskadi) PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) RAF Red Army Faction UK United Kingdom UN United Nations US United States

4 1 Introduction

1.1 Problem Statement & Research Question On October 20, 2011, the Basque separatist terrorist organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom, ETA) officially announced that its violent struggle for an independent Basque homeland had come to an end. Some two and a half years later, in February 2014, the group declared its willingness to decommission parts of its weapons arsenal. Both decisions were taken unilaterally and without any political concessions made by the Spanish state. These declarations sparked hope and mistrust at the same time. Hope, that the armed conflict, which lasted for over half a century and cost the lives of 829 people (Leonisio, Molina, & Muro, 2016, p. 127), was finally over. And mistrust, as the group had broken promises before and had not yet dissolved completely. While the unilateral announcements thus evoked mixed reactions in society, the public was less ambivalent in identifying the reasons leading up to these historical decisions, which were widely considered proof of the group’s decline. Politicians and security officials in particular were quick to declare the announcements a success of the Spanish state and its counterterrorism (CT) initiatives. “The state of law today triumphs” (Burns, 2011, para. 5), then Prime Minister José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol, PSOE) said in a televised reaction to ETA’s October 2011 move. Making a similar yet more precise statement, Ignacio Cosidó, Member of Parliament for the conservative Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP) and at the time responsible for security affairs, argued that the cessation of violence was “due above all to the efficiency of police and security forces” (Abend, 2011, para. 5). This was also the predominant view held among popular victims associations, which ascribed ETA’s “apparent end” in large parts to “the success of police operations over the past 10 years” (Woodworth, 2011, para. 4). Indeed, for much of the 21st century, ETA’s terrorist activities have been comparatively low. The group claimed the highest number of victims and attacks in the year 2000, after which the number of incidents almost steadily declined (Fundación Victimas del Terrorismo, n.d.; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2017). Since March 2010, the armed separatists have not killed a single person. And while numerous crackdowns, high-profile arrests, and increased international police cooperation have almost certainly played a crucial role in these developments, it almost seems too simplistic to attribute

5 the decline and reputed end of ETA solely to the state’s anti-terror initiatives. After all, counterterrorism had formed the main instrument against the group since it committed its first deadly attack in 1968 (Whitfield, 2015). But neither during General Francisco Franco’s military regime (1939-1975), nor in a subsequent democratic Spain did these measures suffice to defeat ETA completely. On the contrary, the policies often created a backlash effect that ultimately strengthened the group and made it more dangerous. Against this background, one is left wondering why the state’s CT efforts this time have seemingly brought about the desired result.

How can this success be explained? A possible answer is provided by the academic literature on the end of terrorism, which is a relatively new area of research that has only recently attracted growing academic interest. While the amount of studies published on this matter is still somewhat limited and not comparable to the enormous body of work on why and how terrorism emerges in the first place, the available literature suggests that the demise of a terrorist organization is not as one-dimensional a process as was earlier depicted in the case of ETA. In fact, research has shown that although counterterrorism is indeed a key determinant in this regard, in most cases “more than one dynamic was responsible” (Cronin, 2006, p. 18) for a terrorist group’s decline and eventual collapse. Scholars have essentially come to view the latter as the result of micro-, meso-, and macro-level factors interacting with, and reinforcing, one another (Bosi & della Porta, 2015; della Porta, 1995; Ferguson, Burgess, & Hollywood, 2015). Their understanding is based on the notion that the individual terrorist is embedded in a group-context, which in turn is embedded in a larger socio-political context (Noricks, 2009). Developments taking place in one particular area are accordingly expected to lead to changes in the other areas. The demise of a terrorist organization is hence brought about by the interplay of external conditions, i.e. changing support structures, new anti-terror legislation (macro-level); intra-organizational dynamics, i.e. funding and recruitment capabilities, conflicts (meso-level); and processes emerging within member’s personal lives, i.e. changing perceptions, burnout, parenthood (micro-level).

In light of these theoretical assumptions, the overemphasis placed on counterterrorism initiatives in the case of ETA may be called into question. Indeed, it seems much more likely that the alleged end of the group has been caused by a multitude of factors emerging both from within

6 and from outside its immediate environment. Against this background, this thesis seeks to provide a more accurate analysis of how ETA’s recent demise came about, culminating in the 2011 decision to abandon violence once and for all. In particular, it intends to answer the following research question: How have factors at the structural, organizational and individual level contributed to the decline of the Basque terrorist organization ETA since 2000? By looking at developments on the micro/individual, meso/organizational and macro/structural levels and examining how these (might) have mutually affected and reinforced each other, the thesis essentially draws on the multi-level framework introduced above to identify the relevant processes that have in the 21st century pushed ETA to the brink of eradication.

1.2 Significance of the Study The findings of this single case study might prove valuable for increasing our understanding of how terrorist groups come to an end, which according to Marsden (2015) is still somewhat “underdeveloped” (p. 199). Expanding our knowledge on this matter is particularly relevant, as terrorism has far-reaching implications. In the Basque case, for example, ETA’s terrorist activities have not only affected Basque and Spanish societies in terms of fear caused or lives lost, but also in regards to the regional economy, which diminished as tourists and entrepreneurs increasingly avoided the Basque Country (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003). Similar developments have occurred in other countries plagued by this particular form of political violence, e.g. in Italy or Sri Lanka. This study makes two significant contributions. Firstly, by uncovering what factors, or combination thereof, have been decisive in prompting one of Europe’s deadliest and most persistent terrorist organizations to renounce its violent struggle, this research might yield important theoretical insights into how other groups with a similar separatist agenda can be weakened and preferably stopped, early on. On a more practical level then, it may lead to more informed policy-choices, as security officials gain a better understanding of the possible interactions taking place between macro-, meso- and micro-level factors.

1.3 Thesis Structure Following this introductory section, in which the general research problem and relevance of the study have been presented, chapter 2 will be dealing with the concept of terrorism, its key characteristics and the difficulties involved in reaching definitional agreement. Chapter 3 then

7 presents a comprehensive review of the relevant academic literature on how terrorism ends. It will essentially provide the theoretical framework based on which ETA’s demise from the year 2000 onwards will be examined. In the subsequent chapter 4, the methodological choices made in this thesis to answer the research question will be outlined. In particular, this section will elaborate on the research strategy, operationalization and the data to be collected, followed by a discussion of the study’s main limitations. Chapter 5 then sets out the historico-political context within which ETA emerged and evolved, from the roots of Basque nationalism to the rise of the Franco regime, Spain’s transition to democracy, and beyond. The background information provided is important for putting more recent developments pertaining to the structural, organizational and individual levels into context. These will be elaborated on in chapter 6. In particular, this section will analyse and discuss the ways in which structural transformations, organizational dynamics and individual-level factors (might) have affected one another, and how these interactions have brought about ETA’s decline. The concluding chapter 7 will then summarize the main research findings and make suggestions for further research.

8 2 What is Terrorism?

2.1 The Search for a Definition ‘Terrorism’ is a term one can hardly escape from nowadays. The events of September 11, 2001, in particular have paved the way for it to becoming part of our daily life and vocabulary, the term being referred to regularly in the news, on the radio, on social media, in movies, in magazines, in talk shows etc. Despite its ubiquitous use, however, the exact meaning and scope of the word ‘terrorism’ remain unclear to many. This has to do with the lack of a precise and consistent definition, which has resulted in the indiscriminate (over)use of the term, as pointed out by Hoffman (2006): Virtually any especially abhorrent act of violence that is perceived as directed against society - whether it involves the activities of anti-government dissidents or governments themselves, organized crime syndicates or common criminals, rioting mobs or persons engaged in militant protest, individual psychotics or lone extortionists - is often labeled `terrorism’. (p. 1) The search for a universally agreed-on definition has plagued the field of terrorism studies ever since it first emerged in the late 1970s. A study carried out by Schmid and Jongman (1988) some 30 years ago already found more than 100 distinct definitions of terrorism and since then, numerous other works devoted to conceptualizing the phenomenon have been published (Ganor, 2002; Hoffman, 2006; Lutz & Lutz, 2013), yet without the envisaged outcome. In the absence of such a definition, however, “there can be no uniform data collection and no responsible theory building on terrorism” (Schmid & Jongman, 1988, p. 3). The lack of consensus on what constitutes terrorism is also problematic for (international) counterterrorism efforts. In this regard, conceptual clarity is needed to ensure all countries involved are on the same page, i.e. fighting the same enemy, and to facilitate multilateral cooperation in legal and judicial matters (Ganor, 2002). Hence, for academics and practitioners alike, finding a coherent definition of terrorism is a necessary, yet challenging undertaking.

In the literature, three obstacles in particular are pointed out as standing in the way of reaching definitional agreement.

9 The first obstacle has to do with terrorism being a dynamic concept. Since it first appeared to describe the atrocities of the French Revolution (1789), terrorism has emerged in many different forms, contexts and circumstances. Its ever-changing nature has been thoroughly illustrated by Rapoport (2004), who described the development of (international) terrorism as a set of four waves. Each wave lasts about 30 to 45 years before ebbing off, and brings with it a particular set of features in terms of purposes, tactics, and organizational structure. The first wave identified by Rapoport (2004) is the ‘Anarchist Wave’, which initially emerged in late 19th century Russia. Characterized by political assassination campaigns as the preferred strategy to induce revolutionary change and political reform, the Anarchist Wave is best exemplified by the Russian Narodnaya Volya, a self-proclaimed terrorist organization that in 1881 killed Tsar Alexander II. Around 1920, the ‘Anti-Colonial Wave’ replaced the Anarchist Wave. This period saw the worldwide emergence of various resistance movements using political violence and guerrilla tactics to oppose colonial imperialism. In contrast to the previous wave, second-wave groups designated themselves as ‘freedom fighters’ (Rapoport, 2004), the most popular ones being the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). It eventually came to an end when the ‘New Left Wave’ began to unfold in the 1960s. This third wave was greatly inspired by the Vietnam War, which increasingly stimulated opposition to the existing exploitative and capitalist world order. Groups emerging during this time were largely based on a Marxist ideology, and relied on kidnappings and hijackings as their primary tactics. Known examples include the Red Army Faction (RAF), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).1 The fourth and last wave described by Rapoport (2004) is the ‘Religious Wave’, which was set off by the Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s, and is still ongoing. This wave is characterized by an indiscriminate use of violence, particularly in the form of suicide bombings as the preferred means to inflict mass (civilian) casualties. Compared to the previous waves, fourth wave groupings are typically large and loosely structured, exemplified best by Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State (IS) or the Taliban. However, the Religious Wave is not confined to Islamic movements. As Rapoport (2004) notes, religious fundamentalism has also occurred in Sikhism, Judaism and Christianity, albeit to a lesser extent. As the Religious Wave is expected to gradually fade within the near future, speculations about the emergence of a potential fifth wave have entered public and academic

1 Depending on the author, ETA is either classified as a second or third wave terrorist organization.

10 discourse. Whether this wave will be dominated by lone-wolf, technological, cyber or an entirely different form of terrorism, however, remains to be seen. Typologies of terrorism in place today strongly resemble those offered by Rapoport: Left-wing, right-wing, ethno-nationalist/separatist, and religious terrorism. These categories are not to be viewed as mutually exclusive, however. A certain degree of overlap is likely and therefore, many contemporary terrorist organizations have a “mix of motivating ideologies” (Cronin, 2003). Terrorism is thus a concept that regularly changes its purpose, appearance and modus operandi, which adds to the complexity of finding and adopting a comprehensive, overarching definition. The second obstacle to finding a definition reveals itself through the infamous phrase ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’, which indicates that terrorism is a highly subjective concept likely to be interpreted differently by different individuals, organizations, agencies or governments. The latter in particular are prone to “make definitions fit their own needs” (Lutz & Lutz, 2013, p. 8), oftentimes attempting to legitimize their own actions against alleged political adversaries. A closer look at the so-called ‘terrorist designation lists’ further illustrates this point. These are lists compiled by national authorities to identify persons and groups the respective state deems “responsible for or supportive of terrorist acts”, and that are hence subjected to “judicial prosecution [and/or] financial and travel sanctions” (de Jonge- Oudraat & Marret, 2010, p. 96). The decision whom to add to such lists, however, is largely dependent on the extent to which the individual or entity in question is perceived “as threatening national interests and territorial security” (de Jonge-Oudraat & Marret, 2010, p. 107). This, of course, leaves room for interpretation and many states have accordingly included into their terrorist watch lists persons or organizations that would not necessarily be regarded as such elsewhere. Turkey, for example, has designated as a terrorist group in May 2016 the religious movement led by Fethullah Gulen (Butler, 2016). While its decision was supported by Northern Cyprus and the predominantly Muslim countries making up the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Gulf Cooperation Council, the great majority of western states, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) refrained from placing the Gulen movement on their respective lists. The latter’s activities apparently did not meet their own understanding of the term ‘terrorist’. ETA and many of its allegedly affiliated groupings, on the other hand, are regarded as terrorist organizations by almost all relevant actors, including the EU, the UN and the United States (US). The support especially from Canada, the United Kingdom (UK) or Italy

11 in this regard comes as no surprise, given that on their territories similar separatist movements have been, or are currently still, active (e.g. the Québécois, the Scots, the South Tyroleans). It is therefore clearly in their national interests to have such groupings recognized as threats or branded as terrorists. Hence, what is viewed as terrorism inherently depends on the definer’s personal perspective and political agenda (Jenkins, 1980), which makes the search for an objective, value-free definition a daunting task. A neutral working definition of terrorism, however, is indispensable if one seeks to eradicate the latter, as without it, “no coordinated fight against international terrorism can really get anywhere” (Ganor, 2002, p. 288). A third obstacle referred to in the literature concerns the need to differentiate terrorism from other forms of violence (Lutz & Lutz, 2013). Oftentimes, definitions of terrorism are either too broad or too narrow and thus fail to exclude or include, respectively, acts of violence or crimes that are (not) terrorist in nature. For analytical and legal/prosecution purposes, however, it is important to be clear about what constitutes an act of terrorism, and what does not.

2.2 Key Characteristics of Terrorism Despite the difficulties involved with finding and formulating a generally accepted definition of terrorism, it nevertheless seems as if agreement has been reached on some of the phenomenon’s core characteristics. Common to many hitherto existing definitions, for example, is the claim that terrorism is inherently political in nature (Cronin, 2009; Lutz & Lutz, 2013; Hoffman, 2006). People engage in terrorist activities to attain political, rather than economic or personal, objectives. These can take various forms such as policy, territorial or regime change (Jones & Libicki, 2008, p. 20). “In the absence of a political aim”, however, “the activity in question [should] not be defined as terrorism” (Ganor, 2002, p. 294). Scholars have further reached consensus that for an act to be labelled ‘terrorist’, it always has to involve the intentional and systematic use of violence, or the threat thereof, at least (Ganor, 2002; Hoffman, 2006). This implies that terrorist attacks are thoroughly organized, well-planned and calculated acts of violence (Hoffman, 2006). Peaceful forms of protests, such as sit-ins, marches or petitions, as well as spontaneous eruptions of violence (e.g. riots) are thus not to be regarded as terrorism. The deliberate targeting of civilians is another key feature commonly emphasized by experts in the field (Cronin, 2009; Ganor, 2002). It is often viewed as differentiating terrorism from other types of political violence, such as guerrilla warfare, which is directed predominantly against military and security forces. While

12 in earlier waves of terrorism, target selection was confined mainly to symbolic figures (e.g. politicians, security officers), terrorists nowadays seem much more indiscriminate and focused predominantly on inflicting mass civilian casualties. This brings us to an additional characteristic frequently referred to in the literature, namely that terrorism is aimed at an “audience beyond the immediate victims” (Lutz & Lutz, 2013, p. 9) of an attack itself. The logic is rather simple: By randomly targeting civilians, terrorists convey the message that potentially everyone is vulnerable, spreading fear and intimidation among the population, which in turn is expected to exert pressure on the government (to give in to the terrorist’s demands). The direct victims of an attack are thus not the principal targets. Rather, they serve as a means to a broader end - to create publicity and anxiety - and thereby influence the behaviour of a much wider ‘target audience’ (Hoffman, 2006). Lastly, terrorism is mostly understood as politically motivated violence perpetrated by non-state/subnational actors only. Violent acts committed by, or on behalf of, a government often do not count as terrorism. According to various proponents of this approach, including most state agencies, the use of force by states should be subjected to, and regulated by, the various branches of international law (Duffy, 2015). Nevertheless, the question of whether to include or exclude the state as an actor of terrorism remains a controversial and politically sensitive issue, the exploration of which lies beyond the scope of this thesis.

The definition of terrorism used in this thesis brings together several key elements identified by the international academic community. Accordingly, terrorism will be defined as “the use [or threat] of violence [by a subnational actor] against random civilian targets in order to intimidate or to create generalized pervasive fear for the purpose of achieving political goals” (Alexander, 1976, p. xiv).

Having outlined the difficulties involved with finding a coherent definition of the politically and emotionally charged term, and having proposed how ‘terrorism’ ought to be understood in this thesis, in the next chapter we will turn to the current state of knowledge on how terrorism can be brought to an end. It will provide the theoretical framework for the analysis of ETA’s decline from the year 2000 onwards, which this thesis sets out to explore in greater detail.

13 3 Literature Review

3.1 How does Terrorism End? During the past decades, the majority of terrorism research has focused on explaining the emergence of terrorism. Studies have examined the phenomenon’s root causes and origins (Bjørgo, 2005; Crenshaw, 1981), have analysed individual and group motivations to resort to terrorist activities (Alonso, 2006; Hudson, 1999), and have looked at the evolution of terrorist groups from a historical perspective (della Porta, 1995; Jenkins, 2006; Rapoport, 1992; 2004). Ever since the 9/11 attacks then, the field of terrorism studies has been dominated by research dealing with religious terrorism as propagated by Al-Qaeda (Stern, 2003), and more recently, the Islamic State (Alexander, 2015; Nuruzzaman, 2015). In this regard, the academic community has shown particular interest in radicalization and recruitment processes (Aly & Striegher, 2012; Nesser, 2010), in suicide tactics (Bloom, 2005; Pape, 2003; Pedahzur, 2005) and in the Foreign Fighter and Jihadi phenomenon (Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2015; Byman & Shapiro, 2014). How terrorism declines, however, has thus far received little academic attention. This is particularly remarkable given that the explicit goal of worldwide counterterrorism initiatives is the defeat of terrorism, leading one to expect that policy-makers and scholars alike should have an enormous interest in understanding the dynamics involved in this complex process. Until recently, this has hardly been the case. A possible explanation might be that terrorism research is often funded by governments, which in the event of a terrorist attack are “more interested in reactive instead of proactive research initiatives” (Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law, 2008, p. 46). It therefore seems likely to assume that the lack of research on the phenomenon’s decline is at least partly owed to the event-driven character of the field of terrorism studies itself (Cronin, 2006). More recently, however, there seems to be a “growing interest in understanding why people leave terrorist organizations” (Altier, Thoroughgood, & Horgan, 2014, p. 647), how terrorist campaigns subside and hence, how this form of political violence can be brought to an end or weakened, at least. In the next paragraphs, some of the most relevant contributions will be presented in greater detail.

14 The Organizational level The first set of publications elaborated on focuses primarily on organizational decline, and suggests terrorists groups implode as a result of developments taking place both within the group itself (internal factors) as well as outside its immediate environment (external factors).

In this regard, one of the earliest contributions has been published some three decades ago by Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr. Their article ‘Why Terrorism Subsides’ explored the reasons behind the decline in domestic terrorist activities in the United States and Canada between 1960-1985. For their analysis, the authors relied on a framework initially developed by Mack (1981), who noticed that in violent conflict a contenders’ survival is largely dependent on its organizational power, i.e. its military and political capabilities. Ross and Gurr (1989) accordingly identified four factors through which terrorism can be diminished: (1) pre-emption, (2) deterrence, (3) backlash, and (4) burnout. While the first two factors encompass governmental counterterrorism actions aimed at weakening said military capabilities (e.g. through incarceration, expanding anti-terror legislation, increasing penalties), a group’s political strength can be undermined by the third and fourth factor, pertaining to decreased societal support and waning commitment among terrorists for the respective organization and its cause (Ross & Gurr, 1989). Applying Mack’s model to the North American terrorism landscape, the authors found that the events leading to the collapse of a terrorist movement “do not necessarily fall neatly” (p. 409) in one of the four categories presented. They argue instead that the loss of military and political power likely results from the interaction of factors that can occur both internally (backlash & burnout) and externally (pre-emption & deterrence) to the group. In this regard, Ross and Gurr (1989) value the loss of political capabilities in diminishing terrorism higher than “any actions taken by the authorities” (p. 409), at least in liberal democracies. Although not explained any further by the authors, one explanation for this statement might be that terrorist groups are generally weaker in terms of military strength than their state opponents, and are highly dependent on outside support and member loyalty. Without the latter, they can neither operate nor survive. Despite the study’s low applicability resulting from the few and geographically restricted cases analysed, Ross and Gurr’s comparative case analysis marks an influential piece of work that has stimulated further research on how terrorism can be diminished.

15 Martha Crenshaw, for example, has drawn extensively on their work and equally found the decline of terrorism to be caused by several interconnected factors. Examining the lifecycle of 77 terrorist organizations active between the 1950s and late 1980s, in her article ‘How Terrorism Declines’ (1991) she concludes that terrorist campaigns may dissolve through “the physical defeat of the extremist organization by the government, the group's decision to abandon the terrorist strategy, and organizational disintegration” (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 71). Crenshaw further elaborated on this initial observation in a paper written for the United States Institute of Peace, in which she ties the end of a terrorist group to its organizational disruption, the (preliminary) achievement of its objectives, waning popular support or the discovery of new modi operandi (Crenshaw, 1999). These scenarios, she argues, are in turn affected by a government’s strategic choices (e.g. deterrence, dialogue etc.) and by processes taking place within the respective terrorist movements themselves. Factors both external and internal to the group thus seem to play a role, although Crenshaw (1991, 1999) similar to Ross and Gurr (1989) does not elaborate any further on this distinction.2

Building on Crenshaw’s work, Audrey Kurth Cronin (2006) comes to roughly the same conclusions. In her article, she examined how terrorist groups have ended in the past, arguing that lessons drawn from the analysis of historical cases are “vital in dealing with … current threat[s]” (p. 9). In this regard, Cronin assessed what has, and what has not, worked in countering previous terrorist campaigns, seeking to identify possible implications for the then US-led war against Al-Qaeda. She eventually came up with seven factors that seem to have played a decisive role. These are (1) leadership decapitation, (2) unsuccessful transition to the next generation, (3) achievement of the group’s goals (success), (4) joining the legitimate political process, (5) erosion of popular support, (6) repressive government action, and (7) switch from terrorism to other forms of criminal activity, or reorientation. Cronin (2006) asserts, however, that the pathways described are not to be viewed as mutually exclusive and that in most cases, “more than one dynamic was responsible” (p. 18) for the observed decline. In this regard, she criticizes the often-exaggerated value placed on counterterrorism policies in defeating

2 Crenshaw (1999) introduces a “set of variables involv[ing] the terrorist groups themselves“ (p. 2), yet subsequently makes a further distinction between internal & external factors. Among the external factors mentioned are a group’s ideological motivation, its relative strength vis-à-vis the government and its relation to other supporting groups or states. It remains unclear to the author of this thesis why these elements are considered “external” to the group and hence, why this second distinction has been made after all.

16 terrorism, and thereby closely follows Crenshaw, who in 1991 already rejected the assumption that “government policies … are the key determinants of outcomes” (p. 69). The ultimate disappearance of a terrorist organization, Cronin (2006) claims instead, is as much a result of factors “independent of government action” (p. 14), as it is of “measures [explicitly] taken against them” (p. 18).

In fact, a similar study by Seth Jones and Martin Libicki supports her thesis. Examining 648 terrorist movements active between 1968 and 2006, they found that while 40% of terrorist groups dissolved primarily as a result of successful police and intelligence operations, 43% ended because the group “decided to adopt nonviolent tactics” (Jones & Libicki, 2008, p. 9) and enter the political process. Clearly, the government’s role in the latter process cannot be played down. The decision to take part in negotiations and dialogue, however, is equally the result of factors internal to the group (e.g. its objectives, organizational structure, resources) and thus, largely beyond the state’s control. The first systematic analysis of its sort, Jones and Libicki’s large-N study of how terrorism ended in the past additionally demonstrated that direct military force is largely ineffective. Only in 7% of cases has it been identified as the primary reason for an organization’s collapse. The remaining 10% of terrorist groups have reportedly declined following the achievement of their original objectives. Jones and Libicki (2008) assert, however, that in most of these cases, the changes envisaged were not the direct result of a group’s use of terrorism, but of larger developments taking place outside its immediate control. Splintering was initially identified as a fifth scenario through which terrorist groups have disappeared in the past. In fact, internal rivalries or frictions accounted for a group’s dissolution in almost 21% of the cases. However, splintering was excluded from Jones and Libicki’s main analysis, as members have often joined other terrorist organizations and hence, continued their terrorist activities. According to the authors, the end of a group could then not be equated with the end of terrorist ambitions or tactics on the part of its (former) members. Jones and Libicki’s line of reasoning in this regard essentially follows the differentiation commonly made in the literature between disengagement and deradicalization. While the former is generally associated with an individual refraining from participation in terrorist activities (Altier et al., 2014; Reinares, 2011), deradicalization is said to occur when he/she mentally distances him/herself from the movement, coming to view the use of terrorism as “illegitimate, immoral and unjustifiable” (Horgan, 2008,

17 p. 7). Jones and Libicki (2008) have restricted their inquiry to such cases in which a terrorist group has ceased to exist based on the majority of its members having deradicalized, and having effectively stopped using terrorism to pursue their political goals. Therefore, splintering needed to be excluded as a strategy through which terrorism can be defeated. Based on their analysis, the authors contend that politics (43%) provides the most promising avenue to ending terrorism. The prospects of such a scenario, however, are closely intertwined with the terrorist group’s particular ambitions. As Jones and Libicki (2008) argue, “the narrower a terrorist organization’s goals, the more likely [those involved will] agree on a settlement” (p. 21). In cases where terrorists aim for broader goals than policy, regime or territorial change, policing might be “the most effective strategy to destroy” (Jones & Libicki, 2008, p. 27) said groups. Another contributory factor identified is the size of the respective movement. In particular, Jones and Libicki (2008) found that larger groups on average seem to last longer than smaller ones. They admit, however, that the correlational evidence is rather weak and indicate that causality might as well “work the other way” (Jones & Libicki, 2008, p. 197), i.e. the duration of a group affecting its size. Support for their initial assumption is provided by Rapoport (1992, 2004), who compared the development of modern terrorism to a wavelike pattern, and found terrorist groups with ethno-nationalist/separatist ideologies to last the longest. Often large in size, nationalist movements like the IRA, the PLO, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have exceeded lifespans of 30, 40 or sometimes 50 years, while most other terrorist organizations dissolved within a year, or within the first decade of their existence at the latest (Rapoport, 1992). The endurance and size of ethno- nationalist/separatist groups is commonly attributed to large segments of the local population being sympathetic to their objectives, and accordingly providing them with a large pool of potential recruits and resources (Cronin, 2003; Hoffman, 2006). Perhaps most importantly, Jones and Libicki’s study has shown that terrorist groups can in fact be brought to an end. Their findings have later been confirmed by Weinberg (2012), who came to the exact same (statistical) results despite drawing on a different dataset.3 Both studies identified politics and policing as the most significant ways in which terror organizations have dissolved in the past. Jones and Libicki (2008) emphasize, however, that “in practice, [they]

3 Jones & Libicki (2008) relied on data provided by the RAND-MIPT database; Weinberg (2012) compiled his data from three different sources - Haifa University’s national security studies center, the US Department of State’s ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism’ reports and Schmid & Jongman’s book on ‘Political Terrorism’.

18 typically end due to a combination of factors” (p. 10) both internal and external to the group, contingent also upon the latter’s size, popular support and breath of goals. The quantitative analyses carried out by Jones and Libicki (2008) and Weinberg (2012) have thus roughly yielded the same results as the qualitative works presented earlier (Crenshaw, 1991, 1999; Cronin, 2006; Ross & Gurr, 1989).

The Individual level A different approach to studying the end of terrorism is provided by Noricks (2009) and Altier et al. (2014). Instead of focusing on how or why terrorist groups as a whole have dissolved, these authors have examined individual processes of disengagement from terrorism. Their studies largely built on the influential work of Bjørgo and Horgan (2009), who found that individual decisions to leave terrorism behind are greatly influenced by what they have termed ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Push factors, they argue, relate to negative internal aspects and conditions one’s participation in a terrorist group brings about. These can range, amongst others, from feeling disillusioned with intragroup dynamics and losing faith in the latter’s purpose and ideology, to experiencing fatigue or burnout resulting from living a life in secrecy (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009). Pull factors, on the other hand, are defined as outside forces incentivizing an individual to cut ties with the terrorist movement and live a more satisfying, ‘ordinary life’. Members of a terrorist group might, for example, come to perceive their age as standing in the way of fulfilling extremist duties; they might develop a strong desire to start a family or personal relationship, or feel the need to engage in more promising employment opportunities (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009). Bjørgo and Horgan (2009) suggest it is the interplay of these factors that yields the strongest incentive for an individual to terminate his/her involvement with terrorism. According to the authors, “push alone or pull alone is less likely to work” (p. 46). Thus, similar to what has been observed in earlier studies in relation to organizational decline (Crenshaw, 1991; 1999; Cronin, 2006; Jones & Libicki, 2008; Ross & Gurr, 1989), Bjørgo and Horgan (2009) have found that on an individual level too, the combination of internal and external factors seems to play a crucial role in explaining pathways out of terrorism.

19 The Multi-level Approach More recently, a more nuanced approach to analysing the end of terrorism has gained popularity among researchers. Rather than viewing it primarily as the outcome of a set of internal and external factors acting either on an organizational or individual level, various scholars have come to study the decline of terrorism from a multi-level perspective (Alonso, 2006; Bosi & della Porta, 2015; della Porta, 1995; Ferguson et al., 2015), which combines these layers so as to provide a more complete picture of the dynamics at play. The rationale for employing a multi- dimensional approach comes from the notion that an “individual’s decisions are nested in a group context”, which in turn “is nested within a specific political, economic and cultural context” (Noricks, 2009, p. 311). Authors like Bosi and della Porta (2015), and Ferguson et al. (2015) have therefore proposed to focus on the interplay of all relevant levels when analysing collective and individual disengagement from terrorism. According to them, developments at the micro/individual, meso/organizational and macro/societal level are interrelated and hence, ought not to be viewed separately. Ferguson et al. (2015), for example, found that in the case of Northern Ireland, individual disengagement from the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force and Red Hand Commando groups largely resulted from the complex interaction of personal (e.g. age, fatigue) and group-level factors (e.g. organizational transformation, leadership change) that were in turn embedded in, and affected by, the wider disarmament-context of the country’s ongoing peace process (pp. 201-202). Della Porta (1995), conducting a case study on the Italian Red Brigades, similarly found the organization’s decline to be the outcome of interrelated micro, meso and macro developments. Burnouts and intra-group divisions over the usefulness of the terrorist tactic in this particular case paved the way for new counterterrorism policies to take effect, as disillusioned members were granted reduced prison sentences or other rewards in exchange for their collaboration with the authorities. The intelligence thus obtained led to further arrests, accelerating organizational disintegration and ultimately contributing to the group’s collapse. Thus, in both Northern Ireland and Italy have contextual events “interact[ed] with organisational dynamics and individual motivations” (Bosi & della Porta, 2015, p. 83) and vice versa, in bringing about the decline of terrorism. Although micro-, meso- and macro-levels might in turn be affected by numerous internal and external factors as previously indicated, it is the “repeated interactions” between the levels that is most important, “since each level compounds and complicates the others” (Bosi & della

20 Porta, 2015, p. 81). Hence, any attempt to study the end of terrorism merely from a single perspective, as happened in previous research, likely tells just one side of the story.

3.2 The Demise of ETA in the Academic Literature Since in 2011, ETA announced to end its violent activities, only few authors have embarked on untangling the specific causes leading up to this historical decision, which was taken unilaterally and without any political concessions made by the Spanish state. The Basque case in this regard forms no exception to the generally scarce body of literature on the end of terrorism, terrorist campaigns or individual groups, which as a research field has only recently begun to attract growing academic interest. Over the past 50 years of its violent struggle for independence, scholars have predominantly focused on ETA’s emergence in the context of Basque nationalism and the Franco-regime (Clark, 1984; Mees, 2001); have sought explanations for ETA’s persistency and increased lethality in the wake of Spain’s return to democracy and the granting of autonomy to the Basque Country (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2010; Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995); or have looked at the impact of terrorist violence on the Spanish economy and tourist sector (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Enders & Sandler, 1991), as well as the effectiveness of Spanish counterterrorism initiatives (Barros, 2003; Perkoski & Chenoweth, 2010).

The few academic works that have been published in relation to the end of ETA’s armed campaign, however, do provide a more diversified and complex picture than the one put forward by Spanish government representatives, who unsurprisingly demonstrated “a strong bias towards tying the decline of [the group] to specific government policies” (Cronin, 2006, p. 14). While not in any way disputing the relevance or effectiveness of the state’s counterterrorism initiatives, authors like Murua (2017a) and Leonisio et al. (2016) for example, have emphasized as a further key determinant the loss of social support. In their view, ETA’s demise was to a large extent the result of a transformation occurring within the Basque Nationalist Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Vasco, MLNV), the complex network of radical-nationalist actors that since the 1970s had fervently supported the group’s separatist goals, and largely condoned its violent methods. Over the course of the 21st century, however, this huge collective of social, cultural and political groupings that is more generally known by the name Izquierda Abertzale (Patriotic Left), increasingly turned against ETA and its terrorist tactics, coming to view the “continuation of the armed struggle [as] totally

21 counterproductive” (Leonisio et al., 2016, p. 76), and even outright “damaging for the Basque pro-independence movement” (Murua, 2017a, p. 93). The changing attitude vis-à-vis the usefulness and efficacy of violence, the authors agree, has itself been triggered by a variety of factors including, amongst others, the “external pressure of political, legal and security measures” (Leonisio et al., 2016, p. 50), and the gradual loss of support from the (Basque) populace, which in the post-9/11 world more than ever questioned the legitimacy of the armed struggle for independence (Murua, 2017a). Zabalo and Saratxo (2015) add to this a growing realization among the radicals that after the last failed attempt (2005-2007), the channel of entering negotiations with Madrid “had been fully exploited” (p. 362) and hence, that the terrorist strategy would also in the future not yield the desired results. According to the authors, it was the combination of all these developments that led ETA to “reassess the situation”, and ultimately “change its discourse and practice” (Zabalo & Saratxo, 2015, p. 378) from violent to peaceful means. Whitfield (2014) similarly views ETA’s demise as the outcome of a multitude of factors including, but not limited to, the state’s counterterrorism initiatives. While acknowledging the successes achieved by (inter)national police and judicial efforts, she asserts that the group’s October 2011 decision was likewise the result of the “widespread rejection of ETA’s violence by Basque society” and of “limited but essential assistance from international actors” (p. 7). In addition to these developments, Whitfield (2014) describes as a further key determinant the government’s move to reopen peace negotiations in 2005, the failure of which led to a series of changes within the radical-nationalist community and ultimately, within ETA itself. According to these works, the end of ETA’s armed campaign for independence has thus been precipitated by developments taking place not just outside, but also within the group’s immediate environment. A similar picture emerges when focusing primarily on the individual level of analysis. Examining why 35 etarras4 between 1970 and 2000 have terminated their involvement with the organization, Reinares (2011), for example, found their decision to be influenced by changes in the broader socio-political spheres (e.g. democratization, declining societal support); intra- organizational dynamics (e.g. changes in internal functioning, strategy, tactics and operational practices), and developments occurring in their private lives (e.g. parenthood, anxiety, relationships), which led them to rethink, and ultimately rearrange their personal priorities. The

4 Spanish term for ETA members.

22 process of disengaging from ETA was accordingly “facilitated … by circumstances both internal and external to [the] terrorist group” (Reinares, 2011, p. 802). Alonso (2011) came to roughly the same conclusion. In his study, he investigated why some ETA members as of the mid-1970s held on to the armed campaign whereas others moved in the opposite direction, and found that it was “a combination of strategic, organizational and psychological factors” that drove “certain terrorists to abandon their involvement with ETA” (Alonso, 2011, p. 697). Similar to Reinares (2011), Alonso (2011) identified as key elements the changing socio-political landscape in the wake of Spain’s transition to democracy; the increasingly high cost and ineffectiveness of engaging in violent activism; the growing alienation of the Basque population; disagreements over strategies, tactics and target selection; as well as personal motivations such as marriage, fear, or general weariness from living a life in secrecy.

Hence, whether focusing primarily on the decline of the Basque group in its entirety, or on individual disengagement processes, the academic works hitherto presented have shown that in both cases, developments at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels have played a decisive role. This largely conforms to the multi-level approach introduced earlier, according to which individuals are embedded in a group context that in turn is affected by its broader social, political and cultural environment (Noricks, 2009). This framework essentially lays the groundwork for the analysis to be conducted in this thesis, which seeks to provide an in-depth investigation of how ETA’s demise progressed in the period from 2000 until 2011. To the author’s knowledge, an extensive evaluation of the individual-, organizational-, and structural-level factors that have been at play during this particular time frame has not yet been conducted. In contrast to earlier studies, this thesis will also attempt to elaborate in more detail on the interplay between these levels, the “repeated interactions” (Bosi & della Porta, 2015, p. 81) between micro, meso and macro developments that according to the theory are so crucial in bringing terrorism to an end. The exact steps and methodological choices made to conduct this research will be laid out in the next chapter.

23 4 Research Design The purpose of this chapter is to describe and discuss the tools and methods employed to answer the following research question: How have factors at the structural, organizational and individual level contributed to the decline of the Basque terrorist organization ETA since 2000?

4.1 Research Approach Research in general follows one of two broad theoretical approaches - the deductive approach or the inductive approach. While inductive reasoning is primarily used for theory-building purposes, moving from specific observations to the development of a more general set of principles, deductive reasoning is concerned with testing theory. It usually begins with the formulation of hypotheses derived from previous knowledge, after which relevant data is collected and analysed in order to “test whether the expected pattern actually occurs” (Babbie, 2015, p. 24). Deductive reasoning thus moves from a general set of assumptions to specific observations and conclusions. This is essentially the approach taken in this thesis, in which theoretical propositions, variables and their expected relations have been identified prior to the data collection process, based on existing literature (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). Depending on the conclusions arrived at, the original theory might be rejected, confirmed or modified.

4.2 Research Purpose Research can be undertaken for various purposes. Researchers may set out to gain knowledge about an understudied topic (exploration); to “collect, organize and summarize information” (Punch, 2006, p. 33) on a particular social phenomenon (description); or to investigate cause- effect relations between variables, seeking answers to how and why the issue observed has occurred (explanation). According to Babbie (2015), studies in the social sciences often have more than one single purpose. The research at hand is an example of this. It is somewhat exploratory given that the demise of ETA in particular has not been extensively studied, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter. The dissection of ETA’s historical evolution in chapter 5 represents a predominantly descriptive section that lays the groundwork for the empirical analysis to be conducted in the subsequent chapter. The predominant purpose of chapter 6 then is to identify

24 possible correlations between a given set of factors (on the structural, organizational, and individual level) and the decline of ETA from 2000 onwards.

4.3 Research Strategy According to Saunders et al. (2009), a research strategy can be considered “the general plan of how the researcher will go about answering the research question” (p. 600). Researchers have a variety of strategies to choose from, e.g. experiments, surveys, ethnography, archival research, case studies, or grounded theory. Each strategy involves a certain way of conducting research and as such, comes with a particular set of techniques and procedures by which data are to be collected and analysed. In the end, however, the choice of the most appropriate strategy depends on the nature of the research project, its overall objective(s), the type of question(s) asked, as well as on “the extent of existing knowledge, the amount of time and other resources … available” (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 141).

In this thesis, the case study has been identified as the most suitable strategy for addressing the research problem. Case studies are generally opted for whenever one seeks to investigate a specific social phenomenon or unit (e.g. an individual person, a group of people, a city, a country) “within its real-life context” (Yin, 2009, p. 18). They are particularly feasible when the researcher has little to no control over events or variables and hence, have proven a valuable strategy in the field of terrorism studies. An additional key strength of case studies is that they neither stipulate the form nor the sources of data to be collected (Yin, 2009). Data may be quantitative, qualitative, or both, and can be drawn from a variety of sources, including interviews, documentation, direct observations, archival records or physical artifacts (Yin, 2009). The freedom of choosing the type of data and source of evidence is a particular advantage for researchers in the area of terrorism, in which interviews or direct observations might be difficult to conduct. The case study strategy is further deemed suitable for this research as it has the potential to uncover and explain presumed causal relationships in real-life “that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies” (Yin, 2009, p. 19). Based on previous research, the decline of ETA during the past 15 years has presumably been caused by a variety of internal and external factors interacting with one another on different levels, and embedded in a dynamic, ever-changing environment. Given the immense complexity of the phenomenon under study, and

25 additionally taking into account time constraints and language barriers, other research strategies had to be neglected.

Researchers employing the case study strategy generally have the choice between single and multiple case designs. Given its focus on just one entity - the Basque ETA - this research qualifies as a single case study. It allows the researcher to delve deep into the respective case, and to gain a fuller and more thorough understanding of the issue at hand than would be possible examining multiple cases. The information richness of the single case design is particularly valuable for research projects like this thesis, which seek to identify complex (causal) relations between variables, and makes it the preferred strategy for many of those involved in studying the decline of terrorism (cf. Alonso, 2011; della Porta, 1995; Ferguson et al., 2015). Single-case designs are generally appropriate whenever the case is (a) critical, (b) unique, (c) typical/ordinary, (d) revelatory or (e) longitudinal (Yin, 2009). According to this classification, the Basque ETA can best be viewed as representing a unique case. Before officially renouncing violence in October 2011, it has long been viewed as one of the most deadly and most enduring terrorist organizations in the world (van Dongen, 2014). Throughout its history, the group has “survived regime change, … several internal splits, changes of strategy, negotiations with almost every democratic Spanish government, several ceasefires, and numerous blows by security forces” (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2010, p. 69). Fighting for the goal of complete Basque independence, ETA over a period of five decades launched numerous attacks, leaving more than 800 people dead and thousands wounded (Whitfield, 2015). Comparable only to the IRA, if at all, the Basque ETA thus presents an interesting and unique instance in Western European terrorism history in terms of lethality and persistence.

4.4 Conceptualization & Operationalization The literature review has indicated that the decline of a terrorist group is affected by developments taking place, and interacting with one another, at the macro-, meso- and micro- levels of analysis, i.e. in its external environment, its own organizational context, and in the personal lives of its members. The next paragraphs will now specify more clearly the conceptual scope of each single level, i.e. its particular meaning in this thesis on the Basque ETA, and at the same time elaborate on the respective factors that have been selected for consideration in this

26 research. In so doing, the author hopes to avoid any potential misunderstandings with regards to the upcoming analysis.

The first, or structural level of analysis, is concerned with the changes that have taken place in ETA’s wider socio-political environment between 2000 and 2011. Here, particular attention will be paid to developments in the (inter)national political spheres; changes in popular support, and the introduction of counterterrorism measures and initiatives on both the national and international/European level. The choice of these factors is based in large parts on the already existing literature on the end of terrorism, which has identified them as some of the most important transformations and processes occurring at the macro-level, i.e. beyond a terrorist group’s immediate control. The second, or organizational level of analysis, will deal with the internal workings of the Basque separatist group and the developments that have in this regard occurred from the year 2000 onwards. The primary focus in this section will be laid on recruitment and funding capabilities; changes in ETA leadership, structure and modus operandi, as well as on internal conflicts. In addition to these aspects, attention will also be paid to the Basque nationalist movement. Although not taking part in the active militancy and thus in ETA itself, this collective of radical-nationalist actors (presumably) supports the group and its separatist agenda, and is widely regarded a vital component of ETA’s terrorist network (Murua, 2017a; Whitfield, 2014). Hence, when examining the group or meso-level of analysis, developments within the Abertzale will also be taken into account. The third, or individual level of analysis, is then concerned with changes occurring in member’s private lives. In this particular section, a closer look will be taken at factors such as anxiety or burnout, disillusionment with intra-group dynamics and processes, or a loss of faith in the organization’s course of action or purpose. In addition, attention will be paid to affective relationships, parenthood or similar turning points that may have led to a rearrangement of an etarra’s personal priorities. These micro-level factors largely conform to the aforementioned ‘push and pull factors’ identified by Bjørgo and Horgan (2009) in relation to individual disengagement. However, due to the fact that individual-level developments are nested within a group-context, it may not always be possible to draw a clear line between the two levels of analysis. A certain degree of overlap can thus be expected.

27 To analyse if and how the various factors have affected ETA’s organizational decline, one needs to find a way by which the latter can be demonstrated. In the field of terrorism studies, a common way to do so is by looking at the number of attacks and fatalities a group has caused over a certain period of time. Particularly if decline is understood as the gradual loss of operational capabilities may a decrease in the level of terrorist activity then be interpreted as proof that an organization is, in fact, in retreat. The indicators are nevertheless to be treated with caution. A terrorist group might, for example, commit fewer attacks and cause fewer deaths not because it is about to collapse, but instead has become more discriminate in terms of target selection, or because it is saving “resources for bigger, more advanced attacks” (van Dongen, 2011, p. 3). Focusing solely on the number of terrorist incidents and the number of casualties to assess decline hence does not have much explanatory power, as the indicators “themselves [have] no unambiguous meaning” (van Dongen, 2011, p. 5). Therefore, in this thesis we will take as an additional indicator the number of arrests. The rationale for doing so is based on the assumption that the more members are captured, the less manpower a group has at its disposal for planning and conducting attacks. The latter, however, is essential for terrorist organizations in terms of raising publicity for their respective causes, and attracting new recruits or sympathizers. Without their support, clandestine movements are unlikely to survive (Cronin, 2006). While an increase in arrests can in this regard provide an indication of organizational decline, especially if leaders or other key members are eliminated, van Dongen (2011) asserts that “one should be careful not to read too much into it” (p. 7). Apart from the fact that the exact size of a terrorist group is rarely known, the problem according to him is that “terrorists can easily be replaced” (van Dongen, 2011, p. 7). Hence, only in cases in which a terrorist group evidently “has little to no outside support”, and in which reliable estimates can be made regarding its size and strength, “can making arrests be seen as chipping away at the organisation” (van Dongen, 2011, p. 8). In the case of ETA, which has dealt with waning popular support since the early 1980s and has reportedly consisted of fewer than 500 (active) members during its most recent history (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2010), the number of arrests might thus serve as a valuable indicator of the group’s decline. A terrorist organization’s looming collapse may furthermore become visible through a decrease in its mobilization power, i.e. the ability to attract new members and garner support from a (local) constituency. It was indicated before that the latter constitute the lifeblood of any

28 terrorist group, as without the continued provision of manpower, financial or material resources (e.g. weapons, safe houses), violent campaigns can hardly be sustained (Cronin, 2006). Hence, if a terrorist movement fails to appeal to the larger population and encounters difficulties in filling its ranks, then this can be considered a sign of its impending decline.

4.5 Data & Data Collection Method As was mentioned before, one advantage of using the case study approach is that it allows the researcher to combine both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study. The primary form of data relied on in this study will be qualitative. Qualitative data largely consists of words and texts, and will be obtained through a document analysis of relevant books, journals, reports and newspaper articles that are either freely available, or can be accessed through Leiden University’s library catalogue. On different occasions, quantitative data will be consulted. This type of numerical information is particularly useful whenever data cannot adequately be captured or expressed in written form, e.g. when examining patterns of terrorist and counterterrorist activity (e.g. # of attacks, # fatalities. # of arrests), or assessing trends in popular support. Such quantitative data will be derived first and foremost from statistical publications and datasets made available by Basque and Spanish authorities, as well as from open-source databanks such as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which covers worldwide terrorist incidents of the past 40 years. The author is aware that information obtained from such sources is generally to be treated with caution due to the potential risks of bias, data inaccuracy and/or incompleteness. Whenever possible, data obtained from these sources will therefore be crosschecked with other relevant sources. Taking into account the scope of this thesis, as well as time constraints and language barriers, the collection of primary data was not an option. The research will therefore largely rely on secondary data collected by other academics or institutions.

4.6 Limitations Just like any other study, the research at hand has some weaknesses that are worth noting. Firstly, case studies, and single case designs in particular, are often criticized for their low external validity. In this regard, the question arises to what extent the study’s findings will hold true beyond the particular Basque case examined. Most likely, this will prove difficult due to the uniqueness of terrorist movements in terms of context, setting, ideology, objectives,

29 structure and the like. The generalizability of this research is thus indeed limited. According to Stake (1995), however, representativeness is seldom the key determinant for choosing single case study designs. The objective of this research, in fact, is to gain as deep an understanding as possible of the complexities and the dynamics at play in the demise of an organization that has proven unique in Western European terrorism history in terms of longevity and lethality. Generalizing beyond this immediate case is thus not the primary intention. Inferences drawn from the Basque case might nevertheless prove valuable on a theoretical level, and might inform existing knowledge on how terrorism can be brought to an end. A second limitation is concerned with researcher bias, the process whereby one’s own beliefs and expectations influence the way data are gathered and interpreted. The subjectivity thus introduced into the research process can lead to skewed results and hence, misleading and erroneous conclusions (Babbie, 2015). To reduce bias, the author has attempted to remain as value-free as possible throughout the various stages of this project. By critically reflecting on her own role, and being aware of the possible ways in which her personal mind-set may affect the research process, the researcher intends to keep the risk of bias to a minimum, and therewith increase the study’s credibility. Despite these efforts, however, a certain degree of subjectivity will most likely prevail, owing to the qualitative, interpretive nature of the study. Other researchers might therefore come to different conclusions when replicating the work. The third limitation pertains to internal validity, or the extent to which one can be sure that “an effect observed in a dependent variable was actually caused by the independent variable” (Rubin & Babbie, 2009, p. 157). Determining cause-effect relations using research strategies other than the experiment is generally problematic, the case study with its limited degree of control over key variables in this regard forming no exception. The risk remains that variables other than those under scrutiny are responsible for the changes observed, i.e. ETA’s organizational decline being the result of economic, cultural or some other factors that are unaccounted for in this study. Due to the potential existence of such third variables, establishing causality is hardly possible. The evidence provided by the case study strategy therefore remains suggestive. To increase certainty, further research in more controlled settings is required. The author is nevertheless confident that the factors selected are among the key determinants for the group’s decline, as many have previously been identified as such by various authors and experts in the field (cf. Alonso, 2011; Murua, 2017a; Reinares, 2011; Whitfield, 2014).

30 The last limitation is related to data availability. Although there is a vast body of (English) literature dealing with ETA and the Basque conflict in general, specific information about the group’s internal workings or the private lives of its members in the period 2000-2011 is much more difficult to obtain. With regards to the organizational level, the problem is not that information is not available. In fact, numerous internal documents and official communiqués released by ETA can be found online. The issue here is that these are largely published in the Basque language only, which effectively precludes their use in this study. In terms of individual- level factors, the author initially sought to extract a great deal of information from autobiographies, memoirs or similar sources. Besides the afore-mentioned language barrier, the author here faces the additional problem that personal accounts of ETA-membership covering the period from 2000 onwards seemingly have neither been published, nor written at all. Conducting personal interviews would have likely proven a valuable alternative source of information in this regard, allowing for a much more detailed and authentic account of the (micro-level) processes underlying ETA’s decline. This was not an option, however, due to time constraints, costs and language barriers. The use of primary sources/data thus proving difficult, the author of this thesis will seek to obtain the relevant information from secondary sources.

Having laid out the methodological choices made, in the next chapter a closer look will be taken at ETA’s origins in the context of Basque nationalism and the Franco-regime, and its historical evolution since then. This background information will provide the basis for the empirical analysis to be conducted in chapter 6.

31 5 The Basque ETA

5.1 Territorial Setting The Basque Country is located on the northern fringe of the Iberian Peninsula, stretching across the Pyrenees Mountains from the northeast of Spain to the southwest of France. Historically, it consists of seven provinces, four of which are to be found in Spain, while the remaining three are located on French soil (see Figure 1). The division of the Basque Country into Iparralde (the Northern side) and Hegoalde (the Southern side) dates back to 1512, the year in which the modern border between France and Spain was officially drawn.

Figure 1. Map of the Basque Country Source: Clark, 1984 The Spanish part of the Basque Country comprises the provinces of Álava (Basque: Araba), Guipúzcoa (Gipuzkoa), Vizcaya (Bizkaia) and Navarra (Nafarroa). Covering an area of roughly 17, 600 km², these four provinces make up more than three-quarters of the entire Basque territory while constituting a mere 3.5% of Spain’s total landmass only. In 1979, Álava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya unified to form the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC). 5 The fourth province,

5 In the Basque language, the BAC is known by the name Euskadi. In Spanish, it is commonly referred to as Communidad Autónoma del Pais Vasco.

32 Navarra, obtained its own statute of autonomy in 1982, and is since officially termed the Autonomous Community of Navarra. According to the most recent data, approximately 2.8 million people (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2017) live in Hegoalde, representing around 90% of the total Basque population. On the other side of the Pyrenees Mountains, the French Basque Country consists of the provinces Basse-Navarre (Basque: Nafarroa Beherea), Labourd (Lapurdi) and Soule (Zuberoa). This smaller segment of the Basque Country has a total landmass of some 3, 000 km², and is home to roughly 300, 000 people (Zenbakiak, 2014). Contrary to the BAC or Navarra, Iparralde has no official autonomous status. As part of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, it is administered by the French central government in Paris. Accordingly, the Basque Country6 today is made up of three distinct political entities spread across two states: the Basque Autonomous Community and the Autonomous Community of Navarra in Spain, and the three provinces of Iparralde on the French side of the border. Thus defined, the Basque Country covers a total area of 20, 600 km² and has a population of approximately 3.1 million inhabitants.

5.2 Historical Background

5.2.1 Early history The Basques are an ancient people whose exact origins to this day remain a mystery. Although archaeological discoveries suggest “there were people living in what is now the Basque region as long ago as 20,000 B.C.” (Clark, 1984, p. 13), experts have so far not succeeded in determining precisely the roots or the subsequent prehistoric evolution of this particular people. Equally enigmatic is the origin of their language Euskara. It is related neither to the Romance languages of neighbouring countries, nor to any other language spoken in modern history (Woodworth, 2012) and as such, reinforces the reputation of the Basques as one of the oldest ethnicities on the European continent. Considered a ‘linguistic isolate’, Euskara has come to be viewed as “the most significant distinguishing feature of Basque ethnicity” (Clark, 1984, p. 11) that is inextricably intertwined with Basque identity and culture. While the origins of the Basque people

6 In the Basque language, the Basque Country is known as Euskal Herria, which might be translated to ‘the land of the Basque speakers’. The nationalistic term Euskal Herria is used to denote the “land of the Basques from a historical, cultural, linguistic and identity standpoint” (Zallo & Ayuso, 2009, p. 5), thus comprising all seven provinces that make up the original Basque Homeland. In Spanish, the Basque Country is referred to as El Pais Vasco. Unlike the Basque territorial understanding of the term, however, El Pais Vasco commonly refers to the Spanish Basque provinces only (BAC + Navarra), excluding the territories on the French side.

33 and language to date thus remain unresolved, what seems uncontested among experts is that the Basques over the course of their presumed centuries-old history have succeeded in “preserv[ing] their land, language, and culture against a succession of invaders” (Anderson, 2003, p. 6), including, amongst others, the Celts, the Romans, and the Franks. During the early Middle Ages then, a significant historico-political development took place with the emergence of the Kingdom of Navarre. Unifying all seven Basque provinces into a single political unit, it created a more or less sovereign Basque state “for the first and only time in its history” (Woodworth, 2012, p. 54). The kingdom lasted for 700 years until in 1512 its southern territories were annexed by the Castilian Crown, and accordingly absorbed into the Kingdom of Spain. The remainder of the ancient Kingdom of Navarre to the north of the Pyrenees Mountains, however, continued to be independent until its incorporation into the Kingdom of France in 1620. Ever since, the Basque nation has been divided into Hegoalde and Iparralde. Under both the French and Spanish Crowns, relations with the Basque provinces were regulated by the fueros, municipal charters of rights derived from ancient Basque customary law. Through the fueros, “each province was granted substantial powers of self-government by the reigning monarch” (Clark, 1984, p. 13), who thereby hoped to secure Basque allegiance to the crown. And although similar arrangements existed elsewhere in Europe and the Iberian Peninsula in particular, the broad powers conveyed to the regional Basque authorities in legal, fiscal and political matters were virtually unmet (Woodworth, 2012). Among the Basque people, this period of extensive autonomy is since known as the ‘Golden Age’. It has become ingrained in Basque collective memory and national identity, and is regularly referred to by nationalists seeking to justify their claims to an independent and sovereign Basque state.

5.2.2 The emergence of Basque nationalism Following the French Revolution in 1789, the formerly autonomous French Basque provinces were brought under direct control of the centralized government in Paris. The regions were subsequently incorporated into the newly formed Département Basses-Pyrénées7, as a result of which the French Basques lost their traditional privileges. The Spanish Basque territories, on the other hand, maintained their fueros throughout much of the 19th century. When the ideas of the French Revolution eventually spread to the Spanish Kingdom, however, clashes broke out

7 In 1969, the Département Basses-Pyrénées was renamed the Département Pyrénées-Atlantique.

34 between traditional Carlists and liberal Centralists that culminated in the First (1833-39) and Second (1872-1876) Carlist Wars. The defeat of the traditionalist forces brought the Spanish Basque provinces under the authority of the central government in Madrid. For the Spanish Basques this meant that almost a century after their French counterparts, they too had lost their ancient rights.8 The deprivation of political autonomy sparked a similar reaction among the Basque populations in both Spain and France - the rise of nationalist feelings. These sentiments were further fuelled by the processes of industrialization and modernization, which at the time brought significant social and economic changes to the region. Initially “founded on small-scale agriculture and commerce”, the Basque country9 by the late 19th century had turned into “a society based on mining, heavy industry, shipbuilding and banking” (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995, p. 415). The economic success and rapid development soon made the region the primary destination for workers from all over the country, who migrated there in large numbers. For the Basques, this constituted a major threat. An isolated people throughout most of their history, the massive influx of a non-Basque, Spanish-speaking population was perceived as “diluting the ethnic … and linguistic purity of the Basque nation” (Woodworth, 2002, p. 22), creating resentment and triggering anti-Spanish sentiment. In order to protect and restore the traditional order, the Basques increasingly turned to nationalism. As of 1895, the growing movement was able to politically express itself through the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV). The PNV had been founded by Sabino Arana (1865-1903), a Basque writer fervently committed to preserving Basque identity, language and culture against the perceived dangers of industrialization, urbanization and mass immigration. In Arana’s view, there was but one way to stop the ‘invasion’ of outsiders and simultaneously safeguard the ‘purity of the Basque race’, namely independence.10 The key to achieving this goal was to reinforce “the boundary between Basques and non-Basques” (Conversi, 2016, p. 35), which Arana sought to accomplish by promoting the use of Euskara and

8 Despite the formal abolition of the fueros, Álava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya through special economic agreements (‘Conciertos Económicos’) were permitted to further levy their own taxes. Navarra, on the other hand, fully maintained its traditional rights and privileges. 9 Unless otherwise indicated, the term ‘Basque Country’ will in the remainder of this thesis refer to the Basque Autonomous Community in Spain only. 10 Arana later changed the PNV’s goal from independence to restoring the ancient fueros, and hence, Basque autonomy.

35 inventing additional expressions of ‘Basqueness’, such as the national flag and anthem.11 Most of these symbols are present in the region until this day, indicating the lasting influence Arana and his ideas have had on Basque society in general, and on the nationalist movement in particular.

5.2.3 Francoism and the founding of ETA Following Arana’s death in 1903, Basque nationalism continued to flourish. The PNV gradually gained in strength, and in the early 1920s and mid-1930s emerged as the dominant nationalist player that was determined to continue Arana’s legacy, and push for greater Basque self- government. The latter was eventually achieved on the eve of the Spanish Civil War (1936- 1939), when Madrid approved a Statute of Autonomy for the Basque Country. Shortly afterwards, however, General Francisco Franco’s nationalist forces overthrew the Republican government, revoked the Autonomy Statute and forced the new Basque government to take refuge in France. Under Franco’s rule (1939-1975), Spain turned into a centralist authoritarian regime, which envisaged the creation of a nationally homogeneous, unified state (Muro, 2013). Culturally distinct regions with a strong ethnic identity, such as Catalonia or Galicia, were considered a threat to this ambitious plan and were henceforth subjected to Franco’s violent assimilation policies. Similar developments occurred in the Basque Country, where the regime “engaged in [the] physical and symbolic repression of any outward manifestation of Basque cultural and political identity” (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995, p. 419). This involved, amongst others, the banning of the Basque flag, anthem and language, the prohibition of Basque cultural events, literature, and music, as well as the mass detention, torture and assassination of Basque activists (Anderson, 2003). Seeking to dilute Basque distinctiveness even further, Franco during the 1950s and 1960s promoted widespread immigration to the region. The renewed inflow of a predominantly Spanish workforce, however, only reinforced the perception among Basques that their homeland was being illegitimately occupied by Spain (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995). These developments contributed to an upsurge in Basque ethnic awareness and significantly strengthened the already existing ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995). Against this background, a small group of PNV-affiliated students in 1959 established ETA. They had grown immensely discontented with the political apathy of the Basque

11 Arana also introduced the Basque national holiday Aberri Eguna (Day of the Fatherland) and invented the name ‘Euzkadi’ to denote the Basque nation.

36 government-in-exile and the lack of formal channels to vent their grievances and hence, “sought new, more radical ways both to oppose the Francoist regime and to express their ethnic identity” (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995, p. 419). ETA would henceforth strive for the creation of an independent and sovereign Basque State comprised of the seven historical provinces, and openly advocated violence as a useful and legitimate means to attain this objective. In 1968, the group carried out its first assassination (Whitfield, 2015), which simultaneously put into effect the strategy of action-repression-action.12 The regime’s (anticipated) response - intensifying its crackdown on the Basque population - was met with fierce opposition across the country. Sympathy for the Basque militants eventually skyrocketed following the infamous Burgos trial13 (1970) and the assassination of Spanish Prime Minister Carrero Blanco three years later (Heiberg, 2007). While the former aroused widespread condemnation and sparked mass protests in support of ETA, it was the killing of Franco’s intended successor that in particular pushed the armed group to “the forefront of the resistance movement against the authoritarian regime” (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995, p. 430). The incident dealt a severe blow to the dictatorship that would come to an end only two years later.

5.2.4 The transition to democracy and the persistence of violence Shortly after Franco’s death in 1975, Spain underwent a process of democratic transition (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995). Political reforms were introduced, free elections were held, and in 1978 a parliamentary monarchy was installed through the adoption of a new Spanish Constitution, which would severely alter the political and administrative structure of the country.14 One of the

12 The logic behind this strategy was to conduct an attack, thereby forcing the regime into taking repressive action against the wider (Basque) population, which in turn would result in increased support for the group, followed by a new cycle of violence and repression (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2009). The spiral thus created would eventually lead to a mass rebellion against the dictatorship and ultimately, to Basque independence, or so ETA hoped (Woodworth, 2002). 13 During the Burgos trial, sixteen ETA members were brought before a military court for taking part in terrorist activities and for their (alleged) involvement in the murder of Melitón Manzanas, head of the Basque secret police unit, and known for his torturous treatment of Basque prisoners. The court sentenced six defendants to death, while the remaining etarras received prison sentences totalling more than 300 years (Clark, 1984). Following enormous opposition and (inter)national outrage over the severity of the punishments, the death penalties were eventually converted into life imprisonments. The Burgos trial greatly discredited Franco’s authoritarian regime at home and abroad. For ETA, on the other hand, it turned into a publicity stunt that would serve to spread its message and portray its members as heroes. 14 The Constitution was adopted following a referendum held in December 1978. Nation-wide, it was approved by 59% of the electorate. In the Basque Country, however, only 31% of the electorate voted in favour while at the same time, abstention rates in the region (55%) almost doubled the national average (32%) (Woodworth, 2002). This was largely the result of nationalist parties calling on Basques to refrain from voting on grounds that the new Constitution did not acknowledge Basque sovereignty. To this day, the high abstention rate is

37 most important changes in this regard was the introduction of a decentralized system of government. It granted Spanish provinces the right to form autonomous communities and hence, a degree of self-government within the confines of the Spanish nation-state. The BAC was eventually established through the Statute of Gernika, which - ratified by referendum in 1979 - paved the way for “the establishment of separate Basque political institutions … an independent Basque police force, tax autonomy from the central government, [and] control over education, culture, language, [and] the media” (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003, p. 12). Yet although the powers and competences devoted to Basque regional authorities far exceeded those granted to other autonomous governments in Spain, the nationalist movement and ETA in particular “rejected autonomy as an unacceptable compromise and continued to insist on complete Basque independence” (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003, p. 12). At the time, ETA switched from its revolutionary war strategy to a strategy of attrition (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2009; van Dongen, 2014). The latter was based on the assumption that an increase in terrorist activities would diminish the state’s operational capabilities to the point where it had no choice but to give in to the group’s demands. These had been laid out in the so- called KAS Alternative15, a document published in 1978 by the Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista (Socialist Nationalist Coordinator, KAS), the principal “coordinating body” (Murua, 2017b, p. 23) of the complex Basque National Liberation Movement. The MLNV in turn had been founded by ETA in 1974 as an umbrella organization for the various civil society groupings sharing and supporting its radical-separatist agenda (Whitfield, 2014, p. xxiv), including NGO’s, trade unions, political actors, as well as youth, women, and sports clubs. Apart from ETA, which acted as the movement’s principal leader and “military vanguard” (Muro, 2013, p. 153), the most relevant unit within the MLNV was Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity, HB)16, a coalition of radical- nationalist parties united by their refusal to accept the legitimacy of the Spanish state, and their desire to form an independent Basque Country comprised of all historical provinces. Altogether,

regarded by many nationalists as proof that “the Constitution had been rejected, or at least not accepted, by a majority of Basques” (Woodworth, 2002, p. 52) and hence, had illegitimately been imposed on the Basque people. 15 The KAS Alternative, originally created in 1976, consisted of the following five (minimum) conditions that would have to be met for ETA to end its violent struggle: (1) Amnesty for Basque political prisoners; (2) legalization of separatist Basque political parties; (3) withdrawal of Spanish security forces from Hegoalde; (4) inclusion of Navarra into the newly formed BAC, and most importantly (5) recognition of the right to self- determination for the Basque Country (Clark, 1984). 16 HB was renamed Euskal Herritarrok (We, the Basque citizens, EH) in 1998, and since 2001 is known simply as Batasuna (Unity).

38 the MLNV/Abertzale movement constituted a major support base for ETA not just in terms of recruitment and funding, but also with regards to raising political awareness for ETA’s nationalist cause. Through the KAS Alternative, ETA for the first time offered a basis for negotiations. In their view, it was now Madrid’s turn to act. The government could either accept the conditions and pave the way for negotiations to end the conflict, or reject the radical demands and therewith ensure the continuation of violence. The non-negotiability of the right to self-determination in particular proved a breaking point, as it was a demand no government could concede to due to the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation” (Spanish Constitution, 1978) enshrined in Article 2 of the new Constitution. ETA accordingly stepped up its armed campaign, causing more fatalities between 1978 and 1981 than it had ever before (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995). Responding to the escalation of violence, Madrid in the mid-1980s embarked on a so-called ‘Dirty War’ against ETA by illegally setting up paramilitary death squads known as the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups, GAL). The GAL primarily operated in the French Basque Country, where ETA had long enjoyed a safe haven allowing the separatists to plan their campaigns with relative impunity (Heiberg, 2007). By targeting ETA militants on French soil, the GAL sought to coerce Paris into more actively taking part in the fight against the group, which it had refused earlier on grounds that etarras were considered “freedom fighters and political refugees” (Heiberg, 2007, p. 42) rather than terrorists. While this goal was eventually achieved in 1984 through the signing of an extradition agreement between the two countries, the activities of the GAL increasingly came under fire as it became clear that of 27 suspected ETA members killed, a third “had no connection whatsoever” (Woodworth, 2002, p. 7) with the group. ETA seized the opportunity to portray the Spanish government as inherently undemocratic and anti-Basque, and thereby managed to increase support that had been dwindling ever since the creation of the BAC. The rise in public sympathy did not last long, however. Under pressure from intensified Franco-Spanish police collaboration following Spain’s admission to the European Community, ETA in 1987 carried out its most lethal attack on a supermarket in Barcelona, killing 21 civilians (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2010). The indiscriminate nature of the attack sparked massive protests against the group, and was condemned even by segments of the Basque nationalist community. Following this unprecedented decline in support, the separatists eventually agreed to enter formal

39 peace talks with the Spanish government in 1989. The negotiation held in Algiers failed, however, and ETA subsequently resumed its violent activities.

5.2.5 The 1990s In the early 1990s, Franco-Spanish police cooperation led to the arrest of the group’s top leaders in the French Basque city of Bidart. The loss of its leadership and additional operational successes at the time severely limited ETA’s capabilities, prompting the group to undergo a period of internal debate and reflection (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2010), at the end of which the attrition strategy was abolished. ETA and the MLNV had essentially come to realize “the impossibility of gaining independence by the pressure of arms alone” (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2009, p. 615), and in the mid-1990s embarked on a different strategy, which emphasized the creation of a Basque nationalist front to pursue self-determination through a political process. The new approach was outlined in the so-called Democratic Alternative, an updated version of the earlier KAS Alternative, and built on the notion that secession could not be averted if Basque society as a whole supported the idea (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2010). To foster the unification of nationalist forces in the region, ETA in 1995 launched a campaign it termed ‘the socialization of suffering’. Central to the latter was the intimidation and marginalization of non- nationalist segments within Basque society. ETA accordingly widened its list of targets to include Basques opposed to the group and its separatist ambitions (e.g. politicians, lawyers, journalists). At the same time, the organization engaged in kale borroka (street struggle), low- intensity acts of urban violence17 perpetrated by radical MLNV youth groups against political opponents and moderates (Woodworth, 2002). Throughout the following months, fear and terror spread in the region. As the massive targeting of civilians and politicians increased, however, so did popular opposition to the group. A key event in this regard was the abduction and eventual killing of Miguel Angel Blanco, a local member of the conservative PP (Whitfield, 2015). The assassination greatly backfired and resulted in some six million people marching against ETA throughout the country (Heiberg, 2007). In response to the violence, the Spanish government under José Maria Aznar (PP) hardened its stance not only towards the armed group itself, but also against the larger nationalist milieu. It ordered the closure of Egin, a radical-nationalist daily that had long been considered “a mouthpiece for ETA” (Woodworth, 2002, p. 153), banned the

17 These included acts of vandalism, arson attacks as well as other types of property destruction.

40 KAS for its close ties with the separatists, and for the same reason imprisoned key members of HB, the main political player within the MLNV. These measures essentially reflected a renewed understanding of ETA in judicio-political spheres as a “complex structure integrating both terrorist commandos and [emphasis added] supporting organizations and networks” (Tajadura & Vírgala, 2008 as cited in Bourne, 2015, p. 341). The increased clampdown against ETA militants and the radical-nationalist movement, growing anti-ETA sentiments in Basque society, and the resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict through the Good Friday Agreement prompted ETA to declare a unilateral ceasefire in September 1998. More precisely, the latter was the result of a secret contract signed between ETA and moderate nationalists, which agreed to more fervently engage in the nation-building process in exchange for the cessation of violence (Murua, 2017a). Under what became known as the Lizarra-Garazi process, negotiations with Madrid took place sporadically over the next couple of months, yet yielded no satisfying results, as neither ETA nor the Aznar government were willing to move away from their respective positions on Basque self-determination. Frustrated and disappointed by the lack of progress, ETA in November 1999 renounced the truce and two months later resumed its terrorist activities by detonating a car bomb in Madrid (Gooch, 2000).

5.2.6 Recent history: The War on Terrorism, the Madrid attacks and the end of violence ETA’s new cycle of violence in the year 2000 eventually resulted in some 46 attacks and 23 fatalities (see Figure 2), marking its deadliest period since the early 1990s. The beginning of the 21st century also saw a significant increase in the amount of kale borroka attacks, from 390 incidents in 1999 to 581 and 552, respectively, in the next two years (Spanish Ministry of the Interior, 2003). The drastic upsurge in violence was met with growing anti-ETA protests throughout Spain and particularly in the Basque region, where many people lived in constant fear for their lives. Their calls for rejecting violence were given additional impetus following the Islamic terrorist attacks that struck the United States on September 11, 2001, which resulted in the death of some 3000 individuals (Hoffman, 2006, p. 18), and set in motion a global ‘War on Terror’. For the Basque militants, the increased political determination to combat terrorism that emerged in the wake of the 9/11 attacks presented a hostile environment, not only in regards to the worldwide hardening of anti-terrorism measures (e.g. freezing of financial assets), but also in terms of intensified international law enforcement, intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation

41 (e.g. France & Spain). As illustrated below, ETA’s terrorist activities during this period visibly declined. Pressure on the armed group grew even stronger when the Spanish government as of 2002 reinforced its clampdown against ETA’s support structures, i.e. by declaring illegal HB and it successor parties EH and Batasuna, as well as banning various other entities associated with the Abertzale. At the time, ETA became more and more isolated. The government’s move financially drained the organization and deprived it of its political platforms as a result of which ETA faced growing difficulties to spread its nationalist message, attract new members and maintain its operational capacity. While the separatists were still able to conduct attacks, these have been less sophisticated and lethal than before, as indicated by the comparatively low number of fatalities caused since 2002/2003.

50 45 40 35 30

25 Attacks 20 Fatalities 15 10 5 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2006 2008 2016

Figure 2. Number of ETA attacks and fatalities, 2000-2016 Source: Own compilation based on data from Fundación Víctimas del Terrorismo (n.d.) and National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2017), Global Terrorism Database [Data file] The terrorist attacks that struck Madrid on March 11, 2004, then for a short period of time moved ETA to the center of global attention. Although it quickly became clear that the coordinated train bombings were the work of Islamic extremists affiliated with Al-Qaeda, Aznar’s PP for three days insisted that Basque separatists were to be blamed for the more than 190 deaths (Whitfield, 2014). The government’s handling of the attacks and its rigidness in the face of mounting evidence pointing towards a different perpetrator severely angered large segments of the population, with many viewing the bombings as an immediate reaction to Aznar’s support for the

42 US-led ‘War on Terror’. Following the general election that took place just days after the attacks, the PP was removed from power and replaced by a new Socialist government under the leadership of José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. His administration rapidly opened a new round of peace talks with ETA, which resulted in the group declaring its first indefinite ceasefire in March 2006. Despite intense negotiations and regular meetings, however, the two parties over the next couple of months failed to reach common ground on the future of the Basque Country. Renewed ETA terrorist activity in December 2006 then dashed all remaining hopes of a peaceful solution to the conflict, the death of two civilians for the PSOE marking the end of the peace process (Whitfield, 2014). In the following years, the government ramped up its counterterrorism efforts against ETA and the radical-nationalist movement. Between 2007 and 2009, Spanish authorities declared illegal five political parties considered as Batasuna proxies, and in close collaboration with their French counterparts dismantled numerous stash houses and arrested hundreds of etarras, including several high-profile figures of the ETA and Batasuna leadership. ETA’s reaction to the failed negotiations and the subsequent developments manifested itself in a “resumption of the armed struggle” (Murua, 2017b, p. 148), as a result of which the death toll in the aftermath of the peace process (2007-2009) rose from zero to nine (see Figure 2). The revival of the old attrition strategy was short-lived, however, and in March 2010, the separatists committed their last fatal attack. Some one and a half years later, ETA declared the end of its forty-year old struggle for independence. The move followed earlier calls made by international mediators, security experts and Nobel Peace Prize winners, which had in March 2010 and October 2011 urged ETA to terminate their violent campaign once and for all (known as the Brussels and Aiete Declarations, respectively). On October 20, 2011 then, ETA published a statement in which it emphasized that henceforth, ”dialogue and agreement” should prevail “over violence and repression” in the process of finding “a just and democratic solution” to the conflict (ETA, 2011, para. 3). Although it has remained inactive ever since, the group has thus far refused to fully decommission its weapons arsenal or to dissolve completely.18 For both Zapatero and his

18 During the process of writing, in April 2017, ETA handed over a list of its remaining weapons caches to the authorities, thereby essentially bringing to an end the disarmament process that had already started in February 2014, when the separatists agreed to putting a small part of their guns and explosives out of use. Calls for its disbandment, however, have so far remained unanswered.

43 successor Mariano Rajoy (PP), as well as their French counterparts Nicholas Sarkozy (2007- 2012) and François Hollande (2012-2017), however, these constituted conditional steps that would have to be taken before their respective governments would agree “to open a process of direct dialogue” (ETA, 2011, para. 6) as envisaged in the unilateral declaration. The conflict might have therefore lost its violent component, with the questions surrounding Basque self- determination still left largely unanswered, it is nevertheless far from being resolved.

Having laid out ETA’s emergence in the context of Basque nationalism and its historical evolution since then, the next chapter will elaborate in more detail how developments and interactions at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels have contributed to the organizations’ decline since 2000.

44 6 Analysis

6.1 The Structural Level In the following paragraphs, developments taking place in ETA’s wider socio-political context will be examined. At this macro-level of analysis, particular attention will be paid to (inter)national political developments, CT initiatives, and changes in popular support that have occurred between 2000 and 2011.

6.1.1 International developments

6.1.1.1 9/11 and the ‘War on Terror’: The emergence of a global security environment When on September 11, 2001, Islamic terrorists hijacked four airplanes and subsequently launched a series of attacks against, inter alia, the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., the world was in shock. Orchestrated by Al-Qaeda mastermind Osama Bin Laden, the terrorist attacks resulted in the immediate death of some 3000 individuals (Hoffman, 2006, p. 18), thousands of casualties, and the almost complete disruption of daily life in one of the world’s leading economic and financial centres. The atrocious events sparked a wave of condemnation throughout the globe, with numerous countries expressing their solidarity and support for the American people and government. 9/11 was essentially perceived as an assault not just on the United States, but on the international westernized community as a whole, its democratic principles, its societies, its people, its values and ideas. This became particularly clear on September 12, 2001, when the NATO in an unprecedented move invoked Article 5 of its founding charter, according to which an armed attack on a single member state constitutes an attack against the entire alliance that should hence be collectively responded to (Daley, 2001). The US government could therefore count on a variety of allies in its self-proclaimed ‘War on Terror’, which was eventually fought out militarily in Afghanistan (2001-2014) and Iraq (2003-2011). While the goal of eliminating Bin Laden was achieved in May 2011, the international campaign until this day did not succeed in curbing the threat of Islamic terrorism. On the contrary, it seems that the Iraq War in particular has contributed to the destabilization of the region, the ousting of Saddam Hussein creating a favourable environment for radical ideas and fundamentalist movements to flourish. One of these

45 - the Islamic State - has essentially evolved into the biggest terrorist threat the world is facing today.

The events of 9/11 have altogether pushed the fight against terrorism to the forefront of the international community’s agenda. The past one and a half decades have seen a drastic increase not only in worldwide defense/CT expenditures and terrorism-related convictions and arrests, but also in the development of new anti-terrorism laws and information technologies. The attacks have moreover set in motion a paradigm shift, in which the protection and security of states has increasingly taken precedence over individual freedoms and privacy concerns. In this regard, extensive identification checks, video cameras, and body/iris scanners have somewhat become the new normal. The massive extension of global intelligence activities severely promoted the emergence of this so-called ‘surveillance culture’, with new data-collection statutes, such as the US Patriot Act, allowing for the interception and storage of vast amounts of personal information. The heinous attacks have had the additional effect of catalysing transnational counterterrorism cooperation to previously unprecedented levels. Whether in the context of the EU/UN frameworks, through bi-and multilateral agreements, or as part of the US-led military alliance, the existence of a common enemy in the form of radical Islamism has seemingly pushed many states to (temporarily) set aside their political differences, and to join forces in combating the terrorist threat. For the cooperating partners, this oftentimes brought with it profound benefits, i.e. in terms of gaining facilitated access to foreign expertise, technologies and/or intelligence resources. A particularly strong relationship in this regard evolved between the US and Spain, which alongside the UK emerged as one of America’s staunchest supporters in the ‘War on Terror’. Convinced that there was “no distinction to be made between … ETA and Al Qaeda” (Whitfield, 2014, p. 98), then Spanish Prime Minister Aznar from the outset fervently promoted the US-led military operations in Afghanistan and particularly in Iraq, where some 1400 Spanish troops participated in despite massive opposition at home (Whitfield, 2014, p. 100). The close bond that henceforth emerged between Aznar and President George W. Bush proved advantageous for Spain not only in terms of strengthening the country’s international profile (Managanas, 2016), but also in regards to ETA terrorism, as the two countries significantly intensified cooperation in the fields of counterterrorism, law enforcement and intelligence-sharing. 9/11 thus provided Aznar with the opportunity to “internationalize his anti-

46 terrorist policy” (Managanas, 2016, The narrative of “Spanish Glory“ section, para. 4), the attacks and the subsequent ‘War on Terror’ creating a favourable momentum to garner widespread support and assistance for his domestic fight against the Basque separatists. As the next section will demonstrate, Spain particularly benefited from transnational actors like the EU as well as individual nation-states such as France adjusting, expanding or improving their CT approaches in the post-9/11 world.

6.1.1.2 International counterterrorism initiatives against ETA As indicated in the previous section, the events of 9/11 considerably transformed the international counterterrorism landscape. Lower barriers to cooperation, an increase in budgetary resources and most importantly, a renewed global commitment to eradicate politically motivated violence severely boosted the development of new CT and security initiatives at the international level. While oftentimes not tailored to ETA specifically, but to eradicate terrorism in general, some of these turned out to have a direct impact on the Basque militant group.

Shortly after the attacks, for example, the EU set up its so-called ‘EU terrorist list’. The creation of this watch list formed part of implementing the measures laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which had been adopted in late September 2001, and instigated member states to intensify joint action against terrorism. Individuals or groups included on the EU blacklist are subjected to “the freezing of [their] funds, and other financial assets or economic resources” (Council of the European Union, 2001, p. 2). ETA was added to the list immediately following its formation in December 2001, as were several other entities deemed “part of the terrorist group” (Council of the European Union, 2001, p. 4). These included, amongst others, Haika (Arise) and Segi (Follow), radical-nationalist youth organisations linked to kale borroka violence; and Gestoras pro Amnistia, an association advocating for the rights of imprisoned etarras. ETA’s main political representative Batasuna and its predecessor parties HB and EH followed suit in June 2003, when the Spanish government succeeded in having them incorporated into the newest version of the EU blacklist. ETA and Batasuna have also been recognized as terrorist organizations by the US authorities, which placed them on their respective watchlists in November 2001 and May 2003.

47 Following the creation of Eurojust and the establishment of a special counterterrorism unit within the EU’s primary law enforcement organization Europol, the Union in June 2002 further stepped up its efforts against terrorism. Acting on an Anti-Terrorism Action Plan19 drawn up by the Council in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the member states introduced a common definition of terrorism and terrorist offences, and in relation to the latter established new minimum penalties (Bures, 2016). Through the adoption of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and the Framework Decision on Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), they moreover made available two new instruments aimed at facilitating the often complex and lengthy procedures in the field of European police and judicial cooperation. Through the EAW, for example, judicial decisions taken by the authorities in one member state would henceforth have to be accepted and executed across the EU (principle of mutual recognition). A person having committed a crime in one country but located in another would accordingly have to be arrested and extradited to the issuing state “with a minimum of formalities and within a set deadline” (European Union, 2015, n.p.). Apart from significantly speeding up the detention and extradition procedures, the measure also intended to ensure that criminals could no longer “evade arrest and prosecution” (Bures, 2016, p. 152) by simply crossing the border. With Basque militants regularly fleeing to neighbouring France, Spain from the outset fervently supported the introduction of this EU-wide arrest warrant. It became one of the first countries to fully implement the Framework Decision into national law (March 2003), and has alongside France, Germany, and Poland emerged as a key user of this instrument (Carrera, Guild, & Hernanz, 2013). In fact, between 2005 and 2011, Spanish authorities have issued a total of 3766 warrants to their European national counterparts (Carrera et al., 2013, p. 38). It is particularly unfortunate in this regard that official statistics detailing the type of crime for which these EAWs have been issued, are not available. The author’s assumption that requests were frequently connected to Basque separatism, however, is confirmed by Jimeno-Bulnes (2008), who argues that “many criminal offences that lead to an EAW being issued in Spain are linked to ETA terrorism” (p. 362). Since 2004 then, etarras trying to evade arrest by relocating to another European country have found themselves under immense pressure. Indeed, following

19 The Action Plan essentially represented a comprehensive roadmap designed to make the EU’s counterterrorism response more effective. It contained a list of more than sixty measures the member states were advised to take in areas ranging from aviation security to terrorist funding and police and judicial cooperation, the implementation of which was to be monitored by the European Commission (Bures, 2016). The Action Plan has been updated in the aftermath of the 2004 Madrid attacks (‘Revised Plan of Action’).

48 its introduction more than a decade ago, the ‘Eurowarrant’ has on numerous occasions provided the basis for ETA members to be detained across the EU, most notably in France and Great Britain.20 Many of these turned out to be high-profile figures of the group, which indicates the EAW’s potential as a valuable tool in the fight against Basque militancy. The Framework Decision on Joint Investigation Teams, on the other hand, aims at lowering the bureaucratic hurdles for EU police cooperation in combating cross-border crimes. It basically enables law enforcement practitioners from two or more European states for a set period of time to pair up, and jointly conduct criminal investigations in their respective territories (Council of the European Union, 2011). JIT members may accordingly take part in “house searches and interviews in all jurisdictions covered” (Council of the European Union, 2011, p. 3), and may also exchange case-specific information directly, without having to file time- consuming requests through their national channels. The Framework Decision in this regard provides for a quicker, smoother, and more efficient handling of cross-border criminal activities. Since 2004 then, five JITs have been set up with the explicit aim of tackling Basque terrorism (four between ES & FR, one between ES & PT). As pointed out by Block (2012), those established between France and Spain in particular “had significant operational success”, leading amongst others to “numerous arrests of suspected ETA members” and “the seizure of 350 kilos of explosives in an ETA safe house” (p. 100) in France. Mounting evidence of the group re- locating its logistical base to neighbouring Portugal in 2007 then led to the creation of a Spanish- Portuguese JIT (U.S. Department of State, 2009), which likely impaired the expansion of ETA’s network in the area. In light of these achievements, it may appear surprising that JITs have not been used more extensively in the fight against Basque terrorism. However, this negligence might be explained by the fact that cross-border law enforcement cooperation had already been running smoothly and effectively even before the Framework Decision entered into force.

France and Spain in particular had a long history of successful bilateral cooperation against ETA dating back to the mid-1980s, when Paris reversed its sanctuary policy towards the group, and began to pursue and arrest its members (Murua, 2017a). Over the course of the 1990s, Franco- Spanish security relations intensified. Joint operations such as the one carried out in Bidart in

20 Official statistics absent, this information has been obtained from online media sources, which regularly refer to an EAW or ‘Eurowarrant’ when reporting about the arrest of ETA fugitives (see, for example, BBC, 2011, 2012a).

49 1992 contributed to both countries developing a high degree of mutual trust, and to numerous militants being detained on both sides of the Pyrenees. In the early 21st century, cooperation was once again stepped up. Following the 9/11 attacks, the countries, amongst others, established a joint Franco-Spanish police station in the border town of Le Perthus, and granted each other more simplified access to information acquired from interrogating ETA suspects in their respective jurisdictions (U.S. Department of State, 2003). France additionally set up a 25-men strong special anti-terrorist unit that would henceforth work exclusively towards eliminating the Basque separatist group (The Telegraph, 2002). This increased collaboration between French and Spanish security forces in the new century altogether put ETA under enormous pressure. Between 2000 and 2011, more than 400 etarras have been arrested on French soil (Spanish Ministry of the Interior, 2013), many of which were key members of the group, such as Juan Guribi, Mikel Antza or Javier Lopez Peña. Joint operations further resulted in the discovery of numerous ETA stash houses predominantly on the French side of the border, where the group had long maintained its logistical base. In August 2009, for example, the French police - acting on information from their Spanish counterparts - uncovered 13 arms caches within less than two weeks, seizing in total “more than 800 kilos of explosives … several weapons, and thousands of rounds of ammunition” (U.S. Department of State, 2010, p. 246). Similar operations have taken place in Bayonne (October 2004), Toulouse (September 2007), Biarritz (May 2015) and Paris (November 2016).

Apart from the post-9/11 EU initiatives mentioned before, the success of Franco-Spanish collaboration against ETA in the 21st century was complemented by various other counterterrorism developments occurring in the European Union. Particularly in the aftermath of the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London terrorist attacks have member states stepped up their efforts in the area of police and judicial cooperation, thereby seeking to provide a more integrated and effective response to the threat posed by (international) terrorism. Among the most significant measures introduced were the creation of the office of a Counterterrorism Coordinator, the implementation of the European Evidence Warrant, the revision of the previous EU Anti- Terrorism Action Plan, the approval of a Strategy on Terrorism Financing, the strengthening of

50 Schengen and visa information systems, the enactment of an EU Data Retention Directive, the adoption of a comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and the signing of the Prüm Treaty.21 It is almost impossible to pinpoint exactly how each one of these initiatives has affected ETA throughout the years. That they have overall made it harder for the group to operate, however, seems unquestionable.

6.1.2 National developments

6.1.2.1 Politics in Spain Focusing on the larger political environment in Spain since the turn of the century, one of the first developments that took place was the March 2000 general election, during which Prime Minister Aznar and his conservative PP emerged as the undisputed winners. Obtaining an absolute majority of votes, Aznar in his second term of office was able to govern without having to consult the regional-nationalist forces that had supported his PP-led minority government ever since the previous general election in 1996. Following his re-election, Aznar reinforced the tough stance he had taken against ETA terrorism since the mid-1990s, when an attempt on his life had narrowly failed. 22 He became prime minister shortly afterwards, and almost immediately overturned some of the more lenient policies the PSOE had earlier embarked on. Amongst others, Aznar intensified the dispersion of jailed etarras throughout the Spanish mainland23, increasingly targeted the Abertzale Left, and - following the end of the Lizarra-Garazi truce in late 1999 - introduced a policy of zero-dialogue (Muro, 2013). The government henceforth refused to resume negotiations with the separatists until the PP’s legislature abruptly ended following the March 2004 general election.

21 The Prüm Treaty was an intergovernmental agreement signed in 2005 by seven EU Member States, including France and Spain, which aimed to deepen cross-border law enforcement cooperation with a view to strengthening the fight against terrorism and other transnational crimes. At the heart of this Treaty lay the idea of facilitating “the exchange of information with regard to sensitive personal data such as DNA profiles, fingerprints and vehicle registration” (Bures, 2016, p. 97). The participating states accordingly obtained near-automatic access to each other’s national databases. In 2008, the Treaty’s most relevant provisions were incorporated into EU law (‘Prüm Decisions’). 22 For an overview of CT measures introduced during Aznar’s second term, see section 6.1.2.2 23 The ‘dispersion policy’ had initially been introduced in the late 1980s as a means to prevent jailed etarras from maintaining communication lines with their comrades and hence, “to break the internal cohesion” (Leonisio et al., 2016, p. 43) of the group. ETA members, who used to be imprisoned close to their relatives in the Basque Country, were henceforth transferred to detention centres all over the country, some even as far away as the Canary Islands (Leonisio et al., 2016).

51 The election was held just days after Spain was hit by one of the worst terrorist attacks the country had ever seen. The coordinated explosions carried out in the early morning hours of March 11th against commuter trains across Madrid resulted in approximately 200 immediate deaths, and hundreds more suffering serious injuries (Whitfield, 2014, p. 133). Prime Minister Aznar and the PP almost instantly blamed ETA for the attacks and held on to this accusation even when the group denied responsibility, and mounting evidence pointed towards the involvement of Al-Qaeda (Deutsche Welle, 2004, para. 3). Despite the government’s insistence, the Spanish public increasingly questioned ETA’s role in the bombings. The official narrative further lost credibility when hours before the election, the authorities admitted to being in possession of a videotape, in which Al-Qaeda allegedly confirmed its involvement in the attacks (Deutsche Welle, 2004, para. 4). Thousands of protesters subsequently gathered in Madrid, accusing Aznar and the PP of suppressing crucial information and misleading the public for their political benefits (Bailey, 2004). Despite pre-election polls pointing towards the contrary, the conservatives were defeated by the PSOE, with José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero set to become Spain’s new Prime Minister. Similar to his predecessor, Zapatero upon taking office in April 2004 declared the fight against terrorism his absolute priority. It soon became clear, however, that with regards to ETA, the approach taken by his minority PSOE-government would deviate markedly from the zero- dialogue policy pursued by the PP. Although during his first months in office, Zapatero “retained many aspects of Aznar’s counter-terrorism policies” (Whitfield, 2014, p. 140), including the latter’s crackdown against the group and its radical-nationalist milieu, in May 2005 he offered ETA a new round of negotiations if the separatists agreed to terminate their violent campaign. His decision was backed by all parliamentary groups except the PP, for which it constituted a direct breach of the agreement both parties had reached in the December 2000 Pact for Freedom and Against Terrorism.24 The result was a severe rift between Spain’s two biggest political players that would dominate politics for years to come. Secretive talks between the government and ETA representatives began in June 2005, but it was not until three months after the group declared its first permanent ceasefire in March 2006 that Zapatero formally took his seat at the negotiating table. Throughout the next months, the conflicting parties met on a regular basis, but the process - as expected by Zapatero in June 2006 - turned out to be “long, tough and difficult”

24 The Pact is elaborated on in greater detail below (see p. 57).

52 (BBC, 2006a, para. 8). Despite the involvement of international figures such as ex-IRA commander Gerry Adams, progress was slow and marked by mutual allegations and distrust, fuelled amongst others by the October 2006 theft of numerous firearms in France for which ETA was being made responsible (Whitfield, 2014, p. 173). The separatists, on the other hand, grew frustrated with the government’s apparent unwillingness to discuss issues other than those of a more ‘technical’ nature (i.e. disarmament, victims, prisoner situation), although Zapatero had ruled out from the beginning any negotiations over ETA’s core political demands (Whitfield, 2014, p. 173). The peace process eventually came to a halt in December 2006, when the government withdrew from the talks following the bombing of Madrid’s Barajas airport, which resulted in the death of two civilians (Whitfield, 2014, p. 159). ETA officially declared the end of its ceasefire six months later, in June 2007, and subsequently resumed its attacks.

However, terrorism was not the only political issue Zapatero had to deal with in regards to the Basque Country. A proposal put forward in December 2004 by then head of the Basque regional government Juan José Ibarretxe (PNV) called for the modification of the Statute of Gernika, which had since 1979 provided the legal basis for Basque Autonomy. The ‘Ibarretxe Plan’ essentially envisaged the BAC to become a ‘freely associated state’ within the Spanish Kingdom, which would grant the region even more powers than it had already obtained, such as an “independent judiciary” or the right “to sign international treaties” (Muro, 2013, p. 179). It further emphasized that Basques as a separate people had an internationally sanctioned right to self-determination, and accordingly should be able to “decide their own future” (Whitfield, 2014, p. 114), e.g. by way of a referendum. Unsurprisingly, the plan stirred a lot of controversy. When Ibarretxe first presented his ideas in late 2002, then Prime Minister Aznar was quick to announce his administration was not up to re-negotiating the provisions of the Autonomy Statute. He declared the proposal a constitutional threat, and condemned it for legitimizing ETA’s violent campaign (Wood, 2003). Faced with rising secessionist aspirations in other regions (i.e. Catalonia) and determined to curb Ibarretxe’s enthusiasm, Aznar in 2003 penalized any unauthorized call for a plebiscite.25 His successor Zapatero similarly denounced Ibarretxe’s plan as “secessionist [and] unconstitutional” (The Economist, 2005, para. 4), while at the same time paving the way for a reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. In contrast to the Ibarretxe

25 The law was declared void in 2005 under Zapatero’s administration.

53 plan, however, the Catalan proposal primarily aimed at greater autonomy in financial matters only.26 Nevertheless, Zapatero’s generally more conciliatory stance towards the Basque conflict, and rising pressure from nationalist parties eventually opened the door for Ibarretxe’s plan to be discussed in the national parliament, where it was ultimately rejected in February 2005. Despite this political defeat, Ibarretxe remained convinced that his proposal presented an opportunity to bring lasting peace and stability to the region, as it would “leave [ETA] with no justification for its existence” (Muro, 2013, p. 179). Shortly after the separatists ended their ceasefire in June 2007, Ibarretxe announced to put his plan up for a popular vote in the Basque Country. The referendum was scheduled for October 2008, but rejected by Spain’s Constitutional Court only weeks before.

In the meantime, Zapatero was re-elected for a second term in office (March 2008). Apart from the political challenges raised by Basque, and increasingly Catalan, pro-independence movements, his new/old PSOE-minority government was confronted with an upsurge in ETA terrorist activities and a looming economic collapse. Tensions with the PP remained, but they were less intense. In fact, the political rivals even reached consensus on the sensitive issue of ETA, agreeing that “no further negotiations would be pursued” and that after the last failed attempt, the militants “could never again be trusted to abide by a cease-fire” (Whitfield, 2015, p. 8). New hopes for a resolution of the conflict emerged in May 2009, when Patxi Lopez was sworn in to become the new President of the Basque regional government. As a member of the PSOE’s Basque branch, he was the first non-nationalist politician to hold this office since the end of the Francoist regime (Whitfield, 2014). Lopez pledged to make ETA’s elimination a policy priority, and made clear that in contrast to the ousted PNV, his administration would not push for further autonomy (BBC, 2009). With the financial crisis having fully unfolded, his government would instead concentrate on securing the region’s economic development. Indeed, the Basque Country fared surprisingly well compared to the rest of Spain, which groaned under extreme unemployment rates, negative economic growth, and the collapse of the real estate market (BBC, 2012b). For Prime Minister Zapatero, the crisis posed a severe challenge. Not only did it catalyse separatist tendencies in both Catalonia and the Basque Country; his government’s strict austerity

26 The proposal was initially approved by popular vote in Catalonia, and subsequently passed through both the Catalan and the Spanish parliaments. Due to an in-text reference to Catalonia as ‘a nation’, however, it was in 2010 declared unconstitutional by Spain’s Constitutional Court.

54 program also sparked massive resentment among many Spaniards. The PSOE accordingly lost the general elections held in November 2011, with the PP obtaining its best result since Spanish democracy had been restored (Whitfield, 2014). Shortly before the elections, which resulted in Mariano Rajoy becoming Prime Minister of a PP-majority government, ETA declared it would terminate its violent activities, and instead seek a “democratic resolution to [the] age-old political conflict” (Burns, 2011, para. 1). Although many political actors welcomed the unilateral announcement, doubts remained as ETA had regularly broken its promises in the past, and the statement included no particular reference to the group disarming, disbanding or giving up its secessionist ambitions (Burns, 2011, para. 7). Upon taking office in December 2011, Rajoy revived the hard stance the PP had earlier taken against ETA, making clear that any sort of dialogue was conditional on the separatists fully decommissioning their weapons arsenal. Although steps in this direction have been made in February 2014 and more recently, in April 2017, the government so far refused to engage in talks.

6.1.2.2 National counterterrorism initiatives against ETA Spain has made some significant changes to its anti-terrorism framework over the past decade and a half. With regards to Basque separatism, the most important developments took place in the early 21st century, when a drastic upsurge in deadly ETA attacks and kale borroka violence sparked so much fear and intimidation in the region that an increasingly large segment of the population felt deprived “of fully exercising their political and civil rights and liberties” (Alonso, 2011, p. 705). In an attempt to respond to the escalating situation and adjust to ETA’s recent tactical changes (i.e. ‘socialize the suffering’), the Aznar government introduced a series of legal reforms, which “substantially broadened both the concept of terrorism in Spain and the measures that could be used to punish it” (Whitfield, 2014, p. 100). The December 2000 adoption of Organic Law (OL) 7/2000, for example, greatly extended the scope of the Spanish Criminal Code, which now recognized as offences the ‘glorification’ and ‘justification’ of terrorism (Art. 578), as well as the ‘collaboration’ with organizations perpetrating such acts (Art. 576). The same law also established the crime of ‘urban terrorism’, which according to Article 577 comprises activities aimed at “subverting the constitutional order or seriously altering public peace” (Whitfield, 2014, p. 101). By introducing this particular provision into the Criminal Code, the government obviously hoped to increase pressure on the radical kale borroka youth, as from now on any act of street violence they carried

55 out - even a comparatively minor offence such as arson or property damage - could be interpreted an act of terrorism. The simultaneous modification of the law on minors then increased the deterrent effect of OL 7/2000, allowing under-aged persons having committed such crimes “to be tried in adult courts” (Heiberg, 2007, p. 44), and extending the period of imprisonment to a new maximum of five (aged 14-16) and ten years (aged 16-18), respectively (de la Cuesta, 2005). The law further stipulated that any financial damages caused by kale borroka activities were from now on to be compensated for by the parents of the accused (minor), thereby shifting the burden from the individual to the immediate family (Buesa & Baumert, 2013). Following the adoption of OL 7/2003 in June 2003, maximum sentences were also raised for adult terror convicts, from an initial 30 to now 40 years (Whitfield, 2014, p. 101). By severely limiting the chances of parole for these persons, the law moreover sought to make sure that terrorists indeed “fulfilled the full terms of their sentences” (Whitfield, 2014, p. 101). Apart from these changes in the field of penal legislation, the government also made amendments to the Spanish Criminal Procedure Code, the most important of which being the extension of the period under which alleged terrorists can be kept in complete isolation, i.e. without proper access to independent attorneys, medical examiners or their relatives (Amnesty International, 2009a, para. 5). While this so-called incommunicado detention used to be allowed for five consecutive days, the implementation of OL 15/2003 in November 2003 granted judges the right to prolong the process to a new maximum of thirteen days (Whitfield, 2014, p. 101). The reforms introduced sparked strong criticism from international human rights advocates. Not only did they object to the comparatively long period under which terrorist suspects in Spain could be held incommunicado, a process they viewed as increasing “the risk of torture and other ill-treatment” (Amnesty International, 2009a, para. 7); concerns have also been raised over the government’s broad conceptualization of terrorism, which through Articles 576, 577 and 578 now also included “crimes that do not comprise or have sufficient relation to the intentional element of causing deadly or serious bodily injury to, or terrorising of, a population” (Amnesty International, 2009b, p. 2). Spain’s reputation as the EU country with one of the toughest anti-terrorism regimes in place was given further impetus by the adoption of OL 6/2002 in June 2002, which paved the way for the Supreme Court to declare illegal any political grouping working against, or undermining, the values and foundations of the democratic system (de la Cuesta, 2009). The

56 latter could, amongst others, take the form of political parties expressing support for terrorism (openly or tacitly); downplaying the significance of terrorist acts; taking part in activities praising and justifying terrorists and their violent deeds; or providing support to terrorism through resources - administrative, financial, or otherwise - they as members of the government apparatus have access to (de la Cuesta, 2009). More generally referred to as the ‘Law on Political Parties’, OL 6/2002 became one of the most vivid expressions of a new CT approach Spain’s political elite had embarked on in late December 2000, when the PP and the PSOE signed the Pact for Freedom and Against Terrorism. In the aftermath of the failed Lizarra-Garazi process, the agreement was based on the rationale that terrorism was never to “result in any political advantage or gain whatsoever”, the signatories emphasizing instead that dialogue would henceforth only “take place among the legitimate representatives of the citizens” (Alonso, 2011, p. 705), and within the legal framework set out by the Constitution. Any future negotiations with an active terrorist organization like ETA were thereby effectively precluded. Through the anti- terrorism pact, the PP and the PSOE for the first time committed themselves to set aside their party differences and to work jointly towards defeating ETA, which was to be accomplished by “apply[ing] pressure simultaneously … on the political, law enforcement, social and judicial fronts” (Alonso, 2011, p. 705). The new approach over the next years manifested itself not only through the introduction of the above-mentioned legal reforms, but also through increased police action and intensified international CT collaboration, which altogether resulted in waves of arrests and numerous terrorist cells being dismantled. At the same time, the government reinforced its efforts to declare illegal various groupings associated with the Abertzale, a strategy it had already pursued since the late 1990s, when it became clear that ETA was not just a single terrorist organization but consisted of a large network of like-minded and supportive entities (‘Everything is ETA’). Organizations outlawed in the aftermath of the anti-terrorism pact included inter alia the aforementioned Gestoras pro Amnistia prisoners advocacy group (banned in 2001); the radical youth movements Haika and Segi (banned in 2001 and 2002, respectively); as well as Euskaldunon Egunkaria (The Daily), which at the time was the only newspaper published entirely in the Basque language (banned in 2003). The authorities additionally shut down numerous nationalist pubs (herriko tabernas) in the region on grounds that these were “acting as fundraising networks” (Whitfield, 2014, p. 102).

57 The implementation of OL 6/2002 then enabled the government to eradicate what it considered the most important actor within ETA’s terrorist network - its political representative Batasuna. Apart from constituting a major platform for the dissemination of ETA’s radical- nationalist agenda and hence, for mobilizing recruits, the party had long been suspected of providing direct financial support to the armed separatists (Buesa & Baumert, 2013). Similar to its predecessor organizations HB and EH, Batasuna had moreover refused to publicly denounce ETA’s latest violent actions, which only added to it being perceived as an ‘anti-democratic’ political unit. The party was eventually proscribed in March 2003, the direct consequences of which were that Batasuna could no longer carry out any political activities (e.g. participate in elections), and lost access to its financial accounts (Whitfield, 2014). As shown in Table 1, throughout the next years several other political entities due to their alleged or proven links to the separatist organization faced a similar fate. These were largely considered substitutes of Batasuna that continued the latter’s radical agenda and party-political activities under a new name, and as such allegedly supported (ETA) terrorism.

Year of Ban Party/Coalition Name 2003 Autodeterminazioaren Bilgunea (Gathering for Self-Determination) 2005 Aukera Guztiak (All the Options) 2007 Abertzale Sozialisten Batasuna (Union of Patriot Socialists) 2008 Eusko Abertzale Ekintza (Basque Nationalist Action) 2008 Euskal Herrialdeetako Alderdi Komunista (Communist Party of the Basque Homelands) 2009 Askatasuna (Freedom) 2009 Demokrazia Hiru Milioi (Democracy three million) 2011 Sortu * (Create) 2011 Bildu * (Unite) Table 1. Basque political parties banned in Spain Source: Own compilation based on Bourne, 2015 *Despite openly rejecting violence, Sortu and Bildu were outlawed by the Spanish Supreme Court in March and May 2011, respectively. In the case of Bildu, the Constitutional Court reversed the earlier ruling within only a couple of days, allowing the coalition to take part in the Basque municipal elections on May 22, 2011. Sortu’s illegalization, on the other hand, was upheld until June 2012.

58 Following the March 11, 2004, train bombings in the Spanish capital, Islamic terrorism replaced Basque separatism as the main target of Spain’s counterterrorism efforts. With an extensive anti- terrorism framework already in place at the time of the attacks, however, the government’s response remained confined to, amongst others, increasing law enforcement and intelligence capacities (i.e. more personnel/budget); strengthening and facilitating interagency CT collaboration (i.e. through the creation of a National Antiterrorism Coordination Center); and adopting a terrorism response plan (Plan Operativo de Lucha Contra el Terrorismo) (Reinares, 2009). While predominantly taken with a view towards improving the fight against international terrorism, these measures according to Reinares and Alonso (2007) at the same time “added further value to the fight against ETA” (p. 130).

Following the attacks and a subsequent limitation in ETA terrorist activity, the new Socialist government headed by Zapatero complemented repressive responses with conciliatory measures. The failure of the 2005-2007 peace process quickly demonstrated, however, that the new approach of combining sticks with carrots would not bring the desired results. Eventually living up to the promises made in the 2000 Pact for Freedom and Against Terrorism, the PSOE subsequently ruled out any further talks with ETA and fully committed itself to pursuing the hard-line strategy that was initially agreed on. Spain’s CT approach towards Basque radicalism has not undergone any significant changes ever since. Over the past years, the government has continued to rely on a mix of intense law enforcement action and tough anti-terrorism legislation as the principal ways through which to disrupt both ETA, as well as its larger network of social and political satellite organizations. The more than 1000 etarras arrested on Spanish soil since the beginning of the century only attest to the effectiveness of this approach (Spanish Ministry of the Interior, 2013). With the group’s dissolution still not finalized in mid-2017, it seems safe to assume that the repressive stance will be retained, if not hardened in the near future.

59 6.1.3 Local developments

6.1.3.1 Public support Public support constitutes the third factor of interest at the macro-level. As was mentioned before, terrorist groups greatly depend on external support from their constituency for material, financial, logistical, and recruitment purposes. With regards to ETA, data provided by the Euskobarómetro indicates that societal acceptance of the group and its activities used to be relatively strong in the past. According to this bi-annual statistical survey published by the University of the Basque Country, in the immediate aftermath of Spain’s transition to democracy (1978-1979), almost half of the Basque population had a positive image of those involved with the armed group, viewing them either as patriots (15%) or idealists (34%). Although as demonstrated in Figure 3, these numbers declined sharply by the late 1980s to mid-1990s, ETA managed to regain its earlier support levels during the Lizarra-Garazi peace process and the subsequent 1998-1999 truce. Apparently, the group’s decision to lay down its weapons and engage in a process of dialogue to solve the conflict served well with its constituency. Following the end of the ceasefire and the initiation of a new cycle of violence, however, popular support at the turn of the century dwindled yet again. In fact, between 2003 and 2007, only one in four Basques still viewed membership with the separatist group in generally positive terms. For the great majority (~65%), however, being an etarra was tantamount to being a fanatic, an assassin, or a terrorist. Compared to the 1978-1979 period, this represents an increase of roughly 19%.

60 100,0% 90,0% 80,0% Crazy/Terrorists 70,0% Criminals/assassins 60,0% 50,0% Manipulated by others/ 40,0% fanatics 30,0% Idealists 20,0% 10,0% Patriots 0,0%

Figure 3. Image of ETA activists among the Basque population, 1978-2007 Source: Own compilation based on data from Euskobarómetro, 2016 (table 21) *2007 only includes the first half of the year Although more recent data on this matter is not available, the increasing societal rejection of ETA also becomes visible when examining attitudes towards the group as a whole (see Figure 4). Whereas in 1981, some 12% of the Basque people expressed their full or at least partial support for the separatists, this number by 2000 had already dropped to 7.5%, and by 2011 could no longer exceed the 3.5% margin. During the same period, the amount of people expressing to reject ETA completely more than doubled, from an initial 23% in 1981 to 53% in the year 2000, and an unprecedented 62% in 2011. A similar development is observable for the section of the population approving of ETA’s nationalist ends, but opposing its (violent) methods. While shortly after Spain’s democratic transition and the creation of the BAC only three out of one hundred Basques expressed this opinion, by the turn of the century this number had increased to 16%. Although the figure slightly dropped throughout the following decade, some eleven out of one hundred Basques still agreed with the statement in 2011.

61 100,0% 90,0% 80,0% 70,0% 60,0% Total rejection 50,0% Ends yes, means no 40,0% Critical justiJication 30,0% Total support 20,0% 10,0% 0,0% 1981 1989 1995 1999 2000 2004 2010 2011

Figure 4. Basque attitudes towards ETA, 1981-2011 Source: Own compilation based on data from Euskobarómetro, 2016 (table 20) Another indication of withering support is provided by the increased mobilization of civil society against ETA between 2000 and 2011 (Whitfield, 2015). While groups protesting the separatist’s actions had already been formed in the late-1980s to early 1990s (e.g. Gesto por la Paz, Elkarri), the murder of Miguel Angel Blanco in 1997 sparked a new level of outrage across the country, with millions marching against, and condemning, ETA violence (Heiberg, 2007). Over the next years, and especially after the failure of the Lizarra-Garazi peace process and the initiation of a new round of attacks in the year 2000, large-scale anti-ETA demonstrations “became a regular feature of Spanish public life” (Shepard, 2002, p. 56). Frustrations also grew over the intensification of kale borroka activities and the increased targeting of non-nationalist Basques, as a result of which thousands were intimidated and required to hire 24-hour bodyguard protection (Heiberg, 2007). Following the terrorist attacks of September 2001 and March 2004, public revulsion against the group increased even more. The horrific events resulted in the widespread delegitimization of politically motivated violence, with the Madrid attacks in particular bringing together millions of Spaniards calling for peace, and demanding an end to terrorism of all forms, including the nationalist-separatist type perpetrated by ETA (BBC, 2004). Harsh protests also accompanied Zapatero’s initiative to launch peace talks with the group in 2005. Many taking part in the marches were utterly opposed to any sort of dialogue with the separatists, viewing the Prime Minister’s offer as proof that terrorist behaviour was worthwhile,

62 and instead calling for ETA to be “defeated through robust police action” (BBC, 2006b, para. 4). The bombing of the Barajas airport in December 2006 then seemingly confirmed to many ETA’s unwillingness to end the conflict. Once again, the country saw hundreds of thousands marching through the streets, demanding peace and protesting the group’s continued use of violence (Ortiz, 2007).

The drop in electoral support for ETA-affiliated political parties, such as Batasuna, provides a further indication of the public’s rising opposition towards the separatists. Before the turn of the century, the party under the names of Herri Batasuna (1978-1998) and Euskal Herritarok (1998- 2001) regularly managed to gain between 15-20% of the votes in Basque parliamentary elections (Basque Government, 2011). In the context of the failed Lizarra-Garazi peace process and renewed terrorist activity, however, ETA’s political wing in 2001 could hardly attract more than 10% of the electorate (Basque Government, 2011). Now known as Batasuna, the party was outlawed in 2003 on the basis of OL 6/2002 and as a result, was prevented from taking part in the 2005 Basque parliamentary elections. While a previously unknown political party - the Communist Party of the Basque Homelands - participated on its behalf, the votes obtained (12.4%) fell short of Batasuna’s earlier successes (Basque Government, 2011). Throughout the next years, Batasuna was unable to contest any further elections, as most of the political groupings taking over its ideological program were illegalized beforehand.27 It seems that at least some voters during this time switched to the regional offshoot of the PSOE - the Socialist Party of Euskadi (Partido Socialista de Euskadi-Euskadiko Ezkerra, PSE-EE). In contrast to the Basque branch of the PP, which only in the early 2000s was a serious political player in the region, the PSE-EE managed to steadily increase its share of votes from an initial 17.9% in 2001 to 22.7% in 2005, and a remarkable 30.7% in the 2009 Basque parliamentary elections (Basque Government, 2011). Apparently, the socialists’ focus on economic and welfare issues was welcomed at a time when it became clear that the financial crisis was irreversible. With the Basque economy still performing comparatively well over the next years, however, support for the party in the 2012 elections had decreased significantly. Simultaneously, support for pro-independence parties explicitly denouncing ETA violence increased. One of the first nationalist parties publicly distancing itself from the terrorist

27 See section 6.1.2.2

63 group was Aralar, an organization formed in 2000 by former HB/EH members who had split from the party due to its continued support for the armed struggle. Aralar competed in Basque local and parliamentary elections held between 2003 and 2011, and during this time managed to increase its share of votes from 1.5% to roughly 3%, and from 2.3% to more than 6%, respectively (Basque Government, 2011). Bildu (Gather), a coalition composed of Basque pro- secessionist parties, even obtained a remarkable 26% of the electorate upon contesting local elections for the first time in 2011 (Basque Government, 2011). Similar successes were achieved later that year when Bildu and Aralar joined forces, and together with smaller segments of the radical-nationalist milieu contested the November Spanish general election. The new alliance under the name of Amaiur gained almost a quarter of the Basque vote, and even obtained more seats than the winning moderates of the PNV, the uncontested giant of Basque politics since the establishment of the BAC. More recently, Amaiur under yet another name - Euskal Herria Bildu (EH Bildu, Basque Country Unite) - has successfully taken part in Basque parliamentary (2012, 2016) and local elections (2015), receiving between 21% and 25% of the total votes cast (Basque Government, 2011).

The increase in electoral support for separatist parties explicitly condemning ETA allows for two tentative conclusions to be drawn. Firstly, it indicates that despite its most prominent advocate gradually leaving the stage, the desire for self-determination in the region is still very much alive. In fact, pro-independence movements such as the PNV or EH Bildu nowadays constitute the strongest forces in the Basque political arena, with regional offshoots of mainstream (Spanish) parties like the PP only playing a minor role, if at all (Basque Government, 2011). Even the PSE-EE, which during 21st century elections often came second after the PNV, has not managed to gain more than 12% of the electorate in the most recent elections to the Basque parliament (Basque Government, 2011). Secondly, and more importantly, it might be viewed as a sign that an increasingly large section of the population has come to renounce violent nationalism, and strongly opposes ETA’s terrorist methods as a way to achieving full autonomy. Euskobarómetro surveys conducted between 2002 and 2013 seem to confirm this assumption, suggesting that the number of Basques considering violence a necessity for attaining political goals in the BAC has decreased significantly, from an initial 18% to now 7% (Euskobarómetro, 2016).

64 These last paragraphs have shown that societal rejection of ETA has gradually increased since the beginning of the century. While the reasons for this development are manifold, the scope of this thesis does not allow for their detailed analysis. It seems safe to assume, however, that the growing intolerance of violence emerging in the wake of the US and Madrid attacks, and a simultaneous outrage over the increasingly indiscriminate nature of ETA’s actions, have played a substantial role. In addition, with the Basque Country already having achieved a substantial degree of autonomy in 1978, a large section of the population nowadays seems satisfied or at least partially satisfied with the status quo (Euskobarómetro, 2016). Basques experience less discrimination from governmental institutions; their language is officially recognized and taught in many schools, and they have a strong-going economy in place. Moreover, Basques are represented politically in both regional and national parliaments, where their grievances can be addressed through legal means. Against this background, it appears that the existence of a terrorist organization such as ETA is no longer justified.

65 6.2 The Organizational Level In this section, a closer look will be taken at processes and dynamics that have occurred within the group itself. At this meso-level of analysis, particular attention will be paid to the Abertzale Left, changes in ETA’s fundraising and recruitment capabilities, developments in its modus operandi, leadership and organizational structures, as well as to internal conflicts.

6.2.1 The Abertzale Left The Abertzale Left has played a vital role throughout ETA’s more than four decades old terrorist history. Not only did this complex network of political and social entities fully support its nationalist goals and in large parts condone its violent methods; for the separatist group it also represented a valuable source in terms of funding, recruitment, and ideological inspiration. ETA and the Abertzale were so closely intertwined that to the outside world, there was practically no difference between the two (‘Everything is ETA’). Inside, however, ETA was the unchallenged leader, the “vanguard of [the] movement”, holding the “exclusive authority to decide on its military strategy and actions” (Murua, 2017a, p. 97). The Nationalist Left, on the other hand, held “a subordinate role”, its moves in large parts “conditioned by ETA’s decisions and praxis” (Murua, 2017a, p. 97). Over the course of the 21st century, this balance of power slowly shifted. This development was largely set in motion by the failure of the 1998-1999 Lizarra-Garazi peace process, which according to Murua (2017a) caused many within the Abertzale Left to start calling into question the armed struggle. The most visible expression of the latter was the founding of Aralar, the pro-independence party that in the year 2000 became the first among the various radical-nationalist actors to openly reject violence and hence, distance itself from ETA and the entire movement. While not all were willing to take this decisive step just yet, it seems that the Abertzale at the time began to at least consider different, non-violent options towards achieving the goal of Basque independence. In November 2004, for example, it put forward the so-called Anoeta proposal. With bombings and indiscriminate killings in the past not having brought the desired results, but instead having invited an increasingly repressive reaction from the state, the Nationalist Left through this proposal for the first time “expressed [its] commitment … to find a democratic solution to the political conflict” (Requejo & Sanjaume i Calvet, 2013, p. 118). The proposal was drafted in large parts by the political leadership of the movement - the recently illegalized but still operative Batasuna - and differed from earlier ones in that it

66 restricted ETA’s role to discussing with Madrid issues of a more technical nature (e.g. disbandment, prisoner situation) (Whitfield, 2015). Crucial questions pertaining to the political future of the region, on the other hand, were to be debated among the (legitimate) “Basque social and political forces” (Whitfield, 2015, p. 7) without any interference from the armed group. By offering this two-track negotiation process, Batasuna made a conciliatory move towards the Spanish government, which had refused to talk directly with the terrorists ever since the signing of the Pact for Freedom and Against Terrorism in December 2000. The political leadership apparently hoped that by keeping ETA on the sidelines, a resolution of the conflict would be more likely. The opening of peace talks with the Zapatero government in the summer of 2005 then initially seemed to confirm their expectations. However, ETA’s repeated meddling in the political negotiations (Murua, 2017a; van Dongen, 2014) indicated that the group was neither fully accepting the Anoeta arrangements, nor Batasuna’s leading role in the process.

In the meantime, more and more actors within the Nationalist Left came to view violence as counterproductive. In a context marked by the growing intolerance of violence, the loss of popular support, and increasingly effective (inter)national CT initiatives against ETA and the Abertzale itself, voices calling for the complete renunciation of the armed struggle grew stronger. The abrupt ending of the peace negotiations in December 2006 only reinforced this trend. ETA’s decision to bomb the Barajas airport in Madrid was “a serious and unacceptable mistake” (Murua, 2017a, p. 100), so the prevailing view among the political leadership, one that had likely shattered all future prospects for a new peace process with the government. If Basque independence was ever going to be achieved, they were convinced, then now was the time to drastically change course, and “move beyond the armed struggle” (Whitfield, 2015, p. 8) once and for all. In October 2009, the political wing took matters in its own hands by putting forward a proposal termed Argitzen (Clarifying), which envisaged the resolution of the conflict through “exclusively… political and democratic means” (Murua, 2017a, p. 101). The proposal led to a heated debate within the Nationalist Left over the continuation and usefulness of the armed campaign, which was remarkable as this had hitherto been the “exclusive competency of ETA” (Murua, 2017a, p. 101). Discussions eventually came to an end in February 2010, when a vast majority (80%) of radical-nationalist actors approved Batasuna’s new strategy (Whitfield, 2014). By way of a declaration called Zutik Euskal Herria (Stand up Basque Country), the Abertzale

67 hence committed itself to pursuing its goals unilaterally, “without armed actions by ETA, and without violence or interference by the Spanish state” (Adams, 2010, para. 5). The overwhelming approval for the new course of action gave the Nationalist Left a strong voice. The complete renunciation of violence opened political doors that had previously been shut, as for the more moderate nationalist forces such as Aralar the latter had always constituted “an absolute condition for collaboration” (Murua, 2017a, p. 102). Newly formed electoral coalitions such as Bildu, Amaiur and EH Bildu then competed surprisingly well in the region28, indicating that large segments within Basque society backed the peaceful approach, and thereby confirming to the Abertzale “that politics alone was the best [and most promising] strategy for the pro-independence movement” (Murua, 2017a, p. 103). The endorsement of the international community by way of the so-called Brussels Declaration in March 2010 only reinforced this perception, its numerous signatories including renowned security experts and Nobel Peace Prize Laureates such as Desmond Tutu, praising the public commitment to nonviolence, and demanding ETA to follow suit.

The Nationalist Left too expected ETA as an integral part of the movement to adhere to what the majority of its members had agreed on in February 2010 and hence, to lay down its weapons (Murua, 2017a). The fact that the group a few weeks later committed its last deadly attack in this regard suggests that ETA was indeed for the first time accepting a strategic decision determined entirely by the political wing. In Murua’s view, this constitutes proof that the traditional allocation of roles had changed significantly, and that the “direction model of the past based on the undisputable leadership of the armed vanguard” (p. 102) had essentially come to an end. Shortly afterwards, the group officially announced the definitive cessation of the violent struggle for independence.

6.2.2 ETA: Modus operandi, leadership/organizational structure & internal conflicts Apart from the gradual change of ETA’s position in the broader nationalist movement, the new century also did see some transformations occurring within the armed group itself, e.g. with regards to its modus operandi. While in the past, ETA had primarily targeted Spanish police or military personnel, and in conducting its attacks was careful to avoid civilian casualties, the

28 See section 6.1.3.1

68 group as of the mid-1990s significantly widened the range of what it considered ‘legitimate targets’. Putting into effect its latest ‘socialize the suffering’ strategy, which aimed at creating a unified nationalist front29, ETA began to use violence more indiscriminately against the general (Basque) population. From that moment on, just about “anyone who voiced an opinion” (van Dongen, 2014, p. 185) against the group and its separatist ambitions became a potential target, with journalists, lawyers, intellectuals, judges, and politicians facing a particularly high risk of being murdered, or severely threatened at least. The shift in the selection of targets from security forces to a broader array of government officials and civilians continued into the next century. Data provided by the Global Terrorism Database indicates that of the total attacks committed between 2000 and 2011, some 40% were directed against these ‘soft’ targets (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2017). This marks a steep increase compared to the previous decade, in which this number still stood at 17.6%. Violence aimed at military and police personnel, on the other hand, fell by some 15 percentage points, the latter forming the primary target in roughly a fifth of cases only. As regards the type of attacks and weapons used, the GTD data shows that ETA in the 21st century has not deviated much from its earlier patterns. The group primarily relied on bombings and assassinations, and has in the majority of cases utilized firearms and explosives to cause the intended harm. Overall, however, the number and lethality of attacks declined significantly. Until in October 2011 the separatists announced to officially end their armed campaign, they had carried out 236 attacks - 40% less than had been committed during the preceding decade (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2017). At the same time, ETA’s terrorist activities became less severe - whereas in the 1990s, a single attack on average resulted in 0.4 fatalities, in the period 2000- 2011, this number had declined to 0.25 (own calculations based on GTD data). Still, some 58 people lost their lives, the great majority of which in the early 21st century, when ETA launched a new cycle of violence. In fact, between 2000 and 2003, 46 individuals fell victim to the group’s attacks. Ever since, “the intensity of ETA’s lethal violence has been very low” (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2009, p. 616). A short increase in attacks during and directly after the peace process resulted in no more than 12 fatalities. They became the last victims in the group’s decades-long struggle for independence. A similar pattern can be observed in the level of street violence, a tactic that had

29 See section 5.2.5

69 formed part of ETA’s repertoire since the mid-1990s.30 Kale borroka incidents peaked at the beginning of the century, with more than 1500 attacks taking place in the period 2000-2002 (Spanish Ministry of the Interior, 2003). Since then, however, their frequency has substantially declined. In 2003, only 150 incidents occurred and after a short revival during the peace process, street violence almost disappeared completely from Basque towns and villages.

Coinciding with and hence, likely connected to these developments were changes in ETA’s organizational and leadership structures. ETA had always been a hierarchically organized group, with leaders predominantly located in France exerting “control over the various commando units” (Heiberg, 2007, p. 33), which were spread across the Basque Country and occasionally, throughout other Spanish regions. These cells “generally consist[ed] of three people” (Heiberg, 2007, p. 33) and largely acted independently of one another so as to prevent, in the case of an arrest, information about planned operations being intercepted by the authorities. ETA’s leadership has never been composed of just one person, but throughout its history was made up of various individuals who each were responsible for a different organizational sub- compartment, e.g. logistics, recruitment, or finances. These “sectoral leaders [were] viewed as equal and together they comprise[d] ETA’s executive” (Heiberg, 2007, p. 33), deciding on the group’s overall strategy and direction, and the activities to be carried out by the commando units. Once a new operation had been planned, the leadership “transferred the order to the cells involved and allocated the necessary resources” (van Dongen, 2014, p. 180). Following the increase in both national and international counterterrorism efforts, this vertical command and control structure during the 21st century was gradually disrupted. The intensified cooperation between France and Spain in particular led to hundreds of ETA members being placed under arrest on both sides of the Pyrenees Mountains, many of which held leadership positions or otherwise played a key role within the organization. These security clampdowns would oftentimes take place within increasingly shorter periods of time. With the capture of Ibon Gogeaskoetxa in February 2010, for example, ETA lost its fourth consecutive military leader within just one and a half years’ time.31 Other key arrests included the group’s logistics chief Asier Txapartegui, detained in September 2002, and his successors Juan Rubenach

30 See section 5.2.5 31 Mikel ‘Txeroki’ Rubina and his alleged successor Aitzol ‘Balak’ Iriondo were detained respectively in November and December 2008; the new military leader Jurdan Martitegi was then arrested in April 2009.

70 (December 2003), Felix Esparza (April 2004), and Juan Artola (July 2007), as well as several of its political leaders, who are commonly considered the true heads of ETA (e.g. Mikel ‘Antza’ Albizu, October 2004; Javier Lopez ‘Thierry’ Peña, May 2008; Ibon Arronategui, February 2010; and Alejandro Arriola, March 2011). It appears that, as a result of these and other successful CT initiatives, ETA began to reassess its organizational structure. According to Kilberg (2011), the group in the 21st century became much more decentralized. Its various commando cells were increasingly acting on their own, and in contrast to earlier times enjoyed relative autonomy “in planning and carrying out attacks” (Kilberg, 2011, p. 119). While “the central executive of ETA ha[d] little to no control” over these issues any more, it did not cease to exist but still provided general guidance, for example, “on how to identify and collect intelligence on a possible attack” (Kilberg, 2011, p. 119). Overall, however, ETA’s command and control structure was less hierarchical, and more loosely coordinated. The successive removal of numerous key members between 2000 and 2011 had the additional effect that ETA was forced to undergo frequent changes in leadership, which assumedly weakened its internal cohesion, and contributed to the group progressively becoming more disorganized and unstable. The latter development was reinforced by the fact that arrested members were increasingly replaced by young and untrained militants recruited from the kale borroka gangs. Beyond street violence activities, these youngsters oftentimes had little to no experience with the armed struggle (Reinares, 2004).32 Their inclusion into ETA’s rank-and-file and leadership hence assumedly introduced a certain degree of amateurism into the organization. Moreover, it has likely led to what Kilberg (2011) has called a “generational battle”, wherein “older, wiser moderates” clash with the “hot-headed youth” (p. 121), and the decisions and actions taken by this increasingly incompetent, yet at the same time more fanatic and ruthless group of etarras.

Indeed, there are signs that ETA in the 21st century was fraught with internal dissension and conflict. In July 2005, for example, the group expelled several jailed etarras who in a letter sent to the leadership had urged it to lay down its weapons. According to Alonso (2011), the exclusion of these dissidents marked an attempt by the executive committee “to exert tight control over the group’s strategy” (p. 706) and to silence those having opposing views. That the

32 This issue will be elaborated on in greater detail below (section 6.2.4).

71 letter’s signatories included members who once held key positions in the organization, such as Francisco Garmendia who belonged to the 1992 group of ETA leaders arrested in Bidart, reinforces the assumption that a rift had emerged between the old guard and the cadre of young militants increasingly acting in their place. This became even more clear following the bombing of the Barajas airport, which in December 2006 led to the end of the peace process with the Zapatero government. The attack was orchestrated by Mikel ‘Txeroki’ Rubina, the then 32-year old military leader of the group, who had been “bitterly opposed to peace talks” (Kern, 2008, para. 5) all along, and who considered violence “the only way [to] achieving an independent Basque nation” (Kern, 2008, para. 4). According to Kern (2008), the fact that the bombing occurred while the ceasefire was still in place suggests that ETA at the time was “undergoing an internal power struggle between the hardliners on the one hand, and those seeking to lay down their arms on the other” (para. 5). Hence, it appears that not only were there divisions between ETA and the Abertzale over the continuation and efficacy of violence, but that within its own ranks too, a similar debate had emerged. As reported by Zuber (2008), the following months “saw bitter infighting within the Basque group pitting the pragmatists, who were worried about waning support for violence from the Basque population, against a group of younger fanatics” (para. 5). Murua (2017b) asserts that at about the same time, a serious crisis emerged within ETA’s leadership. According to the author, “disagreements about organizational issues” (p. 67) in 2007- 2008 left the executive committee “divided into two opposing factions” (p. 207). This chaotic situation, which was marked by “attempts at mutual expulsions, and a struggle to attract internal support by each faction” (Murua, 2017b, p. 68) essentially continued until May 2008, when an important section of the leadership was detained in France. In the meantime, ETA’s rank-and-file had come to an agreement about the course of action to be followed in the near future. Voting on a document containing the results of an assembly held throughout the past months, more than 80% expressed their support for resuming and intensifying the armed struggle (Murua, 2017b, p. 68). With the number of attacks and victims subsequently increasing, it appeared that ETA in 2008-2009 was back on track, and had overcome the worst part of the internal crisis it had been dealing with since the end of the ceasefire. However, the fact that in 2010 - besides the killing of a French police officer - no further terrorist activities occurred, suggests that not everything was going according to plan. Soon

72 thereafter, ETA announced the definite cessation of the armed struggle, and in so doing completely overturned the strategy it had earlier agreed on. In the absence of reliable information, one can only speculate that this October 2011 move was preceded by intense discussions within the group, which at the time had come under considerable pressure from the Abertzale movement, and from intensified security crackdowns. It appears that tensions between hardliners and moderates in ETA’s decimated ranks continued even after the official end of the campaign, with the separatists only recently (April 2017) having taken the step towards complete disarmament.

6.2.3 Fundraising capabilities Changes have also occurred with regards to ETA’s financial situation. In fact, a study conducted recently by Buesa and Baumert (2013) indicates that the terrorist organization in the 21st century had considerably less capital at its disposal than in the past. According to their estimates, ETA’s income between 1993 and 2002 on average amounted to €28.1 million per annum (p. 333). The lion’s share of this sum consisted of subventions the separatist group received through its political fronts, e.g. HB and EH. As officially registered parties, they were legally granted access to European and national funds to finance their political campaigns, amongst others. The money thus obtained made up some 57% of ETA’s total income at the time (Buesa & Baumert, 2013). Albeit less profitable, revenue was also generated through the practice of extortion. ETA regularly sent letters to entrepreneurs and firms throughout the Basque Country demanding them to pay a specific, “usually significant” (Heiberg, 2007, p. 34) amount of money (the so-called ‘revolutionary tax’). Those refusing to comply with the separatists’ terms faced a heightened risk of being assassinated, or having their business facilities bombed or vandalized. Extortion could also take the form of abductions, in which case the relatives of the victim were required to pay for their safe return. According to Buesa and Baumert (2013), these blackmailing activities with some 14% provided ETA’s second largest source of income between 1993 and 2002 (p. 334). Additional profits were generated through the militants’ involvement in a variety of businesses both at home and abroad (12% of ETA’s total revenue), through fraud (~7%), donations (~2%), and a number of other sources left unspecified by the authors (~8%) (Buesa & Baumert, 2013, p. 334). A completely different picture emerges for the 2003-2010 period. As estimated by Buesa and Baumert (2013), ETA’s income during this time did not exceed €8.8 million per year (p.

73 333). Compared to the previous decade, this represents a drop of almost 70%. Their research further illustrates that this development is most likely connected to the introduction of the Political Parties Law (OL 6/2002), which as of June 2002 led to the illegalization of a variety of political units allegedly affiliated with ETA. Henceforth denied access to public money, parties like Batasuna and its proxies could no longer financially support ETA, and thereby “deprived it of a very useful source of income” (Alonso, 2011, p. 705). Indeed, funding obtained through subventions decreased significantly, accounting for no more than 11% of ETA’s income between 2003 and 2010 (Buesa & Baumert, 2013, p. 334). In order to compensate for these financial losses, the militants apparently switched to other sources. Profits generated from corporate and extortion activities, for example, grew considerably, each accounting for some 29% of the total revenue (Buesa & Baumert, 2013, p. 334). In addition, ETA managed to increase the funding received from its (social) support base. Money obtained through donations (~8%) and affiliation fees33 (~23%) nevertheless amounted to “only a fraction of what the group obtained before” (Buesa & Baumert, 2013, p. 334). The inclusion of ETA, Batasuna and various other radical- nationalist entities on the respective EU and US terrorist watchlists by 2003 has then likely aggravated the group’s financial situation. With many of its bank accounts and financial assets frozen, one might assume that ETA increasingly experienced difficulties gaining access to even the comparatively few millions it still made per annum. In April 2011 then, ETA unexpectedly announced it “would no longer demand the … revolutionary tax from Basque businesspersons” (Murua, 2017b, p. 110). Considering that this extortion practice had generated almost a third of the group’s income since 2003, their financial circumstances have likely deteriorated even more over the past years.

6.2.4 Membership & recruitment capabilities As a group accepted and supported by a considerable segment of the Basque population, ETA in the past used to have a large pool of potential recruits at its disposal. During the group’s early years, the typical etarra was male, single, in his mid 20s, came from a rural background, was a member of the working class, and of ethnically Basque descent (Reinares, 2004). At the time, many had experienced state repression and Franco’s discrimination of ‘Basqueness’ first hand, or

33 Unfortunately, Buesa & Baumert (2013) provide no specific definition for this term. According to the author’s understanding, affiliation fees seem to be akin to membership subscriptions those involved with Batasuna and the MLNV were required to pay.

74 at least via their close family and friends. They grew up in a culture of violence in which the state was declared the enemy, and nationalist feelings could flourish extensively. This provided a favourable environment for ETA in terms of recruitment, with many willing to join their ranks. Back then, future activists were for the most part drawn from member’s inner circles, e.g. from among their relatives and social contacts, with the radical-nationalist network of the MLNV providing an additional source and breeding ground for potential recruits (Heiberg, 2007). Looking at ETA’s more recent history, a different picture emerges. According to Reinares (2004), the typical etarra by the mid-1990s, while still predominantly male and single, was now a member of the middle class, came from an urban background, was of ethnically mixed or entirely Spanish origin, and at the time of recruitment was aged 18-20 years or younger. It seems that the trend of appealing primarily to juveniles continued over the next years, with many recruits being drawn from the various kale borroka youth gangs. Participation in the latter in fact constituted “an obligatory rite de passage for ETA membership” (Heiberg, 2007, p. 29). In contrast to earlier generations, which usually had to go through an extensive vetting process and numerous training sessions before being awarded full membership, these youngsters were often accepted into the group right away, their prior experiences with violence being limited to acts of vandalism and petty crime (Reinares, 2004). Another difference was that this generation of etarras had largely grown up in a democratic Spain, raised in an economically strong and practically self-governing Basque Country. Devoid of any direct memories of Franco’s oppressive regime, a growing number of recruits as of the mid-1990s took part in terrorist activities not because they were “dedicated militants with a clear sense of what Basque radicalism was about”, but increasingly for “selfish reasons” (van Dongen, 2014, pp. 181-182). This observation suggests that many etarras in more recent history lacked the fervent determination and commitment that had driven and characterized earlier generations.

The apparent recklessness with which ETA filled its ranks at the time might at least partially be explained by the gradual intensification of (international) counterterrorism operations. With many of its terrorist cells dismantled and an increasing number of etarras placed under arrest, ETA seemingly had no choice but to rely on this “younger, less experienced and less competent generation” (van Dongen, 2014, p. 201) of activists to commit attacks and hence, to continue the nationalist struggle. This, however, posed a risk in itself as many had received little or no tactical

75 training, and as amateurs presented an easy target for the authorities. As more and more etarras were arrested over the course of the new century, ETA simultaneously seemed to be facing difficulties to attract new members with which to fill these empty seats. Indeed, it is estimated that by the time the separatists announced to terminate their violent campaign, less than 100 people were actively involved with the group (U.S. Department of State, 2012). Compared to the 500-600 militants ETA was composed of in the early 1980s (Clark, 1984), and the “hundreds of members” (U.S. Department of State, 2000, p. 71) still forming part of the organization during the late 1990s, membership in the 21st century had thus visibly declined. It appears safe to assume that the failure to attract new recruits is in large parts connected to the loss of popular support ETA experienced in its more recent history, and elaborated on before. With a large segment of the population openly rejecting violence following the 9/11 and Madrid terrorist attacks, and with plenty of legitimate channels available to pursue nationalistic goals, ETA’s message apparently was no longer as appealing. The intensification of the fight against terrorism, resulting in various successful police operations against ETA both in Spain and abroad might then have deterred even those few people that thought about joining or otherwise supporting the organization. Although equally difficult to prove, it seems likely that the strengthening of Spain’s CT framework has also played a crucial role, with OL 7/2000 providing a particularly strong incentive for radical youngsters - ETA’s main recruitment group - to refrain from their urban terrorism activities. The growing political determination to outlaw not just ETA’s electoral platforms, but disrupt its entire radical-nationalist network then further “reduced ETA’s capacity to mobilize supporters and activists” (Alonso, 2011, p. 706). In this regard, the banning of various MLNV youth organizations (e.g. Haika, Segi) was particularly painful, as these meeting places used to constitute a fertile breeding ground for new recruits. The fact that throughout the 21st century, the Nationalist Left increasingly came to renounce violence and that on top of this, ETA was gradually losing its operational strength might then have additionally impeded its recruitment efforts. It appears that as a group coping with the loss of social and financial support, unable to launch significant attacks, fraught with internal dissension and dispute, and overall with no real prospects of achieving its goals, ETA was no longer an attractive option for the pro- independence youth.

76 6.3 The Individual Level Having laid out the changes and developments occurring in the socio-political and organizational spheres, in this last section the primary focus will be on the micro-level of analysis, i.e. the individual ETA member to assess whether, and how, changes emerging in this context (might) have affected the group’s decline.

As was mentioned before, data on this particular issue, i.e. personal accounts covering the period from 2000 onwards, is hardly available. A small exception to the lack of information is provided by Alonso (2011), who in his article offers three examples of how developments in members’ private lives have influenced the organization as a whole. In 2002, for example, an ETA couple resigned from the group so that they, as parents, could properly take care of their sick infant child (Alonso, 2011). For another female member, the “desire to start a family” (Alonso, 2011, p. 714) preceded the decision to end her romantic involvement with one of ETA’s leading members, and to quit the armed organization at some point between 2002 and 2006. Hervé Larrieu, on the other hand, distanced himself from ETA in 2002 on grounds of “his religious conversion” (Alonso, 2011, p. 714). It appears that for this former militant, the path of violence was no longer compatible with his newly found belief. Hence, in these particular cases, changes in members’ personal priorities have led to a decimation of ETA’s ranks, and as such have contributed to weakening the group.

In the absence of any further information on this matter, the previous analysis of structural and organizational-level developments will serve as a basis for formulating some expectations about what other dynamics may have occurred at the micro-level of analysis. It seems safe to assume, for example, that owing to the heightened security environment, members were increasingly afraid of being arrested. The ‘War on Terror’, new EU instruments such as the EAW, and the intensification of Franco-Spanish police cooperation in particular led to scores of etarras being detained and numerous stash houses being discovered, putting enormous pressure on those still at large. On several occasions have documents and laptops seized in CT operations uncovered “the identity and whereabouts of [fugitive] group members” (van Dongen, 2014, p. 188), and it seems likely that additional information might have been obtained from those already in custody. Concerns over imminent arrests were likely reinforced

77 by the fact that the group was losing support among the general population. With a growing number of Basques denouncing ETA and its violent methods in the 21st century, chances increased that they were less willing to help or hide etarras, and more inclined to share information with the authorities, such as addresses of secret sites, or personal details of those involved. The risk of getting caught was thus indeed very high, and in combination with the 2003 extension of terrorists’ prison sentences, it might have led some individuals to acknowledge they had more to lose than to gain if they remained part of ETA. It can further be expected that as the security forces were increasingly closing in on them, members had to change locations more frequently and hence, were constantly on the run. At least for two etarras, the pressure of living such a clandestine and stressful lifestyle eventually became unbearable. In 2003, they left the group on grounds of fatigue and exhaustion (Alonso, 2011). In addition, as their constituency was becoming less receptive to ETA’s radical- nationalist message, and was increasingly turning away from the armed organization, individual members might have also lost faith in the group’s overall purpose and cause. With fewer and fewer people willing to join their ranks and hence, with ETA’s future existence increasingly on the line, there is the possibility that some etarras at least came to ask themselves: “What/Who am I doing this for? If there is no one to take over, why am I investing my time and risk incarceration”? Similar doubts about the continued involvement in the group may have been raised as a result of the loss of income, which in the 21st century supposedly made it more difficult for ETA to plan and carry out attacks, to “pay operatives and their families, arrange for travel … forge documents [or to] acquire weapons” (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 8). Members might have consequently lost confidence in ETA’s operational capabilities and hence, in the group making an impact and/or achieving its goals in the near future.

Yet others may have grown disillusioned with ETA’s course of action, its internal workings or the decisions taken by its leadership. We have seen before that the December 2006 Barajas airport bombing in particular led to heavy infighting between the hardliners and the moderates, who favoured negotiations with the government. The decision to end the peace process and thus rendering impossible any future talks with Madrid might then have constituted a breaking point for the more temperate voices within ETA, the moment at which for some, a personal red line

78 had been crossed. Yet others might have simply grown weary of the internal conflicts and discussions that subsequently characterized the armed group. That members have distanced themselves from ETA based on these developments, however, can neither be proven nor ruled out. Disagreements over ETA’s strategy, on the other hand, have certainly led some to leave. In 2007, for example, two imprisoned members declared they would now “go their own way”, having come to the conclusion that ETA’s violent activities had not at all been helpful for the “liberation of Euskal Herria”, but had in fact “become on obstacle” (Alonso, 2011, p. 704) to achieving the latter. Similar doubts about the continuation of violence had already been raised three years before, when another group of jailed etarras in a letter to the leadership “suggested that perhaps it was time to admit the armed struggle had failed and that ETA should consider switching to political action” (van Dongen, 2014, p. 189). Apparently, objections over the group’s strategic path did also emerge among those militants that had not yet been imprisoned. After all, some 15.5% of etarras voted against the resumption of violence during the assembly held in 2007-2008 (Murua, 2017a). Whether resulting from the ever-intensifying discussion within the Abertzale, the increasing rejection of violence among the population or due to some other reason, these members had clearly come to question the usefulness and efficacy of the armed struggle. And while it is not known if they subsequently left the group, the fact that they had obviously “[lost] the will to fight” (van Dongen, 2014, p. 189) leads one to assume that ETA would not have gained much even if said individuals had remained part of the organization. On the contrary, their lack of commitment and apparent opposition to the chosen course of action might have contributed to weakening the group from within.

Others might have reassessed their involvement with ETA due to developments in the political arena. They may have, for example, become disillusioned or demoralized as a result of the Aznar government’s hard line approach, which between 2000 and 2004 was built around intense police pressure and a strict no-dialogue policy that ruled out any negotiations for as long as ETA remained active and armed. For others, the increasing popularity and electoral success of pro- independence parties explicitly renouncing violence may have constituted a reason to re-consider their participation. At a time when the group had already been substantially weakened and had lost popular support, some members might have come to realize that the legitimate political process in fact provided a more promising path to pursuing their nationalist agenda. Yet again,

79 proof of these processes actually leading to individual disengagement from ETA is hard to come by.

Moreover, one has to keep in mind that certain developments may have also had the opposite effect, i.e. members becoming more radical and fanatic. An indication of this is provided by the December 2006 bombing of the Barajas airport, which was the first deadly ETA attack since 2003. The explosion occurred after months of fruitless negotiations during which it became clear that the government would not give in to ETA’s core political demands. For some etarras, the stagnating peace process may then have reinforced the perception that such talks indeed were a waste of time, and that only through the continuous use of violence could independence ever be achieved.

Thus, while the case could be made that individual etarras have taken on a more radical stance, the last paragraphs have shown that over the course of the 21st century, there were many potential factors (e.g. changing priorities, anxiety, exhaustion, disillusionment) that might have driven members to distance themselves from ETA.

80 7 Conclusion This thesis has examined the recent demise of the Basque separatist group ETA from a multi- level perspective. In the introduction, it was mentioned that Spanish authorities - along the lines of the general consent - first and foremost assigned the official October 2011 cessation of Basque violence to “the efficiency of police and security forces” (Abend, 2011, para. 5). The literature review has shown, however, that the decline of a terrorist organization can seldom be explained in such simplistic terms and that rather, it is the result of a variety of factors occurring, and interacting with one another, across three main analytical levels - the macro/structural, meso/organizational and micro/individual levels. Taking this multi-level approach as its starting point, this thesis set out to provide a more accurate picture of ETA’s gradual demise in the 21st century and in so doing, expand the body of knowledge on a hitherto under-researched topic in the field of terrorism studies. In particular, the study was guided by the following research question: How have factors at the structural, organizational and individual level contributed to the decline of the Basque terrorist organization ETA since 2000?

The analysis then commenced with the structural level, in which ETA’s wider socio-political environment took center stage. In this section, it was shown how ETA in the wake of the 9/11 attacks was confronted with a heightened security climate that was characterized by increased international CT cooperation, the expansion of worldwide anti-terrorism laws and a renewed global commitment to eradicate this form of political violence once and for all. The group furthermore faced a significant loss of support from the local Basque population, and in addition to this encountered a Spanish government that was determined to preserve the unity of the state and that - apart from one last attempt - lived up to its promise of refusing to negotiate with an armed group. At the organizational level, processes and dynamics occurring within the group itself constituted the main subject of interest. Key developments in this area included the gradual withdrawal of support from the radical-nationalist Abertzale movement, a substantial decline of income, difficulties in attracting new recruits, frequent changes in leadership, a decrease in operational capacities, and generational disputes between the older, more moderate guard and an increasingly young and untrained, yet more militant new generation of etarras. The individual level then focused on developments occurring in the context of the individual etarra him/herself. This section has shown that between 2000 and 2011, a handful of members distanced themselves

81 from ETA on personal grounds, and that others might have taken the same step as a result of disagreements over ETA’s strategy, burnout, or loss of faith in the group ever achieving its ambitious goals.

Obviously, neither of these developments was particularly helpful for ETA’s survival. Upon closer examination, however, the claim made by the Spanish authorities - namely that counterterrorism was a key determinant in ETA’s decline - does not seem so far-fetched. In fact, this specific factor has appeared to be the catalyst for a number of developments observed at the meso-level in particular. ETA’s organizational and leadership structures, for example, would have likely remained intact if it had not been for the increased CT cooperation between Spain and France, and the adoption of new EU instruments such as the EAW, which altogether led to hundreds of members being arrested during the period 2000-2011, many of which were high- profile ETA figures. Similarly, without its inclusion on the US and EU terror watch list, and without the introduction of OL 6/2002, ETA would in all likelihood not have encountered significant difficulties in accessing or accumulating capital to fund its violent campaign. Apart from draining the separatists’ flow of income, the Law on Political Parties was furthermore directly responsible for depriving ETA of an important platform to spread its nationalist message. Through the banning of its political wings and the gradual disruption of its radical- nationalist network, the group was increasingly isolated from its constituency, which in turn impeded its recruitment capabilities. The analysis has shown, however, that in addition to OL 6/2002 and the general intensification of CT efforts, ETA’s failure to attract new members and sympathizers was equally the result of another structural-level factor, namely public support or more precisely, the loss thereof. It was demonstrated in the analysis how many Basques over the course of the 21st century came to reject violence as a legitimate tool to achieve political goals. This development in turn was triggered not only by the atrocious events that struck the United States and Madrid, but also through ETA’s very own actions, i.e. the increasingly indiscriminate nature of its attacks and the intensification of kale borroka activities. The fact that the region already enjoyed considerable autonomy and increasingly provided for democratic, legal channels to pursue secessionist ambitions then further diminished the pool of people willing to join ETA’s ranks.

82 The combination of dwindling popular support and effective CT efforts in turn set the stage for the gradual change in the Abertzale’s attitude towards violence, which likewise put enormous pressure on ETA. With more and more radical-nationalist actors coming to view the armed campaign as ineffective, useless, and counterproductive, the group not only saw its vital support network crumble, but was also dragged into an internal power struggle over the movement’s leadership. The infighting specifically gained momentum following the decision made by ETA’s hardliners to break the 2005-2007 ceasefire, which at the structural level in turn had the effect that the Spanish government shut the door on any future negotiations. The Abertzale’s commitment to fighting for Basque independence exclusively through peaceful means eventually found great resonance among the population, which further contributed to ETA’s isolation.

The list of cross-level interactions could go on endlessly. Those accentuated in the previous paragraphs, however, do conform to the general view held in the academic literature that “more than one dynamic [is] responsible for [a terrorist group’s] decline” (Cronin, 2006, p. 18). In line with the works published by Crenshaw (1999), Cronin (2006) and others, this case-study has demonstrated how a mix of factors occurring both internal and external to the group have contributed to pushing ETA to the brink of eradication, i.e. waning popular support, the unsuccessful transition to the next generation, and repressive government action. Similar to Jones and Libicki (2008), this thesis has moreover emphasized the importance of a large section of the terrorist movement “adopt[ing] nonviolent tactics” (p. 9), and joining the legitimate political process. More precisely, however, the analysis has shown that it was the interplay of these and various other developments that eventually led to the group’s demise, thereby confirming the significance of the multi-level approach. Proof of ‘repeated interactions’ taking place has particularly been found with regards to macro- and meso-level factors, i.e. socio-political transformations affecting intra-group dynamics and vice-versa. Due to a lack of data, however, it was not possible to say with certainty how these developments in turn have affected individual ETA militants. And while in all likelihood, the heightened security climate, dwindling social and popular support, a loss of income as well as operational and recruitment capabilities have not gone unnoticed among its members, further research is definitely needed to prove these

83 circumstances have indeed led individual etarras to quit the organization. Interviews with former members might yield more detailed insights into these processes. Similarly, the influence of micro-level developments on organizational- and structural-level dynamics could not be adequately established in this thesis. Apart from those few cases in which changing personal priorities have forced individuals to leave ETA and hence, reduce its organizational strength, no further cross-level interactions were discovered. All in all, however, this study has confirmed that organizational decline is a complex process that cannot be explained by a stand-alone factor. In the case of ETA, too, it was the result of interrelated developments occurring both within and outside the group’s immediate environment.

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