PRISM | National Defense University

PRISM About VOL. 5, NO. 4 PRISM is published by the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners on complex Editor and integrated national security operations; reconstruction and state-building; relevant policy Michael Miklaucic and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and education to transform America’s security and development

Deputy Editor Jacqueline Page

Associate Editor Communications Jeffrey Listerman Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Direct communications to: Editorial Assistants Garrett Dodd Editor, PRISM Samantha Fletcher 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 3605) Riley Perkins Fort Lesley J. McNair Cherish Zinn Washington, DC 20319 Telephone: Copy Editors (202) 685-3442 Dale Erickson FAX: Rebecca Harper (202) 685-3581 Christoff Luehrs Email: [email protected]

Design Director Carib Mendez Contributions Advisory Board PRISM welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from security policymakers Dr. Gordon Adams and shapers, security analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and Dr. Pauline Baker abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address above or by email to [email protected] Ambassador Rick Barton with “Attention Submissions Editor” in the subject line. Dr. Alain Bauer Dr. Hans Binnendijk Dr. Joseph J. Collins (ex officio) This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition of PRISM. Ambassador James Dobbins Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Ambassador John Herbst without permission of the copyright proprietors. PRISM should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content. Dr. David Kilcullen Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are Dr. Roger B. Myerson those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department Dr. Moises Naim of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. MG William L. Nash, USA (Ret.) Ambassador Thomas Pickering Dr. William Reno LtGen John F. Sattler, USMC (Ret.) Dr. James A. Schear Dr. Joanna Spear Dr. Ruth Wedgwood

Publisher Cover art: Presencia de America Latina, by Jorge Gonzalez Camerena. It is located in Dr. Joseph J. Collins the Casa del Arte of the University of Concepcion in Concepcion, Chile. ISSN 2157–0663 10 10 2 FEATURES 206 188 172 150 134 118 100 88 68 48 34 26 20 INTERVIEW

Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle:Northern inthe Alliance forProsperity B FromFailed State Brink: of the Security Back from Colombia Exporter to An Interview with General JohnKelly with An Interview B S Evolving Transnational The Crime-Terrorism NexusPeru andits in B Escalation? Conflict Further or Citizens’ Security of MilitiasinMexico: Rise The B LatinRisk in America Rethinking Systemic Networks: the Illicit B U Transnational Threat to AnInsidious Crime: Organized By MatthewLevitt Now and Then inSouthAmerica: Operation IranianHezbollah and B AStrategicLatin in Analysis America: Russia B S After Negotiations: the HowTeams Reconstruction CanBuild a B State Influencingthe Hemisphere: States United inthe Beyond and policy B Caribbean andthe Latin in Development America and Insecurity By A CriticalJunctureforSecurityand B Northern Triangle Civilian SecurityinMexico andthe De-Militarizing B WesternChange and Adaptation:Changes inthe Beyond and Hemisphere B A Le trategicRelevance Region for U.S.andthe the tronger Peace in Colombia y Juan Orlando Hernández y Juan Orlando Pinzón y Juan Carlos y R.Evan Ellis y Vanda Felbab-Brown Pamela Kalkman and y Ivan Briscoe Novakoffy Renee Eustacia Liana Farah and y Douglas Reyes E.Dominguez y Agustin Fonesca y Frank O. Brian Mora and Velloso Halvia y and Inés Bustillo y Vicente Fox y TomMa S National Security Interests NationalS Security

Leana D.Bresnahan Leana ap Towards Security Regional Ensuring li n o w sk i

and CharlesO.Blaha Human Rights

ndupress.ndu.eduwww.ndu.edu AUTHOR

Alexander Garcia, www.fuerzasmilitares.org

Troops of the Colombian National Army’s Second Infantry Brigade supply water to victims of heavy rain. These individuals lost their homes and were housed in temporary shelters.

2 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 1 Colombia Back from the Brink From Failed State to Exporter of Security

BY JUAN CARLOS PINZÓN

or most of the world, the decade of the 1990’s came to a close with Europe agreeing on a single currency, the movie Titanic earning the distinction of being the most financially F successful picture in history, and the world holding its breath for the predicted chaos that would supposedly be brought on by the Y2K bug. For Colombia, the 1990’s were marked by mounting violence, as the government struggled to protect rural communities from ever increasing attacks by armed insurgents and drug traffickers. Some even considered the country on the verge of becoming a failed state; the economy was foundering, foreign investment had declined sharply, and security had deteriorated to the point where the majority of Colombians did not feel safe.1 In fact, they felt like hostages in their own homes. The security environment was one of constant anguish due to the terrorist bombing campaign initiated by the drug cartels and continued by Colombia’s various armed Marxist insurgent groups.2 Colombians, who are proudly individualistic, resolute, and courageous, began to say “nunca mas” (never again), and their government listened and acted. Between 1999 and 2006, the first “transformation” of the Colombian Public Forces (the Armed Forces and the National Police) took place.3 The overhaul included intense training, revised military doctrine and campaign strategies, and increased capability and capacity. International cooperation and the recognition of shared responsibility to confront this countrywide threat were crucial in generating the needed jumpstart. Every president since 1982 has attempted some sort of peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the Spanish acronym is FARC). After the 2002 election and at the end of another failed peace process with the FARC – that demilitarized an area of land the size of Switzerland, granting the FARC a safe haven as a gesture of good will during that negotiation period – the Colombian electorate clamored for the government to go on the offensive. The FARC leadership’s lack of good faith, especially notable during the negotiation process between the

Juan Carlos Pinzón is the Ambassador of Colombia to the United States. He served as Colombia’s Minister of Defense, 2011-2015.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 3 PINZÓN years 1998 and 2002, led to a public loss of the gradual, systematic, and sustained recovery faith in the peace negotiations. Colombia had of territorial control. They also launched an to adopt a new strategy to confront the con- extensive interdiction campaign against drug flict: first, the Colombian government devel- trafficking, as well as economic revitalization oped measures to regain the strategic initiative efforts that began to rebuild the trust of against these insurgent groups; second, it Colombian citizens in their Public Forces developed options and implemented a plan to across the country. bring the conflict to a close and consolidate After taking the offensive initiative and security across the nation; and finally, it for- establishing minimal state presence, FARC, the mulated an approach to transform the forces National Liberation Army (ELN), and the to face future security challenges. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) terrorist organizations went from being Charting a Path to a New Colombia a nationwide threat to citizens and state sover- In the latter half of the 1990s, the guerrillas eignty across 1,141,748 square kilometers of were capable of conducting multi-battalion national territory, to isolated terrorist cells on size conventional set piece battles, and con- the defensive in the most remote rural areas of trolled large swaths of coca crop growing areas the nation. and drug routes, where they forced the dis- As security continued to improve and as placement of entire towns and plundered civil- the government expanded social services to ians’ property and assets. outlying areas of the country, the illegal armed By the end of the 1990s, President Andrés groups lost the ability to execute larger-scale Pastrana and his administration designed a operations. Now, the guerilla structures were multilayer strategy to address, in a comprehen- forced to withdraw to their traditional base sive way, the security challenges the country areas and scale down their tactics to harass- was confronting. Plan Colombia became an ment of security forces and attacks on eco- effort to strengthen the armed forces and con- nomic infrastructure, as well as seeking new front the drugs trade in a way that enabled the illegal sources of income. state to enlarge its presence in an integrated Most importantly, because of stronger, manner to restore territorial control and modernized, and professional Armed Forces, enhance the rule of law. The U.S. partnered Colombians gradually got their country back. with Colombia in this endeavor in a way that For the first time in years, Colombians were facilitated air mobility, special operations able to move freely between cities and towns. training, intelligence capabilities, professional With this recovered freedom came the reversal standards on human rights, and resources for of the 1990s “brain drain,” as both seasoned rapid response for projects in critical areas. The and skilled Colombian entrepreneurs, along support became bipartisan and sustained, and, with young energetic and resolute Colombians, despite limited resources, the impact became came home. Another positive consequence of substantial. these initial successes was an increase in for- In 2002, the new Colombian administra- eign investment and a more positive credit rat- tion under President Alvaro Uribe initiated a ing. series of offensive military actions that led to

4 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 COLOMBIA BACK FROM THE BRINK

To fund the security effort, extraordinary decisive offensive engagements at the time and appropriations were garnered through special place of their choosing. war taxes and a reformed general tax system. From 2007 to 2011, the Colombian Armed The wealth tax was created in 2006 to fund the Forces inflicted debilitating blows on the security campaign. Since then, this tax has FARC, ELN, and AUC. Their leaders were tar- raised approximately $8 billion dollars for geted; two of the seven members of the FARC investments in assets to enhance security capa- Secretariat were killed in action. Adding to bilities. U.S. support, which has been crucial ongoing group demobilizations, individual for technology and know-how, has only demobilization and disarmament processes accounted for an average 4 percent of defense continued to increase. Leaders of the AUC who budget; 96 percent or more has been funded were not allowed to demobilize under these by Colombians. processes due to the nature of their crimes Increased domestic and international were either imprisoned or extradited to the investments led to stronger and sustained bud- United States. The statistical trends and gets for the national security sector, enabling indexes showed a huge reduction in the ene- enhanced air mobility, improved training, my’s Order of Battle. increased manpower, and the creation of joint The consolidation policy’s main objective military task forces. By 2007, Colombia was to achieve broader popular legitimacy reached a turning point. The government through a “hearts and minds” campaign. The forces were now almost wholly on the offen- improved logistics capacity of the Armed sive, taking the fight to enemy, pursuing Forces led to the construction of highways, bridges, parks, and indigenous villages. bixentro / Flickr

Graffiti depicting FARC leaders Raul Reyes, Manuel Marulanda, and Ivan Rios

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 5 PINZÓN

Following this mandate, in 2011, the National groups continued to inflict indiscriminate vio- Defense Ministry, set out to enhance the last lence against innocent men, women, and chil- decade’s achievements through a top to bot- dren. tom review of the strategy. The result was the Colombia’s existential struggle against the development of two new campaign plans: the twin threats of insurgency and powerful crim- military’s “Sword of Honor” campaign, and a inal organizations historically necessitated civilian security campaign, “Green Heart.” extensive cooperation between the military This new strategic vision emphasized the forces and the Colombia National Police. This importance of flexibility and the ability to collaborative relationship will be beneficial as make “real-time” strategic adjustments, as the the state continues to reclaim previously insur- dynamic security battlespace in Colombia gent-controlled territory. Deepening the rela- morphed and adapted. Emphasis was placed tionship with communities led to the creation on innovation, interagency coordination, joint of military liaisons for minorities and locals as operations, and precision strikes. This well as the launching of police quadrant initia- approach of forward thinking and interagency tives, dividing urban centers into 4,800 super- collaboration was a way of maintaining the vised blocks. As a result, terrorist and criminal offensive initiative. groups were unable to undo the progress made Twelve joint task forces were created and by the Public Forces. Colombians began to deployed against strategic FARC and ELN base enjoy the highest levels of security the country areas of operation with specific missions of had experienced in over two decades. attacking the operational headquarters of both The significant dismantling of the FARC’s guerrilla organizations. Meanwhile in the cit- logistical, communications, and support net- ies, nine new metropolitan police commands works, along with the decisive blocking of were established and provided with their own their transit and resupply corridors, further respective security assets. reduced their offensive capability and confined In 2012, President Santos announced that them to remote, difficult terrain areas. FARC had formally agreed to negotiate a peace Improved intelligence capabilities, deal based on a five-point agenda including improved land, air, and extensive riverine con- land reform, political participation, drug traf- trol, consecutive precision strikes, and ficking, victims’ rights, and the end of the advanced airmobile and combat capabilities internal armed conflict. The negotiations are further degraded and dispersed the terrorist being held in Havana, Cuba. As of this writing, groups geographically, and fragmented and substantial agreement has been reached on eliminated main command and control struc- land reform, political participation, and drug tures. As a result, the number of individual trafficking. In recent days, further agreement FARC deserters increased dramatically. has been reached on accountability for crimes Demobilization of combatants reached an all- committed during the civil war and on justice time high, further degrading the combat capa- for victims. Concurrently, the National bilities of FARC and ELN and decimating the Defense Ministry’s strategies aimed to conclu- enemy’s Order of Battle. Further, FARC lost 54 sively dismantle all terrorist and criminal orga- of its most important leaders including two nizations, and bring justice where the illegal top commanders. During the same time, ELN

6 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 COLOMBIA BACK FROM THE BRINK lost 21 of its leaders and the Criminal Bands Despite the dramatic improvement in (known as the Bacrim) 42 of theirs. Colombia’s circumstances over the past 15 Since the implementation of Sword of years, Colombia still faces development and Honor and Green Heart, security conditions security challenges, most notably the lack of have improved greatly. Criminal and terrorist state presence in remote parts of the country actions continued to decline: the homicide and the likely evolution of the BACRIM and rate declined, only eight percent of the popula- the drug trade. In the face of these challenges, tion reported suffering from terrorist attacks, the Armed Forces cannot be limited to strictly while kidnapping and murder rates plunged. military operations. In the coming years, the Today, Colombia has reduced the homicide National Defense Ministry anticipates that the rate to its lowest level in 35 years. The percep- Armed Forces will continue efforts to protect tion of insecurity in Colombia’s cities is simi- Colombia’s citizens and sovereignty, support lar to those of any peacetime large urban area the development and improvement of infra- around the world. structure for rural economies, further interna- As the negotiations between the govern- tional cooperation, and continue technologi- ment and FARC continue in Havana, the cal research and development - all components Public Forces continue their offensive against of the enduring mission to “Protect the Peace” FARC and ELN with an additional objective of and secure the Nation. degrading organized crime and smaller crimi- While the government of Colombia has nal groups active in Colombia’s urban areas, made significant strides in reducing extreme thus making the cities safer. poverty, many rural populations still lack basic Renewed emphasis has been placed on services. Given the Public Forces’ increasingly protecting the population, protecting infra- wide-reaching presence in remote rural areas, structure, and maintaining territorial control. they are well positioned to assist other minis- Territorial control has expanded outwards to tries and state agencies in the implementation Colombia’s borders. This significant change, of their social programs to help underserved restoring or establishing sovereignty, means and vulnerable populations. Additionally, the Public Force now controls enough internal Armed Forces as first responders have success- territory to support activities that were once fully mitigated the effects of recurrent natural considered peacetime tasks. Such activities disasters. There is a permanent Disaster and include: demining efforts, land restitution, Emergency Battalion as part of the Engineering designing the Armed Forces of the future Brigade, which is an active asset within the through a transformation program, and social National Environmental Risk Management reinsertion of demilitarized insurgents, all now System. fully institutionalized programs on the Recognizing the value of nested opportu- national level. Concurrently, the Public Forces nities, the Defense Ministry aims to better inte- continue to play a vital role in protecting and grate research and development efforts with defending human rights of all citizens and those of the private sector and the academic ensuring the security and reparation of conflict community. To this end, the private and victims. defense sectors are jointly developing technologies to gain self-sufficiency and improve

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 7 PINZÓN parts and equipment replacement with domes- relief missions around the globe. Colombia’s tically produced products. The current step experience successfully combating insurgent involves developing an indigenous armaments groups, illicit facilitators, transnational crimi- and military hardware industry to increase self- nal organizations, and drug trafficking organi- reliance. zations, makes it uniquely capable and quali- Only a decade ago, it was difficult to imag- fied to assist other nations that today, or one ine that one day the Colombian Public Forces day, may face similar threats. Over the past five would be in a position to share their expertise, years Colombian armed forces have trained experience, and training capabilities to assist almost 24,000 police and military from more other nations in building security, peacekeep- than 60 nations, thus, making Colombia a ing, and transnational crime prevention pro- consistent security partner for Central America, grams, many of which have been launched by Caribbean, and other friendly nations. the United Nations or through a NATO man- A Colombia for Colombians date. Because of the sustained progress since the turn of the century, and their exceptional Though Colombia has made tremendous expertise and experience, the Colombian strides protecting and defending its nation, a Armed Forces are well positioned to evolve signed peace agreement with FARC will not into a regional leader in training, education, end all violence, drug trafficking, illegal min- and actively participate in international peace- ing, extortion, kidnapping, murders, or crimi- keeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster nal acts against the civilian population, but it Pedro Szekely/Flikr

Rainbow over Guatavita, Colombia

8 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 COLOMBIA BACK FROM THE BRINK

will end a significant portion of it. With a illustrated, the Colombian people and the signed agreement, as with any other significant Public Forces who protect them are up to the change in the strategic scenario, the Public task. Forces must adapt, modernize, and strengthen Thus, going forward, with honor, pride, themselves. and resolve, the Military and the National Not only will the Armed Forces play a key Police are ready, willing, and able to protect role in maintaining security so that whatever the peace against present and future threats. is agreed upon in Havana is enforced and exe- PRISM cuted in a secure, sustained, and legal manner, they will be tasked with the protection of Colombia’s borders, natural resources, infrastructure, and citizen security. If FARC disarms and demobilizes, under-governed areas of the country will remain vulnerable to security threats posed by the remaining insurgent and Notes criminal entities. Thus, the Public Forces will need to be and are prepared to fill this void. 1 Ann C. Mason. “Colombian State Failure: The The Colombian military and police have Global Context of Eroding Domestic Authority,” shown that they can successfully combat the Paper presented at the Conference on Failed States, tactics, techniques, and procedures of insur- Florence, Italy (April 10-14, 2001). http://www.comm. ucsb.edu/faculty/mstohl/failed_states/2001/papers/mason.pdf. gents, terrorists, and criminal organizations. 2 Colombia had two major communist They must now maintain the momentum to insurgent groups active through the 1990s: the be able to handle the future fluctuations of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and security environment. They have proven that the National Liberation Army (ELN). A reactionary paramilitary force also developed, the United with bold decisions and a strong political will, Self-Defense [Groups] of Colombia (AUC), born out combined with successful international rela- of the 1980’s hitmen squads of the drug cartels, tions and cooperation, institutional develop- whose task initially was to protect relatives of cartel ment, and joint and coordinated efforts, a kingpins from being kidnapped by the leftist insurgents. troubled country can recover and turn the tide. 3 Though the Colombian National Police is To face future security challenges like transna- distinct from the military forces of Colombia, it tional crime, they must now stand ready to constitutes along with them the Public Force and is controlled by the Ministry of Defense. build networks, capabilities, and capacities against new and emerging threats. Particularly, in the new age of cyber warfare, Colombia must be prepared to tackle 21st century threats while continuing to consolidate an enduring peace. Colombia, led by its Armed Forces is now poised to face any aggressor whether they are nation states, organizations, or even individuals, in any battlespace, to include cyber, at any time. As the last half a century has

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 9 International Organization for Migration

The Beast carries half a million immigrants from Central America to the U.S. border each year. Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle A Leap Towards Ensuring Regional Security

BY JUAN ORLANDO HERNÁNDEZ

ne year ago, Honduras, along with Guatemala, El Salvador, Mexico, and the United States, was shaken by one of the most severe and unexpected humanitarian crises ever Owitnessed in the Western Hemisphere. Tens of thousands of Honduran children had walked out of the country and embarked on a perilous journey to the United States. Reports were received throughout the Northern Triangle, of teenagers guiding children into the hands of human traffickers—“coyotes”—who charged thousands of dollars to lead them into the United States. My immediate reaction was to set in motion an emergency task force to contain the exodus of unaccompanied minors, as well as to create a mechanism to receive and take care of the children that would be returning from the southern U.S. border. I deployed a special tactical force to our western border with Guatemala and deeply reformed our migration agency. By swiftly react- ing to the situation, we prevented this from becoming an even larger humanitarian catastrophe. However, this was only the first of our actions in response to that silent cry for help from our children. In July of last year, I invited immigration experts, as well as representatives from countries in the region most affected by this phenomenon, to discuss probable causes as well as our corresponding reactions to the crisis. We soon identified three key push factors driving migration from the Northern Triangle towards the United States: our youth are plagued by insecurity, lack educational opportunities, and face daunting prospects for future employment. In order to fully understand the origin of these factors in Honduras, it is necessary to revisit our recent history. For the past decade, Honduras and the Northern Triangle as a whole have suffered the unintended consequences of successful policies in closing Caribbean drug smuggling routes. As the eastern Caribbean maritime paths that had previously served as a direct link between Andean cocaine producers and North American consumer markets ceased to be an option,

Juan Orlando Hernández is the President of Honduras.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 11 HERNÁNDEZ

Honduras’ Caribbean coast became one of the coming into the country, and creating the preferred transit points for northward bound National Security and Defense Council aircraft transporting drugs. As a result, our (NSDC)—integrated by the Presidents of the homicide rates started climbing and drug car- three branches of government, (Executive, tels expanded their presence in our territory. Judicial and Legislative), the National The alliance between the cartels and criminal Prosecutor, the Ministers of Defense and gangs (“maras”) also continued to plague our Security, the heads of the Armed Forces and neighborhoods, with the latter distributing the Police, as well as other relevant actors in drugs in urban centers, carrying out contract the administration—to coordinate all citizen murders, and providing protection for ground security and defense activities. Our initial drug shipments across the country. This not actions successfully halted the rise in crime only put a strain on our law enforcement and set us on the right track for continued agents, but also swamped our justice system, progress. with both a significant increase in judicial With these lessons in mind, upon taking cases as well as the corrupting influence of office in January of last year, I revised and drug proceeds in the public sector. expanded this strategy. I also founded the FUSINA (the Interagency Security Force that The homicide rate, which had been increasing executes the decisions taken by the NSDC), dramatically since 2007, has been contained continued the police vetting process, strength- and decreased by 25 percent over the last four ened the National Prosecutors Office and the years from its peak in 2011 State’s criminal investigation capacities. The success of our strategy is now palpa- ble in every corner of Honduras. The homicide Had this downward spiral continued rate, which had been increasing dramatically unabated, there existed the very real possibility since 2007, has been contained and decreased that today Honduras would have fallen into by 25 percent over the last four years from its the hands of narco-traffickers, with corre- peak in 2011. A climate of peace is gradually spondingly grave security implications for all returning to many parts of our territory where of Central America, Mexico, and the United lawlessness had ruled for too many years.1 It States. We Hondurans refused to accept this is imperative to highlight that, beyond the fate for our country, setting out on a difficult brave efforts of our men and women in uni- but definitive path to regain our governability form, this success also owes much to the and ensure the safety of our citizens. Three extraordinary assistance and unprecedented years ago, during my predecessor’s Presidential levels of cooperation between the Honduran, Administration and my tenure as President of U.S., and Colombian Governments, as well as Congress, we developed an integrated security other regional actors—United States Southern and defense strategy precisely designed to this Command has been particularly supportive of end: approving a complete overhaul of our our efforts with the maritime interdiction of legal framework, initiating a vetting process for drugs. The results of what we can achieve when the National Police, setting up a land, air, and our countries work together towards a com- sea military shield to prevent drugs from mon goal are now self-evident.

12 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 ALLIANCE FOR PROSPERITY IN THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE

It is true that we have made great progress, analyze the root causes of this phenomenon, but a year ago Central America also received and develop a joint diagnosis of the most many harrowing reminders of how much more pressing push factors causing the immigration is yet to be done. In spite of significant invest- crisis. ment and expansion of social services, our This sobering exercise provided a number social and educational programs have not of striking conclusions, of which I will only managed to keep up with our demographic highlight a few here. Fifty-seven percent of the boom. Similarly, our private sector and the rate population in the Northern Triangle lives in of our economic growth have not been able to poverty, of which a significant proportion lives absorb a growing workforce—more so since it on less than $1.25 a day. Thirty percent of our has lacked the educational and technical youth aged 14-25 neither study nor work, and capacity to engage in value-added enterprises. the pregnancy rate for girls aged between 15 Our infrastructure has suffered the same fate and 19 is ninety-one per thousand—nearly as our institutions—these were built for twice the average for medium/low-income another age, and if we hope to take a leap into countries. As a consequence of being beset by the next stage of our development they must drug cartels and criminal gangs, our homicide be rebuilt and strengthened. It was this diffi- rate is three times higher than the rest of cult introspection which led me to reach out Central America. These facts all help explain a to Presidents Otto Perez Molina of Guatemala quantifiable reality that is being evidenced on and Salvador Sánchez Cerén of El Salvador. the southern U.S. Border—nine percent of our After frank discussions highlighting the simi- population has chosen to migrate in recent larities between the push factors driving away years, a figure five times higher than in other our youths, we concluded that, since the chal- Central American countries. lenges we are facing arise in a regional context, These numbers, especially when com- our best chance of overcoming them lies with pared to other Central American countries, a regional solution. delegitimize the claim that Northern Triangle Out of this revelation, the Alliance for the emigration is largely due to U.S. pull factors. Prosperity of the Northern Triangle was born. Therefore, changes in immigration legislation As a first step in forging this joint commitment and information campaigns will not put an the Presidents of Guatemala and El Salvador end to the trend. If pull factors were the main and I, visited Washington D.C. in July 2014 to cause, Belizeans, Costa Ricans, and hold an initial dialogue with President Barack Panamanians would be arriving at the Obama about the unaccompanied migrant Southern U.S. border at a similar rate as citi- children crisis. During this meeting, both the zens of the Northern Triangle. This is not hap- countries of the Northern Triangle and the pening. United States acknowledged that each country This analysis also helped us identify the bears a share of the responsibility regarding enormous potential that the Northern Triangle the immigration crisis and some of the wider has if it acts as one. Together, the three coun- problems affecting Honduras, Guatemala, and tries represent the ninth largest economy in El Salvador. It was also resolved that the three the region; the fourth manufacturing exporter, Northern Triangle countries would further and ninth overall exporter of Latin America;

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 13 HERNÁNDEZ and our collective population of 30 million Firstly, the actions proposed under these pil- represents a huge untapped work force and lars are entirely aligned with our current import market for regional trade. Strategic Government Plan and multi-annual Taking into account both our deficiencies spending projections. This is to say that a vast and our potential, we developed the Plan of share of our Government’s budget is already the Alliance for the Prosperity of the Northern allocated towards these needs. Additionally, in Triangle. It aims at the neutralization of the order to maximize the effect of our interven- principal push factors driving our population’s tions, we also engaged in an exhaustive focus- emigration, and beyond that, an ambitious ing exercise, taking into account homicide and radical transformation of our justice sys- rates, emigration focal points, economic devel- tems, educational and healthcare services, opment potential, income levels, and drug labor markets, infrastructure, and most impor- trafficking hot spots in order to identify those tantly, the transparency and efficiency of our areas where we can have an immediate and public institutions. dramatic effect on the population’s wellbeing. In the case of Honduras, it is crucial to With the Inter-American Development highlight two overarching principles that have Bank acting in a supporting technical role, we framed our approach towards the Alliance. classified our strategic action lines under four Keith Dannemiller

Construction of City Mall in Tegucigalpa, M.D.C. in Honduras. Upon completion, to become the largest shopping mall in Central America.

14 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 ALLIANCE FOR PROSPERITY IN THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE pillars: 1) Developing human capital, 2) modernized, and we will strengthen their tech- Improving public safety and access to the jus- nical, scientific, and forensic capabilities. Our tice system, 3) Fostering the productive sector, Judicial Branch will be improved through the and 4) Strengthening public institutions. expansion and specialization of its human Developing our human capital is essential resources, streamlined judicial processes, and for mitigating youth immigration. To this end, the promotion of alternative dispute settle- the Northern Triangle countries expect to ment mechanisms—all aimed at reducing judi- expand our social protection systems and con- cial case backlogs. These actions will all help ditional transfer programs in order to incentiv- consolidate our fight against street gangs, ize children to stay in school, as well as extortion, and drug and human trafficking expanding middle and secondary education employing the best international practices. coverage in prioritized areas from 73 to 92 per- Past experience with reactive approaches cent over the next five years. Across the to crime fighting in our countries has demon- Northern Triangle, eight hundred thousand strated the need to pair remedies with preven- secondary school children could benefit from tive measures. In Honduras, we have already classroom construction and upgrades, and one expanded programs that have proven to be million youths could take advantage of voca- successful, such as the establishment of 15 tional training and specializations. Peace and Coexistence Observatories to ana- In order to neutralize the irreversible lyze local crime statistics; the forty-six effects of malnutrition, 7.4 million people Outreach Centers we have opened, partly with would benefit from expanded maternal and support from the U.S. Government, which pro- child healthcare and nutrition programs, and vide spaces for recreation, training, and entre- 260,000 children would benefit from alterna- preneurship assistance that have directly ben- tive childcare and educational programs at the efited over 25,000 youth; the recovery of preschool level. Migrants returning from the public spaces and opening of urban “mega U.S. would also enter strengthened reintegra- parks”—built through a partnership with the tion programs, accessing vocational training private sector—in areas previously controlled and extended social protection programs. by criminal gangs; and the promotion of orga- With regards to the improvement of pub- nized outdoor activities across the country lic safety and access to justice, our relentless which draw many thousands to attend each persecution of criminal enterprises in all their week, demonstrating the yearning of our citi- forms will continue unchanged, but in order zens to step out of their fenced houses and to consolidate our recent advances we must enjoy the everyday routines that had until strengthen certain aspects of our judicial and recently been unavailable to them. security systems. Under the Alliance for The expansion of programs such as these Prosperity we will train 70,000 police officers across the Northern Triangle will benefit 7.4 under a revised curriculum with a strong million people with improved community emphasis on modern policing techniques, security programs, expanded violence moni- human rights and transparency, and vastly toring centers, and upgraded public and com- extended internal affairs operations. The munity spaces. Public Prosecutors’ Offices will continue to be

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 15 HERNÁNDEZ

The expected results of these joint actions States, not only in search of better jobs, but will be central to our future national success, often simply as a means of survival. However, and it is perhaps the most important promise the long-term transformation of the Northern I made to the Honduran people upon taking Triangle economies requires large-scale invest- office—to reduce the murder rate by 10 percent ments and structural reforms to catapult the a year for the next five years. Beyond this sta- region on to a more dynamic economic path. tistic, our population will benefit from a com- This includes reforming regulations, improv- plete overhauling of the security and judicial ing quality and sanitary control systems, systems within the next decade, resulting in streamlining and strengthening our tax collec- systems fully capable of addressing the region’s tion, fully taking advantage of CAFTA-DR2 and needs both in criminal and civil matters. other existing trade agreements, and significant Our efforts in improving the human capi- investment in the modernization of our cus- tal and security of citizens in the Northern toms controls. Triangle will not amount to much if we are Both the focused and general actions unable to provide employment to our youth described above require a significant improve- as they come of age. We are therefore placing ment in the Northern Triangle’s energy matrix an equal emphasis on jumpstarting our econ- in order to produce globally competitive omy. This will be anchored on establishing a results. For this reason, the Alliance also con- one-stop platform for registering foreign and templates the reform, expansion, and diversi- national investment, the introduction of spe- fication of our energy sector through the cial economic zones (ZEDES) and the develop- expansion of the Regional Electricity Market ment of a regional trademark. In order to tar- (MER); the promotion of the region’s gas con- get our most migrant-prone population, nection with Mexico; and through doubling 180,000 micro-, small-, and medium- sized the capacity of the Electrical Interconnection enterprises will benefit from specialized devel- System (SIEPAC), among other actions. This opment programs and be integrated into will achieve dramatic reductions in the region’s regional production chains. As well as energy costs as well as an increase in the stabil- strengthening their technical and logistical ity of energy supplies throughout the entire capabilities, they will have access to $900 mil- territory. lion in financing over the next five years, pro- The jumpstart to our productive sector moting economic development across both also needs to be underpinned by a regional the urban and rural landscape. For that most infrastructure upgrade, including 1,500 km of vulnerable segment of our population living new and upgraded logistics corridors, 2,500 in subsistence, technical assistance will be pro- km of improved rural roads, and significant vided for 500,000 families so that they may investments in border crossings, airports and escape the vicious cycle of extreme rural pov- seaports. The effect this unprecedented inte- erty. grated economic approach will have on the These focused actions are intended to Northern Triangle´s development is difficult to have an immediate effect on a significant seg- overstate – youth will not have to turn to street ment of the population currently forced to gangs, extortion and common criminality as migrate both internally as well as to the United the only available occupations; rural localities

16 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 ALLIANCE FOR PROSPERITY IN THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE where drug trafficking has been a significant— the region’s development and security if it is if not the only—source of income will be able promoted by a concerted and integrated effort to achieve development within the bounds of on the part of all the actors involved. legality; and contraband, drugs, arms, and From the perspective of the security and human trafficking will be further curtailed immigration concerns that have placed such a through strengthened customs controls. It will heavy burden on all of our countries, the amount to a wholesale transformation of the Alliance will have the simultaneous effect of political economy of the region. mitigating the push factors that have fueled If they are to be irreversible, the founda- these phenomena as well as neutralizing the tions of our social, security, justice and eco- transnational actors that encourage them. nomic reforms must be laid upon a strength- Honduras has learned that the myopic and ened institutional framework. Honduras and strictly reactive security approaches of the past the rest of the Northern Triangle must repur- do not encourage our citizenry as a whole to pose our public institutions to become mod- buy into our state efforts, and rather generate ern, efficient, and transparent administrations negative reactions among the populace that permanently safeguarded by the highest inter- result in social tension. We have learned that national standards in oversight and control. This requires the simplification of our tax I hope that during the past decade, the codes, the expansion of tax evasion controls, United States has also seen that spending the professionalization of our civil service, and on border and immigration controls is in the strengthening of local governments. In fact positively correlated to an increase in order to achieve this, we must upgrade our Honduran emigration technical and planning capabilities as well as institutionalize accountability mechanisms in addressing the effects of crime and insecurity public spending, procurement, and public ten- without rooting out their causes is an expen- ders. sive and never-ending process that does not The interdependent nature of these provide an exit from the cycle of violence. I reforms cannot be stressed enough. The hope that during the past decade, the United Alliance made a deliberate decision to embark States has also seen that spending on border on such an ambitious plan because the over- and immigration controls is in fact positively haul of our social sector, the reconstruction of correlated to an increase in Honduran emigra- our economies, the recuperation of our secu- tion. This time last year, the U.S. Congress had rity, and the reform of our state institutions to allocate supplemental appropriations to must all happen simultaneously if they are to various federal agencies in order to address the be permanent. I believe these actions are a immigration crisis. These appropriations were non-negotiable promise my administration far in excess of the money that is required to has already made to all Hondurans, and we address the causes of the crisis; in this case, an will pursue them regardless of the involvement ounce of prevention truly would have been of Central America, Mexico, or the United worth a pound of cure. Following this, in 2015 States. However, I am convinced that the effect there has been a 95 percent decrease in the of this plan will be exponentially greater on number of unaccompanied Honduran minors

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 17 HERNÁNDEZ

reaching the border, but the United States is phenomenon as a whole. This plan does not still bearing the financial cost of this. U.S. seek to contain or disguise the origins of our funding of the “Frontera Sur” initiative, which immigration and security problems—its aim provides the Mexican authorities with is to uproot them. resources to increase their own migration con- The success of the Alliance will cripple the trols, led to a 300 percent increase in appre- deep web between drugs, arms, and human hensions of Honduran citizens in Mexican trafficking, simultaneously wrenching the territory in 2015. This cannot be a sustainable threads that exist between human traffickers solution to the immigration phenomenon. and criminal gangs on both sides of the U.S. The program simply replicates expensive U.S. border, criminal gangs and drug traffickers in border control activities even as it pushes them the Northern Triangle, and between drugs and further south. arms trafficking, often carried out by the same criminal structures. Success in this endeavor The Alliance for the Prosperity of the Northern would also free U.S. border security from what Triangle represents the most cost-effective has morphed into a humanitarian mission res- solution to a security and immigration cuing and protecting vulnerable children, phenomenon that deeply affects Guatemala, El allowing them to fully focus on safeguarding Salvador, Honduras, and the United States the southern border from persons who represent a genuine threat to the national security of United States. When analyzing this situation, we should Such a path will require stringent over- take a cue from our recent joint successes in sight, constant revision, and continuous dia- security and defense cooperation stemming logue between all the parties involved. This is from the U.S.-Honduran High Level Security not a matter of ideology, but one of lessons Dialogue. I am convinced that the continued learned and hard facts about an imminent strengthening of the cooperation, respect, and problem that will not wait to be addressed. We friendship between Honduras and the U.S. is may expect resistance from entrenched inter- fundamental to furthering the cause of ests whose power bases will be compromised regional security and development. I am by such actions, but these must be met with equally convinced that the Alliance for the our unwavering determination to propel the Prosperity of the Northern Triangle represents region and its citizens towards their full poten- the most cost-effective solution to a security tial. and immigration phenomenon that deeply Half a century ago, President John F. affects Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Kennedy spoke these words at his Inaugural the United States. There is no end in sight to Address, “To our sister republics south of our the money spent on reactive policies—and in border, we offer a special pledge—to convert that same vein of trust and friendship through our good words into good deeds—in a new which we have recently shaken organized alliance for progress – to assist free men and crime and drug trafficking in Honduras, we free governments in casting off the chains of should now take a next step through this plan poverty.” During my interactions with to have the same effect on the immigration President Obama, Vice-President Biden,

18 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 ALLIANCE FOR PROSPERITY IN THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE members of Congress and the U.S. Southern Notes Command, I constantly hear echoes of that decades-old pledge. There is an entire genera- 1 Homicide rate per 100,000, per year: 2007: tion of Hondurans who regard President 47.6, 2008: 57.8, 2009: 67, 2010: 77.5, 2011: 86.4, Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress as the refer- 2012: 85.5, 2013: 75.1, 2014: 67, Official July 2015: 64.5 2007-2014, National Violence Observatory, ence point of a “before and after” in the coun- Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, try’s modernization. To this day, tens of thou- 2014-2015, Statistics Unit at the Center of Police sands of our citizens benefit from the schools Strategy and Operations (COEPOL), figures that are and clinics that it provided. We are still reconciled and jointly published with the National Violence Observatory reminded of the deep friendship that bonds our two countries by the seal of that program 2 CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central and the flag of the United States, which have America FTA) not faded from the buildings that it bestowed. Today we are faced with complex regional challenges that require unprecedented cooperation if we are to overcome them. Honduras has already embarked on the path laid out above—with the assistance of the United States, we may take an even greater leap towards the safeguarding of both American and Honduran citizens for years to come. Central America and the U.S. are deeply bound by their physical proximity. Let us therefore recognize that if our region is ravaged by drug- trafficking, violence and lack of economic opportunities, U.S. security will always be at stake. On the contrary, if the Northern Triangle is at peace, served by strengthened democratic institutions, and inclusive economic opportunities, both Central America and the U.S. will greatly benefit from having marked an irreversible turning point in the region’s prosperity. PRISM

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 19 AUTHOR

Stuart Rankin

In this photo, Peruvian, Mexican, Chilean, Colombian, and U.S. naval ships sail together during the annual UNITAS (“unity”) multinational maritime exercise. Peace and prosperity are now, more than ever, dependent on nations working together.

20 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 1 Change and Adaptation Challenges in the Western Hemisphere and Beyond

BY VICENTE FOX

he world we live in today is defined by rapid and constant change. Advances in communication, transportation, and trade have intensified global transnational exchange, and T join all nations in the Western Hemisphere and the world with fates more tightly inter- locked than ever. While some modern technologies have greatly benefitted the people of most every nation, other changes have been more problematic and present us with unprecedented challenges in the 21st Century. In such an environment security and stability must rely on concerted action and cooperation between nations across the hemisphere, and throughout the world. Recent progress in technology has greatly intensified global interaction and continues to factor decisively in the development of countless millions of people, from Africa and Asia to the West and Latin America. As a result, many regions of the world are moving ahead at faster rates of growth and with dramatic increases in per capita income. This is even more significant as we know that strong and steady economic growth can support a virtuous cycle of development, by increasing government revenue necessary for investment in health, education, and infrastructure. Economic prosperity has also been conclusively linked to reductions in societal violence and the likelihood of civil conflict. In the virtuous cycle that economic growth can create, the increased revenue available for health and education, roads and power-grids, steadily creates greater and greater opportunity for people and enables them to help themselves grow and prosper and contribute to the economic growth of their neighborhoods, towns, and countries. We need to bring this opportunity to every citizen and family around the world. This is why our global institutions need to redouble their efforts to help disenfranchised people gain access to credit, finance, and financial markets. Bringing such access is the most

President Vicente Fox was the President of Mexico from 2000 – 2006. He now resides in his home state of Guanajuato where he has founded the Vicente Fox Center of Studies, Library and Museum.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 21 FOX

effective strategy for poverty-reduction and the thinking and strategies, and requires that we prevention of violence and armed conflict in continuously struggle to improve our under- the world, and specifically in Latin America standing of emerging and evolving security today. challenges in today’s rapidly changing world. We must tirelessly explore new solutions …it is time we consider dramatically to these new security challenges. For example, restructuring some of our global in an era characterized by fewer interstate con- intergovernmental institutions – such as the flicts, it is time we consider dramatically United Nations – so that they can be more restructuring some of our global intergovern- responsive and effective in conflict negotiation mental institutions – such as the United and peace building in smaller, regional Nations – so that they can be more responsive conflicts, or even local conflicts and effective in conflict negotiation and peace building in smaller, regional conflicts, or even local conflicts. In order to achieve this more The Western Hemisphere has been merci- dynamic and effective global posture, it is also fully free of major warfare between states for essential that the UN bureaucracy be signifi- several generations. Yet neither stability nor cantly overhauled and reduced. security can be taken for granted. Hostile blocs Unfortunately, while modern technologi- have emerged within the hemisphere embrac- cal advancements have furthered legitimate ing competing and conflicting worldviews and societal development and progress, they have making the specter of interstate conflict more also been a boon to criminal enterprises, orga- imaginable than in generations. Moreover, nizations, and networks. The last few decades crime has become the most commonly identi- have seen an explosive growth of transnational fied problem and source of human insecurity crime, criminal organizations, and networks of in the hemisphere. As we promote economic illicit organizations that have excelled at rapid opportunity, we must recognize that acceler- adaptation and effective exploitation of new ated change, such as we have experienced in communication, transportation, and banking recent decades, can also be traumatic and technologies. We must endeavor to be as nim- destabilizing. ble and innovative as they are in our efforts to The geopolitical changes experienced in contain and eliminate these dangerous crimi- the post-World War II period, and particularly nals who represent a burgeoning security chal- over the last 25 years since the collapse of the lenge for us throughout Latin America, as well Soviet Union, have been enormous and sweep- as the greater Western Hemisphere. ing. Armed conflict between great powers has Similarly, we must pursue new and inno- largely been supplanted worldwide by a pro- vative approaches to stem the flow of weapons liferation of smaller regional conflicts, driven and ammunition from the United States into by ethnic, religious, identity, and interest Mexico and Central America. This pipeline of group concerns. Many of these civil conflicts guns and ammunition has empowered the nar- are fueled by complex webs of illicit activity cotrafficking cartels and street gangs through- and transnational criminal finance. This new out the region for far too long, enabling them reality demands a departure from Cold War to overwhelm underequipped law

22 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 CHANGE AND ADAPTATION enforcement, and produce carnage in the civil- The violence has slowed or even reversed ian populations. Confrontation between dif- in some regions, yet the overwhelming, coer- ferent narcotrafficking organizations, and their cive capability derived from easy access to battles with Mexican police and military, weapons and ammunition enables criminals resulted in an extended period of catastrophic to accrue greater power and wealth. In order to violence and loss of life in Mexico. Further, turn the tide, the United States must acknowl- this issue is not only a Mexican concern as edge the gun problem and stop the widespread major Mexican criminal organizations have proliferation of small arms and assault weap- expanded into Guatemala, Honduras, and El ons into Latin America once and for all. Salvador. What will be or should be the secu- The vast sums of money the cartels use to rity strategy in Mexico going forward? What if buy these weapons, employ mercenary armies, any messages can Mexico learn from corrupt politicians and public officials, and Colombia? What lessons can others learn from finance vast criminal operations comes mainly Mexico’s experience? And what are the options from the sale of illegal drugs. Trafficking in for a joint security strategy between the U.S., illegal narcotics generates hundreds of billions Mexico, the states of the Northern Triangle, of dollars worldwide, every year. The failure of and the coca-growing nations of the Andean the longstanding War on Drugs policy and the Region? prohibition regime is openly acknowledged in most quarters in Latin America. As demand for M & R Glasgow

Gun show, Houston, Texas. Easily accessible small arms and high-tech weapons from the U.S. saturate Mexico and Central America, equipping criminals and gangs with overwhelming firepower.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 23 FOX

drugs in some locales subsides, new consumer production, distribution, and sales of illegal markets for cocaine and heroin continue to drugs. This transition has proven successful in develop and grow around the world, fueling reducing income to criminal organizations spikes in murder, vice, and corruption. Despite and cartels and has the added benefit of shifting demographics, massive profits con- increasing government revenue through taxa- tinue to flow to the cartels and throughout the tion and asset seizure. It is not yet clear criminal networks. Moreover, the annual devo- whether the new law enforcement priorities tion of colossal sums of government revenue will translate to a reduction in illegal drug con- to fighting the War on Drugs has been a terri- sumption. In any event, a new and progressive ble drain on national governments throughout paradigm to deal with narcotrafficking and Latin America, and often results in insufficient illegal drugs should devote resources toward a funding of other important priorities, such as better understanding of illegal drug use as a health issue and not primarily a criminal issue to be prohibited and punished. …a new and progressive paradigm to deal We need to accept the reality of our past with narcotrafficking and illegal drugs failures to eliminate drug use and drug traffick- should devote resources toward a better ing, and accept that prohibition itself creates understanding of illegal drug use as a health the lucrative black market for banned drugs issue and not primarily a criminal issue to be and is the foundation upon which the cartels’ prohibited and punished power, money, and violence find a firm foothold. Regulation and alternative drug policy is the way of the future and after many decades health, education, and infrastructure develop- of bloody Drug War violence and turmoil, the ment. The time has come for fresh and innova- transitional process is irreversible in Latin tive approaches to the growing security chal- America. We all need to accept this fact and lenges presented by drug trafficking networks bravely devote our energies and resources to and the widespread violence and corruption devising smart and sophisticated regulatory that accompany them. We desperately need a strategies. We should resist the temptation to change. cling to the familiar, but failed mindsets and There is a way out of this debilitating situ- procedures of the past. ation. The way is to move from a regime based In the meantime, consumer demand for on prohibition to one of regulation. This pro- illicit drugs will continue to greatly enrich and cess has already begun in different parts of the empower criminal operators and the unprec- world, including the states of Washington and edented money generated will continue to Colorado in the U.S. There have also been drive the most pressing security challenges in some successes and encouraging lessons to be the West. These security challenges are mani- learned from alternative drug policies in fest in various dangerous ways. The profits Portugal and Holland, as well as Uruguay in from criminal enterprises, especially drug traf- South America. There is also a fast-growing ficking have contributed to pervasive corrup- trend to move away from penalizing the con- tion of politicians, police, judges, and other sumer, to focus predominantly on fighting public officials. Meanwhile, many of the cartels

24 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 CHANGE AND ADAPTATION have diversified their investments and activities America and the Western Hemisphere. With and now engage in several other odious enter- diligence to energetically understand and prises including mass kidnapping, human traf- accept day-to-day changes in our fast-paced ficking, sex slavery, and counterfeiting. world, and courage to seek out and try bold We all share security challenges caused by new solutions to new challenges, together we the proliferation of transnational criminal can go forth and continue to prosper in the organizations, illicit networks, drug producers, future. If we muster the intelligence and the and drug traffickers throughout the hemi- will to work together to meet and best the 21st sphere. There is some evidence that the most century’s daunting challenges, the Western powerful cartels and criminal organizations in Hemisphere can become a beacon to those the hemisphere have also diversified their busi- fighting for survival in the 21st century every- ness contacts and greatly expanded their logis- where. PRISM tical network contacts in recent years. This is an ominous development that has, at times, evidently resulted in certain dark alliances. In some cases, these criminal entities have partnered with international terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah or al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Finally, again, the spread of the Zeta organization and others into the Northern Triangle is continuing to brutalize those fragile societies and destabilize those governments. For these many reasons, there can be no doubt that transnational criminal organizations and illicit networks, and the money and power that they wield, represent a growing security challenge in the Western Hemisphere that urgently deserves substantial resources and deliberate action. As technology and trade have advanced and the interaction between nations has intensified and become more complex, the fates of all nations of the world have become more tightly interwoven. Today in the Western Hemisphere, our security, like our economic well-being, is quite interdependent – and as we journey into the future our fortunes will only become more entwined. We are all partners in the quest to meet the challenges of this young century and counter the threats to our security here in Latin

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 25 AUTHOR

Photo courtesy of © Louie Palu/ZUMA Press

In this photo, a Mexican soldier watches over a car in which two men were killed by cartel members. Plagued by intense violence, many Latin American states – and Mexico and the Northern Triangle nations, in particular – have turned to their militaries to help maintain internal state security.

26 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 1 De-Militarizing Civilian Security in Mexico and the Northern Triangle

BY TOM MALINOWSKI AND CHARLES O. BLAHA

“None of us got into the armed forces to do this. We are not comfortable, we didn’t ask for this, we didn’t study for this, but apart from obeying the president’s order, society is asking us to do this.” – Mexican Secretary of National Security Gen. Salvador Cienfuegos, on the military’s role in fighting drug cartels and other criminals.

esponding to some of the highest murder rates in the world, and ever-more audacious abuses by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and gangs, Mexico and the coun- R tries of the Northern Triangle (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) have turned to their militaries to bolster weak and easily corruptible civilian police forces. Why? Because police forces, especially local forces, currently do not have the numbers, resources, skills, or institutional cultures to face these threats. However, militaries are, at best, blunt instruments for police work. They face legal and constitutional quandaries and, in the long run, will not provide a solution leading to stable, law abiding democracies. Further, their protracted involvement creates opportunities for abuse and are latent, long term threats to democracy and human rights. At the U.S. Department of State, we see this turn to the military as a stopgap measure at best. We aim to assist countries in moving away from this practice by helping them promote police reform: professionalizing police; helping police win back the communities they serve; and ensuring accountability for police who engage in human rights abuses and corruption. In response to the underlying causes for growing criminality, our new strategy for engagement with Central America focuses not only on security, but also on good governance and economic prosperity, both necessary to engage populations, provide alternatives to youth, and allow for stability as the countries strengthen their law enforcement and judicial institutions. Mexico has

Tom Malinowski is the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and Charles O. Blaha is the Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the U.S. State Department.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 27 MALINOWSKI AND BLAHA

long worked closely with us on security issues has been in the field for years, moving from through the Merida Initiative, and now the one hot spot to another. Guatemala and El governments of the Northern Triangle have Salvador’s militaries frequently accompany recently formally re-committed themselves their police on operations, and in 2013 when through their Alliance for Prosperity (often its homicide rate spiked, Honduras began to called A4P). rely heavily on its Military Police for Public The region is at a crucial juncture. There is Order (PMOP). Well-armed and generally no short-term fix to this problem, but we respected by the public, the military are usu- believe that with the deep commitment of our ally not local to their deployments, and there- partners and the continued support of the fore, for a time, less vulnerable to corruption American people, we can assist our neighbors, and threats. On the streets, they provide a helping them to develop their legal institu- quick solution, giving the public a visible sign tions, putting their military back in their bar- of order, often leading to short-term falls in racks and moving towards security, better gov- crime. ernance, and greater prosperity throughout the However crucial they have been to tempo- region. rarily increasing citizen security in at-risk communities, ultimately, militaries are ill-suited However crucial they have been to temporarily for police work. First, they are generally not increasing citizen security in at-risk trained in basic police investigative techniques communities, ultimately, militaries are ill-suited and do not know how to preserve crime for police work scenes, interrogate witnesses, or gather evidence. Nor do they have constitutional powers to arrest or detain civilians. The regional pub- It is not hard to understand how things lic is demanding an end to impunity for crim- got to this point. In the face of rising crime led inal acts, and proper police practices are an by powerful gangs and TCOs flush with narco- imperative to constitutionally backed arrests cash, underpaid, under-trained, and out- and convictions that are the backbone of gunned police were easily compromised and highly evolved, open, and fair justice systems. corrupted. Overwhelmed judicial systems suf- Second, once exposed to communities, militar- fered much the same fate. Non-transparent ies quickly fall prey to the same vulnerabilities government practices provided little support, as the police forces. Third, if rotated in and out the public quickly lost faith, and impunity for of communities to protect them from this vul- human rights violations and criminal acts fol- nerability, they do not develop the relation- lowed. Slowly developing economies and the ships necessary for community cooperation lack of opportunity proved fertile ground for and crime prevention that good police work those susceptible to turning toward crime. depends upon for success. And lack of rela- Faced with rising crime rates, shortfalls in tions with the people they serve increases the their civilian police, and limited budgets, these likelihood of human rights violations. governments deployed their militaries into the To their credit, these governments have field to provide the manpower and enforce- pledged to end the use of military forces for ment the police could not. Mexico’s military domestic law enforcement. Much of this credit

28 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 DE-MILITARIZING CIVILIAN SECURITY IN MEXICO AND THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE goes to senior military officials in these mili- encourages abuses by the police to produce taries. As General Cienfuegos states in the those confessions. Of course, this must be opening quote of this piece, they recognize coupled with the forensic capabilities to turn their limited capacities to address these prob- what officers preserve and collect into admis- lems and the dangers of this involvement to sible evidence. their institutions the longer they participate in Winning Back the Community them. Despite these good intentions, phasing out military involvement in civilian security Police cannot do their job without community matters has proved difficult, and none of these support. Members of the community know the governments have been successful so far. bad actors and the persistent problems. They are witnesses to and victims of crimes; without Police Reform is the Key to Change them cases cannot be pursued. They are privy The reason none have been successful is sim- to information about the inside operation of ple: they must have qualified civilian police to local gangs and TCOs operating in their neigh- replace the soldiers. As governments have ded- borhoods. Yet, in much of the region, com- icated scarce resources to military efforts, they munity members shun police and do not have left fewer resources for civilian police. report crimes, because experience shows them Putting qualified police on the streets requires police are incapable of arresting perpetrators resources for reform in order to develop a and reporting a crime will endanger them and cadre of vetted, trained, and effective police may well result in their being targeted by the working for a community that supports their criminals. efforts and bolsters them against the effects of Winning back the community requires the gangs and TCOs. Police reform requires police to get to know the people they serve: professionalization, improving links between where they live, where they work, who their the police and the communities they serve, families are. Community police get out and and holding police accountable. about in the streets, they do not remain in the For starters, police reform means treating station, or staff checkpoints, or sit in squad police like real professionals: increasing pay cars. And the community gets a voice in and and benefits, creating a career track with job power to influence police operations via regu- security and merit-based promotions, vetting lar meetings and viable, consequential com- entry-level officers, and improving equipment plaint procedures. These are the same elements and training. Human rights training, while not many U.S. cities employ under the rubric of a panacea, provides a baseline education to “community policing.” What we are recom- officers, many of whom are poorly-educated to mending for regional governments are many begin with. of the same things we are trying to develop at Equally important is technical training in home. crime-scene preservation, evidence collection, Ensuring Police Accountability and witness interviews. These are the essential building blocks of a larger justice system that With increased professionalization and moves away from a heavy reliance on confes- resources must come accountability. It is cru- sions – a reliance that, all too often, cial to both maintaining a non-corrupt police

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 29 MALINOWSKI AND BLAHA force and to regaining community confidence. violence began to climb in 2008 after one Vetting, including background checks, psycho- criminal organization attacked the police who logical evaluations, drug testing, and conduct- were enforcers for a rival group. The governing polygraph examinations, as Mexico has ment brought in the military, then the federal done, is one tool. However, Mexico’s experi- police. Neither worked. Finally, under national ence with vetting shows that to be successful, leadership, concerned local government and vetting must be well-resourced and staffed by citizen leaders formed a “Security Roundtable” well-trained, independent personnel. (Mesa de Seguridad) that brought together Internal affairs units, like those in U.S. police, prosecutors, business leaders, local gov- police departments, are key safeguards. Unlike ernment officials, and NGOs. Together, they periodic vetting, internal affairs units provide helped reform the local police into a more continuous, information-driven oversight, and professional, better-paid, more rights-respect- a safe harbor for whistleblowers. However, the ing force. Replicating Ciudad Juarez in the rest regional record with police internal affairs of Mexico will not be easy. The city enjoys units is mixed and underlines the need for relative prosperity not found in many other such units to be independent, adequately parts of the country. As well, the city received resourced, and strongly supported at the high- sustained and intensive attention from the est levels of government. Ultimately, the goal U.S. and Mexican governments under the is a police culture that rejects misconduct, val- Merida Initiative and there is some evidence ues internal discipline, and safeguards wit- the decreased violence resulted partially from nesses. a peace between feuding gangs. Civilian courts are the ultimate bastion of In Guatemala City, there are a number of police accountability. Impunity for criminals model police precincts that operate on com- is bad enough, but impunity for police crimi- munity policing principles and the govern- nal misconduct, including human rights viola- ment has a timetable for drawing down the tions and corruption, is one of the biggest fac- military’s involvement in citizen security start- tors undermining community confidence in ing in 2016. However, Guatemala is in the police. This can only be reversed if citizens see middle of a political transition and it remains that police are as subject to the law as anyone to be seen whether the incoming President will else. However, there has been little account- hew to the timetable. ability for security forces in the region. Too The Honduran government is committed often, judges and prosecutors lack training and to reforming the Honduran National Police resources. Cases take years to resolve, decisions and has a police reform plan emphasizing, are opaque, and corruption reaches into the among other things, a career path and courtroom. increased police capacity. However, resources and expertise for police reform are uncertain. Fragile Successes, In Need of Support There is currently no concrete exit strategy for Amid what seems to be a challenging security the military police (PMOP), on which the gov- and political landscape, there are some ernment continues to rely heavily. advances; however, they are few, fragile, and In El Salvador, with the 2015 homicide not easily replicated. In Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, rate on a path to top 90 per 100,000, the

30 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 DE-MILITARIZING CIVILIAN SECURITY IN MEXICO AND THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE military routinely accompanies police to pro- The governments of El Salvador, vide, according to the government, perimeter Guatemala, and Honduras also announced security, and only with a civilian prosecutor their own plan for their region, the “Alliance present. In January, the government published for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle”. While an ambitious, exhaustive 124-point “Safe El most of A4P’s goals address what its authors Salvador Plan” (Plan El Salvador Seguro) that call the region’s “low and not-very-inclusive emphasizes community policing and police economic growth,” they also recognize that respect for human rights. But here again, they must strengthen the institutions respon- resources are uncertain. sible for public safety and modernize their These modest examples suggest what judicial systems. The United States, working might be done with the right combination of through the Strategy, is committed to working political will and adequate resources. But all with our partners, helping them help them- require support. selves in these areas.

Combining Security with Governance The new approach recognized that better and Prosperity security was inextricably linked to good Starting in 2013, the State Department began governance and economic prosperity, and to lead an interagency effort to re-think the aimed to integrate all three lines of effort U.S. approach to Central America, especially Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. The new approach recognized that better security Both the Central American Strategy and was inextricably linked to good governance the Merida Initiative in Mexico envision and and economic prosperity, and aimed to inte- incorporate into policy the new mechanisms grate all three lines of effort. It gained momen- mentioned above: de-militarized community tum in summer 2014 when a surge of unac- policing, police professionalization and companied minors appeared at the accountability, and justice system reform. In U.S.-Mexico border, almost all of them fleeing addition, both envision a significant role for violence and lack of economic opportunity at civil society in interacting with and overseeing home. This was a wake-up call, convincing police. many policymakers, members of Congress, The State Department’s Bureau of NGOs, and the public of the connection International Narcotics and Law Enforcement between security at home and economic con- (INL) plays a major role in assisting regional ditions in the region. In 2015, President governments’ police reform efforts. In all these Obama issued the U.S. Strategy for countries, INL is already operating programs Engagement in Central America, which lays that train individual officers in human rights, out the U.S. plan for partnering with host proper use of force, crime scene preservation, country governments and civil societies to tie and evidence collection, to name just a few together efforts for strengthening security, areas. These are the techniques that will make good governance, and prosperity throughout officers more rights-respecting, reduce impu- the region. nity for those who are not, and reduce incentives for police to abuse their powers.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 31 MALINOWSKI AND BLAHA

INL is also working to professionalize INL is also working to improve regional local law enforcement by assisting law enforce- court systems. This is a major effort under the ment entities, including enforceable career Merida Initiative in Mexico, where the federal standards, conducting pre-employment and government and all 31 states and the Federal periodic vetting and background investiga- District are working to transition from the old, tions, providing basic training and continuing paper-based, inquisitorial system to an oral/ education for law enforcement officials, offer- accusatorial system that promises to increase ing leadership and supervision training and transparency through open trials. INL is edu- development, ensuring accountability and cating tens of thousands of Mexican police oversight through internal affairs departments, about the chain of custody required for admis- and offering specialized training such as teach- sible evidence and how to testify in a live trial. ing experts how to process forensic evidence. The Government of Mexico hopes that an oral/ These initiatives are designed to help trans- accusatorial system will reduce pre-trial deten- form police into professionals, reduce police tion, the source of most abuse allegations, as corruption, and find those ill-suited for the job well as make case resolution faster and more and vulnerable to corruption. transparent. An improved court system that the Mexican Government

At the Baja California State Justice Center in Mexicali, B.C., Mexico, Public Defenders are working alongside judges to implement the various innovative reforms of the New Criminal Justice System, such as international best practices and informative communication with the accused which were supported by training and technical assistance from the USAID under the program “Mexico Rule of Law III: Justice and Security Program (JASP).” In this photo, an accused defendant in an auto theft case is counseled by his court-appointed defense attorney during a preliminary hearing in the court of Judge Gustavo Medina.

32 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 DE-MILITARIZING CIVILIAN SECURITY IN MEXICO AND THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE public trusts will improve police performance around the new Central American Strategy and by making victims more likely to come for- A4P have led the governments of El Salvador, ward, nudging police to employ better prac- Guatemala, and Honduras to produce their tices in the field, and holding police account- own blueprints for police reform, all of which able when they are accused of human rights need resources beyond what those govern- violations. ments can provide. The Department’s Bureau of Democracy, We know police reform will be the work Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), is also of at least a generation. We know there will be already playing a key role in working with setbacks – some police will continue to com- regional NGOs and other civil society actors, mit human rights abuses and corruption will providing training and other types of capacity continue to be a problem. We know that get- building. That includes programs that teach ting the military out of internal security will civil society how to interact constructively and not solve all the region’s problems. And we effectively with police, and programs to edu- know that police reform alone will not trans- cate the public about the justice system. DRL form these countries. The interconnectedness also manages a central policy that fosters of reform throughout the Merida Initiative in police accountability: vetting police officers Mexico and the Central America Strategy is and units who receive U.S. assistance. Under their essential strategic insight, and police the so-called Leahy Law, U.S. training and reform cannot be complete in the absence of assistance may not go to security forces whose simultaneous progress in other areas, notably members have committed gross human rights the court systems, good governance, and eco- violations until the perpetrators have been nomic opportunity. We know there will still be brought to justice. This is designed to support a need for military-type capabilities for some those in regional governments and civil society operations, including takedowns of heavily- who demand accountability for gross human armed suspects in fortified locations. And we rights violations. Embassies and DRL expend know that the U.S. cannot impose solutions thousands of hours a year checking to make – much depends on the political will of sure that U.S. assistance flows only to human regional governments and on the determina- rights-respecting, accountable units and indi- tion of regional civil society. But, if police viduals. reform and de-militarization succeed, the region will be safer, more stable, and more The U.S. as a Partner: Now is the Time prosperous. This is not the time to turn away The region is at a crucial juncture. Recent from the region, but to press forward, embrac- events in Mexico, such as the case of 43 stu- ing the good will and the efforts of our close dents allegedly kidnapped and presumably partners in both government and civil society. murdered at the hands of corrupt local police, We have the plans and we have our partners’ have produced Mexican government commit- commitment. The only other question to ask ments to action and energized civil society is, “If not now, when?” PRISM around, among other issues, police reform. The 2014 surge in unaccompanied children, the resultant publicity, and the consensus

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 33 AUTHOR

Sandra Sebastián

Former military dictator José Efrain Ríos Montt stands before a packed room at Guatemala’s High Risk Court. He was tried for genocide and crimes against humanity against the indigenous Mayan Ixil population during Guatemala’s Civil War.

34 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 1 A Critical Juncture for Security and Human Rights

BY LEANA D. BRESNAHAN

“Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere,” – President Franklin D. Roosevelt

n mid-April 2013, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) sponsored a human rights seminar for Guatemalan military personnel. The seminar was one in a series of workshops, Isubject-matter expert exchanges, dialogues, and events that SOUTHCOM had sponsored in Guatemala since 2004, all under the auspices of a SOUTHCOM-sponsored regional process known as the Human Rights Initiative (HRI).1 HRI events focused on strengthening the Guatemalan military’s human rights performance in the areas of doctrine, education and training, cooperation with civilian authorities, and internal control mechanisms. Unlike previous HRI events, participation in the April seminar by local human rights activists, an indispensable component of all SOUTHCOM’s human rights promotion efforts, was minimal, but for a surprising reason. That week many of the human rights activists were instead at the Palace of Justice, the seat of the country’s highest court, to witness an historic event: the trial of a former dictator who had both risen to and fallen from power by coup d’état. Guatemalan General Efraín Ríos Montt had come to symbolize one of the darkest eras in the country’s history. Now a frail-looking octogenar- ian, Ríos Montt had spent years benefitting from prosecutorial immunity due to his status as a member of Congress. But his place at the defendant’s table that April had come to signify one of the greatest human rights victories for Guatemala – and the hemisphere – in recent history. The trial represented the first time that a former Head of State was tried for the crime of genocide by his own country’s judicial system. It exemplified how rule of law was slowly taking hold in a country where impunity had reigned for decades. It also sent a powerful message to the international community that nobody is above the law in the commission of grave violations of human rights. The trial of Rios Montt and the active participation of the Guatemalan military in HRI are

Leana D Bresnahan is the Chief, Human Rights office at the U.S. Southern Command.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 35 BRESNAHAN

two among other positive changes that have attempts to balance human rights concerns taken place in the past decades in a country with national security interests and foreign with a troubled history.2 policy objectives in the Western Hemisphere. Guatemala does not stand alone as it Much as Guatemala and other countries in the grapples with a legacy of human rights viola- region are demonstrating support to the rule tions against its citizens. Much of Latin of law and respect for human rights, our own America’s modern history involves decades of concept of human rights and the role it should internal conflict, military dictatorships, and play in shaping our foreign policy has guerrilla warfare. Left in its wake were count- evolved—and progressed greatly—in the last less victims of kidnappings, forced disappear- half-century. ances, acts of torture, and massacres, the vast This policy shift was years in the making. majority of whom have not seen justice deliv- With the post-World War II emergence of the ered. As the internal conflicts and political vio- international human rights movement, which lence came to an end in the final years of the the U.S. played a leading role in creating, and 20th century, a process of democratization has the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Congress taken hold. This transition to democracy passed laws that led to significant changes in how we engage with, and provide assistance …our own concept of human rights and the role to, our partners around the world. These it should play in shaping our foreign policy has changes elevated the observance of and respect evolved—and progressed greatly—in the last for human rights to a pre-condition for mili- half-century tary and security assistance. One of the most far-reaching changes is the Leahy Law, first passed in 1997, which prohibits assistance to brought with it the hope that respect for foreign military and security force units if there human rights would be institutionalized and is credible information that a member of the protected in a comprehensive fashion. While unit has committed a gross violation of human the transition has brought with it greater polit- rights with impunity. The law, which is written ical and economic stability for many countries, to apply globally to recipients of U.S. military it did not automatically elevate respect for and security assistance, is a culmination of human rights to a national priority. The con- efforts by successive U.S. Congresses since the struction of a democratic state based on the 1970s to keep U.S. security and military assis- rule of law and respect for human rights tance from supporting repressive regimes. The remains a work in progress in many countries. law directly impacts how the United States Democracy may be a necessary condition for does business in the international security the promotion of human rights, but it is not arena. It helps ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars always enough to ensure their protection.3 are not used to provide assistance to human rights violators and abusive regimes; that the United States Human Rights Policy: Promoting Human Rights United States not become complicit in those abuses; but also to give our diplomats a tool For the United States, the advent of trials that can be leveraged to encourage respect for against former dictators highlights our own

36 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 A CRITICAL JUNCTURE FOR SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS human rights in countries receiving U.S. secu- prosecuted. Furthermore, some security experts rity assistance. argue that cutting off assistance to a unit for Despite its reach and scope, the Leahy Law human rights abuses does not necessarily has not proven to be a panacea for all human bring about the desired change in human rights woes. In 2013, the Government rights performance. Others note that denying Accountability Office recommended the craft- U.S. assistance merely opens up the door for ing of additional guidance to better define how less scrupulous nations, who themselves have the United States might encourage account- abysmal human rights records, to fill the void ability and assist foreign governments in bring- thereby handing them the opportunity to pro- ing those responsible for the human rights mote their own lack of regard for human rights violations to justice. Just in 2015, the protections. Department of Defense and Department of The Leahy Law is complemented by State first issued policy guidance outlining the Congressional conditions on security assis- specific steps a government might take in order tance for specific countries with problematic for an ineligible unit to regain access to U.S. human rights records. These conditions have assistance, once credibly alleged human rights played an important role in advancing U.S. violations have been investigated and human rights goals in the region. Still,

Official signing of the HRI Memorandum of Cooperation in Asunción between the Paraguayan Military Forces and the Center for Human Rights Training (CECADH) on March 17, 2015. Pictured in the photo from left to right: Dr. Amalia Quintana, Human Rights Director, Paraguayan Ministry of Defense; Mr. Daniel Baldizon, Director of CECADH; General Luis Gonzaga Garcete Espínola, Commander of the Paraguayan Military Forces; and the Honorable Leslie Bassett, US Ambassador to Paraguay.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 37 BRESNAHAN

conditions that are overly onerous or that have rule of law, through such programs as the no connection to the human rights perfor- Human Rights Initiative, will play an impor- mance of a military can generate resentment tant role in our being considered as such, par- among local leaders and be counterproductive ticularly as long as democratic governance to our human rights agenda. continues to be the norm in the region. There is recognition within the U.S. gov- At SOUTHCOM we are conscious as well ernment and Congress that the Leahy Law that advocating strongly for human rights alone cannot curb or prevent all human rights places a huge responsibility on our shoulders, abuses. Our foreign policy and bilateral to not only talk the talk, but also to walk the engagement also play major parts – the “car- walk. To that end, SOUTHCOM maintains an rots” to the Leahy “stick.” Over the past two office dedicated entirely to human rights pro- decades, engagement by the U.S. military has motion, requires annual human rights aware- aimed to support the development of profes- ness education of all of its personnel, and inte- sional military and security forces and to grates human rights into its activities, encourage greater regional cooperation. Today, including its operational planning teams, strat- the U.S. government, including the egy and planning documents, key leader Department of Defense, openly champions engagements, and exercise program. We believe that this sustained engagement, coupled with the critical commitment Democratic transition has brought stability, of regional political and military leaders, basic freedoms, and greater protection of builds increasingly capable and accountable human rights to the citizens of most countries regional militaries, which are consistently of the region. As a United Nations report ranked among their countries’ most trusted recently noted, despite improvements, Latin institutions. They serve honorably, including America remains the most unequal and in United Nations peacekeeping and stabiliza- insecure region in the world. tion missions, where they are generally regarded as high quality, well-trained troops.5 There remains much work to be done, how- respect for human rights as we work with Latin ever, especially in the face of new challenges to American partners to support their efforts to human rights in the region. further professionalize their military and Emerging Challenges to Human Rights in police forces. We likewise champion military Latin America subordination to civilian authority and encourage limiting military missions to exter- Democratic transition has brought stability, nal threats as part of our foreign policy aims basic freedoms, and greater protection of in this hemisphere. human rights to the citizens of most countries SOUTHCOM’s goal is to be the military of the region. As a United Nations report partner of choice for defense and security recently noted, despite improvements, Latin forces within the hemisphere. We believe that America remains the most unequal and inse- in the long run our national values and adher- cure region in the world.6 ence to and promotion of human rights and

38 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 A CRITICAL JUNCTURE FOR SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Throughout Latin America, the major is fair to say that the right of the individual to threats to human rights no longer emanate security9 – a fundamental and universal from military dictatorships nor are they pro- human right – is under full-fledged attack in duced as the unfortunate by-product of brutal these specific countries. In many cases, justice internal conflicts. Rather, the threats to human systems and police forces are incapable of rein- rights stem from new sources, particularly in ing in the violence. Central American police certain countries and sub-regions. forces, particularly in the Northern Triangle, On the one hand, there is a troubling are outmanned, outgunned, and out-financed renewed trend toward authoritarianism: not by petty criminals, but by sophisticated elected civilian governments that once in business-savvy entities. In desperation, to pro- power, and under the guise of democracy, shun tect their children from the violence, tens of democratic standards, abuse basic human thousands of parents in the Northern Triangle rights, primarily freedom of the press, expres- entrust their children to strangers to undertake sion, and due process, criminalize peaceful a perilous journey in the hope of their reach- protest in order to suppress the political oppo- ing a new life of safety in the United States. In sition, and consistently aggressively verbalize desperation as well, democratic governments rejection of the admonitions of international have deployed their militaries to support over- and regional human rights bodies. whelmed and largely corrupt police forces, in On the other hand, sky-rocketing violence an effort to provide protection to their citizens. and the spread of powerful criminal organiza- The effectiveness of these efforts has yet to be tions pose severe challenges to regional stabil- determined, but in the meantime, the decision ity and are major sources of human rights to employ militaries in domestic security roles abuse. Transnational criminal organizations has many critics. threaten citizen security, undermine basic The Militarism Issue and its Criticisms human rights, cripple rule of law through corruption, erode good governance, and hinder The concern about security in Latin America is economic development.7 so widespread that 23 of 31 countries in the Although no country is totally immune, SOUTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR) Central America – specifically the “Northern have ordered their armed forces to support law Triangle” of Honduras, El Salvador, and enforcement agencies, including in the fight Guatemala – is at the epicenter of the citizen against transnational organized crime.10 There security crisis. Murder rates in these countries is real cause for concern when the military of are among the highest in the world.8 The any country is deployed domestically to carry Northern Triangle offers a unique case study out law enforcement activities. In the United in the intersection of citizen safety, the use of States, we have a long tradition and strict laws regional militaries in domestic security mis- to prevent the employment of the military to sions, and the role the U.S. can play in protect- provide law enforcement except under certain ing the region’s hard-won progress. well defined conditions. However, there are The sub-region is awash in weapons and times of emergency even in the U.S. when street gangs and has been a primary corridor defense support to civilian authorities is neces- for U.S.-bound cocaine since around 2006. It sary, legitimate, and appropriate, always on a

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 39 BRESNAHAN

temporary basis. We have only to think of the time to strengthen civilian law enforcement presence of the military in U.S. streets and air- forces and fortify judicial reforms.12 ports immediately after September 11, 2001, to The use of the military in domestic law remember the security and the sense of security enforcement, particularly in a region that has their presence provided. Nor is this phenom- only recently succeeded in transitioning away enon unique to the Americas. As an example, from military dictatorships and internal con- the French government deployed 10,000 flicts, is not a viable, permanent solution. It troops in the streets of France’s large cities after evokes strong concerns and passionate the January 2015 terrorist attacks on satire responses among many observers and regional magazine Charlie Hebdo, and plans to keep experts alike. The only long-term solution to 7,000 troops on the streets indefinitely accord- criminal violence that threatens much of the ing to news reports.11 region is through the creation of effective, Given the sheer magnitude of security responsive police forces, accompanied by challenges in Central America, it is at least reforms to promote economic development understandable that governments turn to their and good governance. militaries to help curb the rising tide of vio- U.S. government policy in the region has lence. Even if statistics show that this hardline focused for years has on supporting govern- approach has historically not had the desired mental efforts to build effective, well-trained, effect, it offers Central American governments adequately armed, ethical police forces. It is Sgt. Kim Browne, 366 th MPAD – U.S. Army

A U.S. Army soldier discusses crowd control and organization with two Salvadoran soldiers during the Beyond the Horizon El Salvador humanitarian exercise in May 2015. U.S. Southern Command attempts to incorporate advocacy for respect for human rights across its partner capacity building programs.

40 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 A CRITICAL JUNCTURE FOR SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

hoped that the mix of security, governance, authorities will bring with it a greater risk of and economic reforms outlined in the Alliance human rights violations. for Prosperity program announced by the pres- The role of military leaders and com- idents of Guatemala, El Salvador, and manders in constantly re-enforcing the mes- Honduras in March will provide the right blue- sage that human rights is at the center of their print for effectively addressing these countries’ mission cannot be overestimated. Soldiers ills. Their political will as well as their willing- need to hear that message clearly and unequiv- ness to work together are critical components ocally stated over and over again to ensure the to the success of their plan, which should not message sticks. be underestimated. Numerous human rights groups and Still, citizens’ legitimate demands for members of Congress fear that increased U.S. improved security now mean that governments assistance to Central American armed forces are likely to continue to use their militaries to will encourage governments to “militarize” help address domestic security threats as they domestic security, undermining the still-devel- take the time required to build more transpar- oping democracies, and “walking back” prog- ent, respectful police forces and to implement ress made in the period of democratic transi- other institutional reforms.13 tion.16 As Congress debates the The support to law enforcement comes Administration’s one billion dollar assistance with new responsibilities for the military request for Central America, it will consider forces, as they must adapt to a new operating how to help the countries confront these vio- environment while ensuring that human rights lent security threats within a strengthened remain the center of gravity in their mission. human rights framework. Failure to do this will put at risk continued From the perspective of SOUTHCOM, popular support and trust, and therefore the there is no appetite within the Command for legitimacy, of military institutions.14 its partner nation militaries to remain in the The sharp differences between the military streets. SOUTHCOM will support the U.S. and police in terms of training, functions, inter-agency community in any way requested power, and mindset will make this a challeng- to improve security in the region and it will ing task. The military is trained to confront continue to do everything in its power, given and defeat an enemy with force, but the foun- the resources available, to build strong partner- dation of police work lies elsewhere – in the ships and strong military human rights pro- prevention of crime, arrest and detention of grams in those countries that choose to partner suspects for prosecution, and maintaining with us. public order and safety. Soldiers carrying out The Military and Human Rights: A public security functions must therefore fun- Contradiction in Terms? damentally “shift” their way of thinking in carrying out these new missions,15 something Given today’s security realities, continued dis- that, without proper training, clear rules of cussion and introspection are needed to ensure engagement, well-defined military and civilian U.S. policy – and the advocacy efforts that help functions, and accountability to civilian legal shape that policy – is not only consistent, but also supportive of the broadening and

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 41 BRESNAHAN deepening of respect for human rights with its made human rights a centerpiece of the military partners in the region. At Command. General Kelly regularly meets with SOUTHCOM, a unique effort began in 1997 human rights groups in Washington, D.C. and with the establishment of the first-ever in the countries of the region when he travels, Department of Defense initiative specifically and includes a discussion of human rights in aimed at strengthening the human rights per- meetings with his regional counterparts. He formance of militaries in a Command’s AOR. has become known for his oft-repeated phrase Neither a carrot nor a stick approach to influ- within DOD circles and events with partner encing change, the Human Rights Initiative nation military forces alike: “Everything we do (HRI) was envisioned by SOUTHCOM’s then- at SOUTHCOM begins and ends with human commander General Wesley Clark USA, as an rights.” appeal to common values shared by all demo- HRI began as a regional process that cratic governments and their institutions, and brought together military and security force as an offer to support their efforts to live up to officers from 34 nations of the hemisphere to those common values. develop the Consensus Document, a docu- HRI has been supported and developed by ment that outlines a model human rights pro- every subsequent SOUTHCOM commander to gram for military forces serving democracies. the present day. In fact, current SOUTHCOM Academics, NGOs, and representatives of commander, General John Kelly, USMC, has regional and international organizations Mass Communication Specialist 3 rd Class Andrew Schneider - U.S. Navy

U.S. Marines lead a discussion with Guatemalan service members about human rights in Puerto Barrios, Guatemala, during the 2014 Southern Partnership Station (SPS), an annual deployment of U.S. ships to the U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility in the Caribbean and Latin America.

42 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 A CRITICAL JUNCTURE FOR SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS provided their expertise and advised through- gift to hand to a criminal or illegal actor than out the process. Writing the Consensus an act that erodes the public’s faith in govern- Document required six hemispheric confer- ment institutions, in particular the institution ences over six years (1997-2002). with the monopoly on the lawful use of force. Once completed, participants requested Exploiting violations, such as extra-judicial that SOUTHCOM support their implementa- killings and sexual assaults by state actors, is a tion efforts, so that the Consensus Document tactic and technique employed by the adver- “didn’t become just another report on the sary that helps to fill its ranks. It also helps to shelf” as one participant expressed. So, begin- justify its own acts of violence against innocent ning in 2004, SOUTHCOM worked bilaterally civilians. through HRI conferences to support the efforts of military forces whose governments had cho- From SOUTHCOM’s perspective, there is no sen to implement the Consensus Document. greater gift to hand to a criminal or illegal Each HRI conference brings together represen- actor than an act that erodes the public’s tatives of military, security forces, civilian gov- faith in government institutions, in particular ernment, and civil society, including NGOs, in the institution with the monopoly on the a particular country to develop action plans for lawful use of force that country’s military forces focused on four areas: doctrine, education and training, effective internal control systems, and cooperation No human institution is perfect, despite with civilian authorities. Periodic follow-up serious efforts to prevent misconduct or crim- events are sponsored during which the same inal actions. When human rights violations by participants evaluate accomplishment of the state actors do occur, how the institution action plans and develop new ones. responds – whether with transparency and Currently, eleven Partner Nations have accountability, or by “circling the wagons” and made the formal commitment to implement defending the conduct of the individual rather HRI. By joining the initiative, a partner nation than the honor of institution – will ultimately military receives direct support from define its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. SOUTHCOM through a series of implementa- And, as witnessed throughout the region tion conferences, follow-up seminars, subject today, history will ensure that misconduct or matter expert exchanges in human rights, train extra-legal actions taken in the name of defeat- the trainer programs, and other HRI imple- ing an enemy are not forgotten. mentation events. Since 2004, SOUTHCOM Through HRI, SOUTHCOM advocates for has conducted close to 200 HRI events, involv- institutions to acknowledge and address ing thousands of participants, in 19 different abuses of human rights, whether committed countries. long in the past or more recently. Some HRI HRI engagements often attempt to answer partners struggle to shed the darkness left by the questions of how and why protecting the the reprehensible acts committed decades inherent dignity of the individual is central to prior. These partners are often still judged in protecting national security. From the international community and by advocacy SOUTHCOM’s perspective, there is no greater groups for the sins of their predecessors,

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 43 BRESNAHAN

without recognition of the progress that has grave security concerns that confront these been made to improve their human rights per- countries. While much work remains, the dia- formance. Other partners, in particular those logues have demonstrated that a strong will who have been ordered to support police in exists on both sides to improve civil-military public security missions, fear that a mistake cooperation efforts on human rights, and that during a mission will subject them to a judicial they share common values and objectives to system that has proven itself too weak – or too improve citizen security efforts. corrupt – to provide true justice. As such, some What have been some of the concrete HRI members have shared the perception that human rights advances achieved by military human rights and rule of law protect only the and security forces in the region? First of all, “bad guys,” and that those who defend the including all of the Western Hemisphere, and cause of human rights are their enablers. This as noted previously, 34 nations contributed to line of thinking not only underscores the the Consensus Document. While eleven urgent need to accelerate police and judicial nations have formally committed to imple- reform efforts in the region, but also the ment HRI, many more participate in hemi- importance of re-doubling efforts to bridge the spheric and regional HRI conferences. In those divide between human rights groups and mil- events, there is widespread acceptance of mili- itaries. tary responsibilities to respect human rights. Other nations have implemented human While much work remains, the dialogues have rights training, doctrine, and institutional demonstrated that a strong will exists on both structures independent of HRI. Across the sides to improve civil-military cooperation hemisphere, ministries of defense and military efforts on human rights services have established human rights offices. Human rights doctrine has been developed and soldiers and officers receive human rights training. Three countries have established military human rights schools, and all of them To build confidence and trust between the (Colombia, Peru, and the Dominican civil and military sectors of society, HRI seeks Republic) offer themselves as regional training to incorporate local civil society groups and centers, welcoming students from their neigh- human rights activists in all HRI engagements. boring countries, often tuition free. Under the Their participation unlocks opportunities for United States Colombia Action Plan (USCAP), collaboration, and helps to foster a better the Colombian military offers human rights working relationship on issues related to citi- training to Central American militaries. As the zen security and human rights. Most recently, lead on human rights for the Conference of SOUTHCOM supported a series of dialogues Central American Armed Forces (CFAC), the in a number of countries between human Dominican Republic sends mobile human rights groups and partner nation military lead- rights training teams annually to its Central ers aimed at re-initiating direct and construc- American counterparts. The Western tive dialogue, reconciling long-standing divi- Hemisphere Institute of Security Cooperation sive issues due to past abuses, and addressing (WHINSEC) and the Perry Center for

44 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 A CRITICAL JUNCTURE FOR SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Hemispheric Defense Studies both offer importantly, fewer and fewer at the hands of human rights courses which fill up immedi- soldiers and the police. ately and place would-be students on long Reinforcing the regions’ progress on waiting lists. Neither can meet the demand for human rights over the last two decades – and human rights training, due to resource con- preventing the evolving security threats in the straints. In the same way, SOUTHCOM cannot region from undermining these advances – come close to meeting all the demand signals will require a continued commitment from from partner nation militaries for support on governments in the region as well as from the human rights, again due to resource con- United States. Programs like HRI can help to straints. support continued progress by militaries on human rights, but it must adapt to the chang- Conclusion ing realities and threats facing the hemisphere We may be at a critical juncture for security today and it must be expanded. Paradoxically, and human rights in the hemisphere. General human rights may be one of the issues that can Rios Montt has been tried. Military officers and unite the hemisphere, or at least its militaries, NGOs sit down to dialogue respectfully about once again under one banner. Police and secu- the past, present, and future. In the recent rity forces need added support and assistance cases when partner nation soldiers have been on human rights, including a parallel Human accused of illegal acts, military forces have gen- Rights Initiative. Likewise, both policy and erally turned the accused soldiers over to civil- advocacy aimed at supporting the implemen- ian authorities for investigation and prosecu- tation of human rights ideals must not only tion. High-ranking officers and soldiers acknowledge the security realities the region convicted of human rights violations from faces today, but also be careful to ensure the earlier years are serving prison sentences. tools at governments’ disposal are intelligently SOUTHCOM, WHINSEC, and the Perry Center and consistently applied. As General Kelly struggle and fail to keep up with the demand stresses, the true measure of the region’s secu- for military human rights education and train- rity successes must begin and end with human ing. rights. PRISM And yet there are critical needs that are going unmet. There are tremendous backlogs in human rights cases languishing in ineffi- cient judicial systems, in which alleged perpetrators can wait a decade or more for a final sentence. Many cases still end in impunity. Violence is rampant; stability, progress, and democracy itself may be threatened. And of this there is no doubt: thousands of innocent people are suffering horrific abuse, almost always at the hands of gang members, drug traffickers, and violent criminals, and,

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 45 BRESNAHAN

Notes 11 Ewen MacAskill. “British army reluctant to post troops on UK streets after terror attacks,” The Guardian, July 27, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/ 1 Begun in 1997, the Human Rights Initiative is uk-news/2015/jul/26/british-army-reluctant-post-troops-uk- a means by which SOUTHCOM conducts confer- terror-attack. ences, exchanges and dialogue events to support the 12 See for example Rodgers, Muggah, and strengthening of military human rights programs in Stevenson, “Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs, the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). and Interventions.” Small Arms Survey Occasional 2 Rios Montt was convicted of genocide and Paper 23, May 2009; and J. Aguilar. “Los efectos crimes against humanity in 2013, and was sentenced contraproducentes de los Planes Mano Dura,” to 80 years in prison. Just days after the ruling, the Quorum, 16 (Winter 2006): 84-94. conviction was annulled by the Constitutional Court 13 Police reform, a long-standing U.S. govern- on procedural grounds. In January 2015, the trial ment priority in Latin America, is an extremely re-opened, only again to be suspended on procedural complicated and long-term process, in part due to grounds. In August 2015, a Guatemalan court ruled high levels of corruption present in many police that Rios Montt must stand trial, but that if found forces throughout the region. Political will and guilty, he will not receive a prison sentence due to his functioning judicial systems are an essential part for failing health. any meaningful reform to succeed. Also see Johnson, 3 Leonardo Vivas. “Latin America: A Backlash in Stephen, et al, “Police Reform in Latin America: Human Rights?” Harvard International Review, Fall Implications for U.S. Policy,” Center for Strategic and 2014/Winter 2015. International Studies (February 2012) http://csis.org/ 4 Latin American Public Opinion Project files/publication/120228_Johnson_PoliceReform_web.pdf. (LAPOP): 2014 AmericasBarometer, Vanderbilt 14 Gomez, Juan Carlos, “Twenty-First Century University. Challenges: The Use of Military Forces to Combat 5 International Peace Institute. “Beyond Haiti: Criminal Threats,” International Law Studies, U.S. Enhancing Latin American Military and Police Naval War College 88 (2012): 279-291. Support to UN Peacekeeping,” April 2014. 15 International Committee of the Red Cross. 6 United Nations Development Programme “To Serve and to Protect: Human Rights and (UNDP). Human Development Report for Latin America Humanitarian Law for Police and Security Forces,” 2013-2014. March 2014. https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/ 7 Director of National Intelligence, James R. publications/icrc-002-0698.pdf. Clapper. Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat 16 David Gange. “The Siren Call of Militarization Assessment of the US Intelligence Community. Senate in Latin America,” InSight Crime, August 19, 2015. Select Committee on Intelligence, March 12, 2013. 8 With a homicide rate of 66.4 per 100,000 in 2014, Honduras – once the most violent country on the planet – has now been surpassed by El Salvador. If current trends continue, El Salvador’s homicide rate may reach 90 per 100,000 people by the end of 2015. August was the most violent month in its history, with 911 murders, and the murder total for the first 8 months of the year (4,246) is greater than the total for all of 2014 (3,942). Sources: official government figures from Honduras and El Salvador. 9 The right to security of the individual is an internationally recognized human right, included, for instance in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights, among others. 10 Seven of the remaining eight countries do not have armed forces.

46 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 Now available from NDU Press, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Books/LessonsEncountered.aspx AUTHOR

Valter Campanato/Agência Brasil

Open sewer in Cidade Estrutural, a popular neighborhood in Brazil’s capital city

48 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 1 Insecurity and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

BY INÉS BUSTILLO AND HELVIA VELLOSO

n the last decades, the concept of security has come to acquire new dimensions. A new vision of security relating to the nation-state now incorporates dimensions of security centered on Iindividuals, a concept that has come to be known as human security. Chronic threats like hunger, disease, and repression, or protection from sudden and painful changes in daily life, be it in the workplace or in the community, today form part of this new vision of security. Since the term was introduced in the 1994 Human Development Report, focusing on freedom from fear and freedom from want, its reach has expanded. A 2012 United Nations Resolution described human security as “the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair.”1 While important efforts have been undertaken by the international community to identify and define the main components of human security, given its multidimensional nature, no single accepted operational definition exits. Security encompasses economic, social, political, and safety components allowing for a life free from fear and risk.2 Over the last decade Latin America and the Caribbean have made considerable progress in the economic and social development dimensions of human security, with important gains in poverty and inequality reduction. However, vulnerability to crime and violence increased, to such an extent that opinion polls identify them among the region’s top problems. Crime and violence are increasingly recognized as serious obstacles to social and human capital formation and sustainable economic development.3 Insecurity has become a shared challenge that hampers development in Latin America and the Caribbean.4 This article looks at the economic dimensions of security – with a focus on the economic impact of crime and violence – and how it contributes to and feeds from inequality in the region. It argues that building more equitable and inclusive societies is key to facing the threat that violence and crime increasingly pose to wellbeing. After an overview of the economics of crime and Inés Bustillo is the Director of the Washington Office of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Helvia Velloso is an Economic Affairs Officer at the Washington Office of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 49 BUSTILLO AND VELLOSO

violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, development. Eleanor Sohnen has noted a the article assesses the region’s recent eco- global correlation between relatively high rates nomic and social performance and links to of homicidal violence and failure to achieve crime and violence, as well as the costs of ris- progress on certain Millennium Development ing insecurity. It suggests that progress in Goals, namely eradicating extreme poverty, addressing crime demands more sustainable youth unemployment, and hunger, improving growth with greater equality and social inclu- primary school enrollment ratios, and reduc- sion. It demands, as well, investing in youth, ing infant mortality and adolescent birth rates. so as to take advantage of the opportunity During the 1990-2008 period, countries with offered by the demographic dividend.5 lower average homicide rates had an 11 percent Effective government policies, mobilization of higher chance of improving their standing in resources, strengthening of institutions, and the United Nations’ Human Development collaboration and input from civil society and Index – a composite measure of social and the private sector will be necessary. economic development – than those with higher homicide rates.8 By diverting public and private resources The literature on the economics of crime away from promoting economic activity and and violence in Latin America and the wellbeing, crime and insecurity undermine Caribbean is also extensive. The more recent economic and social prosperity. Physical and work, which for the most part has a regional human capital accumulation can be adversely rather than a country focus, suggests that the affected, jeopardizing long-term development causes and drivers of violence are multiple and as a result. vary among and within countries. Drivers identified in the literature include drug trafficking, availability of firearms, gangs, and weak rule of law, among others. An Economic Perspective on Security Socioeconomic drivers, the focus of this article, From an economic perspective, crime and inse- include factors such as income inequality, lack curity can be a development challenge. By of economic opportunities and social mobility, diverting public and private resources away and chaotic urbanization. Studies conclude from promoting economic activity and wellbe- that the causes are both complex and multifac- ing, crime and insecurity undermine economic eted and no single driver can explain the and social prosperity. Physical and human increase in crime and violence in the region. capital accumulation can be adversely affected, The 2013-2014 UNDP Regional Human jeopardizing long-term development as a Development Report (RHD) highlights the result.6 There is a vast economics literature on multidimensional nature of the growth of crime and violence that goes back many crime and violence.9 Its principal dimensions decades, following on Gary Becker’s 1968 sem- include: an economic-structural dimension, inal work.7 This literature suggests a strong involving low quality jobs and insufficient correlation between insecurity and income social mobility; a social dimension, reflecting inequality, unemployment, institutional weak- structural changes in families (such as the sig- ness, and lack of progress in social nificant increase in single parent households),

50 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 INSECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN dropout rates and accelerated urban growth not only varies from country to country and that erodes the social fabric; crime-drivers, from city to city, but also between neighbor- such as weapons, alcohol and drugs; and, the hoods and streets, suggesting that the local lack of capacity of the state – police forces, causes and drivers of crime and violence judges, prosecutors, and prisons – to ade- should serve as the basis for the formulation quately address security challenges. According of public policies. to the report, although organized crime, espe- CAF Development Bank of Latin America cially drug trafficking, is often associated with highlights as well both the multifaceted nature the rise in insecurity in the region, the causes of the drivers of crime and the importance of for this rise are multiple, with the local, local dynamics.11 The report analyzes what national, and regional dynamics pointing to a leads up to a criminal event including an indi- much more diverse reality. vidual’s characteristics and personal circum- Given the multifaceted nature of the stances, but also his/her physical and social growth in crime and violence, it is difficult to environment. From this perspective, policies properly identify the variables at play, the and actions towards reducing crime involve a interactions among them, and how much each wide range of dimensions such as family, contributes to the problem. The boundaries school, neighborhood, community, urban between different dimensions of the growth in infrastructure, economic regulations, police, crime and violence can be blurred as a result. justice, and prisons. For example, the transformations that took Casas-Zamora and Dammert also suggest place in the region during the 2000-2010 that one must take into account several factors, period, which included progress in poverty namely highly unequal income distribution, reduction, improvement in income distribu- youth marginalization, widespread urbanization, and an increase in the level and quality tion, proliferation of guns, pervasive presence of employment, were also accompanied by of organized crime, and weakness of law rapid and disorganized urban growth. Chaotic enforcement institutions.12 urbanization, combined with changes in fam- Most importantly, recent studies note the ily structure and school system deficiencies, complexity of the rise in insecurity, suggesting has influenced crime in the region. that the region faces a vicious cycle: while high This influence is highlighted in the RHD inequality and insufficient development have report, which points to a direct correlation contributed to the deterioration in public between urban growth and crime. Most coun- safety, the growth in insecurity and violence tries with an urban population growth above has further aggravated inequality and delayed two percent per year (the natural population progress in economic development. According growth) also reported increases in homicide to CAF, “insecurity affects first and foremost rates.10 The problem is not necessarily the size the most disadvantaged, aggravating the of the city, however, but the institutional already-critical development challenges of seg- capacity to include groups in marginal condi- regation and inequality.”13 tions. The report’s findings indicate that crime Several works in the literature of crime and violence have a significant local dimen- and violence in Latin America and the sion. Homicide concentration, for example, Caribbean have stressed this vicious cycle.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 51 BUSTILLO AND VELLOSO

Lederman, Loayza, and Menéndez suggest in and the rule of law, holding back develop- fact that the relationship between social capital ment. and crime is all the more complex given that Moreover, insecurity decreases labor mar- the causality between the two run in both ket participation, reduces productivity (as the directions – crime also affects social capital.14 private sector spends time and resources on Berkman discusses how social exclusion protection and security rather than on produc- and violence interact in a vicious circle, leaving tive uses), earnings, tourism, foreign and the socially excluded in a very hostile environ- domestic investment, and domestic savings, ment where the borders between legal and and spurs capital flight, negatively impacting illegal are often fuzzy and uncertain. Social economic growth. Violence thus may have exclusion is a contributing factor to violent long-term negative economic effects by ham- outcomes, while violence eats away at the del- pering investment in specific sectors.17 icate social fabric that holds communities A 2011 World Bank report focused on vio- together and further saps scarce resources away lence in Central America suggests that crime from more productive uses, deepening devel- drags economic growth down, not only opment challenges.15 The Economic because of the victims’ lost wages and labor, Commission for Latin America and the but also because it pollutes the investment cli- Caribbean (ECLAC) in turn notes that “given mate and diverts scarce governmental today’s situations of violence, there is a need resources to strengthen law enforcement rather to look into the existence of a close relation- than promote economic activity.18 Robles ship with social exclusion processes, where et.al. in turn estimate the effect of the increased violence and context feed upon and into each violence (through the number of homicides) other, so that social, territorial, and family set- on economic activity and employment in tings can end up encouraging the young to Mexico at the municipal level. The authors find seek violent situations.”16 that an increase in the levels of violence has In addition to research with a region-wide significant, negative effects on labor force par- focus, various recent studies focusing on ticipation and employment.19 While low eco- Mexico and Central America also address the nomic activity and lower employment can stir links between insecurity and socioeconomic up violence, violence can lead to lower eco- factors. Sohnen indicates that the poor quality nomic activity and employment. of education and low returns to schooling, as In sum, insecurity contributes to and feeds well as slow job creation and scarce decent from inequality, social exclusion, and insuffi- employment opportunities – which affect the cient development. The magnitude of the pub- youth especially – facilitate insecurity and vio- lic security challenge differs from country to lence. This is aggravated by the culture of country, however. It also differs between and impunity, weak rule of law, diversion of scarce within cities and neighborhoods. public security and justice resources toward Economic and Social Progress, but drug-related activity, as well as low levels of Insecurity on the Rise development. In turn, higher levels of insecurity and violence further weaken institutions In the past decade homicide rates increased in Latin America but declined or stabilized in

52 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 INSECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

other regions of the world. This higher inci- place, dropping from 23 to 16 percent during dence of crime came at a time of important the same period.20 social progress. In fact, in an apparent para- Favorable global economic conditions, dox, the region experienced economic growth, ample access to financing, and improvements social improvements, and increased crime in terms of trade significantly favored many rates during the past decade. Opinion polls countries, mostly exporters of natural consistently show that crime and violence are resources, such that between 2003 and 2011, the primary concern of citizens in the region. economic growth in Latin America and the According to the Latinobarómetro poll in Caribbean was the fastest since the sixties. The 2013, 24 percent identified crime as the most combination of economic growth and important problem, up from five percent in improvements in the labor market with strong 1995, with unemployment coming in second job creation were key to substantial gains in poverty reduction. The poverty rate dropped

Figure 1: Latin America: poverty and indigence, 1980-2014 –Percentages and Millions of people) 60 48.4 50 43.8 43.9 40.5 40 33.5 29.5 28.1 28.1 28.0 30 22.6 18.6 18.6 19.3 Percentage 20 12.9 11.6 11.3 11.7 12.0 10

0 1980 1990 1999 2002 2008 2011 2012 2013 2014*

Indigent Poor

250 225 215 204 200 186 171 164 165 167

150 136

95 91 99 100 72 71 62 67 66 69 Millions of people 50

0 1980 1990 1999 2002 2008 2011 2012 2013 2014*

Indigent Poor Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America (2014):16. *Projections

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 53 BUSTILLO AND VELLOSO

from 43.9 percent in 2002 to 28 percent in significant reductions in poverty in the coun- 2014, meaning that about 58 million people tries of the Southern Cone and Andean region in the region moved above the poverty line in (see table 1). In many countries, however, pov- just over a decade. Extreme poverty also erty remains a pressing challenge. As ECLAC decreased considerably from 19.3 percent in has cautioned, much of the population 2002 to 12.0 percent in 2014. Still 167 million remains vulnerable. Over 50 percent of the are poor and 71 million indigent (see figure 1). population in many countries is vulnerable, As millions of people were lifted out of with monthly income between 1.2 and 1.8 poverty, a significant expansion of the middle times the poverty line. Lack of savings and class took place. The middle class increased in access to social security and low levels of edu- all countries of the region, but with wide dif- cation suggest they are vulnerable to falling ferences. In Guatemala and Nicaragua, less back into poverty. than 10 percent of the population belongs to Alongside progress with poverty reduc- the middle class, while in other countries, such tion, inequality began to decline in many as Uruguay, the figure is 60 percent.21 countries. Between 2002 and 2013, the Gini Similarly, the level and trends in poverty coefficient (the most commonly used measure reduction varied widely across countries, with of inequality) fell by almost 10 percent from Table 1: Latin America (18 countries): persons living in poverty and indigence around 2005, 2012, and 2013 (Percentages)

54 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 INSECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

0.542 to 0.486, a noteworthy achievement in reduction, most of the progress during this a region that is the most unequal in the world, period took place in the countries of the and especially considering that the improve- Southern Cone and in the Andean region. ment took place in a global context of increas- Despite improvements, average per capita ing inequality.23 income of the highest decile in Central Smaller gaps in labor earnings contributed America – where the prevalence of violence to the improvement in income distribution. has become a serious concern – is between 10 The unemployment rate fell from 11.2 to 6.0 and 22 times higher than the average for the percent between 2002 and 2014, and the over- population in the four poorest deciles. all employment rate increased from 52 to 56 Social gains materialized, but violence percent.24 Public policies, increases in the increased. Between 2000 and 2010 the homi- minimum wage and in labor formalization, cide rate rose by 11 percent in the region even including increases in social security coverage as it fell or stabilized in most other regions in in most countries were also instrumental in the world.27 In 2012, the average homicide contributing to this improvement.25 Inequality rate in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) though remains very high with wide variations was around 23 per 100,000 inhabitants accord- across countries. In 2013 the Gini coefficient ing to the United Nations Office on Drugs and ranged from 0.383 in Uruguay to 0.575 in Crime, while the world average stood at Honduras.26 As in the case of poverty around eight per 100,000.28 This is the second

Figure 2: Homicide Rate per 100,000 inhabitants in LAC by country, 2012

Honduras

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

Belize

El Salvador

Jamaica

Guatemala

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Colombia

Bahamas

Trinidad and Tobago

Brazil

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Dominican Republic

Saint Lucia

Mexico

Guyana

Panama

Grenada

Ecuador

Bolivia (Plurinational State of)

Nicaragua

Antigua and Barbuda

Haiti

Paraguay

Peru

Suriname

Costa Rica

Uruguay

Barbados

Argentina

Chile

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Source: UNODC statistics online https://data.unodc.org/#state:0. Data were updated on April 13, 2015 and supersede data published in the Global Study on Homicide 2013. The red line marks a homicide rate higher than 10 murders per 100,000 inhabitants which is considered an epidemic level by the World Health Organization.

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highest in the world, behind only Africa. robberies have become one of the most sig- Homicide rates vary considerably among sub- nificant threats to citizens; six in ten robberies regions – homicide rates stood at 34 for in Latin America are violent. However, robbery Central America and Mexico in 2012, and 17 reported to the authorities is substantially for South America – and countries. Honduras, lower than that recorded through victimiza- the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Belize, tion surveys. Under-reporting is a significant El Salvador, Jamaica, Guatemala, and problem in that more than six million inci- Colombia are seven of the 14 most violent dents went unreported, reflecting that there are countries in the world (see figure 2). Similarly, obstacles involved in reporting, as well as the they vary considerably within countries. lack of citizen confidence in the justice sys- Murder figures thus point to a heteroge- tem.33 neous reality. Moreover, violence not only How can the apparent paradox of rising affects the countries in the region in different crime and improvements in social gains (par- ways, but its impact is also diverse across the ticularly better income distribution) be various socio-demographic groups. For exam- explained? ple, there is a high concentration of regional Motivated by the region’s apparent para- homicide victims among men between 15 and dox of experiencing an economic boom at the 29 years of age, with the homicide rate for this same time as violence and crime increased, group reaching 89.7 per 100,000, nearly five Enamorado, López-Calva, Rodriguez-Castelán, times higher than the global figure (19.4 per and Winkler looked into this puzzle by focus- 100,000).29 Large scale violence among young ing on local dynamics.34 The authors found people prevails in many countries such that that crime and violence have an important increases in youth violence, in which young local dimension. The premise that better eco- people are both victims and perpetrators has nomic conditions result in less crime is indeed become a top priority for policymakers. Crime correct at the municipal level: municipalities and violence is the number one concern with lower inequality saw lower rates of crime. among youth in the Caribbean Community.30 Although the overall national data reveals an The regional data of victimization is quite apparent paradox, broken down by smaller homogeneous, on the other hand. In 2010, the geographical regions, the paradox does not proportion of households where someone was hold. According to the authors, their results the victim of a criminal offense in the previous suggest that the rise in violence might have year was over 25 percent in nearly all Latin been even greater if inequality had not American countries. In any given year, over declined in the region. one-third of Latin Americans – 200 million These results confirm the need for more people – are victims of a criminal offense economic growth with greater equality and either directly or in their immediate house- social inclusion as an essential step towards a hold.31 long-term and sustainable solution to the chal- Robberies, for example, have increased in lenges posed by the rise in crime. Given their the majority of countries in recent years, affect- perverse impact on poverty, equality, and ing even those countries with low homicide development, however, crime and violence rates.32 As the 2013-2014 UNDP RHD reports, impose very high costs on the region.

56 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 INSECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Costs of Insecurity costs, as well as economic and social multiplier effects (see figure 3). Regardless of the various methodologies used Numerous studies have attempted to by the empirical literature, the cost of violence quantify the costs of violence for countries in is high for society as a whole. Crime drains Latin America and the Caribbean, suggesting economic activity through loss of life and that the costs of crime and violence represent destruction of property. In addition, research- a significant share of aggregate production. In ers have more recently identified a broader set 1999, Londoño and Guerrero estimated the of direct and indirect costs, as well. Crime and net costs of violence to be about 12 percent of violence impose multiple, diverse, and signifi- the region’s gross domestic product. cant costs to individuals, firms, and society. As More recently, a World Bank report on crime and violence divert resources away from violence in Central America showed that crime other presumably more productive purposes, and violence carry staggering economic costs they have a direct impact and a direct mone- at the national level, with estimates close to tary cost, but also indirect (non-monetary) eight percent of regional GDP if citizen security, law enforcement, and health care are Figure 3: Direct and Indirect Costs of Insecurity

Source: Eleanor Sohnen, “Paying for Crime: A Review of the Relationships between Insecurity and Development in Mexico and Central America,” Migration Policy Institute, (Dec 2012): 10.

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included; 16 percent of these costs were due to The indirect costs of crime and violence lost life and disability. Estimates presented in are hard to estimate. Several potential conse- the report “suggest that a ten percent reduction quences of crime go beyond the immediate in violence levels in those Central American costs related to victimization, expenditures on countries with the highest murder rates could prevention and punishment, and include costs boost annual economic growth per capita by associated with the effects of a violent environ- as much as a full one percent.”35 ment on decisions affecting human capital A joint study conducted by the Inter- accumulation, investment, entrepreneurship, American Development Bank (IDB) and urban development, and, ultimately, economic UNDP, analyzing costs in five Latin American growth. Most of these are essentially indirect countries, showed significant and differenti- or long-term effects of the crime itself.39 ated costs in terms of GDP ranging from three Londoño and Guerrero offer an estimate of percent in Chile and Uruguay, up to over 10 about seven percent of GDP for the indirect percent in Honduras.36 In the case of Mexico, costs of crime and violence in Latin America. the total cost of insecurity was estimated to Also, indirect costs typically suffer from reach 8.9 percent of GDP in 2009, 80 percent identification problems. For example, just as of which was paid for by individuals and more crime may generate less investment and firms.37 employment, less investment and employment can generate more crime, which brings us back …just as more crime may generate less to the vicious cycle mentioned earlier.40 investment and employment, less investment However, the evidence suggests that crime and and employment can generate more crime violence do have a negative impact on labor participation and wages, as well as on the investment decisions of firms.41 Moreover, sur- Direct costs to governments include veys indicate that firms in the region consis- spending on security, justice, and law enforce- tently perceive crime as one of their major ment. According to ECLAC, between 2007 and obstacles to growth, higher than the global 2010, public expenditures on defense, security, average.42 and justice in Central America grew slightly Other indirect costs include the impact on both in nominal terms as well as a percentage social capital and increasing social fragmenta- of GDP.38 By 2010, expenditures on defense, tion.43 An example is the privatization of secu- security, and justice fluctuated between 1.7 rity that has been taking place throughout the percent and 3.3 percent of GDP. Based on the region. The increase in crime has forced the case studies of five cities (Caracas, Cali, El private sector to turn to private security firms Salvador, Lima, Mexico City, and Rio de to protect physical property and business exec- Janeiro), Londoño, and Guerrero estimated utives, diverting resources from productive the total direct cost of crime in the region to endeavors such as worker training or capital be roughly five percent of GDP: two percent investments.44 The region now has almost 50 due to medical care and the loss of life and percent more private security guards three percent due to public and private (3,811,302) than police officers (2,616,753) expenses on security and the judiciary. and Latin American private security agents are

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the most armed in the world, with rates of gun decade, a situation that has led to a rise in the possession per employee ten times larger than number of people living in extreme poverty in in Europe.45 This situation further increases the region.49 Prospects of tepid economic inequality and social exclusion, as social growth in the years ahead may compromise groups have different capacities to deal with further the sustainability of social gains and crime, reinforcing the vicious cycle of growth pose additional challenges to the fight against in crime and violence contributing to greater crime and violence. inequality and slow economic development. Finding sustainable sources of economic Also, as private security firms fill the gaps left growth, preserving and further improving by the public sector, governments lose both social conditions are a priority in the years to capacity and legitimacy. In turn, their dimin- come. This will require a structural transforma- ished capacity to reassert authority under- tion of output and employment to diversify mines the legitimacy and relevance of public the economy and improve its positioning in programs and even laws, risking destabiliza- the global economy. tion.46 As several studies point out, rising insecu- Finding sustainable sources of economic rity has had a negative impact on trust in gov- growth, preserving and further improving ernment institutions, particularly police and social conditions are a priority in the judicial systems, a key component of social years to come capital. The erosion of trust in institutions has deleterious consequences for the functioning of democracies.47 Moreover, perceptions of government effectiveness vary considerably, It bears recalling that the strongest driver but overall there is increasing skepticism of the region’s recent growth phase has been regarding the capacity of governments to deal exports of raw materials and assembled manu- with crime and violence. In Guatemala and factures with little value added. A virtuous Honduras – countries with the highest structural change would lead to increasing par- inequality and violence – less than 40 percent ticipation in global value chains by generating of the population believes that the government more value added and high quality jobs and can solve this problem.48 forging linkages between exports and high In sum, the direct costs of insecurity are growth markets. The structural changes entail high, but the more difficult to quantify indirect absorbing technology, learning, increasing costs and the multiplier effects on the econ- value added, diversifying, and entering into omy – such as lower savings, investments, pro- new markets drawing labor from informal and ductivity, labor market participation, and ulti- low productive sectors towards formal, mod- mately lower growth – make them even higher. ern, knowledge intensive jobs which pay better wages. It entails as well strengthening linkages Insecurity: A Development Challenge with small and medium-sized enterprises, par- After significant social gains, the pace of pov- ticularly given their role in creating jobs. erty reduction has slowed down and even Without quality employment and income reversed in the early years of the present

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 59 BUSTILLO AND VELLOSO generation opportunities it will not be possi- in the first quintile (bottom 20 percent) had ble to reduce inequality and exclusion. an unemployment rate almost four times as In particular, it is important to expand high as the richest quintile (top 20 percent),51 employment and opportunities for youth. thus facing serious obstacles in breaking the Studies by ECLAC and the Ibero-American barrier of exclusion and social mobility. Youth Organization (OIJ) have shown that Better employment opportunities go hand among the features that most often give rise to in hand with better skills and education. situations of violence in youth are urban mar- Though in the past two decades significant ginalization, lack of social mobility and of progress has been made in improving educa- economic opportunities.50 Better employment tion levels of young people the situation is for youth is key. Unemployment rates are con- quite heterogeneous across and within coun- siderably higher for the population aged 15 to tries. On average, the secondary school com- 24 than for the total population (between 2.3 pletion rate is 60 percent in the region; Chile times and 5.5 times higher than for adults), and Peru have rates in excess of 80 percent exceeding 30 percent in some English-speaking while Honduras (36 percent), Nicaragua (36 Caribbean countries. Moreover, wide differ- percent), and Guatemala (25 percent) have the ences persist in unemployment rates broken lowest secondary completion rate attainment. down by socioeconomic status. For instance, A complete secondary education (about young people aged 15 to 29 from households 12 years of study) is the minimum required to Foto: Manu Dias/AGECOM

The Serrinha Center for Scientific Education (Centro de Educação Cientifica de Serrinha) in the Central Region of Brazil

60 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 INSECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

reduce the likelihood of remaining in poverty. region, although at different stages, are experi- However, many young people do not have this encing a demographic dividend, a time when chance, since in all countries completion of the share of the working age population secondary education varies considerably increases relative to that of children and older depending on income level, ethnic origin, and persons (see figure 4). This is a particularly rural residence. For example, while 84 percent favorable period for economic growth as a of people ages 20 to 29 with income levels in larger proportion of workers combined with a the highest 20 percent of the population had lower level of expenditures on economically completed secondary education (2012), only dependent persons (especially children) would 32 percent in the lowest 20 percent had done tend to accelerate the accumulation of capital. so. Honduras and Guatemala present the larg- As Paulo Saad notes, the combination of a est gaps with only 5.9 percent and 1.8 percent, large pool of young workers with good job respectively, of the bottom 20 percent having skills and a relatively small population of finished secondary education relative to 62.7 dependent older persons created a situation percent and 60.4 percent of the top 20. highly favorable for economic growth in many In addition, around 30 million of Latin Southeast Asian countries. It brought about America’s young people between the ages of 15 increases in productivity largely due to impor- and 29 (22 percent of the total), did not study tant investments in the education of young or have paid work according to 2012 figures. people during the time of the demographic Of that total, 55 percent is in unpaid domestic dividend.55 or care work, 25 percent is unemployed or looking for paid work for the first time, and As Paulo Saad notes, the combination five percent has some kind of disability. The of a large pool of young workers with remaining 15 percent of young people who are good job skills and a relatively small neither studying nor in paid work is the “hard population of dependent older persons core” of social exclusion and probably the created a situation highly favorable for most socially marginalized.53 Investing in youth’s education and economic growth in many Southeast employment is crucial to addressing violence. Asian countries As Imbusch, Misse, and Carrión note, persistent violence has a perverse impact on youth: The countries of Latin America and the Children and youth are heavily affected by Caribbean find themselves in different situa- violence, since childhood and adolescence tions regarding the extent and duration of the are critical stages of personal development demographic dividend. Countries further and for the accumulation of assets. The along in the demographic transition have a fewer assets an individual has, the more shorter period of dividend left relative to coun- likely they are to turn to alternative means tries that are behind in the process. For exam- of survival, including violence.54 ple, in Cuba and Chile the dividend is Investing in youth becomes even more expected to end sometime in the first quarter important at a time when all countries of the of the century. In Brazil and Costa Rica, it is

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Figure 4: Youth Population (Ages 15 to 29) in Latin America – (In millions)

180

160

140

120

100

80 153 158 146

60 122

40 72

20 43

0 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 2050

Figure 5: Stages of Demographic Bonus in LAC

(Periods in which the Dependency Ratio (DR) is decreasing or increasing, but below 2 in inactive ages for every 3 active labor force individuals)

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070

Cuba Chile

Mexico DR decreasing DR increasing, < 2/3 Panama

Argentina

Brazil

Latin America

Costa Rica

Colombia

Ecuador

Dominican Republic

Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)

Peru

El Salvador

Nicaragua

Paraguay

Honduras

Haiti

Bolivia (Plu. State of)

Guatemala

Source for figures 4 and 5: América Latina: Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE) - División de Población de la CEPAL, Estimaciones y proyecciones de población (2007).

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expected to last until the beginning of the all levels – local, state, national, and regional 2040s; in Ecuador and Peru around 2050; and – and should bring about broad alliances, beyond 2050 in El Salvador, Nicaragua, including the participation of communities Paraguay, Honduras, and Haiti. The extreme and businesses, as well as municipal, state and cases are Bolivia and Guatemala where it is federal government officials. expected to last beyond 2060 and, in the case Cooperation and consensus building is of the latter, close to 2070 (see figure 5).56 key. Security is the responsibility of govern- The benefits of the demographic dividend ments. However, tackling insecurity will won’t accrue automatically. It will require the depend on a shared agenda and on partner- adoption of policies to ensure that young peo- ships. Clearly, governments have to respond ple acquire the basic skills and training to better in addressing weaknesses in the institu- enter the world of work. Efforts must concen- tions of the rule of law and in gaining the trust trate on better access to good-quality educa- of citizens, but crime and violence won’t be tion and training for young people particularly solved just on the basis of public action. from low resource households. Those coun- Policies or strategies of “mano dura” (over- tries that have yet to enter this demographic criminalization and repression) have proved stage (most of the Central American countries) counterproductive as levels of violence have will have in the next decades a unique oppor- kept on rising. tunity to capitalize on the productive potential Innovative approaches combine policing of youth by investing in improvements in edu- and law enforcement with local and commu- cation and labor markets.57 Moreover, these nity programs in crime and violence preven- investments are required as well to generate tion, but also in education and economic the necessary savings and productive condi- opportunities. These approaches rely on effec- tions needed to deal with the exponential tive coordination and cooperation between increase in costs expected to come with soci- governments and multiple stakeholders. ety’s aging. By 2050, the region will have five Successful crime reduction experiences (Cali, adults of 60 years of age and older for every Medellín, and São Paulo, among others) attest four young people. This compares to an esti- to the importance of forging partnerships, mated five young people for every adult of 60 working at the local community level, and years or older in 1959.58 implementing integrated responses. The coordination of initiatives from various political Conclusions and social actors and a focus on community Crime and violence undermine human poten- cooperation within high-risk areas was very tial and social capital, disproportionately important to crime reduction efforts.59 Several affecting youth and the most vulnerable, erod- partnerships between local governments, pri- ing their livelihood and assets, and undermin- vate sector, community groups, and faith- ing development efforts. The concomitant based institutions have sought to improve increase in violence during the years of eco- socioeconomic conditions and reintegrate nomic boom in the region suggest that in young people into the labor force and into order to be successful, policy actions and communities. Private sector participation in efforts to hold back crime should be made at the prevention of crime and violence has been

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increasing, but still falls short. Challenges to markets. Science, technology, and innovation its participation in crime and violence preven- are essential factors in an economy’s potential tion include the lack of knowledge about com- to grow and compete in the global economy. munity safety, expectations of immediate Alongside national efforts, strengthening results, reluctance to be associated with per- regional and hemispheric cooperation on sci- ceived negative causes, and the lack of incen- ence, technology, innovation, and education tives.60 can be instrumental in developing more com- In addition to bringing together multiple petitive and inclusive knowledge-based econo- stakeholders in crime reduction experiences, it mies.63 PRISM is necessary to build consensus on mobilizing resources. Improving security demands resources and a strengthening of public finances that, to some extent, depends on the political will of various key actors. With an average tax burden of 18 percent of GDP, the region collects little, and poorly. Narrow tax bases and high levels of non-compliance prevail throughout the region. For example, in Central America and the Dominican Republic, tax revenues as a percentage of GDP are among the lowest in the world, thus limiting the government’s capacity to implement public policies.61 Cases where governments compel the wealthiest sectors of society to pay higher taxes are not that common. However, an interesting experience was Colombia’s adoption of a wealth tax, the “Democratic Security Tax,” to finance its security effort against drug trafficking and guerrilla and paramilitary groups. Between 2002 and 2010, the tax accounted for about five percent of tax revenue or about one percent of GDP. Its contribution to funding the country’s security effort was considered significant, accounting for about 20 percent of the defense and security sector’s total budget.62 In addition, as noted earlier, progress in addressing crime demands sustainable growth with equality. Such an agenda should be based on a virtuous structural change to diversify the economy and improve its positioning in global

64 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 INSECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Notes 7 Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy 76, (1968). 8 Eleanor Sohnen, “Paying for Crime: A Review of the Relationships between Insecurity and 0 This document was prepared by Inés Bustillo, Development in Mexico and Central America,” Director, and Helvia Velloso, Economic Affairs Migration Policy Institute, (Dec 2012): 2. Officer, of the United Nations Economic Commission 9 UNDP, “Citizen Security with a Human Face: for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Evidence and Proposals for Latin America,” Regional Washington D.C. Office. The authors would like to Human Development Report 2013-2014. thank Juan Muñoz for his valuable research assis- 10 According to ECLAC (2014), “La Nueva era tance. The views expressed in this article are those of Demográfica en América Latina y El Caribe,” Latin the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the America and the Caribbean is the most urbanized Organization. region in the developing world, and its level of 1 UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290, urbanization is only surpassed by that of the United “Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of States and Canada. Eighty percent of the regional the 2005 World Summit Outcome,” A/RES/66/290 population resides in urban areas. In 1950, there were (Oct 25, 2012). http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ 8 cities in the region with a population of more than GEN/N11/476/22/PDF/N1147622.pdf?OpenElement. 1 million. In 2010, the number of cities with more 2 United Nations Development Program than 1 million people had jumped to 62, with Mexico (UNDP), “Human Development Report,” (1994). In and São Paulo boasting a population of about 20 addition to economic security, there are various other million. ECLAC projects that by 2030 there will be 90 parts of this new vision of human security, including: cities in the region with more than 1 million people; food, health, environmental and personal, within in six of them, the population is expected to be community, as well as political security. higher than 10 million. 3 Hugo Noé Pino. “Gasto público en seguridad 11 CAF Development Bank of Latin America, y justicia en Centroamérica,” Serie estudios y “Towards a safer Latin America: A new perspective to perspectivas, Sede Subregional de la CEPAL en México prevent and control crime,” (2014). n132, (October 2011). 12 Kevin Casas-Zamora and Lucía Dammert. 4 Insecurity as a shared challenge that thwarts “Public Security Challenges in the Americas,” in The the region’s development is an important message of Road to Hemisphere Cooperation: Beyond the Cartagena the UNDP, “Citizen Security with a Human Face: Summit of the Americas, The Brookings Institution | evidence and proposals for Latin America,” Regional Latin America Initiative (Washington DC, July 2012). Human Development Report, (2013-2014). 13 CAF Development Bank of Latin America 5 Demographic dividend, as defined by the (2014): 20. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) means 14 Daniel Lederman, Norman Loayza, and Ana “the economic growth potential that can result from María Menéndez, “Does Social Capital Matter?” shifts in a population’s age structure, mainly when Economic Development and Cultural Change 50, no.3 the share of the working-age population (15 to 64) is (April 2002): 510. larger than the non-working-age share of the 15 Heather Berkman, “Social Exclusion and population (14 and younger, and 65 and older).” In Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean,” other words, it is “a boost in economic productivity Inter-American Development Bank, Research that occurs when there are growing numbers of Department, Working Paper #613 (October 2007). people in the workforce relative to the number of 16 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America dependents.” http://www.unfpa.org/demographic-dividend. (2014): 29. 6 For example: Ayres (1988); Gaviria, Guerrero 17 Sohnen, 15-16. and Londoño (2000); Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 18 World Bank, “Crime and Violence in Central (2011); Londoño and Guerrero (1999); McIlwaine America,” Sustainable Development Department and (1999); Skaperdas et al. (2009); Solimano (2004); Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit WHO (2004), among others, indicate that violence is (2011): ii. a key obstacle to development. 19 Gustavo Robles, Gabriela Calderón, and Beatriz Magaloni, “The Costs of Crime and Violence

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 65 BUSTILLO AND VELLOSO

in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Inter-American 34 Ted Enamorado, Luis-Felipe López-Calva, Development Bank, Working Document # IDB-WP-426 Carlos Rodriguez-Castelán and Hernán Winkler, (November 2013). “Income Inequality and Violent Crime: Evidence 20 Latinobarómetro, Informe (Santiago de Chile: from Mexico’s Drug War,” Policy Research Working November 2013) Paper 6935, The World Bank (June 2014). 21 ECLAC, “CELAC-European Union, Reinforcing 35 World Bank, “Crime and Violence in Central production cooperation and dialogue: the role of America,” ii and 5- 6. SMEs,” Biregional economic perspectives, LC/L.4020 36 UNDP, Regional Human Development Report (May 2015): 11. 2013-2014: 6. 22 The Gini coefficient measures the extent to 37 Sohnen, 9. which the distribution of income or consumption 38 Pino, 21 (table 5). expenditure among individuals or households within 39 Skaperdas, Stergios et al. “The Costs of an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribu- Violence,” World Bank Group, Social Development tion. A Gini coefficient of 0 represents perfect Department (Washington DC, March 2009): 41. equality, while a coefficient of 1 implies perfect 40 CAF Development Bank of Latin America inequality (for example, where only one person has (2014): 37. all the income or consumption, and all others have 41 Ibid., 37-38. none). 42 World Bank, “Enterprise Surveys, 2006 and 23 Economic Commission for Latin America and 2011,” http://www.enterprisesurveys.org. the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin 43 See ECLAC, “Social Cohesion: Inclusion and a America (2014): 119-120. Sense of Belonging in Latin America and the 24 ECLAC/ILO, Employment Situation in Latin Caribbean,” (2007). America and the Caribbean, no 12 (May 2015) and 44 William C. Prillaman, “Crime, Democracy, previous issues. and Development in Latin America,” Policy Papers on 25 ECLAC, “Compacts for Equality: Towards a the Americas XIV, Study 6, (June 2003): 7. Sustainable Future,” Thirty-fifth Session of ECLAC, 45 UNDP, Regional Human Development Report Lima (May 2014): 46. 2013-2014:10. 26 For comparison, statistics from The World 46 Mark Ungar, “The Privatization of Citizen Factbook produced by the U.S. Central Intelligence Security in Latin America: From Elite Guards to Agency cite a range from about 0.25 to 0.60 for the Neighborhood Vigilantes,” Social Justice 34, no. 3/4 world. Europe generally posts relatively low numbers. (2007-08): 34. The United Kingdom came in at around 0.34 (2005), 47 See Inter-American Development Bank, the United States at 0.45 (2007). “Citizen Security: Conceptual Framework and 27 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America Empirical Evidence,” Discussion Paper No.IDB-DP-232, (2014): 135. (September 2012): 13, on the relationship between 28 UNODC statistics online, data as of April 13, individual experiences of victimization and personal 2015; world average based on data for 219 countries. trust in public institutions. https://data.unodc.org/#state:0. 48 Latinobarómetro, Informe (Santiago de Chile, 29 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime November 2013). (UNODC), Global Study on Homicide: Trends, 49 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2014: Context, Data (Vienna, 2011). http://www.unodc.org/ 16-17. unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html. 50 Ibid., 137. 30 CARICOM Commission on Youth 51 Ibid., 128. Development, “Eye on the Future, Investing in Youth 52 Ibid., 124. Now for Tomorrow’s Community,” Draft Report 53 Ibid: 130-132. (January 2010). 54 Peter Imbusch, Michel Misse and Fernando 31 Casas-Zamora and Dammert, 62. Carrión, “Violence Research in Latin America and the 32 UNODC statistics online (data updated on Caribbean: A Literature review,” International Journal April 13, 2015). https://data.unodc.org/#state:0. of Conflict and Violence 5, no. 1 (2011): 122. 33 UNDP, Regional Human Development Report 55 Paulo Saad, “Demographic Trends in Latin 2013-2014: 3-4. America and the Caribbean.” Workshop on Demographic Change and Social Policy organized by

66 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 INSECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

the World Bank, Washington DC (July 14-15, 2009): 16. 56 Ibid., 17. 57 Hugo E. Beteta and Juan C. Brid, “Structural Change and Growth in Central America and the Dominican Republic: An Overview of Two Decades, 1990-2011.” Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), (Santiago, Chile, 2014): 103. 58 ECLAC, “Youth and Social Cohesion in Ibero-America. A model in the making,” (2008): 39. 59 See Rodrigo R. Soares and Joana Naritomi, “Understanding High Crimes Rates in Latin America: The Role of Social and Policy Factors,” The Economics of Crime: Lessons for and from Latin America, Rafael Di Tella, Sebastian Edwards, and Ernesto Schargrodsky, eds, (University of Chicago Press, 2007): 50-53. 60 See World Bank and the Bogota Chamber of Commerce, “The Public-Private Partnerships and Community Safety: Guide to Action.” International Center for the Prevention of Crime, 2011. The Guide highlights the important role of the private sector in helping to generate safer communities, describing possible ways in which the business and commercial sectors can collaborate in community safety matters. 61 Beteta and Brid, 253. 62 Gustavo Flores-Macias, “Financing Security Through Elite Taxation: The Case of Colombia’s “Democratic Security Taxes,” (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2013): 2. 63 See Inés Bustillo, “Fostering a Culture of Innovation in the Americas,” in “The Road to Hemispheric Cooperation: beyond the Cartagena Summit of the Americas, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., July 2012 and ECLAC, “Areas for Cooperation in the Americas. Building opportunities for inclusive development,” VII Summit of the Americas, LC/L.3986 (March 2015).

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 67 AUTHOR

Solarfeeds

By 2022, the Obama administration hopes to finish off an electrical grid that will connect all of the Americas, from northern Canada down through the Caribbean and ending at the southern tip of South America.

68 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 1 United States Policy in the Hemisphere Influencing the State and Beyond

BY FRANK O. MORA AND BRIAN FONSECA

nited States—Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) relations are strong, and more importantly, built on a broad base of sophisticated, organic relationships that extend Uwell beyond state-to-state engagements. Furthermore, U.S.-LAC relations encompass far more than what is often covered in the commentariat—like the number of presidential visits, the emergence of extra-hemispheric actors, problems related to drugs and immigration, or when compared to the visibility of U.S. engagements in others parts of the world. These outdated measures fail to truly appreciate the complexity and depth of U.S.-LAC relations today, all of which are the result of our persistent and deliberate engagement with the Americas. As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argues, “the United States needs to build on the ‘power of proximity.’ It’s not just geography—it’s common values, common culture, and common heritage. Its shared interests that could power a new era of partnership and prosperity.”1 This article argues that in this context the role of the U.S. government must evolve from that of primary actor, to designer/ implementer of the enabling environment most conducive to the continued growth of organic, non-state relationships throughout the hemisphere, and offers a new set of measures that better reflects the strength of relations between the U.S. and its hemispheric partners. Deepening democratic principles, improving human security, and creating opportunities for economic growth and integration continue to be central to ensuring regional stability and advancing our interests in the hemisphere. This is not a departure from the national interests articulated by previous U.S. administrations, nor should it be. The difference lies in our capacity to expand influence in the increasingly interconnected global context in which U.S.-LAC relations take place. On this increasingly crowded global stage, the U.S. Government must be competitive; we must offer a vision of universal values that is unifying, compelling, and appealing, to citizens across

Dr. Frank Mora is the Director of the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center and a Professor in the Steven J. Green School of Public and International Affairs at Florida International University. Mr. Brian Fonseca is the Director of the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy and Citizenship Studies at the Florida International University.

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the world. Given our shared history, similar In world politics the state remains the cultures, increasing economic and social ties, most important actor, particularly in the area this message will resonate strongly in this of security and the establishment and mainte- hemisphere. Globalization continues to force nance of international norms and practices. the region to rapidly adapt to political, eco- Bilateralism and multilateralism remain criti- nomic and social currents, and improvements cal in exerting influence. Policymakers have yet in access to information provide individual to truly appreciate the impact of non-state citizens with better connectivity and, in many actors beyond the often-mentioned terrorist cases, greater influence over their respective and transnational criminal organizations. governments. Differences in adapting to glo- Businesses, religious organizations, and social balization are producing a region more differ- movements and their structured networks entiated than ever before. Thus, U.S. policy across borders, are impacting international must be recalibrated to match the evolving politics; transnational ties between these strategic environment, tailored to the increas- groups have tangible effects on the politics of ingly pronounced differences among countries their “home countries.” In terms of U.S.-LAC in the region, and inclusive of the full range of relations, dense interactions among non-state actors populating the hemisphere (states, non- actors have become the true determinants of state actors, and individual citizens). hemispheric relations. In fact, the complex network of inter-American non-state relations, The Strategic Environment particularly in the social and commercial U.S. policy must be built on a strong under- spheres, has grown exponentially in the last standing of the strategic environment in which few decades. Chris Sabatini argues that these U.S.-LAC relations take place. It is only in the interactions and exchanges “have often out- last few decades that U.S. policy towards the stripped formal state relations and helped region began to take into consideration key move governments in directions that state elements influencing these relations, such as bureaucracies would not normally steer them- the increasing global integration of the selves.”3 For example, non-state actors con- Americas, growing differentiation among tinue to drive many states to acknowledge and nations of the Americas, “including their will- address endemic corruption, human rights ingness to partner with the U.S., and the mul- violations, and a wide range of socioeconomic tiplicity and diversity of relations within and inequalities. beyond the hemisphere.”2 The dynamic stra- The distribution and diffusion of power tegic environment that characterizes hemi- from the traditional centers of political and spheric relations today is often not clearly economic authority has heightened the capa- understood by many who continue to have a bility of non-state actors and individuals to very state-centric understanding of the region shape and influence global affairs. With regard and of U.S. policy. The need for policy to to U.S.-LAC relations, states continue to play a reflect and respond to this rapidly evolving dominant role but other actors and their net- context is paramount if Washington is to con- works also enhance interconnectivity leading tinue deepening ties and strengthening its to more complex and dynamic inter-American influence in the region. relationships. For this reason, the United

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States government should lead and coordinate social inclusion (e.g. LGBT and indigenous a whole of nation effort that leverages existing rights), crime and violence and competitive- and potential engagements along the three lev- ness. Political-ideological differences emerged els of U.S.-LAC interaction: state, non-govern- in the new century impeding inter-American ment and individual. The connections are fluid collaboration in some areas, but the consensus and dynamic, allowing states to engage and and opportunities for mutual collaboration collaborate with non-state actors to achieve continued to mature, in part thanks to efforts mutual objectives. For instance, the public- by social and economic entities, such as reli- private partnership programs in the economic gious organizations, universities, and human and social realms (e.g. “100,000 Strong in the rights organizations (many transnational) and Americas” education initiative and the their determination to keep the issues at the “Connecting the Americas 2022” electricity forefront of the hemispheric agenda. generation program) in which Washington A Differentiated Hemisphere works with the private sector and community leaders in the U.S. and across the hemisphere Countries in the hemisphere continue to make to meet important needs while helping to strides in their political, economic, and social deepen inter-American connectivity are the developments—and all in the context of an most dynamic kinds of contacts occurring increasingly interconnected, multipolar world. today.4 The U.S. government must leverage However, there are some clear differences and coordinate these actors and opportunities among countries in terms of demographics, since these types of interactions offer the most economy, territory, social development and effective means of advancing U.S. interests and institutional capacity to confront the chal- influence in the new inter-American strategic lenges and opportunities of globalization. context. Comparing the economic size and institutional capacity of Honduras to Brazil or Chile Converging Hemispheric Interests underscores these differences. A key characteristic of hemispheric relations While democracy remains the preferred today is the growing convergence on key issues form of government throughout the hemi- and concerns—and subsequently, interests— sphere the quality of democratic practices var- facing the hemisphere. For instance, the 2003 ies in the region. Progressive social initiatives Declaration on Security of the Americas inte- over the last few decades have led to improve- grated different perspectives regarding security ments in access to education and health and threats and priorities that included terrorism, reduction in poverty rates in most of South corruption, illicit trafficking and weapons pro- America, but the quality and access remain liferation.5 Differences remain as to percep- problematic, particularly in Central America. tions of severity and the appropriate means to Progress, therefore, remains uneven, and in address these challenges, but a consensus per- some cases reversing, producing greater differ- sists around those threats more than a decade entiation than ever before in terms of the qual- since the Declaration. Since then, the consen- ity of governance. In other words, the increas- sus expanded and focused on key issues, ing differentiation lies in the capacity and including energy, climate change, inequality, performance of states to deliver governance

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and development. Again, comparing state Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index only capacity and performance between Chile and ranks five hemispheric countries as full democ- Guatemala, for example, in delivering public racies: Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, the United goods effectively, particularly in the area of States, and Uruguay. Most of the hemisphere citizen security—the main challenge facing varies between flawed democracies and hybrid Guatemala and most of its Central American regimes, with Cuba and Haiti characterized as neighbors—highlights the differentiation that authoritarian regimes (see figure 1).7 exists in LAC. Furthermore, institutions continue to struggle As the quality of democratic practice var- to achieve legitimacy, and widespread corrup- ies within the region, there are strong national tion is undermining institutions’ effectiveness differences in perceptions of the performance in delivering security, justice and inclusive of democratic institutions reflecting those dif- socioeconomic development; this is particu- ferences. According to Vanderbilt University’s larly the case in Central America but still AmericasBarometer, public support for democ- extant in much of LAC. racy is over 65 percent in LAC.6 However, the Public opinion indicates that trust in consolidation or performance/quality of political and social institutions is declining. democracy differs across the hemisphere and While trust in the Catholic Church and the continues to struggle in the Andean Region, Armed Forces remains high throughout the Central America, and Haiti. Economist region (see figure 2), improving political and

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social institutions is the preeminent challenge Honduras, and Paraguay, and highest in facing the consolidation of democratic rule Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. across the region. Recent social protests in Poverty, inequality, and quality of health and Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Honduras, for education figures also vary greatly between example, are signs that structural reforms countries with low levels of socioeconomic remain incomplete. In the end, as Hillel development—Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Soifer’s recent book “State Building in Latin and Paraguay—and countries with higher lev- America” underscores, the challenges to the els, such as Uruguay and Chile.9 The dispari- region’s democracies is more fundamental ties between socioeconomic indicators in than weak rule of law, bad infrastructure and LAC’s precarious democratic environment are poor schools—it’s about state capacity and the giving rise to growing social and political tur- political will to institute necessary reforms.8 moil and ferment Access to health and education is increas- Hemispheric efforts to improve human ingly becoming more available to historically security over the last few decades have achieved marginalized populations though quality, par- some important results. The region has made ticularly in education, remains a challenge at remarkable progress in improving socioeco- a time when Latin America lags in competitive- nomic sources of human security. According to ness. According to Americas Quarterly’s Social the Human Development Index, most coun- Inclusion Index, there are vast variations in tries rank between 60 and 80 on a 0-100 scale social inclusion from one country to the next (see figure 3).10 Poverty (and extreme poverty) (and even within). For example, women’s reduction has been dramatic, from a high of rights are lowest in El Salvador, Guatemala, 44 percent in 2002 to 28 percent in 2013,

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while uneven income distribution, one of the instance, the number of poor increased by greatest challenges for democracy and develop- more than two million since 2012.13 ment, has improved with reductions of the One key challenge faced by just about Gini coefficient of one percent a year during every country in LAC is physical security. the last ten years.11 Moreover, more than 50 Citizen insecurity is among the most pressing million people have worked their way up the concerns in LAC today, and one that is shared social and income ladder in LAC in the past across the hemisphere. The question of physi- decade to become members of the middle cal security is not associated with the threat of class –an increase of over 50 percent.12 inter-state conflict, which remains very low, Despite this important progress, Latin despite legacies of territorial disputes. Instead, America’s middle class is precarious, at best— the nature of the threat is internal to states and they are an economic slump away from pov- involves non-state actors (gangs and transna- erty. They have insecure jobs, weak purchasing tional organizations) and individuals (delin- power and lack access to quality education and quents). According to AmericasBarometer, health care for their children. But they also more than half of LAC citizens perceive that have rising expectations, a new stake in the security has worsened over the last decade, and political process, increased access to uncen- citizens perceive physical security as the most sored information via social media and a voice prevailing issue facing communities.14 that demands to be heard. If this new middle Though citizen insecurity affects all, there class were to drop back into poverty, demo- are some significant differences. Argentina, cratic governance could be further in peril. Chile, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, for instance, Additionally, downward trends in inequality have homicide rates of less than eight per and poverty have now leveled off, in large part 100,000 in 2014. Conversely, El Salvador, because of emerging economic stagnation and Venezuela, and Honduras recorded homicide pending structural reforms. In some countries, rates of more than 60 per 100,000; the highest like in the Southern Cone and the Caribbean, levels in the world.15 The same differentiation poverty has begun to creep up. In Mexico, for applies to other crimes like kidnapping and burglaries. Criminal organizations and gangs

74 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE HEMISPHERE continue to proliferate in areas characterized degrees of success vary across the region (see by weak governance and high socioeconomic figure 4). inequalities, and Colombia and Peru continue The IMF projects overall LAC growth to to fight decades-long domestic, albeit consid- decline for the fifth year in a row – from 1.3 erably weakened, insurgencies. To that end, percent in 2014 to a projected less than one centering notions of security on people, rather percent in 2015. The impact of global shifts in than states, enables U.S. policy to target socio- commodity prices is negatively impacting economic causes of insecurity by building state commodity exporters like Argentina, Brazil, capacity and promoting inclusive develop- Canada, and Venezuela, while the cost savings ment. from the drop in oil prices is presenting eco- Liberal economic policies remain the nomic opportunities to Central American and norm throughout hemisphere, despite long- Caribbean nations. Meanwhile, Chinese finan- standing debates as to the role of the state in cial largesse may decline as its economic domestic economies. For the most part, coun- growth slows and returns on existing loans tries have made improvements in macroeco- become underwhelming, reducing the hemi- nomic policy with some success. Inflation sphere’s governments’ ability to fund budget remains relatively low in most countries, aver- deficits. aging six percent in 2014 for most of the Venezuela’s political and economic col- region. According to the World Bank, LAC’s lapse could have severe consequences for middle class is estimated to encompass nearly countries that are dependent on Caracas’ oil 30 percent of the population. However, supply guarantees and financial aid, namely

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Cuba, Nicaragua, and many countries in the United States policy should seek to reassert Caribbean. Brazil is in the midst of its worst visible leadership in multilateral and regional/ economic recession in twenty years while its sub-regional organizations that advance com- political system is facing a corruption scandal mon hemispheric interests. The U.S. should that may lead to further institutional paralysis. not shy away from engaging “other” multilat- Economic stagnation and persistent inequali- eral organizations—like the Community of ties coupled with institutional deficiencies and Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) lack of political will to deal with the structural for example—even if these organizations are challenges facing these societies can lead to viewed as largely ineffectual or seek to deliber- further weakening of democratic rule and ately exclude the United States. The U.S. enhanced social turmoil. U.S. policies in the should seek every opportunity to communi- hemisphere must encourage long-term struc- cate its vision and policy to the region, to tural reforms in order to enhance accountabil- states, regional bodies, and individuals alike— ity, market openness and overall global com- constantly seeking to present, defend and petitiveness. advance universal values. Hemispheric Integration United States Policy in the Hemisphere

The hemisphere continues to develop and Unites States government policy is critical in expand multilateral and regional/sub-regional the expansion and deepening of U.S.-Latin political, economic, social, and security insti- America relations at the levels of interaction tutions. Despite the growing numbers of insti- required to achieve influence (see figure 5). tutions, results across the hemisphere are Only the U.S. government is capable of defin- mixed. Regional blocs like the Pacific Alliance ing and pursuing U.S. national interests, but are outperforming the Bolivarian Alternative increasingly does so by using its instruments for Latin America and the Caribbean (ALBA) of national power to encourage and create the and Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). Organizations such as the ALBA, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Central American Integration System (SICA) and the Organization of American States (OAS), among others, are impaired by ideological overtones, differences in regional priorities or issues of concern/interests, and lack of political will to truly integrate and collaborate. Furthermore, institutions remain largely state-centric missing opportunities to facilitate substantive engagement beyond the state. Still, the presence of these institutions is vital to creating opportunities for inter-American integration and collabora- Focusing instruments of power at all levels of tion on a wide range of converging interests. interaction advances U.S. national interests.

76 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE HEMISPHERE space that enables the density of societal inter- actors, and even individuals to provide the action across all of society in support of U.S. political and policy infrastructure and thrust interests. In this context, Washington contin- to enhance U.S. influence while making prog- ues to drive and influence the political and ress in areas of mutual interests, such as legal framework by which not only states inter- strengthening democratic rule and human act but non-state actors and individual con- rights; promoting economic opportunities and tacts flourish. To that end, the U.S. must assert integration; and addressing the challenges its leadership in developing partnerships with associated with human security. others in the hemisphere. As articulated in the The U.S. should invest its diplomatic National Security Strategy (2015), the U.S. resources on engaging throughout the must continue leading with strength, convic- Americas and the Caribbean across all levels of tion, strategic vision, and with willing and interaction. In North America, U.S. policy capable partners—using all instruments of should center on integration and cooperation national power.16 in energy, economic competitiveness, and As a way to describe the U.S. government’s security. A recent report from the Council on strategic approach in a dynamic, complex Foreign Relations indicates, “if the three North hemispheric environment, this paper uses the American countries deepen their integration organizational concept of DIME (Diplomacy, and cooperation, they have the potential to Information, Military, and Economics) to again shape world affairs for generations to structure and explain a policy by which the come.”17 Additionally, the U.S. should con- U.S. can utilize the instruments of national tinue working with countries experiencing gov- power to engage and influence the different ernance challenges, particularly those in levels of interaction. These instruments of Central America and the Caribbean, to support national power overlap across the levels of democracy promotion programs (rule of law, interaction, and when used effectively, the U.S. transparency, and institution-building sup- can magnify the multiplicity of ties within port) and partner with governments and non- U.S.-LAC relations. In other words, U.S. influ- state actors to address the causes and conse- ence and national interests lay in strengthen- quences of human insecurity. ing and deepening U.S.-LAC relations along U.S. diplomatic interactions with willing the different levels of interaction. Washington partners must continue to focus on strengthen- plays a pivotal role in providing the appropri- ing the Inter-American system. United States ate framework for these ties to thrive. commitment to working through the Inter– American System, particularly through effec- Diplomatic tive organs such as the Inter American United States government interactions with its Commission on Human Rights, Special counterparts in the hemisphere continue to be Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, and the the principal means of interaction and provide Inter-American Defense College (to name just the foundation and structure in which hemi- a few), remains critical to advancing U.S. inter- spheric relations build momentum. In terms ests by way of facilitating and strengthening of the diplomatic tool, the U.S. must continue collaboration along multiple levels of interac- working with governments, non-governmental tion. Strengthening and working through

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multilateral entities should remain central Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern because they can serve as useful platforms for Triangle and encouraging the deepening of the the advancement of universal values like Pacific Alliance process of economic integra- human rights, advancement of the middle tion (though the U.S. is not a member) pro- class, inclusive socio-economic reforms, com- vide effective opportunities to advance U.S. batting corruption, and protecting the environ- interests in the region through minilateralism. ment. However, the current paralysis plaguing Finally, the U.S. can use diplomatic tools the OAS in some areas undermines both inter- working with other governments to promote American collaboration and the pursuit of U.S. people to people interactions. By providing goals and interests. Nevertheless, the U.S. the political and institutional support and should go beyond the status quo to reinvigo- structure for funding, the U.S. can facilitate rate a moribund system that has the potential interactions at the individual level. The most to advance shared approaches to hemispheric recent example of this is the outreach to the challenges and opportunities. Cuban people by President Obama when he As a complement to bolstering the inter- announced a thawing of relations with Cuba American system Washington must continue on December 17, 2014 and re-establishment to leverage bilateral schemes with countries of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and that have the political will to work with the Cuba on July 20, 2015. The cornerstone of the U.S. on issues of mutual interest. The recent policy is recognition that people to people bilateral agreement on climate change with connections matter and have the greatest pros- Brazil offers a useful example. However, there pects of achieving U.S. objectives and interests are limitations to bilateralism as it constrains on the island. the scope of engagement and the degree to Another important example is the Obama which a particular challenge can be addressed administration’s “100,000 Strong in the in a highly transnational and rapidly evolving Americas,” signature education initiative. The environment. As a response to the paralysis of program aims to increase the number of U.S. multilateral mechanisms and the limitations students studying in the Western Hemisphere or narrowness of bilateral arrangements, to 100,000, and the number of Western Moises Naim suggests a new path: “minilater- Hemisphere students studying in the U.S. by alism.” By minilateralism Naim suggests a the same amount by 2020. The initiative is “smarter, more targeted approach: We should supported by a fund established as a public- bring to the table the smallest possible num- private partnership aimed “at enhancing hemi- ber of like-minded countries needed to have spheric competitiveness, increasing prosperity, the largest possible impact on solving a par- and providing study abroad opportunities to ticular problem” or set of problems.18 This better prepare a globally aware and culturally type of diplomacy can include governments as competent workforce.”19 Student exchange is well as non-governmental organizations that nothing new but the priority and political sup- understand that the global or transnational port given by this program has created the con- challenges of today cannot be solved by one text for this type of interaction to intensify and country or even a set of countries that does not advance U.S. interests and influence in the also include non-state actors. Supporting the

78 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE HEMISPHERE region. These are examples of appropriate, hemisphere. Information related capabilities innovative, and effective new initiatives. (IRCs), such as public affairs/public diplomacy and information operations are low-cost, high- Information return capabilities that are required to advance In this, the “information age,” the U.S. must U.S. national interests and priorities. However, be prepared to understand and engage in two- trends are moving in the wrong direction. At way public diplomacy to proactively shape the United States Southern Command, IRCs have information space in support of U.S. policies been cut by nearly 67 percent since 2013, within the hemisphere. This approach recog- severely limiting the Department of Defense’s nizes that information is among the most ability to proactively engage with its regional important instruments of national power as it partners or counter misinformation dissemi- can efficiently access all levels of interaction. nated by state and non-state actors; similar When coupled with credible actions on the trends exist in the Department of State as well. ground, information can maintain and expand U.S. influence in this hemisphere. Diplomatic, By its very nature, information transcends economic, and military instruments have more state borders and facilitates interaction that narrowly defined domains, and are to a sig- enables bonds to develop across states, non- nificantly greater degree controlled by govern- state actors, and individuals ments, but information is only constrained by the lack of fluid and timely execution of communication related activities. By its very The U.S. should dramatically reform and bol- nature, information transcends state borders ster its public diplomacy capacity, focusing on and facilitates interaction that enables bonds clearly defined messages to specific audiences to develop across states, non-state actors, and across the hemisphere. Public-private partner- individuals. United States public diplomacy ships are also instrumental in reaching broad efforts should constantly stand up for and pro- audiences effectively. To expand U.S. reach and mote inter-American values and not be con- impact, it should capitalize on trusted agents strained by regional politics or the preoccupa- to deliver its messages (i.e. local leaders, char- tion of whether people like the U.S. ities, business sector, etc.). The U.S. govern- government or not. ment’s messages must be built on a strong Shaping the information space, as directed understanding of the audiences—meaning the by the National Security Strategy, is critical to information flow must be bidirectional. In maintaining and promoting U.S. interests and other words, the U.S. must listen to the needs priorities. Nevertheless, the U.S. government’s and interests of the hemisphere in order to recent forays in the information domain to effectively pursue positive sum opportunities. counter unaccompanied minors crossing into Social media has become an important the U.S. from Mexico or to help prepare part- form of communication in the hemisphere, ner nations for the potential spread of an epi- being used as both an instrument of vertical demic like Ebola highlight the negative effects accountability and a means by which people- of an under resourced and poorly managed to-people interaction occurs. Today’s rich instrument of national power in this information environment has allowed citizens

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to voice their displeasure to the highest levels free speech, freedom of expression, social and of government, with social media serving as an economic equality, etc.), while countering organization tool to hold its leaders account- messaging efforts by state and non-state actors able; recent anti-corruption protests in Brazil, that threaten the collective interests of the Guatemala, and Honduras were planned and hemisphere. If the political and budget envi- executed via social media outlets. Facebook, ronment in Washington were to allow, it is Twitter, WhatsApp, and YouTube have success- worth considering the re-establishment of a fully linked communities, both in-state and robust institutional information management internationally. Social media users are capacity to replace what was lost with the dis- expected to rise to nearly 300 million users by mantling of USIA. 2018, an increase from 214 million users in Military 2014.20 The U.S. government’s current attempt to leverage social media falls short as it fails to The U.S. military will remain important in pre- truly connect people and ideas—it simply serving and expanding common interests informs people about U.S. government activi- across the hemisphere. The U.S. military’s ties. The U.S. must also attract the skill sets strong, long-standing relationships with its required to optimize the tools available to counterparts in the region can and should help communicators today. The U.S. should better ensure that these militaries maintain high lev- organize and expand its use of social media, in els of professionalism and a commitment to concert with other traditional forms of media democratic principles as they face unique chal- (radio, TV, newspapers, etc.), to inform the lenges. Militaries across the hemisphere are hemisphere about U.S. policies, “and the peo- among the most trusted, adept, and influential ple, values, and institutions which influence institutions in their respective governments those policies.”21 today—second only to the Catholic Church in The U.S. lost a significant asset with the many countries. This is particularly important dissolution of the U.S. Information Agency given the declining legitimacy of other state (USIA) in 1999, and the subsequent decentral- institutions (judiciaries, legislatures, political ization of IRCs across the interagency. This has parties, etc.). Somewhat worrisome, 40 per- made it difficult for the U.S. to prioritize infor- cent of LAC citizens strongly support the mili- mation programs and persistently deliver the tary’s role in combating crime and violence, U.S. message across all levels of interaction. compared to six percent that strongly dis- Furthermore, the information space has agree.22 LAC militaries are increasingly being become exponentially more complex since asked to serve in nontraditional roles, such as 1999, with the advent of rapidly evolving new domestic law enforcement activities, environ- media technologies, and a considerably more mental conservation efforts, protecting energy competitive presence of external and non-state infrastructure, etc., many of which they are not actors in the region. Rather than focus on pro- well prepared for. LAC militaries will remain paganda efforts—the negative association of among the most influential institutions in at the USIA during the Cold War—the U.S. least the near-to-medium terms, and thus, the should strengthen its information capacity to U.S. should strengthen military-to-military promote democratic principles (transparency, institutional links across the region and ensure

80 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE HEMISPHERE continuity in U.S. interests and democratic continue to emphasize developing partner principles. nations’ institutional capacities, strengthening The U.S. military’s primary mission in the transparency and civilian oversight, advancing region must remain the professionalization of the protection of human rights, and promot- militaries across the hemisphere. It should also ing career development, all contributing to play a supporting role to the interagency in overall defense institutions’ resource manage- combating the security challenges facing the ment capacity. The participation of regional hemisphere—transnational organized crime, governments and non-governmental organiza- gangs, cyber threats, corruption, human rights, tion civilians in existing U.S. military programs etc.—as well as continuing to build capacity in also encourages the promotion of domestic areas that enhance professionalism and inter- and international confidence building mea- operability such as peacekeeping, humanitar- sures that can extend beyond the state. One ian assistance, and disaster response (HADR). example is the William J. Perry Center for U.S. military training should focus on deepen- Hemispheric Defense Studies at National ing democratic and institutional reforms. Defense University that engages senior civilian Military-to-military engagements should and military security and defense professionals Department of Defense

Sandi Burges, Bridge Ministries founder, and a U.S. soldier hand out donated soap kits at the Comayaguela Landfill in Honduras May 20, 2014.

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from around the region “to build strong, sus- There has been a nearly 50 percent decline in tainable networks of security and defense lead- FMF in Latin America. IMET funding is signifi- ers and institutions.”23 cantly lower than FMF and has declined The U.S. military’s primary objective in slightly between 2011 and the total requested the region is the same as it should be across in 2015 (see figure ).6 The decline in resources the entire interagency community, strengthen- allocated to U.S. military engagement in the ing institutional capacity in terms of uniformly hemisphere undermines our ability to bolster accepted democratic principles. As such, the our relationships with military institutions U.S. must review, and as necessary, modify and across the hemisphere. Furthermore, hemi- align its policies, programs, funding, and spheric allies will look elsewhere for training authorities to set the conditions and facilitate and technical support if U.S. resources con- the U.S. military’s ability to effectively engage tinue to decline. and achieve measurable progress. The tools It is no secret that the bureaucratic and available to the U.S. military include military cumbersome processes associated with FMF training and education, military operations and FMS weakens U.S. military engagement and exercises, and arms transfer programs, efforts and undermines hemispheric prefer- often through designated programs such as ences for U.S. equipment. These processes, International Military Education and Training which are outdated, have become more bur- (IMET), Defense Institution Building (DIB), densome over time. The U.S. should overhaul Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI), these processes in order to bolster the U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Foreign military’s capacity to provide infrastructure Military Sales (FMS). Overall trends indicate a and equipment to hemispheric militaries. For decline in military assistance to the region. now, given the current challenges in moving

82 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE HEMISPHERE military equipment into the region, the U.S. prevention and institution building. However, military should place greater emphasis on the U.S. military should stand ready to support building the people to people contacts interagency efforts to help regional militaries between U.S. civilian and military personnel prepare for and mitigate the challenges associ- and security and defense professionals across ated with non-traditional missions. U.S. mil- the hemisphere. The Perry Center for itary engagement will prove more relevant Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Inter- than critics ascribe as the trends of deteriorat- American Defense College, the State ing security, prosperity and stability in the Partnership Program—as well as the national region’s democratic states have led many coun- defense colleges across the hemisphere—are tries to utilize their armed forces in efforts to all excellent venues to facilitate relationships restore stability. The transnational nature of between U.S. and hemispheric military person- many of the threats to these countries will nel. These programs should be expanded. make the establishment of common values Additionally, USS Comfort, New Horizons, between national militaries necessary to Medical Readiness Training Exercises, Defense improve their ability to meet these threats as Institution Building (DIB), and Humanitarian they cross each other’s borders. Assistance Program (HAP) funds, for example, Economic build partner nation capacity and create vital links between the U.S. military and hemi- Economic (and political) power are shifting spheric militaries. These activities should be away from governments and toward non-state bolstered and remain at the forefront of the actors, including individuals, who are increas- U.S. military’s engagement portfolio in the ingly shaping world events. Rather than getting hemisphere. in the way of this process, the U.S. should rec- Although the U.S. military is limited in its ognize and encourage the distinctive economic ability to engage beyond the state, centering on interconnections that exist between the U.S. professionalization of the armed forces, with and countries in the region. For instance, emphasis on training and educational Washington needs to expand programs like the exchanges, will reach all levels of interaction Small Business Network of the Americas that and build institutional links vital to advancing link small businesses in the U.S. with those in U.S. national security interests. Along these the Americas offering an opportunity to share lines, the U.S. also should focus on leveraging experiences and know-how, while enhancing capable and willing regional security exporters prospects for the expansion of trade and like Brazil, Colombia, and Chile and engage investments. They also create opportunities them in supporting less stable regions like for engaging in the region at a level with the Central America. greatest impact on U.S.-LAC relations, helping The U.S. must also reconcile the role it to sustain U.S. influence in the Americas. Also, assigns to the U.S. military with the evolving as discussed previously, private-public partner- roles of LAC militaries. The U.S. should not ships in the area of energy, financing and infra- militarize its assistance to crime and violence- structure development, for example, offer a plagued countries in the region, namely differentiated and effective mechanism by Central America. The focus should remain on which to promote U.S. economic interests

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“based on countries’ needs and capabilities abound. Despite diversification of trading rather than historic one-size-fits all approaches partners and sources of investments from to the region.”24 within and outside (mostly Asia) the region, In the economic realm only the state is the U.S. remains the first or second trading able to negotiate bilateral and multilateral partner for nearly every country in the region, agreements providing the political and legal while foreign direct investments (FDI) in Latin framework governing all forms of economic America is twice as high as it was a decade ago, engagement and interaction. For instance, making the U.S. the largest source of FDI in without free trade agreements negotiated and LAC. A recent report from the Inter-American signed by states, like those the U.S. has with Dialogue (2014) notes, that “from 2000-2012, Latin American countries facing the Pacific U.S. FDI in LAC increased by 83 percent, while (except Ecuador) or bilateral investment trea- LAC FDI in the U.S. rose by 43 percent.”26 It is ties which the U.S. has with a number of LAC also important to note that about 90 percent countries, private sector companies and inves- of the $65.5 billion (2014) remittance income tors would not be able to deepen economic destined to the Americas comes from the U.S. ties. There are also areas that need greater These positive trends undercut arguments that efforts on the part of Washington and partners the U.S. is losing ground in the region. China in the region in order to deepen these ties. and other extra-hemispheric economic engage- Double taxation agreements, for instance, have ment in the region should not be seen as a long been called for by the private sectors in threat but in fact an opportunity for the U.S. the U.S. and a number of Latin American to ramp up its game and compete for markets countries. This is a particularly sensitive but and investment opportunities. The U.S. must significant issue in U.S.-Brazil relations. Such leverage all the levels of interaction to expand agreements establish “common standards and our economic interests that, in the end, are rules for each country’s tax revenue services, to mutually beneficial as this helps generate avoid double taxation. Avoiding being penal- growth, employment and development across ized by paying taxes twice encourages new the Americas. Expanding trade and invest- investments allowing for more productivity ments create the conditions for growth and and new jobs and trade.”25 By negotiating and economic opportunities if coupled with the signing such agreements, governments enable appropriate structural reform that ensure that companies in the U.S. and the region to inten- all benefit from greater economic integration. sify their interaction, in turn, improving the The U.S. government must continue pro- lives of citizens in the hemisphere and enhanc- viding a political, legal and bureaucratic ing U.S. influence. framework and the incentives necessary to In the end, however, it is up to U.S. com- facilitate trade and investments. Efforts to de- panies to take the initiative and engage a more fund or shutdown the Export-Import Bank and globalized regional environment in which the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, many companies from within and out of the entities that promote small and medium busi- region are competing for markets and invest- nesses gain a foothold in emerging markets, ment opportunities. The U.S. remains a domi- are short-sighted and counterproductive. nant economic partner but alternatives These agencies have a significant role in

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providing opportunities and employment for providing the leadership and policy outlines, U.S. and LAC businesses and workforces, while international agreements, and political-legal helping to sustain our influence in the region. foundation through which the U.S. as a nation This is the kind of engagement or interaction engages the region. Globalization, technology that makes a real difference in shaping and and the concomitant empowering of non-state strengthening U.S-LAC relations. actors in the Americas has created space for the different levels of interaction to engage one Conclusion another across borders in ways that make a dif- For far too long experts and others that com- ference in the everyday lives of citizens. It is ment on U.S. policy toward LAC have failed to for this reason that U.S. policy should focus on align their analyses and policy recommenda- facilitating and expanding this interconnectiv- tions with the ever more complex and dynamic ity, via the full range of instruments of national nature of contemporary U.S.-LAC relations. power, to create a context for strengthening Critics often use outmoded Cold War frame- partnership and opportunities for mutual gain works to suggest that U.S. is “losing ground” while helping enhance U.S. interests and influ- in the region. Whether alluding to China’s ence in the Americas. PRISM growth in trade and investments or recent diplomatic “inroads” by Russia and Iran, utilizing zero-sum approaches ignores the complexity of hemispheric relations in the 21st Century. Finally, pundits point to the dramatic decline in economic and military aid or the absence of an all-encompassing policy with an exciting moniker such as the Good Neighbor Policy or the Alliance for Progress as proof that the U.S. is ignoring the region and therefore ceding influence to others with a clear anti-American agenda. In today’s context, however, these are not the best or most effective indicators for measuring the true level of support for U.S. policies or leadership. The “real action” or impact is occurring below the state at other levels of interaction where non-state actors and individuals, such as universities, small to large companies, churches, transnational civil society organizations, media, etc. interact with their counterparts throughout the hemisphere in an organic way giving texture and meaning to U.S.-LAC relations. The role of U.S. government policy remains critical in hemispheric relations

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Notes 11 The Gini coefficient (also known as the Gini index or Gini ratio) (/dʒini/ jee-nee) is a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent the income 1 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on Cuba distribution of a nation’s residents, and is the most and Latin America, Florida International University; commonly used measure of inequality (Wikipedia). Miami, FL: 31 July 2015. 12 “Latin America: Middle Class hits Historic 2 Christopher Sabatini, “The new and High,” The World Bank, November 2012, http://www. not-so-new foreign policies in the Americas,” Latin worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/11/13/crecimiento-clase- America Goes Global, June 9, 2015, http://latinamerica- media-america-latina goesglobal.org/2015/06/554/ 13 Emilio Godoy, “Mexico’s Anti-Poverty 3 Ibid. Programmes are Losing the Battle,” Inter Press Service, 4 Connecting the Americas 2022 is a regional August 2015, http://www.ipsnews.net/2015/08/mexicos-anti- initiative that seeks to create a business environment poverty-programmes-are-losing-the-battle/ to accelerate the development of renewable energy, 14 Zechmeister, The Political Culture of Democracy. attract private investments, and bring the best in 15 David Gagne, “InSight Crime 2014 Homicide energy technology to the market with the aim of Round-up,” InSight Crime, January 2015, http://www. delivering affordable electricity to all communities in insightcrime.org/news-analysis/insight-crime-2014-homicide- the Americas by 2022. This initiative, which is being round-up led by Colombia and the United States, was launched 16 Barack Obama, “2015 National Security at the Sixth Summit of the Americas in April 2012. Strategy,” White House, February 2015, https://www. Five months later, the region’s foreign ministers met whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_secu- in New York to further discussions on the strengthen- rity_strategy.pdf ing of regulatory frameworks and electrical intercon- 17 David Petraeus. Robert Zoellick, and Shannon nections to achieve access to electricity for all citizens K. O’Neil, “North America: Time for a New Focus,” within a decade and improve the quality of life of the Council on Foreign Relations, October 2014, http://www. peoples of the Americas. cfr.org/north-america/north-america/p33536 5 “Declaration on Security in the Americas,” 18 Moises Naim, “Minilateralism: The Magic Organization of American States, 2003, https://www.oas. Number to get real International Action,” Foreign org/en/sms/docs/DECLARATION%20SECURITY%20 Affairs, June 21, 2009, http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/21/ AMERICAS%20REV%201%20-%2028%20OCT%202003%20 minilateralism/ CE00339.pdf 19 “100,000 Strong in the Americas Explained,” 6 Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, The Political Culture U.S. Department of State, 2015, http:// of Democracy in the Americas, 2014: Democratic www.100kstrongamericas.org/100000-strong-explained Governance across 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer 20 “Internet Society Global Internet Report 2014: (Nashville: LAPOP, 2014). Open and Sustainable Access for All,” Internet Society, 7 “Democracy Index 2014: Democracy and its 2014, https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/ Discontents,” The Economist, 2015, http://www. Global_Internet_Report_2014_0.pdf sudestada.com.uy/Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b24- 21 “United States. Information Agency: Archive,” 2504a37f6b56/Democracy-index-2014.pdf U.S. Department of State, 2015, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ 8 Hillel David Soifer, State Building in Latin usia/ America, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 22 Zechmeister, The Political Culture of Democracy. 2015 23 “William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric 9 Rebecca Bintrim, Wilsa Escarfuller, Defense Studies Website” at National Defense Christopher Sabatini, Alana Tummino and Adam University, http://chds.dodlive.mil/about/. Wolsky, “The Social Inclusion Index: 2014,” Americas 24 Daniel Restrepo and Frank O. Mora, “The US, Quarterly, 2014, http://www.americasquarterly.org/charticles/ China and Latin America: Taking Advantage of socialinclusionindex2014/social_inclusion_index_2014.pdf Globalization and Moving Beyond a Threat Matrix,” 10 “Human Development Report 2014: (conference presentation, China, the US and the Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities Future of Latin America, New York, NY, June 11-12, and Building Resilience,” UNDP, 2014, http://hdr.undp. 2015). org/en/2014-report

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25 Ricardo Sennes, “U.S.-Brazil Relations: A New Beginning? How to Strengthen the Bilateral Agenda,” Adrienne Arsht Center, Atlantic Council: June 2015. 26 J. F. Hornbeck, “US-Latin American Trade and Investment in the 21st Century: What’s Next for Deepening Integration?” Inter-American Dialogue, 2014, http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2014/13718.pdf

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©Colombian Government

Locals participate in an act of symbolic reparations in Antioquia, a state located in central northwestern Colombia.

88 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 1 After the Negotiations How Reconstruction Teams Can Build a Stronger Peace in Colombia

BY AGUSTIN E. DOMINGUEZ

or more than a decade, Plan Colombia guided our joint U.S.-Colombia efforts to combat narcotics and, more importantly for Colombia, the insurgents of the Revolutionary Armed F Forces of Colombia (FARC) carrying out the illicit trade. By the end of 2014, the Colombian military, with targeted U.S. support, had degraded the FARC’s capacity by 68 percent from its peak in 2002. Relentless pressure on the organization forced them to join the Government of Colombia in peace talks in Havana, and, for the first time in six attempts at peace negotiations, power resided with the state. The talks, which began in November 2012, have led to partial agreements on three of five agenda items, though the most contentious issues, transitional justice and end of conflict, remain to be solved. The talks are also entering a delicate stage. Last December (2014) the FARC announced an indefinite and unilateral ceasefire and largely abided by it until an attack on April 15, 2015, killed eleven Colombian soldiers and wounded an additional twenty. In response to the attack, President Juan Manuel Santos ended the suspension of airstrikes against the FARC in effect since March 2015 and ordered the military to intensify operations, resulting in approximately 40 rebels killed by the end of May. Despite the recent heightened tensions, the 37th round of peace talks began on May 25, 2015, and progress has been made on other issues such as the March 7th joint humanitarian demining agreement. On February 23, 2015, in a move welcomed by both sides, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Special Envoy Bernie Aronson to the negotiations. The appointment highlights the United States’ support for the peace process and willingness to help both sides resolve the remaining obstacles to reach a final accord. Even so, for a country faced with the challenges of recent setbacks and the realization that for more than 50 years it fought a war for which no combat-only solution exists, reaching the final peace accord will be easy compared to the large and difficult task of implementing it. Yet, President Santos has declared 2015 the “Year of Peace and Progress,”1 and to deliver, his government will have to build confidence in the peace process. MAJ Agustin E. Dominguez is the Andean Ridge Officer in the Deputy Directorate for Politico- Military Affairs (Western Hemisphere), Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, The Joint Staff .

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For that reason, and in order to reach a stron- rural Colombia has lacked legitimate state ger, more durable peace, Colombia should presence and authority, enabling the FARC to accompany the disarmament, demobilization, become the dominant force and use the drug and reintegration (DDR) process with a trade to fuel its insurgency. Colombian model of provincial reconstruction In September 1999, with his country spi- teams (PRTs) to extend state presence to the raling out of control and a failed peace process rural areas, and address the root causes of the under his belt, Colombian President Andrés conflict. Pastrana announced “Plan Colombia.” Plan Colombia was a Clinton administration- Plan Colombia and the Democratic Security Policy backed initiative to prevent Colombia’s collapse by combating drug production and traf- How did Colombia evolve from a near failed ficking; increasing the capacity of the state to a country with real prospects for peace Colombian security forces; and providing with the FARC? In 1999, Colombia was suf- development assistance to bolster prosperity. fering two separate, but related security crises: One of the major strengths of Plan Colombia the fight against the FARC and the explosion has been its staying power and, in 2002, newly of drug production and trafficking organiza- elected Colombian President Álvaro Uribe tions throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The found another committed U.S. partner in genesis of both crises was Colombia’s inability President George W. Bush. The expansion of to exercise state authority over most the coun- Department of Defense authorities in the after- try, especially the rural areas. Historically, math of the September 11, 2001 terrorist ©Columbian Government

Charco, Nariño: a rural area in southwest Colombia that has been plagued by an active FARC presence

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attacks against the United States aided Spanish acronym). It is important to note that President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy most Colombian citizens in the rural areas are to expand state control over Colombia. neither FARC nor part of the RAT, yet they fear During Uribe’s first term, from 2002 to 2006, that peace implementation and demobiliza- the military successfully recovered Medellín, tion of the FARC will result in a security vac- Cali, and Bogotá and its surrounding areas uum in their communities. Their fear is rea- from FARC control.2 From 2006 to 2010, the sonable based on the Colombian government’s Ministry of Defense, under the leadership of historical inability to provide state presence in Juan Manuel Santos, pivoted to a FARC-centric rural areas. strategy aimed at reducing the number of 3 Consolidation – A Road Paved with FARC and eliminating their leadership. At the Good Intentions end of the Uribe administration, the FARC had been reduced from approximately 20,000 to A quick search of the definition for “consolida- an estimated 9,000 active insurgents. tion” yields results that include “unification” Largely as a result of his success as and “strengthening,” but in the Colombian Minister of National Defense, Santos was context, consolidation refers to government elected to succeed Uribe as president in 2010. institutions uniting their security, justice, and During the first two years of the Santos admin- development efforts to introduce and istration, the military pursued another FARC- strengthen the presence of the state in previ- centric strategy known as Sword of Honor with ously ungoverned spaces. Sergio Jaramillo, the goal of reducing the FARC by another 50 Colombia’s High Commissioner for Peace and percent. The ability of the FARC to find safe former Vice Minister of Defense, observed in haven in indigenous areas and in neighboring 2009 that “the problem is not the concept or countries caused the conflict to plateau and the idea…All those things are obvious…It’s made a military combat solution nearly not a question of the ‘what’; it’s a question of impossible. Then Minister of Defense Juan the ‘how,’ and the ‘how’ is the really difficult Carlos Pinzón, a former Vice Minister under thing.”4 This is so difficult, in fact, that Santos, called for a strategic review of the cam- Colombia’s history is riddled with consolida- paign plan. The resulting change to Sword of tion failures. The 1958 Special Commission Honor was to focus the campaign on winning for Rehabilitation lasted only two years due to the hearts and minds of the indigenous popu- disagreements among the commission’s min- lation in the rural areas, the enemy’s center of isters, each with different equities. A 1960s gravity. At that point, it was a matter of when, welfare program aimed at conflict zones failed not if, peace negotiations would occur. due to lack of resources. In 1983, the Despite the successes of the Colombian Colombian government launched the National government and security forces, the FARC still Rehabilitation Plan, which eventually col- maintain influence in rural areas, primarily lapsed in 1990 due to lack of focus and coor- along the borders with Ecuador and Venezuela. dination.5 In these areas, the FARC receive active support One of Colombia’s better consolidation from an estimated 35,000 people of the so- initiatives has been the Center for the called Terrorism Support Network (RAT by the Coordination of Integral Action (CCAI),

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established in May 2004. By the end of 2009, agencies critical for expanding government ser- as the Uribe administration was nearing its vices. In classic counterinsurgency strategy, the end, CCAI had achieved results that far sur- military will, theoretically, clear-and-hold a passed those of previous consolidation efforts. conflict zone until the security situation is suf- However, the results achieved were in spite of ficiently stabilized for a transition to civilian the organization’s structure, not because of it. agencies that will execute the build phase. In CCAI, because it was established by presiden- practice, the Colombian military is doing all tial decree as opposed to legislation, did not three. Lacking the ability to build local gover- have a budget allocation. Instead, it received nance capacity, the military’s focus is on win- unspent funds from contributing ministries’ ning hearts and minds through short-term budgets.6 Additionally, the lack of legislation reconstruction projects such as building roads meant there was no enforcement mechanism and schools. But these types of “quick-win” and, as such, ministers could not be mandated projects do nothing to address the long-term to provide personnel to CCAI.7 Thus, the defi- problems of development. While the Ministry ciency in the legal basis created a perverse dis- of Defense is well intentioned in attempting to fill this gap, the failure of the rest of the gov- Lacking the ability to build local governance ernment to participate produces negative unin- capacity, the military’s focus is on winning tended results. That responsibility for develop- hearts and minds through short-term ment falls on personnel that are inadequately reconstruction projects such as building roads trained for those tasks further erodes trust and and schools. But these types of “quick-win” confidence in the state for failing to provide projects do nothing to address the long-term the services that consolidation promises. problems of development Without immediate correction, these shortfalls will be exacerbated in the event of a peace agreement. The Colombian military will tortion that made consolidation last in priori- not be able to effectively and simultaneously ties for manning and funding from provide security, continue development activi- contributing government ministries. CCAI’s ties, and implement the peace by disarming accomplishments were the result of the influ- and demobilizing the FARC, all while the ence and devotion of its Directive Council. Colombian population will, reasonably, be The failure to institutionalize, vice personalize, expecting their share of the peace dividend. CCAI’s effectiveness caused the program to The DDR Paradox stall. Since taking office in 2010, President In spite of the historical challenges it has Santos has launched strategic reviews of the encountered with consolidation, Colombia is, National Plan for Consolidation and revised arguably, perfectly positioned to implement a the program slightly. Nevertheless, consolida- peace process with the FARC, having executed tion continues to be under-resourced and over- at least seven different DDR processes.8 In militarized. The military’s success on the 1989, the former rebel group 19th of April battlefield has resulted in their presence in Movement (M-19) successfully demobilized conflict zones far in advance of the civilian and transitioned into a political movement. A

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testament to their successful transition is the fulfilling its end of the deal. If the FARC do election of a former M-19 guerilla as the mayor not push rural Colombians through the DDR of Bogotá. The demobilization of the right process, then the excluded portions of society, wing paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces allegedly at the heart of the FARC’s struggle, of Colombia (AUC) from 2002-2006 led to will remain in the same situation they were in sharp declines in violence levels across the when the war began a half-century ago. The country, although remnants of the group con- latter scenario reveals the sad paradox of DDR tinue to maintain control over large drug traf- – the process benefits perpetrators, not victims, ficking operations and other illicit activities. Additionally, Colombia currently con- The objective of PRTs was to aid the host- ducts successful individual demobilizations of nation’s ability to extend the power and rebels through the Colombian Agency for presence of the central government; increase Reintegration (ACR). One of the major les- the capacity of local governments; advance sons learned from the process with the AUC is security; and promote development that the central government did not properly coordinate the reintegration program with of the conflict. In this instance, the FARC local authorities, which left the population would receive benefits to enter legitimately uninformed and fueled the perception that the into Colombian society while the original rea- central government has abandoned them.9 sons they took up arms – poverty, inequality, Notwithstanding Colombia’s vast experience and the persistent lack of state presence in the in DDR, and the many lessons learned, the rural communities – remain unaddressed. The country has never executed DDR on the scale, Government of Colombia, with support from or as politically sensitive, as is anticipated with the U.S., adopted a Colombia-specific solution the FARC. Implementation of the peace must to the security crises in 1999 with great suc- be done well or the Government of Colombia cess. It can do so again for peace implementa- risks backsliding to a state of near perpetual tion and consolidation by adopting its own war. model of provincial reconstruction teams to The problem inherent with DDR is that address the issue of security and development the process is typically designed for combat- in rural Colombia. ants, meaning it will only seek to reintegrate The “How” – Enter PRTs the approximate 8,000-armed FARC guerillas into Colombian society. The question then is The United States first introduced Provincial what to do with the RAT and other residents of Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, and later rural communities that are neither FARC nor Iraq, to improve civil-military operations and RAT. One possible scenario is for the FARC to interagency coordination in post-conflict envi- insert large portions of the RAT and others into ronments. The objective of PRTs was to aid the the DDR process to get as many benefits for as host-nation’s ability to extend the power and many of their supporters as possible. This sce- presence of the central government; increase nario would likely overwhelm the state’s the capacity of local governments; advance capacity and undermine the peace process by security; and promote development. To creating the impression the government is not achieve those ends, PRTs required effective

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collaboration and integration by the so-called The effectiveness of the civilian surge was 3Ds: defense, diplomacy and development. As also hampered by the fact that personnel in such, The Department of Defense (DoD), the civilian agencies could not be ordered to Department of State (DoS), and U.S. Agency deploy; they had to volunteer. This prevented for International Development (USAID) the DoS and USAID from identifying those played prominent roles in U.S.-led PRTs. Even personnel with the requisite skills to accom- so, there was no set structure for PRTs and, plish the mission, comparable to the problems indeed, U.S. PRTs were organized differently Colombia encountered with the CCAI. in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, coalition- Moreover, many of the civilians that did led PRTs also had their own models and deploy lacked the language and cultural exper- slightly different operational focus. Even tise to be effective. In addition, whatever gains within the two countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. PRTs made in Afghanistan and Iraq did PRTs might be organized differently with vari- not have a lasting effect because of the fact that ous levels of other agencies’ participation local populations, and the enemy, understood depending on local conditions and require- that the foreign forces providing security, gov- ments. While this amount of flexibility allows ernance, and development would eventually for operational commanders to determine leave. their own local requirements and priorities, Notwithstanding the identified shortfalls many U.S. PRT veterans believe the program of PRTs, Colombia’s adoption of its own PRT would have benefitted from an agreed concept program to parallel the DDR effort with the of operations, a central coordinating agency, FARC will yield a stronger, more durable peace. and explicit military and civilian roles.10 First and foremost, Colombia is fighting an Another problem that U.S.-led PRTs faced internal war. Colombia’s version of PRTs is that civilian agencies did not have the capac- would be fighting to secure peace in their own ity to properly staff and resource the war country and would not be hampered by lack efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, it was of language or cultural expertise, or the lead- not until then-Secretary of Defense Robert time it would take to develop those skills. Gates and then-Secretary of State Hillary Furthermore, the establishment of PRTs, irre- Clinton implemented the “civilian surge” in spective of a peace accord, offers several strate- 2009-2010 that PRTs, and the war effort as a gic benefits. By tackling the issue of security whole, benefited from improved civilian staff- and development in the FARC’s zones of influ- ing, funding, and administrative support. ence, the Colombian government will build Colombia’s Ambassador to the U.S. has confidence in the peace process by demon- warned of similar interagency shortfalls in the strating its willingness to address the root Sword of Honor campaign against the FARC.11 causes of the conflict. In addition, the PRTs’ By the time the civilian surge occurred in presence in the FARC’s primary areas of influ- Afghanistan, the U.S. had missed the window ence would help drive a wedge between the of opportunity to consolidate the security FARC and their supporters. This is a key gains that the U.S. military and host-nation advantage of the PRTs because it cuts off sup- security forces had achieved. port for the anticipated members of the FARC that refuse to demobilize, instead seeking to

94 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 AFTER THE NEGOTIATIONS continue their illicit ways. Alternately, should (COET) could then negotiate different roles the peace process fail, a rift between the FARC for interagency civilian and military personnel and its bases of support would render the reb- and provide clear direction to PRT command- els less effective should hostilities resume. ers. The COET is responsible for advising the Perhaps more importantly, the portions of government’s negotiators on DDR and plan- society most affected by the conflict and disil- ning and implementation of DDR. The mili- lusioned by previous peace processes would tary also has the most detailed information finally receive the state provided services they regarding the country’s security environment. deserve. As such, the COET will have key insights to the strengths and weaknesses of the DDR model A Colombian Model – DRTs and where PRTs could most significantly To ensure the proper level of central coordina- address those gaps. Additionally, because the tion and budget allocation that failed previous military has been at the forefront of consolida- consolidation efforts lacked, Colombia’s PRTs tion efforts thus far, they have explicit knowl- should fall under the Ministry of Post-Conflict, edge as to where PRT efforts would provide the Human Rights, and Citizen Security (Post- biggest impact to communities and return on Conflict). The Minister of Post-Conflict in investment to the government. Working coordination with the Commander of the through the Ministry of Post-Conflict as the newly created Strategic Transition Command central coordinating agency would eliminate ©Columbian Government

Over 100 participants receive training from Colombia’s Agency for Reintegration, a government organization devoted to the reintegration of members of illegal armed groups who voluntarily demobilize, either individually or collectively.

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the ad hoc arrangements, guidelines, and pri- even if its long-term success cannot yet be fully orities that U.S. veterans complained plagued determined. What is discernible is that the the U.S. programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Colombian government will not have the Additionally, the cabinet-level Post-Conflict resources for a similar effort. Additionally, the Minister, who reports directly to the President time required to properly carry out such an of Colombia, can work to eliminate inter- ambitious plan does not lend itself to the agency turf battles, direct civilians under his political sensitivities of the peace process, as charge, and ask the President to direct agencies the Colombian government will be under to match the military’s current capabilities and pressure to deliver quick results in a post-con- resourcing to ensure robust PRTs. An alternate flict environment. In comparison with the organizational solution would be for PRTs to ISAF strategy, Colombia is divided into a man- fall under Colombia’s High Commissioner for ageable 32 departments plus the capital dis- Peace in the executive branch of government. trict. Moreover, not all of these departments Because the High Peace Commissioner reports are created equal. Some are richer than others; directly to the President, he would enjoy some some are more urban than rural; and some of the same advantages from directing civilian have been disproportionately affected by the agencies as the Minister of Post-Conflict, but conflict. The five biggest and most prosperous would likely have the same resource con- cities in Colombia – Bogotá, Medellin, straints experienced by the CCAI. Cartagena, Cali, and Barranquilla – have mostly capable authorities and are able to gov- Living in their operational areas would allow ern themselves and even assist nearby munici- the DRTs to provide an element of security for palities.13 In view of these reasons, Colombia’s the population while simultaneously extending version of PRTs should reside in the depart- the presence of the state’s civilian agencies ment capitals in the form of Departmental that have had limited or no presence in the Reconstruction Teams (DRTs). Furthermore, past the Ministry of Post-Conflict, in coordination with the COET, should determine key terrain departments to focus the government’s limited The 2009 “civilian surge” in Afghanistan resources. Initial DRT efforts should focus on aimed to improve district governance through- Antioquia, Cauca, Choco, and Valle del Cauca out the country in the hopes of providing the in the west, Arauca, Meta, and Caquetá in the stability required to successfully counter an center-south and Putumayo, Huila, and insurgency. Faced with the impossibility of Nariño in the southwest. It is essential to transforming 401 districts throughout the emphasize the importance of determining the large, geographically complex, and tribally key terrain departments in coordination with diverse country, the International Security the COET, to link the effort to the DDR plan Assistance Force (ISAF) focused on 94 key ter- and maximize the chances of success through rain districts and 44 area of interest districts.12 unity of effort. This narrowed focus allowed ISAF, Afghan National Security Forces and local governments to make significant short-term progress,

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DRTs’ Structure – Demilitarize and reliant on military forces. Militarized consoli- Decentralize dation in post-conflict zones by Colombia, and by the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan, has DRTs, from their regional hubs, would focus often been criticized because it perpetuates the on building the capacity of the departmental belief in those communities that the state is governments, led by a governor and assembly, failing to deliver on its promises, and citizens and when applicable, the subordinate munici- worry about the vacuum that will be left when palities. Furthermore, the DRTs would have the military departs.14 In this regard, the DRTs the flexibility to operate in the villages and should be modeled more like the UK-led or towns of rural Colombia, carrying out devel- German-led version of PRTs in which military opment and reconstruction projects where the involvement in reconstruction was limited; the FARC has historically been the dominant force. degree of civil-military integration was higher Living in their operational areas would allow than that of the U.S.-led PRTs where civilians the DRTs to provide an element of security for were embedded into military teams; and the the population while simultaneously extend- responsiveness to UN and NGO suggestions ing the presence of the state’s civilian agencies was high.15 that have had limited or no presence in the All DRTs would have a military deputy past. This would relieve the military of being commander and a core three-pillar structure of the sole provider of security for the population governance, development, and security (prefer- in these areas, allowing them to execute their ably including a police representative). This other constitutionally mandated missions with structure resembles the 3D concept, except that maximum flexibility. Moreover, as DRTs build diplomacy is replaced with governance because local governance capacity, they would also be of the internal nature of the Colombian effort. empowering those entities to execute their The DRTs’ military deputies provide continuity own budgets and development plans, saving of personnel that have been involved in con- the state resources that can be applied to the solidation efforts thus far and a link to the DDR effort or subsequent consolidation efforts local commander of forces, keeping the DRTs in other departments and municipalities. updated on the security environment. Unlike the U.S. military-led version of Furthermore, the military deputies provide a PRTs in Afghanistan, civilians that report to the link to the COET and the execution of disar- Minister of Post-Conflict should lead mament and demobilization. As DDR pro- Colombia’s DRTs. The Colombian military, gresses and the plan adjusts, the COET can much like the U.S. military in Afghanistan and inform the military deputies, and they, in turn, Iraq, far outpaced its civilian counterparts in can advise the DRT commanders to adjust reaching Colombia’s conflict zones. Having a their plans as necessary to complement the civilian leader would force the Ministry of DDR effort. At this point, DRT commanders Post-Conflict to take greater ownership of con- would only need to inform the Ministry of solidation and incentivize other agencies to Post-Conflict of the next phase to their plans, provide their best personnel. A common thus ensuring the whole-of-government shortfall of all of Colombia’s consolidation approach to DDR and Consolidation is efforts thus far is that they have been overly

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centrally coordinated, but executed with interests by projecting the state’s presence and decentralized control. legitimacy in the communities most affected Beyond the three core pillars, the structure by the conflict. Additionally, the FARC, as of DRTs could be tailored to include experts defenders of rural Colombia, would be able to from other ministries, such as justice, agricul- claim a win for their supporters, therefore ture, health, education, and transportation, building confidence in the peace process. based on the local requirements developed by More importantly, the central and local gov- the DRT leadership in consultation with the ernments would have the capacity to tackle the departmental governor and commander of root causes of the conflict by providing for the Colombian security forces in the area. In some large, disaffected portions of society that are departments, economic infrastructure might the FARC’s center of gravity. Should Colombia be the focus; in others, the sustainability of the adopt its own version of provincial reconstruc- licit agrarian sector might be the priority; and tion teams, the United States should once others might be in desperate need of urban again stand ready to respond with targeted development in cities in order to accommo- support. Such efforts would solidify the date the influx of internally displaced per- United States’ special relationship with sons.16 Consolidation must be centrally coor- Colombia and strengthen support for the dinated because the state will provide the peace process. PRISM majority of the resources for DRTs, but each team will need the decentralized authority to build and execute their own departmental plans.

Peace and Progress

In order to achieve President Santos’ goal of peace and progress, the Government of Colombia must strengthen the real security gains it achieved during the last 15 years. To do so, the state will have to extend the presence and legitimacy of the central government, build the capacity of smaller local governments, project security to large swaths of the countryside, and promote development, all while undertaking the huge task of managing a large and politically sensitive DDR process with the FARC. To increase its chances of achieving a strong and durable peace, the Government of Colombia should implement its own model of PRTs in specifically targeted departments under a centrally coordinated effort. Doing so will advance Colombia’s

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Notes (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2012). 15 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “PRTs in Afghanistan: 1 Juan Manuel Santos, President of Colombia, Successful but not Sufficient,” DIID Report, 2005:6 Christmas address, Bogotá, Colombia, December 24, accessed at http://www.nps.edu/CSRS/Resources/Civ-mil/ 2014, accessed March 16, 2015 http://todaycolombia. Jakobsen%20PRTs_danes.pdf on 26 May 2015. com/2015-will-be-the-year-of-peace-and-progress-for-colom- 16 Fagen, “Colombia: urban futures in conflict bia/. zones.” 2 Peter DeShazo, Johanna Mendelson Forman, and Phillip McLean, “Countering Threats to Security and Stability in a Failing State: Lessons from Colombia” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 23. 3 Juan Carlos Pinzón, Minister of National Defense, “Colombia at a Crossroads: A Conversation with Colombia’s Minister of National Defense,” (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013). 4 Matthew Devlin, “Organizing the Return of Government to Conflict Zones: Colombia, 2004- 2009,” Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University, accessed at http://www.princeton.edu/ successfulsocieties on 20 May 2015. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 David Spencer, “Recommendations for Colombian Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)” (Washington, DC: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2013), 3. 9 Jonathan Morgenstein, “Consolidating Disarmament: Lessons from Colombia’s Reintegration Program for Demobilized Paramilitaries,” (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008), 2. 10 Robert M. Perito, “The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified,” (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 1. 11 Pinzón, “Colombia at a Crossroads.” 12 Frances Z. Brown, “The U.S. Surge and Afghan Local Governance: Lessons for Transition,” (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2012), 6. 13 Patricia Weiss Fagen, “Colombia: urban futures in conflict zones,” (Norway: The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2015), 2. 14 Adam Isacson, “Colombia’s ‘security and development’ zones await a civilian handoff, while Washington backs away from the concept,”

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 99 AUTHOR

Ecuadorian Government

Socialist parade in conjunction with the XII Presidential Summit of ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) held in Guayas, Ecuador in July 2013. ALBA is a regional intergovernmental organization named in honor of Simón Bolívar who wanted to see Hispanic American united as a single nation.

100 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 1 Russia in Latin America A Strategic Analysis

BY DOUGLAS FARAH AND LIANA EUSTACIA REYES

n recent years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has hardly veiled his desire to lead Russia back to superpower status. Putin’s rhetoric emphasizes a multipolar world where the United IStates is no longer the dominant power, and his actions present Russian global leadership as a viable alternative to the United States’. Increasingly visible is the multifaceted nature of Russia’s tactics for undermining U.S. power projection in multiple theaters, including Latin America. Leaders of the U.S. defense and intelligence communities have responded to Russia’s growing global assertiveness by repeatedly singling out Russia as the primary military and strategic threat to the United States, particularly following Russia’s recent annexation of Crimea and hostile activities in Ukraine. In March 2015, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper labeled Russia a “threat actor” and an example of a nation where “the nexus among organized crime, state actors, and business blurs the distinction between state policy and private gain.”1 The 2015 National Military Strategy presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that Russia “has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not respect the sovereignty of its neighbors and it is willing to use force to achieve its goals. Russia’s military actions are undermining regional security directly and through proxy forces.”2 The accuracy of these assessments of Russian intentions and capabilities can be documented throughout many parts of the world. Yet this lens is seldom used in analyzing the burgeoning Russian diplomatic and military presence in Latin America – particularly in Central America. The formal Russian state presence is accompanied by state business ventures, soft power overtures, increasing Russian organized criminal activity, and the reactivation of Cold War proxy networks. While seldom part of the strategic analysis of the new Russian state, there is clear evidence that

Douglas Farah is President of IBI Consultants and a Senior Associate of the Americas Program at CSIS. Liana Eustacia Reyes is the Research Coordinator for IBI Consultants.

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Latin America, considered an area of vital Russia and other extra-regional actors such as interest to the United States, is now an area of China and Iran strengthen the hands of a bloc intense Russian state interest and activity. of radical populist governments, is the long- As General John Kelly, commander of the standing U.S. goal of establishing functioning U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) democracies under the rule of law with stable noted in recent Congressional testimony, “it economic growth. The U.S. is simultaneously has been over three decades since we last saw facing a concerted effort by a significant alli- this type of high-profile Russian presence” in ance of Latin American governments to erase Latin America.3 In his command’s 2015 any trace of U.S. military and security doctrine, Posture Statement Kelly added that: weaken economic and cultural ties, and por- tray any and all U.S. policy decisions as seek- Periodically since 2008, Russia has pur- ing to recolonize Latin America. sued an increased presence in Latin The once-shared hemispheric values of a America through propaganda, military functioning democratic system are being arms and equipment sales, counterdrug replaced by a toxic mix of anti-democratic val- agreements, and trade. Under President ues, massive corruption, and a doctrine that Putin, however, we have seen a clear return draws on totalitarian models, embraces mul- to Cold War tactics. As part of its global tiple terrorist groups, and includes an explicit strategy, Russia is using power projection in justification for the use of weapons of mass an attempt to erode U.S. leadership and destruction against the United States.5 challenge U.S. influence in the Western This article is not intended to cover the Hemisphere. . .While these actions do not full range of Russian commercial, diplomatic, pose an immediate threat, Russia’s activi- and military activity in Latin America, which ties in the hemisphere are concerning and was recently done by R. Evan Ellis of the U.S. underscore the importance of remaining Army War College.6 Rather, it aims to illumi- engaged with our partners.4 nate the nexus described by Clapper, the stra- This is not to say that Russia in Latin tegic objectives behind that nexus, and the real America presents an imminent military threat and potential threat the nexus poses to U.S. to the United States. But Russian officials have interests. A brief case study on Central America been brazen about their desire to undermine is included to provide a more in depth view of and confront the United States in the Western Russian expansion in the hemisphere. Hemisphere, its main sphere of influence, to Russia’s Expansion in the West: Past counter what Russia perceives as U.S. interfer- and Present ence in Russia’s border territories. In the current Latin American context Russia has made During the Cold War, the Soviet Union relied greater progress toward their goals than is usu- on its allies Cuba and Nicaragua (the latter for ally acknowledged. only a decade), but Russia now has at least While the U.S. position remains preemi- seven unconditional allies in the region.7 Most nent – due to geographic proximity, cultural of its allies are among the least democratic and ties, and trade ties – it is eroding more quickly most repressive states in the hemisphere. than is often understood. Also eroding, as

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During the past two years Russia has expanded the world stage, consistently sides with anti- its dealings with these nations at a rapid pace. U.S., totalitarian governments such as Russia, The dominant organization of Latin Syria, North Korea, and Zimbabwe. The bloc American nations allying with Russia is the also supports organizations designated as ter- Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our rorists by the United States and Europe, such America (known by the Spanish acronym, as the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces ALBA);8 a bloc of nations, many of whose of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias leaders had long-standing ties with the former de Colombia – FARC), Hezbollah, and the Soviet Union. They share Russia’s perception Basque separatist ETA. It is worth noting that of the United States as an imperialist nation the U.S. Treasury Department has formally bent on dominating and interfering with the designated at least six senior Venezuelan offi- sovereignty of others that must be suppressed.9 cials for materially supporting the FARC and The ALBA nations have increasingly become an the FARC’s cocaine trafficking activities.11 alliance of highly criminalized states that, on Presidency of the Nation Argentina

Argentinian President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Russian President Vladimir Putin toast during his first visit to Argentina (July 2014).

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Russia’s ALBA allies include several of hold them accountable for human rights viola- Latin America’s most important countries, tions or electoral fraud.13 In return, these Latin including Venezuela, whose late President American allies are shielding Russia from Hugo Chávez used Venezuela’s oil wealth to international isolation, providing political and become Russia’s main weapons client in the diplomatic support, and an important regional region; and Argentina, whose mercurial presi- media network that blankets the continent. dent Cristina Fernández de Kirchner signed a The media network offers coordinated 2014 “strategic partnership” agreement with messages of unstinting support for Putin and Putin and who regularly posts on her Twitter Russia’s aggressive actions in Europe while account high praise for the Russian president. casting the United States as a global aggressor. While not formally a member of ALBA, At the same time, these countries are increas- Fernández de Kirchner has led Argentina to ing Russia’s access to the hemisphere’s ports become one of the most fanatical and vocal and airspace, and ultimately, increasing supporters of the ALBA bloc, both financially Russia’s sphere of influence in a region where and politically (even hosting ALBA’s ten year the United States has seldom been so directly anniversary summit),12 while vociferously challenged.14 backing Russia at every opportunity. Although the Putin government, unlike the Soviet government’s high point, is under Russia’s expanded outreach to the ALBA bloc significant economic stress and as a result has helps insure that Russia’s Latin American allies little to offer in terms of material support, it have a powerful friend on the United Nations generously promises mega projects that rarely Security Council to veto any efforts to hold come to fruition. Additionally, Russia has them accountable for human rights violations signed dozens of memoranda of understand- or electoral fraud ing with Latin American countries that are vague and, if consistent with past behavior, likely to be left unfulfilled. In Central America, Russia’s leading allies But a careful review of Russia’s activities in are Nicaragua and El Salvador. In Nicaragua, the region shows that, despite limited former and current Sandinista President resources, Russia has focused on delivering in Daniel Ortega (1979-1990 and 2007- present) a few key areas, all designed to directly chal- is known for having made his nation a Soviet lenge the United States in areas where it has and Cuban proxy during the Cold War. In El seldom faced competition before: Salvador, President Salvador Sánchez Cerén, a ■■ The sale of weapons: In addition to hun- former Marxist guerilla commander, has cre- dreds of thousands of the most technologi- ated an inner circle that is mostly comprised cally advanced AK-47 assault rifles, sales of Soviet-trained insurgents who fought U.S.- include tanks, helicopters, supersonic com- backed forces in the nation’s civil war. bat aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. After Russia’s expanded outreach to the ALBA registering no sales of surface-to-air missiles bloc helps insure that Russia’s Latin American to Latin America during most of the past allies have a powerful friend on the United decade, Russia sold more than 3,000 to the Nations Security Council to veto any efforts to region from 2008-2011.15 Russia’s primary

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client has been Venezuela, which was ranked equipment and other intelligence equip- the fifth largest recipient of arms deliveries ment.20 from Russia in 2011 at an estimated worth of ■■ Access for financial institutions: Russian $1.7 billion.16 Chavez’s government secured bankers have long pushed for greater access a $2.2 billion loan in 2010 to purchase a to the Latin American financial structure, large batch of Russian weapons for its army, particularly since several of its main banks including 92 T-72M1M main battle tanks, were sanctioned following the annexation of about 240 BMP 3 fighting vehicles and BTR- Crimea. The most active is the U.S. and E.U.- 80 armored personnel carriers, and a variety sanctioned bank Vnesheconombank (VEB), of artillery systems. In total, it is estimated which in July, 2013 signed a memorandum that Venezuela’s arms transfer agreements of understanding with the Central American with Russia amount to $13.1 billion, noting Bank of Economic Integration (CABEI).21 a 52 percent increase between 2007 and The details of this document have not been 2011 . 17 Argentina and other nations are released. In December 2014, Russian acquiring Russian helicopters, ships, and air- Gazprombank, also sanctioned, and craft. El Salvador’s friendly government is Argentine Banco de la Nación signed an considering moving completely away from agreement of cooperation, but the details U.S. weapons to Russian materiel. And were not made public.22 Perhaps the most Nicaragua is increasingly purchasing Russian direct inroad to the Latin American financial military equipment including aircraft that market is through Evrofinance Monsarbank, nations like Costa Rica argue are not neces- a major Russian bank whose largest share- sary for mitigating current domestic security holder is a Venezuelan state-owned National issues. Development Fund (Fondo Nacional para el ■■ Police, military, and intelligence assis- Desarrollo Nacional-FONDEN) known for its tance: The Russian push includes the cre- total lack of transparency in its handling of ation of the Marshal of the Soviet Union billions of dollars from the national oil Georgy Zhukov regional counternarcotics company, PDVSA. FONDEN holds 49.98 training center in Nicaragua, along with a percent of the shares of Evrofinance; the non-public agreement for a permanent pres- other major shareholders include sanctioned ence of 130 Russian counternarcotics train- banks VEB and Gazprombank.23 In a sepa- ers who frequently conduct joint patrols rate case, in March 2015 the U.S. Treasury with their Nicaraguan counterparts.18 In Department designated the Banca Privada addition, Russia has built a munitions dis- d’Andorra a bank of “primary money laun- posal plant19 and has promised to build a dering concern,” including the banks three $14 million military hospital. Russia is now subsidiaries in Panama. The designation offering an almost unlimited number of charged the bank managers with aiding both scholarships for regional military, police, Russian organized crime groups and the and intelligence officials, as well as provid- Venezuelan oil company PDVSA in the laun- ing friendly governments with new, much dering of billions of dollars. As a result of more sophisticated electronic surveillance the designation, the bank’s subsidiaries in Panama were shut down.24

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■■ A Counter-narrative and World View: it is ever built), and in return acquiring eas- The Russians have continually used their ier access to deep-water ports in Nicaragua, growing diplomatic presence to present and possibly airfields. Russia has been par- themselves as a viable alternative to U.S. ticularly successful in leveraging this narra- imperialism in Latin America, a narrative tive to join multiple Latin American organi- that still has some appeal among the former zations where the U.S. is not welcome. For armed Marxist movements in the region as example, Russia is invited to the meetings of well as the radical populist movements of the Community of Latin American and the governments and groups affiliated with Caribbean States (Communidad de Estados the ALBA bloc. A constant in the narrative is Latinamericanos y Caribeños – CELAC), a that a U.S. invasion is imminent and body set up by Chávez from which the unavoidable. This is because the alleged U.S. United States and Canada are excluded.26 policy is based on pillaging the region’s nat- And on March 26, 2015, Russian Foreign ural resources, toppling the revolutionary Minister Lavrov presented an official solicita- regimes leading the march to Latin American tion for Russia to become an observer of the independence, and subjugating its citizens.25 Central American Integration System Russia presents itself as an ally against this (Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana – impending onslaught, offering to guarantee SICA).27 If approved, Russia would have the security of the new Nicaraguan Canal (if extra-regional observer status at SICA, Presidency of the Nation Argentina

Representatives of CELAC member nations stand together at the Teresa Carreño theater in Caracas, Venezuela for the organization’s first summit. (Dec 2011)

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recently a bulwark of U.S. regional allies. 2014; and multiple visits in the past two and a The Foreign Minister’s site noted that the half years by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, request was welcomed unanimously.28 General Valeriy Gerasimov, Foreign Minister Sergi Lavrov, Counter-narcotics chief Viktor Russian leaders have explicitly stated their Ivanov, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, intentions in the region, which are noted as Speaker of the Russian Federation Council retaliatory for what the Russian government Valentina Matvienko, and other senior offi- views as U.S. meddling close to Russian bor- cials. ders, particularly in Ukraine. One of the repeat visitors to Latin America When Russian Defense Minister Sergi is General Valery Gerasimov. Gerasimov is Shoigu visited Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation and in February 2015, the official Pravda news ser- architect of the Gerasimov Doctrine.30 The vice ran an extensive article quoting a Russian Doctrine provides a useful lens for understand- military analyst on the importance of the trip. ing Russian activities in the region. The analyst, close to the Kremlin, noted that The influential Russian doctrine posits the much-publicized new canal through that the rules of war have changed, there is a Nicaragua, when and if completed, would “blurring of the lines between war and peace,” allow the Russian fleet “to enter the Gulf of and “nonmilitary means of achieving military Mexico, that is exit the Pacific Ocean to enter and strategic goals has grown and, in many the Atlantic.” The analyst further noted: cases exceeded the power of weapons in their effectiveness.” Gerasimov argues for asym- This is highly important, because in this metrical actions that combine the use of spe- case, Russia will be able to ensure so-called cial forces and information warfare that create nuclear deterrence, because the Russian “a permanently operating front through the navy has long-range cruise missiles. If such entire territory of the enemy state.” He further Russian vessels are deployed somewhere noted that: near the territory of Cuba, they will be able to attack the United States. This is our New information technologies have response to the deployment of U.S. military enabled significant reductions in the spa- objects near the Russian border. The tial, temporal, and informational gaps United States is quite vulnerable … One between forces and control organs. Frontal may eventually have to create missile engagements of large formations of forces defense from the side of Florida, rather at the strategic and operational level are than Alaska. All these issues arise and gradually becoming a thing of the past. require huge financial resources. I think it Long-distance, contactless actions against will convince the United States of the the enemy are becoming the main means short-sightedness of this kind of policy.29 of achieving combat and operational goals … The information space opens wide The most tangible signs of Russia’s grow- asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the ing interest and footprint are the constant vis- fighting potential of the enemy.31 its to the hemisphere by senior Russian political and military figures, including: Putin in

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An overview of Russian activity in the a Marxist insurgency to topple the U.S.-backed region shows an adherence to Gerasimov’s dictatorship of Anastacio Somoza, closely doctrine of waging constant asymmetrical war- aligned with the Soviet Union in the 1980s. fare against one’s enemies through a combina- While now portraying himself as a less ortho- tion of means. These include military or hard dox ideologue, Ortega and his inner circle have power as well as shaping and controlling the been effusive in their praise of Russia’s return narrative in public opinion, diplomatic out- to the region. Nicaragua now consistently and reach, military sales, intelligence operations, publicly backs Russia in its conflicts with the and strategic offerings of intelligence and mil- United States and European Union. itary technology. All are essential components Merino in El Salvador has worked tire- of the Russian presence and Gerasimov’s view lessly to promote Russian diplomatic and busi- that the lines between war and peace are ness interests. Merino was originally trained in blurred and that non-military means of achiev- the Soviet Union while leading an elite urban ing power and influence can be as effective, or commando unit of the Marxist-led guerrillas more effective, than military force. during El Salvador’s civil war. Today, he is the As we will examine in detail below leader of one of the wealthiest business con- through an extended case study in Central sortiums in the region. While holding no for- America, this Doctrine is indicative of how and mal political position within the government, why Russia is engaging with select Latin which is led by former guerrilla commander American states. Sánchez Cerén, Merino is widely recognized as the most powerful person in the governing Central America Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front In Central America, historically the Latin (Frente Farabundo Martí Para la Liberación American region most closely aligned with the Nacional – FMLN). He has personally escorted United States, Russia has been especially suc- large Russian business delegations to meetings cessful in courting its old allies in Nicaragua with senior officials, pushed hard for the open- and El Salvador, while maintaining a robust ing of a Russian embassy in San Salvador, and presence in Panama and Guatemala. In a thanked the Russians for creating an alterna- milieu of increasingly precarious governance, tive to the U.S. presence in the region.32 spiraling violence, drug trafficking, and ram- These are the most visible and public pant corruption, the Russian government, its aspects of Russian activities in Central proxies, and businesses are creating rapidly America. Yet, as the case study below shows, expanding military, law enforcement, and there is a much less visible, but very active net- intelligence alliances. work behind the ostentatious diplomatic and The steadily expanding Russian presence business presence that demonstrates how the in Central America is spearheaded by two old Russian state, much like the Soviet state, allies from the Cold War: Nicaraguan President deploys a wide network of senior intelligence Ortega and José Luis Merino, a Communist service members, businessmen, and think Party leader in El Salvador. tanks to bolster its efforts. The Russian presence is most visible in Nicaragua, where Ortega, who successfully led

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Case Study: NK SESLA NK SESLA is a parastatal agency whose acronym in Russian means “the Russian The following case study was conducted National Committee for the Promotion of entirely through open sources in conjunction Economic Trade with Countries of Latin with C4ADS, a non-profit organization special- America.” It is a non-commercial partnership izing in data analysis. This study does not of several Russian companies and the Russian allege any criminal activity. It is intended to Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Formed in 1998 show the overlapping nature of the Russian with the approval of the office of the Russian state, former senior intelligence officers, and President, today it includes high-ranking rep- businessmen in a network that reaches the resentatives from various Latin America depart- highest levels of the Russian government and ments within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, security apparatus. Ministry of Economic Development, Chamber

Figure 1: Flow Chart connecting NK SESLA’s Director Starovoitov to Russian Agencies.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 109 FARAH AND REYES of Commerce, Rosnauka (Russian Science), the technology and cryptography. He is listed on Institute of Latin America of the Russian the NK SESLA Spanish and Russian language Academy of Sciences, and other state struc- websites as President of NK SESLA, Director tures.33 General of Inter EVM, and Director of TsITIS. The main public activity of the NK SESLA Inter EVM and TsITIS are two related compa- is organizing meetings with Russian and Latin nies operating extensively in Latin America, American businessmen and diplomatic repre- both of which are closely tied to the Russian sentatives, promoting investments in Latin defense ministry and the FSB, the successor America, and keeping a record of the opera- intelligence agency to the KGB.35 These orga- tions of Russian businesses in the region. nizations, in turn have direct ties to the According to its news page, NK SESLA fre- Russian military and intelligence establish- quently holds meetings with representatives of ments. Starovoitov is the Director of the Latin American states in Moscow and has 91 Cryptography Academy of the Russian members.34 Its representatives also regularly Federation. He is decorated as a Hero of the attend meetings of the anti-U.S. blocs of Latin Russian Federation and served on Russia’s America such as ALBA and CELAC. Security Council from 1998-1999. One of its two directors is Alexander In 1986, Starovoitov was named the Vice Starovoitov, a former general in the Soviet KGB Director Technical Supply for the Directorate intelligence service. His publicly identified spe- of Government Communications of the KGB. cialties include electronic communications That same year he received the rank of Major General in the KGB. In 1991, as the Soviet Union collapsed, he was named Director of the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information of the Russian Federation (FAPSI), roughly the equiv- alent of the NSA, a post he held for eight years. During that time, he was responsible for his nation’s “signals intelligence, cryptography, cryptology, and secret government communications.”36 FAPSI was dissolved in 2003 and folded into the FSB. Starovoitov, however, does not seem to have fully retired from government service. As the Director General of Inter EVM, meaning the International Center for Informatics and Electronics, he manages a parastatal Science and Technology and Information Consortium to “jointly solve the problems of the creation and development of advanced information technology, computer hardware and Figure 2: License from the Russian military displayed on the Inter EVM website

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microelectronics.” The group lists itself as a from oligarchs to dissidents. At the time it was member of NK SESLA on its website.37 often viewed as the successor intelligence The Inter EVM website also displays the agency to the KGB and later ceded most of its company’s licenses from the FSB and Russian intelligence functions to the FSB.40 military on behalf of those institutions “using In October 2014, Vasyagin led a large del- information constituting state secrets,” egation of Russian businessmen to Nicaragua advanced cryptographic information systems, to discuss technology transfers and assistance and “activities in the field of information in mining and petroleum exploration.41 In May tools.”38 This clearly links the company 2015, he led a delegation of Russian business- directly to the most secretive and powerful men to El Salvador, where they met with parts of the Russian state, rather than a simple senior Salvadoran officials, including Vice purveyor of information technology and com- President Oscar Ortiz. puter hardware. According to the Inter EVM website, The third organization Starovoitov directs Vasyagin is also a senior leader of the All is TsITIS - the Center of Informational Russia Public Movement Orthodox Russia, a Technology Systems of Executive Branch zealous nationalist, Russian Orthodox move- Organs, a secretive government agency special- ment whose objective is to return Russia to its izing in signals intelligence and code breaking. “historical traditions.” His biography on the President Putin recently charged the company site lists him as a “state advisor to the Russian with building a multi-billion dollar integrated, Federation First Class,” and “State Councilor secure communications network for the of Justice of the Russian Federation Third Russian military. The network is to help detect Class.” It is clear that Vasyagin acts not only as and deter cyber attacks.39 a private entrepreneur, but also as an agent of These positions place Starovoitov in the the Russian state. center of the nexus of the Russian state’s prized This is only a small sampling of a much intelligence and business worlds, focusing sig- larger network of former senior Soviet intelli- nificant efforts on Latin America. The compa- gence and military leaders now deeply nies he leads are part of some of the most involved in Latin America, simultaneously as important defense and cyber initiatives of the part of the Russian state and part of the busi- Russian government, making Starovoitov one ness community. It is worth noting, as dis- of the most trusted people in Russia’s security cussed below, that in the wake of the appear- apparatus. ance of these networks, Russian organized One of Inter EVM’s most visible officials crime is becoming much more active in the in Central America is Vyacheslav Petrovich region. Vasyagin. Vasyagin, who regularly visits An Additional Strategic Threat: Nicaragua and El Salvador, is a former Soviet Transnational Organized Crime military officer who served in Russia’s executive and judicial branches. From 2000-2003, The Russian engagement, which is conducted he was Deputy Director of Russia’s notorious through direct military contact, diplomacy, tax police, the FSPN, which was often used to front groups, and business associations, comes go after anyone deemed an enemy of the state, as transnational organized crime groups in

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 111 FARAH AND REYES

Latin America, particularly in areas where who traffic primarily through the use of ship- Russia has been most active, are being increas- ping containers are the Solntsevskaya ingly recognized as a growing strategic threat Brotherhood and the Brother’s Circle, the latter to the United States. considered a top tier TOC group with close ties In 2014 General Martin Dempsey, the to the Russian state.43 recently retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of With U.S. cocaine consumption dropping, Staff, ranked transnational organized crime and prices stable at less than $15,000 a kilo, (TOC) networks in the Southern Hemisphere Russia offers a significant opportunity for traf- as one of the major threats facing the United fickers to access a new and growing cocaine States, along with Russia and China.42 These consumption market. Exploding demand in TOC groups control billions of dollars derived Russia and the former Soviet states has driven from the drug trade, the looting of state cof- prices in their domestic markets up to $45,000 fers, and other illicit activities, and operate in to $50,000 a kilo.44 With the FARC controlling concert with the governments of nation-states the great majority of the world’s cocaine pro- engaged in functioning criminal enterprises. duction45 it would be impossible for Russian traffickers to buy the product without dealing Russia’s rise underscores the significant loss with the FARC. of Washington’s ability to shape events in the Implications and Conclusions region closest to home and in which the United States has fostered diplomatic ties since its Russia’s rise underscores the significant loss of inception Washington’s ability to shape events in the region closest to home and in which the United States has fostered diplomatic ties since its inception. This decline, due to waning pol- Yet the increasing criminalization of much icy attention amidst multiple global crises and of Latin America and the growing presence of severe budget constraints, is leaving a dimin- Russia – a state where government, crime, and ishing group of friends in the hemisphere. business operate as a seamless whole, as Since 2010, U.S. engagement efforts, both described by Clapper – are often viewed as military and diplomatic, have been scaled back separate phenomena rather than part of a dramatically with overall aid decreasing both larger mosaic where the two dynamics feed off civilian and security assistance. And regional of each other in a symbiotic relationship. The initiatives have been among the hardest hit by strategic implications of this potential alliance the ongoing budget austerity,46 which has left are significant and pose a direct threat to U.S. a vacuum that is being filled by extra-regional national security interests. actors and a growing group of political leaders Regional law enforcement officials in who hope for a multipolar world where the Central America and Colombia say there is a United States is no longer the dominant noticeable increase in Russian organized crime power. “Our relationships, our leadership, and activity in Central America, predominantly in our influence in the Western Hemisphere are cocaine trafficking via the Pacific Coast. paying the price” for the ebbing of U.S. Among the groups identified including those engagement in the region, Kelly said.

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Russia, a state where connections between sanctions, but it also provides a secure way for state actors, business interests, and organized groups such as state-linked cocaine trafficking criminals are heavily blurred, is rapidly groups in Venezuela, along with the FARC and expanding its relations in Latin America in an others, to launder their money through and effort to undermine historic U.S. interests, as with Russia. One of the instruments the well as rebuilding, in a limited form, the alli- United States has wielded effectively in its ances it had constructed during the Soviet era. counternaroctics efforts is the freezing of assets Russia’s partners are primarily highly criminal- and following the financial trail. But once the ized states led by radical populist governments money is in Russia the financial trail will that are virulently anti-U.S. in their ideology. become even more difficult to follow. Although Russia’s growing presence in Perhaps the most effective tool the Latin America does not pose an imminent Russians have deployed is the creation of a military threat to the United States, it is now counter-narrative to the United States. Due to an integral part of an alliance of state and non- the long history of U.S. heavy-handedness in state actors that have shown their hostility the region and the remnants of the radical toward the United States in their ideology, movements that fought dictatorships and criminalized behavior, and anti-democratic repression in the 1970s and 1980s, the narra- nature. tive resonates heavily. Russian official media, The high-level visits of senior Russian offi- along with the official media of the ALBA cials and the pomp and statecraft surrounding nations, saturate Latin American airwaves and them are adept moves to exploit the vacuum press with their message, while a small army left as U.S. resources and attention have with- of authors and intellectuals, owned by Russia ered. and/or paid by the ALBA states, write a steady The expanding weapons sales not only stream of books, articles, and pamphlets to bring revenue to Russia’s coffers, they offer the reinforce the message. opportunity for long-term military-to-military The cumulative effect of Russian efforts in relationships, as the purchase of weapons sys- the region has been to win an important foot- tems entails training, maintenance, and hold, with access to resources, deep-water renewal. And the police and military training, ports, and airstrips while strengthening and particularly in the field of counternarcotics, prolonging the radical populist alliance that is also offers several benefits: it challenges the destroying the democratic process in multiple preeminent U.S. role in the region to combat countries. It is an advance the United States the flow of drugs to the United States; and it cannot afford to ignore any longer. PRISM provides Russian experts with access to a wealth of intelligence, logistical, and military information across the region, including U.S. strategies and tactics relating to counternar- cotic and counterterrorism activities. Additionally, Russia’s developing relations with financial institutions not only assists Russia with avoiding the consequences of

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 11 3 FARAH AND REYES

Notes 8 ALBA is a bloc of radical populist government founded by Hugo Chávez, the late president of Venezuela. The initials stand for Alianza Bolivariana 1 James R. Clapper, Director of National para los Pueblos de Nuestra América or the Bolivarian Intelligence, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Alliance for the Peoples of Our America. Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence 9 For a broader look at this phenomenon see: Community,” House Appropriations Subcommittee Douglas Farah, “The Advance of Radical Populist on Defense, March 25, 2015, accessed at: http://docs. Doctrine in Latin America: How the Bolivarian house.gov/meetings/AP/AP02/20150325/103200/HHRG-114- Alliance is Remaking Militaries, Dismantling AP02-Wstate-ClapperJ-20150325.pdf Democracy and Combatting the Empire,” PRISM, 2 “The National Military Strategy of the United Center for Complex Operations, National Defense States of America 2015,“ June 2015, accessed at: http:// University, July 2015, accessed at: http://cco.ndu.edu/ www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_ Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-3/The_Advance_Of_ National_Military_Strategy.pdf Radical_Populist_Doctrine_in_Latin_America.pdf 3 Kristina Wong, “Putin’s quiet Latin America 10 For a more detailed look at this phenomenon play,” The Hill, March 21, 2014, accessed at: http:// of criminalized states in Latin America and their thehill.com/policy/defense/201305-putins-quiet-play-for-latin- support for terrorists see: Farah, “Transnational america Organized Crime, Terrorism and Criminalized States 4 Gen. John F. Kelly, “Posture Statement of in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National General John R. Kelly, United States Marine Corps, Security Priority,” op. cit. Commander, United States Southern Command 11 For example in September 2008 the Treasury Before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control Committee,” March 12, 2015, accessed at: http://www. designated three of Chávez’s senior officials for southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_POSTURE_ “materially supporting the FARC, a Narco-terrorist STATEMENT_FINAL_2015.pdf organization.” The three were Henry de Jesus Rangél, 5 The doctrine was outlined by Jorge Verstrynge, head of intelligence at the time; Ramón Emilio a Spanish intellectual and ideologue in his seminal Rodríguez Chacín, a former senior cabinet minister; book Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: and Hugo Armando Carvajal, head of military Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare, intelligence at the time. See: “Treasury Targets (La Guerra periférica y el Islam revolucionario: Orígenes, Venezuelan Government Officials Support of the reglas y ética de la Guerra asimétrica, Viejo Topo (Spain), FARC,” U.S. Treasury Department Office of Public 2004. Then-President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela Affairs, Sept. 12, 2008, accessed at: http://www.treasury. adopted the book as part of Venezuela’s military gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1132.aspx doctrine in 2006. For a full examination of the work, 12 “10 Years of ALBA Commemorated in see: Douglas Farah, “Transnational Organized Crime, Argentina,” TELESUR, November 12, 2014, accessed Terrorism and Criminalized States in Latin America: at: http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/10-Years-of-ALBA- An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority,” Commemorated-in-Argentina-20141112-0005.html U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 13 For a comprehensive look at Russia’s August 16, 2012, accessed at: http://www.strategicstudies- engagement on a state-by-state basis in Latin America institute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1117 see: Ellis, op. cit. 6 For a comprehensive look at Russia’s 14 For a detailed look at this media network see: engagement on a state by state basis in Latin America Douglas Farah, “The Advance of Radical Populist and the high-level visits see: R Evan Ellis, “The New Doctrine in Latin America: How the Bolivarian Russian Engagement wit Latin America: Strategic Alliance is Remaking Militaries, Dismantling Position, Commerce, and Dreams of the Past,” U.S. Democracy and Combatting the Empire,” op. cit. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 17, 15 Richard F. Grimmett and Paul K. Kerr, 2015, accessed at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army. “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1275 2004-2011),” CRS R42678 (Aug 24, 2012), accessed 7 These include the Bolivarian bloc of nations at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R42678.pdf p. 67, which (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Cuba, and El notes that Russia has sold 3000 more surface-to-air Salvador) as well as Argentina.

11 4 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 RUSSIA IN LATIN AMERICA

missiles to Venezuela than any other country in the Today’s action addresses the vulnerability created by world. BPA and helps protect the integrity of the interna- 16 1-4 were Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, and tional financial system.” See: “FinCEN Names Banca the U.A.E. Grimmett and Kerr, 2011, accessed at: http:// Privada d’Andorra a Foreign Financial Institution of fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R42678.pdf Primary Money Laundering Concern,” Financial 17 Richard F. Grimmett and Paul K. Kerr, Crimes Enforcement Network, Department of “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations Treasury, press release, March 10, 2015, accessed at: 2004-2011),” CRS R42678 (Aug 24, 2012); accessed at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/nr/html/20150310.html http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R42678.pdf 25 For example, one prominent Bolivarian 18 For further information on the training center website promotes the idea that “Every U.S. military see: “Russia-Nicaragua: multifaceted cooperation,” base in Our America is not only a terrible threat, but The Voice of Russia, April 22, 2013, accessed at: http:// an attack on the dignity of the people and an sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2013_04_22/Russia-Nicaragua- intolerable humiliation.” See: Visiones Alernativas, multifaceted-cooperation/ . The agreement on allowing accessed at: http://pl-va.prensa-latina.cu/militarizacion/mapas/ the permanent presence of 130 trainers is in mapabases.htm . Thelma Luzzani’s Territories Under possession of the author. Surveillance: How the Network of U.S. Military Bases 19 The munitions plant is to both get rid of old Operates in South America (Territorios Vigilados: Como munitions that are dangerous and reactivate some opera la red de bases militares norteamericanas en munitions to “avoid the expense” of purchasing new sudamérica, Debate, Buenos Aires, 2012) with a U.S. ordinance. See: “Top Russian military brass visits soldier wearing a Nazi helmet on the cover, is a Nicaragua,” Nicaragua Dispatch, April 22, 2013, Bolivarian best seller. It is being touted on multiple accessed at: http://nicaraguadispatch.com/2013/04/ Bolivarian websites as a visionary work that explains top-russian-military-brass-visits-nicaragua/ the “massive surveillance” of the U.S. Southern 20 Farah interviews in Nicaragua and El Salvador, Command over Latin America. January to June 2015. 26 “Russia, CELAC share common foreign policy 21 http://www.veb.ru/press/news/arch_news/index. principles,” TASS Russian News Agency, January 31, php?id_19=30426 2014, accessed at: http://tass.ru/en/russia/717131 22 Consejo Empresario Argentino-Ruso: 27 “SICA estudia convertir a Rusia en el décimo “Presentació del banco‘Gazprom’ y de empresas rusas sexton observador extrarregional,” La Vanguardia productoras de equipos energéticos, de extracción (March 26, 2015) accessed at: http://www.lavanguardia. minera y de hidrocarburos en bolsa de comercio en com/politica/20150326/54428490520/sica-estudia-convertir-a- Argentina, accessed at: http://www.cear.org/index. rusia-en-el-decimo-sexto-observador-extrarregional.html php?option=com_content&view=article&id=193%3Apresentac 28 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian ion-del-banco-gazprombank-y-de-empresas-rusas-productoras- Federation, “Foreign Minister Sergi Lavrov’s remarks de-equipos-energeticos-de-extraccion-minera-y-de-hidrocarbu- and answers to questions at a joint news conference ros-en-la-bolsa-de-comercio-de-buenos-aires&catid=34%3Ano with Foreign Minister of Guatemala Carlos Raul vedades&lang=ru Morales following the Russia-Central American 23 Daniel Cancel and Corina Rodriguez Pons, Integration System (SICA) meeting in Guatemala,” “Chavez’s Russia Bank Beats Citigroup in Venezuela (March 26, 2015) accessed at: http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4. Bonds Sales,” Bloomberg News Service, November 7, nsf/0/A93D25A6BF4076EF43257E16002345C3 2011, accessed at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 29 “Russian armed forces returning to Latin articles/2011-11-07/chavez-s-russian-bank-beats-citigroup-in- America,” Pravda, February 17, 2015, accessed at: venezuela-bond-sales http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/17-02-2015/129844- 24 In the designation, a senior DHS official russia_returning_latin_america-0/ noted that “We are seeing an increasing trend where 30 The title ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ was authored businesses and business professionals are being by Mark Galeotti in his blog, In Moscow’s Shadows. recruited by transnational criminal organizations to See Gen. Valeriy Gerasimov, “The Value of Science in facilitate corrupt practices, such as creating shell Prediction,” Military-Industrial Kurier, February 27, corporations and fronts for money laundering and 2013, accessed at: https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress. other illegal activity. These corrupt individuals and com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non- institutions put profits at a premium and serve as linear-war/ connections between the licit and illicit worlds.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 11 5 FARAH AND REYES

31 Gen. Valeriy Gerasimov, “The Value of Science 21, 2013, accessed at: http://flashcritic.com/russian-fsb- in Prediction,” Military-Industrial Kurier, February 27, mulls-unified-secure-communications-net/ 2013, accessed at: https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress. 40 Argentura.ru website, specializing in dossiers com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non- on Russian leaders. Accessed at: http://www.agentura.ru/ linear-war/ english/dosie/fsnp/ 32 Farah interviews in El Salvador and Panama 41 “Rusia ayudaría a Nicaragua a evaluar with law enforcement and intelligence officials. yacimientos minerals,” Minería Pan-americana, Merino, widely known by his nom de guerre Ramiro October 14, 2014, accessed at: http://www.cpampa.com/ Vasquez, has a long and close relationship with the web/mpa/2014/10/rusia-ayudaria-a-nicaragua-a-evaluar- Colombian Marxist guerrilla movement, the yacimientos-minerales/ Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas 42 Gen. Dempsey’s Remarks at the Naval Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC). His Academy to Class of 2014, Joint Chiefs of Staff, March involvement in significant weapons shipments to the 26, 2014, accessed at: http://www.jcs.mil/Media/Speeches/ FARC was discovered through internal FARC tabid/3890/Article/571951/gen-dempseys-remarks-at-the- documents captured by the Colombian military. For naval-academy-to-class-of-2014.aspx . Dempsey calls his details of his involvement with the FARC see: “The strategic vision, 2-2-2-1 for the actors that will FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive influence U.S. strategy in coming years: Two of ‘Raúl Reyes,” International Institute for Strategic heavyweight nations, Russia and China; two mid-size Studies, May 10, 2011, accessed at: http://www.iiss.org/en/ countries, North Korea and Iran; two networks, al publications/strategic%20dossiers/issues/the-farc-files--venezu- Qaeda and transnational organized crime from Latin ela--ecuador-and-the-secret-archive-of---39-ra--250-l- America; and one domain, cyber. reyes--39-8716 43 Farah interviews with U.S., Colombian, 33 This information is taken from the NK SESLA European and Central American law enforcement Spanish language website. In Spanish NK SESLA is officials and diplomats, January to June 2015. known at El Comité Nacional para la Cooperación 44 Farah interviews with U.S., Colombian, Económica con los Países Latinoamericanos (CN CEPLA), European and Central American law enforcement accessed at: http://www.cepla.ru/es/about/ officials and diplomats, January to June 2015. 34 Ibid. 45 Press release from the Drug Enforcement 35 NK SESLA Spanish-language website accessed Administration, “Manhattan and Brooklyn U.S. at: http://www.cepla.ru/es/events/index.php?ELEMENT_ Attorneys Announce Guilty Plea in Manhattan Federal ID=11928&phrase_id=90484 Court of Colombian Narcotics Kingpin in Massive 36 Much of the information on Starovoitov is Cocaine Conspiracy,” November 20, 2014, accessed taken from his biography on the NK SESLA Spanish at: http://www.dea.gov/divisions/nyc/2014/nyc112014.shtml language website: http://www.cepla.ru/es/about/president. 46 From FY 2008 to FY 2012, U.S. aid to Latin php . For his time as director of FAPSI, see: Mojmi America dropped from $2.1 billion to $1.8 billion, a Babacek, “The Threat of Information, Electronic, 13 percent drop. See: Peter J. Meyer and Mark P. Electromagnetic and Psychtronic Warfare,” Global Sullivan, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America Research, September 29, 2005, accessed at: http://www. and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 globalresearch.ca/the-threat-of-information-electromagnetic- Appropriations, Congressional Research Service, June and-psychtronic-warfare/1016?print=1 Addition informa- 26, 2012. In 2013 and 2014, U.S. aid dropped by tion was found on the following Russian-language another 9 percent and 13 percent, respectively. See: websites: http://www.agentura.ru/dossier/russia/people/ Adam Isacson et al, “Time to Listen: Trends in U.S. starovoitov/ ; http://www.compromat.ru/page_11454.htm ; Security Assistance to Latin America and the and http://www.agentura.ru/dossier/russia/people/starovoitov/ Caribbean, 2013, accessed at: http://lawg.org/storage/ 37 This was taken from Inter EVM’s website, documents/Time_to_Listen-Trends_in_U.S._Security_ accessed at: http://www.inevm.ru/index.php Assistance_to_Latin_America_and_the_Caribbean.pdf. 38 Accessed at: http://www.inevm.ru/index.php Within this context, funding for USSOUTHCOM has 39 “Russian FSB mulls unified secure communi- dropped 26 percent in fiscal 2013, after already cations net,” Flash Critic Cyber Threat News, August suffering substantial cuts in previous years. See: “SOUTHCOM’s Counter-Drug Efforts Hit by Budget

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Cuts,” Institute for Defense and Government Advancement, April 26, 2014, accessed at: http://www. idga.org/homeland-security/articles/southcom-s-counter-drug- efforts-hit-by-budget-cuts/ Adam Isacson et al, “Time to Listen: Trends in U.S. Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, 2013,” accessed at: http:// lawg.org/storage/documents/Time_to_Listen-Trends_in_U.S._ Security_Assistance_to_Latin_America_and_the_Caribbean. pdf.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 11 7 AUTHOR

Israel Defense Forces

Searching through the rubble of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, bombed July 18, 1994

11 8 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 1 Iranian and Hezbollah Operations in South America Then and Now

BY MATTHEW LEVITT

ince at least the early 1980s, Iran has operated an intelligence network in Latin America – Hezbollah soon followed suit. Iran and Hezbollah leveraged support from these networks Sto carry out the 1994 bombing of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. Despite the public exposure of Iranian and Hezbollah operatives in this deadly attack, both continue to develop intelligence and logistical support networks in the region without restraint. While the initial investigation into the AMIA bombing suffered from corruption and mismanagement, it was rejuvenated with the appointment of special prosecutors Marcelo Burgos and Alberto Nisman, who reinvestigated the case from the very beginning (Burgos would later leave this office, but Nisman would stay on until his untimely death in January 2015). In addition to identifying key new suspects and gathering evidence that firmly placed Iran and Hezbollah behind the bombing, the office of the special prosecutor uncovered evidence of Iranian efforts to “export the revolution” across South America. Tensions over the AMIA bombing and the indictment of senior Iranian officials for their roles in the attack resulted in poor diplomatic relations between Argentina and Iran for many years. Then, in 2007, Argentine representatives suddenly ceased their years-long policy of walking out of UN meetings whenever an Iranian official spoke. Despite the standing Argentinean indictments of Iranian officials, Argentina and Iran agreed in 2011 to form a “truth commission” to jointly investigate the 1994 bombing. The merits of this “partnership” were questionable from the out- set, but were cast into severe doubt with Nisman’s mysterious death in 2015. Nisman filed charges that the Argentinean administration, specifically President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Foreign Minister Héctor Timerman, planned a cover-up of Iran and Hezbollah’s role in the AMIA bombing in exchange for a political deal between the government of Iran and Argentina. The day before Nisman was due to present his case to the Argentine parliament, he was found dead in his apartment. Despite his tragic and untimely death, the work Nisman and his team had already Dr. Matthew Levitt is a Fromer-Wexler Fellow and the Director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

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conducted exposed not only the circumstances attacks. During later testimony, three of behind the AMIA attack, but Iran’s ongoing Rabbani’s students at the at-Tauhid mosque intelligence operations in South America – and remarked that he had told them in 1990 to at a time when Hezbollah’s activities in the “export the revolution, and that ‘we are all region are on the rise. This article will explore Hezbollah.’”4 the origins of Iranian and Hezbollah presence That planning ultimately led to the bomb- in Latin America, which dates back to the ing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires on 1980s, and examine their continued and grow- March 17, 1992, when a Ford F-100 panel van ing influence today. filled with explosives drove onto the sidewalk in front of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires Iran and Hezbollah Arrive in South America and exploded, destroying much of the embassy compound, killing 23 people, and wounding Throughout the Lebanese Civil War (1975- 242.5 1990) large numbers of Lebanese immigrants Ironically, only a week prior to the attack, arrived in South America. Hezbollah and Iran Yaacov Perry, then director of the Israel both exploited this refugee migration by plant- Security Agency (Shin Bet), visited Argentina ing numerous agents and recruiting sympa- and discussed “the menace posed by terrorists” thizers among Arab and Muslim immigrants with intelligence counterparts. Within the on the continent. Their efforts led to the estab- week, Israeli intelligence teams, assisted by lishment of formal terrorist cells throughout American and Argentine teams, proceeded to the region, which ultimately enabled them to Buenos Aires in order to investigate this new carry out several deadly terror attacks in terror attack.6 Argentina in the 1990s.1 Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad Organization One notable Iranian operative who immi- (IJO) declared responsibility and released sur- grated to South America in the 1980s was veillance video supporting their claim.7 While Mohsen Rabbani. Rabbani arrived in Argentina the operation had been in the planning stages on a tourist visa in 1983 and permanently for some time, Hezbollah was apparently settled in Buenos Aires. In spite of his status as intent on avenging deaths of their leader a tourist, he initially served as a representative Abbas al-Musawi and his five-year-old son of the Iranian Ministry of Meat.2 After arriving Hussein – who were killed in an Israeli air- in the country, however, Rabbani began teach- strike on February 16, 1992 – beyond ing religion and became heavily involved with Lebanon’s borders. The emerging Israeli the at-Tauhid mosque. He reportedly main- embassy operation provided them with the tained ties with the Iranian government by opportunity to do so. Only eight days after the serving as a member of the Islamic Propaganda assassination, the group purchased the vehicle Organization, which was charged with identi- that would be used in the bombing – three fying groups and individuals that sympathized weeks later, the embassy was in ruins.8 with the “envisaged terrorist activities.”3 The operation occurred quickly, but was Rabbani eventually assumed leadership of the facilitated by Iranian plans to carry out an at-Tauhid mosque and began to search for operation in Argentina well before al-Musawi potential targets for Iranian-backed terror was killed. The year before al-Musawi’s death,

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Argentina suspended shipments of nuclear AMIA Bombing material to Iran due to “concrete indications that Iran had non-peaceful plans for its nuclear On July 18, 1994, at approximately 9:45 in the capacities.”9 According to Nisman, the al- morning, a large explosion occurred at the Musawi assassination was used by Hezbollah Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) to justify the embassy bombing to its support- Jewish center, leveling the building, killing 85 ers, but the attack was carried out at the behest people, and wounding an additional 150. The of Tehran in response to Argentina’s suspen- bombing was the deadliest in Argentine his- sion of nuclear cooperation with Iran.10 tory and sent shockwaves around the world. The Argentine Supreme Court investiga- The United States and Israel immediately sent tion into the embassy bombing identified IJO teams to aid Argentina in the investigation chief Imad Mughniyeh as “one of the persons process. Investigators quickly learned that the that was responsible for the attack.”11 bombing was the result of a suicide car bomb American intelligence concurred with this find- attached to a Renault Trafic van carrying 300 ing. The key piece of evidence was handwriting to 400 kilograms of explosives.13 on the paperwork for the purchase of the truck Argentine federal police released a com- used in the attack that matched with that of posite sketch of the suicide bomber to the known Hezbollah operatives. As further proof, local press from testimony that included a Argentine investigators eventually released door to door survey of neighborhood residents communication intercepts captured in the shortly after the bombing. But, as quickly as wake of the embassy bombing that included a authorities produced these sketches, and as conversation between Tehran and the Iranian useful as they would later be in definitively embassy in Moscow alluding to a forthcoming identifying the perpetrators as members of a attack.12 Hezbollah team, they were too late to help The investigation also began to reveal the apprehend the suspects before they escaped central role Rabbani had in Hezbollah’s Latin the country. Additionally, the Iranian diplo- American operations. Two weeks after the matic support network had already left the bombing, on April 3, 1992, Rabbani placed a country in waves in the weeks leading up to call from his home phone to the secretary of the attack.14 Sheikh Fadlallah, a Lebanese Shi’ite religious According to the testimony of Abolghasem leader with close ties to Hezbollah. Argentine Mesbahi, an Iranian intelligence defector, a intelligence detected the call and prosecutors group of senior Iranian officials selected the pointed to it as timely evidence, not only of AMIA building as the bombing target during a his relationship with Hezbollah, but of the meeting in Mashhad, Iran on August 14, 1993. leadership role he played in their operations. At the meeting, the officials discussed the Less than two years later, as investigators were Palestinian situation, the future of Iraq, and still piecing together the facts of the 1992 the strategy of exporting the revolution abroad. embassy bombing, Hezbollah and Iranian The idea of carrying out an attack in Argentina operatives struck again. was reportedly at the core of the discussion about exporting the revolution. Final approval for the attack was given by the Committee for

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Special Operations within Iran’s Supreme used his various bank accounts at Deutsche National Security Council. Attendees at this Bank, Banco Sudameris, and Banco Tornquist meeting included Supreme Leader Ali to receive Iranian funds in support of the Khamenei, President Rafsanjani, Minister of attack. Most of these funds arrived through Intelligence Ali Fallahian, Foreign Minister Ali international bank transfers, including several Velayeti, Ahmad Asghari, a suspected IRGC sent from Iran’s Bank Melli through Union de official stationed at the Iranian embassy in Banco Suizos. Buenos Aires, and Mohsen Rabbani.15 While Rabbani attended to the necessary Shortly thereafter, Rabbani was named logistical details in Buenos Aires, Hezbollah Cultural Attaché at the Iranian embassy in operatives in the tri-border area planned the Buenos Aires – a move meant to provide him the details of the operation. These two groups diplomatic immunity prior to the AMIA stayed in close touch as the plot slowly came attack.16 Rabbani led intelligence efforts for together. Based on a joint investigation with its the operation. He had been using local Shi’ite Argentinian counterpart, an FBI task force scouts to assess Jewish and American targets in noted that “in the months prior to the attack, Buenos Aires since 1983. Prosecutors later there were many calls from the mosque in the stated that his surveillance reports would prove city of Iguaçu Falls to Iran, the Embassy of Iran to be “a determining factor in the making of in Buenos Aires, the Embassy of Iran in the decision to carry out the AMIA attack.”17 Brasilia, the at-Tauhid mosque in Buenos In addition to his scouting support, Rabbani Aires, and the office of the cultural attaché Israel Defense Forces

Families of AMIA victims commemorate an anniversary of the 1994 bombing that killed 85 people and injured over 300.

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where Rabbani worked.”18 On two occasions, defendant and the four officers involved were tri-border plotters called Rabbani at home, acquitted in 2004 and Galeano was impeached reflecting either sloppy tradecraft or perhaps in 2005.21 Meanwhile, the AMIA-related trial an especially pressing operational need. of former Argentine president Carlos Menem On July 16, 1994, the explosives-laden began that summer.22 Menem, who was presi- Renault Trafic van used for the bombing was dent at the time of the bombing, had long parked at a garage near the AMIA center. maintained close ties to Iranian intelligence Rabbani placed a call from his cellphone while and accepted a $10 million bribe from Iran to in the vicinity of both the garage and AMIA to cover up the Islamic Republic’s role in the the Iranian-owned Government Trade attack.23 The scandal led the Argentine Corporation (GTC), which was believed to be Supreme Court to rule that the evidence in the a front for Iranian intelligence.19 Two days case was inadmissible. Fortunately, the inves- later, the van exploded and the AMIA center tigation began to turn around under Nestor was destroyed. Kirchner’s presidency. Judge Galeano had focused on the local Investigation Revamp and the Iran Deal connections of the bombers and refused to go Initially, the AMIA investigation went very further in his indictments than to say that “it poorly. The late Argentine president Nestor was a small group of fanatics that served as a Kirchner once called it a national disgrace.20 shield for an Islamic fundamentalist group Judge Juan Jose Galeano originally kept his full that presumably had ties to Hezbollah.”24 caseload when he took on this major case. In And, even though a claim of responsibility for March 2003, Judge Galeano filed his indict- the AMIA attack was issued under one of ment, but some of the arrest warrants he called Hezbollah’s known affiliated names, Galeano for were ultimately deemed too weak to concluded that “no evidence has come to light enforce. Former Iranian ambassador to as yet indicating that Hezbollah could have Argentina Hadi Soleimanpour was arrested in known of the plans, and subsequent to that, England in August 2003, on the basis of his could have been implicated in the conse- indictment in Argentina and an INTERPOL quences.”25 Following Galeano’s removal in Red Notice calling for his arrest and extradi- 2005, Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral took tion to Buenos Aires. British officials, however, over and assigned a team of experienced fed- released Soleimanpour on $1.2 million bail in eral prosecutors to the investigation, led by September and concluded shortly thereafter Alberto Nisman. The team started the new that the extradition request failed to meet the investigation from scratch and turned more prima facie evidentiary threshold under British attention to the Iranian and Hezbollah angles, law. Soleimanpour returned to Iran in covering hundreds of files, leveraging tele- November 2003. phone intercepts, and producing some 113,600 Yet that was a relatively minor hiccup – pages of documentation. things got worse. In December 2003, Judge While concluding that the evidence did Galeano was removed from the case for “irreg- not suffice to call for the indictment and arrest ularities,” such as bribing a defendant to of some of the individuals indicted by Galeano accuse four police officers of corruption. The in March 2003, prosecutors determined in

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2006 that several additional Iranian suspects AMIA bombing to be covered up. Veja also should be indicted. Moreover, the prosecutors’ claimed that Venezuela’s late president Hugo report reserved particular criticism for Chavez, one of Iran’s closest allies, was instru- Galeano’s findings regarding Iran and mental in facilitating a deal.27 Venezuela made Hezbollah. Nisman’s report determined, “that large purchases of Argentine debt and in the decision to carry out the attack was made August a Venezuelan businessman was caught not by a small splinter group of extremist at Argentine customs with $800,000 – Iranian Islamic officials, but was instead a decision cash reportedly meant for the political cam- that was extensively discussed and was ulti- paign of Cristina Kirchner. Whether Iran actu- mately adopted by a consensus at the highest ally received the nuclear technology, or levels of the Iranian government.”26 whether the basis of the deal was simply finan- Since the 1994 bombing, relations cial, Argentine-Iranian relations changed between Argentina and Iran had been consis- markedly.28 tently and predictably frosty. This changed in In 2011, Iranian officials expressed a will- 2007. The Brazilian weekly magazine Veja ingness to “engage in constructive dialogue” reported that, in exchange for cash, Iran asked with Argentina about the AMIA case, although for Argentine nuclear technology and for the they continued to insist that talk of an Iranian Jaluj

Argentines have been taking to the streets in 2015 to demand justice for the death of prosecutor Alberto Nisman.

124 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 IRANIAN AND HEZBOLLAH OPERATIONS IN SOUTH AMERICA link was nothing more than “plots and politi- before the U.S. Congress in the weeks follow- cal games.” By January 2013, this Iranian willing the attack, the State Department’s coordi- ingness to look for any non-Iranian perpetra- nator for counterterrorism expressed concern tors of the plot had translated into a bilateral that Iranian embassies in the region were agreement between Tehran and Buenos Aires stacked with larger-than-necessary numbers of to jointly investigate the bombing.29 For diplomats, some of whom were believed to be Nisman and his fellow prosecutors and inves- intelligence agents and terrorist operatives: tigators – whose tireless pursuit of justice in “We are sharing information in our possession this case led to an exhaustive investigation and with other States about Iranian diplomats, the issuing of arrest warrants and Interpol Red Iranian terrorist leaders who are posing as dip- Notices for the arrest of several Hezbollah lomats, so that nations will refuse to give them operatives and Iranian officials – this new deal accreditation, or if they are already accredited, was akin to inviting the fox into the henhouse. to expel them. We have had some success in After all, Iranian officials working on the deal that respect, but we have not always suc- reported directly to one of the investigation’s ceeded.”30 Another witness recounted meeting primary suspects: Mohsen Rabbani. In May with senior government officials in Chile, 2014, a federal court ruled the deal unconsti- Uruguay, and Argentina regarding overrepre- tutional, though the government quickly sentation at Iranian embassies in the region in appealed to the Argentine Supreme Court. March 1995. Officials in Chile and Uruguay On January 14, 2015, Nisman filed a legal indicated that “the activities of those at the complaint formally accusing President Cristina [Iranian] embassy were being monitored and Fernandez de Kirchner and Foreign Minister that this was very clearly a concern.”31 Hector Timerman of trying to cover up Iran’s Fifteen years later, the commander of U.S. role in in the 1994 AMIA bombing. Kirchner Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), indicated and Timerman, Nisman claimed, were cover- the Iranian presence in the region had grown ing Iran’s tracks in exchange for improved still larger, expanding from just a handful of business and political ties with Iran. Four days missions a few years earlier to twelve by 2010. later, and the day before he was scheduled to That, plus Iran’s traditional support for terror- appear before Argentina’s Congress to present ism, concerned General Douglas Fraser. new evidence backing up his accusations, “Transnational terrorists – Hezbollah, Hamas Nisman was found dead in his apartment. – have organizations resident in the region,” After Nisman’s untimely and highly suspicious Fraser noted.32 Two years later, in a statement death, many fear the alleged deal between before the House Armed Services Committee, Argentina and Iran may no longer be necessary Fraser warned of Iran’s success circumventing to derail the AMIA investigation. international sanctions by establishing modest economic, cultural, and security ties, mostly in Iran’s Expanding South American Footprint nations like Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Cuba. Iran, Fraser added, also Iran’s intelligence penetration of South propagates its agenda through its 36 Shi’ite America has expanded significantly in the cultural centers. The Fundación Cultural years since the 1994 AMIA bombing. Testifying Oriente, for example, an Iranian outreach

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 125 LEVITT center dedicated to strengthening Iranian ties Although Kadir had been active from at to Latin America, was run by none other than least the mid-80s, his first contact with Mohsen Rabbani.33 Rabbani seems not to have occurred until In 2007, evidence emerged that Rabbani’s 1994. After this point, contact between the two activism and involvement in terrorism in was regular, and Kadir became a “direct subor- South America had not waned since Argentina dinate” and “man of trust” for Rabbani.37 indicted him and Interpol issued a Red Rabbani had a wide network in Latin America, Warrant arrest notice for his role in the AMIA but the section of Nisman’s 2013 report enti- bombing. According to court documents, tled “The Relationship between Abdul Kadir Rabbani helped four men of Latin American and Mohsen Rabbani” runs over twelve decent who were plotting to bomb the John F. pages.38 Nisman referred to Kadir as Rabbani’s Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New main deputy in Guyana and alleged that his York. Three of the plotters were Guyanese; a role in the region was “directly supported and fourth coconspirator, Kareem Ibrahim, was an promoted by the Islamic Republic of Iran” – a imam and leader of the Shi’ite Muslim com- clear example of an Iranian operative heading munity in Trinidad and Tobago. All four men an “intelligence base” in the region.39 The were ultimately convicted in federal court in Chicken Farm operation enabled the two to the Eastern District of New York. collaborate directly. In a handwritten letter to The four men sought technical and finan- Rabbani from 2006, Kadir agreed to perform a cial assistance for their plot, which they gave “mission” to determine whether a group of the code name Chicken Farm.34 After failing individuals in Guyana and Trinidad were capa- to link up with al-Qaeda and Jamaat al ble of executing an unidentified task.40 Kadir Muslimeen operatives in the Caribbean, played an instrumental role not only in the Ibrahim, already an Iranian confidant, recom- recruitment of operatives, but in logistical ele- mended the plotters present their plan to the ments as well. In financing the plot to attack Iranian revolutionary leadership. Ibrahim the JFK airport in 2007, Kadir decided “that the arranged for Abdul Kadir, one of the plotters, funds allocated to finance the terrorist attack to meet his contacts, including Rabbani, in against the Airport in New York, [would be] Iran.35 deposited in the bank account opened and This meeting was not Kadir’s first run-in allocated to funds raised for the construction with the Iranian revolutionary leadership. of a mosque in Linden, [Guyana].”41 Under cross-examination, Kadir admitted that Kadir was ultimately arrested on June 1, he had drafted reports for the Iranian ambas- 2007 in Trinidad aboard a plane headed to sador to Venezuela in the mid-1980s, which Venezuela, en route to Iran.42 He was carrying focused on Guyana’s economy, foreign policy, a computer drive with photographs featuring and military. His handwritten reports included himself and his children posing with guns that details such as the low morale in the army and were intended, according to prosecutors, to a “five-year development plan” that referred to prove his intent and capability to carry out an infiltrating the military, police, and other gov- attack.43 Documents seized after Kadir’s arrest ernment agencies.36 also revealed a wide range of contacts in the Iranian regime and with organizations closely

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associated with the government. A report 24 youngsters in three Brazilian states to released by Nisman and his team concluded attend ‘religious formation’ classes in that “the conspiracy to attack John F. Kennedy Tehran.”45 In the words of one Brazilian offi- Airport in New York was organized under cial quoted by the magazine, “Without any- [Tehran’s] protection…[and] had the approval body noticing, a generation of Islamic extrem- of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”44 ists is appearing in Brazil.”46 Further, Four years later, around the same time the according to a former FBI agent who worked last defendants in the JFK Airport bomb plot on Hezbollah and the AMIA bombing, were convicted, reports of Rabbani’s continued Hezbollah’s role in criminal activities and activities in South America emerged in the fraud have grown. The group now engages in Brazilian press. Security had become a priority shipping fraud, for example, involving con- in Brazil as the country prepared to host first tainers that enter Brazil at the port of Sao the 2014 World Cup and then the 2016 Paulo and then “disappear on their way up the Olympic Games. As international security river toward Foz in the tri-border area.”47 experts looked closely at Brazil, they expressed To be sure, Iran and Hezbollah remain concern about the country’s lax counterterror- hyperactive in South America – a fact that has ism legal regime and weaker still enforcement. the full attention of U.S. intelligence officials In April 2011, Veja ran an article citing FBI, and their counterparts south of the border. CIA, Interpol, and other documents about ter- Consider, for example, that the Iranian rorist activity in Brazil which warned that Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force plot to Rabbani “frequently slips in and out of Brazil kill the Saudi ambassador to Washington in on a false passport and has recruited at least October 2010 reportedly also included Rocardo Stuckert (ABr)

Former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is greeted in Tehran by the former President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

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possible plans to attack the Saudi and Israeli Immediately after beginning his association embassies in Buenos Aires.48 In a July 2012 with Rabbani, al-Reda became intensively report, the State Department concluded that involved in hatching terror plots against although the department knew of no credible Israeli, American, and Jewish interests in information indicating Hezbollah operatives Argentina.53 Omairi was sentenced in 2007 to were engaged in “terrorist training or other eleven years in a Brazilian prison for drug traf- operational activity” in the tri-border area, ficking, while al-Reda is still at large.54 Washington “remained concerned that these Rabbani’s position as Iran’s coordinator groups used the region to raise funds from for Latin America was facilitated by his role as local supporters.”49 A year later, in May 2013, the head of the at-Tauhid mosque in Buenos Nisman released a 500 page report focused on Aires, which gave him numerous opportunities how the Iranian regime has, since the early to travel to Islamic institutions throughout the 1980s, built and maintained “local clandestine region. At-Tauhid “operated as the center of intelligence stations designed to sponsor, fos- operations from which funding was provided ter, and execute terrorist attacks” in the to other Iranian centers in South America and Western Hemisphere.50 Nisman wrote that took decisions on policies and activities related “through the ‘policy for the export of the revo- to these branches.”55 Recruiting and indoctri- lution’ Iran has developed an elaborate and nation were significant aspects of Rabbani’s rigid support structure…and intelligence bases activities; he would oversee the education and that proved to be a crucial instrument when indoctrination of Guyanese and other South the time comes to carry out – or seek to carry American Muslim youth in Iran.59 He often out – terrorist attacks.”51 sent followers to study in Qom, Iran, including Rabbani’s “portfolio” was fairly expansive. Abdul Kadir’s son, for political indoctrination He was “allocated the task to establish, and religious and paramilitary training.57 develop, support, and indoctrinate the Shi’ite With the exception of Argentina and Muslim organizations of” Chile, Uruguay, and Guyana, the networks established in Latin Colombia.52 In Colombia, for example, American countries are not yet known to have Rabbani was updated on the everyday activities attempted any overt terrorist activity. Yet, as of the Shi’ite community. He was also active in the Nisman report points out, they are in a the tri-border area between Paraguay, position to become active if and when needed. Argentina, and Brazil, a Hezbollah hotspot, Many members of these networks use the cov- where he maintained links to Hezbollah leaders of diplomatic or cultural emissaries. In the ers such as Farouk Abdul Omairi and Salman conclusion of the report, Nisman specifically al-Reda. Al-Reda, a prominent Hezbollah oper- warns the authorities of Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, ative and key player in the AMIA bombing, Paraguay, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, had been groomed by Rabbani in the 1980s. Suriname, and Colombia to be vigilant. As the He is a dual Lebanese-Colombian citizen, who experience of AMIA and the JFK airport shows, lived at various times in Colombia, Buenos Iran’s policy of exporting the revolution can- Aires, and the tri-border area, immigrated to not be taken as mere rhetoric, even as far afield Argentina in 1987, initially settling in Buenos as the Americas. Aires and joining Rabbani’s at-Tauhid mosque.

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Snapshot: Iran and Hezbollah in South against Iran was evidence of Rabbani’s own America, 2015 role in the plot, from running a network of intelligence agents in Buenos Aires to purchas- The same day that Nisman’s report on Iran’s ing the van used as the car bomb in the attack. presence in South America was released in May And he remains active: according to Nisman’s 2013, the State Department released its annual more recent investigations, Iranian agents in terrorism report, which documented a Argentina acting at Rabbani’s behest and “marked resurgence” of Iran’s terrorist activi- reporting directly back to him were conspiring ties around the world. The release of these to concoct fake “new evidence” to supplant the reports coincided with the sentencing of real evidence collected in the case. Mansour Arbabsiar, an Iranian-American used- car salesman from Texas, for his role in an Iranian agents in Argentina acting at Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Rabbani’s behest and reporting directly back Ambassador to Washington. In the assessment to him were conspiring to concoct fake “new of the Director of National Intelligence, evidence” to supplant the real evidence General James Clapper, that plot demonstrated collected in the case that “some Iranian officials – probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – have changed their calculus and are now more will- In one intercepted conversation, one of ing to conduct an attack in the United States Rabbani’s agents, Jorge Khalil, reported to in response to real or perceived U.S. actions Rabbani by phone on a meeting with an that threaten the regime.”58 Argentine official. “Send me the details so I Iran’s brazen Western Hemisphere posture can evaluate them,” Rabbani responded.60 is clear in its dogged pursuit of a joint “truth Exchanges such as this made “it completely commission” with Argentina to uncover the clear that Rabbani retains decision-making “real” culprits behind the AMIA bombing. authority within the regime in all matters Tellingly, while Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran’s related to the Argentine Republic,” Nisman Foreign Minister in 1994 and today an advisor concluded, later adding that “Khalil has been to Iran’s Supreme Leader, declined to appear Rabbani’s man of confidence who has con- before an Argentinean court, he insisted to stantly reported back to him from Buenos Argentina’s C5N TV that charges against him Aires.”61 In another intercepted telephone amount to a “baseless accusation,” adding that exchange, Khalil assures Rabbani further Argentina is “under the influence of Zionism reports are forthcoming: “…Sheikh, don’t and the U.S.”59 worry because tonight when I get home I’ll Meanwhile, the man described by send you a report on everything that I’m Argentinean authorities as the driving force doing.” Such assurances, Nisman determined, behind the AMIA bombing, Mohsen Rabbani, demonstrate Khalil’s subordination to Mohsen told Argentinean TV that Nisman’s investiga- Rabbani.62 tion was based on nothing more than “the Meanwhile, Hezbollah activities in the inventions of newspapers without any proof region have picked up pace significantly. In its against Iran.” In fact, the most powerful proof 2014 annual terrorism report, the State

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Department highlighted the financial support then. When he was arrested in October, police networks Hezbollah maintains in places like raided his home and found traces of TNT, det- Latin America and Africa. The report con- onators, and other inflammable substances. A cluded that Hezbollah is, “capable of operating search of the garbage outside his home found around the globe.”63 This conclusion was chemicals used to manufacture explosives. By underscored in November 2014 when Brazilian the time of his arrest, intelligence indicated police reports revealed that Hezbollah helped Amadar’s targets included places associated a Brazilian prison gang, the First Capital with Israelis and Jews in Peru, including areas Command (PCC), obtain weapons in popular with Israeli backpackers, the Israeli exchange for the protection of prisoners of embassy in Lima, and Jewish community insti- Lebanese origin detained in Brazil.64 The same tutions. reports indicated that Lebanese traffickers tied It warrants noting that Hezbollah activity to Hezbollah reportedly helped sell C4 explo- in the Southern Hemisphere is of direct con- sives that the PCC allegedly stole in Paraguay.65 cern to the United States. This was underscored Hezbollah is not strictly an Israeli con- in January 2015 when the FBI’s Miami field cern. “Beyond its role in Syria,” Matt Olsen, office released a “request for information” bul- the then-director of the National letin about a dual Venezuelan-Lebanese and Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) warned in Hezbollah operative Ghazi Nasr al-Din, September 2014, “Lebanese Hezbollah known both for raising money for the group remains committed to conducting terrorist and meeting with Hezbollah officials in activities worldwide.”66 The NCTC director Lebanon to discuss “operational issues.”69 It continued: “We remain concerned the group’s is not clear what prompted the FBI to issue its activities could either endanger or target U.S. request for information bulletin, but Nasr al- and other Western interests.”67 NCTC officials Din had long been on the U.S. government’s note that Hezbollah “has engaged in an aggres- radar. In June 2008 the U.S. Treasury sive terrorist campaign in recent years and con- Department designated him a global terrorist, tinues attack planning abroad.”68 Indeed, one noting that he “utilized his position as a of the group’s most recently foiled plots was in Venezuelan diplomat and the president of a Peru and involved a Hezbollah operative mar- Caracas-based Shi’ite Islamic Center to provide ried to a U.S. citizen. Peruvian counterterror- financial support to Hezbollah.” Nasr al Din ism police arrested the Hezbollah operative in had met with senior Hezbollah officials in Lima in November 2014, the result of a surveil- Lebanon, Treasury reported, for the purpose of lance operation that began several months discussing “operational issues” and also facili- earlier. In that case, Mohammed Amadar, a tated the travel of Hezbollah members to and Lebanese citizen, arrived in Peru in November from Venezuela, and for travel to Iran to attend 2013 and married a dual Peruvian-American a training course there.70 Hezbollah today is citizen two weeks later. They soon moved to more invested in operations in South America Sao Paolo, Brazil, but returned to Lima in July than ever before. 2014. Authorities were clearly aware of Amadar at the time, because they questioned him upon arrival at the airport and began watching him

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Conclusion State, there is tight competition for bandwidth and dollars for other priorities. Though American officials are deeply concerned about recently much of Latin America has aligned the rise of Iranian intelligence activities in the with western interests, that alignment can not region, as well as Hezbollah operational activ- be taken for granted. American influence in the ities in the region that are now complimenting region now competes with influence from the group’s longtime logistical and financial highly motivated extra-regional powers. As the support activities there. While Hezbollah con- U.S. adapts to a rapidly changing global secu- tinues to raise significant sums of money rity environment, the threat posed by Iran and through illicit business and smuggling in the Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere, a key tri-border area and other free trade zones in geo-strategic interest and historic stronghold the region, it’s activities have spread far beyond of American influence, should be recognized these well-known hot spots and include not as a clear and present danger. PRISM only logistics and financing, but terrorist operational planning as well. Iran, for its part, has also been tied to operations in the region, but is far more invested in building up a robust intelligence network spanning the length of the southern half of the Western Hemisphere. Coming on the heels of the Iran nuclear deal, these activities are even more disconcerting. Whether, or how soon, Iran cheats on its nuclear commitments, U.S. officials cannot Notes say. But there is broad consensus that the 1 international community needs to be prepared Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Georgetown University to deal with Iran’s ongoing non-nuclear Press, 2013): 79. “malign activities” and “menacing behavior,” 2 Investigations Unit of the Office of the as Treasury Secretary Jack Lew put it.71 U.S. Attorney General, “AMIA Case” signed by District officials have similarly noted the administra- Attorney Marcelo Martinez Burgos, Attorney General Alberto Nisman, and Secretary of the Office of the tion’s commitment to “target the full range of Attorney General Herman Longo, (October 25 2006): Hezbollah’s activity, including terrorism, crim- 405. 3 inal activity, and its destabilizing conduct in Investigations Unit of the Office of the Attorney General (2006), 406. the [Middle East] region.”72 4 Investigations Unit of the Office of the In light of their long history of “menacing Attorney General (2006), 46. behavior” in South America, and even more so 5 William R. Long, “Islamic Jihad Says it given the increased tempo and nature of their Bombed Embassy; Toll 21,” Los Angeles Times, March 19, 1992; Ronen Bergman, The Secret War with Iran: “malign activities” in the region, it is critical The 30-year Clandestine Struggle Against the World’s that the necessary attention and resources be Most Dangerous Terrorist Power (New York: Free Press, devoted to tracking and countering the threats 2007): 170. 6 they portend. In the age of the Iran Deal, for- Ronen Bergman, The Secret War with Iran: The 30-year Clandestine Struggle Against the World’s Most eign terrorist fighters, and the rise of Islamic

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 131 LEVITT

Dangerous Terrorist Power (New York: Free Press, 2007): 24 Investigations Unit of the Office of the 170-171. Attorney General (2006), 13. 7 Affidavit of FBI Agent James Bernazzani, Jr., 25 Investigations Unit of the Office of the Government’s “Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing,” Attorney General (2006), 14. USA V. Bassam Gharib Makki, May 2, 1999. 26 Investigations Unit of the Office of the 8 Investigations Unit of the Office of the Attorney General (2006), 12-13. Attorney General (2006), 541. 27 Leonardo Coutinho, “Chavistas confirmam 9 Investigations Unit of the Office of the conspiração denunciada por Nisman,” (Chavistas Attorney General (2006), 153. confirm conspiracy denounced by Nisman, English 10 Report by the Investigations Unit of the Office Translation) Veja, March 14, 2015. of the Attorney General, “AMIA Case” signed by 28 Ibid. District Attorney Marcelo Martinez Burgos, Attorney 29 Emily Schmall, “Deal Reached for Inquiry on General Alberto Nisman, and Secretary of the Office Bombing in Argentina,” New York Times, January 27, of the Attorney General Herman Longo, October 25 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/world/americas/ 2006, p. 22 argentina-and-iran-to-investigate-jewish-center-bombing. 11 Investigations Unit of the Office of the html?_r=0 Attorney General (2006), 534. 30 Terrorism in Latin America/AMIA Bombing in 12 Levitt, 100. Argentina: Hearing before Committee on International 13 Investigations Unit of the Office of the Relations, 104th Cong. (1995) (Testimony of Attorney General (2006), 31. Ambassador Philip Wilcox). 14 Levitt, 76. 31 Terrorism in Latin America/AMIA Bombing in 15 Investigations Unit of the Office of the Argentina: Hearing before Committee on International Attorney General (2006), 145. Relations, 104th Cong. (1995) (Testimony of Mr. 16 Investigations Unit of the Office of the Tommy Baer – p. 34 of oral testimony). Attorney General (2006), 243-245. 32 Benjamin Birnbaum, “General in Latin 17 Investigations Unit of the Office of the America Trains Eye on Middle East,” Washington Attorney General (2006), 436-437. Times, July 29, 2010. http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 18 “Report of the Task Force of the Federal news/2010/jul/29/us-general-latin-america-keeps-eye-middle- Bureau of Investigation (FBI): Analysis of the Attack east/ on the Seat of the Mutual Israeli Argentinean 33 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Association (AMIA), 18th of July, 1994, Buenos Aires, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget Argentina,” August 1998 (Original copy in Spanish, Requests: Hearing before Armed Services Committee, translated to English for the author by Yair Fuxman). March 6, 2012 (Testimony of Douglas Fraser, 19 Investigations Unit of the Office of the Commander United States Southern Command). Attorney General (2006), 316. 34 U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s 20 Dexter Filkins, “Death of a Prosecutor,” The Office, Eastern District of New York, “Imam from New Yorker, July 20, 2015. http://www.newyorker.com/ Trinidad Convicted of Conspiracy to Launch Terrorist magazine/2015/07/20/death-of-a-prosecutor. Attack at JFK Airport,” May 26, 2001. http://www.justice. 21 Alexei Barrionuevo, “Inquiry on 1994 Blast at gov/archive/usao/nye/pr/2011/2011may26b.html Argentina Jewish Center Gets New Life,” New York 35 U.S.: ‘Unthinkable’ terror devastation Times, July 17, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/ prevented,” Associated Press, June 3, 2007. http://www. world/americas/18argentina.html nbcnews.com/id/18999503/ns/us_news-security/t/us-unthink- 22 Jonathan Gilbert, “Trial Starts for Argentine able-terror-devastation-prevented/#.VgWYWctVhBc Ex-President in ’94 Bombing of Jewish Center,” New 36 A. G. Sulzberger, “Trial Focuses on Iran Ties of York Times, August 6, 2015. http://www.nytimes. Kennedy Plot Suspect,” New York Times, July 21, 2010. com/2015/08/07/world/americas/trial-starts-for-argentine-ex- http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/nyregion/22kennedy.html president-in-94-bombing-of-jewish-center.html?_r=0 37 Ibid, 110. 23 Larry Rohter, “Iran Blew Up Jewish Center in 38 Ibid, 122. Argentina, Says Defector,” New York Times, July 22, 39 Ibid, 92. 2002. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/world/iran-blew- 40 U.S. v. Defreitas et al, government exhibit 341. up-jewish-center-in-argentina-defector-says. html?pagewanted=all

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41 “Nisman’s Report on Iran’s terrorist networks 60 Alberto Nisman, Chief Prosecutor, “Filing of throughout Latin America – Nisman report on sleeper Complaint,” Office of the Public Prosecutor of the cells,” 127. Nation, (Conversation of 5/20/2013, telephone no. 42 Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York 11-3238- 4699, File B-1009-2013-05-20-114842-2, CD Field Office, “Russell Defreitas Sentenced to Life in 31). P. 98 Prison for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack at 61 Ibid, 149. JFK Airport,” February 17, 2011. 62 Ibid, 149; See also Douglas Farah, “The 43 Sulzberger. Murder of Alberto Nisman: How the Government of 44 “Nisman’s Report on Iran’s terrorist networks Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner Created the throughout Latin America – Nisman report on sleeper Environment for a Perfect Crime,” International cells,” 138. Assessment and Strategy Center (IASC), March 2015. 45 “Exclusive: CIA Documents, the FBI and PF 63 “Hezbollah has ties to Brazil’s Largest Show how the Acts of Islamic Terror Network in Criminal Gang; Group also Found Active in Peru,” Fox Brazil,” Veja (Brazil), April 2, 2011. News Latino, November 11, 2014. http://latino.foxnews. 46 Ibid; see also “Brazil Latest Base for Islamic com/latino/news/2014/11/11/hezbollah-has-ties-to-brazil- Extremists,” Telegraph (London), April 4, 2001. largest-criminal-gang-group-also-found-active-in/ 47 Author interview, retired FBI agent, 64 Ibid. Washington D.C., February 23, 2011. 65 Ibid. 48 Report: Saudi Officials Warned of Iran Plot to 66 Matthew G. Olsen, “Worldwide Threats to the Attack Israel Embassy in Argentina,” Reuters, October Homeland,” Hearing before the Senate Committee on 14, 2011. Homeland Security, September 17, 2014. http://www. 49 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on nctc.gov/docs/2014_worldwide_threats_to_the_homeland.pdf Terrorism 2011, (July 31, 2012): 184. http://www.state. 67 Ibid. gov/documents/organization/195768.pdf 68 Ibid. 50 “Extended Summary: Nisman’s Report on 69 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Miami and Iran’s terrorist networks throughout Latin America,” San Diego Field Offices, “Seeking Information Ghazi AlbertoNisman.org, May 29, 2015. Nasr al-Din,” January 29, 2015. https://www.fbi.gov/ 51 Ibid, 145. wanted/terrorinfo/ghazi-nasr-al-din 52 “Nisman’s Report on Iran’s terrorist networks 70 “Treasury Targets Hizballah in Venezuela,” US throughout Latin America – Nisman report on sleeper Department of the Treasury, June 18, 2008. http://www. cells,” 218-219. treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1036.aspx 53 For details, see Levitt, 86. 71 Secretary of the Treasury Jacob J. Lew, 54 “Nisman’s Report on Iran’s terrorist networks “Remarks of Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew to The throughout Latin America – Nisman report on sleeper Washington Institute,” April 29, 2015. https://www. cells,” 187-192. washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/remarks-of-trea- 55 Ibid, 182. sury-secretary-jacob-j.-lew 56 U.S. v. Defreitas et al, government exhibit 342; 72 Adam Szubin, Acting Under Secretary for U.S. v. Defreitas et al, Eastern District of New York, Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Director, Office July 21, 2010, Transcript of Trial. of Foreign Assets Control U.S. Department of the 57 “Nisman’s Report on Iran’s terrorist networks Treasury, “Beyond The Vote: Implications for the throughout Latin America – Nisman report on sleeper Sanctions Regime on Iran,” September 16, 2015. http:// cells,” 137-138. www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/other/ 58 General James Clapper, “Worldwide Threat SzubinTranscript20150916-v2.pdf Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” (January 31, 2012): 5. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/ Testimonies/20120131_testimony_ata.pdf 59 Uki Goni, “Iran denies involvement in 1994 Argentinian Jewish centre bombing,” The Guardian, May 19, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/ may/19/iran-argentina-jewish-centre-amia-bombing

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 133 AUTHOR

DVIDSHUB: Ron Rogers

Elaborate cross-border drug smuggling tunnel discovered in a warehouse near San Diego by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

134 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 1 Transnational Organized Crime An Insidious Threat to U.S. National Security Interests

BY RENEE NOVAKOFF

ver the past several years, U.S. officials have begun paying more attention to the insidious threat of transnational organized crime in the western hemisphere and its poten- Otial effect on U.S. national security. While senior officials who are on the front lines tasked to stop the negative trends are calling for increased vigilance and support to end these destructive developments, competing priorities on U.S. policymakers are resulting in unfocused efforts to develop a whole of government approach against these criminal elements. The U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities have had some successes against these bad actors, but as a whole, criminal elements continue to grow in power and resources, and concerning anecdotal information indicates, terrorist groups may be using some of the same criminal middlemen to help them move funds, goods, and people as the transnational organized crime (TOC) groups are using. The time has come for a serious government wide implementation of the administration’s TOC strategy, before we face a tragedy in the homeland that is supported or perpetrated by these transnational criminal elements. Because the threat crosses intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, and military jurisdictions and is truly global, a new U.S. government paradigm is needed to insure a focused effort against the problem. This requires one focal point with the authority to put an operational plan together that crosses all stovepipes and can work domestic and international issues – the bad actors do not care about borders and they cross our organizational seams. It also makes sense to start this work closest to home – in Latin America. This article will lay out the nuances of the burgeoning relationship between criminal elements and terrorist groups in the western hemisphere in an attempt to inspire the U.S. national security establishment to take action. There is no doubt that transnational organized crime, especially in the western hemisphere, has grown over the past ten years. This growth is an unintended consequence of open borders, globalization, and technology that allows individuals to communicate, and to move funds, goods,

Renee Novakoff is the Deputy National Intelligence Manager for the Western Hemisphere at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

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Terrorists and insurgents will increasingly and people around the world more easily. turn to crime and criminal networks for These criminal elements prey on nations that funding and logistics, in part because of have weak institutions, poverty, and a popula- U.S. and Western success in attacking tion that feels disenfranchised from its govern- other sources of their funding.2 ment. These descriptions fit northern Central America, which continues to sort out the lega- Transnational criminal activity is among cies of its civil war period, making the govern- the most concerning soft threats to U.S. ments there vulnerable to elements with national security. It undermines our financial money, jobs, and the ability to manage or gov- institutions, our laws, and our national mor- ern. als. The money alone involved in this activity While TOC groups have grown in influ- easily corrupts small governments; and it can ence and wealth, the international community corrupt large corporations and larger, more has been successful in making it more difficult stable governments if left unchecked. Over for state sponsors of terrorism to fund terrorist time, the simultaneous phenomena of global- groups. This means terrorist groups must ization and success against state sponsors of develop ways to obtain revenue. Rand Beers, terrorism have resulted in terrorist groups and the then U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for transnational organized crime groups relying International Narcotics and Law Enforcement on the same middle men, or facilitators and Affairs, and Francis Taylor, then the U.S. tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to Department of State’s ambassador-at-large for make their activities happen. Thus, we are see- counterterrorism, told a U.S. Senate panel in ing a convergence that transcends ideology 2002 that terrorist groups have increasingly and is weighted in the practical. This conver- turned to drug trafficking as a source of reve- gence of criminal elements with terrorist nue as heightened international efforts have groups could make both groups more power- diminished the funding role of state sponsors.1 ful. Ten years later, in January 2012, the Director of Again, this is not a new phenomenon and National Intelligence James Clapper said: it is a trend national security professionals have been pointing out for years, especially in Latin America. Ambassador Taylor described

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The Triborder Region, notorious for illicit activity and stomping grounds of both transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. Paraguay is in the foreground, Argentina to the right, and Brazil to the left. This crossing is less than 10 miles from Paraguay’s Ciudad del Este.

this convergence trend to Congress in October international security and urged immediate 2001. He spoke about the Triborder Region international action, saying: (Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay) as an area In a world full of transnational threats, where Hezbollah was heavily involved with transnational crime is in an ascendant criminal activities to include document forg- phase… This lethal nexus of organized ing, money laundering, contraband smuggling, crime, narcotrafficking, and terrorism is a and weapons and drug trafficking.3 According threat...9 to a report written for the Brazilian security agencies in 2001, organized crime networks To address the growing threat, in 2011 the were increasing their influence in the triborder Obama White House issued a strategy to coun- area of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina back ter transnational crime.10 The strategy says then.4 These criminal groups, according to the that, international—or transnational—orga- report, offered aid to Middle Eastern terrorist nized crime has expanded dramatically in size, organizations, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and scope, and influence and that it poses a sig- the Islamic Jihad, which totaled $261 million.5 nificant threat to national and international The report claimed these criminal groups are security.11 In the introduction to this strategy, active in Paraguay and along the drug traffick- President Obama writes: ing route from Colombia to the United States …criminal networks are not only expand- and Europe.6 The report noted that most of ing their operations, but they are also diver- these clandestine operations take place in sifying their activities, resulting in a con- Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, considered a vergence of transnational threats that has regional center for drug trafficking and arms evolved to become more complex, volatile, smuggling.7 The transactions mostly involve and destabilizing. These networks also bartering drugs for weapons from Colombian threaten U.S. interests by forging alliances armed rebel groups.8 with corrupt elements of national govern- In a similar vein, in 2009, then National ments and using the power and influence Security Advisor General James L. Jones, of those elements to further their criminal USMC, Ret. warned of the TOC threats to activities.12

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Director of National intelligence, James bring weapons of mass destruction into the Clapper recently declared before a Senate com- United States.16 mittee that transnational criminal organizations, particularly those from Latin America, However, resources focused on transna- were an “abiding threat to U.S. economic and tional crime and the area of the world where national security interests.” He also high- most of the criminal activity that directly lighted the intelligence community’s concern affects the U.S. takes place, Latin America and that these groups may develop ties with both the Caribbean, continue to be cut. Implausibly, terrorist organizations and foreign govern- senior decisionmakers consider Latin America ments.13 as a low threat environment, even as the Over the past ten years that we have been President sets out a strategy and numerous discussing the convergence of crime and ter- senior officials lay out the national security rorism, the relationships have become more threat that emanates largely from this region. complicated and seemingly entrenched. To be sure, the idea of TOC/terrorist con- According to the 2015 U.S. National Security vergence remains controversial. The naysayers strategy, the increasing interdependence of the of this threat are largely characterized by those global economy and rapid pace of technologi- who want the threat to go away. They point out cal change are linking individuals, groups, and the lack of consistent information or events governments in unprecedented ways. The strat- that prove there is ongoing convergence. egy explains that these phenomenon “create However, as Farah explains, “the clandestine shared vulnerabilities, as interconnected sys- nature of criminal and terrorist activities, tems and sectors are susceptible to the threats designed to be as opaque as possible,… of… transnational terrorism and crime.”14 As [means] whatever is known of specific opera- national security specialist Doug Farah points tions along the criminal-terrorist pipeline, or out, “As relationships consolidate, the recom- whatever combinations of links are seen, rep- binant criminal-terrorist pipelines become resents merely a snapshot in time, not a video more rooted and thus more dangerous.”15 of continuing events.”17 Senior officials have gone further. During While there may be limited evidence of his testimony before congress earlier this year true convergence (the FARC in Colombia is a General John Kelly, USMC said: clear example of convergence of terrorism and criminals), the preponderance of activities that In my opinion, the relative ease with which we can identify shows terrorists imitating the human smugglers [from Central America] criminal behavior they see around them, bor- move tens of thousands of people to our rowing techniques such as credit card fraud nation’s doorstep also serves as another and extortion. Louise Shelley and other spe- warning sign: these smuggling routes are a cialists in this area refer to this phenomenon potential vulnerability to our homeland. As as activity appropriation, “a shared approach I stated last year, terrorist organizations rather than true interaction.”18 Additionally, could seek to leverage those same smug- terrorist groups are using some of the same gling routes to move operatives with intent middlemen as TOC groups to obtain the to cause grave harm to our citizens or even

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revenue and logistical support they need. This vulnerabilities and helping their customers use will be laid out later in this paper. those weaknesses to move their goods through As far as activity appropriation goes, what the borders. Last year, almost half a million we are seeing is a nexus of activities as opposed migrants from Central America were appre- to a nexus of organizations. Activity conver- hended on the U.S.-Mexico border. Most paid gence occurs when terrorists use criminal activ- middle men to help them get to the U.S. The ities or criminals use terrorist tactics in pursuit repercussions of weak border control go of their respective political and economic beyond migration issues. ISIL has directly ends. For a myriad of reasons, TCOs and ter- identified this as a U.S. vulnerability. In 2014, rorists are using the same methods and, in ISIL adherents posted discussions on social some cases, the same individuals to sustain media calling for the infiltration of the U.S. their organizations, make money, and support southern border. The May 2015 issue of Dabiq, their activities. the English language ISIL periodical, highlighted the possibility of ISIL moving WMD A Clear National Security Threat materials through global drug trafficking In January 2010, the U.S. government con- routes into the U.S. from Mexico.22 cluded that between 1995 and 2009 transna- Over time, and with the advent of a glo- tional organized crime had expanded dramat- balized world, organized crime has diversified, ically in size and scope.19 The core of this gone global, and reached macro-economic activity takes place in the northern areas of proportions. Illicit goods may be sourced from Latin America where proceeds from drug traf- one continent, trafficked across another, and ficking are making criminals rich or, in some marketed in a third. Transnational organized cases, allowing them to feed their families. crime permeates government agencies and Illicit activities such as drugs, arms, contra- institutions, fueling corruption, infiltrating band, and human trafficking are nothing new, business and politics, and hindering economic however, their scale and associated violence as and social development. The UN says that it is a result of globalization have made these trans- undermining governance and democracy by national crimes a national security concern. empowering those who operate outside the The UN has stated that organized crime threat- law.23 There is no reason to think that this ens peace and human security, violates human cannot happen in the U.S.. Fighting these rights, and undermines economic, social, cul- illicit networks is no longer about drugs, coun- tural, political, and civil development of soci- terfeits, weapons, terrorists, or insurgents. It is eties around the world.20 Furthermore, the vast about defending the integrity of the system of sums of money involved can compromise viable sovereign states and the fundamental legitimate economies and directly impact pub- structure of global order.24 lic processes by “buying” elections through TOC networks are a threat; not a force on corruption.21 force threat, but one that is more insidious and The vastness of U.S. borders make them transcends borders. These borderless groups vulnerable to anyone or anything that is deter- infiltrate government institutions to create, for mined to cross them. Illicit traffickers make themselves, space from which to carry out their living by learning U.S. border illicit activities. “TOC networks insinuate

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themselves into the political process in a vari- estimates in its 2011 Strategy to Combat ety of ways. This is often accomplished Transnational Organized Crime that money- through direct bribery; setting-up shadow laundering accounts for $1.3 trillion to $3.3 economies, infiltrating financial and security trillion—or between two and five percent of sectors…, and positioning themselves as alter- the world’s GDP.27 Bribery from TOCs adds nate providers of governance, security, services, close to $1 trillion to that amount, while drug- and livelihoods.”25 These networks threaten to trafficking generates an estimated $750 billion destabilize governments not by direct means, to $1 trillion, counterfeited and pirated goods but through behind the scenes attempts to add another $500 billion, and illicit firearms gain space to develop their illegal businesses. sales generate from $170 billion to $320 bil- Moises Naim talks about how criminal ele- lion. This totals some $6.2 trillion—10 percent ments are gaining political influence as well as of the world’s GDP, placing it behind only the wealth and connecting remote places of the United States and the European Union, but planet with the most cosmopolitan cities in his well ahead of China, in terms of global GDP book, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and ranking. Other estimates of global criminal Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy.26 proceeds range from a low of about four per- This money and power is what threatens cent to a high of 15 percent of global GDP. U.S. national security. There is not a clear mil- The value of cocaine trade alone to criminal itary threat, but a threat that is more concern- networks in Latin America is more than the ing, a slow corruption of our systems and mor- gross domestic product of every country in the als, that if left unchecked, will make us region except Brazil. These estimates are at vulnerable to the whims of undemocratic pow- least four years old and trends show transna- ers and erode the institutions, rules, and laws tional organized crime groups and networks that we hold dear. What makes this threat even have been growing in power and wealth since more concerning is that others – state and these figures were published. nonstate anti-American actors – could under- The effect of transnational organized mine U.S. institutions. This is the fight that crime groups on Latin America is devastating; some governments in Latin America are facing public insecurity is pervasive there. TOC col- today. laboration is especially important in vulnerable countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, and The Lure of Transnational Organized Crime Profits Honduras, where government institutions are threatened by criminal syndicates. To further Illicit trafficking is estimated to be a $6 trillion complicate the criminal landscape in the industry. In its 2010 report, The Globalization of region, add the role of gangs. In nearly every Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat country in the region, polls have shown that Assessment, the United Nations Office on Drugs the population considers personal security as and Crime (UNODC) estimated that the its number one concern. Across Latin America, smuggling of persons from Latin America to murder rates are generally higher than they the United States generated approximately were ten years ago and the region has the high- $6.6 billion annually in illicit proceeds for est murder rate in the world. El Salvador is cur- human smuggling networks. The White House rently experiencing the highest homicide rates

140 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME it has had since its civil war, thanks largely to violent criminal activities. Although the actual gang wars. percentage of homicides that can be attributed The lines between transnational gang to gangs in Central America remains contro- activity and organized crime are increasingly versial, the gangs have unquestionably been blurry. While most street gangs lack the orga- involved in a broad array of criminal activities. nizational structure, capital, and manpower Those activities include kidnapping, human required to run sophisticated global criminal trafficking, and drug, auto, and weapons smug- schemes or to penetrate state institutions at gling. Gangs are involved in extortions of resi- high levels, a few (such as the MS-13 and the dents, bus drivers, and business owners in M-18) have become more highly organized. major cities throughout the region. Failure to Analysts argue that some gangs in the region pay often results in harassment or violence by may be evolving into “third generation” gangs gang members. In 2010, gangs reportedly that are “internationalized, networked, and killed 130 Guatemalan bus drivers and 53 bus complicated structures.” In other words, they toll collectors.28 In October 2012, the U.S. cross borders. They are directly tied to the Treasury Department put MS-13 on its list of same northern tier states in Central America designated Transnational Organized Crime that are exhibiting increased illicit trafficking Groups pursuant to Executive Order 13581. activity and these gangs have direct links to the The Supreme Court in El Salvador has even U.S. labeled any gang that tries to take power from Today, MS-13 and M-18 engage in a vari- the state – including the notorious MS-13 – a ety of criminal activities, and are largely unaf- terrorist group; earlier this year, the Salvadoran fected by law enforcement in Latin America. government called on its military to secure bus They continue to expand and refine their drivers after gangs shut down the bus system xmascarol

Protestors took to the street of Medellin with giant banners, voicing their outrage against the FARC.

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in San Salvador by threatening violence against into a major trafficking network. They make a the busses. living by moving goods.31 Also connecting the converging threats are The Nexus: The Facilitators legitimate players such as accountants, attor- Over time, it is only natural that those involved neys, notaries, bankers, and real estate brokers, in disparate activities across the illicit universe who cross both the licit and illicit worlds and will begin to establish working relationships. provide services to legitimate customers, crim- What the transnational organized crime inals, and terrorists alike. The range of licit- groups and terrorists have in common is the illicit relationships is broad. At one end, crim- need for support mechanisms to accomplish inals draw on the public reputations of licit their activities. These are individuals or small actors to maintain facades of propriety for groups who specialize in areas such as docu- their operations. At the other end are “special- ment fraud, and moving goods or money. ists” with skills or resources who have been Understanding these networks or supply completely subsumed into the criminal net- chains helps us understand the links between works.32 For example, TOC networks rely on TOC and terrorist groups. Major crime groups industry experts, both witting and unwitting, such as Mexican cartels or Colombia’s FARC to facilitate corrupt transactions and to create contract with smaller, local criminal organiza- the necessary infrastructure to pursue their tions, or vetted individuals that move goods illicit schemes, such as creating shell corpora- across borders, dispatch legal support, or per- tions, opening offshore bank accounts in the form a myriad of other activities needed to run shell corporation’s name, and creating front the big organizations these groups oversee. businesses for their illegal activity and money Increasingly, terrorist groups also need assis- laundering.33 Business owners or bankers are tance in laundering money, obtaining travel enlisted to launder money, and employees of documents, etc. The individuals involved with legitimate companies are used to conceal these activities are important elements of the smuggling operations. Human smugglers, network, in some cases, the glue that keeps the human traffickers, arms traffickers, drug traf- network moving, but little is known about fickers, terrorists, and other criminals depend them. These pipelines, or chains of networks, on secure transportation networks and safe are adaptive and able to move a multiplicity of locations from which to stage smuggling activ- illicit products (cocaine, weapons, humans, ity or to store bulk cash or narcotics for trans- and bulk cash) that ultimately cross U.S. bor- port.34 ders undetected thousands of times each day.29 The conventional view has been that there The actors along the pipeline form and dis- are mutual disincentives for terrorists and solve alliances quickly, occupy physical and TCOs to associate. It might be time to re-exam- cyber space, and use both highly developed ine that analytical assumption. Terrorists can and modern institutions, from the global tap into the global illicit marketplace to under- financial system to ancient smuggling routes write their activities and acquire weapons and and methods.30 They are middlemen who other supplies vital to their operations. have little loyalty to one group and often have Criminals, in their search for profits, will turn no aspiration to develop their organization

142 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME almost anywhere for revenue. The net effect is networks, transnational criminals could wit- a crime-terror nexus. tingly or more likely unwittingly facilitate ter- Historically, traditional criminal organiza- rorist activities. The most likely conduits for tions had specific geographic purviews. This this activity are the facilitators who help both resulted in a sense of nationalism that made TOCs and terrorists move goods and money. working with terrorist groups particularly They are the nexus between the two organiza- abhorrent. The new, contemporary transna- tions. tional terrorist organizations are missing that Terrorists and insurgents increasingly are nationalistic component in their organiza- turning to transnational organized crime to tions, thus they are more willing to work with generate funding and acquire logistical sup- whoever will help them make money. This port to carry out their actions.35 The terrorist presents a particularly troubling trend among and extremist groups derive much of their the contemporary TCOs. Also, as states go after drug-related income from taxation levied for the leadership of these TCOs, the groups tend protection of drug growers, laboratories, clan- to break up, leaving room for less capable destine landing fields, and transport of drugs leaders to take over as well as disrupting the or precursor chemicals through “controlled” tight command and control (C2) that had kept territory.36 As of November 2011, the Drug discipline within the TOCs. With less disci- Enforcement Administration (DEA) had linked pline, it is more likely that we will see a crimi- 19 of the 49 organizations of the State nal organization supporting a terrorist group Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist to move people, money, or goods. Organizations to the drug trade.37 The Department of Justice reports that 29 of the 63 Where the TOCs and Terrorists Meet organizations on its FY2010 Consolidated The presence of all these “bad actors” means, Priority Organization Targets list, were associ- ultimately, there will be a “nexus” between ated with terrorist groups.38 Farah argues that international terrorist organizations and crim- drug trafficking organizations and terrorist inal networks. Nexus does not mean the two groups in the western hemisphere are increas- are working in concert toward a common goal. ingly using the same intermediaries to obtain In most cases, they are not, except for the arms, launder money, and move illicit prod- immediate goal of moving a person or goods ucts across borders via “terrorist-criminal pipe- or making revenue. The threats are different. lines.” According to him, these connections are In its simplest form, a threat is defined as capa- most often temporary associations based pri- bility plus intent. Illicit trafficking groups do marily on necessity, which are constantly shift- not currently possess the intent to attack the ing and evolving. Both Hezbollah and drug United States. That is not to say, that TOCs are cartels rely on experts who can easily transfer not dangerous. These organizations possess and legitimize illicit funds internationally and the firepower to do serious harm if they believe these “super-fixers” (as Farah refers to them) their illicit operations are being hindered and or facilitators as I previously referred to them I already laid out the insidious, soft power are driven by economic incentives. threat that they pose to our nation. However, In 2008, U.S. and Colombian authorities given the diffuse nature of both types of dismantled a cocaine smuggling and

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money-laundering organization that allegedly West Africa. They were actually dealing with helped fund Hezbollah operations. Called undercover agents, whom they believed to be Operation Titan, the enforcement effort uncov- members of the FARC. A confidential human ered a money laundering operation that is sus- source was introduced to Issa and began a pected of laundering hundreds of millions of series of meetings that would lead to the arrest dollars of cocaine proceeds a year and paying of Issa and two accomplices. The confidential 12 percent of those profits to Hezbollah.39 human source identified Issa as a member of Operation Titan led to more than 130 arrests a criminal organization that operated in Togo, and the seizure of $23 million. Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Mali (USA v. Issa, According to official U.S. Government 2009; Markovic, 2011). The indictment stated statements, Hezbollah derives financial bene- that the informant met with Issa on September fits from a global commercial network of licit 14, 2009 in Ghana. This meeting was used to and illicit businesses that not only generates plan the logistics of transporting cocaine for revenue for the organization, but also provides the FARC via West Africa to North Africa, with numerous outlets through which illicit funds the final destination being the Canary Islands. can be laundered, disguised, and moved. In During this meeting Issa stated that the ship- February 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department’s ment would have protection provided by Financial Crimes Enforcement Network AQIM and that they would be able to easily (FinCEN) designated Lebanese Canadian Bank circumvent scrutiny at customs checkpoints in SAL as a financial institution of primary Mali. After this date, there were several phone money laundering concern pursuant to Section calls made to arrange the logistics of transport- 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act (31 U.S.C. ing the cocaine, arranging transfers to Issa 5318A). In its public notice on the Section 311 through Western Union in Togo.40 This case finding, FinCEN described the Lebanese illustrates the murky world of facilitators, Canadian Bank SAL as, “routinely used by drug criminals, and terrorists. traffickers and money launderers operating in At the pinnacle of the facilitator echelon various countries in Central and South there is Victor Bout. He is often referred to as America, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East” one of the world’s most prodigious illicit net- and asserted that Hezbollah profited from the work facilitators or super fixers—individuals criminal activities of this global illicit financial who can help move illicit goods for a price. At network. one point, he is alleged to have owned an On December 15, 2009, Oumar Issa, international network of 30 front companies Harouna Toure, and Idriss Abelrahman were and a fleet of cargo planes. He was an arms indicted on two counts for their role in a con- trafficker, notorious for his ability to transport spiracy to possess with the intent to distribute practically anything anywhere. Prior to his cocaine and conspiracy to provide material arrest and eventual conviction in 2011, Bout support to a foreign terrorist organization was widely believed to have had a hand in a (USA v. Issa, 2009). The men were linked to range of international contraband smuggling al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) and and sanctions-busting activities in Latin were attempting to work with the FARC to America, Africa, southwest Asia, and elsewhere. smuggle Colombian cocaine to Europe via Both the United Nations and the U.S.

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government sought to freeze his assets and In January 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department Belgium issued an arrest warrant for him in designated Joumaa as a drug kingpin and in 2002 for crimes related to money laundering June 2012 labeled him as a specially desig- and diamond smuggling. He has also been nated global terrorist. In November 2011, the accused of illegally transporting arms to the U.S. filed charges against Joumaa. The indict- FARC, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda, while legally ment included details of Hezbollah’s far-reach- providing air freight transport around the ing network of criminal activities in Latin world. He was caught in Thailand in 2008 in a America and around the globe. According to DEA sting operation after attempting to sell testimony before the House of Representatives surface-to-air missiles, AK-47s, ammunition, Committee on Foreign Affairs, the DEA inves- C-4 plastic explosives, and unmanned aerial tigation of Ayman Joumaa indicated that vehicles to U.S. confidential sources purport- Hezbollah leaders were involved in smuggling ing to be members of the FARC. Bout was ulti- cocaine from South America. Ayman Joumaa mately extradited to the United States in was charged with shipping tens of tons of November 2010, convicted in November 2011 cocaine through Mexico from Colombia to the on four counts, and sentenced to 25 years in United States over at least eight years.42 Former prison in April 2012.41 DEA senior official Michael Braun stated that Another key example of the role of a facil- the Ayman Joumaa affair was yet another itator as the link between criminal groups and example of how Hezbollah obtained funding terrorist groups is the story of Ayman Joumaa. through criminal activities. According to the U.S. Navy

U.S. Navy boarding team takes control of a dhow in the Arabian Sea, seizing drugs and detaining crew.

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indictment, Ayman Joumaa had close relations Not all of the middle men are as powerful as a with Hezbollah and was a middleman between Victor Bout. Most are not. They are an accoun- Hezbollah and various drug cartels.43 The tant, a lawyer, a money mover, or an individual indictments went on to say Joumaa coordi- who has access to transporters who can move nated cocaine shipments in connection with people and goods. Most just make a living for the Mexican cartel los Zetas and laundered as their family but some, over time, emerge like a much as $200 million per month through Bout. Powerful and rich. bank accounts with Lebanese Canadian Bank We are seeing the emergence of the mid- SAL and other financial institutions. His South dle men as the most important connecting and Central American drug trafficking opera- point between transnational organized crime tions shipped cocaine to the United States as groups and terrorist groups. Referred to by well as to West Africa for further distribution Doug Farah as the “super fixer.” He describes to Europe. Joumaa reportedly paid undisclosed a small group of super fixers and enablers who fees to Hezbollah to facilitate the transporta- allow networks to function and who facilitate tion and laundering of narcotics proceeds. For global connectivity among illicit networks, example, for bulk cash movements through including linking criminal and terrorist Beirut International Airport, Joumaa paid groups. Not loyal to any single entity or net- Hezbollah security to safeguard and transport work, they are valuable to multiple, even com- cash. Joumaa also reportedly used trade-based peting networks. Among the fascinating attri- money laundering (TBML) schemes to help butes of these individuals, is their ability to conceal and disguise the true source, nature, survive regime changes and political upheav- ownership, and control of the narcotics pro- als. For them, there is no ideological hurdle to ceeds. Such schemes involved Asian suppliers overcome, only business to be done.45 The of consumer goods as well as used car dealer- importance of super fixers to geopolitics is ships in the United States. As part of the U.S. only likely to increase in the coming years. car sales scheme, for example, Hezbollah The other important component for these owned and controlled funds are transferred super fixers, is the ability to do business in from Lebanon to the United States via banks, Latin America. You will note, all the above currency exchange houses, and individuals in examples have a Latin American nexus. This is order to purchase used cars. The cars would be because government institutions in Latin shipped to West Africa and sold for cash. Cash America are still developing. It is also because proceeds, in turn, would be transferred to important financial institutions and markets Lebanon through Hezbollah-linked bulk cash for the illicit goods (drugs) are nearby in the smugglers, hawaladars, and currency brokers.44 U.S. None of the individuals described above Conclusion appear to be terrorists, but they are associated with terrorist groups. Neither do they fit the The U.S. faces national security threats from definition of a transnational criminal organi- borderless groups who are making enormous zation. They are the individuals who lead spe- sums of money, and who conduct their busi- cialty groups to assist other criminals, terror- ness, raise funds, and look for safe environ- ists, and insurgents in getting what they need. ments wherever they can. By far, the most

146 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME concerning of these groups are terrorist orga- information helps the enemy. The U.S. govern- nizations which are intent on harming the ment must develop a new prism from which United States. Also of concern are TOCs that, to confront this new type of enemy that has no due to their vast sums of money, are able to act borders. with impunity and undermine governments. In addition, there must be a clear signal Finally, there are those individuals who facili- from the highest levels of the policymaking tate the activities of both facilitators and, more community that combatting these dangerous concerning, the extremely powerful and rich trends is a national security priority. Operators super fixers who could grow powerful enough and intelligence professionals have warned the to influence governments and terrorists alike. public of the threat for years. The administra- At the most extreme, allowing the current tion has completed the first steps by laying out trends to fester and grow increases the likeli- the issue in the 2015 National Security Strategy hood transnational organized crime organiza- and by issuing a Transnational Organized tions and terrorist organizations could merge. Crime Strategy in 2011. What is needed now is At the least, it increases the importance and the hard part, corralling all the needed exper- thus the power of “super facilitators” whose tise into a focused, comprehensive plan with personal wealth could easily top that of the real deliverables, the power to meet those majority of the nations in the world given cur- deliverables, accountability for those deliver- rent trends. In addition, allowing these net- ables, resources to implement the strategy, and works and individuals to develop unchecked, metrics that measure success against this threatens the fabric of fledgling democracies enemy. PRISM and could weaken even strong global democracies. What is needed is a new paradigm to help us better understand and counter these threats that cross our borders daily. The U.S. government should appoint a leader of an interagency fusion center that can cross traditional policy, law enforcement, and intelligence lines to forge information from all these worlds and then use appropriate U.S. leverage – law enforcement, financial, regulatory, covert, or diplomatic – to stop these trends. This fusion center must be able to work domestically and internationally to follow the “bad guys” where ever they may go. This idea will take new organizational constructs and relationships that are not wedded to parochial U.S. institutional structures. The paradigm must consist of information sharing among all agencies in the U.S. and among its partner nations. Stove piping

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Notes Organized Crime & International Terrorism: National Criminal Justice Reference Service,” 2005. 19 “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized 1 U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Crime” (2011). Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and 20 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Government Information. “Narco-Terror: The “Organized Crime.” Accessed May 19, 2015. http:// Worldwide Connection between Drugs and Terror,” www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/index.html. March 13, 2002. 21 Ibid. 2 Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer, 22 Richard Spencer. “John Cantlie Claims editors. Convergence: Illicit Networks and National ‘Infinitely’ Greater Threat of Nuclear Attack on U.S..” Security in the Age of Globalization. (Washington DC: The Telegraph, May 22, 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ National Defense University Press, 2013). news/worldnews/islamic-state/11625425/John-Cantlie-claims- 3 Anthony Faiola, “U.S. Terrorist Search Reaches infinitely-greater-threat-of-nuclear-attack-on-U.S..html. Paraguay; Black Market Border Hub Called Key 23 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Finance Center for Middle East Extremists,” “Organized Crime.” Washington Post, October 13, 2001, A21. 24 Miklaucic and Brewer (2013). 4 Rex Hudson. “Terrorist and Organized Crime 25 “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South Crime” (2011). America.” Library of Congress: Federal Research 26 Moisés Naim. Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers Division, July 2003. and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy. (New 5 Ibid. York: Anchor Books, 2006). 6 Ibid. 27 “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized 7 Ibid. Crime” (2011). 8 Ibid. 28 Clare Ribando Seelke, “Gangs in Central 9 United States. White House. “Strategy to America.” Congressional Research Service. January Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” National 2013. Strategic Document, The Office of the President of the 29 Farah (2012). United States of America (Washington, 2011) 30 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 13 Jeremy McDermott. “Transnational Crime 34 Ibid. ‘Abiding Threat’ to National Security: U.S. 35 “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Intelligence.” InSight Crime, 2012. Crime” (2011). 14 United States. White House. “National 36 Glenn E. Curtis, Rex A. Hudson, and Nina A. Security Strategy,” February 2015 Kollars. “A global overview of narcotics-funded 15 Douglas Farah. Transnational Organized Crime, terrorist and other extremist groups.” Library of Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Congress: The Federal Research Division, May 2002. Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority. (Carlisle: 37 Statement of Derek S. Maltz. U.S. House of U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Representatives Committee on Terrorism, Non- 2012): 15. Proliferation, and Crime, November 17, 2011. 16 Gen. John F. Kelly, “Posture Statement of 38 “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized General John R. Kelly, United States Marine Corps, Crime” (2011). Commander, United States Southern Command 39 Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella. “Colombia Before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Drug Ring may Link to Hezbollah.” The Seattle Times, Committee,” March 12, 2015, accessed at: http://www. 2008. southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_POSTURE_ 40 Gary Ackerman, et al. “Analyzing and STATEMENT_FINAL_2015.pdf. Evaluating Criminal Organizations.” The “New” Face 17 Farah (2012). of Transnational Crime Organizations (TCOs): A 18 Dr. Louise I. Shelley, et al. “Methods and Geopolitical Perspective and Implications to U.S. National Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Security. (Kiernan Group Holdings, 2013).

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41 John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler. “Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, June 11, 2013. 42 U.S. v Ayman Jormaa: Case #1:11-cr-00560-TSE (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia). 43 “Treasury Targets Major Lebanese-Based Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering Network.” U.S. Department of Treasury: Press Center. http://www. treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1035.aspx. 44 John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler. “Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, June 11, 2013. 45 Miklaucic and Brewer (2013).

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Adam Isacson, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)

A mural dedicated to migrants at the Tapachula (Mexico) Center of Human Rights Fray Matias de Cordova

150 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 1 Illicit Networks Rethinking the Systemic Risk in Latin America

BY IVAN BRISCOE AND PAMELA KALKMAN

riminals dressed up as Rulers: Out! read one of the signs brandished by protesters who have returned time and again to the streets of Guatemala during a wave of corruption scandals Cin the Central American nation.1 Borrowing from previous episodes of public indignation against graft in government from Mexico, Brazil, or much further afield, and prompting in its wake an unprecedented series of demonstrations in neighboring Honduras, the Guatemalan protests are directly linked to the exposure of illicit activities located at the commanding heights of the state. Primarily the work of a UN-led investigative commission, the revelations began in April with the first arrests linked to a customs racket that plundered an estimated $325,000 a week.2 This was followed soon after by cases of embezzlement and money laundering in bodies across the Guatemalan state and political system, leading to a string of indictments against the country’s once untouchable elite. Among them stand the president and vice-president, both of them charged and imprisoned while still serving in office, as well as the former head of the tax service and the former head of the Central Bank. A charge-sheet of this sort suggests not merely that some holders of high office were seeking illegal material gain; nor just that they were conspiring to do so in corrupt conclaves. Instead, as the protester’s placard suggested, the various cases uncovered by the Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) indicate that the core apparatus of the state system and its most basic services – not just the long corrupted National Police, but Congress, taxation, and elements of the financial system – had become protected spaces in which political appointees could exploit the law and their mandates for personal and factional advantage. The law of the land, in short, had become a gift and a goldmine for criminal endeavors. The eventual consequences of the current Central American thaw are as hard to foresee as its recent equivalents in the Arab world or Eastern Europe, not least because of the isthmus’ long

Ivan Briscoe is a Senior Fellow at the Conflict Research Unit in the Clingendael Institute, The Hague. Pamela Kalkman is an investigative journalist at the Dutch news weekly De Groene Amsterdammer.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 151 BRISCOE AND KALKMAN history of rapidly aborted democratic awaken- region: flourishing drug trafficking routes;4 ings. However, the potential impact of these crime rates that place Guatemala, Honduras cases stretches far beyond any immediate and El Salvador in the top eleven countries in political shifts or potential counter-reforma- the world in terms of their lethal violence;5 tions. At their core, the scandals in Guatemala, and, as a result, the mass exodus of child or the ire in Honduras over an estimated $300 migrants to the U.S. border.6 Instead, it would million embezzlement of social security to now appear that the violation of the law is a fund political party spending (among other far more complicated and systemic phenom- things),3 challenge the predominant under- enon than the common understanding of standing of the crises, threats, and develop- criminalized groups or mafias involved in traf- mental concerns facing Central America, as ficking rackets and terrorizing local popula- well as other parts of Latin America. tions. Of course, rates of violent crime remain For over a decade, the Central American alarming; in El Salvador, murder rates have publics, their political leaders, and the interna- recently touched a post-conflict high.7 But the tional community have broadly agreed as to public outcries of recent months underline the what are the main menaces affecting the fact that the identification of criminal enemies Nerdoguate

Hundreds of thousands of people across Latin America have recently protested against the corruption and scandal in their countries in demonstrations that have sometimes rallied many tens of thousands at a time. Here, Guatemalan protesters petition for the resignation of the President. This protestor’s sign reads, “I Don’t Have a President.”

152 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 ILLICIT NETWORKS and criminalized spaces, and the sense that forces9 – has sparked huge anti-corruption pro- they can be fought by the state and security tests across the country, as well as international forces as they currently stand, involves a pro- rebuke. The recent jailbreak of the Sinaloa foundly mistaken conception: the legal order Cartel leader reinforced the typecasting of the and illegality are not binary opposites. Mexican state as a willing collaborator in This blurring of frontiers between law and crime. The region’s powerhouse, Brazil, is now illegality now poses acute dilemmas for every raking through the biggest corruption scandal effort to contain the security crises that in its history, implicating numerous members threaten Central America, and which spill over of the ruling Workers’ Party and allies in the to various other countries, including the taking of bribes in return for lucrative con- United States, through flows of drugs, arms, tracts with the state-owned oil company, and migrants. Both Honduras and Guatemala Petrobras – bribes that were made possible by have recently been ruled by presidents who mechanisms of state-led development that have drawn support from the use of a long- appear to have been captured by political and established policy trope: mano dura (iron fist) business elites. Combined with an economic measures to combat crime, complemented crisis, the effect on President Dilma Rousseff’s where necessary by states of emergency and second term in office has been dire: a poll in deep military involvement in internal security, July 2015 found that 62 percent of those sur- often with U.S. backing. These approaches veyed wished to see her impeached.10 have long been questioned over their effective- As a result, the legitimacy not just of tran- ness. But recent scandals suggest that the entire sient political leaders but of core public insti- theoretical apparatus to support them rests on tutions has come under threat. A recent survey a dubious foundation: the idea that security showed that in Latin America “levels of trust in policy can be a technical exercise in hardware political and social institutions are generally and capacity-building, divorced from ubiqui- falling, with the Catholic Church and the tous political influences whose commitment Army most trusted, and political parties the to legality is largely based on exploiting the least. Of all institutions trust in elections suf- law rather than applying it. fered the greatest decline between 2012 and Broader issues of state legitimacy and sta- 2014.”11 One global survey shows that while bility are also at stake. The interweaving of in most countries the judiciary is seen as a criminal, business, and political interests at all positive influence, in Argentina, Brazil, and levels of the state is publicly acknowledged Chile fewer than three in ten give it a positive across Central America, but has also had grave rating.12 effects on several of the most important large Whether the concern is the terrible vio- Latin American countries. In Argentina, lence suffered on the streets of Central Mexico, and Brazil, scandals have highlighted America, the illicit goods trafficked across the the links between crime and parts of the polit- region, or the prospect of powerful states fac- ical elite.8 The disappearance of 43 trainee- ing severe legitimacy crises, the presence of teachers in Iguala, Mexico in September 2014 illicit networks in the state – and, in a mirror- – with the collusion of local police, political image, the state-like and business-like charac- authorities, and possibly even national security teristics of organized criminal groups

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– challenges almost every preconception as to from the capital and close to borders, criminal how to bring security and stability to the groups – sometimes in allegiance with local region. As a means to guide thinking on how authorities – are free to operate quasi-state these issues may in future be approached, this protection rackets defending illicit activities article aims to reconstitute an understanding such as (but not limited to) the production of how the illicit nexus connects state and and trafficking of drugs, above all cocaine, as non-state actors in Latin America, and what well as of arms, humans, and natural resources. this might mean for future national and inter- Money laundering in these contexts has national policy. To do so, it first explores what become a motor for the general economy. exactly we mean by criminalized spaces and by Some of the regions that are today reputed illicit networks. to be major centers of illicit activities were once remote places colonized by peasant farm- Criminalized Spaces ers in search of land and fortune, such as the Most Latin American countries contain remote, Intag region in Ecuador, the Petén region in rural territories marked by high levels of infor- Guatemala, the Amazonian province of Madre mality, and coercive and patriarchal forms of de Dios in Peru, or regions along the so-called leadership (the so-called caudillos). Some such agricultural frontier in Colombia, such as areas, which historically have been character- Putumayo or La Guajira.13 Certain localities in ized by a lack of formal state control, have these areas are now synonymous with the iron emerged into centers of organized crime and grip of organized crime. The Mexican city of transnational trafficking. Often far removed Tenosique, in the state of Tabasco not far from Reinhard Jahn, Mannheim

Ferry hauling goods and people across the river in the Guatemalan state of El Petén.

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the Guatemalan border, has now fallen under Major centers of international trade such as the effective control of local criminal groups Buenaventura, on the Colombian Pacific, or allied to the Zetas cartel.14 The tri-border area Rosario in Argentina, are the most violent sites between Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina is a in their countries, largely due to strong links meeting point of cocaine smugglers, marijuana to drug trafficking. Yet, as the cases of the producers, and traffickers of goods and people. Mexican border town Ciudad Juárez or the In 2012 the homicide rate of the Brazilian bor- favelas in Rio de Janeiro demonstrate, episodes der city of Foz do Iguaçu was three times the of violence with profound effects on local national average.15 communities can suddenly come to a halt – Yet it is important to note that not all sometimes when one criminal group has criminalized areas are marked by homicidal established its dominance, and managed to violence. In some places, the dominant orga- make some kind of working arrangement with nized crime groups have been able to make the local authorities. relatively stable arrangements among them- For instance, local experts in Ciudad selves, as well as with local officials and peo- Juárez argue that the sharp drop in violence is ple: a pax mafiosa. Often this occurs in areas prompted by an informal pact between the where citizens do not regard illicit activities as Sinaloa cartel and factions of the federal police criminal. This is the case for the contraband and army, not unlike the “peace deal” that gov- convoys between Bolivia and Peru, whose sup- erned Medellín under the paramilitary leader port networks spread deep into communities “Don Berna” between 2003 and 2008.18 Under and local authorities, and whose representa- such circumstances, the peace is experienced tives have acquired seats in the national as a real reduction in violent and petty crime, Congress. In the main regions from which but one that rests on the consolidation of an migrants leave Guatemala, El Salvador, and intrinsically coercive form of leadership, with Honduras, smugglers of humans, known as often very fragile foundations of trust between coyotes or polleros, have long been regarded as a different criminal factions. The El Salvadoran benign influence: “not a criminal but a bene- journalist Oscar Martínez’s remarks about the factor,” according to one expert on border towns of northern Mexico are illumi- Guatemalan migration patterns.16 The legiti- nating in this regard: “Narco-controlled neigh- macy of coca growing is of course a constituent bourhoods are calm, and seem calm. Until of social and political life in parts of Andean they’re not, and then they explode.”19 Peru and in Bolivia. It is nevertheless impossible to generalize Criminal control is not restricted to about criminalized urban areas across Latin remote rural areas. Urban hubs are crucial stra- America. In marginalized parts of the capitals tegic locations, especially when they have of Honduras and El Salvador, the main local strong trading links and provide supportive gangs, which are often part of Barrio-18 and networks (inside and outside the state), access MS-13, tend to exert control over all aspects of to weapons and specialized labor services. daily life and extract protection incomes (the Clusters of rival criminal actors, however, tend so-called impuesto de guerra, or war tax) from to expose these densely populated areas to community members. Their power rests upon peaks and troughs of intra-cartel violence.17 a deeply coercive, local presence, in which a

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large number of people depend upon their Salvador), their perception of state actors, illicit revenues (up to 400,000 people in the most notably security forces, tends to be case of El Salvador), or on identification with shaped by the experience of neglect and by the gangs’ rejection of mainstream society. high levels of distrust. Efforts to reinforce for- However, their activities do not tend to include mal state presence in such areas, above all in particularly lucrative ties to transnational traf- urban zones, flounder when they fail to recog- ficking or high-level political authorities. nize the suspicions and doubts people harbor At present, the effort to extend extortion towards any manifestation of public authority. rackets into ever-wider areas of public life is As Vanda Felbab-Brown has argued, “if the believed to be responsible for the murder of community has previously experienced pri- between three to five taxi drivers each month marily negative manifestations of the state– in Honduras.20 One interviewee from a violent repression against criminal groups, Honduran NGO reported that in Tegucigalpa suppression of illegal economies with no pro- “certain groups even control what women vision of legal livelihoods, or social stigmatiza- wear, what colour their hair should be, to be tion– it will be deeply mistrustful of greater able to differentiate them from women that state presence.”24 cooperate with another group.”21 Other com- In fact, local crime bosses often prove to mon sites of extortion in both rural and urban be quite popular. A recent International Crisis areas include public transportation, schools, Group report, for instance, found that in a community centers and hospitals.22 For Guatemalan border town in the state of instance, one hospital in the Honduran city of Zacapa, citizens were still unhappy about the San Pedro Sula, the most violent city in the 2011 arrests of prominent members of world, was occupied by militarized police last Waldemar Lorenzana’s narcotrafficking orga- year after reports emerged of multiple rackets nization. Ever since their arrests, Zacapa resi- and organ-selling in the medical establish- dents report that jobs – previously generated ment.23 by the family’s fruit-export business – have disappeared, as well as the family’s local char- Embedded Crime and Coping Strategies itable work, such as support for a health clinic Remote rural zones, urban and major commer- that gave free care to the poor.25 Most recently, cial centers, and peri-urban protection econo- the spectacular prison escape of Mexico’s most mies make up the main spaces of concentrated notorious criminal and head of the Sinaloa criminal territorial control in modern Latin cartel, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzman, was cel- America. At the same time, the strength of ebrated on social media by Mexican citizens, criminal groups of all descriptions can almost with tweets admiring him “for letting the universally be paired with the state’s failure to world know that the poor matter too,” and provide for its citizens’ basic needs – or to the asking the Sinaloa cartel “to continue to take state’s indifference to huge differences in ser- care of the country and of all Mexicans.”26 His vice provision and in access to economic escape also inspired a new and popular narco- opportunities. Even when local communities corrido (a song that celebrates drug traffickers), live under the constant threat of violence and welcoming him back to the people and extortion from organized crime (as in El

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celebrating the mafia’s importance to the polit- themselves, after which they were co-opted ical and economic stability of Mexico.27 into official security forces, the so-called fuerza Numerous other cases of popular acclaim rural, to neutralize their increased power.31 In for criminal bosses and their activities, above Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru, mean- all in remote, rural areas with few other eco- while, citizens are known to take justice into nomic outlets and a penchant for charismatic their own hands when confronted with local outlaws, have been reported across Latin criminals. According to a public prosecutor of America. In 2014, Peruvian citizens elected at Cochabamba, in central Bolivia, “there is a least six governors under investigation or fac- macabre ritual in which the suspect is dragged ing charges for crimes ranging from money to the town square, where the lynching takes laundering and extortion to drug trafficking.28 place… It often ends with the person being The former mayor of the Mexican town of burned alive or hanged.”32 Crime rates in Iguala, José Luis Abarca, is now under arrest these rural, often indigenous-populated areas, for his part in the notorious disappearances may well not be nearly as high as in urban and murders of last year. Even so, he served as areas or strategic trafficking zones. But the will- the elected mayor of a major national political ingness to resort to these methods is an elo- party for two years, despite accusations of his quent expression of how a long history of vio- direct participation in the torture and murder lence and of limited or repressive state of activists, and his wife’s family ties to the presence may foster a collective outlook that Beltrán Levya drug cartel. “He showered sup- tolerates coercion as a satisfactory means of porters with his largesse – paved streets, drain- dispute resolution.33 age pipes, and so forth – using money whose Illicit Networks and the State source was a mystery.”29 Money accumulated by criminal activities The historical roots and sheer variety of Latin can pay for an electoral campaign, bribes, and America’s criminalized or non-state spaces are public services. Another reason repeatedly remarkable. Yet the recognition of this multi- underlies people’s support for “strong men” plicity, combined with an appreciation of the with suspected criminal links: the popular many security threats faced by the region– belief that it takes a criminal to effectively according to 2012 data from the UN Office on combat crime.30 Alternatively, in some areas Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Latin America is either beyond state control or where local the most violent region in the world, account- authorities fail to provide security, citizens also ing for nearly one in three homicides around take up arms to protect themselves from the the world34 – does not translate into the most effects of organized crime, only to find them- commonly stated and supported public policy selves embarking upon a similar pattern of response. This response was given its most suc- coercive social control. According to Wil cinct expression in the Democratic Security Pansters, in the state of Michoacán local farm- Policy unveiled by Colombia’s former presi- ers started to organize themselves in self- dent, Álvaro Uribe, in 2003: “A strong state defense forces to combat the presence of drug structure, supported by citizen solidarity, guar- cartels in their region. However, over time antees the empire of the law and the respect these forces came to operate as cartels for rights and freedoms.”35

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To understand the dynamic organizational of a very similar case of fraud, the so-called mutations and broader support networks Red Moreno, which had been hatched in the within these criminalized spaces as somehow later years of the civil war, and was run by antagonistic to the actions of state authorities, senior military officers. It has been noted that both locally and in the central state, ignores a one of the main operators of the current racket vital historical detail. In most parts of Latin was deeply involved in the previous version, America, expansive, organized criminal activity supposedly dismantled 19 years earlier.40 did not flourish in the shadow of a hierarchical The list of cases showing the state’s criminal cartel or via a popular culture of ban- involvement in the genesis and evolution of ditry, but arose instead in states that controlled large-scale organized crime is extensive. During a significant share of the illicit activity.36 Such the Cold War, the governments of Panama and states have been described by Moises Naím as Bolivia were at one stage notorious for their mafia states, where “government officials arrangements with organized crime. Mexico, enrich themselves […] by exploiting the meanwhile, provided a telling example. Under money, power, political influence, and global the long hegemony of the Institutional connections of criminal syndicates.”37 Revolutionary Party (PRI), the governing party Numerous examples attest to the crucial used its monolithic political control over a role played by the state coordination of crime hierarchy that spanned the presidency, the over the course of 20th century Latin American senior echelons of the security system, state history. Under former President Alberto governors, and local authorities to favor mutu- Fujimori and his head of intelligence, Vladimir ally beneficial arrangements with criminal Montesinos, Peru was governed in the 1990s organizations.41 Moves to democratization, according to a logic of private extraction and political fragmentation, and the restructuring the elimination of dissent. While the govern- of state institutions brought an end to these ment income from various corruption rackets coexistence arrangements between the state has been estimated at $600 million, Fujimori and organized crime. Freed from their “protec- and Montesinos also made arrangements with tion” by the central government and its local drug trafficking groups, which provided fund- representatives, criminal groups were able to ing to the government in exchange for the multiply and compete, using ever greater levels assurance they could act with impunity.38 The of violence in a marketplace with no supreme case of Guatemala is also notorious. During arbiter, in which both the police and the jus- the country’s long civil war, army officers are tice system were going through a complicated known to have made arrangements with local process of restructuring. Meanwhile, local politicians and crime bosses, who provided authorities and their security forces were pre- intelligence on the armed insurgency in pared to reach an agreement with whichever exchange for political favors and a general per- criminal group made the best offer. missiveness towards illicit activity that Other states, such as Colombia and extended towards complicity with state offi- Ecuador, were not characterized by this sort of cials.39 Interestingly, the customs racket that state-coordinated criminality, but this does not has recently been exposed in Guatemala was mean that state actors and other elites were not itself preceded in the 1990s by the revelation deeply involved in illicit activity on an

158 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 ILLICIT NETWORKS individual or factional basis. In Ecuador, the 199 deputies and senators were charged for fiscal and political crises at the end of the links to the paramilitary by 2012. 1990s gave way to multiple opportunities for It may appear at first sight that a strong the infiltration of illicit networks, such as the illicit connection between a remote trafficking notorious short-lived presidency of Abdalá zone and a politician in national Congress is Bucaram. In Colombia, drug trafficking has improbable, or costly and risky to maintain. long been connected with favors and support However, a crucial part of these networks tends from parts of the state, as well as attempts by to be played by intermediaries who have close leading traffickers such as Pablo Escobar to links to both the political elite in the capital, transform themselves into political representa- as well as to local politicians and criminal tives. Yet the apotheosis of these relations was groups. An example of exactly this sort of bro- only reached once the ongoing armed conflict, kerage between local criminal spaces and cen- coupled with political fragmentation and eco- tral power can be found in the recent case nomic crisis, fostered the creation of opaque brought by the CICIG against the vice-presi- networks of politicians, security forces, and dential candidate on what was Guatemala’s organized crime. The effects of these combina- leading ticket, and former central bank gover- tions were eventually made apparent through nor, Edgar Barquín.42 the so-called “parapolitics” scandal, for which Barquín is accused of being the central hub of a network led by businessman Government of Guatemala

Edgar Barquín (right), then governor of Guatemala’s central bank, with Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom (center), and Alvir Alberto Hoffman (left), President of the Association of Supervisors of Banks of the Americas.

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Francisco Morales, also known as “Chico with Honduras – one of the most important Dolar,” which used more than 200 front com- narcotrafficking zones in Central America, and panies to launder a total of more than $120 one of the country’s most violent areas.43 Cash million over a five-year period, in settings as was collected in U.S. dollars from a number of diverse as China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South people and groups.44 According to Iván Korea, the Cayman Islands, Colombia, Brazil, Velásquez, the head of CICIG, mayors and dis- Turkey, France, and the United States. trict deputies played crucial linking roles According to the CICIG, while he was head of between the networks collecting the cash and the Central Bank of Guatemala, Barquín the broader support organization as it was advised Morales how to report his company consolidated in national state authorities and finances, and ensured that he would not be international finance. These networks, subject to any financial investigations. He also Velásquez explained, “allow local politics to promised to arrange private meetings between influence national politics, and are the center- Morales and the head of the Guatemalan piece for illicit financing.”45 Financial Analysis Unit (known as the IVE), Money, Politics, and Crime which is responsible for the investigation of money laundering. He was aided in this enter- The reasons for the persistence and expansion prise by his brother, Manuel Barquín, a of illicit networks such as these, and their abil- Congressional deputy for the Líder party (for ity to connect criminalized localities with the which Edgar was the vice-presidential candi- supposed sanctums of law and the state, are to date in this year’s elections), who allowed the be found in a number of developments that offices and personnel of Congress to be have characterized Latin America during the employed for the money laundering activities past decades. of Morales’ network. In return, part of this First, and most obviously, stands the expo- money helped to finance local political cam- nential rise in the income of organized crime, paigns. generating in turn the urgent need to launder larger piles of dirty money. According to the UNODC, in 2009 the total income of transna- The reasons for the persistence and tional organized crime amounted to $870 bil- expansion of illicit networks such as these, lion – an amount equal to 1.5 percent of and their ability to connect criminalized global GDP, although the figure is highly con- localities with the supposed sanctums of law testable.46 According to the U.S. Justice and the state, are to be found in a number of Department, Colombian and Mexican cartels developments that have characterized Latin alone earn between $18 and $39 billion a year America during the past decades from drug sales in the United States.47 Second, the diversification of criminal activities and their change in structure from It was the local branch of the network national and hierarchical family-led networks where the money was made. The network to globalized horizontal networks has led to a operated in the municipality of Jutiapa, and in greater need for political and state cooperation other regions along the Guatemalan border in criminal endeavors.48 Whereas organized

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crime groups tended in the past to be focused finance rules.51 Elections are more competitive on one activity, such as cocaine trafficking, than ever in a region where democracy, despite many criminal groups have expanded their its imperfections, has become firmly range of “expertise” to include, among other entrenched: opposition candidates won more activities, human trafficking, migrant smug- than half the 43 presidential elections in 18 gling, arms trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, countries between 2000 and 2010.52 During money laundering, and trafficking of mari- election times, more money naturally trans- juana and amphetamine-type substances. lates into greater opportunities to woo voters Moreover, global transport and telecommuni- through campaigns, including television com- cation networks have made possible the expan- mercials, road signs, and party hand-outs, or sion of criminal connections to other conti- simple bribes.53 The increased competition nents, and cooperation between Latin has meant that campaigns have become more American-based crime groups and others expensive, while political aspirants are acutely located in West Africa, Asia, and Europe. conscious of their need for a war-chest. At the According to anti-corruption expert Edgardo same time, the lack of, or weak enforcement of Buscaglia, “investigations by the European political finance regulations in Latin America, Union, Canada, and the United States show and the world in general, means that money that the Sinaloa cartel has a presence in 48 of dubious origins encounters very few prob- countries over the world, and is still expand- lems when entering political party or a candi- ing.”49 This diversification means that many date’s accounts. In fact, a 2012 report by more actors are involved, if only on an occa- International IDEA found that most countries sional basis as specialist service-providers, apply no quantitative limits to private dona- while the need to bribe or enlist border offi- tions to political actors at all.54 Even if coun- cials, airport personnel, local mayors, and tries do apply donation limits, or spending other criminal groups for access to territory has caps, the study found that most of them have correspondingly increased. In Colombia, the little effect. A 2014 evaluation report on the criminal organization that appears to have campaign costs of the most recent Senate elec- become the most recent dominant player in tions in Colombia, for instance, found that on the transnational cocaine trade, the Úsuga average a campaign costs four times the legally Clan (also known as the Urabeños), is permitted amount.55 reported to have co-opted 600 public officials A high tide of money across the political alongside taxi-drivers, religious leaders, school system need not mean that illicit finance, and teachers, and community leaders, all of whom thus organized crime, enjoys greater influence are paid regular monthly retainers.50 over political actors: much depends on the Organized crime, therefore, has grown, strength of watchdogs and the activism of the diversified, and progressively outsourced. judicial system. However, the evolution of Meanwhile, the role of private money in public political competition in Latin America has life has gained far greater prominence in Latin strongly encouraged illicit use of the expand- America due on one hand, to the rise in the ing and poorly controlled avenues of political competiveness of elections, and on the other finance, and not merely because of greater hand, to the weak enforcement of campaign opposition success at the ballot box. The

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various economic and political crises of the has undermined internal party structures of 1990s devastated traditional political parties control, loyalty, and discipline, which has per- in many countries in the region, leading to the mitted individuals at the local and national rise of new parties, often based on charismatic levels to use politics to develop a sphere of leaders with populist messages, and to an influence that can be exploited on behalf of extraordinary turnover in incumbents. For private interests. Outside a few countries such instance, in Peru, only 18 percent of the mem- as Chile and Uruguay, parties have come to bers of Congress were re-elected in 2011, while resemble precarious associations of mutual in Guatemala, nine of the ten parties that took benefit between a metropolitan core, built part in elections that year had been in exis- around its leader, and a variety of self-funding tence for under a decade.56 individual politicians in the regions. The prominence of fragmented parties Parliaments for their part have consolidated with little ideological baggage and a minimal their role as increasingly powerful, but corrupt organizational structure has in turn generated organizations within state structures where two effects. To start with, it has exacerbated a “clientelist, personal, political, and criminal party’s dependence on flows of local or interests intermingle, and where everyone regional votes, which sometimes involve agree- exploits the institutional architecture.”57 ments with regional figures whose political It is no coincidence, therefore, that the and economic power emanates from dubious most significant cases of illicit networks that sources. At the same time, the fragmentation have been exposed recently in Latin America Michael Flashman

Protests outside HSBC in New York after senior bank officials admitted laundering billions for drug cartels and terrorist organizations. (Feb 2013)

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– Brazil’s Petrobras, the recent Honduran and of the 108 countries that have ratified UNCAC, Guatemalan scandals, the Iguala case in 86 percent are complying only in theory.60 Mexico, and, though a few years earlier, the Common Weaknesses and Shared Colombian parapolitics scandal – involve cor- Interests rupted or infiltrated political parties, or criminal operations in which transactions with The growth of organized crime in combination members of the national Congress stand at with weak or non-existent controls over polit- their very core. Monetized politics may not ical finance in ever more competitive demo- itself be corrupt, though it is liable to be unfair cratic environments is crucial to understanding and inequitable; but high-money politics with- the transmission mechanisms that link crimi- out proper supervision and with a fluctuating nalized territories to the central state. However, roster of opportunistic political parties has led it would be a mistake to view these connec- in Latin America to numerous illicit combinations simply as the rise in influence of a crim- tions between the local and central level. inalized periphery over an otherwise innocent Once again, the Barquín case shows how, and untainted public sector. We have already through such political intermediaries, local seen how organized criminal networks them- criminalized municipalities are directly linked selves developed and grew under state guid- to the country’s political and economic elite. ance in many Latin American countries, nota- At the same time, this nexus is facilitated by bly Mexico, Guatemala, and Peru. It is opportunities for money laundering on a important to add that both local territories global scale through the use of front compa- and the central state have been jointly exposed nies and tax havens, made possible by bank to a number of influences and incentives deriv- secrecy norms and the lack of transparency in ing from the economic reforms and democra- international financial institutions. As a result, tization processes that have affected the region a leading global bank such as HSBC was able over the past two to three decades. These have to launder as much as $881 million for generated more representative governments Mexican drug cartels; even though found guilty and improvements in macro-economic man- by U.S. law enforcement, it avoided criminal agement. But they have also helped to create a prosecution by paying a record fine of $1.9 bil- series of common interests that are inimical to lion. Other financial institutions that have more rigorous judicial controls and more failed to apply anti-laundering restrictions to effective law enforcement. large-dollar deposits from cartels are Wachovia In particular, the high tide of economic Bank, Bank of America, and Western Union.58 reform processes in Latin America – often Furthermore, while many countries have termed neo-liberalism or the Washington signed up to multilateral anti-corruption Consensus, and exemplified by Chile in the agreements meant to combat money launder- 1980s, and Mexico and Argentina in the 1990s ing, such as the United Nations Convention – did not always achieve the goals of liberating against Corruption (UNCAC) or the Financial the private sector from unwarranted and inef- Action Task Force (FATF), a 2012 assessment ficient state interference. In many, if not most revealed that these have a very limited impact cases, these reforms instead served to weaken on state compliance.59 According to Buscaglia, the state apparatus designed to guide national

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economic development, only to replace it with (including the recent case involving Chilean a much more extensive set of informal links President Michelle Bachelet’s son), jobs, or between political elites and an emboldened special judicial treatment, indicate not just that private sector. The privatization process under- the political class is predisposed towards taken by the government of President Carlos exploiting public power for its private benefit. Menem in Argentina is emblematic of this par- In certain cases, this readiness by politicians ticular interpretation of economic reform.61 and state officials to take advantage of their Although it was portrayed to international public power is believed to extend into a form financial institutions and creditors as an effort of complicity with organized crime and crimi- to dismantle rent-seeking state enterprises in nalized territories, since both the central-level energy, electricity, telecoms and transport, it in politicians and local criminal organizations fact offered the government the opportunity to share a common interest in the perpetuation support favored businesses, engage in numer- of weak judicial controls and oversight. ous fraudulent rackets, and eventually amass a This relationship of shared interest is debt burden that prompted the country’s extraordinarily difficult to prove and to mea- bankruptcy and default in 2001. Since then, sure. One politician in Ecuador described the Argentina has been unable and unwilling to relationship between politicians and money- return to international credit markets. laundering narcotraffickers as “lucrative per- The preceding analysis has identified missiveness.”63 The fiercest critics of the monetized political competition and represen- Mexican state, meanwhile, regard the political tation as a core constituent of Latin America’s establishment as an accomplice to the coun- major corruption scandals. A second way of try’s criminal organizations due to its reluc- understanding this abuse of public power is tance to engage in any serious reform of the through the informal spaces of contact and police or legal system, or to introduce genuine favoritism that have been fostered between the mechanisms of public transparency. According private sector and political elites under the to Mexico-based law professor John Ackerman, influence of economic reform and political for instance, “the central problem in Mexico is change. This proximity was particularly evident the profound lack of accountability of the in Brazil’s Petrobras scandal, in which investi- political class and government institutions to gators have established that a cartel of 16 the people.”64 major businesses allocated among themselves These accusations reach far beyond iden- massive infrastructure projects for the state oil tification of concrete, profit-sharing links firm on the understanding that between one between state officials and criminal organiza- and five percent of the contracts’ value would tions. Instead, they point to a systemic form of be paid in kick-backs to company officials and collusion that brings together, on one side politicians: the total value of the corruption is state structures predisposed to generating pri- believed to exceed $3.5 billion.62 Numerous vate profits, and, on the other, criminal orga- cases of illicit procurement (such as the case of nizations that are often based in territories the Bogotá road-building scandal of 2010), or whose marginalization and inequalities have the many scandals over the use of political been exacerbated by the very same processes connections to gain favorable financial credit of economic reform and global economic

164 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 ILLICIT NETWORKS integration that have fostered certain forms of equipment and personnel to “eradicate” and state-level fraud. Although such alleged com- “combat” organized crime on their territory, plicities certainly do not account for all the and received international backing for their examples of political-criminal relations in efforts. A widely cited and praised model for Latin America, they have managed to generate these approaches has been Plan Colombia. the most ardent criticisms of the state’s legiti- According to U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden, macy, above all in Mexico, Guatemala, and “in 1999, we initiated Plan Colombia to com- Honduras. Furthermore, such complicity poses bat drug trafficking, grinding poverty, and the greatest challenges as regards a response to institutional corruption – combined with a criminal organizations and criminalized ter- vicious insurgency – that threatened to turn ritories that rests upon extending the reach of Colombia into a failed state. Fifteen years later, the state and its security forces. Colombia is a nation transformed.” Compared to the years before Plan Colombia Policy Responses: Beyond Hard Security was initiated, the country has without doubt For now, however, it is mano dura policies that made huge strides: war-related civilian deaths have thrived in the most crime-affected coun- have dropped, murder rates have tumbled, for- tries of the region. Latin American govern- eign investment has enjoyed a huge influx ments have invested heavily in security spurring strong economic growth, and peace Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison,Master Sgt. Jerry U.S. Air Force

U.S. Secretary of Gates and U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Carlos Pascual during the Merida Initiative plenary session in March 2010

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talks with rebels from the Revolutionary for foreign investors by spending on infrastruc- Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) appear to ture and promises of corporate tax breaks. be nearly complete. Yet neither the traditional security support It is important to add that Plan Colombia programs, nor the more recent emphasis on has been questioned by critics for the human investment-driven economic development, rights abuses that it spurred (connected to the appear well-suited to addressing the illicit net- actions of right-wing paramilitary groups oper- works that underlie the spread of criminal ating with informal state support),66 as well as activity, and the failures to confront it, which for its failure to reduce in a significant fashion have been identified in this paper. Plan the export of cocaine from the country. Yet the Colombia’s success derived from its primary progress made by Colombia is undeniable, objective as a counter-insurgent military effort; and the model has therefore been emulated its failures lie almost entirely in its efforts to elsewhere. The Mérida Initiative in Mexico, reduce the volume and dimensions of orga- again supported by the United States, sought nized crime, which is precisely the problem to reinforce the fight against drug traffickers that Mexico and Central America are trying to through funding for the police and legal sys- address. Replicating the plan in other contexts tem. In 2010, the United States backed the has merely served to reproduce the patterns of Central America Regional Security Initiative stronger law enforcement that prove counter- (CARSI) on similar premises. However, these productive for human security in certain latter programs have received rather more crit- dimensions. These include efforts to dismantle icism than Plan Colombia: CARSI has failed to criminal organizations (including extradi- dent extraordinarily high homicide rates in tions) that spur fragmentation and competi- Honduras, though it has accompanied the tion, excessive use of violence by emergent militarization of policing in both Honduras criminal groups,70 and ever-higher levels of and Guatemala.67 Regarding Mérida, John corruption of the state and security forces. It is Ackerman has argued that “today, seven years, also worth emphasizing that the huge eco- two presidents, and almost $3 billion later, nomic incentives underlying criminal partici- Mexico is more unsafe, chaotic, and authoritar- pation in the transnational drug trade have ian than before.”68 remained in place, or grown larger, under the Meanwhile, the ongoing humanitarian prohibition regime and the “war on drugs.” crisis caused by children fleeing their home The recent turn towards a greater empha- countries for the United States has prompted sis on economic development to stem the the Central American states of Honduras, migrant exodus from Central America also Guatemala, and El Salvador to call for U.S. pays insufficient attention to the illicit dynam- financial backing for a plan named Alliance for ics described in this paper. Latin America’s Prosperity in the Northern Triangle.69 Most of most crime-infested cities are not its poorest the intended aid is for the strengthening of places, but its economic and commercial hubs: civilian institutions and economic develop- Buenaventura in Colombia, Ciudad Juárez in ment, rather than support for security forces. Mexico (or, for a while, Monterrey), San Pedro However, the plan has been criticized for Sula in Honduras, or Ciudad del Este in focusing excessively on improving conditions Paraguay. The social and demographic effects

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of an ill-planned economic boom invariably as to what would prove to be a viable alterna- include rapid urbanization, widening inequal- tive to tried, tested, and flawed policies in the ity, and high levels of crime and criminal light of what we now know about illicit net- opportunity. One recent study on the causal works linking crime and the state. relationship between foreign direct investment Clearly, greater efforts should be expended and organized crime in Mexico found that the in weakening the links between politics and latter deterred foreign investment in financial crime. Several Latin American states have tried services, commerce, and agriculture, but did to do so. One outstanding example dates from not have the same effect for oil and mining 2011, when the Colombian government intro- sectors.71 It is worth adding that during the duced innovative reforms aimed at halting economic boom experienced in Latin America political party endorsement of candidates with until recently, oil and mining attracted the suspected links to criminal activities.74 In most attention from foreign investors. Peru, the government and 15 political party At the same time, the child migration cri- leaders recently agreed to reform aspects of the sis has led to further reinforcement of border party and electoral system, including tougher security, not just along the U.S.-Mexico border, sanctions for parties and individuals found but also much further south. In Mexico the guilty of corruption. New legislation estab- “Plan Frontera Sur,” or ‘Southern Border Plan,” lishes that any Congress member found guilty initiated in July 2014, has sought to stem the of these crimes would lose his or her seat in flow of migrants by strengthening control Congress, without the possibility of replace- along the southern border between Mexico ment. and Guatemala. In so doing, the plan has received criticism for contributing to human The laws and regulations aimed at preventing rights abuses by security officials against corruption are in any case largely in place. It Central American migrants, and these officials’ is weak enforcement, especially at the local collusion with criminal groups.72 It has also level, that undergirds the perpetuation of served to reinforce an enduring trend, whereby these complicit arrangements heavier border security limits the possible routes for clandestine migration to areas con- However, reforms to political finance have trolled by narcotrafficking or criminal groups, neither been straightforward nor homogenous. who proceed to establish their own protection A proposal in Paraguay to improve financial rackets over the migrant-smuggling business.73 transparency and ban cash donations to polit- Thus, far from undermining crime, heavier ical campaigns by individuals under judicial border security can actually place additional investigation for drug trafficking was watered sources of illicit revenue generation, local ter- down by the Senate. In Brazil, the powerful ritories, and municipal authorities under the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro control of organized crime. (PMDB) managed in June to secure initial con- Many of these criticisms are already well gressional approval for a bill that would known, and widely accepted within the secu- enable private companies to make donations rity establishments of Latin America and the to political parties.75 United States. However, the question remains

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The laws and regulations aimed at pre- and severing of links between politics, state, venting corruption are in any case largely in and crime are given preferential support. This place. It is weak enforcement, especially at the would mean, above all, support for the judi- local level, that undergirds the perpetuation of ciary and prosecution service, as well as the these complicit arrangements.76 Indeed, the ethics of public service more generally. principal argument of this paper is that the Security issues and the frequency of vio- essence of the power and resilience of these lent crime naturally remain a priority for the illicit networks – and the damage that they do public and the government. But support for to efforts to reduce violent crime and build the security sector should be reoriented more effective states – is to be found in the towards those interventions that would rein- combination of criminalized territories force the virtuous links between communities, beyond state control together with varying police and the state. This would mean direct- degrees of criminal collusion by actors in the ing attention towards reducing the most tan- central state. gible and violent forms of crime, notable Recent scandals, above all in Mexico and extortion rackets and the actions of certain Central America, have drawn attention to the drug trafficking organizations, and establishing compound problem of state corruption, crim- clear targets for their reduction. It would also inalized territories, and violent crime. A win- require sustained consideration of the counter- dow of opportunity has opened for domestic productive nature of certain counter-narcotic reform and for innovative international sup- interventions, border security measures, and port for these initiatives. Naturally, the basis of deportation policies. any reform or support program hinges on the Lastly, it is essential to support economic characteristics of organized crime in the coun- development, but in ways that embrace not try and the patterns of its relations with state just large-scale projects, but also the particular institutions. Clear understanding of these ties needs of marginalized communities. and complicities, whether overt or tacit, as well There is no guarantee that such overarch- as acknowledgement of the counter-productive ing programs will generate the desired trans- consequences of hard security interventions in formations, or bring about a sudden and sharp contexts of strong political-criminal ties, is reduction in violent crime. But at the same essential to the design of future programs. time, it is clearer than ever that the solution to In other words, no approach to the secu- Latin America’s criminal activity is no longer rity dilemmas in the region, which are cur- blindly to support the state institutions that rently most acute in Mexico and the Northern have often shaped, supported, and shared Triangle of Central America, can hope to pros- common interests with the supposed public per without a holistic approach that is driven enemy. PRISM and supported by the efforts of society and government in each country. This new approach would ideally consist of three pillars. It would include, first of all, a program of institutional strengthening, in which the organizations that are most critical to the supervision

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Notes 14 Martínez, Oscar. 2014. The Beast: Riding the Rails and Dodging Narcos on the Migrant Trail. London: Verso, chapter 6. 1 http://cdn.impremedia.com/wp-content/ 15 Folch, C. 2012. “Trouble on the Triple uploads/2015/04/10742511.jpg Frontera.” Foreign Affairs, September 2012 https://www. 2 Plaza Pública. 2015. “Negocios, traiciones y la foreignaffairs.com/articles/argentina/2012-09-06/trouble-triple- voluntad de monopolizar el fraude.” 10/06/15. http:// frontier www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/negocios-traiciones-y-la- 16 Anonymous interview with the authors. voluntad-de-monopolizar-el-fraude 17 The role of criminal competition as a cause of 3 Mejia, Thelma. 2015. “Hondurans lead spikes in violence has received increasing academic unprecedented anti-corruption movement.” IPS News attention. For a recent analysis, see Durán-Martínez, 23/07/15. http://www.ipsnews.net/2015/07/young-hondu- Angelica. 2015. “To Kill and Tell?: State Power, rans-head-unprecedented-anti-corruption-movement/ Criminal Competition and Drug Violence.” Journal of 4 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Conflict Resolution, June. 2012. Transnational Organized Crime in Central America 18 Vulliamy, E. 2015. “Has ‘El Chapo’ turned the and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment. Vienna: world’s former most dangerous place into a calm UNODC city?” The Guardian 19/07/15. http://www.theguardian. 5 The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence com/world/2015/jul/19/mexico-drugs-cartel-joaquin- and Development. 2015. Global Burden of Armed guzman?CMP=share_btn_tw Violence 2015: Every Body Counts. Geneva: Small Arms 19 Martínez, Óscar, op. cit., p. 154. Survey, p. 52 & 58 20 El Tiempo. 2015. “Taxistas, una carrera entre 6 United Nations High Commission for la extorsión y la muerte en Honduras.” 06/05/15. Refugees. 2014. Children on the Run. Washington DC: 21 Authors’ interview with NGO in Tegucigalpa UNHCR. 22 See ACAPS. 2014. Other Situations of Violence 7 Martínez, Carlos. 2015. “El porqué de los 600 in the Northern Triangle of Central America. Geneva. cadáveres.” El Faro 07/06/15. http://www.salanegra.elfaro. 23 El Heraldo. 2014. “Comisión asumirá control net/es/201506/opinion/17064/El-porqu%C3%A9-de-los-600- del Catarino Rivas.” 11/07/14. http://www.elheraldo.hn/ cad%C3%A1veres.htm mobile/mpais/728445-387/comisi%C3%B3n-asumir%C3%A1- 8 Briscoe, Ivan. 2015. “Crime and the state: el-control-del-hospital-mario-catarino-rivas. Latin America’s season of scandal.” Open Democracy, 24 Felbab-Brown, Vanda. 2011. Bringing the State 26/02/15, http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/crime-and- to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban state-latin-america%E2%80%99s-season-scandal Violence in Latin America. Washington DC: Brookings 9 National Commission of Human Rights Institute, p. 6 (CNDH). 2015. Estado de la Investigación del “Caso 25 International Crisis Group. 2014. Corridor of Iguala”. Mexico City: CNDH. http://www.cndh.org.mx/ Violence: the Guatemala-Honduras Border. Bogotá- sites/all/doc//Slider/caso_iguala.pdf Brussels, 2014, p.3 & p.16. 10 Buenos Aires Herald. 2015. “62 per cent of 26 Univision.com. 2015. “Los que celebran la Brazilians want Rousseff impeached.” 22/07/15. fuga de El Chapo en las redes sociales.” 12/07/15. 11 Latin American Public Opinion Project http://noticias.univision.com/article/2398114/2015-07-12/ (LAPOP). 2014. Americas Barometer 2014, pp. mexico/noticias/los-que-celebran-la-fuga 194-198, http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2014/ 27 Brandoli, Javier. 2015. “Los narcocorridos de AB2014_Comparative_Report_English_V3_revised_011315_W. El Chapo.” El Mundo 14/07/15, http://www.elmundo.es/ pdf. internacional/2015/07/14/55a5189722601de0298b45a4.html. 12 Argentina (19%), Chile (24%) and Brazil For a film of his prison escape with the narcocorrido, (25%) See: See Pew Research Center. 2014. “Crime see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5nIwmSMVh8Y and Corruption Top Problems in Emerging and 28 Gurney, K.. 2014. “Meet Peru’s New Narco Developing Countries.” Governors.” Insight Crime, 19/12/14, http://www. 13 Briscoe, I., Perdomo, C., and Uribe Burcher, insightcrime.org/news-analysis/meet-peru-s-new-narco-gover- C. (eds). Illicit Networks and Politics in Latin America. nors International IDEA, Netherlands Institute for 29 Los Angeles Times. 2014. “Iguala’s fugitive Multiparty Democracy, and the Clingendael Institute, mayor a symbol of Mexico’s ills.” October 2014 http:// 2014, p.35.

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www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-mayor- corrupción.” 16 & 17/07/15 http://elperiodico.com. 20141010-story.html#page=1 gt/2015/07/17/pais/cicig-la-mitad-del-financiamiento-de-parti- 30 There are numerous examples. One of the dos-viene-de-la-corrupcion/ best known is that of Colombia’s last “emerald czar,” 45 El Periódico. 2015. “Antejuicio contra Víctor Carranza. See The Economist. 2013. “Víctor candidato vicepresidencial de Líder,” 16/07/15, http:// Carranza.” 20/04/13. elperiodico.com.gt/2015/07/16/pais/antejuicio-contra-candi- 31 Pansters, W. 2014. “Who rules Mexico? dato-vicepresidencial-de-lider/ Criminal violence, self-defense forces, and fragmented 46 UNODC. 2011. Estimating Illicit Financial sovereignty.” CEDLA lecture, 12/12/14, Amsterdam; Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other see also Santamaría, Gema. 2014. Drugs, gangs and Transnational Organized Crimes. Vienna: UN vigilantes. NOREF & The Clingendael Institute, 2014. 47 Krache Morris, E.. 2013. “Think Again: 32 Tegel, S. 2014. “Lynching is still a common Mexican Drug Cartels: they aren’t just about Mexico practice across Latin America.” Global Post 24/01/14 or drugs anymore.” Foreign Policy 04/12/13 http:// http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/ameri- foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/04/think-again-mexican-drug- cas/140121/lynching-latin-america-bolivia-guatemala cartels/ 33 For more on this, see Adams, Tani. 2011. 48 For instance, see International Crisis Group, Chronic Violence and its Reproduction: Perverse Trends in op. cit. Social Relations, Citizenship and Democracy in Latin 49 Verza. M. 2014. : El cártel de Sinaloa, una America. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center. multinacional de las drogas.” El Mundo 22/02/14, 34 Luhnow, D. 2014. “Latin America is World’ http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2014/02/22/5308d063e2 Most Violent Region.” Wall Street Journal, April 2014, 704ece7a8b456e.html http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230360390457 50 El Tiempo. 2015. “Casi 600 servidores públicos 9495863883782316 enredados con ‘bacrim’”. 07/08/15. 35 Colombian government. 2003. Colombia: 51 Perdomo, Catalina, “Chapter 9: Comparative Política de Defensa y Seguridad Demócratica. Bogotá. Regional Analysis of Legislation to Combat Organized http://www.resdal.org.ar/Archivo/col-03-presi.htm Crime and its Links with the Political Sphere,” in 36 Briscoe, Ivan. 2014. “Chapter 3: The Historical Briscoe, Ivan et al, op. cit. Development of the Nexus between Politics, Crime 52 Casas-Zamora, K.. 2010. “Dirty Money: How and the Economy in Latin America,” in Briscoe, Ivan to break the link between organized crime and et al, op. cit.. politics,” Americas Quarterly, spring 2010. 37 Naím, M.. 2012. “Mafia States: Organized 53 For instance, in a move much criticized by the Crime Takes Office.” Foreign Affairs May-June 2012, opposition, months before the June 2015 municipal https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-04-20/ elections in Mexico, the Peña Nieto government mafia-states started to hand out millions of televisions to the 38 Briscoe, Ivan et al. 2014, op. cit. Mexican people. See Corona, S. 2015. “El Gobierno 39 Idem mexicano regala en año de elecciones diez millones 40 Prensa Libre. 2015. “Estructura Morena nunca de televisores.” El País, 25/01/15, http://internacional. desapareció.” 17/04/15. http://www.prensalibre.com/guate- elpais.com/internacional/2015/01/25/actuali- mala/justicia/estructura-moreno-nunca-desaparecio dad/1422153958_948285.html 41 Astorga, Luis. 2005. El siglo de las drogas, 54 Ohman, M., Political Financial Regulations Plaza y Janés, Mexico; Knight, A.. 2012. “Narco- Around the World: An Overview of the International Violence and the State in Modern Mexico,” in IDEA Database, International Institute for Democracy Pansters, W., (ed.) Violence, Coercion and State-Making and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Stockholm, 2012 in Twentieth-Century Mexico, Stanford University Press. 55 Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 42 The details of the initial operation and Democracy (NIMD), United Nations Development charges can be found here: http://www.cicig.org/index.php Programme (UNDP), and Cifras y Conceptos. 2014. ?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=615&cntnt01re “Evaluación de las campañas al Senado de la turnid=67 República 2014.” http://www.co.undp.org/content/dam/ 43 See homicide map on UNODC, op. cit., p. 12. colombia/docs/Gobernabilidad/undp-co-evaluacionse- 44 El Periódico. 2015. “Antejuicio contra nado-2014.pdf candidatovicepresidencial de Lider,” and “CICIG: la 56 Briscoe, Ivan et al, op. cit., 2014, p. 46. mitad del financiamiento de partidosviene de la

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57 Villaveces, Santiago. 2013. “Redes Criminales in Guatemala and Honduras: http://www.wilsoncenter. y Ejercicio de la Política en América Latina: Una org/publication/CARSIExecSummary Mirada Tentativa.”In Niño Guarnizo, C. (ed). Anuario 68 Ackerman, J., op. cit. 2013 de la Seguridad Regional en América Latina y el 69 “Joint Statement by the Presidents of El Caribe. Bogotá: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and the Vice 58 Krache Morris, E.. 2013. “Think Again: President of the United States of America Regarding Mexican Drug Cartels: they aren’t just about Mexico the Plan for the Alliance for Prosperity of the or drugs anymore.” Foreign Policy, 04/12/13, http:// Northern Triangle.” Office of the Spokesperson, foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/04/think-again-mexican-drug- Washington DC, 03/03/15, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ cartels/ ps/2015/03/238138.htm. 59 Johnson, J., Taxell, N., Zaum, D. 2012. 70 The dynamics of fragmentation and violence Mapping evidence gaps in anti-corruption: Assessing the in the case of Mexico is analysed in Rios, Viridiana. state of the operationally relevant evidence on donors’ 2013. “Why did Mexico become so violent? A actions and approaches to reducing corruption, Bergen, self-reinforcing violent equilibrium caused by Chr. Mechelsen Institute, U4 Issue 7; Brunelle- competition and enforcement.” Trends in Organized Quirashi, Ophelie. 2011. “Assessing the Relevancy and Crime vol. 16 issue 2, pp 138-155. Efficacy of the United Nation Convention Against 71 Ashby, N., and Ramos, M. 2013. “Foreign Corruption: A Comparative Analysis,” Notre Dame direct investment and industry response to organized Journal of International & Comparative Law vol 2:1 crime: The Mexican case.” European Journal of Political 60 Buscaglia, E. 2013. “Judicial and Social Economy, vol. 30, June, pp 80-91. Conditions for the Containment of Organized Crime: 72 Isacson, A., Meyer, M. and Morales, G. 2014. A Best Practice Account,” in Schönenberg, R. (ed.), Mexico’s Other Border: Security, Migration and the Transnational Organized Crime: Analyses of a Global Humanitarian Crisis at the Line with Central America. Challenge to Democracy. Berlin: Heinrich-Böll Stiftung. Washington Office on Latin America. See also “Una 61 Silva, Eduardo. 2002. “State-Business Caceria de Migrantes,” three-part video report by Relations in Latin America.” In Whitehead, Lawrence Animal Político: http://www.animalpolitico.com/caceriade- (ed.). Emerging Market Democracies: East Asia and Latin migrantes/index.html America. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, p. 73 Martínez, O., op. cit. 84; Rock, David. 2002. “Racking Argentina.” New Left 74 International Crisis Group. 2011. Cutting the Review 17. September-October. Links Between Crime and Local Politics: Colombia’s 2011 62 Segal, David. 2015. “Petrobras Oil Scandal Elections. Bogotá-Brussels. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/ Leaves Brazilians Lamenting a Lost Dream.” New York regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/37-cutting-the- Times 07/08/15. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/ links-between-crime-and-local-politics-colombias-2011-elec- business/international/effects-of-petrobras-scandal-leave-brazil- tions.aspx ians-lamenting-a-lost-dream.html?_r=0 75 Caicedo, Carlos. 2015. “Congressional 63 Interview with one of the authors, Guayaquil political reform approval without government input 2012. weakens Brazilian president’s political standing.” IHS 64 Ackerman, J. 2015. “It’s time to re-set Jane’s Intelligence 01/07/15, http://www.janes.com/ U.S.-Mexico Relations.” Politico Magazine 06/01/15 article/52722/congressional-political-reform-approval-without- http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/us-mexico- government-input-weakens-brazilian-president-s-political- relations-reset-113998.html#ixzz3gQkYNREi standing 65 Biden, J. 2015. “Joe Biden: A Plan for Central 76 Perdomo, C.. 2014. “Chapter 9: Comparative America.” New York Times 29/01/15, http://www.nytimes. Regional Analysis of Legislation to Combat Organized com/2015/01/30/opinion/joe-biden-a-plan-for-central-america. Crime and its Links with the Political Sphere,” in html?_r=0 Briscoe, I, et al. op. cit. 66 Isacson, A.. 2010. Colombia: Don’t Call it a Model, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), http://www.wola.org/publications/colombia_dont_call_it_a_ model 67 For a more in-depth critical evaluation of CARSI see Wilson Center “Working Papers” on CARSI

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 171 AUTHOR

Ester Vargas

Member of a self-defense militia in Michoacan, Mexico

172 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 1 The Rise of Militias in Mexico Citizens’ Security or Further Conflict Escalation?

BY VANDA FELBAB-BROWN

his article explores the security and political effects of militia forces that emerged in Mexico in recent years in reaction to violent organized crime, most prominently in the states of T Michoacán and Guerrero. Militia forces are not a new phenomenon in the country; in various forms and guises, they permeate the history of Mexico. Often, militia groups have been sponsored by the Mexican state, including as recently as in the 1990s government counterinsurgency efforts against a leftist anti-globalization insurgency, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, EZLN). The anti-drug-cartel militias that emerged after 2006, when then Mexican President Felipe Calderón declared a war on the drug cartels, however, emerged either more or less spontaneously or with the sponsorship of powerful politicians and businessmen, not as a state policy. In fact, for a good number of years the Calderón administration and that of his successor President Enrique Peña Nieto ignored them. Eventually, the behavior and visibility of the militia groups forced the government of Mexico to react. Mexico is a middle-power country with a relatively strong economy; it is not a failing state. Nonetheless, the state has been historically weak or absent in large areas, including those where militias are currently strong. Such weakness of territorial presence and its closely related weakness of rule of law are not only a matter of a lack of governance capacity, but fundamentally also of the decisions the Mexican state and elite have made, namely, not providing the resources necessary to boost state presence in indigenous and rural areas, such as to the drug-cartel and militia- rife La Tierra Caliente of Michoacán and Guerrero. Consciously or by default, those areas have been relegated to socio-economic marginalization and underdevelopment. Laws have neither been enforced nor internalized and socio-economic survival and advancement are often dependent on participation in illegal economies. Rules, essential informal ones, are dispensed or Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution and author of Narco Noir: Mexico’s Cartels, Cops, and Corruption (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2016, forthcoming).

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 173 FELBAB-BROWN enforced by individual powerbrokers, such as complex implications for political rivalries and political caciques, powerful businessmen, or balances of power throughout the political, organized crime groups. The formation of anti- militancy, and criminal systems. organized-crime militias is thus an expression Heat Rising in the Historically Hot La of both the absence of the state and its con- Tierra Caliente … and Around tinual rejection by locals who find it remote, irrelevant, undependable, or outright corrupt. Amidst intense and shifting criminal violence, However, just like other aspects of politics in which since 2006 has resulted in the death of Mexico, particularly in large parts of its rural between 80,000 and 100,000 people in areas, even the formation of the militias has Mexico,1 the country’s mountainous center been co-opted by organized crime groups. stands out. Although the intensity of homi- Indeed, what emerges from the following cides has been smaller there than in some of analysis of militia formation in Michoacán the northern cities, such as Ciudad Juárez, and Guerrero and state responses to their Tijuana, and Monterrey,2 the central states of spread is an overwhelming tendency for the Michoácan and Guerrero are nonetheless very militias to go rogue. Although the militias violent. For at least two years now, Guerrero seemed to alleviate violence in the initial has been one of Mexico’s most violent states. period, they soon became predatory and abu- Its rural areas are badly affected by the vio- sive themselves. No matter what the original lence, and its main city, Acapulco, has held the motivations and justifications for militia dubious title of most violent city in Mexico formation, militias have a strong tendency to since at least 2012. escape control by their overseers and engage in In addition, for decades, Guerrero and problematic and abusive behavior. Even when Michoacán have been some of Mexico’s most militias spontaneously emerge in response to prominent locales for the illegal cultivation of abuse that local communities find intolerable, poppy and production of heroin. These illicit the militias have a strong tendency to deterio- economies have been greatly expanding since rate to such behavior themselves. The scale of 2013 in response to growing demand in the such misdeeds often negates their previous United States for illegal opiates. usefulness, and the militias become a pro- Large parts of their territories, including found threat to order and rule of law and a the so-called Tierra Caliente, have historically new driver of conflict. experienced minimal state presence. The Rarely do local communities or official underdeveloped Guerrero, in particular, has state structures have the capacity to keep mili- been one of Mexico’s most lawless states, per- tias in check. But the less effort the national vaded by insurgents, criminals, rogue politi- government puts into developing official cians, and militant unions. Guerrero and mechanisms of control, restraint, and rollback, Michoacán have also featured some of the the worse the predation and deleterious effects most iconic episodes of Mexico’s crime wars, the militias will have on stability and the long- including the killing of students in Iguala, term legitimacy of local political dispensa- Guerrero in September 2014,3 and the mass tions. Although militias might be local, their killing of presumed members of the Jalisco effects are not: they have profound and New Generation Cartel in Ecuandureo,

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Michoacán in May 2015.4 Those two central context are officially-sanctioned militias of states have seen the most visible expansion of indigenous communities – defined as indige- “anti-crime” militias, capturing the attention nous community police forces and indigenous of Mexico’s public and ultimately also the justice systems – which have been permitted Peña Nieto administration. under Mexico’s constitution for several Militias, whether genuine self-defense decades. forces or private security forces of powerful However, over the past several years, the Mexican politicians, have a centuries-old his- self-defense forces that emerged in response to tory in Mexico. Even in the post-WWII period, the extortion and violence of criminal groups many municipal police forces in Mexico essen- in Michoacán and Guerrero came to symbolize tially functioned like personal (and often abu- the weakness of the central state in providing sive) militia forces of the district mayor.5 public safety. Many municipal police forces in Mexico are President Calderón and the Cartels’ deeply penetrated and often outright con- Shuffle in Michoacán trolled by organized crime, as are many municipal governments, particularly in places like The home state of former Mexican president Guerrero and Michoacán. Historically, the Felipe Calderón, Michocán was an early focus Mexican government and military often of his administration in response to the rapid recruited militias to fight insurgencies, such as growth of the violent criminal cartel La Familia in Guerrero and Chiapas. Adding to this Michoacana (LFM). In 2006, LFM was one of J.-H. Janßen

Poppy field

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Mexico’s most vicious drug trafficking groups, through, sometimes extorting the person for and its authority was expanding over large money. Mixing religion and rituals under a parts of the state, particularly in La Tierra cultish cloak, it also established “courts” and Caliente. It engaged in brutal violence, visible “dispute resolution” procedures for residents on the streets of Michoacán.6 It launched an of areas under its influence. Indeed, some res- aggressive extortion campaign that targeted idents of Michoacán’s Tierra Caliente as well major businesses in the state, such as avocado as Morelia told me in spring 2011 that they growers and logging companies – not even actively preferred the courts of La Familia to businesses operating in the state capital of the formal state justice.8 Others were just ter- Morelia were immune. By 2009, LFM report- rified, believing that the group had halcones edly had influence over (or extorted anyway) (lookouts and informants) everywhere; had perhaps as many as 180,000 sales outlets, deeply penetrated mayors’ offices, municipal including gasoline stations, truck shops, street councils, and local police forces; and could markets, movie theaters, and other businesses. strike anyone.9 But La Familia also had to Its daily earnings were reported (likely highly battle other criminal groups for turf, including exaggerated) to be USD 1.9 million.7 the super-violent and expanding Los Zetas as La Familia’s control over some communi- well as smaller rivals, such as the Millenio ties was pervasive. LFM would monitor the Cartel. Over time, government action com- entries and exits of towns and villages, permit- bined with these attacks from rivals hastened ting or denying passage to anyone passing the demise of La Familia. Diego Fernández

Mexican military in Michoacán

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During the Calderón administration, operations than from drug smuggling or other Michoacán became one of the first areas where extortion.11 Regardless of whether this assess- the Mexican military was deployed to combat ment of the cartel’s financial portfolio is accu- criminal groups. Like elsewhere in Mexico, one rate, the Templarios, exploiting their strong of the military’s key missions was to back up, territorial presence and a fearsome reputation, and in some circumstances completely replace, succeeded in turning themselves into a multi- Michoacán’s municipal police forces which faceted mafia with fingers in many illegal rack- typically were undertrained, under-resourced, ets in the state and widespread extortion. deeply corrupt, and completely overwhelmed Militias Popping Up … in Guerrero Too by organized crime. Equally important, the new military polic- By the spring of 2014, Los Templarios were the ing strategy – consisting of high-value targeting area’s most feared authority. Despite their pur- and searches at fixed checkpoints – failed to ported emergence in reaction to the abuses restore or, perhaps more precisely, expand state and excesses of La Familia Michoacana, the authority and control. Nonetheless, the high- Templarios also overreached in their demands value targeting strategy was capturing many of for extortion fees and obedience and triggered LFM’s top leaders; and in the spring of 2011, a backlash. As a result of this heavy-handed- Los Piños (the seat of the Mexican president) ness, anti-Templarios militias began forming declared LFM dismantled. in Michoacán’s countryside even before the Within weeks, however, a new criminal influence of the Templarios peaked. group, Los Caballeros Templarios, emerged Anti-crime self-defense forces, such as in and took over the illegal and informal markets Michoacán’s Cherán municipality, began in Michoacán that La Familia used to run. emerging as early as 2011, but the Calderón Although portraying themselves as a self- administration did not pay much attention to defense force to protect Michoacán residents them. Their expansion, visibility, and increas- and purge the area of organized crime, Los ingly questionable behavior continued to grow Templarios soon came to behave like the evil through 2013. By then, the militias were arrest- they purported to ostracize. Even more aggres- ing people whom they accused of working for sively than LFM, they extorted legal, informal, the Templarios and other criminal groups, and and illegal businesses. In addition to kidnap- held their own court trials and meted out sen- ping relatives of rich businessmen,10 they, too, tences. They were particularly active in demanded extortion fees from avocado farm- Michoacán’s towns of Tepalcatepec, Buena ers and logging companies, and expanded the Vista, and La Ruana, where they gathered extortion racket into iron ore extraction and whatever weapons they could find and seized shipping through Michoacán’s principal port control of police stations. When the self- and economic hub, Lázaro Cárdenas. In March defense forces began to beat up, expel, and 2014, the Mexican government’s special envoy detain not just municipal police officers, but for restoring rule of law in Michoacán, Alfredo also soldiers, the administration of Calderón’s Castillo, claimed that Los Templarios made successor, President Enrique Peña Nieto, could more of their money from extorting the iron no longer remain placid about their growth. ore extraction, processing, and transshipment But even detentions of militia members who

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were engaged in the worst excesses, such as Guerrero (Unión de los Pueblos y kidnappings of police personnel, did not Organizaciones del Estado de Guerrero: appear to deter them.13 UPOEG) community police force.18 The militias also grew in the neighboring Moreover, an extensive whispering cam- state of Guerrero, one of the most violent areas paign emerged in both Guerrero and in Mexico during the Peña Nieto administra- Michoacán that the militias might also be tak- tion thus far, with 73.2 homicides per 100,000 ing justice into their own hands more aggres- in 2013, compared to the national average of sively – such as by killing those they viewed as 29.3 per 100,000 that year.14 Although its opponents. At minimum, they would trot homicide rate decreased in 2014, Guerrero around with machine guns, expel or arrest remained the second most violent state in municipal police officers they saw as incompe- Mexico.15 A plethora of small, fragmented, tent or corrupt, and block roads, using their unstable, and highly violent criminal gangs own discretion to determine who could go in emerged in the state in the wake of the federal and out. government’s high-value-targeting interdiction Can’t Fight ‘Em: Bring ‘Em Into the Fold policy against the once dominant Beltrán Leyva Cartel. Like in Michoacán, the Jalisco The original reaction of high officials of the New Generation Cartel from neighboring Peña Nieto administration was to denounce Jalisco has also been encroaching on their ter- the militias. The president, for example, point- ritory, triggering violent battles. edly stated: “[W]hatever the denominations of In Guerrero, the provenance and control these groups, the practice they have of taking of the militias seems even murkier than in justice into their own hands [is] outside the Michoacán. Some of the self-defense militias law, and my government will combat it.”19 But appeared to be permeated by organized crime at the same time, state officials in Michoacán groups, such as the Jalisco New Generation continued hinting that the militia existence Cartel.16 In fact, some cartels have begun could be tolerated. In Guerrero, the contradic- labeling their own hitmen as self-defense tions between state and federal-level authori- groups and have attempted to penetrate and ties and among state responses were even more subvert the existing self-defense groups. At the pronounced: on the one hand, the state was same time, the militia forces in Guerrero have providing the self-defense forces with funds, also been intricately intermeshing with the so- uniforms, and communications equipment, called “community police forces,” legally per- while on the other hand, it was arresting at mitted under Mexico’s constitution and least some militia members. In the spring of allowed to carry firearms, which operate February 2014, as one of Guerrero’s militia mainly in indigenous communities. In the groups seized villages on the outskirts of the spring of 2013, there were 45 such community state capital, Chilpancingo, Mexico City dis- police groups in 14 of Mexico’s 32 states.17 In patched military battalions and federal police Guerrero’s municipality of Ocotito, for exam- units to stop them from moving into the city ple, the local self-start-up militia force itself. appeared to have the assistance of the Union As the process unfolded, federal level offi- of the People and Organization of the State of cials learned that doing away with the militias

178 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 THE RISE OF MILITIAS IN MEXICO was not easy. Negotiating with the militias to brutality of the crime groups because the state effect their disarmament proved especially dif- had failed to do so, which indeed was often ficult, as militia members emphasized that the case. 20 they would be subject to retaliation and could The increased deployment of Mexico’s only disarm after the criminal gangs, including military into Guerrero and Michoacán, which the key leaders of the Templarios, were President Peña Nieto boosted by 50 percent at arrested. But forcibly dismantling the militias the beginning of 2013, did not slow the forma- could set off a bloody and problematic fight tion, spread, and audacity of the militia forces. between them and the federal government, in By the end of 2013, 47 out of Michoacán’s 113 which assistance from local and state authori- municipalities experienced their presence. In ties could not necessarily be counted on. After the neighboring state of Guerrero, they oper- all, the militias’ own narrative claimed that ated in more than half of the state’s 81 munic- they were merely defending themselves and ipalities by the spring of 2014.21 Areas that their families and communities against the were key Templarios hotbeds in Michoacán, Government of Mexico

President Nieto in Chilpancingo, Guerrero for presentation of his “Plan Nuevo Guerrero,” which instituted a reconstruction and modernization agenda for the violence plagued state

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such as Apatzingán, experienced dramatic fire- and dismantle the militias in the first place, arm battles between the Templarios and the and was essentially left to make a deal with self-defense forces. Elsewhere, the self-defense them, was glaring evidence of the weakness of forces set up checkpoints. In January 2014, the the state in the rural areas of Mexico. The deal self-defense forces took over the municipal also created a bad precedent, signaling that if building in Parácuaro and blocked off entry one wanted to get on the payroll of the state points to the town, digging in for a battle with and take the law and its enforcement into the Templarios, until the Federal Police negoti- one’s own hands (or cloak one’s extortion and ated its own entry. The militias also seized con- other crimes with legitimacy), one only had to trol of a nearby town, La Huerta. In some parts set up a self-defense militia. More immedi- of Michoacán, the Federal Police began operat- ately, there were good reasons to be skeptical ing joint checkpoints with the self-defense about the accuracy of the member registry forces. Membership in the militias swelled to handed over to the state by the militia leaders the thousands, by some reports to as many as and the ability of the state to do its indepen- 20,000,22 though no reliable counts were con- dent re-vetting of the militia members. ducted, and the militias had an incentive to Moreover, it was not obvious just how com- exaggerate their strength. To accommodate the mitted the militias were to the deal: a key mili- militias’ insistence that they could only stop tia leader, Dr. José Manuel Mireles, was not at their vigilantism if the government arrested the signing, and another militia group from key leaders of the Templarios, the government the Ruana area was not only absent, but occu- launched a dragnet in Michoacán and over sev- pied the government building in the Peribán eral months captured key Templario leaders. municipality that very same day. In Guerrero, When a prominent Templario leader the militias rejected a similar deal to be folded known as “El Tío” was arrested in January into an official rural defense force, claiming 2014, Mexico’s Interior Minister Miguel Ángel they did not believe Mexico’s federal govern- Osorio Chong announced that the government ment was truly motivated to combat the crim- had negotiated a deal with the groups to inal groups.23 absorb them into a new state security entity But, however problematic, the deal to known as the “Rural Defense Corps.” The deal form the Rural Defense Corps was clearly bet- specified that the corps would be temporary ter than the previous policy of just allowing and required that the militia leaders would the militias to run loose and act without provide the government with a registry of their restraint. While not desirable, the Rural members. Putting a time limit on the existence Defense Corps concept was likely the least bad of the militias was a highly appropriate provi- option the government had available at that sion since dismantling any unofficial and moment. It was only a matter of time before extralegal forces and vigilantes, however moti- the unsupervised militias would start engaging vated, always needs to be the position of a in predation on local communities, designat- state adhering to the rule of law. ing as a criminal anyone who crossed them, Even so, there were good reasons to doubt arrogating “justice” to themselves, and further the desirability of the arrangement. The fact damaging the already poor bonds between the that the government was not able to prevent state and the population. And it was not too

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far-fetched to imagine that they might be agreed to disarm by May 10 – but the deadline tempted to take over some illicit markets.24 was missed and the militias showed little inter- Indeed, such problematic developments est in obeying the basic deal struck in January surrounding the militias and their speedy 2014. At the same time, José Manuel Mireles descent into going rogue was exposed just a declared that the self-defense groups under his few weeks after the deal was signed. By the influence would now work with federal forces middle of March 2014, Mexican authorities in cities like Morelia, Uruapan, and Lázaro arrested one of the top militia leaders, Hipolito Cárdenas to take down all remaining members Mora, indicting him for the murders of two of the Templarios, including middle-level members of a rival militia faction in managers, thus changing the terms of the deal Buenavista Tomatlán. Government authorities and parameters of the disarmament of his also detained 28 other vigilante members, militias. He also stated that as part of a new accusing them of stealing and appropriating deal with the government, the federal authori- the property of alleged Templario members, ties agreed to release many of the arrested self- such as ranches, land, and horses, while defense group members.28 demanding money from local citizens for The deal between the government and the returning their property stolen by the militias started breaking down almost as soon Templarios.25 Announcing the arrests, Mexican as the ink on the paper had dried. Some mili- authorities implied that they would no longer tias joined the Rural Defense Corps, receiving tolerate the militias, now that the government guns, uniforms, and salaries from the govern- had developed independent intelligence net- ment, while others continued to drag their works to go after the Templarios. In April 2014, feet. For the rest of 2014, the Mexican govern- an additional 100 militia members were ment kept negotiating with the various militia arrested on charges that they were in fact crim- factions, arresting leaders and members of inals (some belonging to the Templarios) some, only to release them later. Nonetheless, merely posing as self-defense forces.26 The by December 2014, most of the major militia militias, including those of other factions, such factions in Michoacán, including those of as the Tepacaltepec group led by Mireles, Hipolito Mora and his rival Luis Antonio claimed that the government was unjustly Torres, known as “El Americano,” were nomi- prosecuting them while failing to deliver on its nally folded into the Rural Defense Corps. part of the negotiated deal, and that Mexico’s But, their nominal presence in the state- government still could not cope with security sanctioned outfit did not guarantee that the in Central Mexico without help from the mili- state had adequate control over the behavior tias.27 Another vigilante spokesman, Estanislao of the militias. In the middle of December Beltrán, admitted that some bad elements, 2014, Mora’s and Torres’s factions engaged in including criminals, might have infiltrated the a bloody shootout with each other in the town militias, but that the militias would clean their of La Ruana, leaving 11 people dead, including own ranks themselves and continue operating, Mora’s son. Mora and Torres handed them- though preferably under a government hat. selves over to state authorities, and later were Thus, in April 2014, the federal govern- indicted with homicide and kidnapping ment announced that the self-defense groups charges. Nonetheless, once again, in a

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powerful indictment of the persisting weakness One of the most dramatic incidents of Mexico’s justice system and its inability to involving Guerrero’s self-defense forces took effectively prosecute perpetrators, both men place in early May 2015 in the town of were later released because of a lack of evi- Chilapa. Although small in size, Chilapa is dence and other judicial deficiencies. strategically located on the foothills of a major Equally problematic, violence among and poppy growing area and serves as a major between the Torres and Mora factions and a logistical hub for the drug trade since it has the new offshoot of Los Templarios, Las Viagras, only gas station in miles. Following an assas- continued into January 2015. Official military sination of a local political candidate in April and federal police forces also began respond- 2015, 300 civilians armed with rifles, machetes, ing with greater violence toward the militias, and sticks, followed by pickup trucks with men including in a notorious incident after one of sporting high-caliber weapons, seized the the militia forces tried to seize the town hall of town. Although the Mexican military and fed- the city of Apatzingán.29 eral and municipal police were present, they In both Michoacán and Guerrero, violence failed to act against the self-proclaimed self- and the rise of the militias effected Mexico’s defense group. Whether out of intimidation, midterm elections held in June 2015. In indifference, complicity, or on orders from Michoacán, the leader of one militia faction, higher up, the military and police stood by for Enrique Hernandez, was assassinated in March several days as the militias controlled the as he tried to campaign on the ticket of the town, set up checkpoints, and detained people. left-leaning Movement for National At least 11 of those detained (and perhaps as Regeneration, or Morena, party.30 He had ear- many as 30) have not been seen since. lier spent three months in jail, but was released Townspeople believed that the self-defense for a lack of evidence. force, which after several days left on its own accord, was actually the criminal gang Los On the Loose, Coopted, and Getting More Brazen Ardillos, fighting over the important heroin- turf with another gang, Los Rojos.32 Regardless Meanwhile in Guerrero, the federal state did of whether the armed invasion was by a self- not manage to even sign a deal with the mili- defense force run amok or the self-defense tias, let alone enforce it. Various militia groups, label was appropriated by an organized crime whether genuinely indigenous police forces or group, its effect on the community was the fronts for local criminal gangs, continued to very opposite of increasing security. arrest and detain soldiers and government offi- Conclusions and Policy Implications cials, and homicide and extortion rates remained high.31 The election campaign in In some ways, the willingness of the govern- 2015 took place amidst bitter memories of the ment to act against the militias, including to Iguala massacres and widely-assumed state arrest and prosecute some, has been more complicity, widespread intimidation by rival encouraging than its other anti-crime poli- militias and organized crime groups, disap- cies.33 The original plan of folding them into pearances, and assassinations of local govern- the Rural Defense Corps was the least bad ment officials and political candidates. option; however, the government has failed to

182 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 THE RISE OF MILITIAS IN MEXICO effectively enforce the policy with the militias. but spells long-term problems for security, rule In Guerrero, the government has not even of law, and state legitimacy, as much in Mexico been able to convince them to sign any deal. as in Colombia or Afghanistan. To the extent In both Michoacán and Guerrero, many of the that Mexico’s struggle against criminality is not militias have become important sources of merely about reshuffling who has control and conflict and abuse, hardly acting as a stabiliz- power in the criminal market, but about a ing force. Indeed, the Mexican government broader extension and deepening of the rule needs to retain the resolve to monitor the mili- of law and accountability in Mexico, any offi- tias diligently; prosecute those who engage in cial endorsement of the militias fundamentally criminal acts, such as extortion and murders; contradicts that project. and use any opportunity it can to roll them back and dismantle them – even if such efforts From a policy perspective, the most salient have not been going well so far. Partnering findings include the following: with militias might seem like a seductive ■■ In Mexico, militias seemed to have the option in the short term at a moment of crisis, least proclivity toward abuse of local and Sortica

Popular outrage expressed in graffiti regarding the mass disappearance of a busload of students last September in Iguala. It reads, “They took them alive. We want them back alive. Solidarity with the 43 disappeared students.” Iguala’s mayor and his wife were arrested by Mexican officials after evidence was found that they, and several local police, collaborated with a crime syndicate, Guerreros Unidos (United Warriors), on the abduction.

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rival communities when they emerged spon- criminal groups, cartels sought to take them taneously from the local community, faced over or establish rival “militias.” a particularly abusive external force in the ■■ Such competition over control and form of outside criminal groups, and if establishment of militias was also present in major rifts and conflicts were absent from official government structures: Mexico’s the community of the militia’s origin. municipal and state government officials ■■ Nonetheless, even then, local commu- often had militia policies directly contradic- nity structures have often been unable (or tory to those of the federal government. unwilling) to restrain the behavior of the militias. In short, although the formation of mili- ■■ In the absence of effective supervision tias may have originated as a local matter, the by and support from strong official forces, security and political effects the militias had such as powerful domestic or outside mili- did not remain contained within a small local- tary or police forces, militias in Mexico ity or a village. The balances of power they quickly turned to predation and abuse, no affected were much broader. So were the con- matter what their original motivations and tagion effects they set off. No matter what their self-justification. motivations and control mechanisms on ■■ Under President Peña Nieto, the paper, militias have a strong tendency to go Mexican federal government has made more rogue and be easily appropriated by those of an effort to regularize the militias, includ- whom they purport to fight. Ultimately, the ing by folding them into official, if ad hoc rise and spread of militias diminishes state and presumably temporarily-created, police strength and legitimacy. PRISM structures. The government also set limits on what kind of activity the militias can engage in and established some vetting procedures of members. But it has been unable to fully implement and enforce these formal rules. Though the Mexican government has been willing to indict and arrest militia leaders for the most notorious abuses perpetrated by their units, such as murders, kidnapping, and extortion, the ineffective prosecution of such crimes has largely subverted their efforts. ■■ No matter what their origins and motivations, the rise of militias profoundly changes local balances of power. Consequently, both local and outside actors seek to appropriate the militias or establish rival ones. In Mexico, even when the militias rose to oppose the brutality and extortion of

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Notes Papers/2014/11/mexico%20security%20anti%20crime%20 nieto%20felbabbrown/mexico%20security%20anti%20 crime%20nieto%20v1%20felbabbrown.pdf. 1 Kimberly Heine, Cory Molzahn, and David 3 Nick Miroff, “Mass Kidnapping of Students in Shirk, “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Iguala, Mexico, Brings Outrage and Protests,” through 2014,” Justice in Mexico Project, April 2015, Washington Post, October 11, 2014, http://www. https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015- washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/10/11/ Drug-Violence-in-Mexico-final.pdf. In July 2015, the in-mexico-mass-kidnapping-and-slaying-of-students-in-iguala- Mexican government released new data showing that brings-outrage-and-protests-against-gangs-and-government/. between 2007 and 2014, 164,000 were murdered in 4 “Many Questions in Mexico Cartel Battle That Mexico. Cited in Jason Breslow, “The Staggering Killed 43,” Associated Press, May 23, 2015. Death Toll of Mexico’s Drug War,” PBS Frontline, July 5 For a further background on the history of 27, 2015, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ self-defense forces and militias in Mexico and an foreign-affairs-defense/drug-lord/the-staggering-death-toll-of- analysis of their pros and cons in the current period, mexicos-drug-war/. Not all of the murders were linked to see International Crisis Group, “Justice at the Barrel drug trafficking, though many may have been of a Gun: Vigilante Militias in Mexico,” Latin America permitted by the chaos in the criminal market Briefing No. 29, Mexico City/Bogotá/Brussels, May triggered by fighting among the drug cartels and 28, 2013, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/ Mexico’s war on the drug cartels. Many murders are latin-america/mexico/b029-justice-at-the-barrel-of-a-gun- also highly likely to have been unreported, with vigilante-militias-in-mexico.pdf. See also, George Grayson, discovering of mass graves occurring regularly. Easily, “Threat Posed By Mounting Vigilantism In Mexico,” at least half of the murders in Mexico since 2007 can Strategic Studies Institute, September 2011; and Íñigo be attributed to organized crime. For further details Guevara y Moyano, “Gendarmes, Rurales y and debates on the drug numbers, see, for example, Autodefensas,” El Excelsior, March 16, 2014. Molly Molloy, “ The Mexican Undead: Toward a New 6 One notorious incidence of violence occurred History of the ‘Drug War’ Killing Fields, Small Wars in Michoacán’s capital, Morelia, on September 15, Journal, July 21, 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ 2008, when a grenade was thrown into a crowd the-mexican-undead-toward-a-new-history-of-the celebrating Mexico’s Independence Day. La Familia %E2%80%9Cdrug-war%E2%80%9D-killing-fields. Michoacana was widely accused of the crime. It 2 For background on violence in these cities and denied responsibility and accused the Zetas, which on the rise of criminal violence in Mexico, see Vanda were later officially blamed for the incident. Felbab-Brown, “The Violent Drug Market in Mexico 7 Francisco Gómez, “Piratería, el otro frente del and Lessons from Colombia,” Foreign Policy at narco,” El Universal, March 1, 2009. Brookings, Policy Paper No. 12, March 2009, http:// 8 Author’s interviews in Michoacán, spring 2011. www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/03_mexico_ For a similar system of counterculture and of criminal drug_market_felbabbrown/03_mexico_drug_market_felbab- groups providing not just employment, but also brown.pdf; Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Calderon’s Caldron: acquiring political capital and legitimacy and Lessons from Mexico’s Battle Against Organized protection from local communities, see José Arturo Crime and Drug Trafficking in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, Yañez Romero’s study of the Iztapalapa borough of and Michoacán,” Latin America Initiative Paper Series, Mexico City, where pirated and stolen goods are The Brookings Institution, September 2011, http://www. distributed – “Modelo para el Estudio de la brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/9/ Inseguridad, El Caso de Iztapalapa, Center for calderon-felbab-brown/09_calderon_felbab_brown.pdf; Vanda U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California-San Felbab-Brown, “Pena Nieto’s Piñata: The Promise and Diego, May 2005. For a similar study of the fluid Pitfalls of Mexico’s New Security Policy,” Foreign legal, informal, and illegal markets in Guadalajara’s Policy @ Brookings Paper Series, February 2013, http:// San Juan de Dios neighborhood, see José Carlos www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/02/mexico-new- Aguiar, “Nuevos objetos en la agenda de seguridad security-policy-felbabbrown; and Vanda Felbab-Brown, pública: La ‘lucha contra la piratería’ en el Mercado se “Changing the Game or Dropping the Ball: Mexico’s San Juan de Dios, Guadalajara,” in José Carlos Aguiar Security Policy under Enrique Peña Nieto,” The and María Eugenia Suárez de Garay, eds. Policía, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, November seguridad y trasición política: Acercamiento al estado del 17, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/

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México contemporáneo (Amsterdam: Centre for Latin 22 “Mexico to Draw Line on Vigilantes,” American Studies and Documentation, 2008). Associated Press, March 14, 2014. 9 Author’s interviews in Michoacán, spring 2011. 23 Fausset. 10 Author’s interviews in Michoacán, March 24 For how many of the self-defense forces 2011. Regarding the iron ore extortion, see Dave – rondas campesinas – created to combat the Shining Graham, “Chinese Ore Trade Fuels Port Clash with Path ended up as important local drug trafficking Mexican Drug Cartel,” Reuters, January 1, 2014, http:// entities, having often been formed out of the cocaleros www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/01/mexico-drugs-port-idUSL- to start with, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, 2N0JB02E20140101. pp: 54-67. 11 Cited in Eduardo Castillo, “Knights Templar 25 “Mexico to Draw Line on Vigilantes.” Drug Cartel Counts Iron Ore as Main Income 26 “Mexico Arrests 110 Posing as Vigilantes,” Source,” The Associated Press, March 17, 2014, http:// Agence France-Presse, April 22, 2014, and “Mexico www.elpasotimes.com/latestnews/ci_25359614/knights-tem- Arrests 46 Criminals Posing as Vigilantes,” Associated plar-drug-cartel-counts-iron-ore-main. Press, April 22, 2014. 12 Miguel García Tinoco, “Liberan a Militares 27 “Vigilantes Say Mexico Government Secuestrados en Michoacán,” El Excelsiór, March 1, Prosecuting Them,” Associated Press, March 16, 2014. 2013. 28 Laura Castellanos Enviada, “Acuerdan 13 Marguerite Cawley and James Bargent, disolución de las autodefensas en Michoacán,” El “Following Arrest, Mexico Vigilantes Take Soldiers Universal, April 14, 2014; and Dalia Martínez, Hostage,” InsightCrime, March 13, 2013, http://www. “Próximo, desarme de autodefensas: Castillo,” El insightcrime.org/news-briefs/vigilante-self-defense-groups- Universal, April 4, 2014. mexico. 29 Tracy Wilkinson, “Death Toll Rises in Mexico’s 14 James MacAuley, “Self-Defense Group’s Roiling Michoacán State,” Los Angeles Times, January Refusal to Disarm Increases Risk of Conflict with 12, 2015. Military in Mexico’s Guerrero State,” IHS Global 30 Assassinations of politicians are not rare in Insight, January 29, 2014. Mexico, and hardly linked solely to organized crime 15 Heinle, Molzahn, and Shirk (April 2015): or militias. Since 2008, at least 24 political candidates 17-8. have been slain in Mexico. 16 Dudley Althaus, “Michoacán, Guerrero, and 31 For a background on Guerrero and criminal Mexico’s Mixed Responses to Vigilantes,” InSight violence there and its entanglements with the state’s Crime, February 13, 2014, http://www.insightcrime.org/ political system, see Chris Kyle, “Violence and news-analysis/michoacan-guerrero-and-mexicos-mixed- Insecurity in Guerrero,” Woodrow Wilson Center, response-to-the-vigilantes. January 2015, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ 17 Laurence Allan, “’Community Police’ Disarm Violence%20and%20Insecurity%20in%20Guerrero.pdf. Police Officers in Violence-Plagued Mexican State,” 32 For details, see, Deborah Bonello, “Five Days HIS Global Insight, May 10, 2013. of Terror in a Mexican Town,” Los Angeles Times, May 18 Richard Fausset, “Mexico Under Siege: 21, 2015; “13 People Missing in Southern Mexico Guerrero State Sliding into Chaos,” Los Angeles Times, after Vigilantes Withdrew From Violence-Wracked February 16, 2014. City,” Associated Press, May 19, 2015. For violence in 19 Georgina Olson, “Combatiremos defensa por Guerrero, see also Daniela Pastrana, “Drug Violence propia mano: Enrique Peña Nieto,” Excélsior, April 10, Leaves a String of Ghost Towns in Mexico,” InterPress 2013. Services, February 7, 2015. 20 Some scholars also embraced the formation 33 See, Felbab-Brown, “Dropping the Ball.” of the militias – see, for example, Patricio Asfura- Heim and Ralph H. Espach, “The Rise of Mexico’s Self-Defense Forces,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013, http://www.laleadership.org/userfiles/30/Classes/806/ Mexicos%20Vigilante%20Justice%20FA%20July-Aug%20 2013.pdf. 21 Fausset, “Mexico Under Siege: Guerrero State Sliding into Chaos.”

186 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 Available soon from CCO/NDU. Request copy by providing mailing address to [email protected] AUTHOR

Galeria del Ministerio de Defensa del Perú

COIN forces in the VRAEM on review by Peruvian MOD, April, 2012

188 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 1 The Evolving Transnational Crime-Terrorism Nexus in Peru and its Strategic Relevance for the U.S. and the Region

BY R. EVAN ELLIS1

n September, 2014, the anti-drug command of the Peruvian National Police, DIRANDRO, seized 7.6 metric tons of cocaine at a factory near the city of Trujillo. A Peruvian family-clan, Iin coordination with Mexican narco-traffickers, was using the facility to insert the cocaine into blocks of coal, to be shipped from the Pacific Coast ports of Callao (Lima) and Paita to Spain and Belgium.2 Experts estimate that Peru now exports more than 200 tons of cocaine per year,3 and by late 2014, the country had replaced Colombia as the world’s number one producer of coca leaves, used to make the drug.4 With its strategic geographic location both on the Pacific coast, and in the middle of South America, Peru is today becoming a narcotrafficking hub for four continents, supplying not only the U.S. and Canada, but also Europe, Russia, and rapidly expanding markets in Brazil, Chile, and Asia. In the multiple narcotics supply chains that originate in Peru, local groups are linked to powerful transnational criminal organizations including the Urabeños in Colombia, the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico, and most recently, the First Capital Command (PCC) in Brazil. Further complicating matters, the narco-supply chains are but one part of an increasingly large and complex illicit economy, including illegal mining, logging, contraband merchandise, and human trafficking, mutually re-enforcing, and fed by the relatively weak bond between the state and local communities. In this illicit economy, the residual elements of the terrorist group Sendero Luminoso, now concentrated principally in the region known as the VRAEM (defined by the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro river valleys) play a relatively minor role, principally taxing narcotrafficking and other criminal activities in the limited areas under their influence. Yet the marginal role of Sendero Luninoso as one among many players does not make the collective challenge of the growing illicit economy any less severe. Dr. R. Evan Ellis is Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 189 ELLIS

The combination of narcotrafficking and in extractive industry projects. The combina- other criminal activities represents not only a tion of these factors has caused the nation’s significant challenge for Peru’s neighbors and growth, once among the highest in the region, the region, but also a significant distortion of to fall to 2.4 percent for 2015.5 the national economy, which already includes What is at Stake a large informal sector, consisting of people who work in businesses from selling food to Terrorism, narcotrafficking, and the transna- merchandise, generally on a cash basis, with- tionally connected criminal economy in Peru out being registered with, or paying taxes to form a destructive and reinforcing dynamic. the state. The rapid growth of that economy Both the terrorist group Sendero Luminoso during the past decade has been driven princi- and other criminal groups are sustained by the pally by exports from extractive industries such revenue from narcotrafficking and other illicit as mining and petroleum, complemented by activities. The intimidation by both Sendero traditional agriculture and fishing sectors. Yet Luminoso and local criminal elements, com- slowing growth in the People’s Republic of plemented by the dependence of local resi- China has driven down prices for both Peru’s dents on the illicit economy limits cooperation mining and petroleum exports. These prices, with legitimate authorities and the ability of in combination with social unrest in the min- the state to combat the threat. The same vio- ing sector, have also delayed new investment lence and pressures also block development Geraint Rowland

Lima, Peru 2013. Though the country is rich in culture and natural resources, Peru is beset by profound corruption and poverty.

190 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 THE EVOLVING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME-TERRORISM NEXUS IN PERU projects such as highways, that could trans- incorporation of ethnic diversity as a compo- form economically marginal regions, locking nent of national identity. Peru currently reflects local populations into dependence on the not only a delicate balance between state-led illicit economy and alienation from the state. and free-market-led orientations to develop- In the context of limited and ineffective state ment, but also a balance between populist and presence and weak government bonds with the clientelistic, versus rule-of-law based local population, the expansion of illicit activ- approaches to addressing social and ethnic ities in affected zones means even more reve- inequality. nues for criminal organizations to corrupt law Moreover, more than any nation in the enforcement, win over local populations, and Americas, Peru currently maintains a balance conduct operations of expanding scale with in its economic, political, and military rela- impunity, with implications not only for Peru, tionships with the United States, China, and but for the region more broadly. Russia. While its current government main- The ability of Peru’s government to arrest tains strong political and security relationships this destructive dynamic will play a key role with the United States and a pro-trade, free not only in the future of the nation itself, but market economic orientation, its military pri- also of the Americas, and the increasingly marily uses and buys Russian equipment, and important group of nations in both Asia and sends significant numbers of personnel to Latin America defined by their proximity to the Russia for professional military education and Pacific Ocean. The strategic importance of Peru training. At the same time, the People’s and its ability to successfully address the chal- Republic of China has become Peru’s principal lenges of terrorism, narcotrafficking, and the trade partner and the most important investor transnational criminal economy can be under- in the mining sector, key to the Peruvian econ- stood by an examination that moves from the omy. domestic to the regional to the international. Within the region, the course that Peru Peru is a culturally rich country endowed follows on these political and economic mat- with a wealth of natural resources, from petro- ters could lead to the rise of a populist socialist leum and minerals to agricultural potential, leader there, similar to what occurred in yet beset by profound inequality, corruption, Venezuela in 1998, with significant conse- and poverty. It is a nation with a diverse ethnic quences for Peru’s neighbors and the stability mix, reflecting a historic legacy as a center of of the region. In Venezuela, the late populist the Inca Empire, Spanish colonial government, leader Hugo Chavez captured power in demo- and migration from Asia. Peru not only has cratic elections by appealing to the economi- both significant economic weight and poten- cally marginalized, yet once in office, progres- tial, but the choices that it faces, as it weathers sively consolidated political and economic the current narcoterrorism-criminal challenge, power in his own hands, significantly curtailed mirror those facing all of Latin America, and cooperation with international law enforce- by extension, the Pacific community: the rela- ment, allowing the country to become a haven tionship between the state, the private sector, for terrorist groups, organized criminal activity, and the global economy in the pursuit of pros- and extra-hemispheric actors such as Iran and perity and development, as well as the Russia, pursuing activities in the region

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 191 ELLIS opposed to U.S. interests. If deteriorating con- Trans-Pacific Partnership, vice the China- ditions in Peru lead to a Venezuela-style popu- proposed alternative “Free Trade Area of the list revolution in that country as well, the con- Asia-Pacific.” The latter appears to demand far sequences would include not only significant fewer provisions regarding dispute resolution, economic hardship and the loss of political protection of investments and intellectual freedom for Peruvians, but the emergence of a property important to sustain the type of inter- hub of criminality and violence at the heart of national regime in which developed nations South America and its relationship with Asia. can collaborate without fear that free trade will Similarly, the direction taken by Peru rob them of the fruits of the technologies and could influence whether the region seeks mul- capabilities that they have invested to develop. tilateral governance mechanisms which The Challenge exclude the U.S. and Canada such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) The security challenge that currently confronts and the Community of Latin American and Peru is a complex, interdependent, reinforcing Caribbean States (CELAC). Both of these mul- mixture of terrorism, narcotrafficking and tilateral organizations were established in other illicit activities. These both feed off of, recent years as de facto alternatives to the and help to sustain, poverty, inequality, and Organization of American States (OAS) to corruption, in the context of an economy char- address matters of interest to the region in a acterized by a large informal sector in which venue that explicitly excludes the United States the generation of profits, the identity of clients, and Canada. Both venues have also been nota- and the payment of workers are not registered bly silent on deviations from democratic pro- with the state.6 While Peru’s informal sector is cesses by member nations, while CELAC has not atypical of Latin American and Caribbean actively pursued engagement with extrare- states, it particularly complicates combatting gional rivals of the United States including illicit activities, since it serves as a basis for China and Russia. The evolution of these orga- both the recruitment of manpower by criminal nizations as the principal multilateral forums organizations, and the concealment of their for the region would both undermine repre- earnings. sentative democracy in the hemisphere, and Sendero Luminoso. deal a blow to the strategic position of the United States globally. The relative emphasis on narcotrafficking ver- Looking across the Pacific, the choices sus terrorism in this challenge has shifted over made by Peru regarding whether to pursue a the past four decades with the rise, defeat, and model for engaging with Asia that emphasizes re-emergence of Sendero Luminoso as a terror- transparency, efficient markets, and rule of law, ist organization, and the emergence of Europe, vice the state-to-state model of engagement Brazil, and Asia as important consumers in the adopted by the Bolivarian Alliance of the global narcotics trade. Peoples of the Americas (ALBA) will influence Sendero Luminoso was formed in the the type of regime that prevails in the 1960s and 1970s in Ayacucho by Abimael “Community of the Pacific.” These alternatives Guzman as a dissident faction of the Peruvian are reflected in the respective trade pacts the Communist Party, espousing a Maoist

192 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 THE EVOLVING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME-TERRORISM NEXUS IN PERU

ideology. The group initiated its armed strug- Although the Upper Huallaga group first gle against the Peruvian State in the town of recognized and exploited the potential of tax- Chuschi, Ayacucho on May 17th 1980, by burn- ing the cocaine business as a source of revenue, ing ballot boxes to obstruct voting in the elec- it was the Quispe Palomino clan in the VRAEM tion marking the nation’s return to democratic which, in the end, became most immersed in, governance following a period of military rule. and dependent on, the cocaine business. During the height of Sendero Luminoso in the During this time, the two factions of Sendero 1990s, the organization is estimated to have not only rejected each other in their discourse, had some 10,000 members. Per the estimate of but in 2009, Senderistas from the Quispe Peru’s post-conflict “Truth and Reconciliation Palomino clan traveled to the Upper Huallaga Commission,” the armed struggle that it waged valley in an apparent attempt to infiltrate and in the Andean highlands against the Peruvian undermine the Upper Huallaga group, and by state cost an estimated 69,000 lives.7 During so doing, appropriate the international recog- the presidency of Alberto Fujimori, the group nition of and support for the entire Sendero was substantially reduced in power by the Luminoso movement for itself.10 Peruvian security forces, principally through The Quispe Palomino faction also sought the application of traditional counterinsur- to expand its operations beyond Vizcatán, gency tactics, culminating with the imprison- where they were concentrated, including send- ment in 1992 of its leader Abimael Guzman. ing an exploratory force into the eastern part Sendero’s 1993 negotiation of a “peace of the province of La Convención, in an appar- accord” with the Peruvian state led to a split ent attempt to bolster their ability to extort within the remnants of the group between money from oil companies operating in the those led by Forindo Eleuterio Flores Hala strategically important Camisea gasfields11 and (“Comrade Artemio”), who followed the pipeline.12 The group’s presence in the prov- “Guzman” line of thinking, and whose faction ince was dramatically highlighted by its kid- operated in the Upper Huallaga Valley; versus napping in April 2013 in Cusco of 36 workers the Quispe Palomino “clan,” which principally of the petroleum service company Skanska, operated in the “VRAEM,” and which rejected coupled with a badly-executed rescue attempt the Guzman truce and the specifics of his ide- by the government, both of which received ology. national attention.13 In addition to extorting The re-emergence of Sendero as an active companies involved in the local gas industry, terrorist threat in Peru was marked by the Sendero’s move into La Convención also group’s 2003 attack against an oil installation appeared designed to position it to control the in Ayacucho operated by the Argentine firm area and to exploit its value as a potential nar- Techint, including the taking of 71 hostages.8 cotrafficking route connecting the region to the Although the attack led the Peruvian govern- province of Madre de Dios. ment to declare a state of emergency in the With respect to Sendero’s expansion plan region, the level of violence remained rela- more broadly, former head of the special mili- tively limited until Sendero ambushed a police tary command for the VRAEM, Leonardo patrol in December 2005, in the Department Longa, argues that the attempts at territorial of Huanco, killing eight officials.9 expansion of the group both toward the

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 193 ELLIS

northeast and southeast were guided by oppor- where the government simultaneously pursued tunities related to narcotrafficking and other a significant forced eradication program for sources of revenue in the illicit economy in the coca. In February 2012, the government cap- interior of the country, such as illegal mining tured Artemio, the principal leader of the and logging. He argues that Sendero sought to Huallaga faction,17 then leveraging the victory, extend its influence 1) toward the northeast, proceeded to dismantle the Sendero military through Pucallpa, to Colombia, and 2) toward organization in the area. the southeast, through Cuzco and Puno, to As the government consolidated its posi- Bolivia. tion in the Upper Huallaga valley and shifted The Peruvian campaign against Sendero’s attention to the VRAEM, it also began to resurgence arguably began in earnest in 2008, achieve strategic victories there as well, includ- with the establishment of an integrated mili- ing the killing of the organization’s principal tary command in the VRAEM, and a major sharpshooter, Victor Hugo Castro Ramírez offensive against the group in Vizcatán, (“Comrade William”) in September 2012 in Operation Excellence 777, leading to high Huanta (Ayacucho),18 followed in August casualties among government forces without 2013 by Operation “Lobo,” in which it killed producing enduring results against Sendero.15 VRAEM-based leaders Alexandro Broda In 2012, the Peruvian government extended Casafranca (“Comrade Alipio”), and Martin the geographical zone of focus to include the Quispe Palomino (“Comrade Gabriel”).19 By Mantaro river valley, an important trafficking 2014, the Sendero organization in the Upper route for cocaine and precursor chemicals, and Huallaga Valley had largely been eliminated, renamed the region the “VRAEM.”16 The and its faction in the VRAEM had been reduced police were placed under a special military to an estimated 80 core combatants, with 300- command in the zone. The 4th Division of the 500 members in total, under the direction of Army, as well as the Frente Policial VRAEM, Víctor Quispe Palomino (“Comrade José”) and were assigned to the command, both head- his brother Jorge (“Comrade Raúl”). While the quartered in Pichari, located in the center of members’ precise whereabouts were not the zone. Over the course of recent years, the known, the group was generally believed to government has established some 60 tempo- have taken refuge in Vizcatán, whose rough rary and permanent bases at strategically topography, almost constantly obscured by selected locations, and has continued to adapt clouds, makes it difficult for the government to evolving circumstances, including the both to survey and to operate in the area.20 deployment of the 33rd Counter-Terrorist In the political arena, in parallel with the Brigade to the province of La Convención to resurgence, then military setbacks of Sendero block advances by Sendero Luminoso in the Luminoso, formerly jailed members of area. Sendero and lawyers defending the group Despite the effort in the VRAEM, ironi- established a front organization for it in 2008, cally the government’s most significant initial MOVADEF.21 The organization, led by Alfredo victories occurred in the Upper Huallaga Crespo and Manuel Fajardo, aligned with the Valley, where the police command for the zone remnants of those following “Guzman think- was not subordinated to the military, and ing” in the Upper Huallaga Valley, while

194 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 THE EVOLVING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME-TERRORISM NEXUS IN PERU publicly rejecting the Quispe Palomino clan as ideology of the group in the remote villages of mere narcotraffickers who had forsaken the the region. To some degree, however, the abil- group’s ideology.22 In November 2011, ity of MOVADEF to regain a foothold in SUTEP MOVADEF was blocked in its attempt to regis- in the current era has been limited by a new ter as a political party, yet continued to orga- merit-based teacher promotion system estab- nize and proselytize in Peruvian universities lished under the second presidential adminis- where Sendero had previously had some fol- tration of Alan Garcia (2006-2011), since the lowing among students, including Universidad new system has made achievement a viable Nacional Mayor de San Marcos and La Cantuta alternative to organized protest for teachers to in Lima, Universidad Nacional de San increase their salaries.23 Cristóbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho, and Similarly, the following of MOVADEF Universidad Nacional Jorge Basadre within Peruvian universities to date has been Grohmann in Tacna. limited, due to the less isolated character of Following the modus operandi of Sendero contemporary university students, even in the from the 1960s through the 1990s, MOVADEF countryside. Nonetheless, Peruvian experts also continued to build a presence within the interviewed for the present research project national teachers’ union, SUTEP, paralleling worry that the lack of awareness among the the approach that its founder Guzman had new generation of Peruvian youth of the used in the 1960s and 1970s, using sympa- abuses committed by Sendero during the thetic educators to help disseminate the 1980s and 1990s create the opportunity for Galeria del Ministerio de Defensa del Perú

COIN soldier in the VRAEM, April, 2012

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 195 ELLIS

MOVADEF to resurrect the organization as a bands (BACRIM), and increasingly Brazilian mere movement for social justice. groups such as Primer Comando Capital (PCC). The Growing Criminal Economy It is the “family clans” who comprise the While the military successes of the Peruvian narcotics infrastructure within Peru,27 buying government against Sendero Luminoso in the the coca leaf from local farmers, smuggling VRAEM and Upper Huallaga Valley are laud- precursor chemicals to production sites, pro- able, as suggested previously, Sendero is only ducing intermediate products and cocaine one element of a far larger problem which itself, and arranging the transportation of threatens both the long-term health and stabil- those products out of the region, via persons ity of the country, and the region more on foot (“mochileros”), in hidden compart- broadly: an extensive and expanding, interna- ments of vehicles, via river, and with light air- tionally-connected criminal economy which is craft from clandestine airstrips “rented” from fueled by, and in turn, deepens, the profound local landowners.28 In this process, the malaise in the Peruvian government’s relation- Mexican, Colombian, and Brazilian organiza- ship with the population in the interior of the tions reportedly take delivery of the product country. only at the final collection points before it is At the core of the challenge, the Peruvian to leave the country, including the “narco air- state has never had a particularly strong pres- strips” in the VRAEM, or the ports on the north ence in the interior of the country, or strongly Pacific coast, such as Callao, Paita, Chimbote, incorporated the local population (particularly and Piura. With the financing of the external indigenous peoples) into the national system organizations who are their clients, the family of governance. Nor has it effectively connected clans pay “protection money” to Sendero, but the region to the rest of the country and the it is they, and not Sendero, who link Peru’s broader global economy through transporta- illicit economy to the TCOs. tion and communication infrastructures. The strategic landscape of Peru’s drug Largely disconnected from an absent state, the trade is in continuous evolution. As state orga- informal economy has flourished,24 including nizations such as the national police counter- illicit narcotics production, illegal logging, drug organization (DIRANDRO) and the human trafficking, and increasingly, the lucra- counter-narcotics organization (DEVIDA) seek tive business of illegal mining.25 to better control precursor chemicals and From the perspective of the illicit drug smuggling routes, the narco-clans are adapting business, Sendero is one small piece in a their tactics. Some are shifting from producing larger, internationally-connected business con- finished cocaine in the VRAEM, to exporting necting farmers and family clans who organize intermediate products to Bolivia to complete the production and transportation of cocaine the production process there, where controls and intermediate products within Peru, to the are less strict and precursor chemicals are eas- far larger and more powerful players of the ier and cheaper to obtain. Some clans have global criminal economy, including transna- transported intermediate products to the sub- tional criminal organizations (TCOs) such as urbs of Lima for processing there, believing it the Sinaloa cartel,26 Colombian criminal cheaper and easier than smuggling precursor

196 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 THE EVOLVING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME-TERRORISM NEXUS IN PERU

chemicals into areas like the VRAEM and According to Peruvian sources interviewed off- Upper Huallaga valley. Similarly areas used for the-record, such organizations, which in some collection and transportation are evolving with cases have received arms and funding from the government enforcement efforts, with Pichis government to protect their communities Palcazu, north of the VRAEM, recently becom- against Sendero, use the same arms when their ing a more important hub. In addition, some members “moonlight” to escort drug ship- coca growing and production activities have ments, while their teenage and young adult reportedly returned to the Upper Huallaga val- children serve as “mochileros” to transport ley, despite the defeat of Sendero’s main orga- drugs overland. nization, and an extensive forced eradication Yet narcotrafficking is not the only source campaign there.29 of revenue for Sendero. The group reportedly In recent years, light aircraft, flying from also taxes illegal logging, and to a lesser extent, clandestine airstrips, have played an increas- informal mining in a small part of ingly important role in exporting cocaine and Huancavelica. Sendero also reportedly is intermediate products from the country. An engaged in extorting petroleum operators in estimated six to ten such “narco flights” per the Department of La Convención, to which, day now leave the VRAEM for neighboring as noted previously, it continues to project Bolivia and Brazil. Peruvian government forces.34 efforts to destroy the airstrips have proven With respect to the broader illicit econ- costly, risky, and ineffective,30 leading the gov- omy, criminally-tied money flows through the ernment to declare a “no fly zone” over the country, distorting all aspects of the economy VRAEM in February 2015,31 and to consider and political system, including fueling wide- resuming aerial interdiction of suspected narco spread corruption. Illicit money is increasingly flights, a practice that it engaged in between moving beyond the formal financial system to 1995 and 2001.32 include use of businesses, real estate, and asso- The role of Sendero Luminoso in the nar- ciated notary public transactions to launder cotics trade, as noted previously, centers on money.35 Experts interviewed for this study controlling and taxing the cocaine business suggested that the nation’s cooperative credit and other activities in the areas under its influ- organizations,36 expanding network of private ence.33 Yet even within the VRAEM, where universities, and part of the expansion of mid- Sendero continues to have a military presence, dle and upper-class suburbs in the previously its reach is limited. Much of the coca growing poor neighborhoods north of Lima (the “tra- and drug production activity that occurs south piche”) are, to some extent, fueled by the proof the police and military base at Pichari, ceeds from criminal activities. With respect to reportedly does not pay a tax to Sendero. growing corruption and criminal ties at the Indeed, in some cases, production and move- political level, an estimated 700 candidates in ment of coca paste and cocaine in that area are Peru’s October 2014 election, and four of the said to be guarded by members of the same 25 regional (state-level) governors who won, communal defense organizations that the gov- are under suspicion for corruption.37 ernment has built up to fight Sendero.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 197 ELLIS

Obstacles to the Government Response or psychological operations work that could help build confidence with local communities, As suggested previously, Peru’s government reinforcing a disconnect between its presence has made progress in combatting Sendero, and in the zone and the development-oriented to a lesser extent, the illegal economy, yet that activities of other Peruvian government orga- progress has been limited by several factors. nizations there. The principal obstacle to the effectiveness of Although the Armed Forces support the Peruvian government response is arguably actions by the police in the zone, multiple corruption. At the unit level, in the VRAEM, experts interviewed concurred that those forces although military officers are typically limited often do not exercise significant initiative in to spending two years in the zone, it is com- such operations, preferring to avoid contact mon for policemen to be recruited locally, with potential enemies, rather than taking trained in regional centers, and to spend their actions that could produce casualties poten- entire careers there. Moreover, by contrast to tially giving rise to a legal investigation. The military bases which are closed to the local Armed Forces have conditional legal authority population and fortified, police stations must to operate domestically in conjunction with serve and be open to the community. The com- the police under Legislative Decree 1095,38 yet bination of protracted living in, and develop- correctly or not, many interviewed for this ing ties in the zone, daily exposure of the study expressed concern that the military is police facility to potential threats, and immer- inadequately protected from criminal prosecu- sion in an economy and system dominated by tion for actions stemming from the exercise of illicit money, facilitates corruption. their military duties. Similarly, in a recently With respect to the military, the armed published book on the struggle against forces deployed in the VRAEM are arguably Sendero, former head of the Special Command less effective than their ample numbers and for the VRAEM, General Leonardo Longa, the strategic positioning of their bases might urges a political commitment by the state, and suggest. The deployed forces there are rela- an adequate legal framework as key elements tively isolated from the local populations with of his proposed national strategy to defeat nar- which they could build relations of influence coterrorism.39 and gather intelligence to support the fight In addition to such concerns, operations against Sendero. The problem, according to such as conducting patrols have been limited multiple experts interviewed in Peru for this by the operational cost of the equipment study, is a “mutual lack of confidence,” with involved, including maintenance and spare the Armed Forces believing that most local parts for the riverine hovercraft and helicopters townspeople are collaborating with criminal operating in the zone.40 groups (and under the control of Sendero), Some of the greatest public successes while the local community views the Armed achieved by the government against Sendero, Forces as an external force whose presence including the killing of William, Alipio, and undermines, rather than contributes to, its Gabriel, have been through an elite group of livelihood. Some suggested that the military military and police units focused on high- itself is not oriented to the type of civil affairs value targets, directed by Vice-Minister of the

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Interior (later Vice-Minister of Defense) Ivan also been influenced by politics. The law Vega. Yet this approach also has its detractors, itself43 was sponsored Peruvian congressman including those who suggest that the civilian and retired Admiral Carlos Tubino, affiliated Vice-Minister is too senior to be personally with the (opposition) party of former directing military operations in the field, and President Alberto Fujimori. Although the pro- that reliance on the special organization is not posal was approved on March 9, 2015 by the healthy for either the military or police as Defense Committee of the Peruvian institutions. Congress,44 the Humala government has Important parts of the struggle have also, avoided calling it for a vote before the full arguably, become too influenced by politics. A Congress, reportedly to avoid conflict with the coca eradication program by Peru’s counter- United States, for whom resumption of the narcotics organization DEVIDA (principally in flights is a sensitive issue. Legal implementa- the Upper Huallaga Valley) was largely aban- tion will require several months, as will the doned for a less successful crop substitution establishment of procedures and the training program,41 following the May 2014 ouster of of pilots and other personnel. The acquisition the pro-eradication head of DEVIDA, Carmen of radars to provide adequate coverage in the Masias.42 Peru’s proposed resumption of aerial complex terrain of the VRAEM45 will similarly interdiction against suspected narco-flights has Håkan Svensson (Xauxa)

The Madre de Dios region, one of the many remote areas of Peru, is host to a variety of illicit activities including cocaine production, and illegal mining and timber operations.

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require both time and funds which have not markets for their products, important works yet been publicly allocated.46 like the highway from Quinua (Ayacucho) to Ironically, Peru’s fight against narcotraf- San Francisco have been delayed, and signifi- ficking has proven more difficult than its cam- cant amounts of project budgets are reportedly paign against Sendero. Even if the government consumed by corruption. succeeds in reducing narcotrafficking in the Getting resources for development proj- Upper Huallaga Valley and the VRAEM, the ects is further complicated by difficulties in problem is already migrating to other areas. In coordinating between different levels of gov- recent years, narcotrafficking activities near ernment (local versus regional versus Peru’s border with Brazil and Colombia have national), and between national government increased, reflecting the growth of coca and agencies. The VRAEM is comprised of the rela- production of cocaine on the Colombian side tively unpopulated fringe areas of five of Peru’s of the border, in Putumayo, and prompting 25 regions (Junin, Huancavelica, Ayacucho, the Peruvian government to deploy an addi- Apurimac, and Cusco). The regional govern- tional infantry brigade to the region. Possible ments often prefer to invest resources in more displacement of narcotrafficking activities into populated urban centers outside the VRAEM, the northeast (Loreto), the east (Ucayali), and where their constituents are, rather than rela- the southeast (Puno), are also a concern, even tively isolated VRAEM itself. Further compli- though the soil and climatic conditions in cating matters, regional and local elections in these regions yield coca with a lower alkaloid October 2014 brought new leaders to power in content, requiring more hectares of coca to each of the regions involved. As these leaders produce the same amount of cocaine. assumed power in January 2015,47 the Humala Nor would success against cocaine pro- administration had to begin, almost from duction in the region alone bring the illegal scratch, the process of coordination with them. economy under control. To some degree, other At the national political level, a cabinet- illicit activities such as informal mining and level committee called the CODEVRAEM, has illegal timber operations are becoming even responsibility for coordinating the efforts of more important sources of revenue than individual ministries to achieve development cocaine. This is particularly the case in Madre and other national strategic objectives in the de Dios, rich in both mineral resources and VRAEM. While its current head, Luis Rojas timber, and long isolated from the central gov- Merino, a retired colonel, appointed in ernment in Lima. February 2012, is reportedly a man of much While economic and social development experience who knows the VRAEM well, his have been important components of the gov- organization lacks staff, funding, and statutory ernment’s effort to restore effective state pres- authority to effectively shape the priorities of ence in areas such as the VRAEM, the design Peru’s ministries to implement a coherent and implementation of development strategies national plan. has been problematic. Although the govern- Lessons Learned ment has initiated (and sometimes completed), infrastructure projects such as roads The dynamics of the expanding criminal econ- and bridges to connect the population to omy in Peru, including the interdependent,

200 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 4 THE EVOLVING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME-TERRORISM NEXUS IN PERU mutually reinforcing problems of terrorism, also sews doubts that undermine intelli- narcotrafficking and international organized gence sharing and coordination across the crime offer lessons that can benefit the U.S. government. Moreover, among domestic and other countries facing similar challenges constituencies and foreign partners, corrup- of terrorism and transnational organized tion transforms confusion and lack of infor- crime. As noted above, although the fight mation (which always exist), into a pre- against Sendero Luminoso continues to be a sumption against the state. matter of priority for the Peruvian armed ■■ Finally, the government’s relationship forces, the group in its currently reduced form with the population is a center of gravity. is but one of many enablers of a criminal The population is not only a key source of economy which presents growing risks to the intelligence, but its cooperation is funda- Peruvian state and the region more broadly. mental to public order, and its participation Lessons suggested by the aforegoing anal- in civic activities is the key to holding rival ysis include the following: systems of authority at bay. It is not possible ■■ First, the inability to permanently elimi- to prevail against terrorism or the criminal nate Sendero Luminoso in 35 years of armed economy when the state is a “stranger in its struggle shows the limits of military assets own territory.”48 and technology in eliminating an opponent, Conclusion (even of limited size), who has taken refuge in difficult terrain with which he is familiar, Peru’s success in managing the challenges of nurtured by an illicit revenue stream, and Sendero Luminoso, cocaine production, and able to blend into the local population. If other parts of the illegal economy will be key political leaders promise too much, adver- to shaping the future dynamics not only of saries can win symbolic victories simply by organized crime and terrorism, but also of gov- surviving. ernance, and political choices in the region ■■ Second, the military conflict cannot be regarding suitable paths to development. It is won, and a healthy order established, with- difficult to identify another nation in the out severely limiting the illicit economy. region whose characteristics make it simulta- Whether narcotrafficking, illegal mining, or neously as impactful, and as potentially fragile, human smuggling, such activities are the as Peru at the present time. From the perspec- fuel which empowers terrorists, insurgents, tive of the global criminal economy, Peru is the and criminals to operate, intimidate, corrupt geographic nexus for narcotrafficking, illegal institutions, and ultimately, to create alter- mining, and other criminal enterprises tying native vehicles of governance. South America to traditional drug markets in ■■ Third, within a substantial illicit econ- the U.S. and Canada, emerging illicit markets omy, controlling corruption is fundamental. in Brazil, Europe, and Russia, and the poten- Corruption negates both the government’s tially even more significant markets for drugs, plan, and the ability of international part- mining products, and other goods in Asia. ners to help. Corruption in institutions such With high levels of ethnic diversity and as the police and military not only impairs economic inequality, the combination of crim- operations such as drug interdiction, but inality, social unrest, and terrorism manifested

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 201 ELLIS in Peru in recent years suggests that the deter future corruption, particularly at the nation’s socioeconomic fabric is fraying. The local level. In this fight, extradition to the U.S. nation is a timebomb at the center of one con- is a tool which has proven highly effective else- tinent, and an important nexus for three others where, and should be embraced in the present with respect to international criminal, com- context where applicable. The U.S. should also mercial, and financial flows. A significant dete- resolve its own legal and political impedi- rioration of the will or capabilities of the ments to helping Peru establish an effective air Peruvian state to fight organized crime would interdiction capability which minimizes the not only ripple throughout the criminal econ- risk to innocent lives, while not neglecting omy of South America, but would have sig- overland, riverine, and maritime interdiction nificant impacts on North America, Europe, capabilities as well. and Asia as well. As a center of gravity in the struggle, the Beyond the illicit economy, however, Peru United Satates should work with Peruvian is also a key player in mining and trans-pacific security forces to establish meaningful and trade, and its destabilization would have sig- positive state presence in the remote interior nificant repercussions for the global economy. areas of the country most vulnerable to illicit As noted previously, the nation is also at the activity. It is the prerogative of the Peruvian center of the divide within Latin America military not to become more directly involved regarding how to engage Asia, the question of in operations against organized crime, but the what kind of relationship the region will U.S. should make it clear that, while continu- maintain with Russia, and the struggle over ing to support the Peruvian struggle against whether multilateralism in the hemisphere terrorism, the lion’s share of U.S. resources will will include, or exclude the U.S. and Canada. be dedicated to those security organizations As goes Peru, may tilt the hemisphere. focused on eliminating the space in which the While detailed recommendations for criminal economy can prosper. addressing these challenges are beyond the The ability of the United States to help scope of this article, Peru deserves strategic pri- Peru prosper as an ethnically pluralistic ority within the U.S. administration and rele- democracy committed to free markets and the vant bureaucracies such as the State rule of law will stand as an example, either Department, Defense Department, Drug positive or negative, for the rest of the region, Enforcement Administration, and others, not as it wrestles with its own challenges of only as a partner that needs U.S. support, but inequality, ethnic pluralism, and engagement as one in which such support can make a crit- with Asia and the rest the world economy. The ical difference. U.S. support should include, United States has a strong vested interest in but not be limited to, increased intelligence, working with Peru to ensure that it succeeds. technology, and mobility support for opera- PRISM tions against criminal groups operating in the country, complemented by strengthening of law enforcement and judicial institutions, including capabilities to help purge corrupt officials and provide ongoing monitoring to

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Notes in Peru’s VRAEM region,” IHS Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, October 29, 2014. http://www.janes.com/ article/45176/helicopters-face-high-risk-of-attack-in-peru-s- 1 Dr. R. Evan Ellis is Research Professor with the vraem-region. Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War 12 For a discussion of the document in which College. Dr. Ellis would like to thank those who Sendero Luminoso calls for attacks on the Camisea gas dedicated time to speak with him in Lima, Peru about pipeline, see “El nuevo manual de Sendero: regreso a the issues discussed in this article during his recent los ochenta en el Vraem,” Panorama, October 26, research trip to the country, as well as his research 2014. http://panamericana.pe/panorama/nacionales/168150- assistants, Allen Church and Isaac Schlotterbeck. The nuevo-manual-sendero-regreso-ochenta-vraem. views expressed in this article are strictly his own. 13 “Gustavo Gorriti: El drama de Kepashiato 2 “Urresti presentó 7.6 toneladas de cocaína muestra la compleja y vulnerable situación del incautadas en Trujillo,” Peru21, September 1, 2014. VRAE,” La Republica, April 13, 2012. http://www. http://peru21.pe/actualidad/droga-cocaina-dirandro-daniel- larepublica.pe/13-04-2012/gustavo-gorriti-el-drama-de- urresti-policia-nacional-trujillo-2197279. kepashiato-muestra-la-compleja-y-vulnerable-situacion-del-vrae. 3 Loren Riesenfeld, “Peru Shoots Down Narco 14 Longa, 51. Plane Heading to Bolivia,” Insight Crime, March 2, 15 Esteban Valle Riestra and Gustavo Gorriti, 2015. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/peru-shoots- “Métricas de Guerra,” IDL Reporteros, January 20, down-narco-plane-heading-to-bolivia. 2015. https://idl-reporteros.pe/metricas-de-guerra/. 4 United Nations Office of Drug Control, “Perú: 16 “Peru Plans to Step Up Security, Inclusion In Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012,” September Coca Growing Region,” Peruvian Times, June 29, 2012. 2013. http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Peru/ http://www.peruviantimes.com/29/peru-plans-to-step-up- Peru_Monitoreo_de_Coca_2012_web.pdf. security-inclusion-in-coca-growing-region/16136/. 5 Andrea Jaramillo and John Quigley, “Velarde 17 “’Artemio’ capturado,” IDL Reporteros, Opens Door to Peru Rate Cut as GDP Rebound February 12, 2012. https://idl-reporteros.pe/artemio-captur- Falters,” Bloomberg, January 29, 2015. http://www. ado/. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-29/peru-to-have-room- 18 “Cómo murió ‘William’,” IDL Reporteros, to-cut-rate-as-inflation-slows-velarde-says. September 6, 2012. https://idl-reporteros.pe/como-murio- 6 For a good exposition of the interdependent william/. nature of the terrorism, narcotrafficking, informality, 19 “Tras muerte de ‘Alipio’ y ‘Gabriel’: ¿Qué and underdevelopment challenges in Peru, see otros cabecillas tiene Sendero?” El Comercio, August Leonardo Jóse Longa López, Narcoterrorismo en el Perú, 12, 2013. http://elcomercio.pe/peru/lima/muerte-alipio-yga- Lima: Impresión Creativos Perú, 2014. briel-que-otros-cabecillas-tiene-sendero-noticia-1616591. 7 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final 20 Reportedly the Peruvian military has suffered Report, August 28, 2003. http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ significant casualties on virtually every occasion in ifinal/index.php. which it has launched operations in the zone, such as 8 Abraham Lima, “PERU: Sendero Luminoso those by its high mountain battalions. Guerrillas Stage a Comeback,” Inter Press Service, July 21 “’Movadef es la fachada electoral de Sendero 3, 2003. http://www.ipsnews.net/2003/07/peru-sendero- Luminoso’, advirtió el JNE,” Peru21, January 28, 2015. luminoso-guerrillas-stage-a-comeback/. http://peru21.pe/politica/modavef-fachada-electoral-sendero- 9 “Estado de sitio en Per por el ataque de luminoso-advirtio-jne-2210536. Sendero Luminoso,” Perú Noticias, December 22, 22 John C.K. Daily, “Peru’s Shining Path in 2005. http://perunoticias.net/22-12-2005/estado-sitio-en-por- Decline as Its MOVADEF Political Arm Broadens ataque-sendero-luminoso. Appeal,” The Jamestown Foundation, May 15, 2014. 10 Longa, 31. See also Gustavo Gorriti, “La http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ estrategia del sueño,” IDL Reporteros, June 14, 2012. ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42368&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D= https://idl-reporteros.pe/columna-de-reporteros-83/. 26&cHash=84d5655d2aa215d28a3c516242fd5e7a#. 11 In October 2012, Sendero Luminoso destroyed VR1pFU1021s. three helicopters in Cusco belonging to Camisea 23 The Peruvian police and armed forces are oilfield contractors Helisur and Los Andes, allegedly currently working to counter such perceptions for not having paid protection money to the through both national-level propaganda and their organization. See “Helicopters face high risk of attack

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own outreach campaign in the nation’s universities causing the death of a mother and her seven-month and secondary schools. old child. 24 By one estimate, 90% of the economy of the 33 Indeed, its attempt to move from its VRAEM is “illegal and informal.” Longa, 38. stronghold in Vizcatán to establish a presence in the 25 A leading example is the extraction of gold in province of Concepcion in 2012 was motivated, in the Madre de Dios region. See “La minería ilegal en part, by interest in dominating a new overland Madre de Dios tiene los días contados, asegura Daniel smuggling route from the VRAEM through Madre de Urresti,” La Republica, April 16, 2014. http://www. Dios. larepublica.pe/16-04-2014/la-mineria-ilegal-en-madre-de-dios- 34 See, for example, “VRAEM: Ataque terrorista a tiene-los-dias-contados-asegura-daniel-urresti. base temporal deja un militar herido,” Peru.com. 26 As of the end of 2014, approximately 200 November 18, 2014. http://peru.com/actualidad/nacionales/ Mexicans were imprisoned in Peruvian jails, mostly vraem-ataque-terrorista-base-temporal-deja-militar-herido-noti- on narcotrafficking charges, the highest number for cia-301927. any nationality. Ana Lescano and Héctor Jara, “Droga 35 In many cases, the properties and businesses a la mexicana,” Correo Seminal, October 10, 2014. used to launder the illicitly-gotten gains are located in http://correosemanal.pe/del-impreso/droga-a-la-mexicana/. the same zone as the operations of the family clans, 27 It is estimated that Peru’s drug trade is which in combination with government infrastructure organized by approximately 40 “family clans.” See and business promotion programs, has helped to Kyra Gurney, “Peru Dismantles Major Precursor create a net urbanization of the VRAEM in recent Chemical Trafficking Group,” Insight Crime, years. November 4, 2014. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/ 36 In Pichari, a city of approximately 3,000 peru-dismantles-major-precursor-chemical-trafficking-group. persons, for example, 27 credit cooperatives exist. 28 While Sendero Luminoso reportedly accepts Moreover, so long as such organizations do not take payment from farmers in coca leaves, and has or lend money to persons outside of their own operated a small number of its own sites for organization, they are not subject to the nation’s transforming the coca leaf into intermediate products, mainstream banking regulations and associated there is little evidence to suggest that members of the oversight. group are directly engaged in either growing coca or 37 Marguerite Cawley, “Peru Elects Suspected producing cocaine on a significant scale. Drug Traffickers as Governors,” Insight Crime, October 29 See, for example, Esteban Valle Riestra and 8, 2014. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/6088-peru- Nancy Vidal, “’Ahorita nos erradican, mañana ¿qué elects-suspected-drug-trafficker-governors. In addition, the comemos?’” IDL Reporteros, February 2, 2013. https:// head of the region of Cajamarca, Gregorio Santos, idl-reporteros.pe/%e2%80%9cahorita-nos-erradican-manana- was actually re-elected in that contest, while in %c2%bfque-comemos%e2%80%9d/. prison. Such corruption is believed to be principally 30 The Peruvian government estimated that a driven by the familial clans, funded in part by outside quarter of the airstrips destroyed by the government criminal organizations, rather than involving Sendero in 2014 had been rebuilt--a process requiring less Luminoso. than 24 hours. See David Gagne, “24-Hour 38 Ana Lescano and Carlos Navea, “Fuerzas Turnaround to Rebuild Peru’s Narco-Airstrips,” Insight Armadas inician lucha contra inseguridad ciu- Crime, October 14, 2014. http://www.insightcrime.org/ dadana,” Correo Semanal, November 23, 2014. http:// news-briefs/6112-peru-vraem-narco-airstrips-rebuilt. See also correosemanal.pe/actualidad/fuerzas-armadas-inician-lucha- “Interdicción de ‘narcovuelos’ en el VRAE” IDL contra-inseguridad-ciudadana/. Reporteros, December 17, 2013, https://idl-reporteros.pe/ 39 See Longa, 62-68. interdiccion-de-%e2%80%98narcovuelos%e2%80%99-en-el- 40 Recently, however, the Peruvian government vrae/. has acquired 24 new Russian transport helicopters, 31 “Peru declares no-fly zone in its most lawless primarily destined to replace the aging helicopter fleet coca-growing region,” Reuters, February 4, 2015. http:// currently operating in the region. www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/04/us-peru-drugs-idUSKBN- 41 David Gagne, “Peru’s Coca Substitution 0L82MU20150204. Program Stalls Before it Starts,” Insight Crime, March 32 Peru ceased the program in 2001 following 3, 2015. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/peru-coca- the accidental downing of a plane carrying U.S. substitution-program-not-working. Baptist missionaries over the jungle near Iquitos,

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42 Gustavo Gorriti, “Un cambio abrupto de estrategia antidrogas,” IDL Reporteros, May 28, 2014. https://idl-reporteros.pe/un-cambio-abrupto-de-estrategia- antidrogas/. 43 The legislation was proposed law 2891. 44 The full name of the committee is the “Comisión de Defensa Nacional, Orden Interno, Desarrollo Alternativo y Lucha Contra las Drogas.” 45 “Perú anuncia compra de radares para controlar aviones narcos” El Universo, May 22, 2014. http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2014/05/22/nota/2997681/ peru-anuncia-compra-radares-controlar-aviones- narcos?source=mod-ult-not. 46 See Gustavo Gorriti, “De la paciencia a la negligencia,” IDL Reporteros, June 26, 2014. https:// idl-reporteros.pe/de-la-paciencia-a-la-negligencia/. 47 “Nuevas autoridades regionales y municipales asumieron hoy sus cargos” Andina, January 1, 2015. http://www.andina.com.pe/agencia/noticia-nuevas-autoridades- regionales-y-municipales-asumieron-hoy-sus-cargos-537695. aspx. 48 From a conversation with a colleague in Lima, Peru, March 2015.

PRISM 5, no. 4 FEATURES | 205 An Interview with General John Kelly

At a recent meeting of the Organization of the American States, Secretary of State Kerry stated, “The era of the Monroe Doctrine is over.” What’s the replacement?

Gen. Kelly: The first thing is that the Latin Americans have put the Monroe Doctrine so far behind them they think it’s unusual when we bring it up. The replacement is partnership. In the two years I have been in this job, the buzzwords or buzzphrase that I use that gets a very positive reception is not only “partners,” but “equal partners.” Our partnership with these countries is not just in the military realm, I have very close relationships with many of the Ministers of Defense, but with the Presidents as well. We don’t lecture them, we don’t tell them what to do; by example they see what equal partnership is all about. So I would say that it’s partnership that has replaced the previous doctrine.

Are our declining resources directed towards South America reducing our influence there and making the partnership less important to them than it is to us?

Gen. Kelly: I wouldn’t say it’s declining; we haven’t paid much security attention to the region for 15 years. So we’re at a normal steady state; almost no resources, with the exception of Colombia – and that’s a minimal investment really – but almost no real resources for 15 years. They want to partner with us, they like the partnership, they want to be our friends for the most part. There are some countries that are not interested in a U.S. partnership and that is their loss. But others are confused because we don’t really seem to care about them very much, while the Chinese are heavily investing in the region, albeit primarily economically. Our trade is very robust with this part of the world, and so is the Chinese. The Chinese tend to “invest and take:” the Latin Americans resent that to some extent. The Chinese will come in and invest in a copper mine and mine it dry. There’s trade and there’s mutual benefit, but they wish the Chinese were a little bit This interview was conducted by Mr. Michael Miklaucic, the editor of PRISM, and took place October 31, 2014.

206 | INTERVIEW PRISM 5, no. 4 more interested in long-term investment as What do you see as the most threatening opposed to “invest and take.” possibilities that we face in the Western Hemisphere? So the Chinese offer investment without partnership? Gen. Kelly: The least likely, but most concerning to me is the threat to the U.S. coming Gen. Kelly: Correct. That doesn’t make through the illicit networks in this part of the them unwelcome, believe me. The Russians world, that are so firmly established. For two are more interested in selling military equip- years now I’ve been asked in hearings about ment, which everyone in this part of the world what gets into the United States through this acknowledges is really substandard compared illicit network. These are international crimi- to the U.S. equipment. They’re also very internal networks – everything gets in. Hundreds ested in promoting the perception of the U.S. and hundreds of tons of illicit narcotics. as a pushy hegemon and a nation in decline. Relatively small amounts are taken out of the One of the interesting things about the flow by our border controls. Tens of thousands Chinese is that they have now started to engage of sex workers, in many cases adolescents, more and more with the regional militaries. come into the United States every year through While some people in Washington say, “We’re these networks to serve the sex industry. I just as engaged as we always were,” there are spoke at a human rights conference at the certainly others in the part of the world that I University of South Florida, in Tampa. The talk to that see us as not very committed. audience was shocked when I talked about sex workers, but they were even more shocked to learn of the thousands of forced laborers that Are we sending the right messages in this are brought in and are working in Florida in hemisphere? For example in the Quadrennial the agricultural industry. Anything can travel Defense Review, there is very little on this network; I’ve been asked two years in a acknowledgment of security concerns in this row now, “Could someone come in with a hemisphere. weapon of mass destruction, biological weapon travel on this network?” Of course! Gen. Kelly: The message is very bad, and Last year, this network carried 68,000 children as I’ve said, they want to be our equal partners. into the United States. We are dealing with a They don’t require much commitment, but very efficient network, which worries me. It is they need some love. But decisions are made unlikely that a dirty bomb, right now, could in Washington that I wouldn’t even suggest to travel into the U.S. through this network criticize; I just do the best I can to try to make because Special Operations Command, the people understand. It’s interesting many of CIA, the FBI and others are deployed around these countries look at SOUTHCOM in Miami the world preventing these things from hap- as their close friend because we engage with pening. Over time, however, we need to be them a lot and more than Washington does. wary of the fact that this is an incredibly efficient network, it has starting points around the world and comes here, everything travels on it,

PRISM 5, no. 4 INTERVIEW | 207 and all you have to do is be able to pay the Do you see any possibility of some of fare. these states actually failing? We talk about The other issue in this part of the world is failed states and we are often thinking about an increasing tendency in some countries away Africa or Central Asia or places like that; is from democracy. It’s fascinating that there are there any possibility of state failure in the strong democratic institutions in many coun- Western Hemisphere? tries, such as Brazil and Chile, while others are going in the other direction, moving away Gen. Kelly: Any country that is curtailing from human rights, moving away from a free democracy, free press, and other civil liberties, press, moving away from gender rights, and in my mind, is by definition failing, and is on certainly moving away from democracy. a road to destruction or total failure. However, there are other states, and I applaud places like On that specific point, how would you Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, that assess the threat to the U.S. posed by the are suffering terribly from the effects of drug emergence of what seems to be an alignment trafficking networks fueled by drug demand of anti-American states that some refer to as from the United States. They are imperfect the Bolivarian Alliance? democracies, but they are also trying to address some of the long-standing obstacles to eco- Gen. Kelly: My view is that if they are all nomic and political progress. Virtually all of functioning democracies – as we understand it the cocaine that comes to the United States with a functioning free press, with functioning originates in Latin America. The countries I human rights protections, with militaries sub- just mentioned in Central America are doing ordinate to civilian control – they have every their best to stem the flow. Virtually all the right to go in any direction they want and heroin consumed in the United States is now choose their alliances. I certainly would like to grown and produced in Mexico or Colombia. be their partners, but if they so choose to go in Roughly 87 percent now of the methamphet- another direction that’s their business. amines consumed in the United States are pro- However, I fear that many of these countries’ duced in Central America or Mexico. All of this political elites are turning their backs on drug production feeds the American drug democracy and adjusting constitutions so they habit, and the massive, illicit drug revenues are can do what they’re not supposed to do. My then are used by criminal networks to buy off concern is not for our security interests neces- or murder police and judges, and allow for sarily, but for the interests of the people who million dollar bounties to be put on a number live in those countries—all of whom have of national leaders in Central America. These shown a strong interest in democracy. Another small countries are suffering terribly because threat comes from the massive corruption in of U.S. drug consumption. The risk of failure many of these countries that you’ve men- is not the result of anti-democratic behavior, tioned. They’re stealing the people blind, tak- on the contrary, these countries are committed ing their democracy away, taking their free to addressing past human rights violations; press away, and taking their human rights but they might fail because of the massive away; it’s very disturbing.

208 | INTERVIEW PRISM 5, no. 4 amounts of crime and violence generated, to a improve the police forces of nearly every coun- large degree, by U.S. drug consumption. try in the region. Ask yourself, “do we have programs, in the sense of what they’re trying What can they do to counter that and to accomplish?” The answer is “yes.” But you how can we help them? have to ask yourself, “have the police gotten better, are they the same, or are they worse?” Gen. Kelly: We have to build partnerships And in every case you have to say “They’re with these countries, and continue helping worse.” In my culture you don’t wait 10 years them consolidate their democratic gains. to say “Boy, it hasn’t worked out very well.” Many of them have very bad human rights You step back from that, and if you’re not records from 20-25 years ago. Nearly every reaching your metrics for success, then you time I travel to a country, I meet with local change or adjust your program. There are a lot human rights groups; in virtually every country of programs out there, but none of them really I visit, they give the military the highest marks. reinforce or touch each other. As a rule, after the Catholic Church, the military is the most admired, respected institution Is that a result of lack of coordination in the country. The police are often at the bot- among agencies providing that support or is it tom of the pile. In most cases, these countries lack of coordination among the host country have no options but to use their military on nationals? the streets; it’s worth noting that generally, the people like to see the military on the streets Gen. Kelly: It’s a lack of coordination because the police are so ineffective or corrupt. among the agencies, as well as within the agen- In the United States we have a tradition of not cies. One of the presidents of a Central using the military on the streets, though we’ve American country vented his frustration to me done it in the past. I’ve done it twice in my one day saying “You know, I just read that career. We’ve done it when we think we need America ‘has put X millions of dollars into my it, when we’re in extremis. I experienced it in country in 10 years,’ and all of that money is Washington, D.C. in 1971 as a young enlisted wasted because the economy is worse than it Marine, and in Los Angeles when I was a bat- ever was, the security is down, the violence is talion commander in the 1990s, during the up, I’m being blamed for wasting that money, Rodney King Riots. my country is being blamed for wasting the But the United States in general doesn’t money; but they never asked us what programs like to use the military on the streets and since we thought should be funded, nor did they we don’t like it, we tend to criticize others for ever give me the money to spend.” At the end doing it. To answer your question, we need to of 10 years of spending on programs, the help them improve their police. We spend a lot police are worse, the economy is worse, their of money and have a lot of good programs, legal/justice system doesn’t function well, lead- but they don’t touch, they don’t reinforce each ing some people to say “well, this country other; consequently, an awful lot of money is wasted the money.” I was in a human rights spent without the intended results. Over the roundtable in El Salvador five weeks ago where past ten years, we’ve spent money trying to I was told “we appreciate all the things you

PRISM 5, no. 4 INTERVIEW | 209 Americans do for us, but they’re all ‘make you Gen. Kelly: How long have we had the feel good projects;’ you don’t ask us what we CARSI Program? Six years? And what was it think we need.” We were talking at the time supposed to accomplish? Reduce violence? about children at risk. We have a children at With regards to all of the things CARSI was risk program that we’ve been funding for 10 designed to do, as I understand CARSI, things years; by its nature it is a good program. The are not only worse, but they’re geometrically goal is to not have kids joining the gangs, worse. I think you go back to evaluating every which is a horrific problem in all of the coun- program every step along the way; and within tries in Central America, but particularly El the program everything has got to touch. With Salvador. Still, this program ended when the a program like CARSI you have to ask yourself, kids were 12, 13, 14 years old. Unfortunately, not six years later, but six months after you put that’s the point at which kids go into the it in place, “what are the indicators of success gangs; they don’t go into the gangs at 5, 6, 10, or failure?” If CARSI was supposed to get at 11, 12 years old. You have this great at risk pro- violence and rule of law and safe streets and gram that isn’t effective because the age-group citizen security, ask yourself, “has that gotten that you’re focusing on with this particular any better in Central America?” And the program doesn’t go into gangs; but as soon as answer is that things are geometrically worse. they hit 13 or 14, they’re at risk of joining In my opinion, CARSI has to be adjusted, gangs. which is what the U.S. is doing with the new Strategy for Central America. The administra- And that’s when the program ends? tion has asked for a billion dollars to promote better governance and promote economic Gen. Kelly: And that’s when the program development. Without progress in these areas, ends. The point was that there ought to be it will be impossible to make sustained prog- another program to get the kids into voca- ress on the security front. tional school so they learn how to be electri- cians, or brick masons, or beauticians. You One of the successes in your region, have to have programs that reinforce each Colombia, is now considered widely a great other and “touch,” as I say. We have this great success, but here’s another side to it. A program, which makes us feel good because it European politician asked me “Why is it you addresses children at risk, but it’s really a waste Americans consider Colombia such a great of time because kids that age don’t go into success when there’s still the same amount of gangs. cocaine coming into the United States, you still have very profound Colombian One of the flagship programs that we involvement in narcotics trafficking… What’s have in Central America is the CARSI the big success?” How should I have answered (Central America Regional Security Initiative) that question? Program, but there’s growing frustration with its results. How would you assess the CARSI Gen. Kelly: You start with, “cocaine is our Program at this point? problem.” If Americans didn’t want to do a little blow on weekends, then Colombia

210 | INTERVIEW PRISM 5, no. 4 wouldn’t be suffering and Central America democratic, it has a free press, it is dealing with wouldn’t be suffering the way they are. some of the past human rights problems, the Cocaine is our problem. But if you look at military has been transformed, and the tax sys- everything in Colombia from rule of law, to tem has been transformed. They want to be freedom of the press, professionalization of our best partners in the region, they’re think- the military, human-rights protections, and ing beyond FARC now, and we’re working with civilian oversight of the military, then them to envision what their military should Colombia is a success. If you want to focus on look like after the FARC. Not a small, but a cocaine, then you need to acknowledge that in modest military. Because of what they’ve been 2014 Colombians affected -68,000 hectares of through they want to share those experiences coca before it was harvested: that is cocaine and help other people. With the Colombia not produced. That same year they intercepted Action Plan, they’re in a number of Latin 166 tons of finished cocaine before it left American and Caribbean countries teaching Colombia: that is cocaine that didn’t get to that everything begins and ends with human America. The Colombian military destroyed rights. That is one demand I always put down; 2600 jungle labs that turn coca into cocaine: it’s what we do here in SOUTHCOM: every that’s cocaine that was never produced. The conversation begins and ends with human FARC, whom they’ve been fighting for 50 rights, so the Colombians carry that with years, have an acceptance level inside them. They’re also teaching others how to how Colombia near two percent, and they’ve been to conduct counter drug operations, legally pushed to the outer parts of Colombia. I travel and effectively. They’re in a lot of places, they in Colombia quite a bit, and I visited one of play by the same rules as if they were U.S. the reintegration sites that the Colombian gov- forces, and they’re doing a great job. That is the ernment runs. It was full of young people, all success of Colombia. of whom have been in the FARC. The FARC would claim they are recruits into the FARC, Sounds like a paradigm for the but they weren’t; they were kidnapped from partnership approach that you were describing the villages into the FARC when they were as the replacement for the Monroe Doctrine. young – 11, 12, or 13 years old. Now, they’re Going back to the question of illicit networks, being reintegrated back into society and doing there has been discussion about the a great job. We spent the day there listening to convergence of different kinds of illicit their stories. Some had just come out of the networks: terrorists, insurgents, and traffickers jungle. I would answer the European politician of various kinds. Do you see any evidence of by saying “cocaine is our problem. If we that in your area of responsibility? weren’t consuming it, the Colombians wouldn’t be producing it.” The Colombians Gen. Kelly: I do though much of it is clas- used to be the number one producer of sified. There are two ways to look at it. When cocaine in the world; now it’s the number the narcotics traffickers touch worldwide ter- three, behind Peru (number one), and Bolivia rorism, to me that’s a convergence or a nexus. (number two). That’s how I would answer the We know that there are international terrorist question. The country is strong, it’s organizations making vast amounts of money

PRISM 5, no. 4 INTERVIEW | 211 laundering drug proceeds that come out of the network. I was in Costa Rica at a conference United States. The traffickers and cartels’ prob- when a member of the country team saw four, lem is not getting drugs into the United States, five, or six black gentlemen that were speaking their biggest problem is laundering the $85 English, but were obviously not Costa Rican, billion or so that comes from global cocaine on their way through to the border position in sales every year. That’s their problem: launder- Nicaragua. A member of the American ing money. There are terrorist organizations Embassy went over and asked “Who are you and other organizations that have close ties to guys?” They responded, “We’re from Liberia. terrorist organizations that do a lot of the We were there a week ago and we’re on our money laundering. This isn’t just in the Tri- way to New York City.” I’m sure they were great Border region where Paraguay meets Argentina guys going up to start a new life for them- and Brazil. A fair number of Middle Easterners selves. But remember, they were in Liberia a that live there have direct links to banks over- week ago, where Ebola is a big problem, so it’s seas and there’s a lot of money laundering that still only two weeks… There’s a lot of potential goes on there. In fact, the President of for things to move along these networks. I Paraguay is most interested in help to address- shouldn’t have to work hard to convince some- ing money laundering. Since that’s the work of one that there is an attack being planned by a the FBI and Treasury, we alerted them; the terrorist organization and supported logisti- President of Paraguay wants to get his arms cally and philosophically by the cartels. I’m around money laundering because he knows paid to worry about things like that. In that it’s not only detrimental to his country, Martinique a few months ago, I was talking to but that it goes into the coffers of terrorist the French regional coordinator of the French organizations. That’s a convergence or a nexus. version of the Drug Enforcement Agency There are people that push back on that and (DEA). They see a huge amount of cocaine say “when you tell me that the Sinaloa Cartel going to the west coast and they know that the is funding the transportation costs of five guys al-Qaeda affiliates make a great deal of money from ISIS to get into the region then smuggle letting that cocaine flow up through Mali, and them up into the United States, hand them a the Maghreb and into western Europe. Is that dirty bomb, and let them set off the dirty a convergence or nexus of terrorism and drugs? bomb in an American city, detonate the bomb I would argue it is, and the French certainly see and then run for it, I’ll believe there’s a con- it that way nection.” But my belief is if they’re “touching,” this is convergence. Some people will say, the Is there anything that you in your cartels will never allow that to happen because position can do to counter that phenomenon, so much pressure would be brought to bear if the phenomenon of the convergence and the they allowed a terrorist organization to get in. connectivity between Latin American and And maybe that’s true. But many of these net- Africa and Europe? work people don’t check IDs, they don’t check passports, and they don’t check what’s in your bag. They’re paid to move products, not ask Gen. Kelly: I think the first step is to be questions. It’s very easy to move along this vocal about it and we’ve done that. I, Chuck

212 | INTERVIEW PRISM 5, no. 4 Jacoby, of Northern Command, and Bill and others are doing outstanding work in sup- McRaven from SOCOM have been very vocal porting international peacekeeping and stabi- about this and people have begun to recognize lization missions around the world. For one it as a threat. And again, I’m not suggesting terrific example: Colombia is exporting its that there are now conspiracies to move terror- security expertise, providing training in Central ists along the cartel networks into the United America and Mexico, and its navy is exploring States, but the potential is there. If you’re look- the possibility of supporting anti-piracy efforts ing for terrorism and narcoterrorism or drug off the coast of Africa. trafficking touching we see it right now in Finally, I think it’s worth noting that if we money laundering that is funding a great deal want to maintain our partnerships in this of international terrorism. hemisphere, we must remain engaged with this hemisphere. We’re managing to keep the Finally, what do you think the future “pilot light” of regional engagement on—but holds for U.S. defense cooperation with the just barely, and sequestration will completely region? extinguish that light. Why should we make such an effort to remain engaged, especially Gen Kelly: While our focus right now is given the growing list of global challenges fac- on Central America, we can’t lose sight of the ing the United States? For the simple reason opportunities and challenges in the region as that a strong, secure, and prosperous Latin a whole. Many countries are understandably America is in all our interests. After all, the concerned about the second and third order United States and our partners worked hard to effects that will inevitably come with improve- ensure the Western Hemisphere is a beacon of ments in security in places like Honduras and freedom, democracy, and peace. In the face of Guatemala. We need to make sure that the the corrosive spread of criminal networks and successes we have in the Northern Triangle other challenges, we must all work even harder don’t come at the expense of the rest of Central to ensure it remains that way. This, in my America…or the Caribbean and South view, is what the future of U.S. defense coop- America. eration is all about. PRISM There are tremendous opportunities to partner on issues like cyber security, disaster response, mass migration, and of course on persistent challenges like violent extremism and illicit trafficking. In the majority of these missions, the U.S. military will be working side by side with our interagency partners, especially the courageous men and women of DHS, DEA, the FBI, the Treasury Department, and the CIA. I also believe our cooperation won’t just be in Latin America, but beyond… Brazil, along with Colombia, El Salvador, Uruguay,

PRISM 5, no. 4 INTERVIEW | 213 The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China

How will China use its increasing military capabilities in the future? China faces a complicated security environment with a wide range of internal and external threats. Rapidly expanding international interests are creating demands for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to conduct new missions ranging from protecting Chinese shipping from Somali pirates to evacuating citizens from Libya. The most recent Chinese defense white paper states that the armed forces must “make serious prepa- rations to cope with the most complex and difficult scenarios . . . so as to ensure proper responses . . . at any time and under any circumstances.”

Based on a conference co-sponsored by Taiwan’s Council of Advanced Policy Studies, RAND, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and National Defense University, The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China brings together leading experts from the United States and Taiwan to examine how the PLA prepares for a range of domestic, border, and maritime contingencies.

Book available from NDU Press at: http://ndupress.ndu.edu

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